IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION

JOINT HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION

AND THE

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

100-7

Part III

JULY 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, AND 14, 1987

APPENDIXES TO PARTS I AND II

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APPENDIX A: EXHIBITS

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ACCIPIENT RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN BEIRUT

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Background. In June 1985, private American and Israeli citizens commenced an operation to effect the release of the American commenced an operation to extent the release or the American hostages in Beirut in exchange for providing certain factions in Iran with U.S.-origin Israeli military material. By September, U.S. and Israeli Government officials became involved in this endeavor in order to ensure that the USG would:

- not object to the Israeli transfer of embargoed material to ITAN:
- sell replacement items to Israel as replenishment for like items sold to Iran by Israel.

On September 2, the Israeli Government, with the endorsement of the USG, transferred 508 basic TOW missiles to Iran. Forty-eigh-hours later, Reverend Benjamin Weir was released in Beirut. Forty-eight

Subsequent efforts by both governments to continue this process have met with frustration due to the need to communicate our intentions through an Iranian expatriate arms dealer in Europe. In January 1986, under the provisions of a new Covert Action Finding, the USG demanded a meeting with responsible Iranian government officials.

On February 20, a U.S. Government official met with

the first direct U.S.-Iranian contact in over five years. the first direct U.S.-Iranian contact in over five years. At this meeting, the U.S. side made an effort to refocus Iranian attention on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need to establish a longer term lelationship between our two countries based on more than arms transactions. It was emphasized that the hostage issue was a "hurdle" which must be crossed before this improved relationship could prosper. During the meeting, it also became apparent that our conditions/demands had not been accurately transmitted to the Iranian Government by the intermediary and it was agreed that:

- The USG would establish its good faith and bona fides by immediately providing 1,000 TOM missiles for sale to Iran. This transaction was covertly completed om February 21, using a private U.S. firm and the Israelis as intermediaties.
- A subsequent meeting would be held in Iran with senior U.S and Iranian officials during which the U.S. hostages would be released.
- Immediately after the hostages were safely in our hands, the U.S. would sell an additional 3,000 TOW missiles to Iran using the same procedures employed during the September 1985 transfer.

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In early March, the Iranian expatriate intermediary demanded that Iranian conditions for release of the hostages now included the prior sale of 200 PHOENIX missiles and an unspecified number of HARPOON missiles, in addition to the 3,000 Tows which would be delivered after the hostages were released. A subsequent meeting was held with the intermediary in Paris on March 8, wherein it was explained that the requirement for prior deliveries violated the understandings reached in Frankfurt on February 20, and were therefore unacceptable. It was further noted that the Iranian aircraft and ship launchers for these missiles were in such disrepair that the missiles could not be launched even if provided.

From March 9 until March 30, there was no further effort undertaken on our behalf to contact the Iranian Government or the intermediary. On March 26, asked which we had established for this purpose. The asked why we had not been in contact and urged that we proceed expeditiously since the situation in Service was deteriorating rapidly. He was informed by our Farsi-speaking interprater that the conditions requiring additional materiel beyond the 3,000 Tows were unacceptable and that we could in no case provide anything else prior to the release of our hostages. The observed that we were correct in our assessment of their inability to use PHOZNIX and EARPOON missiles and that the most urgent requirement that Iran had was to place their current HAWK missile inventory in working condition. In a subsequent phone call, we agreed to discuss this matter with him and he indicated that he would prepase as inventors of parts a missed to aske their HAWK systems persional.

Current Situation. On April 3, Ari Gorbanifahr, the Iranian intermediary, arrived in Washington, D.C. with instructions from to consummate final arrangements for the return of the nostages. Gorbanifahr was reportedly enfranchised to negotiate the types, quantities, and delivery procedures for material the U.S. would sell account to the process of th

A Parsi-speaking CIA officer in attendance was able to verify the substance of his calls to Tehran during the meeting. Expess to Presidential approval, it was agreed to preceed as follows:

-- By Monday, April 7, the Iranian Government will transfer \$17 million to an Israeli accounts in Switzerland. The Israelis will, in turn, transfer the private U.F. corporation account in Switzerland the sum of \$15 million.

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- On Tuesday, April 8 (or as soon as the transactions are verified), the private U.S. corporation will transfer f3.65; million to a CIA account in Switzerland. CIA will then transfer this sum to a covert Department, of the Army account in the U.S.
- -- On Wednesday, April 9, the CIA will commence procuring \$3.65; million worth of EAMK missile parts (240 separate line items) and transferring these parts to This process is estimated to take seven working-days.
 - On Friday, April 18, a private U.S. arroraft (707B) will pick-up the RAMK missile parts at the land fly them to a covert Isgaeli airfield for prepositioning (this field was used for the arrivery of the 1000 TOMs). At this field, the parts will be transferred to an Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) aircraft with false markings. A SATCOM capability will be positioned at this location.
- -- On Saturday, April 19, McFarlane, North, Teicher, Cave, and a SATCOM communicator will board a CII. aircraft in Frankfurt, Germany, enrouse to Tehran.
 - -- On Sunday, April 20, the following series of events will occur:
 - U.S. parey arrives Tehran (A-hour) -- met by Rafsanjani, as head of the Iranian delegation.
 - At A+7 hours, the U.S. hostages will be released in Beirut.
 - At A+15 hours, the IDF aircraft with the HAWK missile parts absend will land at Bandar Abbas, Iran.

<u>Discussion</u>. The following points are relevant to this transaction, the discussions in Iran, and the establishment of a broader relationship between the United States and Iran:

The Iranians have been told that our presence in Iran is a "holy commitment" on the part of the USG that we are sincere and can be trusted. There is great distrust of the U.S. among the various Iranian parties involved. Without our presence on the ground in Iran, they will not believe that we will fulfill our end of the bargain after the hostages are released.

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Qhadharri's erforts to "buy" the hostages could succeed in the near future. Further, the Iranians are well aware that the situation in Beirut is deteriorating rapidly and that the ability of the IRGC to effect the release of the hostages will become increasingly more difficult over time.

-- We have convinced the Tranians of a significant near term and long range threat from the Soviet Union. We have real and deceptive intelligence to demonstrate this threat during the visit. They have expressed considerable interest in this matter as part of the longer term relationship.

The Iranians have been told that their provision of

assistance to Nicaragua is unacceptable to us and they have

agreed to discuss this matter in Tehran.

-- We have further indicated to the Iranians that we wish to discuss steps leading to a cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq.

The Iranians are well aware that their most immediate needs are for technical assistance in maintaining their air force and navy. We should expect that they will raise this issue during the discussions in Tehran. Further conversation with Gorbanifahr on April 4, indicates that they will want to raise the matter of the original 3,000 Tows as a significant deterrent to a potential Soviet move against Iran. They have also suggested that, if agreement is reached to provide the TOWS.

The Iranians have been told and agreed that they will receive neither blame nor credit for the seizure/release of the hostages.

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- -- The Residual funds from this transaction are allocated as follows:
 - \$2 million will be used to purchase replacement TOWs for the original 508 sold by Israel to Iran for the release of Benjamin Weir. This is the only way that we have found to meet our commitment to replenish these stocks.
 - \$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Micaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces. This materiel is essential to cover shortages in resistance inventories resulting from their current offensives and Sandinista counter-attacks and to "bridge" the period between now and when Congressionally-approved lethal assistance (beyond the \$25 million in "defensive" arms) can be delivered.

The ultimate objective in the trip to Tehran is to commence the process of improving U.S.-Iranian relations. Both sides are aware that the Iran-Iraq War is a major factor that must be discussed. We should not, however, view this meeting as a session which will result in immediate Iranian agreement to proceed with a settlement with Iraq. Rather, this meeting, the first high-level U.S.-Iranian contact in five years, should be seen as a chance to make in this arrestorm. These discussions, as well as follow-on talks, should be governed by the Terms of Reference (TOR) (Tab A) with the recognition that this is, hopefully, the first of many meetings and that the hostage issue, once behind us, improves the opportunities for this relationship.

RECONSLEMBATION

That the Fresident approve the structure depicted above under "Current Situation" and the Terms of Reference at Tab A.

Approve	Disapprove	
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Attachment
Tab A - U.S.-Iranian Terms of Reference

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- BASIC FILLARS OF U.S. POREIGN POLICY (OPELONAL)
- -- President Reagan came into office at a time when Iran had had a certain impact on the American political process -- perhaps not what you intended.
- -- The President represented and embodied America's recovery from a period of weakness. He has rebuilt American military and economic strength.
- -- Most important, he has restored imerican will and self-confidence. The U.S. is now afraid to use its power in defense of its interests. We are not intimidated by Soviet pressures, whether on arms control or Angola or Central America or Afghanistan.
- -- At the same time, we are prepared to resolve political, problems on the basis of reciprocity.
- -- We see many international trends -- economic, technological, and political -- working in our favor.

II. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: BASIC PRINCIPLES


- A. U.S. Assessment of Iranian Policy.
- We view the Iranian revolution as a fact. The U.S. 18 not trying to turn the clock back.
- Our present attitude to Iran is not a product of prejudice or emotion, but a clear-eyed assessment of Iran's present policies.
 - Iran has used "revolutionary Islan" as a veapon to undermise prompted average and American this continue this continue the continue this continue the continue that are continued to the continued to t
 - Support of terrorism and hostage-taking is part of this etrategic pattern. We see it used not only against us, but against our friends. We cannot accept either. Your influence in achieving the release of all hostages, return of those killed (over time) is essential.

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- We see your activity in many parts of the world, rincluding even Central America.
- The U.S. knows how Iran views the Soviet Union. But subversion of Western interests and friends objectively serves Soviet interests on a global scale.
- Thus, our assessment is that a decisive Iranian victory in the war with Iraq would only unleash greater regional instability, a further erosion of the Western position, and enhanced opportunities for Soviet trouble-making.
- The U.S. will therefore do what it can to prevent such a development. We regard the war as dangerous in many respects and would like to see an end to it.
- B. Possible Intersections of U.S.-Iranian Interests.
- Despite fundamental conflicts, we perceive several possible intersections of U.S. and Iranian interests.
 I propose we explore these areas.
- First, the U.S. has had a traditional interest in seeing Iran preserve its territorial integrity and independence. This has not changed. The U.S. opposes some designations.
- Second, we have no interest in a lraqu victory over lran.

We are seeking an end to this conflict and want to use an improved relationship with Iran to further that end.

Third, we have parallel views on Afghanistan. Soviet policy there is maked aggression, a threat to all in the region.

Sut our objective is the same: the Soviets must get out and let the Afghan people choose their own course.

- C. U.S. Objective Today.
- We have no illusions about what is possible in our bilateral relations. Perhaps this meeting will reveal only a limited, momentary, tactical coincidence of interests. Ferhaps more. We are prepared either way.
- In essence, we are prepared to have whatever kind of relationship with Iran that Iran is prepared to have with us.

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III. SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

- Moscow has designs on parts of Iran.
- Afghanistan illustrates the price the Soviets are ready to pay to expand areas under their direct control.
- Summarize Soviet capabilities along border and inside Afghanistan which could threaten Tehran.
- U.S. is aware of Soviet activity
- Soviet plant Working Yould do it.
- Tranian support to Sandinista redime in Micaragua atte and mabets Soviet designs -- makes U.S.-Transan relationship more difficult (\$100 million in oil last year, plus arms).
- U.S. can help Iran cope with Soviet threat.
- AFGRANISTAN **.
- May be real value for Iran and U.S. to find ways to cooperate against Hoscow in Administration.


 U.S. car provide humant lan and the same for refugees
 - We need to know who you work with, what you already provide, and devise strategy to exploit Iranian comparative advantage.
- HARDWARE ٧.
- We may be prepared to resume a limited military supply relationship.
- However, its evolution of ultime cope elli depend whether our convergence of our divergent interests come to loom larger in the overall picture.
- What does Iran want?

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- 1. I talked to Adam this a.m. He quite pessimistic re

 Gorba/ cabal. He know time is nearly over. I agreed to

 transfer 185% to his acct Tuesday to satisfy IAF bill -- there is

 still the matter of about 25% in cash to be resolved. IAF total
 bill is 250% -- a real rip of?.
- 2. Standing by for info on ship procurement, go or no go. I have Tom in the linemans crouch.
- 3. Current obligations over rext few weeks nearly wipe us out except for CDs. Big ticket items are \$22K plus 185K to Adam, D. Walker 110K, S7K to Sat for drop to Blacky, 200K insurance fund, O and A 600K, 100K to defex-balance of 9 Apr 707 shipment. Bottomline is that ship buy plus BP buy can be accomplished only by using CD funds. Ship costs of course can be recovered.
- 4. Now that we have Euc, much more confident and says we should get pricing tomorrow. If you find work, send money.

 Rgds, Dick. BT

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11: 100.00 --C791

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sory Plot: Olives beers

Subject: Asp guesses;

Agre sent a long Peops to Jep ou the excrest state of affairs. It you do not
have it is the acting pis so advise and I will repeat to you if that can be
done e/e the whole world seeing it. Dettes line: earliest we could eate try,
if all west well temocraw is 10 April. This date will slip a day for each
day of delay in sating the requisite deposit for the items requested. I as not
as hopered is wate of Libyan action. Cove believes that there is a significant
laternal debate going as issue on oat they ghould do and we are all
concerned that there may be a chance that could bely the
yet their beads as the other bestayes. Set a jobfd day.

bits got a good secteed. Seat to Coatle to try and coassate our triesds — buts gotts, and resistance that so sublid got leading thre the Coagrass. In the foot gotes I have been vertised this effect, it was the suct depreciate security date. It was the suct depreciate security date, the date, There is great dispair that so say fail to this effect and the resistance support vect. Is derived seen tooks, by thoughts where we can get and so day the security date is a paint back to bis friends she have given by the fair is begun that we can bridge things again, but time is combing out sivey w/ the secay. So far we have seven a/c vecting, have delivered over \$178 to supplies and ordeness but the put is almost copys, flore teld first to

propers to soil the soip first and then the e/c as a sease of sustaining too milert. Where we we effor that is a very big question, one about Subal as justices of hore sever asked big for bely is this regard, believing that he we be inclined to talk about it. It may now be time to take that first, hery thoughts? been regards 6 out love to Josep. (Do satisficthed it was in the Sittle section - ity general?



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TO: NSFH --CPUA

04/22/86 14:1 .

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NOTE FROM: OLIVER MISTER
Subject: Special Mtg: Central America
Fig print 20%;
To: NSWGH --CPUA 04/21,86 16:03 ***

*** Reply to note of 04/21/86 12:57

--WE FROM: OLIVER YOUT Mtg: Special Central America. Will, please pass to Don: This weekend's trip to Honduras and El Salvalin the most depressing venture in my four years of working the Centar assume is gread anxiety that the Congress will not act in time to stave iff defeat for the resistance. This sense exists in the Govts. of Hord Uni Selvador but most alarmingly is now evidenc in the resistance itself of a viable source of resupply has not only affected combat operation beginning to affect the political viability of the CON leaders. Bermudez, in front of the Southern Front commander, El Negro Charmott questioned the need for UNO and the drain of scarce resources to Southern Atlantic and Southern fronts. While he committed to send in 1941 1971 the next few days, he openly admitted in front of that t to come back out in 15-20 days if there is no resupply. As known, it pressing need is for anti-air, but other things are now rurning state. The entire force is back to I meal per day and no more boots, uniforms. ponchos or weapons are available for the new recruits. All new tractions be turned away effective today. All hospitalization for WIAs will cease and of the week. Troops returning to Nicaragua this week will marm and rounds of ammo instead of the 500 they had been carrying. No row will patteries are available so there is no way to pass commands or intelligen-

The picture is, in short, very dismal unless a new source of "bridge" factors an be identified. While we should not raise specific sources with Frequence need to explore this problem urgently or there won't be a force to held when the Congress finally acts. Warm regards, North

P. W.


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1316102 May 86. Abe notified me at 0945L that even though the various banks had exchanged tested telexes on the 10M transfer, the originating bank is not releasing the funds. Adam and I are working the problem. This prevents me from transferring the 6.5% to CIA as agreed yesterday. Will keep you advised. Dick. BT



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


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Copp: 5/13/86 1215

1317002 May 86.

1. Further to my 1316102 May, Abe has cut through most of the problem and has discussed matter with the Director of Credit Suisse himself. Directors says he has the funds, but the remitter has run the funds through so many filters that the pape: work is fouled up. Apparently, the remitter has failed to provide a necessary power of attorney and the remitter is in Vancouver of all places. Telexes to resolve the matter are flying and the Director believes the matter may be resolved tomorrow morning. Meanwhile, there is no sign of teh 5M and no sign of the 1.25M. Adam is advised but Gorba has gone to ground again thus signaling a problem. I new do not think it wise to transfer the 6.5M until we see the remaining 5M. Dick. BT



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Hay 15, 1986

MESTING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (MSPG)

DATE LOCATION: TINE

Friday, May 16, 1986
White House Situation Room
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

FRON:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

I. PURPOSE

To resolve issues on aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces (DRF) and our current posture in the Contadora process.

II. BACKGROUND

The delay in Congressional action on your aid proposal for the DRF, coupled with the ongoing Contadora discussions, are creating expectations and anxieties in the U.S. and in Central America. The resistance itself is increasingly desperate as available supplies are depleted. As of May 1, no further medical supplies or clothing are available. By mid-June the outside support the resistance has received will have been consumed, and no further significant support appears readily available.

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EXHIBIT

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cd Vice President Don Regan

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
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- -- That this country cannot and will not be a party to any agreement which does not assure that implementation of these 21 Points can be fully verified.



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Given the urgency of the situation within the resistance, it is important that we identify measures which can provide some form of immediate assistance. Three options have been developed:

-- An immediate reprogramming of \$15M from DOD to CIA for humanitarian assistance to the DRF. These funds would reduce your subsequent request from \$100M to \$85M. This action would require approval in the House and Senate Intelligence Committes, the Armed Services Committees, and the Defense Appropriations Sub-Committees. We can make a good case that this humanitarian assistance (\$5M per month through August 1986) is essential to maintain the option of DRF pressure in order to improve prospects for a verifiable

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- A Presidential appeal for private donations by U.S. citizens. Such a step would undoubtedly result in considerable domestic criticism and perhaps a Congressional move to make such activity unlawful. We would also have to ensure that donations were properly managed and disbursed in such a way as to support a broad based democratic resistance movement.
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 - The foreign contributors would ultimately expect that their largesse would result in some kind of USG concession in their favor.

Finally, all agree that our policy in the region on both Contadors and the resistance requires you to increase your personal profile on the issues. If this meeting results in consensus on these two issues, we should quickly submit a Presidential Message to the Congress noting the immediate need for the \$15M in non-military assistance to the DRF. Your Message should cite the consequences of a failure to act and its national security implications.

- III. PARTICIPANTS: See clearance list at Tab B.
- IV. PRESS PLAN: None.
- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: See agenda Tab A.

Prepared by: Oliver North Ray Burghardt

Attachments Tab A - Agenda Tab B - List of Participants

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N 3875


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MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG)

Friday, May 16, 1986 White House Situation Room 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

I.	INTRODUCT	ion.	• •	• •	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	.John Poindexter (2 minutes)
ıı.	INTELLIGE	nce i	BRIEF	'ING	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	.Director Casey (5 minutes)
III.	CONTADORA	SUMI	MARY	• •	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	.Secretary Shult: (10 minutes)
IV.	RESISTANC	e fui	NDING	OP1	ric	NS	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	.John Poindexter (10 minutes)
v.	DISCUSSIO	N			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	.All (30 minutes)
VI.	SUMMARY .		• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	.John Poindexter (3 minutes)

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N 3876

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG)

Friday, May 16, 1986
White House Situation Rcom
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

VP Office

Mr. Don Gregg

State

Secretary George Shultz Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams

Defense

Secretary Caspar Weinberger Under Secretary Fred Ikle

CIA

Director William Casey

JCS


Admiral William Crowe LTGEN John Moellering

White House

Mr. Donald Regan Mr. William Ball ADM John Foindexter

NSC

LTCOL Oliver North Mr. Raymond Burghardt



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MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG)

Friday, May 16, 1986 White House Situation Room 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

I.	INTRODUCTION	indexter tes)
II.	. INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING Directo. (5 minu	r Casey tes)
III.	C. CONTADORA SUMMARY	ry Shultz ites)
IV.	RESISTANCE FUNDING OPTIONS	
v.	DISCUSSION	utes)
VI.	SUMMARY	indexter

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May 14, 1986

N 3878

3 JOHN M. POINDEXTER

OLIVER L. NORTHERAYMOND F. BURGHARD

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting

ib I is a memo from you to the President forwarding ing the NSPG meeting scheduled for Friday, May 16, in the WHSR on aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic ross (DRF) and the current situation in the ress. An agenda is attached at Tab A and a list of it Tab B.

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.al and	forward	the	memo	to	the	President	at	Tab	I.
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Poindexter Memo to the President Tab A - Agenda Tab B - List of Participants

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UNITARY WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 15, 1986

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MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG)

DATE

LOCATION: TIME:

Priday, May 16, 1986
White House Situation Room
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

FROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

EXHIBIT

I. PURPOSE

To resolve issues on aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces (DRF) and our current posture in the Contadora process.

II. BACKGROUND

The delay in Congressional action on your aid proposal for the The daily in Congressional action on your aid proposal for the DRF, coupled with the ongoing Contadora discussions, are creating expectations and anxieties in the U.S. and in Central America. The resistance itself is increasingly desperate as available supplies are depleted. As of May 1, no further medical supplies or clothing are available. By mid-June the outside support the resistance has received will have been consumed, and no further significant support appears readily available. significant support appears readily available.

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cc Vice President Don Regan

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
Prepared by: Oliver North Ray Burghardt

Attachments

Tab A - Agenda Tab B - List of Participants

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
MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG)

Friday, May 16, 1986 White House Situation Room 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

I.	INTRODUCTION	• •	• •	 •	John Poindexter (2 minutes)
II.	INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING	• •		 •	.Director Casey (5 minutes)
III.	CONTADORA SUMMARY			 •	.Secretary Shultz (10 minutes)
IV.	RESISTANCE FUNDING OPTIONS.		• •	 •	.John Poindexter (10 minutes)
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Admiral William Crowe LTGEN John Moellering

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Mr. Donald Regan Mr. William Ball ADM John Poindexter

NSC

LTCOL Oliver North Mr. Raymond Burghardt

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	DISCUSSION							(30 minutes)
VI.	SUMMARY	•	•		•	•	•	.John Poindexter (3 minutes)

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May 14, 1986

N 3878

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

OLIVER L. NORTH

RAYMOND F. BURGHARD

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Poindexter Memo to the President Tab A - Agenda Tab B - List of Participants

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
POTE FROM: PLIVER HOSTE Subjects IRAD AND TRACCATES I person the info, a/o continuing his to both Clarridge and Capes, Clarridge bulleres that there my ledged be sensthing to the offer to Vill work of sover on a section plan which to may plan to Gatte out acres to 12528 complete the bestage accasesors. Test should be course that the cudistance support organization nor has noce than 140 available day levelated dissersment. This reduces the need to go to third countried for help. It does not, however, reduce the argust come to get CIJ best into the designment of this program, to can only do this by point . Cotvard with the repreparedly proposal and getting the requisite actionities . for CIA involvement. Unless to do this, so will see increasing rists of trying to assess this proutes from boto with the Attendant physical and political liabilities. I as not complainted, and you know that I love the work, but we . have to lift more of this sate the CII so that I can get more than 2-3 arm of along at night. The tota comey there is fand on will have a considerable sended in a few core dayed the core visible too process become therelease. . pilots, weapons, deliveries, etc.) and the noce inquisition will become - people like Petry, Barton, Sarties, et al. Thile I care not a thit that twoy - may about so, it would well become a political embaracement for the Transfert . and you flood of this cist can be stolded sizely by coroning it with an - authorized CTA process andertakes with the 1954, this is what I was about to may in the smotley today and a point that I bollows Smoltz does not understand to bie edverous of Third seconts solicitation I have as look and boy separate as as does not bood to de private 4.3. operation but the fri 5/6/87 Jmr 1/40 A 25 to 16th Oaf Scoul & Course

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DOTE FROM: JOHN POINDETTER

Subject: IPAN AND TRACKISH
GO ANNAD AND YEARCHISH
GO ANNAD AND YEAR BY THE PAPPE NEEDED FOR THE \$158 DEPFORENMENT. DILL EALL IS
TO CEPCE WITH NICHEL AND CHENET TORAT. I UNDERSTAND TOMA CONCERT AND AGAIN. A
JUST DIDN'T WHAT I'CO TO BRING IT UP AT USPG. I GUESSED AT MALE TOU UPIL GOILG
TO SAY, DAN L-CAN ROOM VERT LIFTLE OF TOMA OPERATION AND THAT IS JUST ES
WELL.

IND AND TERMENTSH MSG PRON: DSJAP -- CPUA

TO: MSPOR --CPUS

05/17/06 14:00:05

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Exhibit OLN-11

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ACTIVITY

Meeting/Event.

LOCATION

THE WHITE HOUSE !

TEXT

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SUBCODE

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SUBJECT

Cabinet/Executive branch.

ATTENDEES

CAB Vernen A. Welters U.S. Representative to the United Nations (UN)

MMS Mr. John M. Poindexter Assistant forONational Security Affairs

WIS Mr. Donald T. Regan Chief of Staff00 MSC 011ver L. North Council (MSC)





Exhibit OLN-13




Exhibit OLN-14

1991/1991 m v. 5 maay 1 7166 Oliver North, AG, WBR, CTC, JR 2" m A6: Want to get all facts from everyone involved. Head out lift recollections. Talk to ER, John P. Worst thing can happen is if someone try to conceal something to protect selves, ER, put good spoke on it. Dant nothing anyone can call what happened early on? How does Ledeel fit in Ledeen first came 35 ON in ON: July on June 85 - was talk about. consultant NSC Asiach prostsal. L ce memory of Amer. prostsal That L took to but. L current ... t Antro N to Al Scheimer Nelat W/Rodi + Adamakashomi.
In Futy or Ang, Schwiner talked
in WH N/N+L — est contacts
W/Jmy in Em. Nashed Allen to go to

r Nga

7167 Istally unwitted of Rabine 3st Dorsele ned move something Had descussed N/ MCF philos Ostalli help OLN called Robine back wanted to send me beg problem fort. move some theys that support what you want to do raproachment Woran - Dick Second -: until burner - West to see Juy m Reine told d'oil related exampont.

The second of th

UNDINOUNIED 1 7168
Several more convers. w/Back— encour him to call Port ofcls. + Think he did. Doraclis aborted The move.
Second went to Teldrin per Asr Nowest, Clear high puros.
I called Dever Claude at C14, got name proposetay.
but when not there — told 18-19 Hawk mussiles.
N talked to Bud — looking— M+N recall—: OK, but not year as white way to be it, not seen as exchange host. If aims. If weet RR set or next tarselis.
A west the set of nest
Noto Eur. to set up 11 mtg =
Note levely Dec - 6 - 7 - worth Note Eur. 40 Set up 11 mtg - West Lay M arrived - 2 mtgs, - all - Corban, Sund, we 1 out Lindo - WN

W/Kimbe, emplate that not way to go w/ aumo - host, ex

Mty: M., Second, Schwimer, Kimshe, Nimrodi, Gorbanifar, N Genetinian.

Ms: die aims trans WM.

N: M dies meentines + their read but said can't be seen as exilly aums f/ host

Ang 22- philos disc Kmule - not oy.

N: No knowled —

learned Nov 25-6 from Second

when in Tel Aviv =:

On't know who knew

Sud + Konche meet July, early Ang, late Ang. in over When in roomy never raised. I 7170

In: London - flu mtg -5908

Emche, M, N - no appear.

Evolux arms/host.

Breakle discussion.

Kimble said all along—
need arms in deal—

Not attile - Knishe.

N: The Nov. op is a mesë—
There were 80 Hawks in

El Am plane
Secord Shut it Lown b/c

Can work—
Off loaded in Tel Aviv—

Probly Celled Clambee zelo 231—

At: CIA - word - look at legality.

Dick sent long regt to N on how... sortevel up this is __. Shipmt of Hanger.

Went in due W/ Pain + MeF -Lote Nov, early Dec. Whatever you want done not being No problem told there or Dewen

UNCLASSIFIED 1 Spot 6 Told them shight involved army touble that oil drilling examinet by trouble HCIA ok suppose to be or agrup. Mid-Dec — talked to Carey. Told them as ops oper, not way to do whetever your princy is. Sesort learned it from Israelis Finding: Version of finding That links today — shows work in saily mid-Dec. Spokin work - on finding, retro-I swesi -+ that was of prospective Shipmto. No the knowledge of retro F for Hawks or fathere Hawks.

One draft re: all previous acts — work in mid-Dec.

After Dec. mtg. in London — talk to h he need ff finding, the. Can't have Iss. out dainy this 7172 toward Finding to cover assista
Heard of McMahon, Casey - Sporting
They were goosey about think
Shight. C14 Thought wrong
leter.

Need CIA to run op. - need Funly

M alreed W/ need H F - sporkin, Carey, Gote, George, No.

That at Carey house in Del.

-recall George was there
hely after trip to London.

Talk to anyone else about shippint after Second told you.

N: To Pain. — Said we need tomething more —

Then N to CIA — glave.

Boin totally unscent — Knew nothing of it. 1st learned in Nov when Nov raised it.

N was tell it oil aguip - I wondered by not but per linew -

got clearance from Poin. to Contact Second for CiA plane.

Second: close personal friend—
luich in Jan; Known when

Second: close personal friend lived in Iran; Krown when Asst Seeles. Not at . N expense — Second.

When learned Hawks, N -> CIA? you. Who? Perhaps directly to Carey. At : Got to McMahon - who sent to lwas-

N: McMahon was not kappy — McMahon can't stand N, blames of Nicas munup so whom't call McMahon.

Lelen would have brought persons
to N? The Lepen was Mar youring of suite at State Veleen pushing from reprovalent.

When 1st her doont 508 Tows?
Think sometime in Oct —
Weir released on 14th —
Think result

5912 7174 9 been second who till it 508 Tows. Think it was Nov. creationly screwed a so screwed M or K - defer C5C: reminded N bk ledeen said 85 worthwhile -reason: verify Who in Iran.
G telking to.
Israelis reelly justing G on us. Didn't ask anyone else re: coverage 13 Sep 85 (re: TOWS ?) recent US. actu good faith. demonstrate N: we talked grongestively -Wein ? decision by M -

N: State not on list b/c it leake - handled three INR then if don't like it, hit Jagers. N: asked for dissim. of migs not done . (by CIA analyst) where from? Leisen learned this in late Sopt. tacks from Gorbanifer. Ledean told Nan Sep told Nin Sept. Q: but said in Nov -N: from an Israeli -: is when I Blarned that from them is Nov. In Dee, Ledern toll to go away Hom this & noves come back. Ble get Israelis involvent -Schwimer, lalen, Gorbanifor N told Nin - + Nir took over. Schwimer: businen; close to Peres. Linche dropped out same time - as

for as N Knew - not K, but now bin

UNG 10011EU 1 7176 11 g 6 chron not right - Jaw. Know for sure of Hanks (Nir) Reptol - h MCF + Poin. Llaked in Nov from Dick + regt'd to John + Bud. aris. plan — 2 To Hawk Loads to from H 160 - not happen. Return of Hawks - What Novote - A said to N bk mal -but our dila't like them -Problem was Ist give # back. M told N to get Hawto back in early Fan. - when Telly gone. Nir naised replenishmt for 1st time - asked any deals made - N don't know - DR M - said no leab -N told Nir. We did replenish hissiles sitting in crates -only / unpacked wrong type + needed us technique and callabrate. Soil Hawks from Jaraeli stocks, best known. Ab: When we paid reglenishmt ____ where \$ 90?

-> Isaa, Nir, Sures acety to DOD normal practice CIA controller handles it, think.

Dick Couried one transfer —

for 1000 Town —

Leb. event doesn't produce hostages —

Show memo: So it something you gregared? We terms of reference with enterent of US gov't, on 1350, with enterent of US gov't, 12100lis transfer 508 Tows—

-don't know who did it; think

M — based on gen't understanding from RK-Heat

HE: B Concern protect the but we need to know facts.

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Everyone N talked to in Israeli gov 4 Rebiner Shamin, etc. — at US request: But not info HN.

or the fact of arms the perception to dran ____ of hostages

N believes RK authorized at himself b/C M wouldn't go off on own. Think M - K understanding

N went to talk to RR re: strategic ...
relation + N/RR it always came ...
back to hostages —
Drawn to linkere
Terrible mustake to say we lk
wanted the strategic relationshipb/c RR wanted the hostages —

At: he (cR) talked about both if just relationship, not agree arms -

MY Same memo, appears to be written

between 4-7 April —

Mention of use of #—

Transferred?—

- yes, bk used it H Hawk points—

16 May # deposited— to Israeli sust

Use of #—

-#2.— million for Israeli replacent.

-#12 M residual funds for

Nicareguen resistance

cost: 6.5 posts

- 2.5 replac Tows for serviced funds.

- 9.00 total 50 3 H of residual funds.

Don't know how much was moved.

to Nicareguene.—

Avalle decides # to Resistance. Dus involvent - none - CIA, NSC None.

ME: how

Nir: Irraelis, in Jan 96, approach

UNCLASSIFIED 1 3180 15 arrange to take residuals from these transactions + to Nice 16 dise W/RR. - not W/N. -> Poin - et of contact W/RR. orinized dep --- , Ant? N don't know: Any CIA handling of that & --No, don't think they know,
Some may suspect. Isaali suggest to sweaten got?
- Dix. Jenali helg zen'lly -N + Rabine. Don't recall asking them. Inach affers. If Pres. OK's something - with working files of Half leapproved it _ you'd have it was. Other files there it could be in?
To verify it dedn't go
forward?

Ch if Israeli # got to Nicaraguans?— It's Israeli # — from profits of arms deal — Numberstood This part of deal. How much more is there to it? Feb the last one work had Who else -3 Who could kn an Israeli idea questioner zot to The + apprec.. Isradi As Coloro lero - open 3 acets ni Switz-ave #5 to Israelis -Name To acets. CIA no knowledge. Via accusations of N raying \$ — last other for its have done, the third w/ Colero + what.

HART ASSIFIED 1 5320 7182 No other US ofcle produced -Israelis: Nir, (perhaps all himself) Gorbanifar cut 1 1ft top. (by kraelis. & left in CIA account - \$ ~ \$00 K AG: 3 transac 1000 tows -> Israel -> Iran -> # Isr (top) (Carpanifer) (~3-4H to contras us ut) 2. Hawk parts 1 508 reglenishent:

- Payment for Tows reglenishent. (contras too)

amts - CA

a: What else like Nicaragian angle H. Northing ...

1-divert fondere -2-use Agraeli # -

3-50, have Janienspay

If this doesn't come out Other is Nov. Howks deal think someone onelt to step up and say this was authorized in Nov. Don't know & RR brufél on tij possible Don Regan Thompson may have seen it. Folk in OLN ofe don't know. M: Must share w/RR - see if any other thing aware of? Problematic areas 508 transfer: Hank transfer: any thing else others could be doing, have done? Iranian law won't gernet assurce Runt _ so Gorb. + Kashogi ____ Heard of complaints nongynt

Ar Courter source presented embarrasement—
Those whom gain + lost of.

Ony in NY, elsewhere, working to most over the Customo.

Gorboson 20 Apr bast — he had by Fo!

At out (400):

Organ

Organ

Nir mtz ny Roin/N — and Nin

admits he is chasee — Roin upset

Almite he in charge — Join ugast

If Hawks deal — get wask —

No doubt Nir convenced

US excom/acquesced/

exceed in 508 Tow shipent —

No reason to doubt Nir.

— Oak M about it — M Said

"The always insisted we doubt that the flade arms front."

Think but need to hink out lice will for the prob with go away.

Dul don not recall spery author. Shipmet of Hawks.

Nor satisfie N - US endersel it. M Answel No: TONS equived emy Feb. shipmt did not produce hostages thus, not strict quil. Come: expect hostages? Reglanishmet? When -M + Kinche Conversations strong objections to linele to striputo in chion. basel on perception —. what doesn't square — is RR - Rostage M4F - strategis dialog. But desen't like gereeption. was: Diseassion of John - vis Iran /embayo, . عام - exception - listing wants.

anti-X musile - is defensive

JNCIASSIFIED , 7187 == 506 Tows linked to Weir: No ges, from what I understand.

18 Howks linked to any histoges—: drift know

Hawks return:
Assaelie didn't want to give A
back. Francisca didn't want isnot what ordered.

Learned of it -:

We have to move all cargo
we have — Febilion forward —
run N/ enew from Southern Ari
Transport in Mani Fla —

905 invertigating of contra relations.

paid by
Israelia

Proprietan ailine — stat med to fran earlier vice them 17 508 7005 (?) — Curan

Met dall N in 12 of assisting you and de constrict in a and all Second to had Call Sea f fellow Second coll + ask / non-US, non-Ju. a jete iid. N called Clandge. equode WSIA. 1st contact on or any of this except for witell request. duis - Unexpecified & flights. In Josel, they want'd, per Second, to take more than I flight - N said M doesn't needly conversation this time was under presence No Tolk M + Poin about Seconds' nept


about what's really going

Copp is Second — for telephone purposes. Mc Adams is Second too w/ documentation.

Claridge gave name of several Second to Israelia, who called + set up the aciplane.

Thompson was with M at Geneva -OK Thompson Logs Thompson: Council + military aide to H + Point (now). M dalled Someone in A: Mature of unency;
A: Malis wantil it. Did you think it oil come -At NB thinght it multitions thold M+P- "3 aid - "Said go do it - CIA told by N it was ril exup + CIA yest tock -

M (TROUTE MHUK)



Know 508/Hanks 1, RK, Thompson, Poin, Regan, UP The to At , M told Hank M -> shuther don't recell M not tell P, N Compuse in Van When M tell Shults.

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7193 28

H frietnowledge — of plan agreed
to with former — not necess.
The Hanks.

the on doop of Assaelisbefore enything public. On trip to Iran in May 5752

M. Care, Terocher, CIA Commin, Nir

Ami (Aire)

He never provided technicians

+ still want one

566 ollie mt

EXHIBIT OLN-15



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(2) 1006 The Washington Post, November 26, 1986

November 26, 1994, Wednesday, Final Edition

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LENGTH: 7708 words

HEADLINE. Transcript of Assurney General Neese's News Conference

BOOY

Why don't I tell you what is the situation and then I'll take your questions

On Friday afternoon -- or Friday at noon, the president asked so to look intend bring together the facts concerning the -- particularly the implementation of the strategic initiative in Iran and sore precisely, anything pertaining to the transfer of area. Over the weekend this inquiry was conducted. Yesterday evening I reported to the president. We continued our inquiry and this sorning the president directed that we make this information issediately available to the Congress and to the public through this sedium this noon.

Let be any that all of the information is not yet in. We are still continuing our inquiry. But he did want so to take available insediately what we know a the present time.

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Uhat is involved is that in the course of the wras transfers, which involved the United States proyiding the gras to Israel and Israel in turn transferring the area -- in offect, solling the area to representatives of Iran Cortain soules which were received in the transaction assumes representatives of Israel and representatives of Israel and representatives of Israel and representatives of Israel and section, which are appearing the Sancinists government there

In essence, the two themselves accounted was that a certain account of each to the two the transactions occurred was that a certain account of each to the two the two the transferred to representative at the transferred to representative at the two, to turn, transfer to the CIA, which was the agent for the United States governaent under a finding prepared by the president — signed by the president in January of 1786. And, incidentally, all of these transactions that I am referring to took place between January of 1886 and the present time. They transferred to the CIA the exacts assumt of the soney that was owed to the United States government for the weapers that were involved plue any costs of transportation that highs he involved. This money was then repaid by the CIA to the Department of Defence under the nereal precedures and all governmental funds and all governmental property was accounted for and statements of that have been verified by use up to the present time.

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The soney -- the differency between the edney dued to the United States government and the money received from representatives of Iran was then deposited in bank accounts which were under the control of representatives of the forces in Central Accrica.

How such somey, sin? How such involved?

A

 $U_{\rm c}$ din's know the exact amount, yet. Our estimate is that it is somewhere between 1 to and 9 30 million

. How did it come to your attention?

In the course of a thorough review of a number of intercepts, and used materials, this we the hint of a possibility that there was summ summa books, add available for some other purpose case to our attention, and then we produce that with the individuals involved.

Why wasn't the president -- why wasn't the president told?

The president was told as soon as we found out about it.

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And he knew nothing about 11?

The president knew nothing about it until I reported it to his I α^* and then I $\mu\nu\nu$ was corday working that we still had some more work to do, and then I $\mu\nu\nu$ with the detail that we had yesterday afternoon

Is this white you were looking for when you began? Or is this just survey, that turned up in the course of your weekend investigation?

This turned up in the course of the investigation. The first thing that triggored, if you will, an inquiry, was the fact that as people prepared view testisony — because this had been done in a rather compartmentalized way appeared prepared their testisony for the Hill on Friday, there were terminal things where facts — there appeared to be sure facts out there than we had atmady put tegether. And it was a satter, then, of the president request to calk with everyone whe had any participation at all, because one agency was doing one this transmitter agency was doing another thing — there was very lively paperwork ?— The determine precisely what all of the facts were because for carried to be the that he had all of the information about anything the ary have accurred in the course of this whole situation. That was — is was during the course of that inquiry that this information was found and then was follow out to the conclusions that I mensioned.

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General Mease, can you tell us who is running hational security pulicy? Cayou clear up for the American people, is Secretary (George P 2 Shultz scaping). This is the new maximal security adviser? And what are you recommending in our of postfilly restricturing the White House staff?

In Litabler to your questions in order, at the present time, upon CVICe3 Adm $^{\circ}$ FJohn N 3 Poinderter actually leaving his post. A3 CAlton G 3 Kept Cdr $^{\circ}$ $^{\circ}$ $^{\circ}$ 5 $^{\circ}$

deputy, will be the acting assistant to the president for national experts affairs. The president has not yet selected a replacement, but he will do so as soon as possible.

Secretary Shultz is remaining in his position as secretary of state. That has not been a matter of conjecture, or discussion, or inquiry. And the third part of your question?

Oh, what recommendations will we make? We will make whatever recommendations for further proceedings come out of it, but some particularly, the president will be appointing a small commission which will look into the procedures and role of the NSC Chational Security Councill staff and will make specific recommendations to him as far as the process for the future.

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He've been told that the president was operating, from the beginning of this operation in June or July of 1985, on legal opinions — not written, but oral from you. Now, one can ask, then, are you, at this point, sorry that you gave the advice that the NSC should do this operation, overlooking the objections of State and Defense?

The only legal opinion that was involved had to do with the routine ¹ concurrence with the finding of January 1986. That's the only legal opinion, or legal advice that was sated for, or that was given.

General Musse, who in the NSC was sware that this extra assume of auncy was being transferred to the so-called contras or under their control? Did his Poindexter specifically know? Who else know, and did the CIA know? Was CIA Director EWilliam J 3 Casey aware of this?

The only persons in the United States government that knew precisely about this, the only person, was Lt. Col. Coliver L. 3 North. Adm. Poindexier did know that something of this nature was occurring, but he did not look into it further.

And what, if I could follow up, sir, what about CIA Director Casey?

. ****

(eP 2705 The Washington Post, November 26, 1986

CIA Directer Class. Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Classur W 3 Weinberger, Secret, the other members in the NSC -- neme of us know.

When you say that Poindexter knew, do you sean he approved of is?

No. Ade. Poindexter knew generally that sesething of this nature was happening. He did not know the details.

He did not try to stop it, though?

I don't know precisely when he learned is. He knew of is sometime during law- year ${\bf r}$

Dut he didn't try to stop it, sir?

.

He did not try to stop it.

let se ask you this. In the course of your investigation, Constal Massa. did you satisfy yourself that you know exactly how many thipsents of area went from the United States or Israel to Iran, and exactly what they contained? There's quite a bit of contraversy over that

الي ويو المعادر

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Sie arm fairly gurm that we know of the chipments of area, because we have some control. We know it was shipped out of DOD Cooperteens of Defensed stocks we will only know —— we only know at this time what the United States participated in. We don't know of any other area sales that may have been ender, but we do know short that the United States participated in.

Uell, let me just follow up. Have you established in your investigation whether anyone in the United States government gave a wink, a ned, an accord of any kind of approval for shipments which Israel or any other third country say have sade?

Well, all of the shipments that, in which the United States' equipment was involved, were made by, through Torsel -- were made by Israel.

Was that logal? Was that logal? >

He Attorney General, do I understand, sie, that what you're reporting on this morning and what the president reported on this morning is a discovery of discretion of funds? The central questions that have been asked for the three or four weeks about the propriety of shipment to -- area to Iran, about

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the U.S. area embargo as the time, the questions that the Hill has been asking -- you have, if I understand correctly, we have heard nothing new on those questions loday. Is that correct?

We have heard making new that hasn's been testified to essentially on the Hill. There are his --- we may have sore information than has been brought to light already there in the with Congress basically. I think Director Casey gave a presty full-distant.

Out this telegithe discovery and the announcement, rather, today of the diversion of funds --- we take it by Col. North -- that does not drive to any of those other questions. Old what Col. North do, is that a crise? Will be businessecuted? prosecuted?

We are presently leaking into the legal aspects of it as to whether there's any crisinality involved. We're also looking precisely at his involvement and what he did, so that the conclusions as to whether there's any crisinal acts. involved is still under inquiry by us.

Ten't it at this time likely, even preferable from your point of view, that a special prosecutor be appointed to examine these questions? You're talking no. only about the law about the Iranian transactions, but the congressional

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strictures against the military aid to the contras. Isn't it now time for a special prosecutor?

He. If we find that there is any criminality — which as yet there have been $-\infty$, $\gamma_{2^{n}}=z^{n}$

no conclusions - and if we find that anyone who is a covered parson under slag Independent Counsel has is involved, then that would be the state to request an independent counsel, as we would in any other eatter.

Is a grand jury - to follow up -- is a grand jury taking evidence on this?

No. There is no grand jury at the present time.

Finaudible3 still saying it was not a mistake --- the policy was not a mistake, General Meese?

I whink the policy, we the president said, to reestablish our relationship with Iran, to try to heing an end to the Tran-Iraqi war, to try to decrease the participation of Iran in terrorism in the Middle East, and to get our hustages back -- all of these objectives -- certainly were not Cal statute.

The way it was carried out led to this diversion of funds by not including the other agencies.

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Is didn't lead to the diversion of funds The funds were transferred, and that's one of the things that has disturbed so and disturbed the president. That was not an inherent part of anything having to do with the policy takelf. Instead, it was actually an aberration from the policy and from everything that been described to the precident and to the other members of the National Security Council.

Cinaudible? suggesting if Congress had been notified, don't you think to would have been unlikely for this to happen?

No. I think exactly the case thing could well have happened because this was something that was unknowing the afficials that gave authorization for this in the first place.

Could your see a sheet these funds were used for?

I don't know. I den't know that anyone does. They were just provided to the central through this back account, and that was the end, so far as we know, of anyone in the United States government knowing anything about what happened to them.

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How did you discover it, Mr. Attorney General?

How did we discover is? In the course of a review of documents, we came across a reference to the possibility of differences in assumb business due faids being naid by Toon and the assumb of the scius weapons of that care is a fact.

And, secondly, there were some forestones to this in one personaler destroys that we found. While is didn't reveal the whole estuation, we then used that as the basis for proceeding further and discussing with one of the persisipants what this all meant., And that's how this was discovered.

When you sailed to Cal. North over the weekend, did he admit that he had done th187

I will calk about the facts. I think as far as anything that might possibly be involved in legal action as to who admitted what, I think it would not be appropriate for me to go into that

Ore final follow-up, then How did Col. North -- let me put it this way these transfers of socies, did they only go through one man -- Col. Advist? Wer. there no other people involved?

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No transfers of soney went through anyone. Sank accounts were established, ... bust we know, by representatives of the forces in Control Aserical And phis information was provided to representatives of the Israeli government and the funds -- or representatives of Israel, I should say -- and then these finds were put into the accounts. So far as we know at this stage, no Aserican person actually handled any of the funds that went to the forces in Control Aserica.

Cinaudible) Israel deposited somey to accounts that it had been asked ... deposit the soney to -- Israel deposited soney to accounts it had been asked

There are some of the details that we're still going into, because we have a had a chance to interview everyone.

General, have you made any finding regarding the use of the National Sequence, Council staff as an operational wing of the government, and that it would result in something like this?

This is what the board or the consistion that the president will set up $\omega_{*}(z)$ presumably be looking at. We will probably be eating recommendations on this. resard.

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You made the leng march with the president from California, and there are many, many reports that his California friends and supporters do think there are usuald be a real shake-up at the top. Yesterday, a Ne. 2 man at the State Organization really damaged the president's position in a way -- publicly -- by opposing it, differing and as forth. On you think that Secretary Shultz has behaved in the proper style, and should be stay on? And what do you think should happen? What's happening to the president?

Well, I think you know that for the aleast six years that I've been here I have never consented on any other member of the administration. I'm not guing to change that now I do think — I will say this. I think every member of the administration owes it to the president to stand shoulder-to-shouldor'w_th ite and support the policies that he has -- the policy decisions he has 4Ado 4A

well as to stand by his when something has happened which the procedure dien's T know, as in this case, and where he has very courageously, I think, sade is issediately available to the Acerican public and to the Congress. And I intend to do that. Other people can speak for theeselves.

Mr. House, setting aside what the president didn't know until last night about the diversion of funds, you have the spectacle of the top seebers of this

administration fighting one another like case and dogs over policy, and the president's co-dibility being damaged as a result. Have you done nothing to

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address that? Has anyone here addressed it?

I think, again, this would involve commenting on other members of the administration, which I won't do I've already said what my position is, and ry position is clearly that I think anyone who is a member of the president's staff or the president's Cabinet has an obligation either to support the policy decisions of the president or to get out.

Specifically, though, there have been published reports that you have recommended to the president or Mrs. Chancy? Reagan or to someone that & change needed to be made at the White House staff. Is that so?

Not true?

I have not -- the published reports I've seen are those which said that I will in league somehow with a, quote, "group of Californians" which had to do with aajor shake-ups in the government. I have not had any conversations with any Californians about such a group or eating such recommendations

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Mave you had any conversations with Orew Lewis about replacing CWhite House chief of staff2 Denald Regan, sir?

110d Brow Louis? You have me

I have not called Drow Louis, and he has not called so about getting the jub.

Is the job open?

Excuse ee, sin You said that between 8 10 sillion and 8 30 sillion surplus funds from the Iranian area sale may have been diverted to sources in Control.

I say, say have been transferred.

That's right. The public reports and what the White House has said suppressed that only 8 iP etition tors) was spent for these. What's the total control $\mathcal D$

ì

ares?

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The difference is -- is was 9 iR million worth -- approximately -- worth of ares that was transferred free 000 stocks. That's --- 1. 1.

Is that how the Israelis sold them for \$ 10 to \$ 20 million more than that '

That's my -- that's the best of our understanding at the present tisz, ...

Did you know they were selling them at a presius?

No one at a command level in the United States government did. No

What was the purpose, as you determined it, for setting up this special given the funding that's been approved, why was it that someone in the Uhite House felt it necessary to funnel this extra money to the contrast?

Well, I don't know precisely -- except that this was all done during a period when the funding was not being provided by the Congress. This was all done priod to the first of this fiscal year when funding was resumed. So, it was all times when no funds were being provided by the United States government.

In this definitely in violation in the law, then?

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That's something we're looking at at the present time because it depends to the things precisely what was done and precisely who did it, in turns of what people who are United States officials, or United States citizens — socially participated, and what their conduct was. That's what we're still looking as

In your conversations with Ads. Poindexter, how does he explain not having alcrived anyone that this was going on? As you said, he was aware of those happenings and $\gamma =$

Again, I'm not going taxa. any precise conversations with anyone while the inquiry is estill process. Let se just say that he did not notify anyone of this, particularly collects, or any of the other members of the National Security County.

Old he quite the price of the price of the price of the National County Cou

Old he quite vired?

Adm. Poindemeer resigned -- or actually requested reassignment to the Navy of the point his own accord before anyone ever raised any question about this. He did this of his own volition because he felt -- because he felt that it was his responsibility to take that action to avoid any possible confusion over this satter and to allow the precident to have a new start in terms of his national security operations.

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When did he do that, sir?

He discussed it with ee, sesterday, and he actually -- and he --

That was after the information had come out about this diversion of funds to the contras, yes?

It was during the same conversation that I discussed with him that he sentioned what his feeling had been as to what he ought to do in regard to the whole satter.

<u>≕</u> •. ,.

Out, it was only after he was aware that this had become public, and you know about it.

No, it had not become public at that time

But, that you know about it, correct?

This is correct. However, I was led to believe that he had already planned ω resign prior to his conversation with me, and he actually told the president this norming.

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You say the seabers of the administration should support the president or ye out. Where does that leave the secretary of state?

I'm not talking about any particular person. Conclusions are your business, not sine.

Would you, please, clarify the whole question of the president conductor, a third-country shipmens prior to signing this order -- this intelligence financy in January. Exactly what did the president knew, and when did ≻e know to? This told him the details were, in terms of Israel shipping area to Iran, apart from this additional question of shipping area to the contras?

This is still being looked into. The president did not have full details of all of the aspects of transactions that took place prior to the finding. There were — there was at least one transaction that we know about in which Israel chipped weapons without any authorization free the United States. There was another transaction of a similar nature, although there was probably knowledge on the part of people in the United States about it, and this —

When was short

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-- is one of -- there was a transaction, one transaction in late August or September, and there was another transaction in . . . of '65 -- in November And in the November transaction, actually, these weapons were returned to Israel, it's our underestanding. That was -- that whole -- both of those transactions took place between Israel and Iran, did not involve, at that time, the United States?

At what point did the president know? You said he didn't have the full details.

What details did he have about those transactions, and when did he have the

The president -- this is one of the things that we're recollecting now. The president was informed generally that there had been an Israeli shipment of weapons to Iran sometime during the late summer, early fall of 1985, and then he later learned thirdrenery of 1986 details about another shipment that had taken

place in November of '55, which had actually been resurned to Israel in February of '86.

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If he didn't really know, why did he call Shi- mon Peres to thank his righ. after Canjanin Woir's release? Why did he call the then Israelt prime a nitter to thank him for Israel's help in sending that shipment of arms?

Well, he thanked — he called — I don't know, because that's sesething I have not discussed with the president specifically, the call to Shasin Esic], but I think there was no question that the Israelis had been helpful in terms of their contacts with other people in regard to Weir.

Attorney General, Adm. Poindexser has told reporters that the president verbally authorized that shipment in September of 1985 from terzel to IPan Rock your information dispute that?

Our information is that the president know about it probably after the fact and agreed with the general concept of continuing our discussions with the Israelis concerning these eatters. That's the information I have

But who had the authorization ability, if not the president? Who can suthertse ...

. . . To my knowledge, nobudy authorized Well, nobody -- to my knowledge . . that particular shipment specifically.

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The Ieraelia heir own?

That's my"

yes.

claim that they never did anything without the full
and consent of the United States government?

My understanding is that in terms of that particular shipment -- and this is

Which one? The September '857

The September -- August or September, it's either August or September -- that on that particular occasion, it was done at thate -- on their own oction by the Israelis. It was known to us, and it's uncertain as to whether it was known before or after, and --

Didn's Efermen national security adviser3 Bud ERobers C.3 McFarlane seet with an Israeli official just at that time?

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Mail & minute. Let me finish my answer -- and that it was, however, after the fact, at least, was condened by the United States government.

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ني يو- نشا

You connected governelf to make a distinction between the Israeli government and Israelis that were involved in the diversion of funds. Are you implying that there was somehody duteids the government and that they are, in fact, the bingpins behind the -- this operation to divers the funds?

Bell, one of the things that's very difficult is to be talking about the siddle of an inquiry which is not yet cosplete. We don't know all the facts and to, as far as things that are happening other than involving United States government officials that we have talked to, we don't know all the facts. That's why I's being very careful to say that, at best we know, they were representatives of Israel. Whether they were specifically authoritied by the government or not is one of the things I would assume we will first out.

What's to prevent an increasingly cynical public from thinking that you went looking for a scapegoas and you case up with this whopper, but it doesn't have a lot to do with the original controversy?

Well, the only thing that I can say is that we have been very careful to lay out the facts for you and for the Aserican public just as rapidly as we've gotton them -- such, such different than we would do in a nersal inquiry or investigation, when we usually wait until the inquiry is complete. But the

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president felt that in the interests of gesting the full story out, that he should eate the statement that he did today and that I shoulf appear before you and answer questions — which I think you will agree is during overything we can do to be sure that there is no hint that anything is trying to be concealed

Hr. Heese, how high did this get In other words, do you believe, and the cot being asked to believe, that a liquidenant colonel took this initiative and had those funds transferred, and that only Ada. Poindexter those about 12.7 How high did it get

Well, what we have the said is an accurate picture of what we know as this time. And to the boat of our knowledge -- and we have checked this rather extensively -- did not go any higher than that.

Mr. Messe, was Cretired sajor3 general EJohn K.3 Singlaub or Cretired major3 general ERichard V.3 Second or anybody in that network providing ald to the contras -- were they involved in this?

Well, I can't tell you because we have not completed our inquiry, and the only mases that I have used are people with whom we have talked and have processed information as to whe's who.

to: 1786 The Washington Post, November 26, 1786

You've talted about atving us this information should the funds to the colour

Congress specifically ferbade you, in the Boland amendment, from directing or Top providing support to the centrum. Haven't you, based strictly on the infermation you've given us today, violated the Boland amendment, and hasn't one of the president's staff members everseen that?

This is essething that we are looking into at the present time. As to the specific applicability of variety of laws and whether the acts that particular $\frac{1}{2}$.

purished committee? More in violation of those laws, I'm not prepared as this city to make a legal conclusion because that's still under consideration

Sould you tell the president that the Boland amendment might have been violated, and that's why you were taking this action?

hy answer . wasing the same.

Mr. Meess, you say Adm. Caindexter is being reassigned. Should he bu reassigned without any determination being made as to whether or not show has been any criminality involved here?

Hell, he is a naval officer, a very distinguished naval officer. He has asked to be returned to the Navy, and the president has agreed to allow him to do

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that. So it's a easter of his deciding to relinquish his position as the assistant to the president for national security affairs. So he automatically goes back to the Navy, as he's requested.

Cincudible: Do you believe, or has the president expressed to you some concern that perhaps he needs to change come of his staff operations in order for his to receive more infernation and have more of a hands-on presidency?

It's not a matter of having a hands-on presidency, it's eaking sure that those people who are working for his are following the procedures. That a the reason why he has this consission which will be reviewing specifically what these procedures and what these standards of conduct are. As far as what the president didn't knew, I bely mentioned the times — one time where he know nothing, which was the transfer of funds to the forces in Nicaragua. The other thing was where he didn't have complete information at the time regarding the Novosber transaction. And in the summer the August situation in which he was informed of that has after the fact. And it's my understanding that the United the individual investigation in forced after the fact.

But does he leve that he has been badly served? Is he angered by that?

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I think what -- that that calls for a conclusion. I'm just talking abou. facts.

What does this do to your credibility with Congress? I mean, how can your people now go down to Congress and look them in the eye when they passed a law opposing funds for the contras and your administration, however it happened, would up sending that meney?

I think the same were you do when anybody in the administration come council,

that is not correct. And that is, you go down to Congress and the exactly what happened, which is what the president and what I did today. I don't think anyone can be responsible if sessone on the lower echelens of government does seesthing that we don't feel — or that — objectively viewed as not correct. But when that happens and you find out about it, you investigate it and you take the necessary action, which is exactly what we did and what the president has done.

÷ 4.

Mr. Attorney Ceneral, will you cooperate with Congress?

It's my -- I don't like to -- I want to get Larry's CWhite House spakeshin Larry Sportes] permission (to take additional questions), but I'm not re-1'y χ sadmanochist.

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Congress will undoubtedly require its own investigation, on the theory that the administration cannot properly investigate itself in this eatter. Will you cooperate with a congressional investigation?

I don't accept your preside that Congress will feel that we can't investigation curselves. We're not investigating ourselves. We're investigating certain people within the administration. There's no question whatsoever or no implication, has anything that was done was administration policy or directed by top administration officials. However, the president has already directed $\frac{1}{2}$ as he told you, I think alsost two weeks ago — that he wanted all sembers of the government to cooperate fully with the Congress so that all the facts would be presented to them. And that's why such an immediate presentation to the Cunyries was made, as it was this morning.

Sir, was there -- can I ask you, what did Col. North actually tell you? why did he do it, and who was the soney deposited? Was it in one bank or tave of banks?

I'm not going to go into specific conversations, for the reasons that I sentiuned earlier. My -- the information we have at the present time is that it was done because this was during a period when Congress had not provided acoust to the contras; it was done during a time in which, it is sy understanding,

e Weshington Post, Nevember 26, 1984

that provision the by Congress to persit the United States to sawfunding of the constant from third countries and -- what was the other parts of the constant from the bank accounts -- ay understanding is that the banks were in Switzerland and that they were -- where normal deposits are sade into becomes -- into numbered accounts, and then this was withdrawn by the representatives of the forces in Nicaragua.

Was Contra leader3 Adolfs Calers involved? Was he the san that North contacted?

I'm not going to be able to talk about people where I den't know specific facts.

I would like to know what's going to become of Lt. Col. North, and if $n\omega' \omega$ going back to the Marine Corps?

Lt. Col. North has requested to return to the Marine Corps, and that has be

accomplished. As a passer of fact, I think — by understanding is — I would that he has already indicated that he is retiring from the Marine Corps, but that I'd have to check.

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You said that it is time for the president's een to stand chouldor to shoulder -- that that is your belief. But specifically, what has the president instructed of his Cabinet members in that meeting yesterday that lasted for two hours, that he wants to have happen new?

You know that I never consent on sectings with the president and who said what

Could you say — since that somey was exed to the U.S. government, the 8 30 million or 8 40 million, are you going to —

No, it was not used to the U.S. government. All the enney that was used to the United States government was paid to the United States government.

Are you going to require that that additional money that went to the contrat go back to the U.S. government?

We have no control over that soney. It was never United States funds, it was never the property of United States officials, so we have no control over that whatsoever

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Cinaudible? Can the president legitimately expect to get anything accomplished on Capital Hill unless he makes some changes?

I think the president has already indicated that he will sake some changes. One of the things he's going to do it to have a consisten to review the procedures and the role of the Matienal Security Council staff. Already, Admirctadater has requested return to the Navy, so the president can sake some changes in their particular spot. So I think the changes are already underway.

Robert McP the fereer national security adviser who was deeply involved in the their project, did he know about this diversion of funds to the contrast?

Bud HcFarlane knew about it. He was teld about it in the middle of the year -- April or May of 1986 -- at a time when he was no lenger in the government.

So he was aware of this while it was going on?

That's my understanding, yes.

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And possibly an illegal act -- an illegal diversion of funds?

You're coming to conclusions that we haven't sade yet.

Why did the minimistration decide not to send medicine and humanitarian aid, and isn't it true that if you had decided to go that rouse, you wouldn't be in $\frac{1}{2} : z^{-1}$

the mess you're in?

Than's a satter for foreign policy expension. Custico is my routine.

Do you expect further resignations or some other way for this administration to establish its credibility and to show that its Cabinet is functionary?

I think that the administration has already demonstrated its condititive by the full disclosure of the facts. I think there's no question the Cabines is functioning right now — as witness the sestings we've had yesterday and today — and I know of no other resignations that are either contemplated or requested.

Do you mean to suggest, eir, that the Congress may have authorized what Col North did in recting funds for the contrib and third countries? Did you mean to suggest that?

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I certainly, Congress never specifically authorized what Col. North 3:1 The question that has to be locked at, as a legal matter, is whether he consisted any violation of law at the time he did that.

Out, were you suggesting that the intelligence consists may have given of a gorahead to the CIA, for instance, to raise somey from third countries?

No, I did not I did not comment on that aspect of it at all. All I said the only point that I'm making -- is that before determining whether where is any criminal offense, you have to find out what, how the law applies to specificate -- and that's going on at the present time.

To follow up, ear, could you explain how is in that the president's national security advisor, who has the president's ear, could not, at least, infore the chief of staff Mr. Regard of this?

I cannot a 15 15 100 than the fact that it happened.

Since no edition, while these two een knew about this, and since the president insite "that "Hordid not sake a mistate in the Iran deal to begin with, why was the investigation begun? Why did he come to you last week and say, "Luck into this"?

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He didn's. I case to him.

...

Why?

nature of the operation, a let of people did not know certain things that were geing on, that were being done by others. My suggestion to the presidest was that we get all of the facts together to be sure that anyone testifying before Congress was being absolutely accurate, not only me to what they know, but as to other facts, since they were representing the administration. The president suggested that that be done -- that the facts all be pulled together. It was in

the course of thus, that this information came to light.

In your inquiry, did you determine how such information the State Department has gotten -- not in reference to contra money -- but in the whole ruspect of this Iran tennection, did, were they informed, or weren't they?

Well. I think Mr. Shultz has said that he participated in cortain according, and did got centain information, that he had opposed the contept of day

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transfer of arms, and that he was not involved, nor was he informed about any u the implementing steps. And everything that I have found, including my discussions with Mr. Shultz himself, verify that that is essentially correct.

Whose money was misappropriated? If it wasn't the United States government funds $\pm \infty$

I don't know that anybody's maney was misappropriated.

Can you explain a little more about how the pricing of these weapons which place \cdot . I much, who it was who set the price for the Iranians, and how stock conumed? Was it North? Was it the Iranelis?

My understanding is that all of that took place in negotiations between people which we eight call "loosely" representing Ierael and people represents. Iran. And, so — that this was not done in the presence of, or with the participation of any American persons, to the best of our knowledge to the time. That's one of the things that we'll be looking into.

Did Israeli officials know that this mency then was being transformed to ± 1 contras -- that that was the goal or the target of ± 1 ?

1984 The Washington Post, Nevember 26, 1984

I don's by the Israeli officials, as opposed to representatives, depending on which people were, knew -- that's one of the things again this will be looking at

Who were the Israelis and who were the Iranians?

1 💥 1 Miles

Again, I can't sontion any names until we actually have those things panded down, which is one of the things we'll be leaking at.

Was this Col. North's idea? Was it Col. North's idea — if we can tid up and anount of sonny the Transans are paying, we can take that extra sorny to it to the contrast Did he cose up with the original idea? Was it an intalificant And a socond question, eir — there have been allegations that the Prosident Dush was involved in supplying soney or aiding the supply of allegation that contrast. To you know whether or not he was swarm of this project. It is

Firs., I don't know precisely what the conversations were — who said what to who — when this thing first get started Again, it's a satter that is still under investigation. I do know that 'he president — that the vice president did not know about any of this until yesterday when I infered his of essentially the same inferentian I had given the president.

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How is in that to such of this can go on and the president not know it? He is the promident of the United States. Why doesn't he know?

Theorem suscepting didn's tell him, that's why. And remember, we're calking stone three situations over a period of some six or night months, and the project who were involved in the situation didn's tell anybody, including the president So, it's common understanding why the president wouldn's know, because no one is the chain of command was informed.

Mr. Menar, if they weren't U.S. funds, whose money was this?

Well, I think that's -- I would assume that it either belonged to the party that - who had sold the weapons to the Iranians, or it belonged to the party who had bought the weapons and given the koney. That's -- but I think is would probably be the party that had sold the weapons to the Iranians

Tir, were any of the principals on the Iranian or the Israeli side - will they involved in cases that the Justice Ompartment was prosecuting or involvingting separately -- first? And second, was that --

Mer to him knowledge, in answer to your question

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Were those bank accounts — is there any evidence or indication those back accounts were set up by the CIA?

No There's ne indication as all.

Or that sheet the is wish the help of the CIA?

No. There? Cindication whatevever, to the best of our knowledge or that one in the City and anything about it.

Can you explain, eir, why, if it was the people who are leaving today -- copere the ones who proposed to the president the idea of arms shipments to Iran -- if, perhaps, they had ether information from the president on that policy, as well, why doesn't the president ask for a reexamination of that policy? Peologic the four goals that you centioned, which they proposed -- that there's a question about thee, as well? Perhaps the president has been sisted about this larger policy, as well, since we know that Secretary Shultz opposes it and Secretary Weinberger opposes it, but the main advice case from NSC, from the people who are now leaving Con't you think the president should reasseing chick policy as well?

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No, because the people who are leaving today were not the people that proposed the policy to the president. The policy was proposed initially as a result of conversations with Israel. It was then presented to the president by the them-essistent to the president for national security affairs. It was

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discussed with all of the members, in January, with all of the members of the Matienal — or almost all of the members of the Matienal Security Council and that on the National Security Council there was a split of opinion. But after hearing all of the arguments, pro and con, the president decided that the potential for achieving the goals of effecting peace in the Middle East, helping secure that area, stopping a war and obtaining our hostages was worth the class decided.

Can you say that when the president made that decision -- who was his national security adviser?

Ade. Poindexter was actually — is really was at the time when Bud McFarlane was leaving. The discussions with the president about this specific series of events had gone on under Mr. McFarlane during 1985 and the specific discussions of some of these things that lod to the finding in January had actually started in December, while Mr. McFarlane was here.

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He was transferring out during the latter part of December and the marly par of January. At that time, Adm. Poindexter came in.

So he knew about details of this operation but didn't tell anyone in the administration for --

Mr McFarlane?

He didn't learn of this, of the transactions involving the forces in Convent America until probably Applier May of 1986.

Why did he transactions to the president?

I don't in

ter the president --

He didn't --

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-- in May of that year, right? He was a representative of the presid at

That's correct. Whether he talked with the president during that partial of time, I don's know.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Bell, why should the president take these people's advice, sary " " " " "

Well, because -- the president didn't just take these people's advice as to the everall pelicy. He had the advice of the entire range of his national security advisors.

Hest of them advised against it.

- i

All of his advisors . . two of -- some of whom advised against it, some of whom idvised in favor of it.

Who else advised in favor of it besides members of the MSC?

As you know, I don't talk about who gives advice to the president

The people who you say profited from this diversion of funds, these then are the people that we were working with, people perhaps that were even abound the

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plane with Mr. McFarlane into Iran

he funa No, no. The people who profited? I don's know that anyone profited.

In Iwrael, who you say --

I don't know that anyone in Israel --

owned the soney that get diverted into --

The soney that was transferred to the forces in Nicaragua -- I don't know that anyone who was involved in that transaction was necessarily on the plane with Mr. McFarlane. That's sesesting we haven's gene into yet.

We now know of three specific shipments, unless I'm mistaken -- the one in late August, early September, as you've described it; one in Nevember, which returned to Israel; and then another one in May. The diversions of funds took place from which of those or all three of these?

There were several missenss -- there were, I believe, three or four shipments during the process dates. The transfer of

funds were thirelived with at least one and possibly three of those thipsents during the period from raughly January of 1986 or February through probably September of 1784.

Mr. Meese, Mr. (Eugene) Hasenfus is in jail in Nicaragua, as you know, fur running supplies into Nicaragua to help the centras. Did his sission, can you now say, was it in any way funded by any of these diverted funds?

I have no knowledge and I doubt if we'll ever find out since we have ± 0 information about how those funds were used once they were ultimately received

GRAPHIC: Photo, President Reagan stem aside as Attorney General Eduin Henne III prepares to speak to reporters at the White Mouse. I President Peauli and

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12/04/06

ACTIVITY

Phone cell.

LOCATION

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON, D.C.

TEXT

The President talked with Oliver L. North, Deputy Director, Political-Hillitary Affairs, Hational Security Council (NSC)

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1,450,275,00		31,753.00	9 ITEM - SIICI	SECIA	VP-Ph., 85	FRENCH MISSAGES	(Males
1,628,225,00		24,440,40	MANGAL BELLI	MMS.	113 May 1-85	CHINCH MESTAGE	CARRIAG
1,528,,25,00		90,466,46	C. 160	UPI N	17-R17-65	EMERI M. JOLES	CP114L
1,418,424.00	89,201,00	,	(RL(R)	INC THE	1-Reg-85	EMPLY NES MES	has code
1,348,475,40		39,00	HOULER	(PIIA	21 66, 55	EMP-LY RESONAL	(PTHE
1,355,107,00		15,277,0e	defetten, a.	MA IPS	22-May-85	CHEST RESPORTS	(quites
1,352,925.00		274.00	MONTH	CAPLIAL	, 4 Peop 65	ENERGY MESONALES	(MIN
1,344,925.00		8,000,00	MARGARIT AND	M*6	24-May 85	EMERGY MESON (5	(- mail@a
1,207,425,00		\$1,500,60	PORTION MAY SEE COR	Mes	75-P 49 85	ENERGY HESDINES	COMPANY
1,367,272.00	277,848,46	,,,,,	LALID	SHE FREE	21 Pen 85	EMERCY MESONS-LS	THE POPE
1,357,773.00	211,040,00	.a.000.00	-AKIN	- MITAL	1. Jul. 65	EMPLY HES MILE:	· PINE
1.552.273.00		3.80.00	Maria	CAPITAL.	10-00-05	EMERCY NESIGN	(W) IR.
1,347,273,00		5,000,00		UNTITAL	11 344-65	EMERLY MESONA (;	ONER
1,307,273,00		45,000,00	SCHOOL STILL	SELIE	18-34-85	CHERCY RESIDEN	CHITE
1,462,273.00		45,600,60	HERY EM	WIN	16	DEACY MESONALES	CAPTINE
1.42.43.00		710,00	MORE!	CP114L	12.34-85	OFEN	CFINE
1.437.043.00		27,600,60	. IGA	CATIFIE	40 Jul 85	CHENCY RESIDENCES	CAP1 HE
1,436,643.00		429.00	HERIM	CIPITAL	62-144-85	EMERCY MERINALES	CRP114L
1.414.773.00		74,450,00	MAKIM	CAPITAL	v5 Jul -85	CHENCY RESOURCES	CAPTING
1,744,511,60	347,718,00	10, 55,00	(m.fm	ENCOME.	5 M B	ENEACH RESOURCES	排灰學院
1,967,511.00	,,	4,000,00	SITECH - W. PHILLIPS	CAFTIAL	10-14-65	ENERGY HESDAM LS	COPT TAL
1.992.511.60		20,000,00	SCINCH - SINCE	SPECIAL	11-Jul 85	ENERGY RESURCES	CATTO
1,797,139,00		145, 52,00	PORTICOR ARMS SES CAR	MANS.	: 344-65	ENERGY RESIDENCES	CENTRA
1,776,837.00		70, 36u, 66	HOLLA	CAPITAL	15 Jul -85	EMENTY RESOURCES	COTINE
1,774,379,46		2,54,61	MAREL ESECUTION	CAPITAL	14 Jul -85	EMERCY RESONALES	CW1 WL
1.346.37.99		200,090,14	L. HA	C#1184	16-Jul-85	ENERGY MESHARUS	CPTIME
1,318,787.00		30,004,00	QUINTERO, R.	ALR IPS	1a Jul -85	EMINCE MESONO (S	CHICAN
1,315,769.00		500,14	NORTH CHEVE	API IR.	14 Jul - 85	EMAIN PERMITES	(AP) TEL
1,367,730,00		7,817,10	MINIEM, A.	AIR US	14 34 -83	FRENCY MESADES	CENTRA
2,457,750.00	\$30,800,v0		(A(6-)	. TO UNE	15 24 65	EMPIR NO 1845	146,000
.470, F7+.00	,,	7,100,100	中海((気(水線)	UPTIR	19 mt 85	CHAIR ME SHALES	· MITTEL
2,042,950,00		8,1941,00	LEUR FEES	UND-MONE	19 3-4-85	EMERCY MESOURIES	SECURITY
2.242.95			POSTRUPE MENS SIN OWN	ARRS.	. 24 65	CHERCY MES - MILE	CENTRA
1,842,097,0		501.851.00	MFET (FRINGE)	MAS SHUR	M 85	EMPICE MESUR ES	VERSIONS
1,587,097,00		75,444 0	Mr IR	LATINE	34 65	EMERCY NE YOUR ES	CAPTION
1,584,154,49		. 943, 94	HOLER CASA	1 04 1 164	.a. Aug 85	EMENCY MESOURCES	(MITAL
1,749,154,49	6", ##J,OU		had the firsts	-	-: 45	LALE RESPORT	In off
1,000,594,00		45,544,14	STEE	- # 17mg	.5 Peg 85	LINE RECORDES	(WITE
1,79v,1 H. 00		(· , 10P) , ·P	we IR LASH	MIR	5 to mg 85	LIME MESON -S	(PFL)AL
1,134,570,00			COUNTEND, A.	AIR IFS	A Project	LIME HESIANIES	(Outline
360,394,4			Raich ALPRISA	446	31 Aug 85	LIME 4900P (5	-
5.4.394.90		4.	rent P	+ RP-1 IRL	- P 85	LANE RESOURCES	(AP1 TAL

PIEPOSE	Riclam!	t=1€	144	36% At 13:00	14 RI 1	· ~{U	IPLAN,E
HINER	ENERGY RESIDENCES	11h Sage 85	INAVEL	HO : INTER ONLINENIS	922	****	570,662,70
CONTRA	LANE RESIAMILES	i. 54; 65	ALC:	WILL RIGHT	4 20 91		517,662,00
CAPITAL	LAKE RESIMBLES	1. Sep-8s	Colle	SUITE H - STICE	15,450,00		50.,612,00
CALIAL	LAKE RESULTED	15 Sept-85	Strike	SLITE H - MOUL -ANNAH	. 636.04		499,976,00
I.OMTRA	LANE RESCUR LC	10 Jay 85	HIL IPS	WINTERU, fr.	4,000,00		495, 176,00
(AP) TAL	LANGE AT SOLINE ES	: 1 Sept. 85	OPPLANE.	IOREL - MASICAL	2,000.00		493, 276,00
CAPITAL	LIME RESINE ES	לפיקאי 17	LATITAL	以能、(表((4))	19,440,04		483,976,01
INCOME	LANG RESOURCES	. 11- 5 ~0 - 85	IN OPE	FUNDS FROM SAM LICEN		1,000,000,00	1,485,976,01
(MIIAL	LANE RESOLUTES	29 tep 85	(押)(机	SCITELM - N. PHILLIPS	2,004,00		1,481,776,10
(MITAL	LAKE RESHALES	25-5ep-85	(AV) TAL	HERTH	11,50+.00		1,470,476,00
(AP) IRL	LAME RESCURCES	21 549-85	CAPLIAL	HMKIN	\$,500.00		1,440,976,00
CONTINA	LINE RESIDENCES	23-5 60-85	ALDCOAF!	MRAE RIRCHIT	4,000.00		1,450,976,00
INCOME	LAME RESUMBLES	23 · Sep - 85	INCOME	1C		129,936,00	1,584,912,00
CONTRA	LANE RESUMPLE	23-Sep-85	ALF OPS	QUIMTERO, R.	2,378,00		1,584,534,00
CAPITAL	LANE RESOURCES	24-Sep-85	CAPITAL	HBKIR	5,000.00		1,579,534.00
CONTRA	LANE RESIDENCES	34-Sep-85	CONTRA	ULENO	175,000,00		1,404,534,00
CONTRA	LAME RESOURCES	61-0c1-85	ARMS	PLIRTUCAL ARMS SBS CVA	301,498.00		1,103,0%,00
CONTRA	LANE RESOURCES	01-0:1-05	AIR OPS	QUINTERO, R.	4,000,00		1,099,034,00
CONTRA	LANE RESOURCES	01-0c t-8 5	CONTRA	CALERO	25,000,00		1,074,036,00
CAPLIAL	LAKE RESOURCES	41-Oct 85	CAPITAL	SCITECH	2,100.00		1,472,036.00
CIPTIAL	LINE RESOURCES	04-0ct-85	CAPITAL	HAKIN	1,500.00		1,070,534.40
IM OPE	LANE RESOUREES	11-0:1-85	INCOME	IC		77,144,00	1,170,484,00
(CHETHA)	LIME RESOURCES	15-0ct-85	(-mtan	MPSUBI	5,000,00		1,145,484.00
CONTRA	LAME MESONACES	15 · O· t - 85	AIR OPS	QUINTENO, R.	4,000.00		1,161,484,00
CAP1 TAL	hybe park sjuare	15-9K 1-85	CAPITAL	HAKTA CASH	2,000,00		1,157,464.00
UNER	LANE RESOURCES	19-0: 6 5	TRAVEL	HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL	4,812.00		1,154,672.00
CONTRA	LANE RESIGNACES	21 · I/C L - 85	(getan	ROBELO	15,000,00		1,139,672,00
CONTRA	LIME RESOURCES	21-0ct-65	ALINCRIPE T	HALLE ALRORAFT	50,225,00		1,089,447,00
CAPITAL	LINE RESUMPLES	23-9:1-85	UMPLIAL.	KOREL	9,000,00		1,080,447,00
CAPITAL	LAKE RESUMLES	25-0:1-85	APITAL	9.TTECH - K. PHILLIPS	2,000.00		1,078,447,00
(APITAL	LINE RESOURCES	26 Oct - 85	(APITAL	HIRLIN	102,000,00		976,447,40
INCOME	LANE RESOURCES	(H-Mov-85	INCOME	IC.		147,916.00	1,126,363.00
(ONTINA	LANE RESULACES	12-1004-85	AIR OPS	QUINTERU, R.	902.00		1,125,461,00
APITAL	LANE RESOURCES	12-Nov-85	CAPLIAL	NUREL (ASH WITHBRAVAL	7,000.00		1,118,461,00
CAPITAL	LANG RESCUNCES	14-Nov-85	LAPTIAL	HAVIN TRANSFER	43,030.00		1,075,431,00
CAPITAL	LANE RESULACES	:4-Nov-85	CAPITAL	SCITECH TRANSFER	67,340,00		1,006,491,00
CAPLIAL	LANCE RESOURCES	:5 Nov-85	CAPITAL	MIKIN TRANSFER TO SERFID	20,000,00		968,771,00
L-MIRR	LINE RESIDENCES	15·Ww 65	I IJMTRA	nd#£Lú	15,010,00		973,091.00
CAPITAL	LIME RESOURCES	15 Nov 85	CAPITAL	HAKIM	25,000,00		748,071,00
CONTRA	LANE RESIDENCES	18-Mov-85	AIRCRIFT	R.E.	450,630,00		497,461.00
INCOME	LANE RESOURCES	20-Nov 85	INCUME	FUNDS FROM 19MEL - NIM RUAI		1,000,000,00	1,497,461,00
UNGOLOGIA	LANE HESINAMES	21 Nov-85	(MACHEGARI	LEGAL FEES	7,500.00		1,487,961,(11)
CONTRA	LAKE RESUMMLES	22 Nov-85	ARIKS	PORTUGAL MAYS SBS GVA	1110,000,00		1,389,961,W
CAPLTAL	LAKE REGULACES	22-M- 85	CAPLTAL	HRLIM	21,470,00		1,348,491.60
CONTRA	LINE RESOURCES	25 - Nev - 85	AIR OPS	(AUINTERO, R.	4,000,00		1,564,491,00
1984	LINE RESOLUCES	29-Nov-85	AIR	SAITA LUCIA AIRWAYS	127,700.00		1,236,791.00
CAPITAL	LINE RESINACES	u: Dec 85	CAPSTAL	MICH	4,000.00		1,232,791.00
COPITAL	LINE RESOURCES	03-0=c-85	CAPITAL	MACIN	9,529.00		1,273,262,00
CONTRA	(SF INVESTMENT	10-ber -15	AIR OPS	SOUTHERN ATR TRANSPORT	60,000.00		1,163,262,40
CONTRA	CSF (INVESTMENT	13-Dec 85	ARPS	PURTUCAL ARMS SAS CVA	200,000,00		863,262,00
LRAN	CSF INVESTMENT	14-Der -85	AIR TRANSPORT	REPULEASING	21,985,00		841,279.00

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PURPOSE	RCU: WI	98ic	· w	THINKS I	L p; i	46011	lefal.file :
CONTRA	CSF INVESTMENT	. Fet-bb					
CONTRA	(SF 197251MH)	. 8 Fet: 86	aras Algenari	FINITURAL RICHS SUS GUI	222,000,00		6,208,565,00
CONTRA	CSF INVESTMENT			PINLE AIM, RAFT	4,578,00		6,293,987,90
Carian	(SF INVESTMENT	(r*:Mar 86 (r4 Har 86	air ups air ups	MATERIA, J	20,000,00		6,173, 487,00
CUNTRA	LAKE RESOURCES		ALR (FS	MATERN, J	21,000,00		6,152,987.00
(APLIAL	CULF HERMEIIN;	ii5-Har-86 iG-Har-86	CAPITAL	SULHERN FIR HANSPURT	50,000,00		6,102,987,00
CONTRA	CLE PROVETING	uS-Mar-86	RIK UPS	HAKIN (CAPITAL INVESTMENT ACCT)	.,006,006,00		4,102,987,00
OTHER	ALBON VALUES	96 Nar-86	BUSINESS	MINTERN, J. ACIOS	30,000,00		4,172,987.00
IRRI	LANE RESOURCES	10-Mar - 86	BUSINESS	TRANSFER TO ISRAEL	15,000.00		4,457,987.00
CONTRA	CULF MEMOETING	1/-Rar-86	AIRCRAFT	WE THE TO THEFT	100,000,00		3,957,967.00
CAPITAL	CULF PARE INC				475,000,00		3,482,987,00
CONTRA	LAKE RESOURLES	18-Mar-86 18-Mar-86	(APITAL CONTRA	HRITI CASH	28,000,00		3,454,987.00
CATTIAL	CALF INDICES		•••	AMELO	10,000.00		3,444,987.00
CONTRA		18-Har-86	CAPITAL	HAKIR CASH	50,000,00		3,394,987.00
CONTRA	CULF HARRIETING	21 Mar - 86	AIR OPS	SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT	71,000.00		3,323,987,00
	CULF MAKETIN.	21 Har 86	ALRORAFT	MCE	29,000,00		3,294,987,00
(ATAN)	CSF INVESTMENT	25 Ran-86	AIR OPS	QUINTERO, R.	10,000.00		3,284,987,00
CONTRA	QULF INTRICETING	03-Apr-86	AIR OPS	SOUTHERN AIR IMPRESIONS (partial payment)	264,813.00		3,020,174,00
CUNTRA	CULF MAGNETIN,	Apr-6t	AIR OPS	QUINTERO, R.	28,000,00		2,992,174.00
CONTRA	CULF INGUETING	03-Apr 86	AIR OFS	SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT partial payment	135, 187.00		2,854,987,00
CONTRA	OLF MAKETING	07-Apr-86	REPS	PURTUGAL MAIS SAS CVA	95,120,00		2,765,867.00
(CONTRA	OULF HARVETING	10-for-86	A-S	FUETUÇAL MRHS SBS CVA	136,137,00		2,627,730,00
CONTRA	CALF MANETING	14 Apr 86	AIR OFS	EAST INC	30,000.00		2,597,730,00
CONTRA	CALF PROMETING	14-Apr-86	AIR UPS	SUITHERN ATR TRANSPORT	150,000,00		2,447,730,00
INCOME	LANG RE-UNIES	15-Apr -86	14.UPE			47,974,00	2,495,704.00
INCOME	LANE RESTRACES	15-Apr -86	INCOME	180		449,853,00	3,145,557,00
OTHER	ALBON VALUES	17-84-86	BUSINESS	DIRECTORS FEES CIE SERVID	2,673,00		3,142,884.00
CAPITAL	HYBE PARK SOIL	171. 86	(AF : TAL	Media	3,000,00		3,139,884.00
LAPITAL	MEDON WALVES	17 Apr - 86	LAPITAL	High (a	72,580,00		3,067,304,00
UNER	HYDE PARK SCHAFE	17 mpr 86	HISTHESS	DIRECTORS FEES	2,750,00		3,064,554,00
CONTINA	UDALL	17 mpr -85	AIR OFS	EHST INC	100,357,00		2,964,197,00
(AP) TAL	UDALL	17 April 86	SEFUIAL	HAVIN - SHAGE CREEN AND LAWSING	294.00		5,962,903.00
LONTRA	UDALL	17 Pg+ -86	AIR OFS	SOUTHERN ALK TRANSPORT	200,000,00		1,762,402.00
(W) (W)	ALBON VALUES	(i Apr -86	CRP11FE	F.XIII	15,000,00		2,748,903.00
UNICHOUN	PLEAM VALUES	17 mr A6	ARMS SPECIAL	DEFEI	161,000,00		2,587,903.00
CONTRA	ALBON VALUES	18 Apr -86	ALRICARET	A.E	57,022.00		2,530,881,00
CONTRA	UDALL	16 Apr 86	Alfi	RERO CONTRACTORS LTD	19,625,00		2,511,246,00
CAPLTAL	ALBUM VALUES	Apr 66	SECTAL	HAKIN - STANFURD TELHNOLOGY	20,000,00		2,491,244.00
CONTRA	UDALL	.1 Apr 86	AIR OPS	SUITHERN ALP THANSPORT	1.0,000.00		2,371,746,00
CAPITAL	ALBON VALUES	28 feet 86	(APITAL	KUREL	28,111.00		2,343,135,00
CALLIAT	ALPAN VALUES	.8 Rr 86	CAPITAL	HAVIH	4,975,00		2,338,160.00
[PPP	ALBON VALUES	.9 fept :86	AIR	HEM) EYTAN	185,000.00		2,153,160,00
CONTRA	ALBON VALVES	29 Arr-86	PIR UPS	GUINTERO, R.	5,000,00		2,148,160,00
CONTRA	ALBON VALUES	10 hpr -86	(ijalīra	RUBELO	10,000.00		2,138,160,00
CONTRA	MLBON VALUES	34 Apr -86	LONTRA	CRUZ	7,000.00		2,131,160,00
SHIP	DOLITY	01-May-86	SHIP EXPENSES	CIE SERVID	6,406.00		2,124,754.00
SHIP	DOLPY	∪l-May B6	SHIP	SHIP	31,098,00		2,093,656,00
CAPLIAL	ALBON VALUES	02 may 86	CAPITAL	HMKIT	943,00		2,092,713,00
LAPLIAL	ALBON	45 May 86	CAPITAL	r, tea	2,275,00		2,090,438.00
SPECIAL	ALBON VALUES	115-May 86	ISLAMO	NORTH TRUST BANK MOTARYER	100,000,00		1,790,438,00
(P) IAL	ALBUM VALUES	15 Hay 86	SPECIAL .	SUTEM - STEE	15,400,00		1,975,438,00
CONTRA	ALBON VALUES	115 May 86	PILOIS	GALDEN'S CLIEN' - FILOIS DAVID WILKER	[](),(((p),(n)		1,865,438,00

PURPOSE	ACCOUNT	bin i	1476	'ideaSe Tires	NEBLT	- SEULT	(PL FOR E
SHIP	DOLHY	117 May-86	SHIF EXPENSES		8,010.00		1,857,438,00
94P	BLENY	417 -May-86	SHIP LIPENSES	(AFTAIN ANNE HERUF (LASH ADVANCE)	5,000,00		1,852,438,60
94P	BOLMY	17 Hay-86	SHIP	SHIF (MOVINCE)	290,464,00		1,561,974,00
OTHER	ALBON VALVES	12 May: 66	INSINESS	TRIP - IGAVEL	2,793,00		1,559,181,00
OHER	PLEON VALUES	13-May-86	BUSINESS	TRIP - TANGL	3,400,60		1,556,181.00
INCOVE	LAKE RESOURCES	14-194-86	INCOME.	FUNDS FROM MASHOCCI	-,,	10,000,000,00	11,556,181,00
UTIER	PLD IN VALUES	14-May-86	PUSINESS	TOO CODELIS (AM EXP)	101,500,00	**,***,***	11,454,681,00
PERMITO	ALBON VALUE:	15 May 86	BUSINESS	BUSINESS EXPENSE	2,778.00		11,451,903.(#)
SPECIAL	ALBUM VALUES	15-Ray-86	CYPHESS	BILL/CREC/AVE DEN TO CYFRESS	30,150,00		11,421,753.00
(RPM)	HYDE PARK SULFIE	15 May-86	Nes	CIA	6,500,010,00		4,921,753,00
INCOME	LANE RESIDENTS	16 May-86	INCOME	FUNDS FROM MISHOGGI	-,,-	5,000,000,00	9,921,753,00
INCOME	LANE RESOUR ES	16-Hay-66	INCOME	FUNDS FROM ISRAEL		1,460,000,00	11,381,753,00
CAPITAL	MLBIAN VALUES	16-Hay-86	CRP11RL	SCITECH TRIMMERICAN ARMS	150,000,00	.,,,	11,231,753,00
I-DER	OULF PROMETS A.	20-Ray-86	#SINESS	DIRECTORS FEES CSF INV 640101	2,500,00		11,229,253,00
LANTING	VORLL	24-May 86	ALE OPS	EAST IN.	84,894,00		11,144,359,00
LIPSTING.	ALBON WALLES	20-May-86	LAFITAL	SCLITECH	8,833.00		11,135,524,60
CAPTIAL	PLEON VALUES	34-May-86	LAPITAL	MAREL	26,490,00		11,107,034,00
IN THE R	1010	31-Hay-85	PISINESS	DIRECTOPS FEES	2,740,00		11,106,296,00
SHIP	DOLHY	211-11213-86	SHIP	CURRENCY INSURANCE (ADVANCE)	52,904,00		11,053,392,00
LAPS TAL	ALRAN VALUES	21 Nau-64	WITH.	. 16A	26,490,00		11,026,902,00
((BITM)	VORLL	20 194-86	ALFF RAFT	NCE	192,411,09		19,924,491.00
CAPITAL	HYBE PRIN SYMPRE	30-Hau-86	CAPITAL	POTTON	200,000,00		10,724,491.00
CONTRA	IOACO	20 May 86	RHES	PORTUGAL ARMS SES GUN FACCE 67 666 BAD	13.150.00		10,711,241,00
CAPITAL	HE BON VALUES	20-May 86	API IAL	HIKIP	26,490,00		10,484,851,00
CAPITAL	HYDE PRINK SQUARE	21 - May - 86	UPF 19	HBKIN	60.300.00		10,624,551.00
SHP	DOLAY	21-Rau-86	SHIP EIPENSES	= -	5,012.00		10,617,539,00
CONTRA	RLDON VALUES	21-Hau-86	AIR OFS	SOUTHERN AIR TRANSFORT LING	55,000,00		10,564,539,00
CONTRA	PLECH VALUES	21-Hay-As	AIR OFS	SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT JET STAR	50,000,00		10,514,539,00
CONTRA	ALBON VALUES	21-Nay-86	AIR OPS	SOUTHERN ALR TRANSFERT REFUEL	40,100,00		10,474,539.00
CAPITAL	CULF MARKETING	21-May-66	CAPITAL	HRKIM	10,000,00		10.444.539.00
CAPLIAL	HYDE PARK SHARE	22-May-86	(MITAL	SCITETH	100,000,00		10,344,539,00
1RMs	HYBE PARK SAURKE	22-May-86	ALR TPAKSPORT		23,471,00		10,231,068,00
CIR	HYDE PRIOR SOURCE	23-May-86	MAKE	PORTUGAL ARMS SAS CVA	200,000,00		10,131,048,00
IRR	HYDE PARK SO ARE	23-Ray-86	AIR IFS	SOUTHERN ALR THANSPORT	410,000.00		9,721,048,00
CAPITAL	HYBE PARK SCURRE	23-Ray-86	CAPLIAL	HINKIN	500,000,00		9,221,068,00
(18	HYDE PASK SCHARE	22 Pau-86	ARMS	PORTUGAL ARMS SAS GVA	200,000,00		9,021,048.00
SHIP	DOLAY	99- Neb 52	SHIP EXPENSES		20,000,00		9,001,048,00
UNGCOM	HYDE PARY SUIMME	23 May 86	UNKNOWNEL	CASH (CENERAL EXPENSES)	Z.144.00		8,998,974.00
OHER	HYDE PRINK SUMME	27 May-86	BUSINESS	DUSINESS EXPENSE	26,653,00		8,972,271,00
APLIAL	10WL0	27 May 6s	APLIAL	HIVIN	10.000.00		8,962,271,00
I RANK	HYDE PARK SLURGE	15-Nay-86	AIR UPS	SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPART	201,000,00		8,762,771,00
OTHER	HYDE PRIOR SY WEE	28-1147-86	#ISINESS	BI-SINESS EXPENSE	1,604,00		8,760,667,00
CAPITAL	HYBE PANK SURVE	28-May-A6	SECIAL	SCITEUM - STIGI	43,847,00		8,716,820,10
9416	HYDE PROV SAMPLE	28-H3, 86	SHIP	CORSERLY EXCHANGE	26,525,00		8,691,295,00
UNFIRE	TOYCU	65-3-m-86	(AF) TAL	HFK1N	79,167.0		8.611.128.00
APITAL	TOWLO	1.4 -86	AFITAL	L. '16	79, 167,00		8,531,961,170
DINEK	HYDE FARE SOUNLE	Jw 66	MSINESS	BUSINESS EXFENSE	1,1861,181		8,5%,961,00
· API TAL	(i) NLD	11 : 64: 66	1061161	HAGE	74,167,141		8,451,794,00
(PP) IR.	TeM (i	Of the SA	164.9	SITIEM	7,107,III		8,425,404,00
SHIP	30x m/	95 Jun 56		THE PART HERE	•		8,472,279.40
-					5,175,(a)		
SHIP	DOLMY	02-1-w-86	PHILL EXHAUSE?	LINEW WALES - LIMIEF CIRM AND MATE	5,5(#1,1#1		8,416,779.00

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23-Jul-86

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SHIP	DILIN	25 61 35	Sent	SMIF EAFTYLES	4,1 5,IR	2,291,892,100
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(MIIAL	ALBIN VALLES	.4 Ju 86	SPE: IAL	HOWER - JANES, STHUELKA, AND WEINSTER	10.000.00	2,194,032.00
n Æk	ALTON ALIES	_4 Jul 86	166vEL	HOTEL INTERCONTINUATE	7,052,00	2,185,980,00
SHIF	DEM	.5 Ju: -86		AF Fris HORE METER	.125.10	2,183,855,40
Lidige	MYLE PROME : MANE	28 Jul 36	AIR	MEMI EYTAM	196,350,00	1,987,415,10
SHIP	DIEMA	2h 1/1-8o	SHIP EXPENSES	HARTERING SERVICES	15,(#10,18)	1,971,6/5,00
IRA	HIDE PANY SHAKE	20-20-66	Silving	ERIE ZULKER LASH	, , (HI) , (H)	1,979,645,00
LUNTRA	UDALL	2013/41-86	AIR OFS	WINTERO, J.	10,204,00	1,954,401,00
OFFER	V DA LL	86-لدديد	ENSINESS	CLESHIA DEL DESRIE	. 97. 00	1,450,408,40
(MITAL	IDALL	30-101- 86	SPECIAL	HAVER - LILAU NUMBE CHARLES	4,896.00	1,945,512,00
Series	UDHLL	20 kd - 86	FEES	LAMINAMI, JILA	8,900,00	1,937,512,00
nt ₩ £R	UDALL	31-Jul-86	MISTNESS	BUSINESS EXPENSE	40,000,00	1,897,512,00
SHIP	DULNY	21-77-86	SHIP EXPENSES	CAPTAIN NOE HERUP	3.125.00	1,894,367,00
SHIP	DULHY	21 - Jul - 84	SHIP EXPENSES		7,100,00	1,867,287.00
MELTAL	UDALL	vi-Avg-86	SPECIAL	SCLIFEON - STIGI	70,000,00	1,817,287,00
CAPITAL	UDPLL	/4-flue-66	SPECIAL	HAKIN - STANFORD TECHNOLOGY	12,000,00	1,804,287,00 1,804,287,00
942	DOLIN	04-Aug-86	SHIP EXPENSES		12,000,00	
CONTRA	UDA:	U7-Pag-86	AIR	COMPONATE ALIX SERVICES - DECHAY	81,434,00	1,792,287,00
IRRI	ALBIW VALUES	20-Am-86	BUSINESS	BUSINESS EXPENSE (TOR CLINES)	10,000,00	1,710,853.00
CAPITAL	ALBUM VALUES	20-A-10-86	SPECIAL	SCITECH - DANCO ASSOCIATES (STICL)	10,000,00	1,700,853.00
SHIP	DOLW	21-Aug-86		CHAPTERING SA	4,800,00	1, 68 2,053,00
CUNTRA	UDALL	22-Rug-86	AIR OPS	SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT	125,000,00	
CONTRA	TUNCO	22-Aug-86	CONTRA	CRUZ	14,000,00	1,561,053,00 1,547,053,00
1 Refer	UDALL	22 - Pag - 86	ALR TRANSPORT		21,439,00	1,525,614.00
OTHER	UDALL	22-Aug-86	ENSINESS	BUSINESS EXPENSE RVS (SECORD)	7,000,00	
CONTRA	INATO	22-Rug-86	CONTRA	MODEL()	20,000,00	1,518,614,30
CONTRA	UDALL	22-A-g-86	PMESTICALE	N/BINETTE (INVESTIGATE (ASH/ACCT.)	9,000,00	1,489,614,00
SHIP	DOLRY	22-Aug-86		APTAIN AGNE HERUP	6,250,00	1,483,364.00
CONTRA	(IDRLL	22 Aug 66	AIR OPS	EAST IN		1,427,364,00
CUMITRA	TOYLO	22 Nag 66	AIR OPS	WINTERD, K.	56,0%,00 10,000.00	1,417,364.00
(MITAL	TOYCO	25 Aug-86	SPECIAL	SITECH - FORMAY INDUSTRIES (STIGL)	50,000,00	
SHIP	DOL MY	25 Rug-86	SHIP EXPENSES		7,106,00	1,367,364,00
SHIP	DULMY	25 Aug-Bo		LAFTAIN ARME HERUP	6,350,00	1,360,264,00
OTHER	10900	25-Aug-86	BUSINESS	MISTRESS EXPENSE	9,453,00	
CONTRA	UDRLL	In Page 85	ALR/RAFT	A E	46,892,00	1,344,561.00
OTHER	IOVLO	25 Pag-86	NUSTRESS	BUSINESS EXPENSE	500,00	1,297,669,00
CUSTIL	I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	27-A o-86	- AP (TAL	PUBLET BASINESS EN ENSE	258,398,00	1,028,771.00
(AP) IAL	107(0	And So	(APTIAL	HANTA	258,398,00	
(AP) IAL	IUTCG	27-Pag 86	APLIAL	C. TEA	.758,298,00	780,373,00
CIMER	1040		MISTRESS	BISINESS EXPENSE	1,000,00	521,975.00 520,975.00
		27-Mag-86				
CAPITAL	10m.0	.7 Aug-86	LAP!TAL	SCLIECH	01, 221, 68	434,842,00
SMP	90Lmy	28 frag 86	SAIP EXPENSES		15,000,00	419,842,00
OTHER	1070	01 Sep-86	BUSINESS	TOD CODELIS (AM EXP)	51,000,00	368,842,00
CONTRA	1040	03-Sep-86	AIR	(MPCRATE AIR SERVICES	62,018,00	306,824.00
CONTRA	1040	UZ Sep 86	A I TORNEY	TUPL CREEN	15,001,00	291,824.(v)
CONTRA	TOM.	05 Sep-86	AIR OPS	QUINTERO, R.	5,000,00	286,824.00
IAN	10400	(/5:Ser. 86	FEES	LAMPARAMI, JILA	5,000,00	781,824.00
CONTRA	10400	09-5-p-86	CONTRA	(RUZ	7,14(4),140	274,824.00
(ONTRA)	10 Y C0	(19 Sep 86	LINTRA	(e) MELO	10,000,00	264,824.00
CONTRA	104C0	11 Sep 86	AIR OFS	SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPIET	50,000.00	214,824.00

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PIRPOSE	RCCOUNT	MIE	1 454	TERRISHI (1) (M	DEP11	CHEDIT	BPL 100 E
CAPITAL	TUYCO	12-Sep-86	SPECIAL	SCOTECT - STIGE	15,000,00		199,824,00
IRRO	TOYCO	1.º Sec-44	-£ES	LAWFERI, JILA	10,180,00		189,824,00
CUNTRA	TOYCO	12-560-86	ATT(date o	TOM CHEEN	19,000,00		179.824.00
OTHER	TOYCO	18-Sep-86	P-SIMESS	BUSINESS EXPENSE - TON CLINES	2.000.00		177,624,60
CURITRA	HYSE PARK SQUARE	24-5ep-86	AIR UPS	GUINTERO, R.	19,000,00		167,824,00
1000	PLBON VALUES	24-Sep-56	BUSINESS	BUSINESS EXPENSE (10H CLINES)	5,000,00		162,624,00
INCOME	HYBE PAGE SLAURE	24-Sep-86	INCOME	FUNDS FRUM CIA	2,,14	1,200,900,00	1,342,824,60
CONTRA	LANE RESOURCES	25-Sep-86	AIR OPS	EAST INC	14,449,00	.,,,	1,348,375,00
(India)	HYBE PHAN SQUARE	25-Sep-86	ALF TRANSPORT	RENGLERSING	5,729,00		1,342,646,00
CONTRA	TUNCO	25-Sep-86	ALR OPS	SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT	100,000,00		1,242,646,00
(CHTRA)	UDPLL	25-Sep-86	AIR	COMPORATE AIR SERVICES	91,936,00		1,150,710,00
94P	BOLIN	26-Sep-66	SHIP ENPENSES	CREW WRICES	7,100,00	*	1,143,610,00
3 42	BOLIN	26-Sep-86	SHIP EXPENSES	(APTAIN ARKE HERUP	3,125,00		1,140,485,60
34 P	BOLINY	26-Sep-86	SHIP ENFENSES	CAPTAIN ARME HERUP	3,125,00		1,137,340,00
SHIP	DOLINY	27-Sep-86	SHIP EXPENSES	CHATERING OR	13,340,00		1,124,020,00
(PARM	HYDE PARK SQUAKE	30-Sep-86	BUSINESS	BUSINESS EXPENSE WAKIN	51,000,0n	-	1,073,020,00
1 Refer	HVEE PANK SUIME	30-Sep-86	SUM	ERIC Z'ICKER CASA	1,000,00		1,072,020,00
CONTRA	HYDE PARK SHARE	v2-0ct-86	AIR OPS	QUINTERO, R.	5,100,00		1,067,020,00
CAPITAL	HYDE PARK SQUIPE	v3-0ct-86	SPECIAL	SCLITECH - STIGL	25,000,00		1,047,020,00
CAPITAL	HYBE HAW YOUNG	03-0x1 86	CAPLIFAL	HAKIN REIMBURSENEHT	250,000,60		797,020,00
(ONTON	HYBE PANK SQUANF	119-11-86	L (MINA)	PUMELU	10,000,00		782.020.00
CONTRA	WITE PARK SUPPLE	(6-6-56	CONTRA	CRUZ	7,000,00		775,020,00
(AP) TAL	HYME PRIME SALIME	06-0c1-86	SPECIAL	HANTH - STANFORD TECHNOLOGY	30,000,00		745,020,00
(1996)	HYBE PRIOR SQUARE	118-0-1-86	FLES	LANKARANI, JILA	5,740,00		734,280,70
1700	HYSE PARK SUI ALE	46 -9:1-86	HIR HANSPAT	REMULEASING	54,552,00		684,728,00
ባባ ፈ ጸ	HYBE FARK SAUKE	118-11: t-86	BUSINESS	DIRECTOR : FEES	1,872,00		482,854,00
SHIP	BOLTY	15-14:1-86	SMIP EXPENSES	CHARTERING SA	20,000,00		662,856,00
OINER .	HAVE PARK SOURCE	15-0-1-86	BASINES>	MISTRESS EXPENSE - HAKTR	2,40,00		660,856,00
1 Parties	HYDE PANK SCAME	20-uct-66	Alfi	HEIRI EYTAN	251,440,00		409,854,00
CONTINA	HALDE HAUSE ZÖMBRE	22-Oct 86	AT THEY	TOM LAKEEN	20,440,00		387,856,40
ONER	HYDE PAGE SHAME	22-0ct-86	BUSINESS	BUSINESS EXPENSE CASH	2,000,00		387,856.00
i Parise	以底 bush 30.44€	22-961-86	MIR INMISSIONI	MEROLEFISING	19,065,00		368,79°,00
[PAPE	HYLE PARK SOUNIE	27 - (v. t86	Mishess	BUSINESS EXPENSE HAKIN	51,000,60		- 217,741.00
(AM)	HYPE PARK SWAFE	_7-0c1-86	ARMS	CIA	2,4 37,000 ,440	•	(1,719,209,00)
(COL	WHILE PAINT SUMBLE	27 .*! 66	EXPENSES	EXPENSES (DITTON)	40,000,00		(1,759,209,00)
SHIP	BULMY	.76-0/c t-86	SHIF EXPENSES	CAPTAIN ARME HEMP	7,100,00		(1,766,309,00)
SMP	BOLHY	8 U t 86	SHIP EXPENSES	UNPTAIN ARME HERUF	3,125,00		(1,769,434,00)
94P	DUT NA	28 W.L. 86	SHIP EXPENSES	CASTAIN ASME HEREP	3,1.75.00		(1,772,559,01)
011€R	hybe page stable	76 U t 86	BUSINESS	BUSINESS EXPENSE	6,14~1,00		(1,778,559,00)
INCOME	HYBE PARK SOLANE	29-11 1 86	I M. LIVE	FUNDS FRUM IRRN		2,640,440,00	1,821,441.(*)
CAPITAL	HYBE PARK SQUARE	05 Nov-86	SHELIAL	SCITECH - STIGI	50,090,00		1,771,441.00
I CONTRACT	HYBE PANK SQUAFE	115-Mov-86	AIR OPS	QUINTERU, R.	5,000,00		1,766,441.00
OHER	HYBE PRIK SUMME	1/5-14 v=86	BUSINESS	MISTMESS EXPENSE	1,176,00		1,765,265,(*)
CUNTRA	HYDE FANK SJUNFE	(Ŋ·#nv-86	.00369	Rulfito	10,000,00		1,755,765.00
OTHER	HYBE HALL SCHME	+5 Nc • 86	BUSINESS	MISTRESS EXPENSE	10,000,00		1,745,265,00
CUNTRA	HARE HAW PLANE	Ø-₩.n -85	CONTRA	1607	7,000,00		1,738,265.00
∩11€R	HYDE FAMIL SCHARE	the Nov-86	EUSTNESS	EMSINESS EXPENSE	4,671,190		1,735,594,00
IRAN	HYBE FRAN SLUARS	116-16-v - 86	rtt5	two-bount, 11f4	10,000,00		1,7,7,594,00
(AP) (AL	HYDE PRIN STIRK	1 i - Nov - db	HIM	I, IEA	(****, (#)		1,495,594,41
94F	DULRY	11 400-85	SHIP I THEMSES	HETAIN HOE HERIE	7, top .cm		1,680,494,141
(AF) TAL	HYDE PANK SUPPLE	12-Miv-E-	SPECIAL	HINTER - FORMERY OF SECTIONES INC.	Seje .00		1,426,494.90

MINISE	~ y&'	UKTE	rit	fic dasper []-di,	14 61	Cert.	the little b
Uncallage	VOPEL	15 Nov-86	1464459	HISH OF THORPING	1, 7 AU, OH		1,420,794,69
(AP) IAL	WHEN SHIP BOTH	16 H - 86	-Jt 184	ALTE H - STIGI	** , 'MH		1,376,774,00
(#F IRL	HYDE PRIOR STATE	18 N -v-85	SPE: TAL	SCHECK - STIGE	Singular		1,370,294,00
(RP) IRL	PYDE PARK SYMPLE	J Nov-95	SHE IRE	HAVEN STANDING TECHNOLIST	25,000,00		1,145,.94,00
(AP) TAL	HYDE PAGE SUINE	25 5-7-86	SELIA	HARLER - L' AL TO HEIST I HARLES	868,00		1,344,426,0
(MPLTAL	HYDE HAGO SUME	5-Nov-85	SECIAL	SHEET SHOT	51.000.00		1,294,426,00
CONTRA	HYRE PHIN SUMME	26-WW-86	ATTI GOEY	MISTRESS CEPENSE SHEA AND LANDINGS	6,216,00		1,288,210,00
SHIF	BCCHY	27-Nov-86	SHIP EXPENSES		1,125,00		1,285,085,09
SHIP	DOLEY	27-16-4 86	SHIP EXPENSES	LAPIAIN ARM HERAP	3,115,00		1,281,960,00
190000000	HYTE FIXE SQUARE	.6-Nov-86	- Mede Nat	63 CAREY	2 -, 000, 00		1,261,960,00
					. (***,***		1,.61,960,00
				TO BALANCE	(22,490,00)		1,284,450,60
					46,187,196,00	47,471,456,00	
				OTHER INCOME STRAUSS TIAM		2,491,90	1,286,850,00
				INTEREST INCOME		260,237,00	1,547,087.00
				BMIK CHIRGES	74,715.00	•	1,472,372,00
				TELEPHONE CHARGES	1,776.00		1,470,596.00
				OTHER BUSINESS EXPENSES	47,325.00		1,423,271,46
				UTHEN HANGEMENT PRES	882,UD		1,422,389,00
				OTHER DIRECTORS FEES	23,438,00		1,398,951.00
				TAIES	128,00		1,398,823.00
				WHER LEGAL FEES	34,000,00		1, 564, 823, 90
				FHSH BALANCE	1,364,823,00		0,00
				1016g		47,734,093.00	

EXHIBIT OLN-18



TOP SECRET 11/17/86 2000 (Maximum Version)

U.S./IRANIAN CONTACTS AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES

From the earliest months following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the U.S. Government has attempted to reestablish official contact with that government in order to discuss strategic developments in that critical part of the world and to try and reestablish a constructive working relationship. Even before President Reagan came to office the U.S. Government agreed to expand security, economic, political, and intelligence relationships at a pace acceptable to Tehran. In the fall of 1979, the U.S. undertook three secret missions to Tehran:

- -- September 1979
- -- October 1979
- -- October-November 1979 normalization of relations)

discussed

When these meetings and the secret November 1, 1979 meeting in Algiers, between Brzezinski and Prime Minister Bazargan, became public in Iran, they precipitated the takeover of the U.S. Embassy by radical elements and led to the resignation of the Bazargan government. These events have adversely influenced Iran's subsequent willingness to engage in any direct contact with the USG.

Despite mutual difficulties involved in re-establishing normal relations, our strategic interests in the Fermion Gulf mandate persistent efforts on our part to try to establish a dislogue. In this regard, it is notable that only a few major countries do not have relations with Iran -- Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and the United States. Even Iraq continues to have dipEgmatic relations with Irany

Iran, the key to a region of vital importance to the West, is increasingly threatened by growing Soviet military and political influence along its borders and inside its territory. Over the course of the last two years, the Soviets and the last two years, the Soviets are the last two years, the last two years are the last two y

-- The Soviets believe that once Khomeini dies, they will have an excellent opportunity to influence the formation of a government in Tehran which serves Soviet strategic interests in the area.

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Communist nations have become principal arms suppliers to Iran -- making Iran dependent on this source of supply in contending with an increasingly threatening Iraq. This leads us to the conclusion that the Soviets may well be attempting to pursue their own revolution in Iran. That is, by fueling both sides in the conflict, the Soviets could well encourage, a disastrous "final offensive" by Iran that would precipitate a political disintegration is Iran that leaving a power vacuum which the Soviets could exploit. Specifically, the Communist integence in Iran stead from:



The increasing desperation brought on by the costs of the Iran-Iraq war has exacerbated Iran's vulnerability to Soviet influence. Moreover, Soviet designs in Afghanistan, pressure on Pakistan, and actual crossborder strikes in Iran from Afghanistan have made reopening a strategic dialogue increasingly important.

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In short, the Soviets were far better positioned to significantly improve their influence in the region in 1985 when we were presented with an opportunity to open a dialogue with Iran. In deciding to exploit this opening, we evaluated previous efforts through more conventional channels which had not succeeded.

Since 1983, various countries have made overtures to the U.S. and Iran in an effort to stimulate direct contact.

About two years ago, senior Irraian officials apparently decided that some accommodation with the U.S. was necessary. However, internal splits and debates made it difficult for them to respond to these overtures.

Numerous individuals and private parties have likewise attempted to be helpful as intermediaries in establishing contact in Iran or in seeking Iranian assistance in the release of our citizens held hostage in Lebanon.

In 1985, a private American citizen (Hichael Ledeen) was approached by a representative of the Israeli government (David Rimche), who reported that they had established a liaison relationship with an Iranian expatriate (Manuchehr Ghorbanifar) in Europe who sought Israeli help in establishing contact with the U.S. Government. In acknowledging the need to demonstrate the bonafides of the officials involved, he (Ghorbanifar) indicated that his "sponsors" in Tehran could also help to resolve the American hostage situation in Beirut.

The Israelis analyzed this intermediary's background exhaustively in order to validate his legitimacy. This analysis led them to have extremely high confidence in his standing and genuine relationship to the highest Iranian officials. Based in large part upon the Israeli evaluation and in recognition of the clear part upon the Israeli evaluation and in recognition of the clear U.S. interest in a dialogue that might, over time, lead to the moderation of Iranian policies, the U.S. established an indirect contact with the Iranian intermediary in mid-1985, through the private U.S. citizen and a senior Israeli official. These contacts were established through the National Security Council staff with the full knowledge of appropriate Cabinet officers. From the very first meeting with the Israelis and the Iranian, it was emphasized that the USG could not proceed with direct contact unless Iran renounced terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

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In June of 1985, in the midst of the TWA-847 hijacking, the Israeli officials in direct contact with the Iranian expatriate asked him to use his influence with senior Iranian officials to obtain the release of the hijacked passengers. Two days after this approach, four Americans held separately from the rest of the hijacked passengers were freed and turned over to Syrian authorities.

Speaker Rafsenjani, who was travelling in the mid-east at the time, and Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati both intervened with the captors. Rafsenjani, in his speech on November 4, 1986, for the first time publicly acknowledged his role in this matter.

In September of 1981 the Israelis advised that they were close to athieving a Dreakthrough in their contact with Seen and would proceed unless we objected. It is important to note that the U.S. had long been aware of Israeli efforts to maintain discreet contact with Iran and to provide Iran with assistance in its war with Iraq. Despite long-term U.S. efforts to convince the Israelis to desist, Israel continued to provide limited military and industrial technology to Iran. The USG judged that the Israelis would persist in these secret deliveries, despite our objections, because they believed it to be in their strategic interests.

On August 22, 1985, the U.S., through the U.S. citizen intermediary, acquiesed in an Israeli delivery of military supplies (508 TOMS) to Tehran. We were subsequently informed that the delivery had taken place at the end of August, though we were not aware of the shipment at the time it was made. U.S. acquiescence in this Israeli operation was based on a decision at the highest level to exploit existing Israeli channels with Tehran in an effort to establish an American strategic dialogue with the Iranian government.

On September 14, 1985, Reverend Benjamin Meir was released in Beirut by the Islamic Jihad Organization. This release was preceded by an intense effort on the part of Mr. Terry Naite, the Special Emissary of the Archbishop of Canterbury. To this date, Mr. Maite remains the only Westerner to ever meet directly with the Lebanese kidnappers.

On October 4, 1985, Islamic Jihad announced that it had "executed" Seirut Station Chief William Buckley in retaliation for the October 1 Israeli air raid on PLO installations in Tunis. This announcement led to a series of sectings in Europe among the U.S. (CIA and NSC), Israeli, and Iranian intermediaries. In these meetings, the Iranians indicated that, while their ability to influence the Hisbellah was waning, the Hisbellah had not killed

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On August mediary, as (508 TOMs) delivery his aware of the in this Isi level to estable to the contact with Israelis with Is

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Buckley; he had in fact died several months earlier of natural causes. We have since substantiated this information in debriefs of Father Jenco and David Jacobsen, both of whom indicate that Buckley probably died on June 3, 1985 of pneumonia-like symptoms.

In late Movember 1985, the Israelis, responding to urgent entreaties from the Iranians, provided 18 basic RAME missiles to Iran in order to improve the static defenses around Tehran. The Israeli delivery of MAME missiles raised U.S. concerns that we could well be creating misunderstandings in Tehran and thereby jeopardizing our objective of arranging a direct meeting with high-level Iranian officials. These missiles were subsequently returned to Israel in Pebruary 1986, with U.S. assistance. On December 6-8, 1985, the Mational Security Advisor Mit Made Loodon with the Israeli official and the implementation of the mature of our interest in a fine with Irania Atlanta meeting, Mr. McGarlene stated that our sails with the Israeli official and the mature of our interest in a fine with the Mational Mating William Mr. McGarlene stated that our sails with the Israeli official and the mature of our interest in a fine with the Mational Mationa

- Devising a formule for constablishing there of relationship with Tehren
- Inding the Iran-IFeq War on honorabilitierms.
- Convincing Iran to cease its support for taszemen and radacal subversion.
- Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and coordinating ways in which we might counter Soviet activities in the region.

Mr. McFarlane made clear that a Western dialogue with Iran be precluded unless Iran was willing to use its influence to achieve the release of Western hostager in Beirut. He also made clear that we could not and would not engage in trading arms for hostages.

On January 1, 1988, the President approved a covert action Finding directing that the intelligence community proceed with special activities aimed at accomplishing the goals set forth above. In accord with extant statutes, the President directed that the Directoring Coastal Literaligence research to the Finding to the appropriate committees of the Congress until reasonably sure that the lives of those carrying out the operation (both U.S. and foreign) would not be in jeopardy.

On February 5-7, U.S. officials (NSC and CIA representative of the Israeli Prime Ministry (Amiran Nir), and a senior-level Iranian official

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met in Germany. At this meeting, the Iranians agreed that, if the USG would provide TOM weapons to Iran, they would, in turn, provide same to the Afghan Mujahideen. The U.S. agreed to explore this possibility and, working with the Israelis, established the following mechanism for transfer of the weapons:

- The Iranian intermediary (Ghorbanifar) would deposit funds in an Israeli account.
- The Israelis would transfer funds to a sterile U.S.-controlled account in an overseas bank.
- Using these funds, the CIA would covertly obtain material authorised for transfer from 0.5. military stocks and transport this to Israel for onward movement to Iran.

Using the procedures stipulated above, funds were deposited in the CIA account in Geneva on February 11, 1986 and on February 14, 1,000 TOMS were transported to Israel for pre-positioning. The TOMs were off-loaded and placed in a covert Israeli facility

On February 19-21, U.S. and Iranian officials (NSC and CIA) met again in Germany to discuss problems in arranging a meeting among higher-level officials. At this meeting, the U.S. side agreed to provide 1,000 TOWs to Iran as a clear signal of U.S. sincerity. This delivery was commenced on the morning of February 20 and completed in two transits to Tehran on February 21.

On March 7, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israeli representatives met with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether any further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these meetings, the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military effectiveness.



The escalation of tensions with Libya, leading up to the April 14 strike, prevented further dialogue from taking place until the Iraniana urged the intermediary (Ghorbanifar) to accelerate the TOP SECRET DRAFT

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effort in late April, 1986. At that point, the Iranian expatriate advised us that the leadership in Tehran was prepared to commence a secret dialogue with the United States along the lines of our established goals. We believe that the Iranians were stimulated to renew the contact by the April 17 murder of hostage Peter Rilburn on Libys.

Tranian expatriate told the MSC and CIA officers, who set with him in Europe at the end of April, that the Iranians did not wish to be accused of any culpability in Rilburn's death.

Based on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-face with top-level Iranian officials, on May 15, the President authorized a secret mission to Tehran by former National Security Advisor McFarlane, accompanied by a CIA annuitant, CIA communicators, members of the MSC staff, and the Israeli and Iranian interlocutors. In order to ensure operational security, the trip was made from Israel, coincident with the delivery of a pallet of spare parts for Iranian defensive weapons systems (MAWK spare electronic parts). At the specific request of the Iranians, alias foreign documentation

In the course of the four-day (May 25-29) visit, lengthy meetings were held with high-level Iranian officials, the first direct contact between the two governments in over six years. Mr. McFarlane and his team were able to establish the basis for a continuing relationship and clearly articulate our objectives, concerns, and intentions. The group was also able to assess first hand the internal political dynamic in Tehran and the effect of the war which Iran clearly can no longer win. Using Presidentially approved Terms of Reference (Tab A), which had been reviewed and approved by appropriate Cabinet officers, McFarlane emphasised that our interest in Iran transcended the hostages, but the continued detention of hostages by a Lebanese group philosophically aligned with Iran prevented progress. During the visit, Mr. McFarlane made clear:

- -- that we fundamentally opposed Iranian efforts to expel us from the Middle East;
- -- that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism;

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- that we accepted their revolution and did not seek to reverse it;
- --- that we had numerous other disagreements involving regional policies (i.e., Lebanon, Nicaragua, etc.), but might also find areas of common interest (i.e., Afghanistan) through dialogue.

During these meetings, both sides used the opportunity to detail the obstacles to implementing a strategic relationship between the two countries. In addition to the points noted above, Mr. McFarlane emphasized the political problems caused by Iranian involvement in the hostage issue. The Iranians objected to the USG embargo on U.S. military supplies already paid for plus the continued USG blocking of Iranian assets in the U.S., even after U.S. courts had ruled in their favor. During the course of these meetings, the Iranian officials admitted that they could not win the war, but were in a dilemma in Tehran over how to end the conflict given the need to present an Iranian "victory" before it could be concluded. They emphasized that the original aggressor, Saddam Russein, must be removed from power in order for the war to end. Mr. McFarlane concluded the visit by summarizing that notwithstanding Iranian interest in carrying on with the dialogue, we could not proceed with further discussions in light of their unwillingness to exert the full weight of their influence to cause the release of the hostages.

On June 10, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, in a speech in Tehran made guarded reference to Iranian interest in improved relations with the U.S. On July 26, Father Lawrence Jenco was released in the Bekks Veiley and found his way to a Syrian military checkpoint. On August 3, three pallets (less than h planeload) of electronic parts for Iranian anti-aircraft defenses (HAWK missile subcomponents) arrived in Tehran (from Israel).

In early August 1986, the contact with the Iranian expatriate began to focus exclusively on the willingness of the USG to provide military assistance to Iran in exchange for hostages and we sought to establish different channels of communication which would lead us more directly to pragmatic and moderate elements in the Iranian hierarachy. In mid-August, a private American citizen (MGEN Richard Secord, USAF (Ret.)) acting within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe with CIA, this Iranian official (Refsenjani). With the assistance of the CIA, this Iranian (Ali) was brought covertly to Washington for detailed discussions. We judged this effort to be useful in establishing contact with a close confident of the man judged to

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be the most influential and pragmatic political figure in Iran (Rafsanjani). These discussions reaffirmed the basic objectives of the U.S. in seeking a political dialogue with Tehran. We also provided intelligence designed to discourage an Iranian offensive and contribute to an Iranian decision to negotiate an end to the war.

Through August, September, and October 1986, numerous additional meetings were held in Europe between U.S. representatives and the new and Iranian contacts. During the October 26, 1986 meeting in Frankfurt, Germany, the U.S. side, as in the past, insisted that the release of the hostages was a pre-requisite to any progress. The Iranian, and the Alghan resistance

The Iranians also proffered, and the U.S. accepted, the offer of a Soviet T-72 stated that there was a "very good change that another American or two would be reed soon." On October 29, with U.S. acquiscence, Israel provided Iran with an additional increment (500 TOW missiles) of these defensive weapons.

Late on October 31, Called the U.S. citizen (Hakim) tasked to maintain contact and advised that Iran had "exercised its influence with the Lebanese" in order to obtain the release of American -- David Jacobsen -- and an uncertain number of French hostages. He further noted that this was part of the purpose of the Iranian Poreign Minister's visit to Syria. stated that the situation in Tehran, as well as Iranian influence over Eizballah were both deteriorating.

David Jacobsen was driven to a point near the old American Embassy compound in Mest Beirut. The U.S. Embassy in East Beirut immediately dispatched an embassy officer to West Beirut to pick up Mr. Jacobsen.

It is now apparent that persistent U.S. efforts to establish contact with Iran have probably exacerbated the power struggle in Iran between pragmatic elements (led by Rafsanjani) and more radical factions (under the overall sponsorship of Ayatollah Montazeri). In late October, radical supporters (of Montazeri) revealed the (Rafsanjani) contact with the USG and the terms of the contact. In order to defend himself against charges of colluding with the USG and to preserve a degree of latitude for both parties, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani provided a highly fabricated version of the May 1986 McFarlane mission in his

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November 4 address to the masses. Moderate Iranian political leaders apparently now feel constrained to settle their internal political problems before proceeding with the U.S. relationship. The revelations in Tehran regarding the McFarlane mission are demonstrable evidence of the internal power struggle. The October 1986 arrest, of radical leader Mehdi Rashemi, a close confident and son in-law of Aytollah Montesari, for acts of terrorism and treason has caused further internal conflict. Resolution of the Lebanon hostage situation is also complicated by waning Iranian influence in Lebanon due in part to financial constraints and the fact that the Libyans are expendit their contacts with more radical Hisballah elements.

Despite these internal directed time attendant publicity in the Mestern media, the Demissurful tinue to maintain direct contact with the USG and met again in Geneva on November 9-10 with MSC and CIA representatives.

It is interest to note that since the initiation of the USG contact will Iran there has been no evidence of a sian government complicity in acts of the contact the last. Wa believe that the September-October kidneppings of Messel. Meed, Cicippio, and Tracy were undertaken in an effort to undertaken the nasocat U.S.-Iranian strategic dialogue and exacerbate the internetion transan power struggle against the moderate faction with which have been in contact.

Contrary to speculative reports that these hostages were taken in order to stimulate the acquisition of more arms, they were most likely captured in order to prevent the very rapproachment with Iran we are seeking.

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Throughout this process, the USG has acted within the limits of established policy and in compliance with all U.S. law. The shipment of 2,000 TOWs and 235 HAMK missile parts was undertaken under the provisions of a govert action finding.

In support of this finding and at the direction of the President, the CIA provided the following operational assistance:

- -- Sterile overseas bank accounts for financial transactions.
- -- A secure transhipment point for the dispatch of U.S. military items from the U.S.
- -- Transhipment of military items from the U.S. to Israel.
- -- Communications and intelligence support for the meetings with Erenian officials and the Hoferlane trip to Tehran in Hay.
- -- Cleared meeting sites in Europe for meetings with Iranies officials.
- -- Alias documentation for U.S. and foreign officials for meetings in Europe and Tehran.

The weapons and materiel provided under this program are in no way adequate to alter the balance of military power nor the outcome of the war with Iraq. They have, however, had a positive effect on the Afghan resistance and demonstrated the U.S. commitment to Iranian territorial integrity. Further, U.S. efforts over the last 18 months have had tangible results on Iranian policy:

- -- The Rafsanjani/Velayati intervention on behalf of the TWA #847 passengers (June 1985).
- -- Iranian direction that the hijacked Pan Am #73 could not leave Karachi for Iranian territory.

-- The release of three American and two French hostages.

It should also be noted that the U.S. arms embargo notwithstanding, West European nations have provided \$500 million a year in military equipment to Iran. Most of these transfers were accomplished with government knowledge and/or acquiescence.

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All appropriate Cabinet Officers have been apprised throughout. The Congress was not briefed on the covert action Finding due to the extraordinary sensitivity of our Iranian contacts and the potential consequences for our strategic position in Southwest Asia. Finally, our efforts to achieve the release of the hostages in Lebanon must continue to rely on discreet contacts and intermediaries who cannot perform if they are revealed.




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U.S./IRANIAN CONTACTS AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES

From the earliest months following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the U.S. Government has attempted to reestablish official contact with that government in order to discuss strategic developments in that critical part of the world and reconstruct a working relationship. Even before President Reagan came to office the U.S. Government agreed to try to expand security, economic, political, and intelligence relationships at a pace acceptable to Tehran. In the fall of 1979, the U.S. undertook three secret missions to Tehran:

September 1979 - (Transans) (met secretly with Bazargan at the

October 1979 - @

October-November 1979 - normalization of relations

When these meetings and the secret November 1, 1979 meeting in Algiers, between Brzezinski and Prime Minister Bazargan, became public in Iran, they helped precipitate the takeover of the U.S. Embassy by radical elements and led to the resignation of the Bazargan government. These events have adversely influenced Iran's subsequent willingness to engage in any direct contact with the USC. with the USG.

Despite mutual difficulties involved in re-establishing normal relations, our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf mandate persistent efforts to establish a dialogue. In this regard, it is notable that only a few major countries do not have relations with Iran -- Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and the United States. Even Iraq continues to have diplomatic relations with Iran.

Iran, the key to a region of vital importance to the West, is increasingly threatened by growing Soviet military power and political influence along its borders and inside its territory. Over the course of the last two years the Sovieta and their surrogates have moved actively terminal influence in the Gulf:

The Soviets believe that once Khomeini dies, they will have an excellent opportunity to influence the formation of a government in Tehran that serves Soviet strategic interests in the area.

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
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Communist nations have become the principal arms suppliers to Iran -- making Iran dependent on this source of supply in contending with an increasingly strengthened Iraq. This leads us to the conclusion that the Soviets may well be attempting to pursue their own revolution in Iran. That is, by fueling both sides in the conflict, the Soviets could well encourage a disastrous "final offensive" by Iran that would precipitate a political disintegration in Iran, leaving a power versum which the Soviets could exploit. Specifically, the indicators of Chemunist influence in Iran are:



The increasing desperation brought on by the costs of the Iran-Iraq war has exacerbated Iran's vulnerability to Soviet influence. Moreover, Soviet designs in Afghanistan, pressure on Pakistan, and actual crossborder strikes in Iran from Afghanistan have made reopening a strategic dialogue increasingly important.

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In short, the Soviets were far better positioned to improve significantly their influence in the region in 1985 when we were presented with an opportunity to open a dialogue with Iran. In deciding to exploit this opening, we evaluated previous efforts through more conventional channels which had not succeeded.

About two years ago, senior Iranian officials apparently decided that some accommodation with the U.S. was necessary. Since 1983 various countries have made overtures to the U.S. and Iran in an effort to Stimulate direct contact.

However, internal splits and debates made it difficult for the Iranians to respond to these overtures.

Numerous individuals and private parties have likewise attempted to be helpful as intermediaries in establishing contact in Iran or in seeking Iranian assistance in the release of our citizens held hostage in Lebanon.

In 1985, a private American citizen (Michael Ledeen) was approached by a representative of the Israeli government (David Kimche), who reported that they had established a liaison relationship with an Iranian expatriate (Manuchehr Ghorbanifar) in Europe who sought Israeli help in establishing contact with the U.S. Government. In acknowledging the need to demonstrate the bonafides of the officials involved, he (Ghorbanifar) indicated that his "sponsors" in Tehran could also help to resolve the American hostage situation in Beliut.

The Israelis analyzed this intermediary's background exhaustively in order to validate his legitimacy. This analysis led them to have extremely high confidence in his standing and genuine relationship to the highest Iranian officials. Based in large part upon the Israeli evaluation and in recognition of the clear U.S. interest in a dialogue that might, over time, lead to the moderation of Iranian policies, the U.S. established an indirect contact with the Iranian intermediary in mid-1985, through the private U.S. citizen and a senior Israeli official. These contacts were established through the Mational Security Council staff with the full knowledge of appropriate Cabinet officers. From the very first meeting with the Israelis and the Iranian, it was emphasized that the USG could not proceed with direct contact unless Iran renounced terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

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In June of 1985, in the midst of the TWA-847 hijacking, the Israeli officials in direct contact with the Iranian expatriate asked him to use his influence with senior Iranian officials to obtain the release of the hijacked passengers. Two days after this approach, four Americans held separately from the rest of the hijacked passengers were freed and turned over to Syrian authorities.

[Hajlis Speaker Rafsanjani, who was travelling in the mid-east at the time, and Iranian Poreign Minister Velayati both intervened with the captors. Rafsanjani, in his speech on November 4, 1986, for the first time publicly acknowledged his role in this matter.

In September of 1985, the Israelis advised that they were close to achieving a breakthrough in their contact with Iren and would proceed unless we objected. It is important to note that the U.S. had long been aware of Israeli efforts to maintain discreet contact with Iran and to provide Iran with assistance in its war with Iraq. Despite long-term U.S. efforts to convince the Israelis to desist, Israel continued to provide limited military and industrial technology to Iran. The USG judged that the Israelis would persist in these secret deliveries, despite our objections, because they believed it to be in their strategic interests.

On August 22, 1985, the U.S., through the U.S. citizen intermediary, acquiesed in a single Israeli delivery of military supplies (508 TOMs) to Tehran. We were subsequently informed that the delivery had taken place at the end of August, though we were not specifically aware of the shipment at the time it was made. U.S. acquiescence in this Israeli operation was based on a decision at the highest level to exploit existing Israeli channels with Tehran in an effort to establish an American strategic dialogue with the Iranian government. The single entire operation, to include delivery, arrangements, funding, and transportation. The total value of this shipment was less than \$2 million and, therefore, below the threshold for required reporting of a military equipment transfer under the Arms Export Control Act.

On September 14, 1985, Reverend Benjamin Weir was released in Beirut by the Islamic Jihad Organization. This release was preceded by an intense effort on the part of Mr. Terry Waite, the Special Emissary of the Archbishop of Canterbury. To this date, Mr. Waite remains the only Westerner to ever meet directly with the Lebanese kidnappers.

On October 4, 1985, Islamic Jihad announced that it had "executed" Beirut Station Chief William Buckley in retaliation for the October 1 Israeli air raid on PLO installations in Tunis. This announcement led to a series of meetings in Europe among the U.S. (CIA and NSC), Israeli, and Iranian intermediaries. In these meetings, the Iranians indicated that, while their ability to

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influence the Hizballah was waning, the Hizballah had not killed Buckley; he had in fact died several months earlier of natural causes. We have since substantiated this information in debriefs of Father Jenco and David Jacobsen, both of whom indicate that Buckley probably died on June 3, 1985 of pneumonia-like symptoms.

In late November 1985, the Israelis, responding to urgent entreaties from the Iranians, provided 18 the HAMK missiles to Iran in order to improve the static defenses around Tehran. The Israeli delivery of HAMK missiles raised U.S. concerns that we could well be creating misunderstandings in Tehran and thereby jeopardizing our objective of arranging a direct meeting with high-level Iranian officials. By mutual agreement of all three parties, those missiles were subsequently returned to Israel in February 1986. On December 6-8, 1985, dischartional Security Advisor met (in London) with the Idraeli ficial and the Iranian contact to make clear the mastere of our interest in a dialogue with Iran. At this meeting, Mare Maregiane stated that our goals were as follows:

- Devising a formula for re-establishing a strategic relationship with Tehran.
- Ending the Iran-Iraq War on honorable terms.
- Convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism and radical subversion. $\hfill \pm$
- Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and coordinating ways in which we might counter Soviet activities in the region.

Mr. McFarlane made clear that a Western dialogue with Iran would be precluded unless Iran ware willing to use its influence to achieve the release of Western hostages in Beirut. He also made clear that we could not and would not engage in trading arms for hostages.

On January 17, 1986, the President approved a covert action Finding directing that the intelligence community proceed with special activities aimed at accomplishing the goals set forth above. In accord with extant statutes athe President directed that the Director of Central Intelligence refrain from reporting the Finding to the appropriate committees of the Congress until reasonably sure that the lives of those carrying out the operation (both U.S. and foreign) would not be in jeopardy.

On February 5-7, U.S. officials (NSC and CIA (Amiram Nir), and a representative of the Israeli Prime Ministry (Amiram Nir), and a senior-level Iranian officia

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At this meeting, the Iranians agreed that, if the USG would provide TOW weapons to Iran, they would, in turn, provide same to the Afghan Mujahideen. The U.S. agreed to explore this possibility and, working with the Israelis, established the following mechanism for transfer of the weapons:

- -- The Iranian intermediary (Ghorbanifar) would deposit funds in an Israeli account.
- -- The Israelis would transfer funds to a sterile U.S.-controlled account in an overseas bank.
- -- Using these funds, the CIA would covertly obtain material authorized for transfer from U.S. military stocks and transport this to Israel for onward movement to Iran.

Using the procedures stipulated above, funds were deposited in the CIA account in Geneva on February 11, 1986 and on February 14 1,000 TOWS were transported to Israel for pre-positioning. These TOWS were transferred by CIA from DO 18.5. Army stacks in Anniston, Alabama) and transported through legistics arrangements. Posity-level coordination for these arrangements was effected by NSC (North) with DOD (Armitage and Kooh) and CIA (Clair George). The TOWS were placed in a covert Israeli facility awalling onward shipment.

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On March 7, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israeli representatives met with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether any further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these meetings, the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military effectiveness.



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The escalation of tensions with Libya, leading up to the April 14 strike, prevented further dialogue from taking place until the Iranians urged the intermediary (Ghorbanifar) to accelerate the effort in late April, 1986. At that point, the Iranian expatriate advised us that the leadership in Tehran was prepared to commence a secret dialogue with the United States along the lines of our established goals. We believe that the Iranians were stimulated to renew the contact by the April 17 murder of hostage Peter Rilburn by Libyan authorities, in retaliation for the U.S. raid on Libya.

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- -- that we fundamentally opposed Iranian efforts to expel us from the Middle East;
- -- that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism;

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U.S./IRANIAN CONTACTS AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES

From the earliest months following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the U.S. Government has attempted to reestablish official contact with that government in order to discuss strategic developments in this critical part of the world and reconstruct a working relationship. Even before President Rusqua came to office the U.S. Government agreed to try to expand security, economic, political, and intelligence relationships at a pace acceptable to Tehran. In the fall of 1979, the U.S. undertook three secret missions to Tehran:

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Despite mutual difficulties involved in re-establishing normal relations, our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf mandate persistent efforts to establish a dialogue. In this regard, it is notable that only a few major countries do not have relations with Iran -- Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and the United States. Even Iraq continues to have diplomatic relations with Iran.

Iran is the key to a region of vital importance to the West, yet it is increasingly threatened by growing Soviet military power and political influence along its borders and inside its territory. Over the course of the last two years, the Soviets and their surrogates have moved actively to gain greater influence in the Gulf:

The Soviets believe that once Khomeini dies, they will have an excellent opportunity to influence the formation f a government in Tehran that serves Soviet strategic interests in the area.

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
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Communist nations have become the principal arms suppliers to Iran -- making Iran dependent on this source of supply in contending with an increasingly strengthened Iraq. This leads us to the conclusion that the Soviets may well be attempting to pursue their own revolution in Iran. That is, by fueling both sides in the conflict, the Soviets could well encourage a disastrous "final offensive" by Iran that would precipitate a political disintegration in Iran, leaving a power vacuum which the Soviets could exploit. Specifically, the indicators of Communist influence in Iran-are:

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In short, the Soviets were far better positioned to improve significantly their influence in the region in 1985 when we were presented with an opportunity to open a dialogue with Iran. In deciding to exploit this opening, we evaluated previous efforts through more conventional channels which had not succeeded.

About two years ago, senior Iranian officials apparently decided that some accommodation with the U.S. was necessary. Since 1983, various countries have made overtures to the U.S. and Iran in an effort to stimulate direct contact.

However, internal splits and debates made it difficult for the Iranians to respond to these overtures.

Numerous individuals and private parties have likewise attempted to be helpful as intermediaries in establishing contact in Iran or in seeking Iranian assistance in the release of our citizens held hostage in Lebanon.

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The Israelis analysed this intermediary's background exhaustively in order to validate his legitimacy. This analysis led them to have extremely high confidence in his standing and genuine relationship to the highest Iranian officials. Based in large part upon the Israeli evaluation and in recognition of the clear U.S. interest in a dialogue that might, over time, lead to the moderation of Iranian policies, the U.S. established an indirect contact with the Iranian intermediary in mid-1985, through the private U.S. citizen and a senior Israeli official. These contacts were established through the Mational Security Council staff with the full knowledge of appropriate Cabinet officers. From the very first meeting with the Israelis and the Iranian, it was emphasized that the USG could not proceed with direct contact unless Iran renounced terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

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Speaker Rafsahjani, who was travelling in the mid-east at the time, and Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati both intervened with the captors. Rafsahjani, in his speech on November 4, 1986, for the first time publicly acknowledged his role in this matter.

In July of 1985, the Israelis advised that they believed they were close to achieving a breakthrough in their contact with Iran and would proceed unless we objected. It is important to note that the U.S. had long been aware of Israeli efforts to maintain discreet contact with Iran and that they had in the past provided Iran with assistance in its war with Iraq. Despite long-term U.S. efforts to convince the Israelis to desist, we believe that Israel continued to provide limited military and industrial technology to Iran -- even after they officially told us that such activities had ceased. The USG judged that the Israelis would persist in these secret deliveries, despite our objections, because they believed it to be in their strategic interests.

On August 22, 1985, a senior Israeli official (David Kimche) visited Washington and met with the National Security Advisor. The Israeli asked us to acquiesce in a single Israeli delivery of defensive military materiel to Tehran. He urged that we allow such an action to take place in order to gain increased influence in Tehran. Mr. McFarlane stated that the U.S. could in no way be construed as an "arms for hostages" weal and that there could be no guarantee that whatever items of U.S. origin Israel sent, could be replaced. We were subsequently informed that the Israelis had delivered 508 TOWs at the end of August. Though we were not specifically aware of the shipment at the time it was made we did make a subsequent decision not to expose this Israeli operation so that we would have the option of exploiting existing Israeli channels with Tehran in our own effort to establish an American strategic dialogue with the Iranian government. The Israelis managed this entire operation, to include delivery, arrangements, funding, and transportation. The total value of this shipment was less than \$2 million and, therefore, below the threshold for required reporting of a military equipment transfer under the **Emps Export Control Act.*

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On October 4, 1985, Islamic Jihad announced that it had "executed" Beirut Station Chief William Buckley in retaliation for the October 1 Israeli air raid on PLO installations in Tunis. This announcement led to a series of meetings in Europe among the U.S. (CIA and NSC), Israeli, and Iranian intermediaries. In these meetings, the Iranians indicated that, while their ability to influence the Hizballah was waning, the Hizballah had not killed Buckley; he had in fact died several months earlier of natural causes. We have since substantiated this information in debriefs of Father Jenco and David Jacobsen, both of whom indicate that Buckley probably died on June 3, 1985 of pneumonia-like symptoms.

In late November 1985, the Israelis, responding to urgent entreaties from the Iranians, provided 18 HAWK missiles to Iran in order to improve the static defenses around Tehran. The Israeli delivery of HAWK missiles raised U.S. concerns that we could well be creating misunderstandings in Tehran and thereby jeopardizing our objective of arranging a direct meeting with high-level Iranian officials. As a consequence of U.S. initiative and by musual agreement of all three parties, these missiles were subsequently returned to Israel in February 1986. On December 6-8, 1985, the National Security Advisor met (in London) with the Israeli official and the Iranian contact to make clear the nature of our interest in a dialogue with Iran. At this meeting, Mr. McFarlane stated that our goals were as follows:

- Devising a formula for re-establishing a strategic relationship with Tehran.
- Ending the Iran-Iraq War on honorable terms.
- Convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism and radical subversion.
- Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and coordinating ways in which we might counter Soviet activities in the region.

Mr. McFarlane made clear that a Markens dialogue with Iran would be precluded unless Iran were Willing to use its influence to achieve the release of Western hostages in Beirut. He also made clear that we could not and would not engage in trading arms for hostages.

On December 14, the President-met, in the residence with the Secretaries of State and Defunse, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence and the National Security Advisor to review the findings of Nr. McFarlane's meetings in London, the situation in Iran and the prospects for a strategic dialogue. At this meeting he decided that we should attempt to keep the Israeli channel open as long as it offered possibilities for meetings with high-level Iranian officials.

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On January 2, the Prime Minister of Israel dispatched a special emissary to the U.S. (Amiram Nir) to review proposals for next steps in dealing with Iran. In that implementation of the Israeli proposals would require the active participation of the intelligence community, the NSC Staff (North) was tasked to prepare a covert action finding. Mork on this Presidential finding convened on January 5 and the document was forwarded to the President on January 15 after it had been reviewed by appropriate MSC officials.

On January 17, 1986, the President approved a covert action Finding directing that the intelligence community proceed with special activities simed at accomplishing the goals set forth above (Tab A). In accord with extant statutes, the President directed that the Director of Central Intelligence refrain from reporting the '''. 'ing to the appropriate committees of the Congress until reasonably sure that the lives of those carrying out the operation (both U.S. and foreign) would not be in jeopardy.

On Pebruary 5-7, U.S. officials (NSC and CI representative of the Israeli Prime Ministry (Amiram Nir), and a senior-level Iranian official

met in Germany. At this meeting, the Iranians agreed that, if the USG would provide defensive weapons (TOWs) to Iran, they would, in turn, provide same to the Afghan Mujahideen. The U.S. side agreed to explore this possibility and, working with the Israelis, established the following mechanism for transfer of the weapons:

- -- The Iranian intermidiary (Ghorbanifar) would deposit fulls in an Israell account.
- -- The Israelis would transfer funds to a sterile U.S.controlled-account in an overseas bank.
- -- Using these funds, the CIA would covertly obtain material authorized for transfer from U.S. military stocks and transport this to Israel der onward movement to Iran.

Using the procedures stipulated above, funds were deposited in the CIA account in Geneva on February 11, 1986 and on February 14,000 TOWS were transported to Israel for pre-positioning. These TOWS were transferred by CIA from DOD (U.S. Army stocks in

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
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Anniston, Alabama) and transported through using standard CIA-DOD logistics arrangements. Policy-level coordination for these arrangements was effected by NSC (North) with DOD (Armitage) and CIA-(Chair George). The TOMS were placed in a covert Israeli facility awaiting onward shipment.

On February 19-21, U.S. (NSC and CIA), Israeli and Iranian officials met in Germany to discuss problems in arranging a meeting among higher-level officials. At this meeting, the U.S. side agreed to provide 1,000 TOWs to Iran as a clear signal of U.S. sincerity. This delivery was commenced on the morning of February 20 and completed in two transits to Tehran on February 21. Transportation from Israel to Iran was aboard a false flag Misraeli aircraft.



On February 28, the Prime Minister of Israel wrote to President Reagan (Tab B) urging continued efforts to achieve a strategic breakthrough with Iran, but asking consideration for the safety of recently seized Israeli hostages.

On March 7, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israeli representatives met with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether any further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these meetings, the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military effectiveness.

The escalation of tensions with Libya, leading up to the April 14 strike, prevented further dialogue from taking place until the Iranians urged the intermediary (Ghorbanifar) to accelerate the effort in late April, 1986. At that point, the Iranian expatriate advised us through the Israeli point-of-contact that the leadership in Tehran was prepared to commence a secret dialogue with the United States along the lines of our established goals. We believe that the Iranians were stimulated to renew the contact by the April 17 murder of hostage Peter Kilburn by Libyan authorities, in retaliation for the U.S. raid on Libya.

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The Iranian expatriate told the NSC and CIA officers, who met with him in Europe at the end of April, that the Iranians did not wish to be accused of any culpability in Kilburn's death.

On May 6, 7, 1986, U.S. and Israeli officers met in London with the Iranian intermediary in which he urged that we take immediate steps to arrange for a high-level U.S./Iranian meeting in Tehran. During the London meeting, the Iranian urged that we (U.S. and Israel) take immediate steps to help with Iranian air defense. He emphasized that the Iranians were desperate to stop attacks on population centers. The Israelis also used this opportunity to privately ask the U.S. to replace the 508 TOWs which they had sent to Iran in August, 1985. The Israelis were informed via coded message on May 15 that the U.S. had agreed to the Iranian request for limited anti-air defense equipment and to replenish the 508 TOWs sent by Israel.

Based on resurrances that we could as last must face-to-face with top-level Iranian officials, on may 15, the President authorized a secret mission to Tehran by former National Security Advisor McFarlane, accompanied by a CIA annuitant, CIA communicators, members of the NSC staff, and the Israeli and Iranian interlocutors.

On May 16, the Iranians, through the Israelis provided \$6.5M for deposit in the CIA secure funding mechanism. The funds were used to acquire 508 TOW missiles (for replenishing the TOWs Israel shipped in September 1986) and acquiring HAWK missile sparsparts. This material was subsequently moved to repackaged and shipped tendelly AFE_CES_award_rev_let_to Israel on May 22. As in the restrict shipped to the movement of this material to Israel.

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In the course of the four-day (May 25-29) visit, lengthy meetings were held with high-level Iranian officials, the first direct contact between the two governments in over six years. Mr. McFarlane and his team were able to establish the basis for a continuing relationship and clearly articulate our objectives, concerns, and intentions. The group was also able to assess first hand the internal political dynamic in Tehran and the effect of the war which Iran clearly can no longer win. Using Presidentially approved Terms of Reference (Tab B), which had been reviewed and approved by appropriate Cabinet officers, McFarlane emphasized that our interest in Iran transcended the hostages, but the continued detention of hostages by a Lebanese group philosophically aligned with Iran prevented progress. During the visit, Mr. McFarlane made clear:

- -- that we fundamentally opposed Iranian efforts to expel us from the Hiddle East;
- -- that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism;
- -- that we accepted their revolution and did not seek to reverse it;
- -- that we had numerous other disagreements involving regional policies (i.e., Lebanon, Nicaragua, etc.), but might also find areas of common interest (i.e., Afghanistam) through dialogue.

During these meetings, both sides used the opportunity to detail the obstacles to implementing a strategic relationship between the two-countries.—In-addition-to-the points noted above, Mr. McFarlane emphasized the political problems caused by Iranian involvement in the hostage issue. The Iranians objected to the USG embargo on U.S. mulitary supplies already paid for plus the continued USG blocking of Iranian assets in the U.S., even after U.S. courts had ruled in their favor. During the course of these meetings, the Iranian officials admitted that they could not win the war, but were in a dilemma in Tehran over how to end the conflict given the need to present an Iranian "victory" before it could be concluded. They emphasized that the original aggressor, Saddam Mussein, must be removed from power in order for the war to end. Mr. McFarlane concluded the visit by summarizing that notwithstanding Iranian interest in carrying on with the dialogue, we could not proceed with further discussions in light of their unwillingness to exert the full weight of their influence to cause the release of the Western hostages in Lebanon.

On June 10, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, in a speech in Tehran made quarded reference to Iranian interest in improved relations with the U.S. On July 26, Father Lawrence Jenco was released in the Bekka Valley and found his way to a Syrian military checkpoint.

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On August 3, the remaining three pallets (less than & planeload) of electronic parts for Iranian anti-aircraft defenses (HAWK missile sub-components) arrived in Tehran. As in all flights to/from Iran this delivery was made with an Israeli Air Porce aircraft (707) using false flag markings. Timing of the delivery was based on coordination among U.S., Israeli and Iranian officials.

In early August 1986, the contact with the Iranian expatriate began to focus exclusively on the willingness of the USG to began to focus exclusively on the willingness of the USG to provide military assistance to Iran in exchange for hostages and we sought to establish different channels of communication which would lead us more directly to pragmatic and moderate elements in the Iranian hierarachy. In mid-August, a private American citizen (MGEN Richard Secord, USAF (Ret.)) acting within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe within the purview of the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe Within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe Within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe Within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe Within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe Within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe Within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe Within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe Within the January Covert Action Finding, made contact in Europe Within be the most influential and pragmatic political figure in Iran (Rafsanjani). These discussions reaffirmed the basic objectives of the U.S. in seeking a political dialogue with Tehran. We also provided intelligence designed to discourage an Iranian offensive and contribute to an Iranian decision to negotiate an end to the The intelligence also detailed the Soviet threat to Iran.

- Through August, September, and October 1986, numerous additional meetings were held in Europe between U.S. representatives and the new and Iranian contacts. During the October 26, 1986 meeting in new and Iranian contacts. Frankfurt, Germany, the U.S. side, as in the past, insisted that the release of the hostages was a pre-requisite to any progress. The Iranian urged that we take a more active role in support for the Afghan resistance and suggested again that, if we could provide additional TOW weapons to fran, they would train we could provide additional TOW weapons to Iran, the would train and equip more Afghan resistance fighters with these weapons. The Iranians also proffered, and the U.S. accepted, the offer of a Soviet T-72 tank. At this meeting that there was a very good chance that another American or two would be freed soon. On October 29, with U.S. acquiscence, Israel provided Iran with an additional increment of defensive weapons (500 TOW missiles).

Late on October 31 Falled the U.S. citizen (Hakim) tasked to maintain contact and auvised that Iran had "exercised its influence with the Lebanese" in order to obtain the release of an American -- David Jacobsen -- and an uncertain number of French hostages. He further noted that this would be

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part of the purpose of the Iranian Foreign Minister's visit to Syria -- an event we became aware of on November 1, 1986. stated that the situation in Tehran, as well as Iranian influence over Misballih were both deteriorating

2, David Jacobsen was released by his captors near the old American Embassy compound in West Beirut. The U.S. Embassy in East Beirut immediately dispatched an embassy officer to West Beirut to pick up Mr. Jacobsen.

It is now apparent that persistent U.S. efforts to establish contact with Iran and subsequent public speculation regarding these contacts have probably exacerbated the power struggle in Iran between pragmatic elements (led by Rafsanjani) and more radical factions (under the overall sponsorship of Ayatollah Montaseri). In late October, radical supporters (of Montaseri) revealed the (Rafsanjani) contact with the USG and the terms of the contact. In order to defend himself against charges of colluding with the USG and to presente a degree of latitude for both parties, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani provided a purposely distorted version of the May 1986 McFarlane mission in his

November 4 address to the masses. Moderate Iranian political leaders apparently now feel constrained to settle their internal political problems before proceeding with the U.S. relationship. The revelations in Tehran regarding the McFarlane mission are domonstrable evidence of the internal power struggle. The October 1986 arrest of radical leader Mehdi Hashemi, a close confident and son in-law of Ayatollah Montezari, for acts of terrorism and treason has caused further internal conflict.

Resolution of the Lebanon hostage situation is also complicated by waning Iranian influence in Lebanon due in part to financial constraints and the fact that the Libyans are expanding their contacts with more radical Hizballah elements.

On November 7, the day after a meeting with U.S. officials,
_Iranian_government authorities arrested six other individuals

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involved in radical activities. Among the two were senior military officers and a Majlis deputy (Ahmad Rashani), the grandson of Ayatollah Kashani, a conspirator in the 1949 attempt against the Shah. Despite these internal difficulties and attendant publicity in the Western media, the Iranians continue to maintain direct contact with the USG and met again on November 9-10 with NSC and CIA representatives

It is important to note that since the initiation of the USG contact with Iran there has been no evidence of Iranian government complicity in acts of irrorism against the U.S. We believe that the September-October kidnappings of Massacs. Reed, Cicippio, and Tracy were undertaken in an effort to indepting the nascent U.S.-Iranian strategic dialogue and emicrobellation internal Iranian power struggle against the moderator diction with which we have been in contact.

Contrary to speculative remains that have hostaged were talked inverded to attimulate the attimulation of seems arms, they were most likely captured in order to frequency arms, rapproachment with Iran we are seeding and the service of the limits of established policy and in compliance with all U.S. law. The shipment of 2,008 U.S. TOMS and 235 HAME missile parts was undertaken under the provisions of a covert action Finding.

During the course of the operation went before with U.S. was cognizant of only two shipments from Reseal to Iray.

Specifically,

- The Israelis achievement the market live stimment of 708 TOWN after the tiken place that I we were advised by the Israelis, and had the informationable sequently confirmed by Iranian authorities we were unautre of the composition of the shipment. We subsequently agreed to replace these TOWs in May of 1986.
- The October 1986 shipment of 500 TOWs from Establish was undertaken with U.S. acquisecency. These TOWs were replaced on Movember 7, 3
- -- The Movember 1985 shipment of Strawli HAMK missiles was not an authorized exception to policy. This shipment was eventually retrieved in February 1986 as a consequence of U.S. intervention.

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In support of this Finding and at the direction of the President, the CIA provided the following operational assistance:

- -- Sterile overseas bank accounts for financial transactions.
- -- A secure transhipment point for the dispatch of U.S. military items from the U.S.
- -- Transhipment of military items from the U.S. to Israel.
- -- Communications and intelligence support for the meetings with Iranian officials and the McFarlane trip to Tehran in May.
- -- Cleared meeting sites in Europe for meetings with Iranian officials.
- -- Miss documentation for U. Wast foreign officials for meetings in Europe and Tehran.

The weapons and madiries provided under this program were judged to be inadequate on alter either the belance of military power or the outcome of the life with rest They have become the U.S.

commitment to Isahian territories integrity and served to support those in Iran interested in opening a strategic relationship with the U.S. They have also furthered U.S. efforts over the last 18 months have had tangible results on Iranian policy:

- -- The Rafsanjani/Velayati intervention on behalf of the TWA #847 passengers (June 1985).
- -- Iranian direction that the hijacked Pan Am #73 would not be received in Iranian territory if it left Karachi.



- -- The release of three American and at least two French hostages.
- -- The initiation of an Iranian dialogue with their regional neighbors.
- --. The Iranian "final offensive."

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
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Finally, it must also be noted that the U.S. arms embargo notwithstanding, West European nations have provided \$500 million a year in military equipment to Iran. Most of these transfers were accomplished with government knowledge and/or acquiescence.

All appropriate Cabinet Officers have been apprised throughout. The Congress was not briefed on the covert action Finding due to the extraordinary sensitivity of our Iranian contacts and the potential consequences for our strategic position in Southwest Asia. Finally, our efforts to achieve the release of the hostages in Lebanon must continue to rely on discreet contacts and intermediaries who cannot perform if they are revealed.

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
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U.S. / IRANIAN CONTACTS AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES

from the earliest months following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the U.S. Government has attempted to restablish official contact with that government in order to discuss strategic developments in this critical part of the world and reconstruct a working relationship. Even before President Reagan came to office the U.S. Government agreed to try to expand security, economic, political, and intelligence relationships at a pace acceptable to Tehran. In the fall of 1979, the U.S. undertock three secret missions to Tehran:

September 1979 limes secretly with Basargan as the

October 1979 -

October-November 1979 - normalization of relations:

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when these meetings and the secret November 1, 1979 meeting in Algiers, between Briesinski and Prime Hinister Bazargan, terme public in Iran, they helped precipitate the takeover of the I.S. Embassy by radical elements and led to the resignation of the Bazargan government. These events have adversely influenced Iran's subsequent willingness to engage in any direct contact with the USG.

Despite mutual difficulties involved in the establishing comat relations, our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf mandate relations, our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf mandate persistent efforts to establish a dialogue. In this regard, it is notable that only a few major countries do not have relations with Iran -- Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and the United States. Even Iraq continues to have diplomatic relations with Iran.

Tran is the key to a region of vital importance to the West. ;et it is increasingly threatened by growing Soviet military power and political influence along its borders and inside its territory. Over the course of the last two years, the Soviets and their surrogates have moved actively to gain greater influence in the Gulf. influence in the Gulf:


The Soviets believe that once Khomeini dies, they will have an excellent opportunity to influence the formation of a severament in Tehran that serves Soviet strategic interests in the area. NCLADOSECRE Ender provide in a series A CT S. MAN 97.

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communist nations have become the principal arms suppliers to Iran -- making Iran dependent on this source of supply in contending with an increasingly strangthened Iraq. This leads us to the conclusion that the Soviets may well be attempting to pursue their own revolution in Iran. That is, by fueling both sides in the conflict, the Soviets could well encourage a disastrous "final offensive" by Iran that would precipitate a political disintegration in Iran. leaving a power vacuum which the Soviets could exploit. Specifically, the indicators of Communist influence in Iran are:



The increasing desperation brought on by the costs of the fran-fra war has exacerbated fran's vulnerability to Soviet influence. Moreover, Soviet designs in Afghanistan, pressure on Pakistan, and actual crossborder strikes in fran from Afghanistan have made reopening a strategic dialogue increasingly important.

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In short, the Soviets were far better positioned to improve significantly their influence in the region in 1985 when we were presented with an opportunity to open a dialogue with Iran. In deciding to exploit this opening, we evaluated previous efforts through more conventional channels which had not succeeded.

About two years ago, senior Iranian officials apparently decided that some accommodation with the U.S. was necessary. Since 1981, various countries have been engaged in overtures to the U.S. and Iran in an affort to stimulate direct contact between the two countries.

Turkey have all attempted to serve as interlocutors in this Movever, internal splits and debates made it difficult for the Iranians to respond to these overtures.

Numerous individuals and private parties have likewise attempted to be helpful as intermediaries in establishing contact in Iran or in seeking Iranian assistance in the relate of our cititens held hostage in Lebanon.

In the spring of 1985, a private American citizen (Michael Ledeen) learned from an Israeli jovernment official (David Kimshe) that the Israelis had established a liaison relationship with an Iranian experiete (Manuchehr Ghorbanifar) in Europe who sought Israeli help in establishing contact with the U.S. Government. In acknowledging the need to demonstrate the bonafides of the Iranian officials involved, he (Ghorbanifar) indicated that his "spensors" in Tehran could also help to resolve the American hostage situation in Beirut.

In June of 1985, in the midst of the TWA-847 hijacking, the Israeli officials in direct contact with the Iranian expatriate asked him to use his influence with senior Iranian officials to asked him to use his influence with senior frantan officials to obtain the release of the hijacket passengers. Two days after this approach, four Americans held separately from the rest of the hijacket passengers, where freed the turned over to Syrian authorities.

Speaker Refeanjahl, who we translate the hijacket that time, and frantan forming Minister Valued Them intervened with the captors. Taisenjahl in his specifi on Movember 4, 1986, for the first time publicly acknowledged his role in this matter.

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Yeabeline NEFCHRAND will word edits.

On July 3, 1983, during a visit to Washington, an Israeli official (Kimche) advised National Security Advisor, Robert Mefarlane, that Israel had established a channel of communication with authoritative elements in Iran who were interested in determining whether the United States was open to a discreet, high-level dialogue. The Iranians were described as comprising the principal figures of the government (i.e., Speaker of the Majlis Rafsenjani, Frime Minister Musavi, and Rhomeini's heir-apparent, Ayatollah Mentaseri) and as being devoted to a pregionization of Iranian policy. reorientation of Iranian policy.

At this first meeting, McFarlane went to great length to draw out the Israeli as to why he found the Iranian proposal credible, given the events of the past six years. The Israeli replied that their exhaustive analysis had gone beyond the surface logic deriving from the chaos and decline within Iran and the degenerative effects of the war, to more concrete tests of the willingness of the Iranians to take personal risks. Me noted that the Iranians had exposed themselves to possible compromise by meeting with Israelis and by passing extraoling tensitive intelligence on the sizuation (passing extraoling tensitive intelligence on the sizuation (passing extraoling ext

The Israeli asked for our position on opening such a dialogue. No mention was made of any presentations or Ifanian priorities. McFarlane conveyed this proposal to the President (in the presence of the Chief of Staff). The President said that he believed such a dialogue would be worthwhile at least to the point of determining the validity of the interlocutors. This decision was passed to the Israeli diplomat by telephone on July 18.

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On August 2. 1988, the Israeli called again on McFarlane. At this meeting, he stated that he had conveyed our position to the Iranian intermediary and that the Iranians had responded that they recognised the need for both sides to have tangible evidence of the bone fides of the other and that they believed they could affect the release of the Americans held hostage in Lebanon.

added

According to the Israeli, the Iranians separately stated that they were vulnerable as a group and before having any prospect of being able to affect change within Iran they would need to be substantially strengthened. To do so, they would need to secure the cooperation of military and/or Revolutionary Guard leaders. Toward this end, they expressed the view that the most credible demonstration of their influence and abilities would be to secure limited amounts of U.S. equipment. The Israeli asked for our position on such actions. . lir

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Mr. McFarlane elevated this proposition to the President at a meeting within days that included the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President stated that, while he could understand that assuming the legitimacy of the interlocutors, they would be quite vulnerable and ultimately might deserve our support to include tangible material; at the time, without any first hand experience in dealing with them, he could not sutherize any transfers of military material. This was conveyed to the Israeli.

udded

On August 22, 1985, the Israeli diplomat called once more to report that the message had been conveyed and that an impasse of confidence existed. He asked what the position of the U.S. Government would be to an ioracli transfer at malant quantities of defendive military metalli transfer at malant quantities of defendive military metalli transfer at malant quantities such an addition while represent distinctional thous a difference. The Israeli diplomat emphasional group length that israel had its own palley interests that the berved by fostering such a disloque in the latest of the first property of the U.S. and the second of the control of the U.S. and the second of the U.S. and th

On September 14, 1985, Reverend Senjamin Meir was released in Seirut by the Islamic Jihad Organisation. This release was preceded by an intense effort on the part of Mr. Terry Matte, the Special Emissary of the Archbishop of Canterbury. To this date, Mr. Waite remains the only Mesterner to ever neet directly with the Lebanese Midneppers.

In late September, we learned that the Israelis had transferred 300 10W missiles to Iran and that this shipment had taken place in late August. The Israelis told us that they undertook the action, despite our objections, because they believed it to be in their etrategic interests. The Israelis managed this entire operation, to include delivery arrangements, funding, and transportation. After discussing this matter with the President, it was decided not to empose this Israeli delivery because ve

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wanted to retain the option of exploiting the existing Israeli channel with Tehran in our own effort to establish a strategic dislogue with the Iranian government. The total value of the jos TOMS shipped by Israel was estimated to be less than \$2 million.

On October 4, 1989, Islamic JiMid entraced the of the "executed" seignt Station Chief Milliam Bucklay In retaliation for the October 1 Israeld in raid on \$10 heatslaters in Tunes. This announcement led to a series of meetings in Europe among the U.S. (CIA and MSC), Israeli, and Iranian intermediaries. In these meetings, the Iranians indicated that, while their ability to influence the Misbellah was maning, the Misbellah had not killed meeting; he had in factional Several Buckley; he had in factional Several Buckley of natural causes. We have since the second several buckley probably died on June 3, 1983 of pneumonia-like symptoms.

In mid-Nevember, the Israelis, through a senior efficer in the Poreign Minister's office (Rimehe), indicated that the Government of Israel was convinced that they were nearing a breakthrough with Iran on a high-level dislogue. The Israeli centacted a U.S. efficial (Merth) and asked for the name of a European-based. airline which could discreetly transit to Iran for the purpose of delivering passengers and sarge, Be specifically noted that neither a U.S. carrier nor an Israeli effiliated carrier could be used. We were assured, at the time, that the Israelis were going to "try oil drilling parts as an incentive," since we had expressed so much displeasure ever the earlier TOW shipment. The name of the proprietary that the aircraft chartered through normal connectial contract for a flight from Tel Aviv to Tabur. Iran, on Nevember 13, 1985. The Israelis were unwitting of the CIA's involvement in the aircline and the aircline was paid at the aircline personal connectial charter rate (approximately \$127,700). The aircline personal were also unwitting of the carge they carried.

In leavery, we learned that the Israelis, responding to urgent entreaties from the Iranians, has used the proprietary atterraft to expenser 18 MANK missiles to Iran in an effort to improve the state six defenses around Tehran. Our beleted awareness that the Israeli's had delivered MANK missiles raised serious U.S. concerns that these deliveries were jeopardising our objective of arranging a direct meeting with high-level Iranian efficials. As a consequence of U.S. initiative and by mutual agreement of all three parties, these missiles were returned to Israel in February.

On December 7, the President convened a meeting in the White Rouse (residence) to discuss next steps in our efforts to establish direct contact with the Iranians. Attending the

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meeting were the Chief of Staff, Secretaries of State and Defense; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and his Deputy. Immediately after the meeting, Mr. McFarlane departed for London to meet with the Iraalia official and the Iranian contact to make clear the nature of our interest in a dialogue with Iran. At this meeting, Mr. McFarlane, as instructed by the President, stated that:

 the U.S. was open to a political dialogue with Iran, but that no such dialogue could make progress for as long as groups seen as dominated by Iran held U.S. hostages; and

-- the U.S. could under no circumstances transfer arms to Iran in exchange for hostages.

These points were made directly to the Iranian interlocutor. The Iranian replied that, unless his associates in Tehran were strengthened, they could not risk going ahead with the dialogue. Mr. Merarlane acknowledged the position but stated we could not change our position. In a separate meeting with the Israeli official, Mr. McCarlane made clear our strong objections to Israeli weapons shipments to Iran. Following these meetings, Mr. McCarlane returned to Washington and shortly thereafter left active government service.

On January 2, the Frime Minister of Israel dispatched a special emissary to the U.S. (Amiram Nir) to review proposals for next steps in dealing with Iran. The Israelis urged that we reconsider the issue of providing limited defensive arms to those attempting to take power in Tehran, since all other incentives leconomic assistance, medical supplies, machine parts) were of no value in shoring-up these whe wanted an opening to the Mest. Admiral Poindexter neted our stringent objections to the MAMK missile shipments in Newsber and neted that the U.S. would have to act to have them returned is step undertaken in February, when all is missiles were returned to Israell. In that any implementation of the Israell proposals would require the active participation of the intelligence community, the MSC Staff (Morth) was tasked to propers a covert action finding. Merk on this Fresidential finding commenced on January 4.

On January 6, the President, the Vice President, the Chief of Staff, and the Mational Security Mov'eer and his assistant reviewed the first draft of the Finding and the recorrendations made by the Prime Minister of Israel through his special emissery.

On January 7, the President met in the Oval Office with the Vice President, the Chief of Staff, Secretaries Shults and Weinberger, Attorney General Messe, Director Casey, and the National Security

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Advisor to discuss the overall situation in Iran and prospects for a strategic dialogue. It was again noted that Mr. McFarland, on return from his trip to Lendon, had recommended that no further action be taken unless a sechanism could be established by which the U.S. could exert better central over events. Me agreed, in principle, with Director Casey that providing limited quantities of defensive arms after the hostages were released still had merit. Both Secretary Shults and Secretary Weinberger objected to any provision of arms, diting that we could not be sure that these would really help soderate elements and that, if exposed, the project would not be understood by moderate Arabs and would be seen as contravening our policy of not dealing with states that support terrorism. The President decided that we should attempt to keep the Israeli channel active as long ascit offered possibilities for meetings with high-level Iranian officials and left open the issue of previding defensive arms to Irania if all the hostages were released.

It was further determined by the President that any disloque with the Iranians must be aimed at achieving the following goals:

- -- Devising a formula for re-establishing a strategic relationship with Tehrange as
- Inding the Iran-Iraq War on honorable terms.
- Convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism and radical subversion.
- Helping ensure the Countain interests and countar soviet activities in the region.

The President made clear that a Western dialogue with Iran would be precluded unless Iran were willing to use its influence to achieve the release of Western hostages in Beirut. He also made clear that we could not and would not engage in trading erms for hestages. Secretaries Shults and Weinberger retained their original position on previding any arms to Iran, but Attorney General Messe and Director Casey both supported the concept as a valid means of opening the dialogue. Attorney General Messe, noted a 1981 determination by them Attorney General French Saith that transferring small quantities of arms through third countries under a Cevert Action Finding was not illegal.

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On January 16, a meeting was held in the National Security Advisor's office with Secretary Meinberger, Attorney General Meese, Director Casey, and CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin. At this meeting, the final draft of the Covert Action Finding was reviewed and was forwarded to the Freetdent with Secretary Weinberger dissensing.

On January 17, 1986, the President approved a Covert Action Finding [Tab A] directing that the intelligence community proceed with special activities aimed at accomplishing the goals set forth above. The President futher determined that the activities authorized by the Finding justified withhelding prior Congressional notification due to the extreme mensitivity of the dialogue being established. He further noted that public knowledge of the program would place the American hestages in Lebanon at greater risk. Noting his concern for the lives of these carrying out the operation (both U.S. and foreign), he directed that the Director of Central Intelligence refrain from reporting the Finding to the appropriate committees of the Congress until reasonably sure that those involved would no longer be in jacoardy. those involved would no longer be in jeepardy.

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The tin London. At this weeking, the franchis agreed that, if the USG would provide defensive weapons (TOMs) to franchis U.S. side agreed to explore this possibility and, working with the Israelis, established the following mechanism for transfer of the veapens:

- The Iranian intermediary (Gherbanifar) would deposit funds in an Israeli account.
- The largelis would transfer funds to a sterile U.S.-controlled account in an eversees bank.
- Using these funds, the CIA would covertly obtain material authorized for transfer from U.S. military stocks and transport this to Israel for enverd movement to Iran.

Using the procedures stipulated above, \$3.7 million was deposited in the CIA account in Geneva on February 11, 1986 and on February 14, 1,080 Toms were transported to Israel for pre-positiving. These TOMS were transferred by CIA from DOO (U.S. Army stocks in Annisten, Alabama) and transported through the stocks in Annisten, Alabama) and transported through the stocks in Annisten, Policy-level coerdinates for these arrangements was effected by MSC (Merth) with DOO (Armitage) and CIA (Clair George). The TOMs were placed in a covert Israeli facility avaiting envard shipments. ijn .

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
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On Pebruary 19-21, U.S. (MSC and CIA), Israeli and Iranian officials met in Germany to discuss problems in arranging a meeting among higher-level officials. At this meeting, the Iranians committees

After coded authorization vas received from Washington, the U.S. side agreed to provide 1,000 Toms to Iran as a clear signal of U.S. sincerity. This delivery was commenced on the merning of february 10 and completed in two transits to Tehran on February 21. Transportation from Irrael to Iran was aboard a false flag Israeli aircraft. On the return flight from Iran, these aircraft carried the 18 MANK missiles which Israel had sent to Tehran in November 1985 with USG afgreknowledge.



On Pebruary 24, U.S. (CIA and MSC) officials met again in Frankfure with the Israeli and Iranian officials to discuss next steps. At this meeting, the U.S. side urged that the Iranians expedite a mieting among higher-level officials on both sides.

On Pebruary 18, the Prime Minister of Israel wrote to President Reagan (Tab 8) urging continued efforts to achieve a strategic breakthrough with Iran, but asking consideration for the safety of recently seized Israeli hostages.

On March 7, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israeli representatives met with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether any further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these meetings, the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military effectiveness.

The escalation of tensions with Libya, leading up to the April 14 strike, prevented further dialogue from taking place until the Iranians urged the intermediary (Gherbanifar) to accelerate the effort in late April, 1986. At that point, the Iranian expatriat advised us through the Israeli point-of-contact that the leadership in Tehran was prepared to commence a secret dialogue

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with the United States along the lines of our established goals. We believe that the Iranians were stimulated to renew the contact by the April 17 murder of hostage Pater Rilburn lin retaliation for the U.S. raid on Libya.

The Iranian expectiate told the MSC and CIA efficers, who may with him in Europe at the end of April, that the Iranians did not wish to be accused of any culpability in Kilburn's death.

On May 6, 7, 1986, U.S. and Israeli efficers met in Lendon with the Iranian intermediary in which he urged that we take immediate steps to arrange for a high-level U.S./Iranian meeting in Tehran. Ouring the London meeting, the Iranian urged that we U.S. and Israel) act urgently to help with Iranian air defense. He emphasized that the Iraqi Air Force was increasingly effective of late and that the Iranians were desperate to stop attacks on population centers. The Israelis also used this opportunity to privately ask the U.S. to replace the 508 TOMs which they had sent to Iran in August, 1985.

Sased on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-face with top-level Iranian efficiels, on May 15, the President authorized a secret mission to Tehran by former National Security Advisor McFarlane, accompanied by a CIA ennuitant, CIA communicators, members of the NSC staff, and the Israeli and Iranian interlocutors. The Israelis were informed via coded message on May 15 that the U.S. had agreed to the Iranian request for limited anti-air defense equipment and to replenish the 508 TCMs sent by Israel.

On May 16, the Iranians, through the Israelis provided \$6.5% for deposit in the CIA secure funding mechanism. The funds were used to acquire 508 TOW missiles (for replenishing the TOWS Israel shipped in September 1985) and acquiring NAWK missile electronic spare parts. This material was subsequently moved to provide the repackaged and shipped to Felly AFS for envard downent to israel on May 22. As in the February shipment, the CIA provided logistics support for the movement of this material to Israel.

In order to ensure operational security, the McFarlane trip vas made from Israel, coincident with the delivery of a pallet of spare parts for Iranian defensive weapons systems (NAMR spare

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electronic parts). At the specific request of the Iranians, alias foreign documentation is botained from the CIA -- was used. CIA also provided covert transportation support from CONUS to Israel for the McFarlane party. The group was transported from Israel to Tehrun aboard an Israeli Air force 137 with false flag markings.

In the edurac of the four-day (May 15-26) visit, lengthy meetings were held with high-level Iranian efficiels, the first direct contact between the two governments in ever six years. Mr. McFarlane and his team were able to establish the basis for a continuing relationship and clearly articulate our objectives, concerns, and intentions. The group was also able to assess first hand the internal political dynamic in Tehran and the effect of the war which Iran clearly can no length win. Using Fresidentiesly approved Tetal of Appropriate Chinat officers, McFarlane apphasized that our interest—in Iran transcended the hostages, but the continued detention of hestages by a letanese group philosophically aligned with Iran prevented progress. Ouring the visit, Mr. McFarlane made clear:

- -- that we fundamentally opposed Iranian efforts to expel us from the Middle Sast:
- -- that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism;
- -- that we accepted their revolution and did not seek to reverse it;
- that we had numerous other disagreements involving regional policies (i.e., Lebanon, Micaragua, etc.), but might also find areas of compon interest (i.e., Afghanistan and the Soviet threat to the Gulf) through dialogue.

During these meetings, both sides used the opportunity to detail the obstacles to implementing a strategic relationship between the two countries. In addition to the points noted above, Mr. McFarlane emphasized the political problems caused by Iranian involvement in the hostage issue. The Iranians objected to the USG emberge on U.S. military supplies already paid for plus the continued USG blocking of Iranian assets in the U.S., even after U.S. course had ruled in their favor. During the course of these meetings, the Iranian officials admitted that they could not vin the war, but were in a dilemma in Tehran ever how to end the conflict given the need to present an Iranian "victory" before it could be concluded. They emphasized that the original aggressor, Saddan Bussein, must be removed from power in order for the var

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to end. Mr. McParlane concluded the visit by summarizing that notwithstanding Iranian interest in carrying on with the dialogue, we could not proceed with further discussions in light of their unwillingness to exert the full weight of their influence to cause the release of the Western hostages in Lebanon.

On June 10, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, in a speech in Tehran made quarded reference to Iranian interest in improved relations with the U.S. On July 26, Pather Lawrence Jence was released in the Bekka Valley and found his way to a Syrian military checkpoint:

On August 3, the remaining three malless (less than t planeless) of electronic party for Images afte-strengt defenses (Exist missile sub-components) in the state of the sub-components of the sub-com

In early August 1994, the provided the provide and the provided and the pr

detailed discussions. We include the waterly to involve on for detailed discussions. We include the provided to be the most individual loss artifacts of the man judged to be the most individual in the provided to the most individual in the provided as a seeking a situation reality of the U.S. in seeking a situation the provided assessments designed to the courage an Iranian offensive and contribute of an Iranian designed the Seviet threat to Iran.

Through Aufust, September, and Detaber Note: humarous additional meetings were held in Europe between U.S. representatives and the new Irenian contacts. Dealer, the Mashes 15, 1986 meeting in Frankfurt, dealer, the Mashes of the page, insided that the release of the large way that the release of the large way that the release of the large ways that the page and region in support for the Alcale resistance

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The Iranians also preffered, and the U.S. accepted, the effer of a Soviet T-72 tank [The Iranians have also offered to provide a copy of the 400 page interredation of Seiruz Station Chief Milliam Buckley. At this meeting, [stated that there was a "very good chance that another American of two would be freed seen." On October 19, with U.S. acquiseence, Israel provided Iran with an additional increment of defensive weapons (500 TOW missiles).

C. Late on October 31.

(Nakim) tasked to maintain contact and advised that Iran had
"exercised its influence with the Labenese" in order to obtain
the release of an American -- David Jacobsen -- Amd an uncertain
number of French hestages. He further noted that this would be
part of the purpose of the Iranian Foreign Minister's visit to
Syria -- an event we became aware of on Nevember 1, 1986.

stated that the situation in Tehran, as well as Iranian influence
over Misbellah were both deterioration.

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Reirus terpick up Mr. Jacoblan.

It is now assault that perfectest U.S. efforts to establish contact with Iran and subsequent public speculation regarding these contacts have probably exacerbated the power struggle in Iran between prequents elements (led by Rafsanjani) and more radical factions (under the overall sponsorship of Ayatollah Hontaseri). In late October, radical supporters (of Hontaseri) revealed the (Rafsanjani) contact with the USG and the terms of the contact. In order to defend himself against charges of the contact. In order to defend himself against charges of colluding with the USG and to preserve a degree of latitude for both parties, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani provided a purposely distorted version of the May 1986 Merarlane mission in his Mevertor devertor of the masses. Moderate Iranian political leader a apparently now feel constrained to settle their internal leader a apparently now feel constrained to settle their internal political problems before proceeding with the U.S. relationship. The revelations in Tehran regarding the Merarlane mission are demonstrable evidence of the internal power struggle. The comber 1986 arrest of radical leader Mehdi Mashesi, a close confident and see in-law of Ayatollah Heatersari, far-toric of terrorism and treasen has caused further internal conflict.

Resolution of the Lebanon hestage situation is also complicated by waning Iranian influence in Lebanon due in part to financial constraints and the fact that the Libyans are expanding their

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leyal to the new imprisoned Mehdi Rashemi. If so, this could be an effort to undermine the nascent U.S.-Iranian strategic dialogue and exacerbate the internal Iranian power struggle against the praymatic faction with which we have been in contact.

Throughout this process, the USG has acted within the limits of established policy and in compliance with all U.S. law. The shipment of 2,008 U.S. Tows and 235 NAME missile electronic spare parts was undertaken within the provisions of a Covert Action Finding.

During the course of this operation -- and before -- the U.S. was esquisant of only three shipmants from Israel to Iran. Specifically:

- The Israelis acknowledged the August 1985 shipment of 508 1986 after it had taken place. Ontil we were advised by the Israelis, and had the information subsequently confirmed by Iranian authorities, we were unaware of the composition of the shipment. We subsequently agreed to 1981age these TOME in May of 1986.
- -- The Mevember 1985 shipment of 18 Israeli HAMR missiles was not an authorised exception to policy. This shipment was retrieved in February 1986 as a consequence of U.S. intervention.
- -- The October 1986 shipment of 1981 TOW's from Israel to Iran was undertaken with U.S. asquiescence. These TOWs were replaced on Nevember 7.

In support of this Finding and at the direction of the President, the CIA provided the following operational assistance:

- -- CIA communications officers and an annuitant to assist in various phases of the operation.
- -- Sterile eversess bank accounts for financial transactions.
- A secure transhipment point for the dispatch of U.S. military items from the U.S.
- -- Transhipment of military items from the U.S. to Israel.
- -- Communications and intelligence support for the meetings with Iranian officials and the McFarlane trip to Tehran in May.

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U.S. / IRANIAN CONTACTS AND THE AMERICAN ROSTAGES

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From the earliest months following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the U.S. Government has attempted to reestablish official contact with that government in order to discuss strategic developments in this critical part of the world and reconstruct a working relationship. Even before President Rasgam came to office the U.S. Government agreed to try to expand security, economic, political, and intelligence relationships at a pace acceptable to Tehran. In the fell of 1979, the U.S. undertook three secret missions to Tehran:

September 1979 (met secretly with Basargan at the request of the Iranians)

October 1979 -

October-Hovember 1979 -normalization of relations)

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When these meetings and the secret Hovember 1, 1979 meeting in Algiers, between Brzerinski and Prime Minister Bazargan, became public in Iran, they helped precipitate the takeover of the U.S. Embassy by radical elements and led to the resignation of the Bazargan government. These events have adversely influenced Iran's subsequent willingness to engage in any direct contact with the USG.

Despite mutual difficulties involved in re-establishing normal relations, our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf mandate persistent efforts to establish a dialogue. In this regard, it is notable that only a few major countries <u>do not</u> have relations with Iran -- Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and the United States. Even Iraq continues to have diplomatic relations with Iran.

Iran is the key to a region of vital importance to the West, yet it is increasingly threatened by growing Soviet military power and political influence along its borders and inside its territory. Over the course of the last two years, the Soviets and their ourregates have moved actively to gain greater influence in the Gulf:

The Sovieta believe that once Mosseini dies, they will have an assellent opportunity to influence the formation of a government in Tehran that serves Soviet strategic interests in the area.

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Communist nations have become the principal arms suppliers to Iran -- making Iran dependent on this source of supply in contending with an increasingly strengthened Iraq. This leads us to the conclusion that the Soviets may well be attempting to pursue their own revolution in Iran. That is, by fueling both sides in the conflict, the Soviets could well encourage a disastrous "final offensive" by Iran that would precipitate a political disintegration in Iran, leaving a power vacuum which the Soviets could exploit. Specifically, the indicators of Communist influence in Iran are:

The increasing desperation brought on by the costs of the Iran-Iraq war has exacerbated Iran's vulnerability to Soviet influence. Horeover, Soviet designs in Afghanistan, pressure on Pakistan, and actual crossborder strikes in Iran from Afghanistan have made reopening a strategic dialogue increasingly important.

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In short, the Soviets were far better positioned to improve significantly their influence in the region in 1985 when we were presented with an opportunity to open a disloque with Iran. In deciding to exploit this opening, we evaluated previous efforts through more conventional channels which had not succeeded.

About two years ago, senior Iranian officials apparently decided that some accommodation with the U.S. was necessary. Since 1983, various countries have been engaged in overtures to the U.S. and Iran in an effort to stimulate direct contact between the two countries.

However, internal splits and debates made it difficult for the Iranians to respond to these overtures.

Numerous individuals and private parties have likewise attempted to be helpful as intermediaties in establishing contact in Iran or in seeking Iranian assistance in the release of our citizens held hostage in Lebanon.

In the spring of 1985, a private American citizen (Michael Ledeen) learned from an Israeli government official (David Kimche) that the Israelis had established a liaison relationship with an Iranian expetriate (Manuchahr Ghorbanifar) in Europe who sought Israeli help in establishing contact with the U.S. Government. In acknowledging the need to demonstrate the bonafides of the Iranian officials involved, he (Ghorbanifir) indicated that his "spoacos," in Jahrana and Laborator and the American hosters situation in the situation in the American hosters situation in the situation i

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Speaker Rafeenjani, who was travelling in the mid-case at the
time, and Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati both intervened with
the captors. Rafeenjani, in his speech on November 4, 1986, for
the first time publicly acknowledged his role in this matter.

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In July of 1985, during a visit to Washington, an Israeli official (Rimche) advised Mational Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, that Israel had established a channel of communication with authoritative elements in Iran who were interested in determining whether the United States was open to a discreet, high-level dialogue. The Iranians were described as comprising the principal figures of the government (i.e., Speaker of the Majlie Refsenjani, Frime Minister Musavi, and Rhomeini's heir-apparent, Ayatollah Montaseri) and as being devoted to a reorientation of Iranian policy.

At this first meeting, McParlane went to great length to draw out the Israeli as to why he found the Iranian proposal credible, given the events of the past six years. The Israeli reglied that their exhaustive analysis had gone beyond the extract legic deriwing from the chaos and decline within Iran and the degenerative effects of the war, to more concrete tests of the willingness of the Iranians to take personal risks. He noted that the Iranians had exposed themselves to possible compromise by meeting with Israelis and by passing extremely sensitive a intelligence on the situation (and political line-up) within Iran information which was proven valid.

The Israeli asked for our position on opening such a dialogue. No mention was made of any pre-conditions or Iranian priorities. McParlane conveyed this proposal to the President (in the presence of the Chief of Staff). The President said that he believed such a dialogue would be worthwhile at least to the point of determining the validity of the interlocutors. This decision was passed to the Israeli diplomat.

Michia days the Israeli called again on McFarlane. At this meeting, he stated that he had conveyed our position to the Iranian intermediary and that the Iranians had responded that they recognized the need for both sides to have tangible evidence of the bona fides of the other and that they believed they could affect the release of the Americans held hostage in Isbanos.

According to the Israeli, the Irantens separately stated that they were vulnerable as a group and before having any prospect of being able to affect change within Iran they would need to be substantially strengthened. To do so, they would need to secure the cooperation of military and/or Revolutionary Guard leaders. Toward this end, they expressed the view that the most credible demonstration of their influence and abilities would be to secure limited amounts of U.S.

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Mr. McFerlane elevated this proposition to the President at a meeting within days that included the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President stated that, while he could understand that assuming the legitimacy of the interlocutors, they would be quite vulnerable and ultimately might deserve our support to include tangible materiel; at the time, without any first hand experience in dealing with them, he could not authorize any transfers of military material. This was conveyed to the Israeli.

on August 22, 1985, the Israeli diplomat called once more to report that the message had been conveyed and that an impasse of confidence existed. He asked what the position of the U.S. Government would be to an Israeli transfer of modest quantities of defensive military material. Herarlane splies that to him, such an action would represent a distinction without a difference. The Israeli diplomat explained at quantities without a difference. The Israeli diplomat explained at quantities without a difference. The Israeli diplomat explained at quantities without a difference. The Israeli diplomat that have the property of the property

On September 14, 1985, Reverend Benjamin Weir was released in Beirut by the Islamic Jihad Organization. This release was preceded by an intense effort on the part of Mr. Terry Waite, the Special Emissary of the Archbishop of Canterbury. To this date, Mr. Waite remains the only Mesterner to ever meet directly with the Lebanese kidnappers.

In late September, we learned that the Israelis had transferred 508 TOW missiles to Iran and that this shipment had taken place in late August. The Israelis told us that they undertook the action, despite our objections, because they believed it to be in their strategic interests. The Israelis managed this entire operation, to include delivery arrangements, funding, and transportation. After discussing this matter with the President, it was decided not to expose this Israeli delivery because:

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- -- We wanted to retain the option of exploiting the existing Israeli channel with Tehran in our own effort to establish a strategic dialogue with the Iranian government.
- -- The total value of the 508 TOWS shipped by Israel was less than \$2 million and, therefore, below the threshold requiring a report of military equipment transfers under the Arms Export Control Act.

On October 4, 1985, Islamic Jihad.announced that it had "executed" Beirut Station Chief William Buckley in retaliation for the October 1 Israeli air raid on PLO installations in Tunis. This announcement led to a series of meetings in Europe among the U.S. (CIA and MSC), Israeli, and Iranian intermediaries. In these meetings, the Iranians indicated that, while their ability to influence the Hisballah was waning, the Hisballah had not killed Buckley; he had in fact died several months earlier of natural causes. We have since substantiated this information in debriefs of Father Jenco and David Jacobsen, both of whom indicate that Buckley probably died on June 3, 1985 of pneumonia-like sympgoms.

In late November 1985, an aircraft owned by a CIA proprietary airline was chartered through normal commercial contract to carry cargo from Israel. It was subsequently determined that the Israelis, responding to urgent entreaties from the Iranians, used the aircraft to transport 18 HAMK missiles to Iran in an effort to improve the static air defenses around Tehran. The Israelis were unwitting of the CIA's involvement in the airline and the airline was paid at the normal commercial rate (approximately \$127,700). The airline personel were also unwitting of the cargo they carried. The Israeli delivery of HAWK missiles raised serious U.S. concerns that these deliveries were jeopardizing our objective of arranging a direct meeting with high-level Iranian officials. As a consequence of U.S. initiative and by mutual agreement of all three parties, these missiles were subsequently returned to Israel in February 1986.

On December 7, the President convened a meeting in the White Mouse (residence) to discuss next steps in our efforts to establish direct contact with the Iranians. Attending the meeting were the Chief of Staff, Secretaries of State and Defense, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant to the President for Mational Security Affairs and his Deputy. Immediately after the meeting, Mr. McFarlane departed for London to meet with the Israes official and the Iranian contact to make clear the nature of our interest in a dialogue with Iran. At this meeting, Mr. McFarlane, as instructed by the President, stated that:

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- -- the U.S. was open to a political dialogue with Iran, but that no such dialogue could make progress for as long as groups seen as dominated by Iran held U.S. hostages; and
- -- the U.S. could under no circumstances transfer arms to Iran in exchange for hostages.

These points were made directly to the Iranian interlocutor. The Iranian replied that, unless his associates in Tehran were strengthened, they could not risk going ahead with the dialogue. Mr. McFarlane acknowledged the position but stated we could not change our position. In a separate meeting with the Israeli official, Mr. McFarlane made clear our strong objections to the Israeli shipment of the HAMR missiles and noted that the U.S. would have to act to have them returned (a step undertaken in February, when all 18 missiles were returned to Israel). Following these meetings, Mr. McFarlane returned to Washington and shortly thereafter left active government service.

On January 2, the Prime Minister of Israel dispatched a specjal emissary to the U.S. (Amiram Mir) to review proposals for next steps in dealing with Iran. The Israelis urged that we reconsider the issue of providing limited defensive arms to those attempting to take power in Tehran, since all other incentives (economic assistance, medical supplies, machine parts) were of no value in shoring-up those who wanted an opening to the Mest. In that any implementation of the Israeli proposals would require the active participation of the intelligence community, the NSC Staff (North) was tasked to prepare a covert action finding. Work on this Presidential finding commenced on January 4.

On January 6, the President, the Vice President, the Chief of Staff, and the National Security Advisor and his assistant reviewed the first draft of the Finding and the recommendations made by the Prime Minister of Israel through his special emissary.

On January 7, the President met in the Oval Office with the Vice President, the Chief of Staff, Secretaries Shultz and Meinberger, Attorney General Meese, Director Casey, and the National Security Advisor to discuss the overall situation in Iran and prospects for a strategic dialogue. It was again noted that Mr. McFarlane, on return from his trip to London, had recommended that no further action be taken unless a mechanism could be established by which the U.S. could exert better control over events. He agreed, in principle, with Director Casey that providing limited quantities of defensive arms after the hostages were released still had merit. Soth Secretary Shultz and Secretary Meinberger

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objected to any provision of arms, citing that we could not be sure that these would really help moderate elements and that, if exposed, the project would not be understood by moderate Arabs and would be seen as contravening our policy of not dealing with states that support terrorism. The President decided that we should attempt to keep the Israeli channel active as long as it offered possibilities for meetings with high-level transan officials and left open the issue of providing defensive arms to Iran if all the hostages were released.

It was further determined by the President that any dialogue with the Iranians must be aimed at achieving the following goals:

- -- Devising a formula for re-establishing a strategic relationship with Tehran.
- Ending the Iran-Iraq War on honorable terms.
- Convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism and radical subversion.
- Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and coordinating ways in which we might counter Soviet activities in the region.

The President made clear that a Western dialogue with Iran would be precluded unless Iran were willing to use its influence to achieve the release of Western hostages in Beirut. He also made clear that we could not and would not engage in trading arms for hostages. Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger retained their original position on providing any ames to Iran, but Attorney General Messe and Director Casey both supported the concept as a valid means of opening the dialogue. Attorney General Messe noted a 1981 determination by then Attorney General French Smith that transferring small quantities of arms through third countries under a Covert Action Finding was act illegal.

On January 16, a meeting was held in the Mational Security Advisor's office with Secretary Meinberger, Attorney General Meese, Director Casey, and CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin. At this meeting, the final draft of the Covert Action Finding was reviewed and was forwarded to the President with Secretary Meinberger dissenting.

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On January 17, 1986, the President approved a Covert Action Finding (Tab A) directing that the intelligence community proceed with special activities aimed at accomplishing the goals set forth above. The President futher determined that the activities authorized by the Finding justified withholding prior Congressional notification due to the extreme sensitivity of the draloque being established. He further noted that public knowledge of the program would place the American hostages in Lebanon at greater risk. Noting his concern for the lives of those carrying out the operation (both U.S. and foreign), he directed that the Director of Central Intelligence refrain from reporting the Plading to the appropriate committees of the Congress until reasonably sure that those involved would no longer be in jeopardy.

On Pebruary 5-7, U.S. officials (MSC and CIA representative of the Israeli Prime Ministry Amiras Fr?), and a senior-level Iranian official

met in London. At this meeting, the Iranians agreed that, if the USG would provide defensive weapons (TOMs) to Iran, they would, in turn, provide same to the Afghan Mujahideen. The U.S. side agreed to explore this possibility and, working with the Israelis, established the following mechanism for transfer of the weapons:

- -- The Iranian intermediary (Ghorbanifar) would deposit funds in an Israeli account.
- -- The Israelis would transfer funds to a sterile U.S.controlled account in an overseas bank.
- -- Using these funds, the CIA would covertly obtain material authorized for transfer from U.S. military stocks and transport this to Israel for onward movement to Iran.


Using the procedures stipulated above, funds were deposited in the CIA account in Geneva on February 11, 1986 and on February 14, 1900 TOWS were transported to Israel for pre-positioning. These TOWS were transferred by CIA from DOD (U.S. Army stocks in Anniston, Alabama) and transported through using standard CIA-DOD logistics arrangements.

Policy-level coordination for these arrangements was effected by MSC (Merthinish DOD (Armitage) and CIA (Clair George). The TOWS were placed to the course of the

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On February 19-21, U.S. (MSC and CIA), Ieraeli and Iranian officials met in Germany to discuss problems in arranging a meeting among higher-level officials. At this meeting, the Iranians committed

After coded authorisation vas received from Washington, the U.S. side agreed to provide 1,000 Tows to Iran as a clear signal of U.S. sincerity. This delivery was commenced on the morning of Pebruary 30 and completed in two transits to Tehran on February 21. Transportation from Israel to Iran was aboard a false flag Israeli aircraft. On the return flight from Iran, these aircraft carried the 18 MAMN missiles which Israel had sent to Tehran in November 1985 with USG aforeknowledge. USG aforeknowledge.

On Pebruary 24, U.S. (CIA and MSC) officials met again in Frankfurt with the Israeli and Iranian officials to discuss next steps. At this meeting, the U.S. side urged that the Iranians expedite a meeting among higher-level officials on both sides.

On February 28, the Prime Minister of Israel wrote to President Reagan (Tab B) urging continued efforts to achieve a strategic breakthrough with Iran, but asking consideration for the safety of many sales (CIA and Mac) and Israeli representatives met with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether any further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these meetings, the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating aconomic situation the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military effectiveness.

The escalation of tensions with Libya, leading up to the April 14 strike, prevented further dialogue from taking place until the Iranians urged the intermediary (Ghorbanifar) to accelerate the effort in late April, 1986. At that point, the Iranian expatriate advised us through the Israeli point-of-contact that the leadership in Tehran was prepared to commence a secret dialogue

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The Iranian expetriate told the NSC and CIA officers, who met with him in Europe at the end of April, that the Iranians did not wish to be accused of any culpability in Kilburn's death.

On May 6, 7, 1986, U.S. and Israeli officers met in London with the Iranian intermediary in which he urged that we take immediate steps to arrange for a high-level U.S./Iranian meeting in Tehran. During the London meeting, the Iranian urged that we (U.S. and Israel) take immediate steps to help with Iranian air defense. He emphasized that the Iranians were was increasingly effective of late and that the Iranians were desperate to stop attacks on population centers. The Israelis also used this opportunity to privately ask the U.S. to replace the 508 TOWs which they had sent to Iranian August, 1985. The Israelis were informed via coded message on May 15 that the U.S. had agreed to the Iranian request for limited anti-air defense equipment and to replenish the 508 TOWs sent by Israel.

Based on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-face with top-level Iranian officials, on May 15, the President authorized a secret mission to Tehran by former National Security Advisor McFarlane, accompanied by a CIA annuitant, CIA communicators, members of the MSC staff, and the Israeli and Iranian interlocutors.

On May 16, the Iranians, through the Israelis provided \$6.5M for deposit in the CIA secure funding mechanism. The funds were used to acquire 508 TOW missiles (for replenishing the TOWs Israel shipped in September 1985) and acquiring HAWK missile electronic spare parts. This material was subsequently moved to repackaged and shipped to Kelly AFS for onward movement to israel on May 22. As in the February shipment, the CIA provided logistics support for the movement of this material to Israel.

In order to ensure operational security, the McFarlane trip was made from Israel, coincident with the delivery of a pallet of spare parts for Iranian defensive weapons systems (MAWK spare electronic parts). At the specific request of the Iranians, alias foreign documentation and obtained from the CIA -- was used. CIA also provided covert transportation support from COMUS to Israel for the McFarlane party. The group was transported from Israel to Tehran aboard an Israeli Air Force 707 with false flag markings.

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electronic parts). At the specific request of the Iranians, alias foreign documentation obtained from the CIA -- was used. CIA also provided covert transportation support from CONUS to Israel for the McFarlane party. The group was transported from Israel to Tehran aboard an Israel; Air Force 707 with felre flag markings.

In the course of the four-day (May 25-28) visit, lengthy meetings were held with high-level Iranian officials, the first direct contact between the two governments in over six years. Mr. McFarlane and his team were able to establish the basis for a continuing relationship and clearly articulate our objectives, concerns, and intentions. The group was also able to assess first hand the internal political dynamic in Tehran and the effect of the war which Iran clearly can no longer win. Using Presidentially approved Terms of Reference (Tab B), which had been reviewed and approved by appropriate Cabinet officers, McFarlane emphasized that our interest in Iran transcended the hostages, but the continued detention of hostages by a Lebanese group philosophically aligned with Iran prevented progress. a During the visit, Mr. McFarlane made clear:

- -- that we fundamentally opposed Tranian efforts to expel us from the Middle East;
- -- that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism;
- -- that we accepted their revolution and did not seek to reverse it;
- -- that we had numerous other disagreements involving regional policies (i.e., Lebanon, Nicaragua, etc.), but might also find areas of common interest (i.e., Afghanistan and the Soviet threat to the Gulf) through dialogue.

During these meetings, both sides used the opportunity to detail the obstacles to implementing a strategic relationship between the two countries. In addition to the points noted above, Mr. McFarlane emphasized the political problems caused by Iranian involvement in the hostage issue. The Iranians objected to the USG embarge on U.S. military supplies already paid for plus the continued USG blocking of Iranian assets in the U.S., even after U.S. courts had ruled in their favor. During the course of these meetings, the Iranian officials admitted that they could not win the war, but were in a dilemma in Tehran over how to end the conflict given the need to present an Iranian "victory" before it could be concluded. They emphasized that the original aggressor, Saddam Russein, must be removed from power in order for the war

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On June 10, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, in a speech in Tehran made quarded reference to Iranian interest in improved relations with the U.S. On July 26, Father Lawrence Jenco was released in the Bekka Valley and found his way to a Syrian military checkpoint.

On August 3, the remaining three pallets (less than h planeload) of electronic parts for Iranian anti-aircraft defenses (HAWK missile sub-components) arrived in Tehran. As in all flights to/from Iran this delivery was made with an Israeli Air Force aircraft (707) using false flag markings. Timing of the delivery was based on coordination among U.S., Israeli and Iranian officials.

In early August 1986, the contact with the Iranian expatriate began to focus exclusively on the willingness of the USG to provide military assistance to Iran in exchange for hostages and we sought to establish different channels of communication which would lead us more directly to pragmatic and moderate elements in the Iranian hierarchy. In mid-August, a private American citizen (MGEN Richard Secord, USAF (Ret.)) acting within the purview of the January Covert Action finding, and contact in Europe with the senior Iranian official (Rafsanjahr). With the assistance of the CIA, this Iranian was brought covertly to Mashington for detailed discussions. We judged this effort to be useful in establishing contact with a close confident of the man judged to be the most influential and pragmatic political figure in Iran (Rafsanjahi). These discussions reaffirmed the basic objectives of the U.S. in seeking a political dialogue with Tehran. We also provided imabilities designed to discourage an Iranian offensive and contribute to an Iranian decision to negotiate an end to the war. The intelligence also detailed the Soviet threat to Iran.

Through August, September, and October 1986, numerous additional meetings were held in Europe between U.S. representatives and the new Iranian contacts. During the October 26, 1986 meeting in Frankfurt, Germany, the U.S. side, as in the past, insisted that the release of the hostogram was a pre-requisite to any progress. The Iranian, urged that we take a more active role in support for the Afghan resistance

The Iranians also proffered, and the U.S. accepted, the offer of a Soviet T-72 tank. The Iranians have also offered to provide a copy of the 400 page interrogation of Beirut Station Chief William Buckley. At this meeting, it is stated that there was a "very good chance that another American or two would be freed soon." On October 29, with U.S. acquiscence, Israel provided Iran with an additional increment of defensive weapons (500 TOW missiles).

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Late on October 31 called the U.S. citizen (Makim) tasked to maintain contact and advised that Iran had "exercised its influence with the Lebanese" in order to obtain the release of an American -- David Jacobsen -- and an uncertain number of French hostages. He further noted that this would be part of the purpose of the Iranian Foreign Minister's visit to Syria -- an event we became aware of on Movember 1, 1986. Stated that the situation in Tehran, as well as Tranian influence over Risballah were both deteriorating.

On Movember 2, David Jacobsen was released by his captors hear the old American Embassy compound in Mest Beirut. The U.S. Embassy in East Beirut immediately dispatched an embassy officer to West Beirut to pick up Mr. Jacobsen.

It is now apparent that persistent U.S. efforts to establish contact with Iran and subsequent public speculation regarding these contacts have probably exacesbated the power struggle in Iran between pragmatic elements (led by Rafsanjani) and morg radical factions (under the overall sponsorship of Ayatollah Montaseri). In late October, radical supporters (of Montaseri) revealed the (Rafsanjani) contact with the USG and the terms of the contact. In order to defend himself against charges of colluding with the USG and to preserve a degree of latitude for both parties, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani provided a purposely distorted version of the May 1986 McFarlane mission in his November 4 address to the masses. Moderate Iranian political leaders apparently now feel constrained to settle their internal political problems before proceeding with the U.S. relationship. The revelations in Tehran regarding the McFarlane mission are demonstrable evidence of the internal power struggle. The October 1986 arrest of radical leader Mehdi Hashemi, a close confident and son in-law of Ayatollah Monterari, for acts of terrorism and treason has caused further internal conflict.

Resolution of the Lebanon hostage situation is also complicated by waning Iranian influence in Lebanon due in part to financial constraints and the fact that the Libyans are expanding their contacts with more radical Hisballah elements.

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On Movember 7, the day after a meeting with U.S. officials, Iranian government authorities arrested six other individuals involved in radical activities. Among the two were senior military officers and a Majlis deputy (Ahmad Kashani), the grandson of Ayatoliah Kashani, a conspirator in the 1949 attempt against the Shah.

Despite these internal difficulties and attendant publicity in the Mestern media, the Iranians continue to maintain direct contact with the USG and met again in Geneva on Movember 9-10 with MSC and CIA representatives.

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It is important to note that since the initiation of the USG contact wish Iran thereshas been no evidence of Iranian government Tempe lity is acts of terrorism against the U.S. We do not know who although the last three American horsesses in Secret (Mesers. The Ciciopia and Teacy). The Islamic Jihos Omfanication Iran although temperature in the companion of the USG

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established file process, the MS has acted within the limits of established file with all U.S. law. The shipment of 2,000 U.S. Town and 177 MUK missile electronic spare parts was undertaken within the provisions of a Covert Action Finding.

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During the course of this operation -- and before -- the U.S. was cognizant of only and shipments from Israel to Iran. Specifically:

- The Israelis acknowledged the August 1985 shipment of 508 TOWs after it had taken place. Until we were advised by the Israelis, and had the information subsequently confirmed by Iranian authorities, we were unaware of the composition of the shipment. We subsequently agreed to replace these TOWs in Nay of 1986.
- -- The Movember 1985 shipment of 18 Israeli HAMK missiles was not an authorized exception to policy. This shipment was retrieved in February 1986 as a consequence of U.S. intervention.
- -- The October 1986 shipment of 500 TOWs from Israel to Iran was undertaken with U.S. acquiescence. These TOWs were replaced on Movember 7.

In support of this Finding and at the direction of the President, the CIA provided the following operational assistance:

- -- Sterile oversee tak sommer for figuretet transactions.
- -- A secure transhipsent and the dispersion U.S.
- -- Transhipment of Elbeary itensulus the U.S. to Israel.
- -- Communications and intelligence support for the meetings with Iranian officials and the McFarlane trip to Tehran in May.
- Cleared meeting sites in Europe for meetings with Iranian officials.
- -- Alies documentation for U.S. and foreign officials for meetings in Europe and Tehran.

The weapons and material provided under this program were judged to be inadequate to alter either the balance of military power or the outcome of the war with Iraq. They have, however, demonstrated the U.S. commitment to Iranian territorial integrity and served to support those in Iran interested in opening a strategic relationship with the U.S. U.S. efforts over the last 18 months have had tangible require an Iranian policy:

- -- The Rafsanjani/Velayati intervention on behalf of the TWA #847 passengers (June 1985).
- -- Iranian direction that the hijacked Pan Am #73 would not be received in Iranian territory if it left Karachi.

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- -- The release of three American and at least two French hostages.
- -- The initiation of an Iranian dialogue with their regional neighbors.
- -- Continued delay in the Iranian "final offensive."

Finally, it must also be noted that the U.S. arms embargo notwithstanding, West European nations have provided \$500 million a year in military equipment to Iran. Most of these transfers were accomplished with government knowledge and/or acquiescence.

All appropriate Cabinet Officers have been apprised throughout. The Congress was not briefed on the covert action Finding due to the extraordinary sensitivity of our Iranian contacts and the potential consequences for our strategic position in Southwest Asia. Finally, our efforts to achieve the release of the hostages in Lebanon must continue to rely on discreet contacts and intermediaries who cannot perform if they are revealed.

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THE PRESIDENTIAL PINDING

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Let me begin by stating the obvious. Iran is one of the most important states in the Middle East. Its strategic location and oil resources make it a country of critical significance to U.S. and western interests in the area.

It is also a longstanding Soviet target. Soviet interest is reflected in the fact that they have twice established short-lived independent communist republics in Northern Iran since World War I. Soviet interest in Iran has not waned and we know that they are working hard to extend their influence with the present regime and possible successors.

The U.S. has been trying to reestablish official contact with Iran and develop a working relationship ever since the Islamic revolution. We have tried to do so because Iran is, quite simply, a geopolitical force which neither we, nor the Soviets, can afford to ignore.

We also must not forget the hostages. The simple fact of the matter is that U.S. citizens are being held by terrorist groups over which Iran has some influence. We have an obligation to do what we can to move Iran away from terrorism and to get our fellow citizens back.

It was against that backdrop that the President signed a Finding on 17 January directing the CIA to provide operational and logistical support for a program aimed at (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining intelligence to determine the current Iranian Government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of American hostages held in Beirut and preventing further terrorist acts, by these groups.

The Finding stated that the USG will provide moderate elements within the Government of Iran with arms, equipment and related material in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their efforts to achieve a more moderate government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain resources to defend their country.

In the Finding, the President directed the CIA to refrain from reporting the Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the Latingal Mecurity Act of 1947, as amended, until otherwise directed.

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At the time the Presidential Finding was signed, the CIA's Office of General Counsel advised me that the President clearly has the authority to withhold prior notice of operations from the Congress. Section 501 of the National Security Act expressly provides that notification of intelligence activities to the Congress shall be provided "to the extent consistent with all applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred by the Constitution."

The Act also states that the Intelligence Committees be given timely notice of activities, for which no prior notice was given. This was a clear recognition that extraordinary circumstances could lead the President to conclude that notice of an operation should be withheld in whole or in part, until an appropriate time as determined by the President.

The history to the oversight act clearly recognizes the accommodation that was reached on this issue. The subsequent procedures agreed upon by the DCI and the SSCI on reporting covert action operations provide that advance reporting of such operations would be subject to the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Section 501 of the National Security Act.

The President determined that the activities authorized by the Finding justified withholding prior notification due to the extreme sensitivity of the dialogue being established. In addition, had the fact of this program become known, the American hostages in Lebanon would be put at a greater risk.

That's the legal justification for not informing Congress. The reason why Congress was not informed was, quite simply, a very real concern for the lives of those carrying out the operation. That concern, particularly when you have people travelling to Iran, was not exagerrated.

Earlier experience in conducting secret talks with Iranian officials showed the risk involved should the fact of such discussions become public. In 1979, President Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski held such talks with then Iranian Prime Minister Bazargan. Following the public disclosure of those contacts, radical students took over the American Embassy in Tehran, taking the staff hostage, and the Bazargan Government fell.

Throughout the course of the activities undertaken by the CIA to fulfill the directives of this Finding, only a handful of officials were involved. Current procedures involving

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notification of the oversight committees would have required that two or three times as many individuals be informed than were aware of the activity within the CIA. This is the only finding since the signature of the 1980 oversight act that has not been briefed to the Committees. In fact, the only other finding that has not been briefed since the inception of the oversight process was the Iranian hostage rescue mission.

Now I would like to explain exactly what activities were undertaken by the CIA in carrying out the directives of this Finding signed on 17 January 1986.

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In late November 1985, the NSC asked CIA for the name of discreet, reliable airline which could assist the Israelis in transporting a planeload of Israeli Hawk missiles to Iran. The name of our proprietary airline was given to the NSC which, in turn, passed it to one of the intermediaries dealing with the Iranians.

That intermediary, who was unwitting of CIA's involvement with the airline, hired the airline to transport a Boeing 707 load of weapons from Tel Aviv to Tehran. The airline was paid the normal commercial rate which amounted to approximately \$127,700. The people in the proprietary did not know what was being shipped.

When senior CIA management learned that this had occurred, it was decided that a finding was necessary before the Agency could provide any future support of this type.

That was the only CIA support provided prior to the finding.

On 26 January a CIA officer (Charlie Allen) provided limited, general information

information was provided to the Iranian intermediary (Ghorbanifar) for passage to Iranian officials.

On February 5-7, U.S. officials (NSC), a representative of the Israeli Prime Ministry (Amiram Nir), and a senior-level Iranian official met in

Germany. At this meeting, the Iranians agreed that, if the USG would provide TOW missles to Iran, the Iranians would The U.S. agreed

to explore this possibility and, working with the Israelis,

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established the following mechanism for transfer of the weapons:

-- The Iranian intermediary (Ghorbanifar) would deposit funds in a European account.

-- The funds would then be transferred to a sterile U.S.-controlled account in an overseas bank.

--Using these funds, the CIA would work with the Army Logistics Command to obtain the material. This type of activity, conducted under the Economy Act, is the routine method for obtaining U.S. military material for CIA Covert Action Operations from DoD. Hone of the working level DoD personnel involved were aware of the eventual destination of the weapons.

-- The materiel was then transported to Israel for future shipment to Iran:

Using the procedures stipulated above, \$3.7 million was deposited in the CIA account in Geneva on February 11, 1986 for the purchase of 1,000 TOW missles and associated costs.

On 15 February, Office of Logistics personnel delivered the 1000 TOW missles to Kelly Air Force Base. The missles were then transported to Israel for onward shipment to Iran. CIA was not involved in the transportation of this shipment.

On February 19-21, U.S. and Iranian officials (NSC and CIA) met again in Germany to discuss problems in arranging a meeting among higher-level officials.

On 24 February, the same U.S. officials traveled to Germany where they met with the intermediary and an Iranian Government official. At that meeting, the Iranian official provided a list of varying quantities of approximately 240 different spare parts needed for the Hawk missle batteries provided by the USG to Iran during the Shah's reign. The Iranian official asked for USG assistance in obtaining these spare parts as additional proof that this channel had the approval of the highest authority in the USG.

On 25 Pebruary, the U.S. officials provided the Iranians with limited, vague information

On Harch 7, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israeli representatives met with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether

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any further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these meetings, the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military effectiveness.

Throughout March and April, the Office of Logistics worked with DoD to clarify the items on the Iranians' list of spare parts and identify which items were in DoD stocks. We were informed that the Iranians had agreed that high level Iranian officials would meet with a USG team that would come to Tehran with the spare parts.

The escalation of tensions with Libya, leading up to the April 14 strike, prevented further dialogue from taking place until the Iranians urged the intermediary (Ghorbanifar) to accelerate the effort in late April, 1986. At that point, the Iranian expatriate advised us that the leadership in Tehran was prepared to commence a secret dialogue with the United States along the lines of our established goals.

Based on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-face with top-level Iranian officials, on May 15, the President authorized a secret mission to Tehran by former National Security Advisor McFarlane, accompanied by a CIA annuitant, a CIA communicator, members of the NSC staff, and the Israeli and Iranian interlocutors.

On 16 May 1986, the Tranians provided \$6.5 million for Hawk spare parts and an additional 508 TOW missles. The receipt of the Tranian funds set into motion arrangements for the planned visit to Tran as follows:

-- The Office of Communications provided secure communication equipment and the services of a communications officer to travel into Iran with the U.S. team.

--The Office of Technical Services was tasked to provide ten passports for use by the team and the air crew of the aricraft that would fly from Israel to Tehran. The Iranians insisted on the use of non-U.S. passports passports were chosen because the aircraft used tor the journey carried registration numbers.

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e-The Office of logistics assembled the available Hawk missle spare parts at Relly Air Force Base. The parts were then transported to Israel, but the CIA was not involved in their transfer.

-- The Office of Logistics delivered 508 TOW missles to Kelly Air Force Basa for onward shipment to Israel. CIA was not involved in their shipment.

On 25 May the U.S. team traveled to Tehran via Israel. The CIA provided two members of the team-a communications officer and a Farsi speaking annuitant with considerable experience in Iranian affairs. The annuitant provided translation services and advice to the team. He continued to be involved in subsequent meetings with Iranian representatives.

The U.S. team brought several aircraft pallet loads of Hawk missle spare parts with them to Tehran at the time of the meeting. However, it was decided that the greater portion of the spare parts would stay in Israel for later delivery to Iran pending further progress in establishing the dialogue. We understand that those spare parts were ultimately delivered to Iran.

The U.S. team also provided the Traniana with

Cn 19 September three Iranians travelled to the U.S. for detailed discussions with MCC officials. These discussions reaffirmed the basic objectives of the U.S. in seeking a political dialogue with Tehran. We also provided designed to discourage an Iranian offensive and contribute to an Iranian decision to negotiate an end to the war.

Throughout August and September, numerous additional meetings were held in Europe between U.S. representatives and the new Iranian contacts in an effort to develop the dialogue authorized by the Presidential Finding.

On 6 October, those Iranians traveled to Frankfurt for meetings with the U.S. team.

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On 26.October, more meetings were held in Prankfurt with the same participants.

During the October 26, 1986 meeting in Frankfurt, Germany, the U.S. side, as in the past, insisted that the release of the hostages was a pre-requisite to any progress. The Iranians urged that we take a more active role in support and suggested again that, if we could provide additional TOW weapons to Iran,

The Iranians also proffered, and the U.S. accepted, the offer of a Soviet T-72 tanks should be in our hands shortly.

On 2 November, the Iranians provided \$2.037 million and the Office of Logistics produced 500 more TOW missles from DoD.

Those missles were delivered by the Office of Logistics to Kelly Air Force Base on 5 November. A USAF C-141 aircraft carried the missles to where they were transhipped to a CIA air proprietary aricraft which carried the missles to Israel.

On 9 November, the U.S. team held another meeting with one of the Iranian officials from the Iranian team.

This brings the record of CIA involvement in these activities authorized by the 17 January 1986 Presidential Finding up to date an of the present time. We should note that none of the weapons of me from CIA stocks.

We have received no requests from the NSC to acquire any more material of any type for shipment to Iran under this program. $\ \ \, ,$

I would like to reiterate that the funds for the procurement of the materiel ennumerated above, as well as for all associated costs, were provided by the Iranians themselves. Funding from Iran was transferred to CIA for deposit in a covert funding mechanism. This action provided secure means for control, payment, and accountability of all funding associated with this program. The funds provided by Iran, a total of \$12,037,000, remained in a special account in a Swiss bank, and costs were paid directly from the account.

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The only costs incurred by the CIA in this activity were expenses for the travel of CIA officers involved in the various meetings, the costs of hotel rooms

meetings, the costs of hotel rooms for the two October meetings held in Germany, and operational support amounting to approximately \$48,000. The costs for this support have been charged against normal operational accounts. Since all travel by CIA officials is routinely charged to such accounts, to do otherwise in the case of the trips undertaken during this program would have compromised the security of the activities.

LEGALITY OF ARM SHIPMENTS

Questions which have appeared in the media is to the legality of the arms shipments raise the question as to whether or not the CIA was responding to a legal order.

At the time the Presidential Finding was signed, applicable legal authorities were reviewed and it was determined that there is clear and ample authority for the President to approve transfers outside the context of the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act. Those laws were not intended and have not been applied by Congress to be the exclusive means for sale, loan or provision of U.S. military equipment to foreign governments.

CIA's legal authority to furnish U.S. military equipment to foreign governments on a covert basis is based on language contained in Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947, which provides that it shall be the duty of the CIA, under NSC direction, to perform services of common concern for the benefit of intelligence agencies and to perform "such other functions and duties relating to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." In short, it is clear that legal authority exists for CIA to transfer U.S. military equipment abroad outside the foreign military sales and assistance statutory framework when the activity is in furtherance of a legitimate and authorized CIA mission; that is, a special activity or intelligence collection operation.

This fundamental and underlying legal conclusion has been arrived at by the CIA Office of General Counsel and has been confirmed by the Attorney General. A transfer is legal,

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therefore, if we can show that the transfer is in the furtherance of an approved and legitimate intelligence activity and, for covert action, that there is a signed Presidential finding covering the activity as provided by the Hughes-Ryan Amendment.

The next question is how the CIA obtains the materiel it needs in order to meet those legitimate intelligence interests. CIA's legal authorities permit it to obtain military equipment if it is available on the open market. If that is not the case, or if the equipment cannot be provided as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise, CIA can utilize the Economy Act to obtain the necessary items from the Department of Defense. Of course, transfers of U.S. military equipment in general ought to be, and are in fact, made to foreign governments under the U.S. foreign assistance program. However, it is important to point out that any decision to have CIA supply U.S. military equipment inherently involves a determination that the foreign military assistance framework is inappropriate for that purpose. Obviously, the very purpose and nature of the operation for which CIA's extraordinary authorities have been utilized are incompatible with the concept underlying overt U.S. foreign aid programs.

Let me assure you that at the time the decision to go forward with the Presidential Finding for this sensitive operation was made, *hese legal authorities were reviewed in order to ensure that this Agency was in full compliance with the law.

CONCLUSION:

Let me make it perfectly clear that it was apparent to all that this initiative was a controversial one. Even those of us who supported going forward understood that it was a close call and a risky operation. There were no illusions.

Was it a reasonable call? Yes, I think it was. As the health of Khomeini has declined over the past year, we have seen an increase in factional infighting in Tehran. This infighting has been sharpened by severe economic problems, as well as the war with Iraq. There have been numerous arrests. This factional infighting has implications for both the United States and the Soviet Unional It was the Administration's

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judgement, that any powerful Iranian faction seeking to reestablish ties with the West and willing to attempt to curtail Iranian support for herrorism was worth talking to.

It was in that context that the judgement was made that providing a small amount of defensive weapons would give this faction some leverage in the internal struggle by suggesting that there were advantages in contacts with the West.

As I stated earlier, Iran is not going to go away. Its geographic and strategic position guarantee that it will remain a geopolitical force which the U.S. will have to deal with. If we do not establish ties to the various Iranian factions now, we will be faced with the problem of doing so later. It is that simple.

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EXHIBIT OLN-27

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SUBJECT: Background and Chronology of Special Project

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BACKGROUNG: The USG has actively sought the release of American hostages held in Iran through various channels since 1984. In addition, the USG has been interested in getting the Government of Iran to moderate its support for international terrorism. As it became clear that some of the hostages were being held by the pro-Iranian faction of the Hisballah, it was felt that the Iranian Government might be able to put pressure on the Hisballah to release its hostages.

In late 1984, Michael Ledeen approached the NSC to discuss contacts with Iran and suggested the NSC work with Israeli officials who already had contacts with Iran based on their covert arms deals with that country. Ledeen met with Prime Minister Peres who agreed to help and introduced Ledeen to David Kimche and Jacob Nimradi, two other Israeli officials. These two Israelis, in turn, introduced Ledeen to Manucher Gorbanifar, an Iranian arm merchant operating in Europe who was actively involved with the Israelis. Ledeen introduced Gorbanifar to NSC officials. Gorbanifar appeared to be well tied in with various factions within the Iranian Government and he served as the intermediary between the NSC and the Iranians.

In June 1985, the Hizballah hijacked TMA flight 847 and Iranian Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani played an important role in resolving that incident, which included the release of a number of Lebanese Shi's held by Israel.

Throughout 1985 MSC contacts with Ledeen, Gorbanifar, and the Israelis continued. In summer 1985, MSC periods officials first met Amiran Nir, an Israeli official on Peres' staff who was to become the principal Israeli contact in MSC dealings with Gorbanifar and the Iranians.

In early September 1985, the CIA was asked by the NSC to on Iranian communications due to the imminent release of an American hostage. The NSC informed the CIA that Gorbanifar and vere involved.

On 14 September 1985, Reverend Weir was released by the Hizballah. At the same time, the Israelis, at MSC behest, delivered SO8 TOW missiles to Iran. Since the Iranians would not pay for the TOW missiles until they were delivered, and since the MSC was instructed not to use any USG funds for the operation, Gorbanifar used his contacts with Saudi financier Adnam Khashoggi to come up with \$5 million USD to pay for the

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TOW missiles. The MSC agreed to provide the Israelis with 508 TOW missiles to replace those they provided for the operation. The aircraft carrying the TOW missiles delivered them to Tabriz but had problems during the return flight which forced a technical stop

On 3 October 1985, the Hizballah announce they have killed hostage Buckley, though later debriefings of released hostages indicate he probably died in early June 1985.

In November 1985, as the next step in the operation, the MSC arranged for Israel to send 18 HAWK missiles to Iran. However, the Israelis neglected to remove the Israeli markings from some of the missiles. This oversight, plus the fact that the Iranians had been led to expect they would be receiving HAWK missiles, led to a huge disagreement which caused further developments to grind to a halt.

In December 1985, McFarlane left the MSC and Poindexter ordered Ledeen out of the operation and made Ollie North directly responsible for dealing with Gorbanifat On the Israeli side, Nimradi was replaced as the primary contact by Amiran Nir.

In January 1986, the President approved the operation to work with the Iranians for the release of hostages in return for military equipment. The CIA is asked to provide logistical and operational support.

In early 1986, contacts with Gorbanifar serving as a go-between to continue.

In mid- February, the MSC delivers 1000 TOWs to Iran.

In March 1985, Gorbanifar Grant March 1985, Gorbanifar Germany. The NSC are given a list of spare parts for HAWK missile batteries and radars requested by the Iranians. CIA then works with solect number of DOD officials to obtain the spare parts. It is agreed that the spare parts plus more TOW missiles will be delivered to Iran at the successful conclusion of a meeting between NSC officials and Iranians in Tehran.

To provide the US with the money for the spare parts and TOW missiles, Gorbanifar must again finance the deal. He raises 16 million dollars which is passed to the US, with the expectation that the Iranians will, in turn, pay him once the items have been delivered. Gorbanifar again works with

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Khashoggi to raise the money from several Canadian, American, and Arab investors.

On 22 Ap. 11 1986, a U.S. Customs Service "Sting" Operation in Switzerland under the State Department's "Operation Staunch" disrupts a large on-going Iranian arms procurement deal being run by Gorbanifar. This deal was unrelated to the NSC operation. Gorbanifar is arrested by the Swiss, but released after 24 hours. Gorbanifar loses the money he and Khashoggi put into that particular operation, funds probably raised from the investors for the NSC operation.

On 15 May 1986, Gorbanifar finally comes up with sufficient funds for the next step of the MSC operation and a meeting is arranged to take place in Tehran.

On 22 May 1986, HAWK missile spare parts are picked from Kelly AFB and flown to Israel and the US team departs for Europe.

On 23 May, a second aircraft picks up 508 TOW missiles and flies to Israel.

On 24 May the US team goes to Israel where Nir joins them for the trip to Tehran. The Team departs for Tehran. They bring along some of the Spare Parts to show the Iranians their good faith.

On 25 May, the US team arrives in Tehran and holds meetings with the Iranians. However, the meetings do not go well, probably because the Iranian factional concensus is falling apart. The second aircraft load of spare parts is recalled while on its way to Iran and returns to Israel. The US team departs after five days, having made no progress.

In June and July 1986, talks with Gorbanifar and continue and it is decided that the Iranians must show their good faith by forcing the Hizballah to release another hostage. In July Gorbanifar goes to Lebanon and Syria in an effort to get Father Jenke released.

On 26 July 1986, Father Jenko is released.

On 3 August 1986, the remainder of the HAKK spare parts that have been collected are delivered to Iran. The spare parts are picked up at Kelly AFB and flown to Iran via Israel.

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In August 1986, Gorbanian reports the Iranians are angry over the price he charged them for the spare parts and the whole operation stalls over this issue. The NSC suspects that Gorbanian has not been truthful.

A new channel is found through NSC contacts with

In September 1986, the NSC drops the Gorbanifar Channel and decides to meet with Rafsunjani's

On 19 September the MSC. They are aware of the the US for sectings to the MSC. They are aware of the Gorbanifar thannel and offer to replace it.

On 6 October, there is a second meeting with which takes place in Germany. He is accompanied to this meeting by a least that meeting, they agree to a several point plan which will involve the release of two hostages as an initial step. They disclaim any involvement in the three recent hostage kidnappings and say that their faction of the Hisballah only hold three of, the hostages. They also agree to try to find Buckley's remains to return to the US. In addition they agree to turn never a copy to the Hisballah devited in the contraction.

On 26 October, the NSC has another release of two hostages in return for a shipment of 500 TOW missiles. Since the money they provided in October had not cleared into the US account, the NSC prevails upon the Israelis to Send 500 TOWS to Iran, with the agreement they will be replaced by the US as soon as possible.

On 29 October, the Israelis deliver 500 TOW missiles to Iran.

On 2 November, hostage Jacobson is released.

On 3 Movember, a pro-Syrian magazine in Beirut breaks the story that Jacobson and the other hostages had been released by Iranian pressure in return for military equipment.

EXHIBIT OLN-28

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Iran Testimony 21 November 1986

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Throughout the Reagan Administration, both the national security community and the intelligence community have been keenly aware and constantly concerned about the geopolitical position and the strategic significance of Iran. Much thought and effort has been devoted to how we might develop contacts and relationships which would provide a better understanding of what is happening there and establish contacts and relationships which might lead to improved relationships later on.

- I recell speaking to

about the importance of our tentifying and establishing contact

with leaders in a future Iran.

said that we do not know who

will emerge to lead Iran in the future, that we must gather all the

strands and hold them in our hands so that will be ready.

In the fall of 1985, Sud McFarlane, after a weekly meeting which he and his deputy had with me and my deputy, asked me to stay behind. He told me about discussions he had had at the highest levels in Israel urging the desirability of discussions with officials in Iran and offering ditinels of access. I distinctly recall HcFarlane emphasizing that the purpose of such discussions would be the future relationships with Iran and its great importance in the East-West and Middle East-Persian Gulf equation. The Israelis wanted to put us in touch with an Iranian expatriate. The Israelis said they had checked out this man's background and contacts exhaustively and had high

confidence in the quality of his relationship with high Iranian officials.

McFarlane had been told that at the time of the TVA 747 hijacking in 1985, the Israelis had asked this Iranian expatriate to use his influence with senior Iranian officials to obtain the release of some of the hijacked passengers. Just two days later, four Americans who had been separated from the bulk of the hijacked passengers were freed and turned over to Syrian authorities. The Syeaker of the Hajlis, Rafsanjani, was traveling in the Middle East at the time with Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati and were believed to have intervened with the captors to release the four Americans. Rafsanjani, in a speech on 4 November 1986 (check year??), for the first time publicly acknowledged his role in securing the freedom of the hijacked passengers.

In late November 1985, the NSC acked our officers to recommend a charter airline, the reliability of which we could vouch for, to carry some cargo from Tel Aviv into Iran. Our was told that there was some urgancy about this in connection with a meeting in a general between an Iranian official, whe expatriate intermediary, and private U.S. citizens. Our recommended a proprietary of theirs Take I little airlineAregularly took on commercial ventures, and we side not know what was a little forms. Not the side of the recommendation of the little forms and the fact that the private was a little forms. The little forms and the fact that the private was a little forms and the fact that the private was a spare, parts for the oil fields and was to go into Tabriz.

decided that in order to protect the plane, our should be acked to get flight clearances into Iran. On 25 November 1985, the plane

dropped the cargo in Tehran without knowing what it was. The Israelis were unwitting that the plane was a CIA proprietary, and the airline charged the normal connectial rate which was approximately \$127, addition. Our Associate for

urgency of the requirement, but in consultation with the Deputy Director decided that we want not provide any future support of flights into Iranin the absence of a finding.

We didn't learn until sometime in January 1986 that the shipment involved 18 air defense dissiles and that it was later rejected by the Iranians on the basis that it was not what the Iranians had ordered from the Israelis. In this affair, our air proprietary had been made available to accommodate a delivery requirement in which the NSC was interested and the shipment was billed and paid for at the normal rates charged by our air proprietary.

In the meantime, the policy of probing the possibility of discussions with Iranian officials, including smalltshipments of arms to establish our good faith and to induce them to use their influence with those holding combostages, was discussed at one or two meetings of the MSPG principals. There were differences of view about the desirability of this policy, but it was finally decided that it should be cautiously pursued.

On 6-8 December 1985, Bud McFarlane, then National Security Advisor, met in London with the Israeli officials and the Iranian expatriate. At this meeting, Mr. McFarlane stated our goals of pursuing the relationship with Iran were these:

- -- nevising a formula for reestablishing a strategic relationship with Tehran.
- -- Ending the Iran-Iraq War on honorable terms.
- -- Convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism.
- -- Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and coordinating ways to counter Soviet activities in the region.

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Mr. McFarlane made clear that in this relationship we would expect fran to use its influence to achieve the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. He also made it clear that we could not and would not engage in trading arms ·for hostages.

On 17 January 1986; a Presidential Finding was signed directing the CIA to provide operational and logistical support for a program aimed at (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining intelligence - to determine the current Iranian government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of American hostages held in Beirut and preventing further personist acts by thèse groups.

The Finding stated that the USG will provide moderate elements within the government of Iran with arms equipment and related material in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their efforts to achieve a more moderate Fibility to obtain resources to defend government in Iran by demonstrating the their country.

In the Finding, the President directed the CIA to refrain from reporting the Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the Mational Security Act of 1947, as amended, until otherwise directed.

At the time the Presidential Finding was signed, the CIA's office of General Counsel provided the legal epinion that the President Clarity the authority to withhold prior notice of operations from the Congress. Section 501 of the National Security Act expressly provides that notification of intelligence activities to the Congress shall be provided to the extent consistent with all applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred by the Constitution." - 83384 **a**

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The Act also states that the Intelligence Committees be informed of activities for which no prior notice was given at the appropriate time as determined by the President. This was a clear recognition that extraordinary circumstances could lead the President to conclude that notice of an operation should be withheld, in whole or in part.

The history to the Oversight Act shows that an accommodation recognizing both the President's constitutional responsibility and authority and the Congressional oversight responsibility and authority was reached in this legislative process. The subsequent procedures agreed upon by the DCI and the SSCI on reporting covert action deperations provide that advance reporting of such operations would also be subject to the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Section 501 of the National Security Act.

The President determined that the activities authorized by the Finding justified withholding prior notification due to the extreme sensitivity of the dialogue being established. His advisors recognized that if the fact of this program become known, the American hostages in Lebanon would be put at a greater risk.

On 5-7 February 1986, U.S. officials from the MSC and CIA met in Germany with representatives of the Israeli Prime Ministry and a senior-level Iranian official. At this meeting, the Iranians agreed that if the USG would provide TOW weapons to Iran, they would,

The U.S. agreed to explore this possibility and, working

with the Israelis, established the following mechanism for transfer of the weapons:

-- The Iranian intermediary would deposit funds in an Israeli accou

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- -- The Israelis would transfer funds to a sterile U.S.-controlled account in an overseas bank.
- -- Using these funds, the CIA would covertly obtain material authorized for transfer from U.S. military stocks and transport this to Israel for onward movement to Iran.

Geneva on 11 February 1986 and on 14 February 1,000 TOWs were transported to Israel for pre-positioning. These TOWs were transferred by CIA from DoD (U.S. Army stocks in Anniston, Alabana) and transported through using standard CIA-DoD logistics arrangements. Policy-level coordination for these arrangements was effected by MSC (Morth) with DoD (Armitage and Koch) and CIA (Clair George). The TOWs were placed in a covert Israeli facility awaiting onward shipment.

on 19-21 February, U.S. and Iranian officials (NSC and CIA) met again in Germany to discuss problems in arranging a meeting among higher-level to Iron the 1,000 Touls that had be officials. At this meeting, the U.S. side agreed to provide 11,000 Touls that had be positioned as a clear signal of U.S. sincerity. This delivery was commenced on the morning of 20 February and completed in two transits to Tehran on 21 February. Transportation from Israel to Iran was aboard a false flag Israeli aircraft.

On 7 March, U.S. (CIA and MSC) and Israeli representatives met with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether any further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials During these meetings, the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military effectiveness.

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Based on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-face with top-level Iranian officials, on 15 May the President authorized a secret mission to

Tehran by former National Security Advisor McFarlane accompanted by a cia?

On 16 May 1986, the Iranians provided \$6.5 million through an intermadiary for Hawk spare parts and an additional 508 TOW misules. The receipt of the Iranian funds set into motion arrangements for the planned visit to Iran as follows:

--The Office of Communications provided secure communication equipment and the services of a communications officer to travel into Iran with the U.S. team.

--The Office of Technical Services was tasked to provide ten passports for use by the team and the air crew of the aricraft that would fly from Israel to Tengan. The Iranians insisted on the use of non-U.S. passports.

passports were chosen because the Israeli aircraft used for the journey carried registration numbers.

-- The Office of

remarked the available lir Force Base. The a private




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


Ouring these meetings, both sides used the opportunity to detail the obstacles to implementing a strategic relationship between the two countries. In addition to the points noted above, Mr. McFarlane emphasized the political problems caused by Iranian involvement in the hostage issue. The Iranians objected to the USG embargo on U.S. military supplies already paid for plus the continued USG blocking of Iranian assets in the U.S., even after U.S. courts had ruled in their favor.

On 10 June, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, in a speech in Tehran made guarded reference to Iranian interest in improved relations with the U.S. On 26 July, Father Lawrence Jenco was rejeased in the Bekka Valley and found his way to a Syrian military checkpoint. On 3 August, three pallets (less than 1/2 planeload) of electronic parts for Iranian anti-aircraft defenses (HAWK missile sub-components arrived in Tehran (from Israel).

In mid-August, two contacts were made with Iran. George Cave made contact with and Ollie Horth made contact with of the senior Iranian official Rafsanjani.

Through August, September, and October 1986, numerous additional measures



Western media, the Iranians continue to maintain direct contact with the USG and met again in Geneva on 9-10 November with NSC and CIA representatives.

It is important to note that since the initiation of the USG contact with Iran, there has been no evidence of Iranian government complicity in acts of terrorism against the U.S. We believe that the September-October kidnappings of Messrs. Reed, Cicippio, and Tracy were undertaken in an effort to undermine the mascent U.S.-Iranian strategic dialogue and exacerbate the internal Iranian power struggle against the moderate faction with which we have been in contact.

Contrary to speculative reports

that these hostages were taken in order to stimulate the acquisition of more arms, they were most likely captured in order to prevent the very rapproachment

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This brings the record of CIA involvement in these activities authorized by the 17 January 1986 Presidential Finding up to date as of the present time. We should note that none of the weapons came from CIA stocks.

We have received no requests to acquire any more material of any type for shipment to Iran under this program.

I would like to reiterate that the funds for the procurement of the material ennumerated above, as well as for all associated costs, were provided by the Iranians themselves. Funding from Iran was transferred to CIA for deposit in a covert funding mechanism. This action provided secure means for control, payment, and accountability of all funding associated with this program. The Iranian funds, a total of \$12,237,000, were deposited into a special account in a Swiss bank.

The only costs incurred by the CIA in this activity were expenses for the travel of CIA officers involved in the various meetings, the costs of hotel rooms

operational support
amounting to approximately \$48,000. The costs for this support
have been charged against normal operational accounts. Since
all travel by CIA officials distroutinely charged to such
accounts, to do otherwise in the case of the trips undertaken
during this program would have compromised the security of the
activities.

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LEGALITY OF ARM SEIPMENTS

Questions which have appeared in the media as to the legality of the arms shipments raise the question as to whether or not the CIA was responding to a legal order.

At the time the Presidential Finding was signed, applicable legal authorities were reviewed and it was determined that there is clear and ample authority for the President to approve transfers outside the context of the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act. Those laws were not intended and have not been applied by Congress to be the exclusive means for sale, loan or provision of U.S. military equipment to foreign governments.

CIA's legal authority to furnish U.S. military equipment to foreign governments on a covert basis is based on language contained in Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947, which provides that it shall be the duty of the CIA, under NSC direction, to perform services of common concern for the benefit of intelligence agencies and to perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. In short; it is clear that legal authority exists for CIA to transfer U.S. military equipment abroad outside the foreign military sales and assistance statutory framework when the activity is in furtherance of a legitimate and authorized CIA mission; that is, a special activity or intelligence collection operation.

This fundamental and underlying legal conclusion has been arrived at by the CIA Office of General Counsel and has been confirmed by the Attorney General. A transfer is legal, therefore, if we can show that the transfer is in the furtherance of an approved and legitimate intelligence activity and, for covert action, that there is a signed Presidential Finding covering the activity as provided by the Bughes-Ryan Amendment.

The next question is how the CIA obtains the materiel it needs in order to meet those legitimate intelligence interests. CIA's legal authorities permit it to obtain military equipment if it is available on the open market. If that is not the case, or if the equipment cannot be provided as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise, CIA can utilize the Economy Act to obtain the necessary items from the Department of Defense. Of course, transfers of U.S. military

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equipment in general ought to be, and are in fact, made to foreign governments under the U.S. foreign assistance program. However, it is important to point out that any decision to have CIA supply U.S. military equipment inherently involves a determination that the foreign military assistance framework is inappropriate for that purpose. Obviously, the very purpose and nature of the operation for which CIA's extraordinary authorities have been utilized are incompatible with the concept underlying overt U.S. foreign aid programs.

Let me assure you that at the time the decision to go forward with the Presidential Finding for this sensitive operation was made, these legal authorities were reviewed in order to ensure that this Agency was in full compliance with the law.

CONCLUSION:

Let me make it perfectly clear that it was apparent to all that this initiative was a controversial one. Even those of us who supported going forward understood that it was a close call and a risky operation. Therefwere no illusions.

Was it a reasonable call? Yes, I think it was. As the health of Rhomeini has declined over the past year, we have seen an increase in factional infighting in Tehran. This infighting has been sharpened by severe economic problems, as well as the war with Iraq. There have been numerous arrests. This factional infighting has liplications for both the United States and the Soviet Union. It was the Administration's judgement that any powerful Iranian faction seeking to reestablish ties with the West and willing to attempt to curtail Iranian support for terrorism was worth talking to.

It was in that context that the judgement was made that providing a small amount of defensive weapons would give this faction some leverage in the internal struggle by suggesting that there were advantages in contacts with the West.

As I stated earlier, Iran is not going to goldway. Its geographic and strategic position guarantee that it will remain a geopolitical force which the U.S. will have to deal with. If we do not establish ties to the various Iranian factions now, we will be faced with the problem of doing so later. It is that simple.

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EXHIBIT OLN-29



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OCI's Iran Testimony for HPSCI and SSCI 21 Navamer 1986

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Throughout the Reagan Againistration, both the national security community and the intelligence community have been beenly aware and constantly concerned about the geopolitical position and the strategic significance of Iran. Much thought and effort has been devoted to how we might develop contacts and relationships which would provide a better understanding of what is happening there and establish contacts and relationships which might load to improved relationships later on.

I recall speaking to

about the importance of our identifying and establishing contact

with leaders in a future Iran.

said that we do not know who

will emerge to lead (ran in the future, but that we must gather all the strands and hold them in our hands so that we will be ready.

In the early fell of 1985, Bud Acfarlane, after one of the weekly meetings which he and his coputy had with me and my deputy, asked me to stay behind. He teld me about discussions he had not at the highest levels in Israel urging the desirability of discussions with officials in Iran and offering channels of access. He teld me that, for covious reasons, only a handful of possile in the Israeli and American governments were to be teld about this effort. I distinctly recall mefarlane amphasizing that the purpose of such discussions would be the future relationships with Iran and Iran's ACFAPD importance in the East-Meet and Hiddle East-Persian Gulf equation.

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N 10008

CIA's involvement began when the Agency was asked to recommend a reliable airling that could transport bulky oil-drilling marts to an unspecified destination in the Middle East. We recommended a proprietary of ours called This little airline regularly took on commercial ventures. Neither the arline nor CIA know the cargo consisted of 18 Mout missiles. when the place got to Tel Aviv, the pilets were told the cares was spare parts for the eil fields and was to go into Tabriz. Our should be asked to that in order to protect the plane. get flight clearances into Iran. On 25 Nevember 1965, the plane dropped the cargo in Tehran. To the best of our knowledge, neither the Israelis nor the Iranians knew that they were dealing with a CIA proprietary, nor did airline sersenne) know what they were carrying. The sirline was paid the normal commercial rate which amounted to approximately \$127,700. I should stress that the airline does a considerable amount of normal business in addition to its support to CIA.

Our Associate Deputy Director for Operations authorized the flight because of the alleged urgency of the requirement. When the Deputy Director was consulted on 25 November, it was decided that we would not provide any future support of flights into Iran in the absence of a finding.

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In the meantime, the Israeli proposal of probing the possibility of discussions with Iranian officials, including making small shipments of arms to establish our good faith and to induce them to use their influence with those holding our hostages, was discussed at one or two meetings of the MSPG principals. There were differences of view about the desirability of this policy, but it was finally decided that it should be cautiously pursued.

On 7 December 1985, Bud McFarlane, then National Security Advisor, met in Londor with Israeli officials and the Iranian expatriate who was their intermediary to the Iranian government. At this meeting, Mr. McFarlane stated our goals of pursuing the relationship with Iran were these:

- -- Devising a formula for reestablishing a strategic relationship with Tehran.
- -- Enging the Iran-Iray War on honorable terms.
- -- Convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism.
- -- Helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and coordinating ways to counter Soviet activities in the region.

Mr. McFarlane made clear that in this relationship we would expect Iran to use its influence to achieve the release of Mestern hostages in Lehanon.

Me also made it clear that we could not and would not engage in trading arms for hostages. This matter was discussed again several times with the President and others in the national security community following the December McFarlane trip.

On 17 January 1986, a Presidential Finding was signed directing the CIA to provide operational and logistical support for a program aimed at (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining intelligence to determine the current Iranian government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of American hostages held in Beirut and preventing further terrorist acts by these groups.

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The finding stated that the USG would provide moderate elements within and without the government of Iran with arms equipment and related maxeriel in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their efforts to achieve a more moderate government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain resources to defend their country.

In the Finding, the President directed the CIA to refrain from reporting the Finding to the Congress until otherwise directed. The Finding was reviewed and concurred in by the Attorney General,

At the time the Presidential Finding was being drafted, the CIA's Office of General Counsel, provided the legal opinion that the President has the authority to withhold prior notice of operations from the Congress. Section 501 of the National Security Act expressly provides that notification of intelligence activities to the Congress shall be provided. The extent consistent with all applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred by the Constitution.

The Act also states that the Intelligence Committees be informed of activities for which no prime was given by the Personal Tribunal Release recommend that expenditurely circumstances could less the President to conclude that notice of an operation should be withheld, in viole or in part.

The history to the Oversight Act shows that an accommodation recognizing both the President's constitutional responsibility and authority and the Congressional oversight responsibility and authority was reached in this legislative process. The subsequent procedures agreed upon by the DCI and the SSCI on reporting covert action operations provide that advance reporting of such operations would also be subject to the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Section 501 of the National Security Act.

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N 10011

The President has instructed me to advise you that he determined that the activities authorized by the Finding justified withholding prior notification due to the extreme sensitivity of the dialogue being established. He determined that if the fact of this program became known, those carrying out the dialogue both U.S. and Iranian) and the American hostages in Lebanon would be put at a greater risk.

There have only been two findings since the inception of the oversign® process ten years ago which have not been briefed to Congress. This is one. The second was the Iranian hostage rescue mission.

Now I would like to explain exactly what activities were undertaken by the CIA in carrying out the directives of this Finding signed on 17 January 1986.

On 5-7 February 1986, U.S. officials (KSC), a representative of the israeli Prime Ministry (Amiron Kir), and a senior-level Iranian official

met in Germany. At this meeting, the U.S. side emphasized its desire to enter into a strategic dialogue with the Iranian side. The Iranians raises with the to receive U.S. weapons. The U.S. agreed to explore tais lity. Morting with the Israelis, the following mechanism for transfer of the weapons was established:

- -- The Iranian intermediary (Ghorbanifar) would deposit funds in an Israeli account.
- -- The funds would then be transferred to a sterile U.S.-controlled account in an overseas bank.
- -- Using these funds, the CIA would work with the Army Logistics
 Command to obtain the material.
- -- The material would then be transported to [srae] for future shipment to Iran.

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Using these procedures, \$3.7 million was deposited in the CIA account in Geneva on 11 February 1986 for the purchase of 1,000 TOW missiles and associated costs.

On 15 February, Office of Logistics personnel delivered the 1,000 Toy missiles to Kelly Air Force Base. The missiles were then transported to Israel for onward shipment to Iran. CIA was not invulved in the transportation of this shipment.

On 19-21 February, U.S. (RSC and CIA) and Iranian officials met again in Germany to discuss problems in arranging a meeting among higher-level officials. At this meeting, the U.S. side agreed to provide 1,000 TOWs to Iran as a clear signal of U.S. sincerity and support for the faction we were talking to. This delivery was commenced on the morning of 20 February and completed in two transits to Tehran on 21 February. Transportation from Israel to Iran was abound a false flag Israeli aircraft.

On 24 February, the same U.S. officials traveled to Germany where they met with the intermediary and an Iranian government official. At that meeting, the Iranian official provided a list of varying quantities of approximately 240 different space parts needed for the Hawk missile batteries provided by the USG to Iran during the Shah's reign. The Iranian official asked for USG assistance in obtaining these space parts as additional proof that this channel had the approval of the highest authority in the USG.

On 25 february, the U.S. officials, as they continued to do in later contacts with the Iranians, provided the Iranians with limited information designed to encourage an Iranian decision to negotiate an end to the war and increase Iranian awareness of the Seviet threat to Iran.

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Throughout March and April, the Office of Logistics worked with 000 to clarify the items on the Iranians' list of spare parts and identify which times were in 000 stocks.

On 7 March, U.S. (CIA and MSC) and Israels representatives met with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether any further progress was assisted in arranging for a high-level meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these meetings, the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military effectiveness.

Based on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-face with top-level Iranian efficials, on 15 May the President authorized a secret mission to Tehran by fermer National Security Advisor McFarlane, accompanied by a CIA annuitant, a CIA communicator, members of the MSC Staff, and the Israeli and Iranian interlocutors.

On 16 May 1986, the Iranians previded \$6.5 million through an intermediary for Hauk spare parts and an additional \$08 TOM missiles. The receipt of the Iranian funds set into motion arrangements for the planned visit to Iran as follows:

- -- The Office of Communications provided secure communication equipment and the services of a communications officer to travel to Iran with the U.S. team
- -- The Office of Technical Service was tasked to provide ten

 assperts for use by the team and the air

 crew of the aircraft that would fly from Israel to Tehran.

 The Iranians insisted on the use of non-U.S. passports

 passports were chosen because the Israeli aircraft used for the

 journey carried registration numbers.

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- -- The Office of Logistics assembled the available Hawk missile spare parts at Kelly Air Force Base. The parts were then transported to Israel by a private contractor (Southern Air Transport).
- Air Force Base for onwerd shipment to Israel by private contractor (Southern Air Transport).

On 25 May, the U.S. team traveled to Tehran via Israel. The CIA provided two members of the team--a communications officer and a Farsi speaking annuitant with considerable experience in Iranian affairs. The annuitant provided translation services and advice to the team. He continued to be involved in subsequent meetings with Iranian representatives.

The U.S. team brought a single attricted pallet of Mawk missile space parts with them to Tehran at the time of the meeting. Mawever, it was decided that the greater perturbed their space parts would stay in Israel for later delivery to Iran pending further progress in establishing the dialogue. We understand that these space parts were ultimately delivered to Iran.

The 25-29 May meetings were held with high-level Iranian officials, the first direct contact between the two governments in over six years. Mr. McFarlane and his team were able to establish the basis for a continuing relationship and clearly articulate our objectives, concerns, and intentions. The group was also able to assess first-hand the internal political dynamic in Tenran and the effect of the war on Iran. Using Presidentially-approved Terms of Reference, which had been reviewed and approved by appropriate Cabinet officers, McFarlane emphasized that our interest in Iran transcended the hostages, but the continued detention of hostages by a Lebanese group philosophically aligned with Iran prevented progress. Ouring the visit, Mr. McFarlane made clear:

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- -- that we fundamentally opposed Iranian efforts to expel us from the Middle East;
- -- that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism;
- -- that we accepted their revolution and did not seek to reverse it;
- policies (i.e., Lebanen, Micaragua, etc.), but might also find areas of common interest

On 19 September, three Iranians traveled to the U.S. for detailed discussions with the U.S. team. These discussions reaffirmed the basic objectives of the U.S. in seeking a political dialogue with Tehran.

Inroughout August and September, numerous additional meetings were held in Europe between U.S. representatives and the new Iranian contacts in an effort to develop the dialogue authorized by the Presidential Finding.

On 6 October, those Iranians traveled to Frankfurt for meetings with the U.S. team.

On 26 October, more mostings were held in Frankfurt with the same

The Iranians proffered, and the U.S. accepted, the offer of a Soviet T-72 tank

On 2 Mayember, the Iranians provided \$2.037 million and the Office of Legistics procured 500 more TOW missiles from DeO.

Those missiles were delivered by the Uffice of Logistics to Kelly Air
Force Sase on 6 Nevember. A USAF C-141 aircraft carried the missiles to
where they were transshipped by a CIA air proprietary aircraft which
carried the missiles to Israel.

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This brings the record of CIA involvement in these activities authorized by the 17 January 1986 Presidential Finding up to date as of the present time, we should note that none of the weapons came from CIA stocks.

We have received no requests to acquire any more material of any type for shipment to Iran under this program. \triangleleft

I would like to rescenate that the funds for the procurement of the material enumerated above, as well as for all associated costs, were provided by the Iranians themselves. Funding from Iran was transferred to CIA for deposit in a covert funding mechanism. This action provided secure means for control, payment, and accountability of all funding associated with this program. The Iranian funds, a total of \$12,237,000, were deposited into a special account in a Swiss bank.

The only costs incurred by the CIA in this activity were expenses for the travel of CIA officers involved in the various meetings, the costs of rotel record

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amounting to approximately \$48,000. The costs for this support have been charged against normal operational accounts. Since all travel by CIA officials is reutinely charged to such accounts, to do otherwise in the case of the trips undertaken during this program would have compromised the security of the activities.

Let me make it perfectly clear that it was apparent to all that this initiative was a controversial one. Even those of us who supported going forward understood that it was a close call and a risky operation. There were no illusions.

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Was it a reasonable call? Tes, I think it was. As the health of khomelini has declined over the past year, we have seen an increase in factional infighting in Tehran. This infighting has been sharpened by severe economic problems, as well as the war with Iraq. There have been numerous arrests. This factional infighting has implications for both the United States and the Seviet Union. It was the Administration's judgment that any powerful Iranian faction seeking to reestablish ties with the West and willing to attempt to curtail Iranian support for terrorism was worth talking to.

It was in that context that the judgment was made that providing a small amount of defensive weapons would give this faction some leverage in the internal struggle by suggesting that there were advantages in contacts with the West.

As I stated earlier, Iran is not going to go away. Its geographic and strategic positions guarantee that it will remain a geopolitical force which the U.S. will have to deal with. If we do not establish ties to the various Iranian factions now we will be faced with the problem of doing so later. It is that simple.

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EXHIBIT OLN-30



For the last five years, both the national vecu intelligence community have been keenly aware and constantly concerned about the geopolitical position and the strategic significance of Iran. Much thought and effort has been devoted to how we might develop contacts and relationships which would provide a better understanding of what is happening there and establish contacts and relationships which might lead to improved relationships later on.

I recall speaking to

about the importance of

our identifying and establishing contact with leaders in a future Iran.

said that we do not know who

will emerge to lead Iran in the future but that we must gather all the strands and hold them in our hands to that we will be ready.

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which he as National Security Advisor and his deputy had with me and my deputy, asked me to stay behind. He told me about discussions he had had at the highest levels in Israel urging the desirability of officials in Iran and offering channels of access. He reasons, only a handful of people in the Israeli and about this effort. HcFarlane emphasized that the purpose of tuch discussions would be the future relationships with Iran and Iran's great importance on the East-West and Middle East-Persian Gulf equation. AINI ARRITITH 20

CIA's involvement began in late November when the Agency was assect to recommend a reliable airline that could transport bulky caryo to an urspecified location in the Middle East. The requirement specified that it be reliable and able to move fast. A proprietary of ours which regularly took on commercial ventures was designated. When the plane got to tel Aviv. the pilots were told the caryo was sware parts for the oil fields are was to go into Tabriz. Our decided that in order to protect the plane, should be asked to get flight clearances into Iran. This was done. On 25 November 1985, the plane dropped the cargo in Tehran. To the best of our knowledge, neither the Israelis nor the Iranians knew that they were dealing with a CIA proprietary. The airline was paid the normal commercial rate which amounts to approximately \$127,700.

I was out of the country at the time and the Deputy Director, then in charge, approved the flight as an urgent mission in keeping with the proprietary's normal business. But he directed that we would not provide any future flights into Iran in the absence of a Finding.

In the meantime, the Israeli proposal of probing the possibility of discussions with Iranian officials, including making small shipments of arms to establish our good faith and to induce them to use their influence with those holding our hostages, was discussed at one or two metings of the MSPG principals in December and January. There were differences of view about the desirability of this policy, but it was decided that it—should be cautious; pursued.

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Fig. Descrip Fishinges to defend their country.

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The Act also states that the Intelligence Committees be informed of activities for which no prior notice was given at the appropriate time as determined by the President. This was a clear recognition that extraordinary circumstances could lead the President to conclude that notice of an operation should be withheld, in whole or in part.

The history to the Oversight Act shows that an accommodation recognizing both the President's constitutional responsibility and authority and the Congressional oversight responsibility and authority was reached in this legislative process. The subsequent procedures agreed upon by the DCI and the SSCI on reporting covert action operations provide that-advance reporting of such operations would also be subject to the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Section 501 of the National Security Act.

The President has instructed me to advise you of his conclusion that the activities authorized by the Finding justified withholding prior notification due to the extreme sensitivity of the dialogue being established. Re determined

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There have only been two Findings since the inception of the oversight process ten-years ago which have not been briefed to Congress. This is second. The first.was_the Transan hostage rescue mission of 1960.

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On 5-7 February 1986, U.S. officials (NSC), a representative of the Israeli Prime Ministry, and a senior-level Iranian official met in Germany. At this meeting, the U.S. side emphasized its desire to enter into a strategic dialogue with the Iranian side. The Iranians raised their desire to receive U.S. weapons. The U.S. agreed to explore this possibility. Working with the Israelis, the following mechanism for transfer of the weapons was established.

- -- The Iranian intermediary would deposit funds in an Israeli account.
- -- The funds would then be transferred to a sterile U.S.-controlled account in an overseas bank.
- -- Using these funds, the CIA would work with the Army Logistics
 Command to obtain the material.
- -- The material would then be transported to Israel Confuture shipment to Iran.

Using these procedures, \$3.7 million was deposited in the CIA account in Geneva on 11 February 1986 for the purchase of 1,000 TOM-missiles and associated costs.

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On 24 February, the same U.S. Officials traveled to Germany where tree met with the intermediary and an iranian government official. At that meeting, the Iranian official provided a list of varying quantities of approximately 240 different spare parts needed or the Hawk missile batteries provided by the USG to Iran during the Shah's reign. The Iranian official asked for USG assistance in obtaining these spare parts as additional proof that this channel had the approval of the highest authority in the USG.

On 25 February, the U.S. officials, as they continued to do in later contacts with the Iranians, provided the Iranians with limited-information designed to encourage an Iranian decision to negotiate an end to the war and increase Iranian awareness of the Soviet threat to Iran.

Throughout March and April, the Office of Logistics worked with DoD to clarify the items on the Iranians' list of space parts and identify which items were in DoD stocks.

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On 7 March, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israeli representatives met with the Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether any further progress was possible in arranging for a high-level meeting with U.S. and Iranian officials. During these meetings, the intermediary emphasized the deteriorating economic situation in Iranian anxieties regarding increasing Iraqi military effectiveness.

Based on assurances that we could at last meet face-to-face with top-leve' Iranian officials, on 15 May the President authorized a secret mission to Tehran by former National Security Advisor McFarlane, accompanied by a CIA annuitant, a CIA communicator, members of the MSC Staff, and the Israeli and Iranian interlocutors.

On 16 May 1986, the Iranians provided \$6.5 million through an intermedian, for Hawk spare parts and an addition; 508 TOW missiles. The receipt of the Iranian funds set into motion arrangements for the planned visit to Iran as follows:

-- The CIA Office of Communications provided secure communication equipment and the services of a communications officer to travel to Iran with the U.S. team

passports for use by the teamland the air crew of the aircraft that would fly from Israel to Tehran.

The Iranians insisted on the use of non-U.S. passports.

passports were chosen because the Israeliaircraft used for the journey carried registration numbers.

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- -- The Office of Logistics assembled the available Hawk missile spare parts at Kelly Air Force Base. The parts were then transported to Israel by a private contractor.
- -- The Office of Logistics delivered 508 TOW missiles to kelly Air Force Base for onward shipment to Israel by private contractor.

On 25 May, the U.S. team traveled to Tenran via Israel. The CIA provided two members of the team--a communications officer and a farsi speaking annuitant with considerable experience in Iranian affairs. The annuitant provided translation services and advice to the team. He continues to be involved in subsequent meetings with Iranian representatives.

The U.S. team brought a single faircraft pallet of Hawk missile spare parts with them to Tehran at the time of the meeting. However, it was deciced that the greater portion of the spare parts would stay in Israel for later delivery to Iran pending further progress in establishing the dialogue. We understand that those spare parts were ultimately delivered to Iran.

The 25-29 May meetings were held with high-level Iranian officials, the first direct contact between the two governments in over six years. Mr. McFarlers and his team were able to establish the basis for a continuing relationship and clearly articulate our objectives, concerns, and intentions. The group, in its discussions and observations, was also able to assess distinant the internal political dynamic in Tehran and the effect of the warfon Iran.

Using Presidentially-approved Terms of Reference, which had been reviewed and approved by appropriate Cabinet officers, McFarlane emphasized that our interest in Iran transcended the hostages, but the continued detention of hostages by a Lebanese group philosophically aligned with Iran prevented progress. During the visit, Mr. McFarlane made

-_that we fundamentally opposed Iranian efforts to expel us _from the Midale East; -- that we firmly opposed their use of terrorism; e accepted their revolution and did not seek to reverse it; ie had numerous other disagreements involving regional (i.e., Lebanon, Nicaragua, etc.), but might also fine On 19 September, three Iranians traveled to the U.S. for detailed discussions with the U.S. team. These discussions reaffirmed the basic objectives of the U.S. in seeking a political dialogue with Tehran. Throughout August and September, numerous additional meetings were held proper between U.S. representatives and the new Iranian contacts in an effort to develop the dialogue authorized by the Presidential Finding. On 6 October, those Iranians traveled to Frankfurt for the U.S. team. On 26 October, more meetings were held in Frankfurt with the same participants. The Iranians proffered, and the U.S. accepted, the offer of T-72 tank On 2 November, the Iranians provided \$2.037 million the Office of Logistics procured 500 more TOW missiles from 000. Those missiles were delivered by the Office of Louistics to Kelly Air

Those missiles were delivered by the Office of Loyistics to Kelly Air Force Base on 6 November. A USAF C-141 aircraft carried the missiles to

where they were transshipped by a CIA air-proprietary aircraft wris-

carried the missiles to Israel.

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This brings the record of CIA involvement in these activities authorized by the 17 January 1986 Presidential Finding up to date as of the present time.

In surmary, a total of 2,008 TOW missiles along with various Hawk missile space parts have been delivered under the Finding of 17 January 1986. 1,000 TOWs, were delivered in February 1986; 508 in May 1986; and 500 in hovember list. We should note that none of the weapons came from CIA stocks.

We have received no requests to acquire any more material of any type for shipment to Iran under this program.

I would like to reiterate that the funds for the procurement of the materiel enumerated above, as well-assfor all associated costs, were provided by the Iranians themselves. Funding from Iran was transferred to CIA for deposit in a covert funding mechanism. This action provided secure means for control, payment, and accountability of all funding associated with this program. The Iranian funds, a total of \$12,237,000, were deposited into a special account in a Swiss bank.

The only costs incurred by the CIA in this activity were expenses for the travel of CIA officers involved in the various meetings, the costs of hotel rooms

operational support

amounting to approximately \$48,000. The costs for this support have been charged against normal operational accounts. Since all revellor CIA officials is routinely charged to such accounts, to do otherwise with the case of the trips undertaken during this program would have compromised the security of the activities.

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ar confident that my testimony is complete as to the casho facts of CIA's involvement, but let me assure you that we are still combing our records and will promptly report any new information that comes to light.

Let me make it perfectly clear that it was apparent to all that this initiative was a controversial one. Even those of us who supported going forward understood that it was a close call and a risky operation. There were no illusions.

has declined over the past year, we have seen an increase in factional infighting in Tehran. This infighting has been sharpened by severe economic problems, as well as the war with Iraq. There have been numerous arrests.

This factional infighting has implications for both the United States and the Soviet Union. It was the Administration's judgment that any powerful Iranian faction seeking to reestablishities with the West and willing to attempt to curtail Iranian support for iterrorism was worth talking to.

It was in that context that the judgment was made that providing a small amount of defensive weapons would give this faction some leverage in the internal struggle by suggesting that there were advantages in contacts with the West.

As I stated earlier, Iran is not going to go away. Its geographic and strategic positions guarantee that it will remain a geopolitical force which the U.S. will have to deal with. If we do not establish ties to the various Iranian factions now we will be faced with the problem of doing so later. It is that simple.

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3 39

Businer OLN-21

SECRET

SUBJECT: CIA Airline Involvement



In late Movember 1985, a CIA proprietary airline was chartered to carry cargo to Iran at the NSC's request. The carge was described to us as oil drilling spare parts. Although we did not know it at the time, the cargo was actually 18 Nawk missles. The chronolgy of the incident is as follows:

On 22 November 1985, the MSC contacted the Agency with an urgent request the name of a discreet, reliable airline that could transport bulky oil-drilling parts to an unspecified destination in the Middle East.

We offered the name of the CIA's proprietary airline as a company which could handle the MSC request. The MSC passed the name of our airline to their interactions with the Israelas.

In the interim, we contacted our airline and told them that they would be receiving an urgent, legitimate charter request. The MSC intermediary contacted the airline that evening (22) Movember and made arrangements for the airline to pick-up the PACE

The destination was changed to Tel Aviv and two of the cargo was ultimately loaded onto only one of the aircraft. Loading was completed by 24 November and the aircraft proceeded to Iran via a stop at the land then overflying At the NSC's request, and for the protection of our aircraft, we helped arrange for the overflight clearances.

To the best of our knowledge, the internation of the Insulus Know internation of the inte that they was dealing with a CIA proprietary, nor did sigline pursonnel know what they were carrying. mid-January when we were told by the Iranians.

The airline was paid the normal commercial rate which amounted to approximately \$127,700. I should stress that the airline does a considerable amount of normal business in addition to its support to CIA. It had, in fact, made and which to the airline to Tehran carrying commercial items prior to the 22-25 November incident.

Senior CIA management found out about the flight on 25 rebrussy. Although we did not know the nature of the cargo, we thought that any future support of this type to the NSC would require a finding.

INCHOLITED 22 Jul 1987

EXHIBIT OLN-31A

NIINTHOOFFICE

gualect: CIA Airline Involvement



In late Hovember 1985, a CIA proprietary airline was chartered to carry cargo to Iran. The cargo was described to us as oil drilling space parts. Although we did not know it at the time, the cargo was actually 18 Hawk missles. The chronolgy of the incident is as follows:

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Senior CIA management found out about the flight on 25 February. Although we did not know the nature of the cargo, we thought that any future support of this type to the NSC would require a Finding.

Partially Declaration/Februarie et 7 July 1987
tooler parallices of E.S. 1238
by 9. Reger, National Separity Council

EXHIBIT OLN-32

UNCLASSIFIED

CHEADER> TO: MEPST -- CPUA -- (PUA CPUA TO: MSPAT -- CPUA PAUL THORPSON 11/22/66 16:56:51 -- secher --MOTE FROM: JOHN POINGERTER N 19124 <\$991667> Subject: MFAC *** Reply to note of 11/21/86 19:12 -- segter --MOTE FROM: BOSERT MEPAPLANE Subject: MFAC Reser John. You dust must be pretty well drained after the pessions with the Intel consistees. That's not a corribly uplifting experience; I did it a simple for Olife. I spent a couple of hours with Ed Reese today going over ty record with him. The only blind spot n by part concerned a shippent in howesbor '85 which still doesn't ring a bell with me.

But it appears that the opttor of not notifying about the Israeli transfers can be covered if the President made a "mental finding" before the transfers took place. Well on that score we ought to be at because he was all for letting the Israelis de anything they wanted at the very first briefing in the hospital. Ed second relieved at that. Caroline tolls so that the hua arrange for set to be to the high the MFAC on Bec Sthat 2:00es. They want it to be closed but for the record. I don't sind either way but will be guided by whatever y all prefer.



Ехнівіт OLN-33

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..... S Schedule

Friday, Nov 21

Wednesday, Nov 19

15,87

HAYN BELASSIFIED 0- JMP in WHSR W/HPS

Spitz & Garwood

(DCI Preparation)

0900- JMP in WHSR W/SSC

. 1000- Father Tom Dowling

1000 - Benyleons 1336 - Jinp

رد دامه از مکسید مسال

1715 Ruchanan 1500- H.B. Day Jim Stare

17 cum Dele Haling

1530 - Michael Leder 1600- Steve Chouck (WHC: Farewell NEOB 201

1600- JMP Mtg W/Gates-

ال المدار سيد.

الناس

MONDAY, 17 NOVEMBER

Oliver North's Schedule

Tuesday, Nov 18

0730- ODSM WHSR

1000 - Father Dowling W/

Rich Miller


1200 - Lunch w/McDaniel, Sommer & Mayor of Barcelona WH MESS

MAYOR Pasqual Naragall

Ехнівіт OLN-34

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_		er North, A			Sunacy J 7160	6 1904
213 m	<u>A6</u> :	Want to involved. Talk to	Hesh the	facts from	n everyo	ne tions
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		≛: D. Reger, i.	tional Security Council	auried	CYN	24

ASSISTANCE AND A SECONDARY



UNGLASSIBLU

7167 Something Had discussed N/ MCFto Iran DLN called Robine back big problem got ma - move some they that support what you want to do Ribut told moving itens to support Raproachment Woran - Dick Second -: Lut (busine - West to see Juy m Rebie told "oil related exujount.

Usion accitied

J 716à 1 5906 Several more convers. w/Bad encour Soraelis aborted The move Second went to Teloviv per fore Nouest, Clean high pur. 366-I called Devey Clandy at CIA, got name progrestay. orck not yet in Tel Aviv told 18-19 Hawk missiles. N talked to Bud - Roythy M+N recall —: OK, but not went went way to be it, not seen as exchange host. I aims. If meet be stok to meet dancelis. hofy early Dec - 607 - worth to Eur. to set up 4 mtg = N/ Damers -Next day M anwel -2 mtgs, all - Contan, sund, we 2 mtgs, all - Contan, sund, we

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W/Kimbe, emphatic that not way to go w/ arms - host, etc.

Mig. M., Second, Schwimer, Kimshe,

Nimrodi, Gorbanifar, N

Geralinian.

Event. - one)

Hs: due aims trans WM.

N: M disc incentives + their read but said can't be seen as exchige aims f/ host

Ang 22- philos disc Knuche - not og.

N: No knowled —

learned Nov 25-6 from Second

when in Tel Aviv —

On't know who knew

Sud + Komehe meet July, early Ang, late Ang in gast of

ناء ١١٠ ناري لايالا When in room, never raised, la London Emele, M, N _____.
exchare arms/host. Breader discussion Kimche said all along need aims in deal NYT article -N: the Nov. of is a mess -There were 80 Hawks in Second ste shut it down b/c off baled in Tel Aviv -Probly Called Clandae zeto 231 -At: CIA - word - look at legality. Dick sent long regt to N on how -sortevel up this in . Shipmet of Went in due W/ Pain + MCF Nudever you want done not being N process told there or Dewes

UNCLASSITE 1 - 5904 6 Told them shight involved army to the process of trouble black of the suppose to be or squip. Mid-Dec — talked to Casey. Told them as ops open, not way to do whetever your princy is. Sesord learned it from Israelis Finding: Version of finding That exact stoken - shows work trate today - shows work in saly Jan - Dec. Spoken work - on finding retroapplie swear that was of prospective No the knowledge of retro F for Hawks.

One draft re: all previous acts — work in mid-Dec.

After Dec. mtg. in London — talk to A re need ff finding, the.

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Can't have Iss. out dans this 7172 t want Finding to cover activities Heard of McMahon, Casey - Sporting They were goosey about truck Shipat. C/A Thought wrong Cotes. Need CIA to run op. — need Finding
M agreed W/ need H/F—
Sporkin, Casey, Gate, George, N,
That at Casey house in Dec.
—recall George was there holy after tip to London. Talk to anyone else about shipmet after Second told you N: To Pain. — Said we need Fran N to CIA - plane. Poin -totally innocent -Knew Nothing of it. 1st learned in Nov When N raised it. N was told it oil coup - I wondered by not but per linew -

got clearance from Poin. to Contact Second for CiA plane. Second: close personal friend-Not at Neysense _ Second. When learned Hawks, N -> CIA? yos. Who? Perhaps directly to Carey. At Good to McMahon _ who sent to lung -N McMahon was not happy McMahon can't stand N Mr. Nicas muning so whom't call At: Leben: Leleen would have brought to N? me _ but rineig contact for lepen was MCF. joining suite at State _ Olekeen pushing draw rapros When 1st hear doont 508 Tows? Think sometime in Oct Weir released on 14th think result

Think it was Nov. Whether M or K - defer C56: Jesaelis reelly juding G on me. re: coverage (re: Tows ?) # US. actus demonstrate good fait. N: we talked grospectively -Ween ? decision by M -

N: State not on list b/c it leads - handled thru INR then if don't like it, hits N: asked for dissim. of mtgs not done . (by CIA analyst) Cheop. info se: 5tmt-Ledeen learned this in Late Septtalks from Gorbanifar -Ledeen told Nin Sept. Q: But said in Nov -N: from an Jaraeli -: is when I learned That from them is Nov. In Dee, Ledern tolk to go away Som this + naves come back. B/c get Israelis involunt Schwiner, Calcan, Gorbanifor-- + Nir took over. N told Nir Schwimer: busmen; close to Beres. Limche dropped out same time - as far as N Knew - not K, but now be

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المازية

UNCLASSIFIED 1 7176 1 g. 6 chron. not right - Jaw. Knew for sine of Heutes (Nir)
Reotd to McF + Poiss.
Llaked in Nov from Dick
+ reot'd to John + Bud. arie. plan — 2 80 Hawk Loads of Fran H 160 — not happen. Return of Hawks - What N wrote - H said to N bk mad -but from didn't like Them -Problem was Ist give # back.
Don't know # ____ pre-finding. M told N to get tawks back -in early Jan. — when boly gone. Nir naised replenishmt for 1st time - asked any deals made - N don't know - ask M - said no leads -N told Nir. We did replenish hissiles sitting in crates —only / wrong type + needed ___ wrong type + needed ___ calabrate. Said.

UNPIROSIFIED 1 7177 /2 Hawks from Israeli stocks, best knowl Ab: When we paid replenishmet. - Iran, Nir, Swiss acety to DOD cia controller handles it, think Dick carried one transfer Feb. event doesn't produce hostages -Money moved to CIA account -Ipahians -> Israelis -> CIA account. - Army Show memo: Is it something you regard? W terms of reference acted Apr 86 reference to on 1350, with endersont of US gov't, Israelis transfer 508 Tows -don't know who did it; think from KK Het gen't understanding

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& Concern protect the but we need to know facts.

Some have

UNCLASSIFIED Everyone N talked to m Israeli Peres, Rebiner Shamin, etc. __ at US request. But not injo HN. or the fact of arms to Dran — of hostages N believes RK authorized at himself b/c M wouldn't go off on own-Think M - K understanding N went to talk to RR re: strategic. relation + N/RR it always came back to hostages. Drawn to linkage Terrible mustake to say we RR wanted the strategic relationship-b/c RR wanted the hosteges — At he (ce) talked about both if just relationship, not agree aums-

UNSCHOOLICEU 5917 14 appears to be written Hr: Same memo, between 4-7 Maril mention of me of # -Transferred ? -- yes, &/ used it of Hank gaste - 10 May A deposited - to Israeli esci Use of # — - #2. _ million for Assaeli replacent. - \$12 M revidual funds for Nicareguan resistance cost: 6.5 parts 9.00 -total 50 3 H of residuel fundo. > Don't know how much was moved. to Nicarequene __ Israeli decides # to Resistance. Dur involvent — none — CIA NS none - CIA, NSC MONE. ME: how Nir: Israelis, in Jan 96, approach w/2 ways to help—

MARIANCIFIED 1 57180 /5 anange to take residuals from these transactions + to Nic.

No dise w/RR - not w/N. -> Poin. - st of contact W/RR. grinapel dep-Ant? N don't know that # _____,

Any CIA handling of that # _____,

No, don't thunk they know,

Some may suspect. Jeneli suggest to sweaten got?

- Dix. Jeneli help zen'lly -Don't recall asking them. Israeli offers. If Pres. OKS something - with working files of Atalf chappored it _ you'd have it was. Other files there it could be in?
forward? It didn't so MIN with N.

nach \$ got to Nicareguans? N understood this part of deal. How much more is there to d? Februar last one both had Who else n 3 neets ni Switz-Islaelis — CIA no knowledge Via accusations of N raying \$ — let other for its have done the thing w/ Colero + usual.

11101 1331FIED 1 5220 7182 No other US ofcle produced _____ Juallis Nir, (perhaps all humself) Gorbanifar cut A Af top. \$ left in CIA account - # " son K AG: 3 transac 1000 tows -> Israel -> Iran -- # (Feb) (Gorbanifu) (~3-4H to contra u ut) Haut parts 1 508 reglenishent:

- payment of parts
- gayment for Tows reglenishent. (contras too)

UNCLASSIFIED ...

Nir upset ble

and - CIA

a: What else like Nicaraguan angle H. Nothing.

Jaraelis said

1-dwest fording -2-use daradi # -- N: No. Act - from

3-50, have Iranians pay

If this doesn't come out only only offer is Nov. Hawks deal think someone oneht to step up and say this was authorized in Nov. Don 4 know of RR briefel on it; possible Don Regan is. Thompson may have seen it. Folks in OLN ofe don't know to Must share w/RR - see if any other thing aware of? Problematic areas 508 transfer: any thing else others could be doing, have done? Aranian law won't gernet assurce Rarie \$, corsortium. Heard of complaints non pyrit.

Ar Cnother source potential embarrassout—
Those who wast flost of.

Any m NY, elsewhere, working to most one the had

This it lost 19M in String by FB1

At out (405) 8 ---

(Jorgen:

Almite he in change — goin. upset

If Hawks head — get wack —

No doubt Nir convenced

US excom/acquesced/

exceed in 508 Tow Shipmit —

N didn't agree —

Trom list. wy bud.

No reason to doubt Nir.

— ask M about it — 11 said

"I've always insisted we didn't made arms & hoot."

Think bud needs to hink out lise w/RR + Straelis to think out

lise w/RR + Straelis to This prob with go away.

__ UNDLASSITIED

Shippint of Hawks.

Nor Satisfied N - US endersel it. M answer re: TOWS equival emy so data to dishelieve Nit. hostages—
thus, not strict quil.
Comper: expect hostages? Reglenishmet? When -M + Kinche Conversations :-:

strong objections to kinche to
shipmets in chron. based on perception -.
-what doesn't square - is RR - Rostager
Mer - strategis dialog. But doesn't like perception. WOR: Discussion of John - vis Dran / embayo, - suegtion - list of wante - we leelined many of ...

•

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anti-X musile - is défensive.

JNCIASSIFIED, 7187 22

508 Tows linked to Weir: No ges, from what I understand.
18 Howks linked to any histogram: drift known

Hautes return:

Deraelie didn't want to give A
back. Franciene didn't want itnot what ordered.

Learned of it -:

US Air crow to move all cargo
we han — Febisson forward —
run N/crow from Southern Air
Transport in Mami Fla —

Oot invertigating of contra relations

paid by
Isradia

Proprieten airline - start used to Draw earlier - start used use them 11 508 Tows (?) - total Carely

INCLASSIFIED 1 7189 Met dell N in The profilens Said fellow non-US, noncargo plane. on any of this except for witell - Unapocified & flights. In Josef, they want's, par Second, to take more than I flight - N said M doesn't needly conversation this time he was under gressure about Secondo' rept M + Poin.

UNGLASSIFIED 1 7190 5928 25

about what's really going on

Copp is Second — for telephone purposes Mc Adams is Second too — w/ documentation.

Second to Seraelia, who called + set up the airplane.

Thompson was with M at Geneva—

Ok: Thompson logs

Thompson Counsel + military aide to

M + Point (now).

M called Someone in

Nature of unency;

A: hoslis wanted it.

Did now think it oil exus—?

A: NB thinkely it multipose


+ told M + P — "Said go do it—

+ CIA mot told— CIA told by N


M supress it was ril exusp.

5° pm (SR out a mount)

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113171 ASSIFIED 1 5931 1 7193 28

to with forced — of plan agreed the with forced — not necess.

the on coop. of Assaelis before anything public

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On trip to Iran in May 5952

M. Cave, Tenscher, CIA commin, Nir

Ami (sind)

We never provided technicians

+ still want one

556 ollie mt

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Exhibit OLN-35





Exhibit OLN-36






EXHIBIT OLN-37




Exhibit OLN-38




EXHIBIT OLN-39







Exhibit OLN-40







Ехнівіт OLN-41




EXHIBIT OLN-42

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इन्हरूका व

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 19, 1985 N 10967


Dear Major General Secord:

Your discrete assistance is again required in support of our national interests. At the earliest opportunity, please proceed to and other locations as necessary in order to arrange for the transfer of sensitive material being shipped from Israel.

As in the past, you should exercise gre caution that this activity does not become public knowledge. You should ensure that only those whose discretiois guaranteed are involved.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFar






Major General Richard Secord 6502 Anna Maria Court McLean, VA 22101

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There is a requirement for 40 additional suppose f the same presentators for a total requirement of 120. \$100 is payment for the first DD has been depended in the appropriate account. Do acit will land in Tabeix until the AUTITS tore been delivered to the ondersop. The Irrelans have also ashed to order additional stone in the fatore and have been told that they will be considered after this activity has succeeded, all transfer arrangements have been ands by Dick Sacord, she desertes a order (or his extraordinary mbert solice effects.

Peplemiobaset accomponents and being made through the SSD perchasing office in SSC. There is, to may the least, exceldenable assists that we will exceeded delay as their plan to perchase 120 of those ecopous in the cont for days. ISD year instructions I have teld their agent that we will sell thee 120 items at a price that they can meet. I have further teld then that we will make no effort to seen on their perchase ISC request notif we have all time ARCITS safely delivered. In short, the pressure is on thes.

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**Vol. for four-hoor elect to pick up any bootsque she any be released over the contend. All of the parties above will be told that up have info (from the same source which advised up of Vier's rejected that mean, if not all, ACCT bectages will be termed over the person are and Ameder.

As seen as we have the colones confirmed, we need to more quickly with Defense to provide the 170 stealers the Instable meet to bey. They are very concerned that they are depraising their defense capability, and in vice of the Syrian about-does posterday the FO has placed considerable prosence on both habin and Blocks for very prospt replacement. Both called several times today.

There is the distinct possibility that at the end of the west or sill have five isorices been and the presise of no feture beetape takings is exchange for colling the largelle 130 and McMa. Boughts the difficulty of scaling all this fit isoids a Strings gister, it iso: that had a deal --

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Exhibit OLN-44

UNCLASSIFED

POINT PAPER

Hawk Missiles for Iran



- Missiles are available right now, suitable for foreign sale. There are 164 missiles at Red River Arsenal - 77 intended for UAE and 8° for Korea. Seven of these are intended for tests, but the tests can be foregone.
- The missiles at Red River Arsenal cost \$300,000 apiece. This is not necessarily a firm price, and replacements could cost as much as \$437,700 apiece.
- Thus, the total bill for 120 missiles would be \$36-52.5 million.
 To this, applicable charges would have to be added (NRC cost, administration charge, packing and transport charges, plus storage).
- The missiles for Korea and UAE would have to be replaced, so DSAA will need the money to replace them.
- The modalities for sale to Iran present formidable difficulties:
 - -- Iran is not currently certified for sales, including indirectly as a third country, per Sec. 3 of the AECA.
 - congress must be notified of all sales of \$14 million or more, whether it is a direct sale or indirect to a third country. The notice must be unclassified (except for some details), and the sale cannot take place until 30 days after the notice. As 30 days can be waived for direct sales, but the third country transfer has no such provision, and notice must still be given in any case.
 - -- Thus, even if the missiles were laundered through Israel, Congress would have to be notified.
- It is conceivable that the sale could be broken into 3 or 4 packages, in order to evade Congressional notice.
 - -- While there is no explicit injunction against splitting up such a sale (subject to check...), the spirit and the practice of the law is against that, and all Administrations have observed this scrupulously.
 - -- It is conceivable that, upon satisfactory consultation with Chairmen Lugar and Fascell and their minority counterparts, they might agree to splitting the sale into smaller packages.
- The customer countries (UAE and Korea) would have to be told that their deliveries had been rescheduled, but we would not have to tell them why. We would not want to charge them more for later deliveries.

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The political drawbacks are equally formidable:


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- -- If Iraq ever found out, they would be greatly irritated. Their sources of supply are more readily accessible than Iran's, however, so there would be no effect in that respect.
- -- Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States would also be irritated and alarmed.
- -- If Israel were used as the laundering country, they would be greatly encouraged to continue selling to Iran, and to expand their sales.
- -- If the sale became known, all bars would be removed from sales by such countries as Spain, Portugal, Greece, UK, Italy, and FRG, countries who are only barely restrained from overt, large sales to Iran now.
- -- In short, the risk is that of prolonging and intensifying the Iran-Iraq war, while seriously compromising US influence over Israel and other countries to restrain sales to Iran.

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EXHIBIT OLN-47

The Director of Central Intelligence

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26 November 1985

0400

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN

Deputy Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:


Presidential Finding on Middle East


Pursuant to our conversation this should go to the President for his signature and should not be passed around in any hands below our level.

With am J. Carley

Attachment: As stated

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Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection

0401

I have been briefed on the efforts being made by private parties to obtain the release of Americans held hostage in the Middle East, and hereby find that the following operations in foreign countries (including all support necessary to such operations) are important to the national security of the United States. Because of the extreme sensitivity of these operations, in the exercise of the President's constitutional authorities, I direct the Director of Central Intelligence not to brief the Congress of the United States, as provided for in Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, until such time as I may direct otherwise.

SCOPE

Hostage Rescue - Middle East

DESCRIPTION

The provision of assistance by the Central Intelligence Agency to private parties in their attempt to obtain the release of Americans held hostage in the Middle East. Such assistance is to include the provision of transportation, communications, and other necessary support. As part of these efforts certain foreign material and munitions may be provided to the Government of Iran which is taking steps to facilitate the release of the American hostages.

All prior actions taken by U.S. Government officials in furtherance of this effort are hereby ratified.

The White House Washington, D.C.

Date:

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
Scopite this perception Storbs said economic times that this shole thing nes e "chosting pass" or the part of the leconics, Cope & dische have been able to present with a resemb disingue which still presince began for echievies our three objections

-- aupport for a prognetic - eray extented faction which could take ever in a change of prestagest

-- Do note terrection directed epitest U.S. personnel or interests.

Free those engalog discussions, which is too cases included [casion or litery officers, Copy and Metho emericale that the children situation in Ital in dispersion. The Iracian descriptions of the state of their opeliposet, Jack of competent associately inability to one sect of the remining fig. cotoriel pertunds the real possibility of a military colleges (at least by the hear) in the sear to nid-ters. Thes, there is considerable processes on the interlerators to decept to produce - quickly.

Gives the relatively low level of competence on the part of the Irentana In Europe, and the fact that may supplies delivered will undembtodly have to be executed by an army or his force officer, it is very doubtful that a "single transaction" accomponent can be eathed out with the parties in Tobtas, so setter that is agreed to be torope. In about, they have been



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"occasion" or easy times in the post that the attitude of district is very high on their path. At the case time, is all distriction (inclined teday's phone calleg they are desperted to conclude some time of extrapposed in the most 16 days and here even acted that the mosting acted lad for Saturday is Leeden be advanced. Board on that we can conclude from intelligence as Delreit, we believe that they are very concessed that the hestogon (the only freshes inverage point besides the Jove is Iran) may be lilled or captured/released by the Syriano, Pounce, Philosop or that is the soor froster. Satisf's contacts with the capture, spans to extrabotate this assessment. In other, time is very short for all parties assessment.

Finally, there is the matter of the looper tore strategy for what we should be attempting to accomplish wis a vis the Bran-Trag set and a seco resemble percental in Iran, free of percent, discussions with finche and decen it is apparent the the faranite ment: the was to continue at a stalement, a seco seducate landas concessed to the end and will presches find a way to continue getting their people (Josep) out of true through more hind of borton arrangement. In that the first tree of their gesle ere, it would even, quartaily congruent of our interests, and their least a fact of life, or should probably be seeing the retern of the ASCIT hestoges as a subsidiary bossili — set the princry objective, though it may be a part of the secondary fixed steps is achieving the brooker objectives. While Electhe, Geron, Copy and I all agree that there is a high degree of tiet to persone the course so here started, so are see so far down the read that stagging what has been started sould have even sore coriose repercuedade, to all view the most ologo se "coolideere building on the part of both sides. There of as here any illusions about the cast of characters so are dealing of the of the other side. They are a printtire, escaphisticated group the are natrocadinarily districtful of the feat in general and the localis/6,5, in particular. They have not the elightest ides of that is pring as in our processes or how our apotes waris. Today for encapie, Setts called top its absolute confusion over the fact that Todanjani, had just consisted a letter free per all peoples (see, Sulma restring the Appricas Besisses. Since the freeless ore educate that they set to publicly connected with the sections, telding or release of the ARCITA. why, Corba unated to know, may folios belog brought into this "embetion to the puzzle." Soche contented that "Betri could to have sore control over the combace of his pecliment" then to allow them to confuse on already difficult grables. Dist told big the letter had nothing to do sith what so ore cheek, but dothe did not soon convigued that this case't man ment of offert to esterose tres. fired this very aposphisticated class of things so their part and the dis-

the correct relationship wer -- can the gioth of meet bails we the langer term goals in that the people on are dealing with will be totally discredited at boos; and

-- inter the greater libelihood of reprincis spaint to for "loading then on," These septiants could belt the fore of additional mentage servines, speculies of appropriate our hold, or both.

treat that the fraction obviously fool, so believe that if so step the current affort at this point and do not at local proceed with a "test" of

While the threat to entry out manchines equient on has not, to sy hoseledge, over arises (it cortainly has not since flatbo/Copy/Borth have been directly sequent — and licked mover sentioned it), it is interesting to note



2 may 1987

that when Copp questioned the bose fides of Corbs and his coberts as capable of delivering on their and of the arrangement, boths corofolig noted that of see those discussives boses of dicheel & Scholasse, there has not bose a Ch mingle Inlante Jibod book threat, bijecting or hideapping -- and that there seeld be seen it this "rocked." D.S., Copp and I regard this to be at locat see sign of coefidence that this activity ony jet prosper. There are some CV leases todications of contidence to recent depar

- In response to Capt's describ for finels to be deposited in edvance to detrap specialises conta, and what the translate seas told seas "perchange" es the arms merbot" a total of \$400 has been deposited;

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All involved on our aids reregaine that this dees not seed one al the beste criteria established at the eponion of this restore: a simple transaction which of he proceeded by a release of the bestopen. Bosever, given tie points above reputding the actual distract in the dislayer, or all, bullever it is about the only vay we can get the everall process soring. decourse here toom token to reduce the chance for deplicity on the port of the Iranian and to preserve a secoure of GFSEC in cattying out the transaction. In the case of a double cross, one of the Iranian will be in the books of secrets so control throughout. One of then her already suffered a sections (though apparently not fately best attely after leet cost's miss transaction failed to produce caselia. The tiret two delivation, via 707 froighters are relatively small and it they do not presions the desired estrooms, all size stops. All I are now under our control.

5may 1987

OpSEC consume are threefold: consumications, deliveries ententto Iron and explanishment of the facenti stocks, is select the first problem on Ore Code to see to use by all parties. This code is similar to the one send to everson deliveries to the Dicaregone Senistance and has moreer been compressions. The delivery/flight planning security grables has been selved by a such sore deliberate selection of electraft and electors field controlled by the Ironian Broy at Yaterin. Apprentiate arrangements have also been soon to occure that the occuflight of the provided of the Ironian Ironian at a transient location between Tal Bris and Tables. Before the A/C actually crossess into Ironian atrapace, the appropriate colonomy made occur. The locat OFFEC convers, that of capturishing Israeli stocks, is probably the most delicate ingoon. The apprintability of 19th converted represents

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5may 1987

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5may 1987

Exhibit OLN-49

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December 5, 1985

SPECIAL PROJECT RE IRAN

Background: Several months ago, one of the agents engaged in shipping material to the Micaraguan resistance noted the presence of U.S. military stocks in a state warehouse. Inquiries indicated that the military material was of Israeli origin being snipped by a private company for sale to Iran. When we approached a high-level Israeli official with this knowledge, we were advised that the GOI was not "technically violating" the U.S. ban on shipments to Iran in that the sales were being undertaken by a non-governmental entity.

We were told that each sircraft that delivered arms to Iran, returned to Israel

In discussing the matter with the Israelis, they indicated that their objectives in "permitting" this activity were threefold:

- -- Use the arms sales to build the credibility of moderate elements in the Iranian army in hopes that they would become sufficiently powerful to establish a more reasonable government in Tehran.
- -- Deliver sufficient military material to ensure that the Iranian military does not collapse under the pressure of an increasingly effective Iraqi military effort.

In early September, in order that we not take action to terminate the arms sales, the Israelis proposed that this process be used as leverage to recover the American citizens held hostage in Lebanon. It was decided to test the validity of this proposal and on September 14, the Israelis, using chartered aircraft, delivered 500 TOW missiles to Tabris, Iran. Prior to commencing this operation, we committed to the Israelis that we would sell them replacements for the items they had sold and delivered to Iran. Two days later Reverend Benjamin Weir was released.







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
TORSE JANE STORY

Bill Buckley is dead

N 28751

Current Situation: The Iranians have significant interest in continuing this process. They are under extraordinary military pressure from Iraq and are, by their own admission, subject to regular overflights of Iranian territory by Soviet aircraft. They currently have no capability to deal with this affront and find themselves in an increasingly desperate situation vis-a-vis Iraq. They have urged the Israelis, with whom they are in contact, to continue the process which resulted in the release of Senjamin Weir.

Our continuing efforts to achieve release of the hostages through diplomatic and other means have proven fruitless. There are numerous indications 'luding reports from the special representative of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Terry Waite, that time is running out for the hostages. We are relatively confident of information that former Seirut Chief of Station,



- -- The release of the five Americans and one of the French hostages still being held.
- No further acts Shia fundamentalist terrorism (hijackings; bombings, kidnappings) directed against U.S. property or personnel.

There is considerable reason not to accept this proposal. It is contrary to our stated policy of not making concessions to terrorists or those who sponsor them. It is also possible that such an arrangement is a "double-cross" in that the Iranians can not or will not release the captives as agreed. Such an arrangement, bartering for the lives of innocent human beings, is repugnant. Finally, the quantities which the Iranians wish to purchase will significantly degrade Israeli stockpiles and require very prompt replenishment.

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U.S. Interests: Motwithstanding the undesirable nature of such a transaction, it must be noted that the first two Israeli objectives are congruent with our own interests:

- -- A more moderate Iranian government is essential to stability in the Persian Gulf and MidZast.
- -- Such a change of government in Iran is most likely to come about as a consequence of a credible military establishment which is able to withstand the Iraqi onslought and deter Soviet adventurism/intimidation. The Iranian army (not the Revolutionary Guards) must be capable of at least stalemating the war.
- Shis fundamentalist terrorism is a serious threat to the United States which has long-term adverse consequences for our interests and we must endeavor to stop its spread.
- -- The return of the American hostages will relieve a major domestic and international liability -- in addition to its obvious humanitarian aspect.

The first three of these goals may well be achievable -- and the fourth accrued as a subsidiary benefit -- by commencing the process of allowing the Israeli sales as proposed by the Iranian agents in Europe. It is unlikely, however, that we can proceed further toward the first three -- and not at all on the hostage release unless we allow the process of delivery to begin.

Discussions toward this end have been proceeding among the Israelis, Iranians and a U.S. businessman acting privately on behalf of the USG for nearly three weeks. There are several indications of confidence that an arrangement can be consummated in the next 10 days which would result in the release of the hostages and commencement of a process leading toward the first three objectives above. The military situation in the Iran/Iraq war and the increasing pressure on the Eirballah in Lebanon both point toward immediate action. There is also, as the Iranian intermediaries pointedly noted last week, a complete absence of any Shie fundamentalist hijackings, assassinations, hostage seizures, or bumbings since this dialogue began in September. While there have not been expressed or implied threats by the Iranians in these discussions, the Israeli and U.S. private citises participants believe that if the current effort is not at least tried, we run the risk of abandoning both the longer term goals and the likelihood of reprisals against us for "leading them on." These reprisals would probably take the form of additional hostage seisures, execution of some/all those now held, or both,

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Mext Steps: The Iranians, the Israelis, and our U.S. businessman plan to seet in London on Saturday, December 6 to discuss whether or not to proceed with the sale of the TOWS and HAMES. The Israeli government has informally told us that if they can be assured of "prempt" resupply, they will sell the quantities requested from their prepositioned war reserve. 3,300 TOWS represents approximately half their available supplies.

The U.S. businessman has arranged for the charter of two non-U.S. registered aircraft for use in the deliveries. The total delivery would be conducted in 5 flights from Tel Aviv to Tabriz. Iran via interim airfields in Europe prior Each delivery is to result in the release of a specified number of hostages. Arrangements for the interim airfields, overflight rights, and flight plans have been made, some with the help of the CIA. A communications code to preserve operational security is available for use by all parties. All aircraft would be inspected by an Iranian at one of the transient locations between Tel Aviv and Tabriz. The entire evolution is designed to be completed in a 24 hour period. It can be stopped at any point if the Iranians fail to deliver.

The greatest operational security concern is that of replenishing Israeli stocks. The Israelis have identified a means of transferring the Iranian provided funds to an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) account, which will be used for purchasing items not necessarily covered by FMS. They will have to purchase the replenishment items from the U.S. in FMS transaction from U.S. stocks. Both the number of weapons and the size of the cash transfer could draw attention. If a single transaction is more than \$14.9 M, we would normally have to notify Congress. The Israelis are prepared to justify the large quantity and urgency based on damage caused to the equipment in storage.



If this process achieves the release of the hostages and proves the credibility of the Iranian contacts in Europe, Bud McFarlane would them step is to supervise achieving the longer range goals. Additional meetings with the Iranians would be arranged to further our objectives without requiring such large scale sales/ deliveries by the Israelis.

Approval is now required for us to take the next steps on Saturday. After carefully considering the liabilities inherent in this plan, it would appear that we must make one last try or we will risk condemning some or all of the hostages to death and undergoing a renewed wave of Islamic Jihad terrorism. While the risks of proceeding are significant, the risks of not trying are even greater.

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PROSPECTS FOR IMMEDIATE SEIPHENT OF I-BANK and I-TON HISSILES

I-BAME

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- There are 164 missiles available at Red River Arsenal--75 intended for UAB and 84 for Rores. The missiles have bot yet been lot acceptance tested, but there is a very low risk of failure. The missiles will be at Red River until about April 1986 for testing.
- There would be no impact on the UAE if we ship their 75 missiles. The program has slipped in other ways, and can be accommodated within the normal production lead time for replacement missiles.
- Rorea would have to be consulted to ascertain the impact on their program, if it is necessary to ship any missiles in addition to the 75 mentioned above. Procurement lead time to replace Rorea's missiles would be about 33 months.
- To the best of our knowledge, all of U.S. Army I-EANTS are with units and should not be considered from diversion.
- Unit replacement price of EANK missiles is about \$437.7K; total package price for 50 would approximate \$22.5M; for 100 about \$45M. Package prices include FMS surcharges.

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- Army has about the town (including 60.000 1-70M) on hand, against a distribution requirement of about the latest through the latest through the latest latest through the latest lates
- Based on the numbers, the impact on Army of shipping 3,100 I-TOWs immediately would be serious but not intelerable. But missiles would have to be taken from troops. Based on the seriousness of the requirement, and keeping in mind that the Army would receive TOW-II replacement missiles, it is likely that the Army would reluctaatly acquiesce to immediate shipment of the entire quantity.
- Duit price of the replacement TON-II missile is about \$12,200; total package price would approximate \$42M, with PMS oursburges.
- Delivery from production of TON-II pay back missiles to the Army would occur about the beginning of CY 1988. If Secondary-though this is not recommended-approximately 2,000 unallocated TON-II missiles could be delivered from SAF to Army is second quarter CY 1907.



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N 28746

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 9, 1985

MEMO FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
JOHN M. POINDEXTER


FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTHA

Attached are our plans to date.

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December 9, 1985 N 28747

WEXT STEPS

The meetings this weekend with the Israelis and Gorbanifahr were inconclusive. Gorbanifahr refused to return to Geneva with our message that no further deliveries would be undertaken until all the hostages were released. Gorbanifahr and the Israelis both believe that if he were to pass such a message to the Iranian Prime Minister or the Companifahr (who provides funds for items delivered) -- one of more of the hostages would be executed. Gorbanifahr noted that nine Misbellin leadern had been summoned to Tehran on Friday and that, given the pressures inside Lebanon, all it would take for the hostages to be killed would be for Tehran to "stop saying no."

Much of what we decide to do in the days shead depends upon whether or not we can trust Gorbanifahr. The Israelis believe him to be genuine. Gorbanifahr's earlier game plan delivered Reverend Weir. He has proposed that we "deliver something" so that he can retain credibility with the regime in Tehran. He even suggested that the weapons delivered be useful only to the Army or Air Force (not the Revolutionary Guards) and that they be "technically disabled." He urged that, if improved HAMEs were not feasible, to at least keep the door open by some kind of delivery between now and the end of the week. He said we must recognize that if TOMS are provided that they will probably go to the Revolutionary Guards.

The Israelis have willingly consented to "kick-back" arrangement which allows Israeli control over Gorbanifahr and the state of Israel believes strongly in using any means to bridge into fran. Their last three governments over a four year period have been consistent in this theme.

Whether we trust Gorbanifahr or not, he is irrefutably the deepest penetration we have yet achieved into the current Iranian Government. There is nothing in any which which contradicts what he has told us or the Israelis over the past several menths. Much of our ability to influence the course of events is achieving a more moderate Iranian Government depends on the validity of what Gorbanifahr has told us -- and his credibility as one who can "deliver" on what the Iranians need. While it is possible that Gorbanifahr is doubling us or simply lining his own pockets, we have relatively little to lose in meeting his proposal; i.e., the Israelis start delivering TOMs and no hostages are recovered. On the other hand, a supply operation now could very well trigger results he claims.

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The current situation is one in which information is incomplete, the motivation of the various participants uncertain, and our operational control tenuous in that we have had to deal exclusively through the Israelis. The near term risk to the hostages has undoubtedly been increased by Iranian "expectations" arising from earlier decisions to proceed with deliveries and by the increasing pressure against Eisballah in Lebanon.

Our greatest liability throughout has been lack of operational control over transactions with Gorbanifahr. The Israeli contact, Schwimmer, has arranged deliveries of items which were not requested by Gorbanifahr for the Iranian military. Further, the terms which he negotiated are disadvantageous to the IDF and our ability to replenish the Israelis. It was apparent, during the meeting with McFarlane, that Gorbanifahr preferred to deliver only items useful to the Iranian military -- not the Revolutionary Guard. Despite admonishments to the contrary, Schwimmer had already arranged for the 3,300 TOWs as part of the next steps.

Schwimmer's arrangements would have exchanged the 1,100 Tows for three hostages at a price which would not allow the IDF to recoup expenses, thus complicating our ability to replenish IDF stores. In short, most of the problems with this endeavor have arisen because we have been unable to exercise operational control over arrangements or their expected outcome. For example, at the meeting with McFarlane we learned for the first time that the Iranians want desperately to return the 18 basic HAWK missiles which are still in Tehran. All agree that we should only do so if the in-bound aircraft has something aboard which the Iranians want. At the end of the meeting it was agreed that we would "get back" to Gorbanifahr quickly as to our next steps. He departed for Geneva to brief.

The question which now must be asked is should we take a relatively small risk by allowing (encouraging) a small Israeli-originated delivery of TOWs and hope for the best or should we do nothing? If such a delivery were to take place, we would have to plan to replenish the Israeli stocks on a "routine" basis to avoid drawing attention.





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If we are to prevent the death or more of the hostages in the near futpre, we appear to have four options available:

- Accept Gorbanifahr/Schwimmer's game plan:
 - -- Stretch and replemishment to Israel over several months making it routine.
 - -- 1,100 TOWs are maximum risk materially. Cost and cover can be maintained by selling from stock to Israel over time.
 - -- If hostages are recovered disclosure doesn't hurt much.



- Allow the Israelis to deliver 400-500 TOWS while picking up 18 HAWRS in effort to show good faith to both factions in Iran:
 - -- This could cause Iran to deliver a hostage as sign of cooperation. It will also serve to boost Gorbanifahr's reputation.
 - -- Israel could do this unilaterally and seek routine replacements.
 - -- This gives U.S. more breathing time (maybe!).
- Do nothing:

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-- Very dangerous since U.S. has, in fact, pursued earlier Presidential decision to play along with Gorbanifahr's plan. U.S. reversal now in mid-stream could ignite Iranian fire -- hostages would be our minimum losses.

There is a fifth option which has not yet been discussed. We could, with an appropriate covert action Finding, commence deliveries ourselves, using Secord as our conduit to control Gorbanifahr and delivery operations. This proposal has considerable merit in that we will reduce our vulnerabilities in the replenishment of Israeli stocks and can provide items like the Improved HAWE (PIP II) which the Iranian Air Force wants and the Israelis do not have. Finally, Secord can arrange for third country nationals to conduct a survey of ground and air military requirements which is what Gorbanifahr has been attempting to obtain from the Israelis for nearly three months.


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January 4, 1986

N 1249



ACTION

MEMORANDUM POR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Covert Action Finding on Iran

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding a Covert Action Finding (Tab A). This Finding is based on our discussions with Nir and my subsequent meeting with CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin.

At Sporkin's request, I talked to Bill Casey on secure re the Finding and the overall approach. He indicated that he thought the Finding was good and that this is probably the only approach that will work. He shares our goal of achieving a more moderate government in Iran through this process.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ____ Disapprove _

Attachments
Tab I - Poindexter Memo to the President
Tab A - Covert Action Finding

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
By B. Right, Retional Security Council

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT:

Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran

This week, Prima Minister Peres of Israel secretly dispatched his special advisor on terrorism with instructions to propose a plan by which the U.S. and Israel can act in concert to bring about a more moderate government in Iran. The Israelis are obviously very concerned that the course of the Iran-Iraq war and the potential for further radicalisation in Iran pose a significant threat to the security of Israel.

The Israeli plan is premised on the assumption that moderate elements in Iran can come to power if these factions demonstrate their credibility in defending Iran against Iraq and in deterring Soviet intervention. To achieve the strategic goal of a more moderate Iranian government, the Israelis are prepared to unilaterally commence selling military material to Western-oriented Iranian factions. It is their belief that by so doing they can achieve a heretofore unobtainable penetration of the Iranian governing heirarchy. The Israelis are convinced that the Iranians are so desperate for military material, expertise and intelligence that the provision of these resources will result in favorable long-term changes in personnel and attitudes within the Iranian government. Further, once the exchange relationship has commenced, a dependency would be established on those who are providing the requisite resources, thus allowing the providor(s) to coercively influence near-term events.

As described by the Prime Minister's emissary, the only requirement the Israelis have is an assurance that they will be allowed to purchase U.S. replenishments for the stocks that they sell to Iran. Since the Israeli sales are technically a violation of our Arms Export Control Act embargo for Iran, a Presidential Covert Action Finding is required in order for us to allow the Israeli sales to proceed and for our subsequent replenishment sales.

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The Covert Action Finding ettached at Tab A provides the lattitude for the transactions indicated above to proceed. If this Finding is signed, we would not interfere when the Israelis unilaterally commence sales and deliveries of TOW missiles during January, 1986. We would also be able to legally sell basic TOWs to Israel when they submit purchase orders for replenishing their own stocks. The Iranians have indicated an immediate requirement for 4,000 basic TOW weapons for use in the launchers they already hold. We would be expected to replace the Israeli stocks in less than 30 days. 4,000 missiles represent 1/3 of all available TOWs in Israel.

The Israelis and the Iranians with whom they are in contact agree that the continued holding of the five American hostages in Beirut will be immediately solved through commencement of this action. Prime Minister Peres had his emissary pointedly note that they well understand our position on making concessions to terrorists. They also point out, however, that terrorist groups, movements, and organizations are significantly easier to influence through governments than they are by direct approach. In that we have been unable exercise any sussion over Hizballah during the course of nearly two years of kidnappings, this approach through the government of Iran may well be our only way to achieve the release of the Americans held in Beirut. It must again be noted that since this dialogue with the Iranians began in September, Reverend Weir has been released and there have been no Shia terrorist attacks against American or Israeli persons, property, or interests.

The Israelis have asked for our urgent response to this proposal so that they can plan accordingly. They note that the current crisis in the Middle East provides a rationale for a significant purchase of TOMs and expedited delivery on our part. In order to provide an answer to Frime Minister Peres, the Finding at Tab λ should be discussed privately with Secretaries Shultz, Meinberger, Director Casey and Attorney General Meese. If, based on their input, you decide to proceed, the Finding should be signed and held.


Recommendation:

OR No

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That you agree to meet with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, Director Casey and Attorney General Neese on this matter as soon as possible.





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Finding Pursuant to Settion 662 of The Israel Affletance Act of 1981 Af Amencel, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Centra, Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection

N 1254

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and due to its extreme sensitivity and Security risks, I determine it is essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.

SCOPE

DESCRIPTION

Iran

Work with Iranian elements, groups and individuals, selected foreign liaison services and third countries, all of which are sympathetic to U.S. Government pinterests and which do not conduct or support terrorist actions directed against U.S. persons, property or interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, and (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current Iranian Government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts. Provide funds, intelligence, counterintelligence, training, guidance and communications assistance to these elements, groups, individuals, liaison services and third countries in support of these activities.

The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related material in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their effort to achieve a more pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S. Government learns that these elements have abandoned their goals of moderating their government and appropriated the material for purposes other than that provided by this Finding.



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MERCHANDUM FOR

Associate General Counsel

FRCH:

Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT:

Third Country Transfer of Equipment Provided Under the Poseign Assistance or Arms Export Control Acts

1. A question has arisen under what circumstances a recipient of U.S. foreign military assistance can transfer military equipment provided through the foreign assistance mechanism to a third country. Two statutory provisions address this question: one in the context of grant assistance under the Poreign Assistance Act (PAA) and the second where the equipment was purchased by a foreign country under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). Both Acts require Presidential consent to a third country transfer and certification to Congress where certain dollar amounts and specific types of equipment are involved.

PAA \$ 505, 22 U.S.C. \$ 2314(a) and (e)

- 2. In order to be eligible for military assistance on a grant basis, the recipient foreign country must agree that it will not transfer the equipment to another country without the consent of the President of the U.S. and that it will return the articles to the U.S. when they are no longer needed, unless the President agrees to other disposition. 22 U.S.C. § 2314(a)(1) and (4).
- 1. In considering a request for approval of any transfer by gift, sale or otherwise of any implement of war to a third country, the President shall not give his consent to the transfer unless the United States itself would transfer the defense article under consideration to that country. The President shall not give his consent to the transfer of any significant defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List unless the foreign country requesting consent agrees to demilitarize

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such defense articles prior to transfer, or the proposed recipient fareign country provides a committeent in writing to the United States that it will not transfer such defense erticles, if not derilitarized, to any other foreign country or person without first obtaining the consent of the President (Consent authority was delegated to the Secretary of State in Executive Order 12163, § 1-201(a)(3),(4), and (5), September 19, 1979, 44 Fed. Rep. \$6673.)

AECA \$ 3, 22 0.8.C. \$ 2753.

- 4. No defense article or defense service shell be sold or leased by the U.S. to any country or international organization unless the country or international organization shell have agreed not to transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article, unless the consent of the President is first obtained. The President shall not give his consent under this provision of AECA unless the U.S. itself would transfer the articles to that country. In addition, the President shall not give his consent to the transfer of significant defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List unless the transferring country agrees to demilitarize the equipment or the recipient articles.
- 5. Under both the AECA and the PAA provision outlined above, the President must report a third country transfer to Congress after certain threshold requirements are reached. The President may not consent to a transfer of major defense equipment valued (in terms of its original acquisition cost) at more than \$14 million or any defense article valued at more than \$50 million (original acquisition cost) to a third country unless he submits a certification to the Speaker of the House and Senate Committee on Poreign Relations for congressional consent to the proposed transfer.
- 6. The written certification must contain (a) the name of the country proposing to make the transfer, (b) a description of the defense article or service proposed to be transferred, including its original acquisition cost, (c) the name of the proposed recipient, (d) the reasons for the proposed transfer, and (e) the date on which the transfer is proposed to be made. Such certification will be unclassified except that information regarding the dollar value and number of articles may be classified if public disclosure would be clearly detrimental to security of the United States. Consent to the transfer shall not become effective until 10 calendar days after the date of the subsittal of the certification, and then only if Congress does not adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving the

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propried transfer. Note: legislative vett declared Unconstitutional by Supreme Court in <u>INS V. Chadre</u>, 462 U.S. 515 (1983).

7. Functions of the President under this section, with certain exceptions inapplicable here, were delegated to the Secretary of State by S.O. No. 11938, January 15, 1977, 41 Fed. Feg. 4311. With respect to consent to a third country transfer, the Secretary of State is authorised to find, in consultation with other federal departments and agencies, manager the proposed transfer will sirengihen the security of the U.S. and propose world peace.

Other Considerations

- a. Both the FAA and AECA require that consent be given to a third country transfer of defense articles only if the U.S. itself would transfer the articles to that country. This caveat triggers a panoply of general policy considerations and specific probibitions relating to foreign military assistance including:
 - no assistance to Communist countries unless the President finds and reports promptly to Congress that (1) such assistance is vital to U.S. security; (2) the recipient country is not controlled by the international Communist conspiracy; and (3) such assistance will promote the independence of the recipient country from Communism (22 U.S.C. § 2370(f)).
 - no assistance to countries engaging in of preparing for aggressive military efforts directed against the U.S. or FMS recipient nations, unless the President determines that military efforts or preparations have ceased and he reports to Congress that he has received satisfactory assurances they will not be renewed. (ACC other FAA waiver provisions may be used.) (22 U.S.C. § 2370(1);
 - no assistance to countries that grant sanctuary to international terrorists; unless the President determines the national security justifies such assistance and reports his finding to the Speaker of the Bouse and the Senate Committee on Periodn Relations (22 U.S.C. \$\$ 2371, (PAA), 2753(f)(AECA); and
 - ne assistance to countries who have severed diplomatic relations with the U.S., or with whom the U.S. has

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severed diplicatic relations, triess diplomataic relations are resumed and agreements for assistance are entered into after the resurption of diplomatic relations (22 U.S.C. § 2370(t)).

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MENORALDUM POR - General Counsel

PRON

98.

Associate General Counsel

SUBJECT:

Proposed Iran Finding (Ta



1. I believe there is sufficient legal authority to support a covert action Pinding that would result in the transfer of military equipment to Iran for the purpose of (a) moderating Iran's hostile attitude toward the U.S., (b) preempting possible Soviet influence in the region, and (c) obtaining a hostage release. Such authority would be based upon a Presidential Pinding under Sughes-Ryan that the operation is important to the national security, and upon the extraordinary authorities of the National Security Act. The Agency would purchase the equipment from DoD under the Economy Act (and transfer the equipment abroad.


- 2. Attached are several means prepared in the past on related issues. At Tab A are opinions of the Attorney General, the State Department, and this office stating there is authority for CIA to transfer equipment abroad outside the foreign assistance mechanisms. At Tab B is a 1983 mean that indicates there are no general prohibitions that would proclude CIA's sending equipment to Iran. I have confirmed that this is the case today. Further, I don't believe the Trading with the Enemy Act precludes the transfer, for two reasons. First, the Act itself makes trade unlawful unless conducted with the license of the President. 50 U.S.C. App. 5 3. Second, the Act simply was never intended to preclude acts of the Executive. Tab C contains two opinions on the inapplicability of the Meutrality Act to conduct sanctioned by the inapplicability of the Meutrality Act to conduct sanctioned by the President that are relevant on this point.
- 3. One problem could arise, however, if the equipment to be transferred constitutes articles the U.S. has provided to a second country through the Foreign Assistance/Arms Export Control Acts. The memo at Tab D indicates a country may use material it has received through such U.S. foreign aid only for self defense and may retransfer it only in certain limited circumstances, that require U.S. consent, notice to Congress, and the Aligibility of the third country recipient for U.S. aid. Terrorist activities, among other things, can disqualify a potential recipient

Partially Declassified / Rolesand on 22 June 1587 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by 3. Peger, Untional Security Council

Exercise Reports 7420

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4. Finally, as you know, Congress facently passed the Intelligence Arthorization Act to require reports of venpons transfer velved in excess of 1 million dollars as significant anticipated intelligence activities for the purpose of and, therefore, in accidence with, section 501 of the Hational Security Act. A copy of the relevant language is at Tab E.





UL1 13 Jan 1986



The Israelis are miring ahead on their Tow for Hostage deal with the Iranians. You will recall that in Sportin's legal analysis there were two options: one for DoD to do it directly with the Israelis, the other to do it through CIA. Sportin feels that the most defensible way to do it from a legal standpoint is through CIA. We prefer keeping CIA out of the execution even though a Presidential Finding would authorize the way Defense would have to handle the transactions.

Under this uption, the idea was that the Israelis would buy the improved version of the Tow and ship to the Iranians the basic Tows they now have. The Israelis would then replace those basic Tows by buying the improved version. Unfortunately, there is not enough money available to do this. The Iranians have placed \$22 million in an account in Switzerland. This is enough for the basic Tows, but for the Israelis to buy the improved version it would cost about \$44 million.

Therefore, they want to use the second option under which CIA would buy 4,000 basic Tows from DoD for \$21 million. As far as Defense is concerned these purchases would be for general CIA wases for assistance in the second etc., and other purposes. The meney for the Iranian account would be transferred to the Israelis. The Israelis would transfer that money to a CIA account to pay for this purchase of the Tows from DoD, the shippers would move the Tows to the Israelis who would then move them on to the Iranians. The Israelis would keep their basic Tows and the problem of upgrading them to the new Tows would be handled in the normal DoD-Israeli relationship.

I am told that time is of the essent of in getting this done for two reasons: first, the situation in Lebanon is deteriorating so that any delay reduces the prospects of cetting the hestages and of Labacon.

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15 January 1986 1440 Bours MENORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

PRGH:

Associate General Counsel

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from General Counsel Regarding Authority to Provide Weapons to Third Parties Pursuant to Presidential Findings

- 1. At approximately 1420 hours today I received a secure line telephone call from the General Counsel. Be wanted to discuss whether I saw any problems or reporting requirements with a proposal to have DoD provide weapons to a CIA "agent" who would pay for the weapons with money supplied by a friendly third country. The agent would then supply the weapons to the intended recipient country. The agent would have no connection with CIA other than to act as a "middle man" with our authority.
- 2. I told the General Counsel that I would feel more comfortable if CIA were directly involved in the activity and that it would be essential that we act in furtherance of a traditional covert action objective. I said that I could foresee problems if this activity were merely intended to rotate a specific country's stock of weapons. (We had been considering since 10 January a proposal to provide missiles to Israel that would, in part, be to secure the return of U.S. citizens held by or under the control of Iran. As originally explained, Israel would keep the newer missiles supplied by us and give Iran older missiles currently held by Israel. According to the General Counsel, this activity was authorized by a signed Presidential Finding which he worked out with Oliver North on 10-11 January 1986.)
- 3. Despite repeated urgings to concur in variations that would have DoD provide the weapons without other than token CIA involvement, I did not do so. (At one point, Mr. Morth came on the line to "clarify" the hypothetical facts for me and then put Stan Sporkin back on the line.) I had previously urged both the General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel to obtain a copy of the Presidential Finding from Mr. Morth so we could determine what was intended to be authorised. These efforts proved unsuccessful.

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


4. I repeatedly told the General Course: that I could not gate the legal determination he was seeking without the facts. Before I changed offices (I was in the middle of a Beeting when the General Coursel called) George Jameson overheard my reparks to this effect.

11 March 1986

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
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
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TALKING POINTS

thether existing statutes and regulations control the manner and method in which the Dob can sell weapons to third parties is an issue that Dob must determine. From a CIA standpoint, since there is a presidential finding, CIA is authorized to assist in the obtaining of the material in question. If CIA actually took control of material through an Economy Act transfer by Dob, this would seem to be the preferred way to handle the proposal from a legal standpoint. This would provide the maximum use of CIA authorities.

- -- If CIA merely acts as a accommodation party and, in effect, requests DoD to deal with a particular agent, this might also be proper but it would be up to DoD to tell us whether their authorities would allow such a transaction outside of the Economy Act. We have found no such precedent.
- -- The key issue in this entire matter revolves around whether or not there will be reports made to Congress. Each of the Acts involved—the Poreign Assistance Act, the Arms Empert Control Act and indeed the Mational Security Act as amended—have certain reporting provisions in them. Unile the Mational Security Act provides for a certain limited reporting procedure, it is my view that there may be other ways of making a suitable report by emercise of the President's constitutional prerogatives.
- -- One such possibility would be not to report the activity until after it has been successfully concluded and to brief only the chairman and ranking minority members of



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the two Oversight Committees. This would maximize the security of the mission and reduce the possibility of its premature disclosure.

In this way, you will have limited the number of persons having access to the information and also be assured that there will be no disclosure of the information until after the activity has been successfully completed. I repeat again that it is the various reporting requirements that seem to be dictating how we can proceed. If there can be an agreement that a report will be made, it minimises the risk inherent in any such undertaking, and the way that the project is carried out can then be put on a less fractious basis.

-- Finally, whatever plan is adopted, such action should be taken only after it has been discussed with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant to the President for Mational Security Affairs.

1/ As you know, the Act itself provides for a report to be limited to the chairman and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the Bouse of Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.

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THE WHITE HOUSE ---

January 17, 1986



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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT:

Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran

Prime Minister Peres of Israel secretly dispatched his special advisor on terrorism with instructions to propose a plan by which Israel, with limited assistance from the U.S., can create conditions to help bring about a more moderate government in Iran. The Israelis are very concerned that Iran's deteriorating position in the war with Traq, the potential for further radicalization in Iran, and the possibility of enhanced Soviet influence in the Gulf all pose significant threats to the security of Israel. They believe it is essential that they act to at least preserve a balance of power in the region.

The Israeli plan is premised on the assumption that moderate elements in Iran can come to power if these factions demonstrate their credibility in defending Iran against Iraq and in deterring Soviet intervention. To achieve the strategic goal of a more moderate Iranian government, the Israelis are prepared to unilaterally commence selling military material to Western-oriented Iranian factions. It is their belief that by so doing they can achieve a heratofore unobtainable penetration of the Iranian government hierarchy. The Israelis are convinced that the Iranians are so desperate for military material, expertise and intelligence that the provision of these resources will result in favorable long-term changes in personnel and attitudes within the Iranian government. Further, once the exchange relationship has commenced, a dependency would be established on those who are providing the requisite resources, thus allowing the provider(s) to coercively influence near-term events. Such an outcome is consistent with our policy objectives and would present significant advantages for U.S. national interests. As described by the Frime Minister's emissary, the only requirement the Israelis have is an assurance that they will be allowed to purchase U.S. replenishments for the stocks that they sell to Iran. We have researched the legal problems of Israel's selling J.S. involactured arms to Iran. Because of the requirement in government of transfers to third countries, I do not recommend that you agree with the specific details of the Israeli plan. However, there is another possibility. Some time age Attorney

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General William French Smith determined that under an appropriate finding yes could authorize the CIA to sell arms to countries outside of the provisions of the laws and reporting requirements for foreign military sales. The objectives of the Israeli plan could be met if the CIA, using an authorized agent as necessary, purchased arms from the Department of Defense under the Economy Act and then transferred them to Iran directly after receiving appropriate payment from Iran.

The Covert Action Finding attached at Tab A provides the latitude for the transactions indicated above to proceed. The Iranians have indicated an immediate requirement for 4,000 basic TOW weapons for use in the launchers they already hold.

The Israeli's are also sensitive to a strong U.S. desire to free our Beirut hostages and have insisted that the Iranians demonstrate both influence and good intent by an early release of the five Americans. Both sides have agreed that the hostages will be immediately released upon commencement of this action. Frime Minister Peres had his emissary pointedly note that they well understand our position on not making concessions to terrorists. They also point out, however, that terrorist groups, movements, and organizations are significantly easier to influence through governments than they are by direct approach. In that we have been unable to exercise any suasion over Hizballah during the course of nearly two years of kidnappings, this approach through the government of Iran may well be our crivially to achieve the release of the Americans held in Beirut. It must again be noted that since this dialogue with the Iranians began in September, Reverend Weir has been released and there have been no Shie terrorist attacks against American or Israeli persons, property, or interests.

Therefore it is proposed that Israel make the necessary arrangements for the sale of 4000 TOW weapons to Iran. Sufficient funds to cover the sale would be transferred to an agent of the CIA. The CIA would then purchase the weapons from the Department of Defense and deliver the weapons to Iran through the agent. If all of the hostages are not released after the first shipment of 1000 weapons, further transfers would cease.

On the other hand, since hostage release is in some respects a byproduct of a larger effort to develop ties to potentially moderate forces in Iran, you may wish to redirect such transfers to other groups within the government at a later time.

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The Israelia have asked for our urgent response to this proposal so that they can plan accordingly. They note that conditions inside both Iran and Lebanom are highly volatile. The Israelis are cognizent that this ontize operation will be terminated if the Iranians abandon their goal of moderating their government or allow further acts of terrorism. You have discussed the general outlines of the Israeli plan with Secretaries Shultz and Meinberger, Attorney General Messe and Director Casey. The Secretaries do not recommend you proceed with this plan. Attorney General Messe and Director Casey believe the short-term and long-term objectives of the plan warrant the policy risks involved and recommend you approve the attached Finding. Because of the extreme sensitivity of this project, it is recommended that you exercise your statutory prerogative to withhold notification of the Finding to the Congressional oversight committees until such time that you deem it to be appropriative.

Recommendation

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That you sign the attached finding.

Prepared by: Oliver L. North

Attachment Tab A - Covert Action Finding

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Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
As Amended, Concerning Operations
Undertaken by the Central Intelligence
Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than
Those Intended Solely for the Purpose
of Intelligence Collection

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and due to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.

SCOPE

DESCRIPTION

Iran

Assist selected friendly foreign liaison services, third countries and third parties which have established relationships with Iranian elements, groups, and individuals sympathetic to U.S. Government interests and which do not conduct or support terrorist actions directed against U.S. persons, property or interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current Iranian Government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of the American hostages held in Beirut and preventing additional terrorist acts by these groups. Provide funds, intelligence, counter-intelligence, training, quidance and communications and other necessary assistance to these elements, groups, individuals, liaison services and third countries in support of these activities.

The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related materiel in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their effort to achieve a more pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S. Government learns that these elements have abandoned their goals of moderating their government and appropriated the material for purposes other than that provided by this finding.


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
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
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DER FROM CHIEF/EUR

DIRECTOR 631010

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S. PLEASE ASP THE AMBASSADOR TO PRIVISE ALL OF HIS BEFOREING IN THIS CHANNEL AND ME WILL PASS EXPEDITIOUSLY TO THE NET WIS IN TURN MILL INFORM APPROPRIATE IND VIOUALS IN THE DEFARTMENT OF STATE.

A. LET ME PERSONALLY THANK YOU FOR ALL OF YOUR EFFORTS OF THE AST SEVERAL DAYS. I KNOW IT HAS NOT BEEN EASY AND I ASSURE YOU THAT APPROPRIATE AUTHOR YIES HERS ARE WELL AWARS OF WHAT YOU HAVE TRIED TO DO AND APPRECIATE IT.

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
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


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







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
















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



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



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
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












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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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






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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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




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
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
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


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
1738- Call from Thompson

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
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
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
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
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
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



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
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



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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



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
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
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




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


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


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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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ISRAEL - Cincinnati
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AIRPORT - Auditorium

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POINDEXTER - Schubert
P.M. - Mozart
NORTH - Magner
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
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EXHIBIT OLN-70

TO NSIMP -- TPLA

mar Reply to note of 08/31/85 13.20

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NOTE FROM OLIVER NORTH

Subject: PRIVATE BLANK CHECK

Hopefully you have by now been informed that UNO.FDN safely released the eight best Germans this evening just before dark at the religious commune at Presillas. Franklin is headed North in attempt to get across the Rama Rd before the Sandinistas can close in on him. At this point the only libouity we still have in one of DEMOCRACY INC 's simplenes is mired in the mud lit is the rainy season down there; the related matter. The reason why I asked to speak to you urgently earlier today is that Ray called Elliott Abrams regerding the third country issue. Elliott has talked to Shultz and had prepared a paper re going to Elliott has talked to Shultz and had prepared a paper re going to Elliott to send the money." I told Elliott to do nothing, to send no papers andto talk to no one further about this until he talks to you. He is seeing you privately tomorrow. At this point I need your help. As you know, I have the accounts and the means by which this thing needs to be accomplished. I have no idea what Shultz knows or doesn't know, but he could prove to be very unhappy if he learns of the past from someone other than you. Did RCH ever tell Shultz?

I am very conterned that we are bifurnating the effort that has, up to now, worked relatively well. An extraordinary amount of good has been done and money truly is not the thing which is most needed at this point. What we most need is to get the CIA re-engaged in this effort so that it can be better managed than it now is by one slightly confused Marine LtCol. Money will again become an issue in July, but probably not until mid-month. There are several million rounds of most types of amount on hand and more (SMM) worth on the way by ship the control of the expanded warehouse facility. Boots, uniforms, peachos etc. are being purchased locally and Calero will receive \$500K for food purchases by the end of the week. Somehow we will molify the wounded egos of the triple A with not being able to see RR. On the blowpipesif we are going to do anything at all about outside support in the next few days, and I we love to carry the letter from RR of we are going to move on something. Nearwhile, I we recommend that you and RCM have a talk about how much. Set Shultz does or does not know abtom never told me. At this point I'm not sure who on our side knows since the never told me. At this point I'm not sure who on our side knows what. Help. Were regards, North

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by B. Reger, Cational Security Council

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Exhibit OLN-71

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December 4, 1984

HEHORANDUN FOR ROBERT C. HCFARLANE

N 16887

OLIVER L. HORTH

SUBJECT:

Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance

In accord with prior understanding, I met on Wednesday, Wovenber 28, with ; Defense Attache ; Defense Attache, Embassy Gaston Sigur arranged the of the Gaston Sigur arranged the luncheon meeting at the Cosmos Club and was present throughout.

As agreed, I explained to our purpose in the meeting was to clarify questions which had been raised in Canada regarding an arms transaction destined;

7 I explained that an intermediary had advised that a 'apparently made a decision not to proceed with the Canadian-Originated arms sale.

This offer of purchase included 10 41-7 missile launchers

[10 missiles, 1 training dnit, and 10 tracking units.

professed to be unaware of the Canadian transaction. I advised him that the purchase was not really intended for use by but rather for the Micaraguan Resistance Forces. Further, the intermediary had indicated that the problem appeared to be the number:

appeared to be the number:

are duates of the had a consequence of the apparent reluctance to proceed with the sale showing end user certificates the Canadian arms dealer is preparing to re-initiate discussions for a similar delivery was advised that the FDM would prefer to have the delivery as soon as possible, since the Soviet HIND-D helicopters were being assembled as we spoke.

vas further advised that Adolfo Calero, the Head of the FDH, was willing to commit to a recognition Indicated the Resistance Forces had succeeded. that he understood the message and would confer with the le understood the message and would confer with the le observed, for the lecord, that refused to become involved, in any way, in the internal affairs of another country. I indicated that we fully appreciated this position and noted that it was too bad that the soviets, Bulgarians, and East Germans involved in Micaraqua did not feel the same way.

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Later that afternoon, MGEN Jack Singleun (U.S. Army, Retired) visited to advise of two meetings he had held early in the day regarding support for the Resistance. Singlaub passed on the following points:


Meeting with

N 16888

- -- The FDN is in urgent need of anti-aircraft weapons and other crew-served weapons ammunition (particularly 60 and 81mm mortar rounds). Units in the field are also in need of large quantities of boots and clothing since the number of ralliers has exceeded expectations by 2,000.
- -- The Resistance Forces are also in urgent need of expertise in maritime operations.
- -- The USG is unaware of the Singlaub mission and he is making this request based on his long friendship,

 Because of the law restricting USG involvement, no USG official can solicit on behalf the Resistance Forces.
- -- If like to help, Singlaub can arrange a meeting with Adolfo Calero. If it is necessary for a USG official to verify Calero's bona fides, this can be arranged.

Meeting with



- -- The Resistance still is in reed of financial support, munitions, and training assistance.
- situation" than that which he had been aware of earlier.
 While not committing to support, he noted to Singlaub that
 this new information might make a difference




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This weekend, at the request of Sec. John Lehman, I met with Mr. David Malker, a former British SAS officer who now heads two companies (DMS and SALADIN) which provide professional security services to foreign governments. Malker had been approached several months ago, prior to initiating the current financial arrangement for the PDN. In addition to the security services provided by RMS, this offshore (Jersey Islands) company also has professional military "trainers" available. Malker suggested that he would be interested in establishing an arrangement with the FDN for certain special operations expertise aimed particularly at destroying HIMD helicopters. Walker quite accurately points out that the helicopters are more easily destroyed on the ground than in the air.

Unless otherwise directed, Walker will be introduced to Calero and efforts will be made to defray the cost of Walker's operations from other than Calero's limited assets.



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Exhibit OLN-72

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February 6, 1985

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ACTION

HEMCRANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

7013

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Cable to President Suazo of Monduras

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, Director Casey, and General Vessey requesting their concurrence in a proposed backchannel cable to President Suazo from President Reagan (Tab A). The cable is intended to emphasize for President Suazo our support in the event of a Sandinista attack

Since we originally reported on January 25, the HUMINT and indications of an attack,

Since January 29, the Sandinistas have been sporadically firing into Honduras with their artillery and rockets. GEN Faul Gorman delivered to the Pentagon on Monday, February 4, two 122mm rocket assemblies taken from their point of impact in Honduras. The intelligence at Tab II pertains.



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At this point, two steps need to be urgently taken:

- The FDN is in urgent need of near-term financing--approximatel \$2M--for the purchase of rifles, amountion, and boots for the new volunteers.
- The Hondurans need to be stiffened with assurances from the United States that we will meet our responsibilities under existing treaties.



be here to see me tomorrow. With your permission, I will ask him to approach

proceed with their offer. Singland would then put Calero in direct contact with each of these officers. No White House/NSC solicitation would be made. The school former before the second former than the sec RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign and transmit the memo at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

That you authorize me to proceed as indicated with GEN Singlaub.

> Approve ___ Disapprove _

Attachments
Tab I - McParlane Memo to Shultz/Weinberger/Casey/Vessey
Tab A - Proposed Backchannel Cable to Suazo
Tab II - Intelligence

Tab III - Photograph
Tab IV - Background Cables

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 7, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ The Secretary of State

N 7016

THE HONORABLE CASPAR κ . WEINBERGER The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT:

Cable to President Suazo of Bonduras (S)

There are continuing indications that the Sandinistas are planning a major attack against

I understand that we have in our possession some evidence of the recent firing into Bonduras. (S)

units have been put on elect or roved to the area and there are

(8)

It would appear that the Hondurans are reacting to the extraordinary buildup across their border in such a way as to minimize the attractiveness of

SECRET Declassify: OADR UNSEASSETEL

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N 7017

It is possible that a message of assurance to President Suazo could have a stiffening effect on Honduran resolve in the face of the Sandinista offensive. The cable at Tab A is designed to serve such a purpose. Could I ask that you review this cable personally and provide comments/concurrence in its dispatch by COB Thursday, February 7, 1985. Separately, I am asking John Poindexter to convene a CPPG to consider contingent U.S. actions in support of Honduras in the event it becomes necessary. (3)

Robert C McParlane

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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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CURRENT REPORTS

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N 7025

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3. NICARAGUA/HONDURAS: NOMBURAN FOOT REPORTEDLY ATTACKED

hundures therged January 31 that a Bicaroguan army unit entered hunduren territory mear Pale Verde, Cheluteca January 30 and attacked a Henduren cray post, secording to proce and USDAO Tegucigalpa reporting. Henduren officials claimed that at least one Sandinista aridier was killed in the akiroish.

The Computer This luter is the third violation of Honduran territory to the Computer attention secontly. Heat provious border violations have been but this incident may be related to an increased Hunduran app cliest to interdict area trafficking from Historague into El Salvador. (COMPIDENTIAL)



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
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Bureau of Intelligence and Research Current Analysis Series

N 7023

February 1, 1985

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


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



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



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
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




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TO: BEJEP

reduce your disibility. Let se know what you think and I will talk to George. : Agree about CIA but to have got to get the legislation past. PAIVATE BLANK CHRCK

--CPSA

ASG PROM: MSOLE --- CPUA to: BSJEP . --CPEA


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Shultz?

06/10/36 23:21:54

*** Boply to mete of 00/31/05 13:26 10TE PROE: OLTVER BORTE Inbloct: PAITATE BLANK CRECK topotally for have by now been informed that UNO/FDN safely released the eight fest Gereans this etening just before dark at the religious common at tronillas. Pracklin is boaded North in attempt to get across the Rada Rd refere the Sandinistan can close in on him. It this point the only liability se still have is one of DESOCPACT INC. 's airplanes is mired in the and fit is the rainy season down there) They bose to save it get by dawn. On a separate bet related natter: The reason why I asked to speak to you urgently earlier today is that hey called Elliett Abrans cogarding the third country issue. Blight has talked to Sheltz and had prepared a paper re going to the manufact For contributions. filliott called se and asked "where to send the noney." I told Elliott to do bothing, to mend no papers andto talk to no one further about this until he talks to you. He is seeing you privately tocorrow. At this seint I need your belp. As you know, I have the accounts and the Seens by which this thing aceds to be accomplished. I have no idea what Shultz known or doesn't know, but he could prove to be very unhappy if he learns of the world and mile that has been given in the past from someone other than you. Bid BCH over toil

N 12546



#2

Copp: 3/3/86 1745

of Short Bros.	He
advises that Just m	making noise.
approved by UR	to BP and, therefore,
refuses to part with any SPs.	wants paper from UK
approving any transfer and	Jeannot arrange.
asking us to reinforce his bon	afided

underscoring our interest in a quick transfer of Will explain context and get back to us next week. Can do? BT

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET 12

#3

TOP SECRET

Copp: 3/6/86 1220

Ref my earlier message on and blow pipes.

reports yesterday that latest effort

failed. This because he told USG was behind him and he sent a letter to asserting this.

Letter was signed by a private citizen and it turned off. will be in three days. Meanwhile, he needs your support as requested in my earlier message.


Also request you rturn Mr. Synott's call to you -- he is Short Bros rep in Washington (293-7371). If possible, we need to tell them that U.S. supports transfer of small number of BPS to contras. BT

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


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on our other action, there are fresh developments. Testorday, testied the phase drop that Dich Secord had given bin. At Balts, up on passed off as a "white house interpreter" at the Frankfact sty. south to living performer. The calls is that the state of the calls in that the state of the calls in the state of the s


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


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--- toply to note of 11/20/05 04:36





5 may 1987

PR GROSE UNDINGSTEE

¥ 6

Microsite with which we wanted to drop in the southern quadrant of Microsque is in desperate need of ordnance resupply. We had planned to do a material drop from the supplies we are bringing into but the units - headed by

plan which has been briefed on and it which he concurs.

The L-100 which flies from to on Wednesday should terminate it's NHAO mission on arrival at At that point it should load the supplies at which - theoretically

is assembling today at - and take them to

These items should then be transloaded to the C-123 after being properly rigged. On any night between Wednesday, Apr 9, and Friday, Apr 11 these supplies should be dropped by the C-123 in the vicinity of

Coast shouth of Call signs freqs and zone marking light diagram to be provided to Ralph at by the new UNO Sur operator we are taking care of. Hope we can make this happen the right way this time. If we are ever going to take the presence off the northern front we have got to get this drop in empirically Please make sure that this is retransmitted via this channel to Ralph, Sat and Steels. Owen already briefed and prepared to go w/ the L-100 out of if this will help. Please advise soonest.

Warm regards,

4202 EC107)

Goode

BT

CHESS

SECRE:



0318



6/34/84 2130

The pilots and repair people are talking about a week to ten days before they can use the C-123 again and that is only if we are able to find the necessary part very quickly. The dual navigation systems aboard the aircraft showed them to be within 1 to 1.5 MI of the DZ for over 40 minutes. They were never able to see zone lights and never had contact on the radio on either channel. The pilots never had the agreed upon proposed run-in heading, possible themy locations or recommended pull out direction to avoid enemy fire. The pilots described the fire as intense AA MG fire, probably 12.7. Wheere committed to commencing drops to the FDN by C-F tomorrow night but can delay for one night to do your drop if we can get the necessary info for the pilots. To facilitate, have asked Ralph to proceed immediately to your location. I do not think we ought to contemplate these operations without him being on scene. Too many things go wrong that then directly involve you and me in what should be deniable for both of us. We still don't know what the medicine is for treating mountain leprosy. I was asked to provide 1500 doses for inclusion in the drop and we don't even know what we are supposed to be providing. I know we can do better; we have got to if these brave people -- the fighters and the pilots are to survive the experience. Help. BT NORTH

Partially Declassified/Released on JSYMpa, 1927 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by 3. Reger, Mational Separity Council

SPENT.

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ارن ا

1435 HRS. Local

·. 06-16-86.

- 1. received MSJ. from the farm. They are very happy awaiting Caribu. Can we send them tomorrow?
- 2. Drops will take place at . __ and ____
- 3. We have run out of funds. Pls send ASAP. Ramon again using money of his own. Also construction not started for same reason.
- 4. I will leave tomorrow morning for --but will be back late afternoon same day.

162.302 pm 36 in seper ene Max. Dudustand FDH enough atout flying unnerthe charlets and 32 large Central electrony towns wow. I have no problem with that if you don't. C? should be ready. Rules semain as begin the legace before. Hay must provide successing EET on 1) 2 and souts, see in:

no chopsany people, Is Ak and less final go vote for ess listen Max. In C.Y from easy heat. Suggest transfer fuzz busters & C.Y for this sweet .

- they be you any good on last humsion? Callow the succharis- (specific any question. Bot BT.

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
30000 Har b Bob 1 C-7 will try mentenmen right 2. load six 30 drives becation of 02 if changed & fight patter med & mont 02 to mission on info provided on that > Revision CH: 2 and Ch. 4 advise mo troops to month. MH2 publicames, we suggest c. 7 collection Ches is the troops callegen Pedro C advancement in light C-123 Nor So. 7 TOT: 2 6 8 Pt are we tright look in late. Then USOUL IC time to more.

But to Mar the Ralph .. Hand againer for enable determine exact location of troops ? herefore, townsom fly in supposed enthum opening forces . We will fly the southern here subserved the ho 1 e. ? operating on me No 2 later in the meet, But 2 for Jack; Con many PSPON south

Note from Hood: Con Rill hat blue fix & C. 40-6? Con em god PSPON somethe to plantation to con use RAD? Wheel is lained done to the R/W MOW? Do see head to being another A/C & gover Touther oper This bird? From Kee. . Asset Omaga cuits of Cinci. Read to got 3 hours long raings thous HIA

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#402005 Dated: 2/7/85

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7	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY	
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J. L.	REMARKS: CC: Oliver No Jim Radzi	orth (#2 and 3) mski (#4)	HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONL
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NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT

SECRET EYES ONLY

Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

Notice

The attached document contains classified National Security Council Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by law.

Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you will show or discuse information contained in the document only will bersons who are authorized by law to have access to this document.

Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any tawful investigation by the United States Government into any unauthorized discinium of classified information contained because

Access List

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME

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MEMORANDUM

UNDEASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SYSTEM IV NSC/ICS-400258

N 7127

March 15, 1985

40000

EYES ONLY

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCFARLINE

FROM:

OLIVER L. MORTH

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Arturo Cruz

In accord with your instructions relayed through VADM Poindexter, I met with Arturo Cruz on the afternoon of March 12, to discuss his funding

The specifically asked if there was the specifically asked if there was the which would provide funds commensurate with his earning capabilities were he not engaged in the resistance effort. He noted that his annual salary prior this involvement was in excess of \$7,500 per month

Declassify: OAD

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EYES ONLY

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THOUSET

2

EYES ONLY

N 7128

Unless otherwise directed, I will proceed as follows:

- -- Adolfo Calero will deposit \$6,250 per month in Cruz' checking account without Crus' knowledge. Calero will be aware that he is funding Cruz. The CIA will not be told of the new source for Crus' funds.
- -- Contact will be established with a legitimate publisher or foundation to assume Calero's role as soon as possible. Cruz will be asked to sign a normal business contract with this publisher or foundation.

RECOMMENDATION

That	you	authorize	me	to	proceed	45	indicated	above.
------	-----	-----------	----	----	---------	----	-----------	--------

Approve CM


Disapprove ____

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EYES ONLY

473 Exhibit OLN-93



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

474
EXHIBIT OLN-94
(DELETED)

EXHIBIT 94




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


Exhibit OLN-97





Exhibit OLN-98



W. LADOITIEL

N 46664

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT. WASHINGTON, B.G.

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
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by B. Rasac Paticyal Security Council:

LAWSUIT HAS NOTHING TO AS WITH THE NAS COMMENT MADE TO AS DOTHER SET MAN WITH SHE SET MAN WITH THE WORD WILL SAPIDLY ATTOUR MONTHS AND THE WORD WILL SAPIDLY ATTOURAGE AND MARTIN. CARL JENKINS, MALL SAPIDLY ATTOURAGE, FOR MARTIN. CARL JENKINS, MALL SHEHAN, AND MOST OF OTHERS WILL SAME HARD THE AND MORE BAD PRESS RESULTS. OF ALL AND THE OTHER COMPANIES ARE FERFEITLY LEGAL IN THEIR ACTIVITIES AND I WILL MAKE THIS A MAJOR ISSUE IF AMBASSADOR AND STEELE DO NOT RECTIFY MATTER WITH I WILL NOT PREMIT MAN TO TEAR US OF THE STEEL SO SMALL MATTER. WE MUST OPERATE AS THOUGH WE HAVE SOME SENSE. DICK BT.

Feedball District Transition of Ed. 23 Hours Jourcell

MARCH RECOMMEN





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
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CHARTAUGS CETVED NEW GUITANCE
THEOUGH GOODE FROM HIS BOSS. WE ARE TO
TAY IN FULL OPERATION SUPPORTING THE
CROPS UNTIL 1 OCT. AT THAT TIME NSC
SAYS THAT CIA WILL HAVE BEEN IN
OPERATION ARROW 1 MONTH. THE CIA WILL
GO TO CAMBEROW 1 MONTH. THE CIA WILL
AND THEY. THE CIA. ARE NOW IN CONTROL
AND THEY DONT WANT OUR ASSETS TO REMAIN
IN THE AREA AND CONFUSE THE ISSUE. AT
WHICH TIME WE WILL TOTALLY WITHDRAW AND
THEM ELSEWHERE. THIS IS CURRENT PLAN
ONLY TO BE CHANGED BY THE NEXT PLAN. BOB
BT.

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
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 22, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE

THRU:

MAX FRIEDERSDORF

M.B. OGLESBY, JR

FROM:

W. DENNIS THOMAS

Republican Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in anticipation of marking up the Intelligence Authorization bill (which includes restrictions on aid to Nicaraguan Contras) want to meet with an appropriate Administration policy official. They are seeking guidance on this issue and the best strategy to pursue. The legislative process is underway, with the schedule calling for mark-up by the 1st week in April.


Would you please advise who the appropriate Administration official should be? I recommend the meeting be arranged in the near future.

cc: Chris Lehman



484

EXHIBIT OLN-104



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



1652

February 28, 1985

N 40601

TO:

BUD MCFARLANE

FROM:

MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF


SUBJECT:

Meeting with Republican Members of House Select Committee on

Intelligence

Bud, could you meet with this group?

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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
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40599

March 8, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Meeting with House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)

Attached at Tab I is a self-explanatory memo from you to Max Friedersdorf responding to his memo at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward your memo to Max Friedersdorf.

Approve _ Disapprove _

Attachments

I - McFarlane Memo to Friedersdorf

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to Friedersdorf Tab II - Friedersdorf Memo to McFarlane of February 28, 1985

Partially Declassified/heleased on 230 1987 under provisions at E.M. 12356 by B. Reger, Buttered Sept 16, Co. off

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1652

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

N 40000

MEMORANDUM FOR MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF

FROM:

BUD MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)

Per you memo of February 28, 1985, I met with the following members of the HPSCI on March 4, 1985:

Representative Robert Stump (R-AZ)
Representative Robert Livingston (R-LA)
Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL)
Representative Robert McCollum (R-FL)

Bob McCollum expressed belief that found U.S. aid essential to the success of the Nicaraguan resistance and need for increased lobbying on the Hill

Henry Hyde felt that we should expand private sector and third country assistance, such as the sector and third in the effort to support the resistance. I explained why these are just not tenable alternatives—for the freedom fighters or for us.

Bob Stump indicated that we needed to get on with some "hard bargaining" if we plan to win the vote.

Bob Livingston had obviously done the most thinking about the problem and made a strong case for a well orchestrated effort. He noted that we had great need of a vote count before we go too much further and start disipating our energies.

In short, it was a good session. They were all emphatic that it will take a well executed plan to get the votes that we need. We committed to help get as much as possible declassifed and to set up a series of briefings both here and on the Hill. I also stressed the need to get as many members as possible down to the region to meet with Duarte, Suazo, Monge and the resistance.

If you feel that this kind of session helps, keep 'em coming!.

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify: OADR



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

0111e:

On the chance Steve didn't give you a copy, attached is for your use.

ン(Vince

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20618

August 8, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HYDE

FROM:

Steven K. Berry, Associate Counsel

SUBJECT: New York Times Article, August 8, 1985, Alleging Contras Receive Advice from the White House

- -- The current Boland Prohibition in Sec. 801 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1985 (P.L. 98-618) prohibits U.S. intelligence entities from obligating or expending, to support the Resistance, funds authorized to be appropriated by the FY 1984 and FY 1985 intelligence authorizations acts. Since no money was authorized for NSC by either of those acts, Sec. 801 is not relevant to the issue.
- -- The only statute arguably relevant to the subject of the Times article is Sec. 8066(a) of the 1985 DDD Appropriations Act (P.L. 98-473), which provides that "During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Apancy, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or antity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual." (Emphasis added)
- -- The Section 8066(a) prohibition remains in effect throughout FY 1985, which ends 9/30/85.
- -- MSC is clearly a U.S. entity involved in intelligence activities subject to the Section 8066(a) prohibition.
 - The National Security Act of 1947 specifically establishes the CIA "under the National Security Council" and provides that CIA duties shall be carried out "under the direction of the National Security Council." (Sec. 102(a) and (d))
 - Executive Order 12333 provides that the MSC shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and special activities, and attendant policies and programs. (Sec. 1.2(a))
- -- Although the Section 8066(a) prohibition clearly applies to MSC as an entity of the U.S. Government involved in intelligence activities, that prohibition has not been violated.

UNCLASSIFIED

- -- The prohibition forbids obligation or expanditure of funds available to an intelligence entity to support paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, but nothing in the Times article indicates that the NSC staff officer involved poligated or expanded any NSC funds.
- -- The Vimes article only states that the NSC staff officer talked with members of the Resistance or with individuals in the U.S. interested in helping out the Resistance, which does not violate the promibition.
- -- No matter how you stretch it, talking to the Resistance or anyone else is not obligation or expenditure of funds.
- -- And, if I may raise a final point, doesn't a member of the NSC staff have the same constitutional right of free speech under the First Amendment that every other American has?
- -- As long as it is talking to the Resistance--not coligation or expenditure of funds for weapons or anything else--it doesn't violate the law. I note also that the Times article cites (unnamed) Hemoers of Congress of do not believe it violates U.S. laws.
- The President has supported the Nicaraguen Democratic Resistance fighters and has stated so publicly. He has met with Adolfo Colaro, Arturo Cruz and other members of the Unified Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) leaders in demonstration of his support for their efforts.
- -- The President has attended fundraising dinnars for the Resistance movement and has received their leaders at the White House. I suppose you could say that is direct assistance to the Resistance.
- It is not unusual to expect that the White House staff or NSC staff, who are directly responsible to the President, would encourage the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance in the same manner and in the same ways that the President has encouraged the Resistance.
- -- Before Congress's recent reversal on the Boland Amendment, intelligence agencies were forbidden to assist the Resistance forces in any manner. This abrupt termination of the relationship between the Resistance forces and any United States entity forced the Nicaraguan Resistance groups to establish other lines of communication and contact. The NSC or the White House would be a logical point of contact for any group seeking to establish a relationship with the U.S. Government.
- Did the Boland Amendment prohibit third parties, other countries or groups and organizations throughout the world from requesting the official United States policy regarding Nicarague? The President's position on assistance to the Nicaraguen Damocratic Resistance is clear

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- -- It is one thing to state that the law forbids any assistance to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance.
 - -- Tit is another thing to state that the President's position is clear and that he intends to pursue initiatives to renew a sistance to the Democratic Resistance.
- -- The Soland Amendment does not prohibit or the U.S. Covernment from receiving the views of its friends and allies throughout the world on the significance of the military buildup of the Marxist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. On the contrary, I would say we have a obligation to inform our allies and friends of the U.S. position on Nicaragua.

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HOUSED-PASSED PROVISION ON MICARAGUA IN H.R. 2419, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 1985

IEXT IN PROVISION

SEC. 105. During fiscal year 1986, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended, directly or indirectly, for material assistance to the Nicareguan democratic resistance including arms, ammunition, or other equipment or material which could be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death, or which would have the effect of providing arms, ammunition or other weapons of war for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any group, organizatith, movement or individual.

HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE RECORT (H. Kapt. 99-106, pt. 1)

As introduced, Section 105 would have prohibited any funds available to any agency involved in intelligence activities being used to support, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. The section also had the effect of dearing any funds requested for such a purpose in fiscal year 1896. It would

extend the current statutory prohibition for support to the Nicaragram "contras" through the end of FY 1986.

Am amendment was adopted by the committee to strike the original language of Section 105 so as to make clear that the prohibition that applies to supporting Nicaraguan insurgents or "contras" applies only to the provision of funds, goods, equipment, civilian or military supplies, or any other material, but does not include the provision of intelligence information or advice to the contras.

BOLAND PROBLETIONS UNCLASSIFIED

Section 8066(a), Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 (F.L. 98-473)

SEC. 8066. (a) During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.

Section 801, Intelligence Authorization Act for TV 1995 (P.L. 98-618)

Src 801. No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or by the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1984 (Public Law 98-215) may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual, except to the extent provided and under the terms and conditions specified by House Joint Resolution 648, making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1985, and for other purposes, as enacted.





#565

Congress of the United States 46 Committee of Forty Arres

Heateger, DC 1995

August 16, 1985^{A/1}

The Honorable Robert C. M:Parlane Assistant to the President for Mational Security Affairs Executive Office of the President The White House Washington, D.C. 18506



Dear Mr. Mefeclane:

I am writing in response to recent press reports detailing the activities of certain Mational Security Council staff members in providing advice and fundamining support to Miceraguen rebel leaders.

These reports raise serious questions regarding the violation of the letter and the spirit of U.S. law prohibiting support for the Microsquan robols. The Congress, in passing the Boland Amendment (Section 8066 of P.L. 98-473), prohibited "the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the U.S. involved in intelligence activities" from supporting the robols. It would be stretching the integrity of the law to support that this prohibition was not intended to cover the MSC. President Reagen, hisself, in his executive order on the nation's intelligence agencies, describes the Mational Security Council as the highest government entity with responsibility for intelligence activities.

In addition, the Beland Amendment attictly prohibits assistance "The "the primers or which would have the affect of supporting, dilitating emindicestly, military or paramilitary operations" of the Microgram insurgents. Reports quote Administration officials describing Marine Lt. Col. Oliver Morth as providing "tactical influence" on robel military operations, facilitating contacts for prospective financial denors, and otherwise organizing and coordinating robel-efforts. These activities clearly have "the effort of supporting" the Microgram robels.

Congressional intent in passing the Boland Amendment was to distance the United States from the Hidaraques rebel movement, while the Congress and the nation debated the appropriateness of our involvement in Hidaraque. The press reports suggest that, despite congressional intent, during this period the U.S. provided direct support to the Hidaraques rebels.

N 9647

The Moderable Robert C. McFarlane Page Two August 16, 1985

In order to clarify the circumstances surrounding Lt. Col.
North's activities, as chairman of the subcommittee with
jurisdiction over United States policy toward Micaragua, I
request that you provide Congress with all information, including
memoranda and any other documents, pertaining to any contact
between Lt. Col. North and Micaraguan robels leaders as of
enactment of the Soland Ayendment in October, 1984.

Thank you for your attention to this request.

Sincérely,

Michael D. Bernes Chairman Subcommittee on Mestern Hemisphere Affairs

MDB : na

From: NSVRP --CPG --CPUA

JOSH H. PUTNDEXTER

Date and time 04/20/85 14:41:04

*** Reply to note of 08/19/85 13:37

-- seeket --

NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH
Subject: Barnes letter requesting material re North/Contra contacts
Prior to yr xfer of this action, I discussed the Barnes ltr w/ Jim Michel and
he urges that we not jump too feet on this issue. He shares my concept that
our legal fellow is going to create unhelpful speculation re our intentions on
this matter as he proceeds around town asking questions about the Bolands'
ammendment and its legal/legislative intent. Jim recommends, and I agree,
thatour response to the Barnes letter should be very quietlydrafted by Jim,
Paul Thompson and a rep from Fielding's office. Regards, North, NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH

cc: NSBSR --CPUA --CPUA

--CPUA NSWFM

JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA

JOHN M. POINDENTER

cc: NSOLN --CPUA NSPBT

--CPUA

NSBSR --CPUA



HIND ACCURED

N 9648

Had / Rolesand on MAY 2 AND under provisions of E.O. 12323
by B. Rayra, National Saturity Council

BUDN SYING ST MBTBNINGAW

September 12, 1985

SELECTION STATE

Dear Congresenan Barnes:

This is in reply to your letter of August 16, regarding the activities of members of the MSC staff in connection with the Micarequan democratic resistance. Like you, I take these charges very seriously and consequently have thereughly examined the facts and circumstances which could bear upon these charges in any fachion.

Based on this review, I want to assure you that my actions, and those of my staff, have been in compliance with both the spirit and the latter of the law. In your latter, you referred specifically to the proscriptive language of Section 6066 of P.L. 98-472—the Beland Amendment. There have not been, nor will there be, any empenditures of HRC funds which would have the effort of supportions in Biographs or indirectly military or parametrisms in Biographs by any sation, group, organization, novement, or individual. Indeed, our actions have been and must be in conformity, not only with this prescription, but with all laws.

Your letter affords a useful experiently to estment upon allegations in the modic regarding the activities of Lieutenant Celesel North and other numbers of my staff. Various NOC staff officers have been in contact with numbers of the Historquan resistance since the opposition began to expanize in 1982. These staff contacts, as well so my own, and these of the President, have been important in determining the course of our policy. Discussions with the resistance leaders have helped us to assess the integrity of their commitment to the cause of democracy and justice in Microsqua. We have also discussed the evolving character of U.S. support as we moved from covert support for their couse in 1963-16 to the more restrictive, exclusively political support allowed since Ostebar of last year to the current situation in which we are able to provide only humanitarian assistance.

Contrary to reports that we used those contacts to provide "taction! influence" or to plan military operations, we urged the resistance landers to force a representative political front, involving credible non-military figures, aimed at achieving a description outcome in Micaragus. No have also emphasized that

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N 9649

the resistance must investigate charges of human rights violations, punish any quilty parties, and put in place measures to prevent such acts from taking place. Throughout, we have scrupulously abided by the spirit and the letter of the law. Hence of us has colimited funds, facilitated contests for preopperive petential denote, or etherwise expanited or coordinated the military or paramilitary efforts of the recistance.

Since October 1984 when the Beland restrictions were enacted, Lieutenant Colonel Herth has travelled to Control America eight times for the purpose of meeting with ferring government efficials regarding our Control America policy. During these trips, as well as in other meetings in the U.S., he has conferred with leaders of the Hierarquan resistance. He acknowledged to both the foreign government efficials and the opposition leaders that, while we could no longer contribute directly or indirectly to the military/paramilitary presention of their resistance, we would continue to seek Congressional support for their cause. He further urged, as I did during my January 1985 trip to the region, that every affort be note to breaden their political base and establish a political program providing for negatiations toward an internal researciliation. We also urged that they make clear their commitment to a political, not a military solution, in their international contacts.

These efforts led to the March I San Jose Declaration in which the freedom fighters effored to lay down their arms and enter into a church-mediated dialogue with the Sandinistae. As this process natured this past Spring, the President met with the three principal remistance leaders and encouraged than to desist from military activities when it appeared that their proposal might be accepted by the Sandinistae. These actions resulted in the June II statement of democratic objectives announced by the Unified Biceroguan Opposition (UNO) in San Salvador, El Salvador. Our emphasis throughout has been on a political rather than a military sciution.

Record contacts with the resistance have forused on ensuring that the \$27 million in humanitaries assistance is properly administrated and fally compliant with the logal requirements contained in the logislation. In short, we want to do it right. I well recognize that the Administration and the Congress may differ as to how we can best achieve our shared goal of a democratic outcome in the Control American region. Hometholoss, we agree on the desirability of this outcome and that it must be achieved within the limits of our law.

CONFIDENTIAL

N 9650

Mr. Cheirmen, like you, I am meet concerned that at a time when humanitarian assistance is being extended to the UNI there be no misgivings as to the emistence of any parallel efforts to paramilitary or intirectly, support for military or paramilitary activities in Missisqua. There has not been, nor will there be, any such activities by the MSC staff. In the interest of providing such assurances as may be helpful in forging mutual trust and confidence, I remain fully prepared to discuss these matters with you and other members of your committee.

Thank you again for this opportunity to clarify a most unfortunate misrepresentation of the facts.


Sincoroly,

The Benerable Michael D. Barnes Bouse of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

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Exhibit OLN-110

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Congress of the United States 51
Connected on Fortin Arrivo

Name of Representations Westington, DC 10915

September 30, 1985

The Bosorable Robert C. McFarlane Assistant to the President for Mational Security Affairs Executive Office of the President The White House Washington, D.C. 20500



7290

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

Thank you for your letter of September 12 regarding the activities of members of the staff of the Matienal Security council in connection with the Micaraguan rehals.

I appreciate having your emplemention of these activities and your willingness to discuss these matters further. I suggest that you have your staff call my office to arrange a mutually convenient time for us to meet. Of course, this meeting is not a substitute for further section by the Committee on this matter, should the Committee consider such action to be appropriate.

However, I am surm you understand that the pertinent documents must be provided if the Committee is to be able to fulfill its obligation to adopt logislation governing the conduct of United France foreign policy and to eversee the implementation of that policy under the law. In your latter, you do not refer to my request for such documents. In order to enhance the usefulness of our meeting, I request that you provide the necessary documents to me in advance so that I may review them prior to the meeting.

It may be halpful if I spall out more clearly the interest of the Counities. The Counities retains its essent about possible violations of federal law by members of the NBC staff. However, that is not the Counities's only--er even primary--concern, given that the enforcement of the law is an Executive Branch function. It is the Counities's responsibility, however, to conduct oversight of laws that limit the activities of the Emercive Branch under the Counities's jurisdiction, and to reach judgments as to whether changes in the law are indicated by those activities. Even if the Counities distermined that the activities of the NBC staff on this matter were entirely legal, the Counities might still determine that changes in the law were measurer.

N 9652

I am sure it is obvious to you that the Committee example make these judgments unless it has in its possession all information, including deborated and other documents, pertaining to any contact between the MSC staff and Minaraguan robal leaders. I would between you request for such information, both oral and documentary. In order that there will be no misunderstanding, I want to make it clear that the Committee's interest is in any information that pertains to MSC contacts with the robals, regardless of whether those contacts took place prior to or after the affective date of the bound emeadment.

I approxiate your desire to be forthcoming on this matter and look forward to our meeting.

Sincerely,

Michael D. Barnes

Subcommittee on Vestern Bemisphere Affaire

ce: The Momorable Dante S. Fascell

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Congress of the United States Committee on Foreign Affairs

Mouse of Representatives Washington, DC 2011

October 29, 1985

N 337

The Honorable Robert C. HcFarlane Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Executive Office of the President The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

Sear Mr. McFarlage:

I am writing with respect to my request for information and documentation on the activities of members of the staff of the National Security Council in connection with the Nicaraguan rebels.

I appreciate your willingness to share some such information and documentation with me. However, it is my belief that the procedures that you have suggested under which I would have access to this information would be inadequate to permit me to reach any confident conclusions regarding the relationship of the NSC staff with the rebels. Clearly, competent staff must have the opportunity to subject this information to serious analysis if any meaningful conclusions are to be drawn. I have consulted with the leadership of the Bouse, which shares my belief on this matter.

Accordingly, and after consultation with the Chairman of the Permanent Select Counittee on Intelligence, The Honorable Lee E. Hamilton, I hereby request that you provide this information and documentation to the Intelligence Counittee under that Counittee's normal procedures for Hamber and staff access to and review of highly elacsified materials.

I believe that this proposal would surely resolve any concerns that the Administration might have about the security of the information, while at the same time fulfilling the responsibilities of the Couse.

As you requested during our recent meeting, I am attaching an outline of the information that we are requesting.

OLN-III

N 3376

The again. I appreciate your willingness to be forthcoming on this matter and trust that this proposal will resolve the issue of congressional access to this information to everyone's setisfaction.

Sincerely.

Michael D. Barnes Chairman Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs

cc: The Honorable Thomas P. O'Heill, Jr.
The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
The Honorable Dante B. Fascell

MDB:vj

N 3377

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF INFORMATION REQUIRED OF THE MSC ON ITS RELATIONS WITH THE CO


- A complete list of all meetings or contacts between Lt. Col. North or any other member or official of the MSC staff and:
 - (a) "members of the Micaraguan resistance eince the opposition began to organise in 1982" (September 12 McFarlane letter, p. 1. third para.).
 - (b) "leaders of the Micaraguan resistance" since October, 1984 (September 12 McFarlane letter, p. 2, first full para.).
 - (c) the Micaraguan resistance that "have focused on ensuring that the \$27 million in humanitarian assistance is properly edministered and fully compliant with the legal requirements contained in the legislation" (September 12 McFarlane letter, p. 2, last pera.).
 - (d) paramilitary groups such as QM, Soldiers of Fortune, etc.
 - (e) Friends of the Americas, a Louisiana group headed by Woody Jankins.
 - (f) representatives of South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, or any other country, in July, 1984, or at any other time, pertaining to assistance for the Nicaraguan resistance.
 - (g) John Bull, an American reacher with land in morthern Costs Rica.
 - (h) General Singlaub,or any other person involved in fundrateing for the resistance, regarding fundrateing plans or activities, military needs of the resistance, or any other matter relating to the Hicaraguan resistance.
 - (i) any person pertaining to the Micaraguan refugee fundraising dinner that was held in April, 1985.
- 2. All information with respect to any meeting or other contact referred to above, including any membrands, reports, minutes, meeting echedules, appointment calendars, memorands of calls, phone logs, and any other information.
- 3. Any memoranda or other decuments prepared by Lt. Col. Horth or any other member or officer of the NBC staff containing or discussing plans or programs with respect to aid for the Misaraguan resistance, any supporting documentation or other information related to such documents, any records of NBC consideration or review of any such plans or programs, and any documents pertaining to the adoption or implementation of any such plans or programs.

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
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON INTELLIGIOUS
WASHINGTON, OF 20016

N 49663

August 20, 1965

Honorable Assert C. Hoferlane Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, D.C. 20000

Deer Hr. Heferlane:

Recent press accounts of the alleged activities by the National Security Council regarding the contras in Microsopul raise some questions.

If the MEC did engage in actions that supported the military activity of the contras, I am curious about what actions were taken by the MEC to support the activities of the contras during the period after the enectment of the Soland emendment and before its recent modification.

I would like to receive a full report on the kinds of activities regarding the contras that the MSC corried out and what the legal justification is for such actions given the legislative prohibitions that existed last year and earlier this year.

with best wishes, I am

Singapoly yours,

Lee H. Hamilton Chairman

OLN-114

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N 29784

National Security Council The White House

		Package #		
CLA-115	Bob Pearson William Martin	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
	John Poindexter Paul Thompson Wilma Hall			
	Bud McFerlane William Martin NSC Secretariat Situation Room		Æ	staff doesn to
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Pres: NORCH --CPUA

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JOHN'H. POLINERTER

NOTE FROM: ROSSET ABRANCING SUBJECT: Roply to Memilton on Oli

I have sent you both separately a draft latter I have composed to answer Lee Hamilton's letter on Ollie's activities. One or two annotations are appropriate. The reference to "insert #1" refers to paragraph one of page two of your draft Olliu. "insert #2" refers to the second paragraph of page two Please do not share either this note or the separate draft with anyone. Wil will prepare a smooth version of it for me Wednesday morning. Please bring me any edits you have. Ollie, don't send me any PROFS notes about it. Nany thanks.

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From: HSRCH --CPUA --CPUA

Date and time

06/63/85 21:35:34 ·

To: NEVON

NOTE FROM: MEAST-INVARIANT SUBJECT: Letter to Congressmen Lee Namilton ly Council

Dour Mr. Chairman.

This is in reply to your letter of August 20, 1951 in which you called attention to press reports of "...alleged activities by the National Security Council (staff) regarding the contres in Niceragua..." and asked for a full report and legal justification for any such activities. Like you, I take such report and legal justification for any such activities. report and legal justification for any such activities. Dike you, I take such charges very seriously and consequently have thoroughly examined the facts and charges very seriously and consequently have thoroughly examined the facts and charges which in any remote fashion could bear upon these charges. From all matters which in any remote fashion could bear upon these charges. that review I can state with deep personal conviction that at no time did I or that review I can state with deep personal conviction that at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law. While your letter refers to the language of the Boland amendment which proscribes activities "...for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in or supporting, directly or indirectly, whilesty or paramilitary operation. Micaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual, would extend my assurance to the violation of any law.

Your letter does provide a timely opportunity to restate the policy of this Administration with regard to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters and just what activities have been undertaken in support of this policy. First it is I think clear that President Reagan believes in the purposes for which the Freedom Fighters were formed-to resist the repression of the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters were commed-to resist the repression or the Alcareguen government and to work for the establishment of democracy in Nicaregus. But it is equally clear that the President has made it emphasically clear that all US is equally clear that the President has made it emphatically clear that all US support was to be in strict compliance with the law, what then was the nature of our activities in support of the Freedom Fighters?

In the fall of last year, with the enactment of the Boland Amendment, it was apparent that the resistance was demoralized at the prospect of an end to was appearant that the transferred was acknowledged to them that we could no longer contribute directly or indirectly to the military paramilitary prosecution of their resistance we stated that he would continue to seek congressional support to do so and that meanwhile they could usefully devote their efforts in other directions. For example, it was clear that the Freedom Figurers here at a disadvantage to the extent that their goals, purposes and Fighters here at a disarvantage to the extent that their goals, purposes at terms were poorly understood while those of the Sandinista government were promoted by the normal diplomatic and public affairs institutions of their government. In order to help belence this promotional effort we made approximately to the forces leaders as to her could have a sunial government. In order to belp belance this promotional errors we used recommendations to the Contra leaders as to how they could better explain their cause; how our Congress was organized; to whom they ought to make their cause; how our Congress was organized; to whom they ought to make their cause and why there was a natural sentiment of antagonism toward them by some called the course of th case and why there was a natural sentiment of antagonism toward them by some of your colleagues. In this latter regard, we stressed reports of alleged atrocities committed by them and urged strongly that they investigate these charges and if true, punish those responsible. Separately, we atrassed that their purposes would suffer a lack of credibility for as long as their activities remained military alone. We urged that they forge a representative political front involving credible non-military figures and that this front take responsibility for framing a political program centered upon peaceful avolution

evolution
toward a pluralistic process. Over time these efforts led to the March 1 San
Jose proposal in which the Freedom Fighters offered to lay down their arms and
lose proposal in which the Nicaraguan government brokered by the Church.
As this process began to mature this past spring we even encouraged them to
desire from military activities at a time when their proposal might have had
desire from military activities at a time when their proposal might have had as this process began to meture this past spring we even encouraged them to

rose chance of adoption by the other side. At a finding encourage military activities. This urging against continuing military activities was as clear as we ever case to commenting upon or seeking to influence the military appear of their struggle.

It is equally important to stress what we did not do. We did not solicit furth or other support for military or paramilitary activities either from Americans or third parties. We did not offer tactical advice for the conduct of their military activities or their organization. Nor did our limison contacts seek to influence them toward other than a pluralistic outcome. It is insert will.

With regard to the legal justification for the activities I have cited, I can only state the reasonable requirement that any Administration gain appropriate information on which to have coherent policy decisions. The Freedom Fighters comprised one significant element among many on whom it was and remains important for the Administration to be advised in a timely fashion. As a personal observation I would only add that had we failed to do so, the absence of influence, which in all likelihood would have ensued, could have led the Freedom Fighters to adopt a purely military effort—a course which neither of us would support. But I wish to stress once more that at no time did it seem to me that any of our activities was in contravention of law or the public trust.

Mr Chairman (add insert #2) .

Sincerely

P.3 Mr Chairman I would like to call to your attention a particularly unfirtunate result of the recent public allegations. Following the appearance in a Sunday article of the charges, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, the officer who conducted many of the contacts with the Freedom Fighters, suffered a number of intrusions on his family life. Demonstrators at his home pushed down a fence; one of his pets was poisoned and his automobile was damaged. He and members of his family received numerous harassing telephone cells at various times of day and night. To

avoid this harassment he had to leave home with his family and take up temporary residence at a remote location until the demonstrations ceased. I while ask that you not share these events with anyone for neither he nor I will to engender sympathy. I bring them to your attention in the interest in bringing this matter to a close. I am at your disposal to help in any way possible.

ce: NSOLN --CPUA

NSJRP --CPUA

JOIN H. POINDEXTER

UNCLASSIFIED

~ 1355 ~ 1212/

Dear Mr. Chairman:



This is in reply to your letter of August 20, 1985 in which you called attention to press reports of "...alleged activities by the National Security Council (staff) regarding the contras in Nicaragua... and asked for a full report and legal justification for any such activities. Like you, I take such charges very seriously and consequently have thoroughly examined the facts and all matters which in any remote fashion could bear upon these charges. From that review I can state with deep personal conviction that at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law. While your letter refers to the language of the Boland amendment which proscribes activities "...for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual," I would extend my assurance to the violation of any law.

Your letter does provide a timely opportunity to restate the policy of this Administration with regard to the Micaraguan Freedom Fighters and just what activities have been undertaken in support of this policy. First, it is I think clear that President Reagan believes in the purposes fee which the Freedom Fighters.

democracy in Nicaragua. But it is equally clear that the

President has made it emphatically clear that all US support was
to be in strict compliance with the law. What then was the
nature of our activities in support of the Freedom Fighters?

In the fall of last year, with the enactment of the Boland Amendment, it was apparent that the Freedom Fighters were demoralized at the prospect of an end to US support for their cause. While we acknowledged to them that we could no longer contribute directly or indirectly to the military/paramilitary prosecution of their resistance, we stated that we would continue to seek Congressional support to do so and that meanwhile they could usefully devote their efforts in other directions. For example, it was clear that the Freedom Fighters were at a disadvantage to the extent that their goals, purposes and terms were poorly understood while those of the Sandinistas government were promoted by the negment diplomatic and public affairs institutions of the sandinistas government. In order to help balance this promotional effort, we discussed with the Contra leaders the

importance of their explaining their cause to the public and their providing information to interested Nembers of the Congress. We pointed out why there was a natural sentiment of antagonism toward them by some congress. In this latter regard, we stressed reports of alleged atrocities imputed to them and urged strongly that they investigate these charges and, if true, punish those responsible. Separately, we stressed that

their purposes would suffer a lack of credibility for as long as their activities remained military. Them. We urged that they forge a representative political front involving credible non-mulitary figures and that this front take responsibility for framing a political program centered non percent evolution sees. Over time these efforts led to the March 1 San Jose pass in which the Freedom Fighters offered to lay down their arms and enter into negotiations with Missingues government to be brokesed by the Shussh. As this process began to mature this past spring we emb-encouraged them to desist from mulitary activities at a time when their proposal might have had some chance of adoption by the other side. At no time did we encourage military activities. This arging against when to the industrian making to influence the military aspect of their struggle.

It is equally important to stress what we did not do. We fid not solicit funds or other support for military or paramilitary againstituse either from Americans or third parties. We did not effer tactical advice for the conduct of their military activities or their organisation. Nor did our lisison contacts seek to influence them toward other than a present contacts with the Freedom Fighters have dealt with the administration of the \$27 million in humanitarian assistance. Our effort has been to ensure that this program is properly administered and that it, too, is fully compliant with

the legal requirements contained in the legislation. In short, we want to do it right.

Note regard to the legal justification for the activities I have cited, I can only state the reasonable requirement that any Administration gain appropriate information on which to base coherent policy decisions. The Freedom Fighters comprised one significant element among many on whom it was and remains important for the Administration to be advised in a timely fashion. As a personal observation I would only add that had we failed to do so, the absence of influence, which in all likelihood would have ensued, could have led the Freedom Fighters to adopt a purely military effort -- a course which neither you nor I would support. But I wish to stress once more that at no time did it seem to me that any of our activities was in contravention of law or the public trust.

Mr Chairman, I believe that future events will confirm that the involvement with the resistance has had a positive effect on achieving a democratic outcome in the region. I well recognize that the Administration and the Congress may differ as to how best to achieve this goal. Nonetheless, we are both in agreement that such an outcome is desirable and that it must be achieved within the limits of our law. Should you so desire, I would be most willing to discuss this matter further with you and other members of your committee. Thank you for this opportunity to

clarify what has been a most unfortunate misrepresentation of the facts by the media.

Sincerely,

Mr Chairman, I would like to call to your attention a P.S. particularly unfortunate result of the recent public allegations. Following the appearance in a Sunday article of the charges, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, the officer who conducted many of the contacts with the Freedom Fighters, suffered a number of intrusions on his family life. Demonstrators at his home pushed down a fence; one of his pets was poisoned and his automobile was damaged. He and members of his family received numerous harassing telephone calls at various times of day and night. To avoid this harassment, he had to leave home with his family and take up temporary residence at a remote location until the demonstrations ceased. I would ask that you not share these events with anyone for neither he nor I wish to engender sympathy. I bring them to your attention in the interest of bringing this matter to a close. I am at your disposal to help in any way possible.

- 1987 7. 1987 enter professes et E.O., 1203 by P. Rosen, National Security Council

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON



September 5, 1985

Dear Mr. Chaisman:

This is in reply to your letter of August 20, 1985 in which you called attention to press reperts of "...alleged activities by the Matienal Security Council (staff) reparding the contras in Micaragua..." and asked for a full repert and legal justification for any such activities. Like you, I take such charges very seriously and consequently have theroughly examined the facts and all matters which in any remote fashion could beer upon these charges. From that review I can state with deep personal conviction that at no time did I or any member of the Matienal Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law. While your letter refers to the language of the Boland amendment which prescribes activities "...for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Micaragus by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual," I would extend my assurance to the violation of any law.

Your letter does provide a timely opportunity to restate the policy of this Administration with regard to the Micraguan Freedom Fighters and just what activities have been undertaken in support of this policy. Pirst, it is I think clear that President Reagan believes in the cause espoused by the Freedom Fighters -- eppecition to Sandinista repression and the achievement of democracy in Micragua. But it is also true that the President has made it emphatically clear that all US support was to be in strict compliance with the law. What then was the nature of our contacts with the Freedom Fighters?

In the fall of last year, with the ensement of the Boland Amendment, it was apparent that the Process Fighters were described at the process of an end to US support for their cause. While we asknowledged to them that we could no longer contribute directly or indirectly to the military/paramilitary prosecution of their resistance, we stated that we would continue to seek Congressional support to do so and that meanwhile they could usofully devote their efforts in other directions. For example, it was clear that the Freedem Fighters were at a disadvantage to the extent that their goals, purposes and terms were poorly understood while those of the Sandinistas were presented by their existing diplomatic and public affairs institutions and those of their bloc patrons. In order to help belance this premotional effort, we discussed with the Contra leaders the importance of their explaining their cause to the public and their providing information to interested Numbers of the Congress. We pointed gut why there was a natural sengiment of antagonism toward them by some in the United States. In this provides in the United States. In this

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N 9665

latter regard, we stressed reports of alleged atrocities imputed to them and urged extendly that they investigate these charges and, if true, punish these responsible. Separately, we stressed that their purposes would suffer a lock of credibility for as long as their activities remained only military. We urged that they forge a representative political front involving credible non-military figures and that this front take responsibility for framing a political program contacted on achieving a peaceful, democratic evolution in Ficaragea. Over time, those efforts led to the March I fam Jose declaration in which the Freedom Fighters effored to lay down their arms and enter into a church-mediated dialogue with the Sandinistae. As this process bogan to mature this past spring we encouraged them to desire from military activities at a time when their proposal might have hed some chance of adoption by the other side. At no time did we encourage military activities. Our emphasis on a policial rather than a military solution to the situation was as close as we ever some to influencing the military aspect of their strengle.

It is equally important to stress what we did not do. We did not solicit funds or other support for military or parenilitary activities either from Americans or third parties. We did not offer tactical advice for the conduct of their military activities or their expenisation. Her did our lisison contacts seek to influence them toward other than a democratic outcome. Our most recent contacts with the Freedom Fighters have dealt with the administration of the 527 million in humanitarian assistance. Our effort has been to ensure that this program is properly administered and that it, too, is fully compliant with the local requirements contained in the logislation. In short, we want to do it right.

with regard to the logal justification for the activities I have cited, I can only state the reasonable requirement that any Administration gain appropriate information on which to base coherent policy decisions. The Freeden Fighters comprised one significant element among many on whom it was and remains important for the Administration to be advised in a timely fashion. As a personal observation I would only add that had we failed to do so, the absence of influence, which in all likelihood would have ensued, could have lod the Freedom Fighters to adopt a purely military effort -- a course which neither you not I would support. But I wish to stress case more that at no time did it seem to me that any of our activities was in contravention of law or the public trust.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that future events will cenfirm that our contact with the resistance has had a positive effect on achieving a democratic outcome in the region. I will recognize that the Administration and the Congress may differ as to how best to achieve this goal. Memetholess, we are both in agroement that such an outcome is desirable and that it must be achieved within the limits of our law. Should you so desire, I would be

PAGE 1

N 9666

most willing to discuss this matter further with you and other members of your committee. Thank you for this opportunity to clarify what has been a most unfortunate misropresentation of the facts.

Siscerely.

Polito popular

The Monorable Lee E. Hamilton Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Ecuse of Representatives Washington, D. C. 20515

PAGE 4

N 9667


P.S. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call to your attention a particularly unfortunate result of the recent public allogations. Following the appearance in a Sunday article of the charges, Lieutenant Colonol Oliver Merth, the efficar who conducted many of the centerts with the Freedom Pighters, suffered a number of intrusions on his family life. Demonstrators at his home pushed down a fonce; one of his pots was poisoned and his autumabile was damaged. He and members of his family received numerous harassing telephone calls at various times of day and night. To avoid this harassment, he had to leave home with his family and take up temperary recidence at a remote location until the demonstrations consed. I would ask that you not share those events with anyone for neither he ser I wish to engender sympathy. I bring them to your attention in the interest of bringing this natter to a close. I am at your disposal to help in any way possible.



UNULASSITIES



CALANDIT COLORT COLORTITIS CALANDACE WASHINGTON, OR 20010



September 12, 1985

Minorable Patent C. Hafferland Assistant to the President for Matienal Security Affairs The White Mouse Whathington, D. C. 20800

Door He. Haffeelann:

As our meeting Tuesday, you agreed to answer written questions extention by Manhara of the Committee concerning allegations about the activities of Lieutenant Colonal Cliver North of your staff. Stalesed are questions that have been submitted by Manhara of the Committee.

The Committee appreciates your willingness to discuss this matter and to respond to these questions-

With best wishes, I am

HALL COMMISSION

Inclosure

CREATE

N 9669

Direction, Parties! Influence, and Myles to the Contras

- 1. South Adolfo Coloro and Répar Changero (<u>Machineton Post</u>, 14 August 1985 and <u>Mismi Herold</u>, 24 June 1988) have publicly seased that Colonel Morth traveled to Mandaras in the opring of 1986 we assure them that, despite Congressional opposition, the White Mouse would "find a way to keep their movement alive." Also, they name that Colonel Morth and with them in June 1984. What was the purpose of Colonel Morth's visit to the FOF in April and June 1986?
- 2. It has been alleged in the <u>Hew York Times</u> (6 Aug 65) that Colonal Morth was advised in advance of proposed rotal estacts and had offered the rotals advice and direction. Do you have any browledge of whether this is true? A specific emaple was citals an attack in July on a ferry boot that travels between Ruma and Elusfields in continuation Hierarchy. Do you have any branchage of whether the HEC had advance information that attack was to take place?
- 3. When the CDA had we withdraw from their day-to-day contact with the rubels, it has been alleged in the <u>New York Times</u> (8 Aug 85) that Colonel Morth tried to fill the wold, partly through helping facilitate the supplying of legistics help. Did Colonel Morth, in his especity as a staff member at the Mational Security Council, use his influence to facilitate the sevement of supplies, either raised privately in this country or otherwise, to the contras?

N 9670

- 4. A Microspilla exile leader is quoted in the <u>May York Time</u> (6 Aug 85) as starting that Colonel Herth was very important in coordinating efforts to reorganise and better executinate the operations of the two main rebel groups, the FDM and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance or AFCE, and that he had not with rebel leaders in both countries. Is that an accurate statement?
- 5. There are allegations of some concern empressed by intelligence officials in the CDA that Colonal Morth may have been walking a dangerous line in his artivities with the contras (May York Times, 10 Aug 85). Here such sentiments brought to your attention?
- 6. Adolfo Calero, President of the FDM and a leading figure in the new Unified Miceraguma Opposition (UMO), the group which will receive the \$27 million of humanitarian assistance, has stated publicly (<u>Maddington Post</u>, 14 Aug 86) that he set a half a doesn times with Colonel Morth this spring. For what purpose did Colonel Morth meet so frequently with Nr. Colonel
- To has also been alleged that Colonel Morth had to travel to Honduras and most with Monduran military leaders because apparently they were sightning off supplies which were intended for the contras. As a result, the supply without was metahed from the civilian airport at Tegucigalpa to the military airfield at Palmerola. Did Colonel Morth undertake such a mission?

CANTED

N 9671

Partitioning the Painting of Purds from Private Sources

- 1. Now Colonel Morth been the foreit ppint within the MSC staff for hendling contacts with private fundraising groups, such as the Morld Anti-Communist League and the Council for Marid Freedom headed by retired Najor Constal John K. Singledo?
- 2. General Singland has stated (<u>Machineton Post</u>, 9 Aug 86) that he would often talk to Colonal Morth and indem him what he was doing and than state that if it was a darb idea, for North to send him a signal. In that your impression of the relationship between General Singland and Colonal Morth?
- 3. It is alleged (<u>Micri Merald</u>, 34 Jun 86), after a visit by Colonel Morth and a CTA official to the FDM in June 1984, that the CTA provided funds to publish ade in Asserian navepagers to solicit private aid. Is that, in fact, what command?
- 4. Did Colonel North at any time during the frequent speeches and lectures that he has given around the country on the subject of Micaregus, advise individuals on how they might donate soney to the rebals as was alleged in the Mar York Times (8 Aug 88)?

- 5. It has been alleged in the <u>Machington Post</u> (11 Aug 80) that Colonel Morth has been particularly close to the leadership of the Citizens for America, an organization hasded by Levis Labrana, and that Colonel Morth was in almost daily contact with the Sormer essentive director of that group and halped select contract for speaking engagements and tours within the United States organized by the Citizens for America during the April Congressional debates. In that true?
- 6. General Singlaub has indicated (<u>May York Times</u>, 10 Aug 88) that, at one time, he had fairly frequent contexts with individuals within the Department of Defence and other agencies concerning the Micaraguen freedom fighters but, because of the Congressional restriction, he didn't go near the Fentagon anymore. Why did he continue to deal with Colonel Morth?
- 7. It has been alleged that Colonel Morth has been in close contact with Alvaro Risso, a former Source diplomet, who was a master of the Microgram Development Council and also the Microgram Refugee Fund and that both Colonel Morth and enother member of the MSC staff, Mr. Malter Reymond, set with Risso earlier this year to help set up the Microgram Refugee Direct which was held in April at which the President spoke. Here Colonel North and Mr. Reymond involved in helping set up this direct?
- 8. While Colonel North any not have had direct contact with paramilitary groups such as CM, Soldier of Fortune and others, it is alleged that Colonel North used other members of the White Nouse staff, to include his secretary, to communicate with these groups. Do you know anything about that?

9. Has Colonal. Morth been active with a group headed by Nr. Woody Jentine of Louisians Numer as the Friends of the Americas and has he assisted this group in obtaining transport for goods which they have provided to Microspore refugees?

NEWS CONTROL

N 9674

- The Assertable Press reported that three foreign countries one to the thite Name in July 1984 and offered to provide assistance to the contrast but without my guid pro que. In that true?
- 2. The Micerogues freedom fighters, in the last two months, are reported by the U.S. Rebessy. Topusignips to have received a large influx of funds and equipment with some estimates of their value reaching as high as \$10 million or mars. Do you know where they have obtained this assistance?
- 3. Why was it necessary to have expecte from the Mational Security Council staff in touch with the various contra groups? Couldn't this have been better handled in Cantral America by State Department representatives by CDA personnel who could have certainly maintained contact for the purposes of collecting information, which is what Deputy Press Secretary Speaks implied was the reason for Calonal Morth's contact?
- 4. The Machinston Foot reported (26 Aug 85) that according to leaders of Minura, the main condition of the Indians Sighting the Sandinsta government, Cantral Intelligence agency personnel brohered two agreements this year on how the insurport groups should divide supplies which had been privately raised. To your browledge, was the CIA involved in brohering this agreement? Was any MSC official? Any other U.S. official?

N 9675

- 5. You have been quoted as saying that the role of the MEC staff was to collect information and to offer ensouragement to the central. How do you distinguish between that and the provision of advice and assistance in raising funds?
- 6. Why didn't you came to the Congress when this relationship began and indexs us that there would be high-level contacts but they were for the purpose of "collecting information and heaping the faith"?

A-4- 93759 2 2 ... 4



EXHIBIT

October 3, 1995

attachment

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARI

FRCM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Letter from Congressman Hamilton re NSC Connection with Nicaraguan Resistance

Attached at Tab I is a letter from you to Congressman Hamilton responding to his questions forwarded in his letter at (Tab II

Fer our discussion, the responses are based on your earlier briefing before the committee on September 10, 1985.

This package should be reviewed in concert with SYSTEM 1 +7890 (Barnes) and +7913 (Durenberger and Leahy).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward your letter to Congressman Hamilton at Tab I.

Disapprové

Attachments

Tab I McFarlane ltr to Hamilton Tab II - Hamilton ltr to McFarlane of September 12,

w/attachment

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, OC 20618

September 12, 1985

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

At our meeting Tuesday, you agreed to answer written questions summitted by Members of the Committee concerning allegations about the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of your staff. Enclosed are questions that have been submitted by Members of the Committee.

The Committee appreciates your willingness to discuss this matter and to respond to these questions.

With best wishes, I am

Sincethly yours,

Lee H. Hamilton Chairman

Enclosure

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Direction, Tactical Influence, and Advice to the Contras

- 1. Soun Notific Calero and Edgar Chambro (<u>Washington Post</u>, 14 August 1985 and <u>Miami Farald</u>, 24 June 1985) have publicly stated that Colonel North traveled to Honduras in the spring of 1984 to assure them that, despite Congressional opposition, the White House would "find a way to keep their movement alive." Also, they note that Colonel North met with them in June 1984. What was the purpose of Colonel North's visit to the FDN in April and June 1984?
- 2. It has been alleged in the New York Times (8 Aug 85) that Colonel North was advised in advance of proposed rebel attacks and had offered the rabels advice and direction. Do you have any knowledge of whether this is true? A specific example was cited: an attack in July on a ferry boat that travels between Rama and Bluefields in southeastern Nicaragua. Do you have any knowledge of whether the NSC had advance information that attack was to take place?
- 3. When the CIA had to withdraw from their day-to-day contact with the rebels, it has been alleged in the New York Times (3 Aug 85) that Colonel North tried to fill the woid, partly through helping facilitate the supplying of logistics help. Did Colonel North, in his capacity as a staff member at the National Security Council, use his influence to facilitate the movement of supplies, either raised privately in this country or otherwise, to the contras?




- 4. A Sicaraguan exile leader is quoted in the New York Times (3 Aug 55) is stating that Colonel North was very important in coordinating efforts to reorganize and better coordinate the operations of the two main repeigroups, the FDN and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance or ARDE, and that he had met with rebel leaders in both countries. Is that an accurate statement?
- 5. There are allegations of some concern expressed by intelligence officials in the CIA that Colonel North may have been walking a dangerous line in his activities with the contras (New York Times, 10 Aug 35). Were such sentiments prought to your attention?
- 5. Adolfo Calero, President of the FDM and a leading figure in the new Unified Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), the group which will receive the \$27 million of humanitarian assistance, has stated publicly (Hashington Post, 14 Aug 85) that he met a half a dozen times with Colonel North this spring. For what purpose did Colonel North meet so frequently with Mr. Calero?
- 7. It has also been alleged that Colonel North had to travel to Honduras and meet with Honduran military leaders because apparently they were siphoning off supplies which were intended for the contras. As a result, the supply effort was switched from the civilian airport at Tegucigalpa to the military airfield at Palmerola. Did Colonel North undertake such a mission?



Facilitating the Raising of Funds from Private Sources

- 1. Has located North been the focal point within the NSC staff for handling contacts with private fundraising groups, such as the Norld Anti-Communist League and the Council for World Freedom headed by retired Major General John K. Singlaub?
- 2. General Singlaub has stated (<u>Washington Post</u>, 9 Aug 85) that he would often talk to Colonel North and inform him what he was doing and then state that if it was a fumb idea, for North to send him a signal. Is that your impression of the relationship between General Singlaub and Colonel North?
- 3. It is alleged (<u>Miami Herald</u>, 24 Jun 85), after a visit by Colonel North and a CIA official to the FDN in June 1984, that the CIA provided funds to publish ads in American newspapers to solicit private aid. Is that, in fact, what occurred?
- 4. Did Colonel North at any time during the frequent speeches and lectures that he has given around the country on the subject of Bicaragua, advise individuals on how they might donate money to the rebels as was alleged in the New York Times (8 Aug 85)?



- It has been sileged in the <u>Washington Post</u> (II Aug 35) that Colonel Cortinas been particularly close to the leadership of the Citizens for America, an irganization headed by Lewis Lehrman, and that Colonel Cortinuas in simpst daily contact with the former executive director of that group and helped select contras for speaking engagements and tours within the United States organized by the Citizens for America during the April Congressional debates. Is that true?
- 6. General Singlaub has indicated (New York Times, 10 Aug 85) that, at one time, he had fairly frequent contacts with individuals within the Department of Defense and other agencies concerning the Nicaraguan freedom fighters but, because of the Congressional restriction, he didn't go near the Pentagon anymore. Why did he continue to deal with Colonel North?
- The has been alleged that Colonel North has been in close contact with Alvaro Rizzo, a former Somoza diplomat, who was a member of the Nicaraguan Development Council and also the Nicaraguan Refugee Fund and that both Colonel North and another member of the NSC staff, Mr. Walter Raymond, net with Rizzo earlier this year to help set up the Nicaraguan Refugee Dinner which was held in April at which the President spoke. Were Colonel North and Mr. Raymond involved in helping set up this dinner?
- 3. While Colonel North may not have had direct contact with paramilitary groups such as CM. Soldier of Fortune and others, it is alleged that Colonel North used other members of the White House staff, to include his secretary, to communicate with these groups. Do you know anything about that?

3. Has Inloned North been active with a group headed by Mr. Woody Jenkins of Louisiana known as the Friends of the Americas and has he assisted thus group in obtaining transport for goods which they have provided to Nicaraguan refugees?

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EXIT XETIXS

- .. The Associated Press reported that three foreign countries came to the White House in July 1994 and offered to provide assistance to the contract out without any guid pro quo. Is that true?
- 2. The Nicaraguan freedom fighters, in the last two months, are reported by the U.S. Embassy, Tegucidalpa to have received a large influx of finds init equipment with some estimates of their value reaching as high as \$10 million or more. Do you know where they have obtained this assistance?
- 3. Why was it necessary to have someone from the National Security Council staff in touch with the various contra groups? Couldn't this have been better handled in Central America by State Department representatives by CIA personnel who could have certainly maintained contact for the purposes of collecting information, which is what Deputy Press Secretary Speaks implied was the reason for Colonel North's contact?
- 4. The Washington Post reported (28 Aug 85) that according to leaders of Misura, the main coalition of the Indians fighting the Sandinsta government, Central Intelligence agency personnel prokered two agreements this year on how the insurgent groups should divide supplies which had been privately raised. To your knowledge, was the CIA involved in brokering this agreement? Was any NSC official? Any other U.S. official?



- 5. You have been quoted as saying that the role of the NSC staff was to collect information and to offer encouragement to the contras. How do you distinguish between that and the provision of advice and assistance in raising funds?
- 6. Why didn't you come to the Congress when this relationship began and inform us that there would be high-level contacts but they were for the purpose of "collecting information and keeping the faith"?



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GARBECHINE

THE WHITE HOUSE

October 7, 1985

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OFU-151

THE W/strachment

Door Mr. Chairman:

Please find attached responses to the questions posed by members of your committee and forwarded under your letter of September 12, 1985. Where requisite information was provided in my briefing of September 10, the response so indicates. I have classified the responses to proclude the unintentional disclosure of classified information or potential emberrasement to friendly governments in the region.

I remain committed to ecoparate fully with you and your committee on this matter. I am, however, ihereesingly conserned that continuing this process of constantly responding to unsubstantiated allogations by unnamed individuals is debilitating to our overall effort to achieve a democratic outcome in Biscrepus. It is my sincers hope that this communication will suffice to put this matter to rest so that we can get on with the more important task of ensuring that the recently implemented humanitarian assistance program is properly administered.

•

Attachment

The Honorable Lee B. Hamilton Cheirman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20519

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under providing at E.O. 1200 by B. Rayne, Halland Serundi, Council

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QUESTIONS AND AMENERS

Direction, Tactical Influence, and Advice to the Contras N 9677

- Q-1 Soth Adolfo Celero and Edgar Chemorro (Mashington Post, 16 August 1985 and <u>Hismi Reveld</u>, 24 June 1985) have publicly state that Colonel North traveled to Sendures in the spring of 1986 to assure them that, despite Congressional opposition, the White House would "find a way to keep their movement alive." Also, they note that Colonel North met with them in June 1986. What was the purpose of Colonel North's visit to the FDS in April and June 1986?
- A-1 As I noted in my briefing on September 10, Lieutenant Colonel North has traveled frequently to Central America to meet with those who our pelicy is designed to support, as well as these who are opposed to it. Lieutenant Colonel North did not travel to Hendurae in April or June 1986. During a visit to Hendurae in May 1986, Lieuteghant Colonel North met with members of the Headurae Government and the Micaraguan democratic resistance. He assured them that the Administration was committed to the cause of the democratic resistance and would, as the President had promised, go back to the Congress for resources to support a democratic outcome in Micaragua.
- Q-2 It has been alleged in the <u>New York Times</u> (8 Aug 85) that Colonel North was advised in advance of proposed rebel attacks and had offered the rebels advice and direction. Do you have any knowledge of whether this is true? A specific example was cited: an attack in July on a farry boat that travels between Rame and Bluefields in southeastern Micaragus. Do you have any knowledge of whether the MSC had advance in:[ermation that attack was to take place?
- A-2 The ellegation that Lieutenest Colonel North offered the remistance testical advice and direction is, as I indicated in my briefing, patently untrue.
- Q-3 When the CIA had to withdraw from their day-to-day contact with the rebels, it has been alleged in the Mew York Times (8 Aug 85) that Colonel Morth tried to fill the void, partly through helping facilitate the supplying of logistics help. Did Colonel Morth, in his capacity as a staff member of the Mational Security Council, use his influence to facilitate the movement of supplies, either raised privately in this country or otherwise, to the contras?
- A-3 Lieutenant Colonel North did not use his influence to facilitate the novement of supplies to the resistance.

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2

N 9678

QUISTICHE AND AMENIES (Cent'e...) Direction, Tectical Influence, and Advice to the Contras

- Q-4 A Micaraguan exile leader is quoted in the May York Times (8 Aug 85) as stating that Colonel Morth was very important in coordinating efforts to rearganize and better coordinate the operations of the two main robel groups, the FDW and the Democratic Alliance or the ADDS, and that he had met with robel leaders in both countries. Is that an assurate extenses?
- A-4 As I indicated in my briefing and my earlier letter, the HSC has been actively engaged in urging the resistance to forge a representative political front involving credible non-military figures and that this front assume responsibility for framing a political program aimed at a democratic outcome in Micaragua.
- Q-5 There are ellegations of some concern expressed by intelligence officials in the CEA that Colonel North may have been walking a dangerous line in his activities with the contras (New York Times, 10 Aug 85). Were such sentiments brought to your attention?
- A-S I am aware that unmaned intelligence officials have been quoted in the New York Times as being "concerned" about Ligutement Colonel North's activities. He official of our intelligence community in any of our frequent meetings has ever taken the opportunity to address such a "concern."
- G-6 Molfe Calero, President of the FDW and a leading figure in the new Unified Bicaraquan Opposition (UMO), the group which will receive the \$27 million of humanitarian assistance, has stated publicly (Washington Poet, 14 Aug 85) that he met a half a desen times with Colenel North this spring. For what purpose did Colenel North meet so frequently with Mr. Calero?
- A-4 As indicated above and in my briefing, Lieutemant Colonel North and others in the Administration, including the President and I, have not with Messers. Calere, Crus, and Robele; leaders of the Indian opposition; and opposition figures from the Micaraguan southern resistance front in order to better determine the course of our policy and to convey our concerns parting human rights.

· CALIFORNIA .

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N .9679

QUESTIONS AND ANNUESS (Cont'd...) Direction, Tartical Influence, and Marine to the Contras

Q-7 It has also been alleged that Colonel Worth had to travel to Mondares and most with Mondaren military leaders because apparently they were sighening off supplies which were intended for the centras. As a result, the supply effort was switched from the civilian airport at Topseigalpa to the military airfield at Falmerola. Did.Colonel Worth undertake such a mission?

A-7 No.

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QUESTIONS AND AMENERS

N 9680

Pacilitating the Reising of Funds from Private Sources

- Q-1 Has Colonel North been the feeal point within the HSC staff for handling contacts with private fund raising groups, such as the World Anti-Communist League and the Council for World Freedom headed by retired Najor General John E. Simplant?
- A-1 No.
- Q-2 General Singlaub has stated (Washington Post, 9 Aug 85) that he would eften talk to Colonel Berth and inform him what he was doing and them state that if it was a dumb iden, for North to send him a signal. In that your impression of the relationship between General Singlaub and Colonel Horth?
- A-2 There is no official or unofficial relationship with any number of the MPC staff regarding fund raising for the Misaraquan democratic opposition. This includes the alleged relationship with Separal Singland.
- Q-3 It is alleged (Missi Merald, 24 Jun 85), after a visit by Colonel North and a CIA official to the FDM in June 1984, that the CIA provided funds to publish ads in American news; apers to solicit private aid. Is that, in fact, what news; and?
- A-3 To my knowledge, the CIA has never provided any funds for publishing any material in U.S. newspapers.
- Q-4 Did Colonel Herth at any time during the frequent speeches and lectures that he has given around the country on the subject of Nicerague, advise individuals on how they might denate money to the robels as was alleged in the New York Times (8 Aug 85)?
- A-4 No.
- Q-5 It has been alleged in the <u>Washington Post</u> (11 Aug 85) that Colonel Worth has been particularly close to the leadership of the Citisens for America, an organisation bedded by Levis Lehrman, and that Colonel Worth was in almost daily contact with the former executive director of that group and helped select centras for speaking engagements and tours within the United States organised by the Citisens for America during the April Congressional debates. Is that true?
- A-5 No.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Cont'd...)

Pacilitating the Reising of Punds from Private Sources N 9681

- Q-6 General Singlaub has indicated (New York Times, 16 Aug 25) that, at one time, he had fairly frequent contact with individuals within the Department of Defense and other agencies concerning the Misaraguan freedom fighters but, because of Congressional restriction, he didn't go near the Fentagon anymore. Why did he continue to deal with Colonel North?
- A-4 You would have to inquire with General Singless as to why he chose not to be in contact with other departments or agencies. MSC contacts with General Singless were not unlike these with other concerned Americans who have an interest in our foreign policy. It should also be noted that Licutenant Colonel Morth and other numbers of the MSC have also been in frequent contact with these who oppose our policy or who have differing views. Licutenant Colonel Morth and others, in the course of their duties, have also not with the Morld Council of Churches, the American Friends Service Committee, and other organizations which have empressed disfever for our-Central American policy.
- Q-7 It has been alleged that Colonel Worth has been in close contact with Alvaro Risso, a former Senora diplomat, who was a member of the Ricaroguan Development Council and also the Micaroguan Refugee Fund, and that both Colonel Worth and another member of the MSC staff, Mr. Walter Raymond, not with Risso earlier this year to help set up the Micaroguan Refugee Dinner which was held in April at which the President spoke. Were Colonel Worth and Mr. Raymond involved in helping set up this dinner?
- A-7 Lieutenant Colonel North and Nr. Raymond coordinated the request for Presidential involvement in the Bicaraquan Refugee Fund dinner in the same manner that the HSC staff routinely coerdinates other functions involving the President, such as the recent appearance before the INTERPOL conference.
- Q-8 While Colonel Herth may not have had direct controt with paramilitary groups such as the CMB, Seldier of Fortune, and others, it is alleged that Colonel Houth used other numbers of the White House staff, to include his secretary, to communicate with these groups. Do you know anything about that?

A-8 This allogation is untrock.



N 9682.

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CONSTICUS AND AMERICAS (Cont'e...) Pacilitating the Reising of Punds from Private Sources

- Q-9 Mas Colonel North been active with a group headed by Mr. Woody Jenkins of Louisiana known as the Friends of the American and has he assisted this group in obtaining transport for goods which they have provided to Micaraguan refugees?
- A-9 Friends of the Americas is a regutable, private, valuntary organization providing humanitarian assistance to Hidaraquan refusees. Our contacts with Friends of the Americas have been the same as those maintained with Enights of Halts, the Enights of Calumbus, Project Hope, and other humanitarian organizations committed to easing human suffering. We assistance has been provided to this or other groups in obtaining transportation.



CONTIQUATION.

AMENERS TO RELATED QUESTIONS


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- Q-1 The Associated Fress reported that three foreign countries came to the White House is July 1980 and offered to provide assistance to the contras but without any quid pro quo. Is that true?
- A-1 No.
- Q-2 The Micarequan freedom fighters, in the last two months, are reported by the U.S. Embassy, Toqueigalps, to have received a large influx of funds and equipment with some estimates of their value reaching as high as \$10 million or more. Do you know where they have obtained this assistance?
- 2-2 He.

- Q-3 Why was it necessary to have someone from the Mational .
 Security Council staff in touch with the various centra groups? Couldn't this have been better Randled in Central America by State Department representatives by CIA personnel who could have certainly maintained contact for the purposes of collecting information, which is what Deputy Press Secretary Speakes implied was the reason for Colonel North's contact?
- A-3 The statutory function of the Mational Security Council is to advise the President with respect to the integration of demestic, foreign, and defense policies related to the national security of the United States. The Council has the responsibility to assess and appraise the objectives of the United States on metters of securin interest to the United States on metters of securin interest to the descriments and spencies of the government, and to make such resumendations and such reports to the Fresident as it doess appropriate or as the President may require. It is the responsibility of the MSC staff to facilitate this process. Thus, it follows that MSC staff members must be in contact with a wide range of groups, mevenints, and individuals who are affected by our policies.

CONFIDENTIAL



AMERICAS TO RELATED QUESTIONS (Contité...)

- Q-4 The <u>Washington Fost</u> reported (28 Aug 85) that according to leaders of Risura, the main coalition of the Indians fighting the Sandinista government, Central Intelligence Aquaey personnel brokered two agreements this year on how the insurgant groupe should divide supplies which had been privately raised. To your knowledge, was the CIA involved in brokering this agreement? Was any MSC official? Any other U.S. official?
- A-4 As indicated above, we have actively encouraged a broadbased political unity movement within the Micaraguan democratic opposition. The opposition includes the various Indian and Creele factions -- now unified as RISAN -- headed by their nawly elected coordinator, Wyelleffe Diego. Sowever, the Washington Post (18 Aug 85) article to which you made reference is without basis in fact.
- Q-5 You have been quoted as saying that the role of the MSC .
 staff was to collect information and to offer encouragement
 to the contras. Bow do you distinguish between that and the
 provision of advice and assistance is reising funds?
- A-5 I believe that my briefing to your committee on September 16, adequately explained how I distinguish between collecting information and offering encouragement and the issues of advice, secistance, and fund raising.
- Q-6 Why didn't you come to the Congress when this relationship began and inform us that there would be high-level contacts but they were for the purpose of "collecting information and beeping the faith"?
- A-6 My confidence of full compliance with the law and the absence of any other reporting requirement obviated need for each contact.



99TH CONGRESS 2D Session

H. RES. 485



Directing the President to provide to the House of Representatives certain information concerning activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North or any other member of the staff of the National Security Council in support of the Nicaraguan resistance.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 24, 1986

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas submitted the following resolution; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affaris, Armed Services, and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

RESOLUTION

Directing the President to provide to the House of Representatives certain information concerning activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North or any other member of the staff of the National Security Council in support of the Nicaraguan resistance.

- 1 Resolved, That not later than 7 days after the adoption
- 2 of this resolution, the President shall provide to the House of
- 3 Representatives the following information, to the extent such
- 4 information in the possession of the President:
- 5 (1) A complete list and description of any contact
- 6 or other communication between Lieutenant Colonel
- 7 Oliver L. North or any other member of the staff of

- 3

22 -

the National Security Council and any private individual or any representative of a foreign government concerning the provision to the Nicaraguan resistance of any funding or other assistance from any source other than the United States Government (including assistance by any private group or individual or by any foreign government); and any document prepared by or in the possession of any member of the staff of the National Security Council concerning the provision of any such assistance, specifically including any document concerning any discussion of or involvement in private fund-raising activities on behalf of the Nicaraguan resistance by any member of the staff of the National Security Council.

(2) A complete list and discription of and any document concerning any contact or other communication, directly or through intermediaries, since July 28, 1983, between Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North or any other member of the staff of the National Security Council and any member or representative of the Nicaraguan resistance, including any communications concerning the military strategy or tactics; coordination of the activities, or the military equipment or training needs of the Nicaraguan resistance.

1.	(3) A complete list and discription of and any doc-
2	ument concerning any contacts or other communication
3	since July 28, 1983, between Lieutenant Colonel
4	Oliver L. North or any other member of the staff of
5	the National Security Council and Robert W. Owen
6	(who has served as a consultant to the Nicaraguan Hu-
7	manitarian Assistance Office), Major General John K.
8	Singlaub (United States Army, retired), John Hull (a
9	United States citizen operating a ranch in northern
10	Costa Rica).
11	SEC. 2. As used in this resolution, the term "document"
12	includes any report, memorandum, meeting schedule or min-
13	utes, log or other record of telephone calls or other communi-
14	cations, appointment calendar, or other record or document
15	of any other kind.

4300**91** .

Congress of the United States Committee on Foreign Affairs N 13361

> thouse of Representatives Washington, BC 20515

> > June 25, 1986

The President The White House Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to request your comments on H.Res. 485, a resolution of inquiry directing the President to provide to the House of Representatives certain information concerning activities of Lt. Col. Oliver North or any other member of the staff of the National Security Council in support of the Niceraguan resistance.

This resolution was introduced in the House on June 24, 1986 and referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Under the rules of the House, the committees must act on this legislation within 14 legislative days, beginning June 25. Since the July 4th recess period will start shortly, this time period will not be up until the end of July. Therefore, I respectfully request your response to this resolution no later than July 22, in order to give the committee adequate time to consider the matter.

A copy of H.Res. 485 is enclosed for your reference.

with highest regards, I am

Capue west to Enclosure Alan Lyn Salole,

Sacist Will.

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OLN-123

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	The Presiden The White Ho Washington,	use U	OUN-124

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to request your comments on H. Res. 485, a resolution of inquiry directing the President to provide to the House of Representatives certain information concerning activities of Lieutenant Colonel sliver North or any other member of the staff of the National Security Council in support of the Hicaraguan resistance.

This resolution was introduced in the House on June 24, 1996 and referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence. Under the rules of the House, the committees must act on this legislation within 14 legislative days, beginning June 25. Since the July 4th recess period has intervened, this time period will not be up until the end of July. Therefore, I respectfully request your response to this resolution no later than July 22 in order to give the Committee adequate time to consider the matter.

A copy of H. Res. 485 is enclosed for your reference.

With Dest Wishes, I am

Lee H. Hanilton

Enclosure

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THE WHITE HOUSE

July 21, 1986



Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in reply to your letter to the President of June 25, 1986, requesting comments on H. Res. 485, relating to the allegations of improper activities by members of the National Security Council staff in support of the Nicaraguan resistance. The Administration strongly opposes enactment of the resolution.

Last fall, in an effort to cooperate with Chairman Barnes, my predecessor, Robert C. McFarlane, met with members of your committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. While I did not participate in these discussions, I understand that information on the specific issues raised in H. Res. 485, was provided to your Committee and that this information made it clear that the actions of the National Security Council staff were in compliance with both the spirit and letter of the law regarding support of the Nicaraguan resistance.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on H. Res. 485. I have forwarded similar letters to Chairman Fascell and Chairman Aspin and sincerely hope this matter can finally be put to rest.

Sincerely,

John M. Poindexter

The Honorable Lee Hamilton U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20618

August 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Oliver North

NSC and Diver North contact with contras began in 1962 — to assess capabilities of contras and to assure them Administration would seek aid from Congress.

From Boland amendment on -- North emplained strictures to contras.

- Never violated stricture

- Save advice on human rights, civic action program

McHugh - what was done in anticipation of cutoff?

Oliver North - encouraged contras to contact other sources.

LHH -- What about your contacts with Singles -- Owner

- Through 1983 talked frequently to Singleub.

- North never gave Singleub any advice on raising movey - did not see him for two years, 1984-5.

- Complete consultant to NEMO - North met him when he was on Hill staff - NEME consultant to NEMO - North met him when he was on Hill staff - NEME consultant to NEMO - North met him when he was on Hill staff - NEME consultants of the North him often re Central American developments.

- Did you game funds? (did nos).

- Did you game military advice? (did nos).

McCurdy - would like Committee to report Resolution unfavorably.

8/6.86

EXHIBIT 041-126

UNCLASSIFIED

September 3, 1986

MENO TO THE FILES

EROM:

Steven K. Berry, Associate Counsel

Æ:

August 6, 1986, 8:35 a.m., White House Situation Room. Discussion with Mr. Ollie North regarding House Resolution 485, directing the President to provide to the House of Representatives certain information concerning the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North or any other member of the staff of the National Security Council in support of the Nicaraguan Resistance, submitted by Congressman Tom Coleman.

In attendance: Bob Pearson, Counsel, NSC; Ollie North, Special Assistant, NSC; Ron Sable, Director of Legislative Affairs, NSC; Tom Latimer, HPSCI; Steve Berry, HPSCI.

Members present: Chairman Hamilton, Msers. McCurdy, Kastenmeier, Daniel, Roe, Stump, Ireland, Hyde, Cheney, Livingston and McDwen.

Mr. Ollie North indicated that his principle mission was to coordinate, contacts with the FDN (the Nicaraguan Resistance) and U.S. government officials. One of the main purposes of his job was to assess the long-term viability of the FDN as a democratic institution and to explain the U.S. government's relationship to that organization including the explanation of the Boland Amendment. North indicated he gave the FDN and their officials advice on human rights and political advice concerning the need for an improved civic image: North also explained the United States' legal position with regard to the guidelines and limitations of U.S. support as outlined under the Boland Amendment. Prior to the ben on assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance of October 1, 1983, North indicated he had given books to the leadership of the FDN which focused on creating guerrilla movements and popular support for their goals, ideas and objectives. In support of that concept, North asked the FDN leaders to focus on the principles and the tactics espoused by such individuals as Researching and Sunges and Cheginerria and also asked that they focus on the internal and external support necessary to continue the movement. North indicated that he stressed thase points with Calero, Bermudez, Cruz, Robello, and Pastora when he was an active participant.

When queried regarding his relationship with General Singluab, Colonel North indicated that although he knew him he had no association as indicated in press reports and it was unfortunate that General Singlaub made those statements.

Mr. Roe asked Mr. North to comment on his relationship with Robert W. Owen, a former Hill staffer who was employed by the Micaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (\$50,000 contract), to facilitate delivery of supplies to the FDN and UNO. Colonel North indicated that he had talked to Robert Owen, had only a casual and formal contract with him; was familiar with Owen but that his contacts were greatly exaggerated and were not nearly as extensive as the prees had reported.

ing asserted

OLN-127

-2-

Similarly, Mr. North indicted he did not know Mr. Terrill, an individual who had appeared on numerous news shows and who had been quoted in newspapers supporting allegations of improper activities of Colone North. Furthermore, it seemed as though Mr. Terrill was not who he said he was and had never been an Army officer.

Mr. North in a direct response to a question regarding the proprieties of his activities after October 1, 1984, responded that he did not in any way, nor at any time violate the spirit, principles or legal requirements of the Boland Amendment.

Congressman Ireland indicated that he had heard of several personal difficulties Colonel North and his family had experienced since the newpaper articles diclosed his joo, duties and responsibilities in the NSC.

To summarize, Colonel North, his wife and children, have been targets of organized protests and pickets in front of his home, his personal property was damaged, fences torn down, his car damaged, his house had been broken into, his dog had been poisoned, his family received continuous threatening phone calls during all hours of the day and night and his children had been threatened. At the suggestion of the FBI and Secret Service his family was moved for several weeks to Camp Perry while improved security procedures were installed in his home at North's expense.

Near the conclusion of the meeting. Congressman McCurdy supported by several other Hembers of the Committee indicated that although it was no longer necessary for the Intelligence Committee to meet to report on H. Res. 485 to stay its privileged status, he hoped the Intelligence Committee would meet to adversely report H. Res. 485 in the near future. The Chairman responded that action would be more appropriately done at a full Committee Meeting after all Hembers had been notified of the Committee meeting.

The Chairman empressed his appreciation for the good faith — effort that Admiral Peindenter had shown in arranging a meeting and indicated his satisfaction in the responses received. Ron Sable from the MSC staff expressed the Administration's concern and his hope that this meeting had satisfied the Committee's concern with regard to the allegations of improper conduct by Lt Col North and further expressed his hope that this meeting would be the final imapter in the Committee's inquiries. The Chairman indicated that, barring any new or additional information, he too thought the Committee would be satisfied with the information that it had received.

HACKASSIFIED

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555

to: MSOLK to: MSOLE

WITE THIS: JOHN POINDRITES Rebiect: MPS:7 interview of Morth mil dese.

*** Porvarding note from #545P 08/06/36 09:29 *** To: 45#84 --- CPU?

N 12581

HOTE PLON: NOR PEASON BUBLECT: MPSCI interview of Morth

Session was success - Wasilton will entertain metion soonest to comport unlaworably on Semplation of Inquiry and made clear believes MPSCI can turn aside future offers of similar resolutions. North's remarks were thereups and convincing. Habilton underlined his appreciation to Adeiral and to ded for pri full consecution offered by MSC. He rustated there were no tacts uncovered by or known to MPSCI to substantiate the allegations is the resolution of inquiry or media reports on North's activities.

In response to specific questions, Gille covered following points:

o contact with FDW and UNO mixed to fester viable, desecratic political stratogy for Dicaraguan opposition, gave so military advice, knew of se specific military occupations.


o Singleds - gave no advice, has had no contact in 20 months; Owen saver worked trom CLE office, CLb had casual contact, power provided trop midance.

o threats/harassment - in response to question, Ols recounted incidents of bacausment/throats prior to '05 vote and equip prior to '06 vote, speculated that possibly due in part to active measures effort.

:c: #5/B^ --CPUL **USOLY** --CPUA MESKS --CPWA MSFUE --CPWA PF PUR --CPWA TRLES --CPUA BSMF --- CPUA

00/11/06 19:01:02

1 MPSCI interview of Borth 156 PLON: BSJSE --- CPUA PO: TELDA



3547

COMP IDENTIAL

August 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: HPSI Discussions Regarding Oliver North

Following Admiral Poindexter's agreement to a request from Chairman Hamilton, Oliver North, Robert Pearson and the undersigned met with the HPSCI in the Situation Room on August 6, 1986. Purpose of the meeting was to address committee concerns relative to a Resolution of Inquiry on Mr. North filed by Representative Coleman (D/TX). In accordance with the agreement, Representative Coleman (D/TA). In accordance with the agreement, members were provided an opportunity to review relevant correspondence. Throughout the meeting Mr. North was candid and forthcoming, and answered every question about his alleged involvement with support for the Democratic Resistance in Nicaragua, to the satisfaction of the committee.

At the end of the session, following favorable comments by members of the Committee, the chairman stated that there was no further need for questions and that they had been answered satisfactorily.

Following that meeting, I met with Representative Coleman and provided him access to the related classified correspondence between the National Security adviser and the HPSCI.

Mr. Coleman related his intention to abide by the committee determination in this matter.

'In follow-on conversation, the MPSCI staff director, Mr. Latiner, informed me that the committee did not intend to take further action (1) since the MASC had previously indicated there was no basis for the resolution, and (2) since the MPSCI review did not reveal any wrongdoing.

-RONALD K. SABLE Special Assistant to the President for Mational

Security Affairs

Declasuries, Neutural on 6 July 1987 under provisions of E.O. 12356

by B. Reger, hational Security Council

Declassity on: OADR

. FD XX (REV. 1-10-61)

UNCLASSIMED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

7/25/86

On July 22, 1986, Lieutenant Colonel OLIVER L.
NORTH, Director for Political-Military Affairs and the
Counterterrorism and Low Intensity Marfare Group of the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (MSC), was interviewed by the
undersigned Special Agent and Assistant Special Agent is
Charge of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), Mashington
Field Office, at his office located in the Old Executive
Office Building. After being apprised of the interviewers'
identities and the purpose, WORTH furnished the following
information: information

MORTH stated he has never personally met JACK REYNOLDS TERRELL, but has heard about him through numerous sources. Among these sources, MORTH enumerated the following:

1) Approximately 18 mont

advised NORTH that Talling in Honduras telling people he worked for MORTH.

told MORTH that TERRELL, known to him as "Colonel FLACO,"
was in Honduras in a training capacity and was purported
to be brutal with the troops. MORTH advised that he recomme
go to the Honduran authorities to throw TERRELL
out of the country. MORTH believed that TERRELL was thrown
out of Honduras subsequent to this. mended

2) When MORTH was in Central America, he heard that FLACO was trying to bring guns into Honduras from Miami. Contacts advised MORTH that TERRELL was telling others he was retired from the UNITED STATES ARMY, Special Forces, and was formerly with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA). MORTH stated he ran checks for both, which were negative.

3) NORTH stated TERRELL is to be a star witness in a 1986 civil suit filed in the Southern District of Florida in which a group of United States citizens are to the state of the state of named as defendants.

Washington Field 1990-4773 - 5...

Washington, D. C. 7/22/86

SA ELLEN GLASSER & ABAC DAVID G. BINNEY

EG : mye

7/25/86

EXHIBIT OLN-130

FO-308s (Fav. 11-18-63)

reading of FD-200 of

UNCLASSIFIED

OLIVER L. MORTH: 1990-4773

7/22/86

. . On .

2

- 4) NORTH stated that TERRELL's name had surfaced in connection with a staff investigation being conducted by Massachusetts Senator JOHN KERRY.
- 5) While TERRELL's name has not come up, NORTH mentioned that in March, 1986, <u>Mashington Post</u> Managing Editor LEONARD DOWNEY received obscene calls at night in which the caller used MORTH's name. DOWNEY wrote NORTH a letter advising him that if the activity did not stop, he would prosecute. MORTH stated that he did not make the calls, wondered who did, and stated he had responded to DOWNEY's letter with a letter offering assistance.
- 6) TERRELL has used OLIVER MORTH's name on television interviews.



SINGLAUB can be contacted at P. O. Box 585, Tabernash, Colorado, 80478, telephone

NORTH stated that he is acquainted with both Retired Air Force Major General RICHARD V. SECORD and GLENN ROBINETTE. SECORD runs an import-export business, but is also a consultant to the DEPARTMENT OF DEPENSE (DOD) as a member of the Special Operations Flanning and Analysis Group. NORTH advised that SECORD is named in the Florida civil suit, and another suit and hired ROBINETTE, a security investigator, to learn information about TERRELL, the key witness in both suits. NORTH stated that he was aware of ROBINETTE's investigation and has talked to both ROBINETTE and SECORD about it, but he did not initiate the investigation. NORTH has denied media allegations that SECORD works for him and reiterated this point during the interview.

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PO-302s (Fev. 11-15-63)

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Confirmation of PD-302 of OLIVER L. NOTH; 199C-4773

7/22/86

On the evening of July 17, 1986, ROBINETTE called NORTH who asked him to do a favor. NORTH had been alerted by the FBI that the FBI sought to immediately locate TERRELL and NORTH asked ROBINETTE to meet with the FBI that evening. Before meeting FBI Special Agents, ROBINETTE met with NORTH in his office, giving him copies of documents, which ROBINETTE later also furnished to the FBI.

NORTH stated he has never met a DAVID MAC MICHAEL, whom he believed is associated with lobbying on Central America and has reported on "atrocities" in the last year. NORTH heard information through contacts that MAC MICHAEL had former LIA ties.

NORTH advised that his NSC duties center around the coordination of interagency process within the NSC and carrying out policy. He has worked extensively in the area of Central American affairs and has played a large role in the "Nicaraguan Policy problem." NORTH stated that he strongly believes in a democratic resolution of Nicaraguan issues. He described himself as an "activist." He has a staff of four, two secretaries and two assistants.

NORTH stated that neither he nor his staff are responsible for funding, arming, or administrating Contra programs. He stated that he is not involved with any covert operations being run in the United States. NORTH does travel extensively and meets openly with foreign leaders, including Nicaraguan Pabassy Ambassador CARLOS TUNNERMANN. Other than NSC employees operating within the realm of their assigned duties, he stated he had no subordinates currently operating in the United States and knew of no one on his staff, to include himself, who was operating outside the scope of MORTH's jurisdiction.

On this date, NORTH furnished investigators with an original letter to him, dated June 27, 1986, from TOM POSEY, Head of the CMA.

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WATIONAL SECURTY COUNCE WAS STORY D.C. SEESS Hon-Log 211 Yel

September 30, 1986

TOP SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Press Guidance re Costa Rican Airstrip

" 30181

OLN-132

Attached at Tab I is draft press guidance regarding the airstrip at Santa Elena, Costa Rica, which was divulged by the Costa Rican Security Minister at a press conference on Friday, September 26. This story has now been picked up by the New York Times (Tab II) and is generating press questions at State and Merense.

The press quidance at Tab I has floor coordinated with Steel.

(Abrams), Defense (Armitage), and CIA

extreme sensitivity of the issue, your approved is requested before the quidance is used in respecting to grantees.

The damage done buildle divelation is considerable. As indigated in the CIA report at Tablill in the Special project benediately as the second project benediately has been a project on the self-buildly of the resistance to sustain belief the self-buildly of the resistance to sustain belief the self-buildly of the self-buildl

The airfield at Santa Elika has been a write elegant is supporting the resistance. Suite by a Project Democracy remaindering (UM:11 Corporation, S.A. - (a Penamatical Corporation) the Shide was initially used for direct from affects (Pely 1985 - February 1986). The since early this has affects has served as a primary about base for aircraft damaged by Bandinista anti-energet fire. The photographs at the IV silv the field in June 1986 and a damaged Project Democracy EC-118, which made an emergency landing on the field early this month.

The Arias Administration revelations regarding this facility have caused Project Democracy to permanently close Udall Corporation and dispose of its capital assets. It has also resulted in the loss of a facility important to keeping the resistance supplied and in the field against the Sandinistas.

Partially Declaration of 12 May 1967

under provisions of £.0. 12356
by 2. Reger, National Security Council

TOP SECRET
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
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September 30, 1986

PRESS GUIDANCE RE AIRSTRIP IN COSTA MICA

30183 J7

DID U.S. PERSONNEL SUPERVISE CONSTRUCTION OF THE AIRSTRIP IN MORTHERN COSTA RICA?

"The U.S. Embassy in San Fose, Costa Rica, has reported that during the Administration of Porned President Honge the Ministry the use of a site on the Santa of Public Security was offer Elena Peninsula which could be used as an extension of the civil quard training center at Mussielago. Thereite included serviceable airstripmhich could have supplemented: which is located near the training contag. reportedly made by the comme of the property vi decided to abandon plans for a teurist project The no information on the Ministry's decim cated or used in No U.S. Government funde were with this site nor were any U. Covernment personnel-inv its construction. Any gusther infu

WAS THE AIRSTRIP INTERIDED FOR USE BY THE CONTRAST

The Government of Couta Rics has made clear its position that it will not permit the made of its territory for military action against neighboring states. The U.S. Government respects that position.

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
THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER IN, 1966


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
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
Americans Reportedly Supervised Airstrip Project Near Nicaragua






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PROJECT DEMOCRACY AIR FACILITY.
Santa Elena, Coste Rica.
June 10, 1986



1

DAMAGED PROJECT DEMOCRACY KC-135 After Landing at Santa Elena Facility September 12, 1986

IMM ASSIFIFN

Exhibit OLN-133

--CPUA UINGLASSIFIED and time CPUA JOHN M. POINDENTER NEWS --CPUA From: NSVMC 10/08/86 16 08 12 TO NERM -- CPUA JOHN M. JOHN M. POINDEATER

SUBJECT: Downed Plane

At RIG meeting with Elliott Abrams today the question of the captured American held by the Nicaraguans was discussed. Following decisions were made—
--Demands for consular access would continue. Elliott thought Nics would accede to our request today. (He later called me to say the Nics had still not responded and we should be prepared to escalate tomorrow if here is no movement. Believes we say have to make this a "hostage crisi;"

-- Fress Guidance was prepared which states no U.S.G. involvement or connection, but that we are generally ewere of such support contracted by the

Contras. --UNO to be asked to assume responsibility for flight and to assist families of Americans involved. Elliott will follow up with Ollie to facilitate this.

--ARA will attempt to identify appropriate legal counsel and ask UNO to engage him. Lawyer will be asked to donate services pro bono. Alternatively, private money can be found, according to Elliott.
--HPSCI and SSCI have been briefed and there were no problems.

-- Elliott said he would continue to tell the press these were brave men and prave deeds. We recommended he not do this because it contributes to perception U.S.G. inspired and encouraged private lethal aid effort.

--CPUA cs ShP

leverage on Sandinistas

NSRLE --CPUA

Partially Declassified/Released on _______ 1667 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by B. Reger, National Security Council

UNCLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

A Captured American Presented by Nicaragua

Reagan Administration Denies U.S. Link to Plane 10-8-86 A1

By Joanne Omang

Top Reagan administration officials yes-terday flatly denied any U.S. government connection with a transport plane-that the Sandiolata government said it shot down in Nicaragus with three Americans and a man of Latin erigin aboard. At the same time, U.S. officials indicated

that they knew more about the situation than they were willing to disclose, including the names of those killed in the crash. Sec-retary of State George P. Shuits said the "had so connection with the U.S. government at all." He said they were "not from our military, not from any U.S. government agency, CIA included . . . These are private citizens." vate citizens.

A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency denied the agency was involved in the mission, as the Nicaraguan government asserted, but refused to deny that it knew

anything about it

The issue of CIA involvement was heightd by Wisconsin relatives of Eugene Hasenfus, the lone survivor of the crash. Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, told reporters that Hasenfus' wife, Sally, had telephoned the State Department yesterday morning from her home in Marinette, Wis., "and said her husband worked for the CIA."

A spokesman for Sally Hasenfus said she "is not granting any interviews to anyone."
Earlier Hasenfus was quoted by wire services as saying of her husband, "I don't know where he is and what he's doing. I only know what I see on the TV, too, and I really don't know anymore."

The Associated Press said that Hasenfus brother, William, reportedly told a friend that Hasenfus had gone to work 20 years ago for Air America in Vietnam, when it was a CIA cover company, and later returned to work for the firm readying cargo

Kathy Pherson, a CIA spokesman, denied any link. "We have nothing to do with the plane, nothing to do with the giane, nothing to do with the giv. He does not work for us, and we are not involved," she said. The CIA is barred by law from sidness to the said. ing the Nicaraguan contras, or counterrev-

PLANE, A19, Col I

Crash Survivor Described As Adviser in El Salvador 10-8-86 Al

By Julia Preston

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Oct. 7-An American captured by Nicaraguan troops appeared briefly at a press conference here late today, and the Sandinista military displayed credentials identifying him and the American pilot who died in a downed plane Sunday, as U.S. military advisers in El Sal-

vador.

A second American, the copilot, also was killed, according to Nicaraguan officials.

The Nicaraguan government charged that the flight was operated by the CIA to resupply U.S.-backed rebels, known as contras, inside Nicaragua.

U.S. contessies in Contral America desired the sircraft and its crew were linked to the TIS.

the U.S. govern

"My name is Eugene Hasenfus. I'm from Marinette, Wiscossin," said the tall red-headed man who was led out in front of a roomful of journalists by a Sandinista offi-

cer.
"I was captured yesterday in southern Nicaragus," Hasenius said, in a statement

islating sees than a manufacture of steered away by Sandinista guards.
Hasenfus is the first American prisoner of war the leftist Sandinista government is known to have captured in five years of fighting against the contras.

Hasenfus, 35, was dressed in a mudcaked blue cotton work shirt, blue jeans and work boots. His face appeared bruised and rollen, but he stood and walked without

aid. Deep sadness marked his features. Lt. Col. Roberto Calderon, Sandinista Army commander in the southeastern jungle region where he said the C123 military cargo aircraft was shot down Sunday after-noon, identified the deceased pilot as Capt. William J. Cooper.

The copilot was identified as Wallace. Blaine Sawger, also killed in the crash. A beame Savger, and kined in the craim. In fourth crew member was of Latin origin but could not be identified, Calderon said. The bodies, found inside the plane's smoking hall, have not yet been evacuated from the region, he said

According to the Sandinista officer, Hasenfus said under questioning that he was a "kicker," the crew member assigned to push cargo out the plane's open rear door into

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Nicaragua Presents American Crewman After Crash

NICARAGUA, From A1

the forests below. Hasenfus was said to have parachuted to safety when the plane was pierced by a portable Soviet-Bloc rocket fired by Sandinista infantrymen.

Hasenfus was surrounded and captured at midday yesterday by Nicaraguan counterinsurgency forces as he fled through overgrowth about 30 miles north of the border with Costa Rica.

In the plane's charred and fractured wreckage, Nicaraguan troops found wallets they said belonged to the three Americans. One plastic-encased credential in Hasenfus' name bore his picture and indicated issue by the Salvadoran Air Force on July 20 of this year. It identified him as an "adviser" in the "USA" group at the Ilopango air base in San Salvador.

A similar reddish credential, its photo showing a man with a mustache, was in Sawger's name.

A third credential was issued to Cooper by a Miami-based air freight firm, Southern Air Transport. It was dated April 2, 1986, with a signature identified as that of personnel director Carl Holeva.

One wallet contained the business card of Capt. Humberto Villalta, an officer of the Salvadoran Navy. Another card belonged to P.J. Buechler of the State Department office that administered humanitarian aid for the contras during the Mast fiscal year.

In El Salvador, the U.S. Embassy said in a statement that Hasanfus "is not part of the U.S. military group here. He has no links with the U.S. Embassy. We don't know who he is."

The U.S. Embassy in Managua sent a diplomatic note to the Foreign Ministry requesting consular access to Hasenfus and additional information about the dead, according to Alberto Fersendes, the embassy spokesmen, who said the embassy received no response. Fernandez said, "Methas the airplane nor its crew and carge were financed by the U.S. government."

Sandinista troops removed from the wreckage about 70 new Soviet-made assault rifles, 100,-000 rounds of rifle ammunition, about one dozen PG7 rockets and 150 pairs of combat boots, said Calderon, the Sandinista commander. Calderon said Nicaraguan intelligence had detected four other contra resupply flights from El Salvador since July. He asserted that the flights circle in from the Pacific Ocean over Costa Rica before looping north into Nicaragua.

[Earlier, Hasenfus told local journalists in San Carlos, near the crash site, that the flight began in Miami, picked him up in El Salvador, then went to Honduras, where it picked up a Nicaraguan, and entered Nicaraguan airspace from Costa Rica at a site called La Noca, The Associated Press reported.]

Calderon quoted Hasenfus as saying in a "conversation" with his captors that five contra re-

supply planes are parked at the Salvadoran Ilopango base. The downed plane was said to carry registry number C824, according to a log book Calderon held in his hands.

None of the three Americans appeared to be active-duty U.S. military personnel. Hasenfus reportedly said he served in the U.S. military in Vietnam until 1972 and had "continued to do the same work he did in Vietnam."

In Tegucigalpa, a contra spokesman said by telephone that all of his group's aircraft were accounted for undamaged "in their airports."

Carlos Icaza of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), which with an estimated 14,000 men, is the largest contra force, said the group sometimes accepts aid, including air resupply of its field fighters, from "private volunteers."

But the contra leader said that in recent weeks no organization made any attempt to coordinate such assistance with the FDN.

Icaza said the CIA has not been involved in resupplying contra rebels with flights over Nicaragua since its mandate to provide aid was suspended in 1984. He said no U.S.-supported contra group currently has enough funds to obtain an airplane such as the C123.

The C123 is a twin-engine cargo craft that has been in production, with various models, since Fairchild introduced it in the 1950s. It has been a staple troop carrier for the U.S. Air Force and was in heavy see in Vietnam.

PLANE From A1

olutionaries, with anything but intelligence information, "and we do not break those restrictions," sho said.

Asked whether that meant the agency knew nothing about the in-cident, Pherson said, "I can't help YOU.

Asked to identify the four men, State Department officials said they had the names but would not reveal them. They would not say how they had obtained the names.

Ethori Abrams, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, told reporters that if reports that the four were carrying arms to anti-Nicaraguan rebels were true, then they are heroes."

Ernesto Palazio, spokesman here for the United Nicaraguan Opposition, the rebels' unibrella organization, said the downed plane "could very well be" one of the contras' planes, but that he was not yet certain. "Ever since Congress placed restrictions on aid, we have had to go get private donations," he said. "Occasionally we have had to use the services of volunteers to complement our own pilots."

He said there had been no contact yet with contras on the ground near the crash site in southern Nic-

aragua.

Spokesmen for several groups previously associated with aid shipments to the contras denied any link to or knowledge of this flight. They included officials of the Civil-ian Materiel Assistance, formerly Civilian-Military Assistance, in Memphis, which supplies medical and other aid and which lost two members in a September 1984 helicopter crash in Nicaragua.

Retired major general John K. Singlauh, head of the U.S. Council for World Freedom in Phoenix, who has spoken proudly of facilitating arms purchases for the contras, said from the Far East through spokeswoman Joyce Downey that he knew nothing about the plane. We have located all of our people,

Downey said

Officials of Southern Air Transport in Miami, whose planes have reportedly been chartered for previous aid flights to Nicaragua, said they knew nothing about this one or Hasenfus, William Hasenfus said his brother, Eugene, had been working for a Florida air freight company, but refused to name it.

Defense Department records show that a Eugene Hasenfus joined the U.S. Marines on May 9, 1960, was trained as a parachute rigger for equipment drops and sent to Camp Pendleton, Calif., where he remained until he left the service as a corporal June 17, 1965.

His military records say he did not serve abroad. His stepmother, Theresa Hasenfus, told The Associated Press, however, that he had served in Vietnam.

Durenberger said at a news conference that the CIA had assured the intelligence committee that "there is abuildtely no connection

between that plane, what was in that airplane, the pilots or anybody else [on board] and a U.S. govern nunt-financed or -sponsored effort auch as the so-called contra oper-

Durenberger added that he believes the agency: "They have so much riding on this Edon't think they've ever hed to any of us. . . Likmit The problem is what they don't tell

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), the committee vice chairman, said he was concerned that the flight might have been "connected with any of these soldier of fortune type operations which are sort of sent out there with a wink and a shrug as a way of going around our stated for-eign policy." If there is such a link, he said, "then I think we're in for some very serious trouble."

Committee spokesman David Holliday said later that, based on current information, "nobody on the committee believes that the CIA or any government agency violated the law or did something they shouldn't have done."

Rep. Michael D. Barnes (D-Md.), head of the Foreign Affaira subcont-mittee on Western Hemisphere affairs, said he thought it "unlikely" that the government was not in-volved. 'Very little of what's happening down there right now is not somehow affected by U.S. action, he said.

Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (1)meanwhile, called for House investigation into two recent air crashes in Texas and Nicaragua to determine whether they were part of an alleged covert CIA operation aimed at toppling the Saudi-

nista government.

Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-III), a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said he agreed with Assistant Sec-retary of State Abrams. "The Soviets are pouring all kinds of stuff in there. And unless there's some kind of an effort at equalization, the con-tras will be overwhelmed," he said. 'Anyone who's attempting to keep them vuble, I say,

so said he Greek day we still a of Greek that he # U.S. add to it in 1 e very brave p material into Nicara T ed in this offert, i

He said he had "some intelligence about the plane" and the people on it but that the information "is not for public consumption."

Asked about possible violations of the Neutrality Act, which bars U.S. citizens from supporting attacks on nations with which the United States is not at war, Abranis said he had advice for others seeking to aid the Nicaraguan rebels: "If you're planning to do something like this, get yourself a lawyer."

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EVANS & ROVAK

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ELLIOTT ABRA-C

Assistant Secretary of State tor

Inter-American Atfairs

INTERVIEWED BY:

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EDITOR: This is a rush transcript provided for the information and convenience of the press. Print and broadcast media are permitted to quote this transcript provided credit is given to "EVAMS & NOVAR" (CMS). Video and audio cassettes are available upon request to the media. For further information, please contact Elissa Pree or Susan Cheikan at (202) 898-7900.

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OLA-135

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MR. NOVAK: I'm Robert Fovak. Rowland Evans and I will question a senior administration official about the American shot down over Micaragua by the Sandinistas.

MR. EVANS: That official is Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrans.

MR. EVANS (on tape): Who is Eugene Hasenfus? We know he is an American citizen, an ex-Marine, a solider of fortune in the Vietnam War, and we know his transport plane was shot down over Hicaragus. The CIA flatly dunies that he was a CIA man, or that the CIA had anything to do with the plane or with Hasenfus. And President Reagan strongly suggested that Hasenfus is a good American citizen acting as a private citizen to help the U.S.-backed contras overthrow the Sandinista-Parxist regime.

PRESIDENT REAGAN (Wednreday, October R, 1986): We've been sware that there are private groups and private citizens that have been trying to help the contras, to that extent, but we did not know the exact particulars of what they're doing.

MR. EVANS: Mr. Secretary, can you give me categorical assurance that Hesenfus was not under the control, the guidance, the direction, or what have you, of anybody connected with the American government?

MR. ABRAMS: Absolutely. That would be illegal. We are barred from doing that, and we are not doing it. This was not in any sense a U.S. government operation. done.

MR. NOVAK: He'll be back with more questeions for Assistant Secretary Abrans after tress messages.

MR. WOVARI Assistant Secretary of State Abrams, you gave categorical assurance in answer to my partner's question that Mr. Hamenfus is not taking orders from anybody connected with the U.S. government. You know, in this town, sir, that gets howls of laughter, particularly from my colleagues, when Mr. Hesenfus himself says I thought I was working for the CIA.

MR. ASRAMS: First, we don't know what Mr. Masengus

thinks. Mr. Masenfus is a captive of the Sandinistas; he is in their control. God knows what they are saying to him or doing to him. And nething that he says while he's in their captivity can be thought of as being his actual views until he's free to speak. Secondly, it is conceivable also to me that he thought--because I don't know him--that he thought he was, in fact, working for the CIA. That is conceivable.

MR. NOVAKI Why would be think that?

MR. ABRAMS: Well, I'll get to that in a second. I just wanted to repeat that categorical assurance that he was not. If you look at this series of people who are, in fact, engaged, and have been for the last couple of years in helping the centrae, they came in when the Congress abandoned the fredom fighters in Micarague, and they've been keeping them alive for two years. When they got started, it looks as if they did what you'd you expect. They looked around and said, who's got some experience for this kind of work. And they came up with some people who were in Air America, which had connections with the CIA in Vietnam, and who were in Vietnam, and who were in the CIA. You'll find a close pattern of relationships here. You'll find some old school ties. But you will not find any current ties.

HR. HOVAK: All right, now, just on Friday the San Francisco Examiner reported that, no, quoting intelligence sources, said there was no CIA connection, but there was connection, of all places, from Vice President Bush's office. That Vice President Bush's security eid, Mr. Don Gregg, had hired this Max Gomes, who Mr. Hasenfus described as a CIA agent. Do you know anything about that?

Priday morning as well. I can say first of all there's no Max Gomes. Whoever that gentlemen is, he certainly isn't named Max Gomes. So we need, first of all, to find out who he is. Secondly, I know nothing about any connection to the Vice President's office whetseever. And thirdly, is his especity down there in Central

WAN & BYANS & MUVAK

America helping whoever he is, he is not on the U.S. government payroll in any way.

MR. NOVAK: Now, when you say gave entegorical essurance, we're not playing word games that are so common in Washington. You're not talking about the NCS, or something else?

MR. ABRAMS: I am not playing games.

MR. HOVAK: Hational Security Council?

MR. ABRAtiS: No government agencies, none.

MR. EVANS: Mr. Secretary, you said that if the Sandiniatas had Masenfus in captivity, and if he said what they wanted him to say, he'd be out in no time; if he didn't, he might be in for 38 years. Will he now be out in no time, since he has said he was a CIA man?

HR. ABRAMS: I don't know. I don't know how they're--

MR. EVANS: But you said that.

MR. ABRAMS: Well, that's right. and the question is what they think of what he said, and unat they're trying to use this incident for, for political advantage, obviously. But how? Will they risk a trial? Will they risk turning themselves into an Iran with kengeroo courts of Americans?

MR. EVANS: You think he has been coerced into making this statement about the CIA. You don't think he made it knowing that it was correct, thinking it was correct, I mean. He made it knowing it was false?

MR. ABRAMS: I don't know. I know that you cannot rely on any statement he makes while in their control as being his actual views.

MR. EVANS: Mr. Secretary, the New York Times reporter down there--I don't renember his name, but I think he's probably a good reperter--said that he had inspected the records on the plane, the documents, for two hours, and he said they don't prove anything to me, but he said everything I looked at tends to support what Hesenfus has told us, that he was a CIA nam.

MR. ABRAMS: Well, be wasn't.

MR. EVAMS: Can you give me on signation of that?

HR. ABRAMS: Yes. I would first point you, again, to the Senate and House Intelligence Committee chairmen, Durenberger and Hamilton--

 $\mbox{MR. NOVAR: Senator Durenberger of hinnesote and Congressmen Hamilton of Indiana.$

MR. ABRAMS: That's right, who has said --

MR. EVAMS: Chairman of two Intelligence Committees.

MR. ABRANS: Soth chairmen, one Democrat, one Republican, have said this is not in any sense a CIA operation. And I went to repeat that again. Why does it look like a CIA operation? I will bet you, and it's a bet because I don't know for sure that there are ex-CIA people involved, or people who have done this kind of work before in Asia and Africa, in Latin America. Who do you--you know, then you're putting an operation like this together, you don't advertise in the New York Times. You ask around for people who are reliable.

PR. EVANS: I understand that. Hr. Secretary, let me pursue this one more, and don't please draw erroneous conclusions about my own feelings about this from these quesetions. I'm only seeking the truth. I'm not telling you think. I think the man is a patriot. However, he's being paid three thousand dollars a month, and if there's one who kicks out the cargo being paid three thousand dollars a month, there must be twenty or thirty or forty or heaven knows how many. Tho's supplying that money?

MR. ABRAMS: I can tell you only one thing about that, and that is that there is no one source, as near as I can make out, nor is there any one organization. There are a whole bunch of them. I don't know who they are. I want to be very clear on that. He do not follow and find out the identities of the thousands of Americans who help the PMLM guerillas in El Salvador, the communists, or the communist regime in Micaragua. Because they have a right to do so as Americans. And we don't follow the people who are trying to help U.S. policy and restore freedom to micaragua. I don't know who they are.

MR. EVANS: Saudi Arabian money?

HR. ABRANS: I have heard that, again, on Thursday or Priday, and as far as I am aware it is just plain false.

HR. BYAMS: Istaeli money

MR. ABRAMS: Again, as far as I am aware--but I want to-MR. EVANS: I can't believe you don't know where that
money's coming from.

HR. AURANS: I do not know where that money is coming from.

HR. HOVAK: All right, Hr. Abrams, there's one problem

with your story. And that is that Mr. Hasenfus says that his
plane had been taking off from a U.S. airbase in El Salvador, it
had taken off on this particuliar flight from a base used by the
U.S. military in Honduras, and the Joe Smith Ajax Transport Company

can't just use those bases. You have to have a lot of clout to
use a U.S. military base.

MR. ABRAMS: I start again, you don't know what Mr. Hasenfus actually believes. You only know what he's saying under the control of the Sandinistas. As to allegations of third country involvement in this, you, I think, would understand, I am never, ever going to comment publicly on allegations that other countries are involved.

HR. NOVAK: But it's our Air base in Cl Salvador.

MR. ABRAMS: We don't have any air bases in El Salvador.

HR. MOVAK: Well, who owns that base in Cl Salvedor, who maintains that base?

MR. ARRAMS: We don't have any bases, and therefore, any bases that exist in El Salvador are maintained by the government of El Salvador.

MR. EVANS: We have the right to use it, however. We rent certain facilities at that air base.

MR. ABRAMS: I don't believe that's correct.

MR. NOVAK: You've backed me into a cul de sac, Mr.
Abrams. You're a very clever fellow, but the puint of the matter
is that if you have this plane using U.S. military facilities, and

they are down there--

MR. ABRAMS: It is not. Let me just say that. It is not. That if this plane were using, the plane that was downed, U.S. military facilities, we would be in violation of the law, because the law says no weapons to the freedom fighters, and we are not doing that it. They are not using U.S. military facilities.

 $\mbox{MR. HOVAK:}$ So you are extending your categorical denial to that.

MR. ABRAMS: To DOD, absolutely.

MR. NOVAK: One more thing on the legal end, Mr. Abrame. There are a lot of people on this network, on CNN, last week Congressman Peter Kostmayer of Pennsylvania said that this man, whatever else, Mr. Hasenfus was in violation of the Neutrality Act. What do you think of that?

HR. ABRAIS: I'm not expert on the Neutrality Act. My understanding is that if fir. Harenfus was working in Central America that he was not in violation. If he was shipping arms out of the U.S. then perhaps he was. But that, you know, these are eighteenth century, arcane statutues. I can't tell you whether he was or wasn't. But I don't think he was.

mR. NOVAK: Do you think we ought to repeal the Neutrality Act?

MR. ABRAMS: Oh, I'm not going to touch that one.

MR. EVANS: But you think it's a non-act anyway; you say it's arcane, archaic.

MR. ABRAIS: No, we have, no, there have been people who have been actually prosecuted by the Justice Department for violations of it.

MR. EVANS: Now, Mr. Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams, I hate to do too much on this, but I have to. A plastic ID was found in that aircraft. It was issued by the Salvadoran air force. It identified Hesenfus as a quote, as an, quote, advisor, unquote, in, quote, U.S.A., unquote, group at Ilopange.

MR. MOVAR: Ilopango's the air base in El Salvador.

MR. EVANS: Correct.

MR. APRAMS: I'll repeat again. He was not in any way not only a U.S. government employee, U.S. government adviser, he had no connection whatsoever with the U.S. military.

MR. EVANS: I have to believe you, because I know you're an honest man. Explain to me what the word adviser, and U.S.A., those two words, mean, could mean, what could they mean?

MR. ABRAMS: This-my understanding was it said, it said "Grupo U.S.A.", U.S.A. group. That's not the U.S. military adviser group. The first thing I did when I heard about that from the Sandinistes in TV was to call our ambassador in El Salvador and say who's on, who's in your military group, the famous 55 advisers, is this man any way--no connection. Now, who printed up that card and who gave it to him? I don't have a clue.

IIR. EVANS: Now, let me ask you another question that intrigues me, and Sally, firs. Hasenfus, and apparently she's a very intelligent woman living up there in the great state of Misconsin. I was told that she phoned the State Department, and in asking what had happened to her husband, said, of course, he is with the CIA. Why would she on earth do that?

MM. ABRAMS: If she said that, I can think of one very good reason. Maybe she thinks that he was.

MR. EVANS: In other words, that he was not leveling with her as to what is real--

IR. ABRAHS: I don't know. all I know for a fact is that he wasn't.

 $\mbox{\sc MR.}$ NOVAR: You're going to say that maybe he thinks he was, too?

MR. ABRAMS: Oh, that's perfectly plausible to me.

MR. EVAMS: How? Explain that to our --

MR. ABRAMS: Renember the--

 $\mbox{\sc MR. EVAHS:}\ \mbox{\sc I}\ \mbox{\sc don't understand that.}\ \mbox{\sc I}\ \mbox{\sc don't think our viewers understand that.}$

MR. ABRAMF: Oh, I think it's simple. Remember what's

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going on here. A group of people, lots of people, disorganized groups of people are engaged in supplying the resistance. They know that what they're doing is generally approved of by the administration, and it is, keeping the freedom fighters alive until Congress finally acts.

They know that this was an activity that the United States has been engaged in on and off. For example, we had the humanitarian assistance, getting uniforms, food, medicine, to the freedom fighters, and someone comes along and says, I'd like to put you on a covert CIA operation. I'll pay you three thousand dollars a month. Will you help me? -You say yes. You don't actually know whether it is a covert CIA operation or not. When you get down to the level at which hr. Hasenfus was working, a so called kicker, pushed things out of the airplane, into Micaragus, I very much doubt whether he was exactly sure who was paying him.

MR. MOVAR: All right, hr. Abrams. By coincidence or not, the Sunday of last weekend, CRS, "tf minutes", one of the most widely watched programs in Aberica, had a feature on retired risjor General John Singlaub in which their prorotion said, sh, here's a guy who will fight your war for you, as long as it's an anti-communist wer. They kept hyping that during the footbell game. The New York Timese subsequently says--. 'r. Singlaub is in the public consciousness--that General Singlaub's organization owned this plane that crashed; General Singlaub denies it. Who is telling the truth?

if. APRAIS: Singlaub was telling the truth. That was not one of his planes, as near as I can make out. The Times story to which you refer, about a week ago, is filled with errors, and that's one of the errors. There is a mistaken view that General Singlaub does all of this. There are actually a lot of groups out there, and a lot of people helping.

MR. NOVAK: Now, I want to just go into this whole question, if I could, of this operation, which as a military amateur it seems to se was the nost amateurish thing I could

imagine. It was a daylight operation. There was no back up plane. It looked like they didn't use much evasive action. Is this, how deput operating this way they didn't shoot down a plane long before this? So you have any nuese?

MR. ABRAMS: Yes. Sheer luck. And the fact that the good, that anti-eigeraft material has been growing in Micaragua as the Soviets shipped in more. I'd just pick up on that to say one other thing. The reason this is going on, the reason that there are Americans who were killed and shot down is that Congress wen't act. If this bill passed, and the U.S. government were permitted to do this, under that statute no American goes near Micaragua or within twenty miles of its borders.

IR. MOVAK: Gill it pass before the end of this session?
HR. ABRAMS: I believe it will. I believe it will pass
next week.

MR. EVANS: Mr. Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams, de you feel that the credibility of the U.S. government, which has been under some attack anyway, quite apart from this incident, has been hurt by this?

hR. ABRAMS: I think it's too soon to tell. I take great comfort in the fact that the intelligence Committee members I speak to seem to be in complete agreement that, yes, there was no U.S. government involvement. In fact, even the journalists I speak to have, I think, tended to come to the conclusion.

PIR. EVAICE fir. Secretary, Dernard Kalb, one of your beloved associates, until very recently, just quit the State Department on a charge that he couldn't work under an administration that had a credibility factor as large as the Rengan administration. What do you think about that?

MR. ABRAGE You're tempting me.

MR. EVAMS: No, no. Speak out.

IIR. ABRAMS: I think that resigning with this kind of public fuse a few days before the President goes off to a pre-summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev was something that should

not have been done.

MR. MOVAR: It would have been okay if he resigned three days later, is other words.

-MR. ABRAMS: Well, I think it would have been a lot verter for the country had it been done a few days later. I also think that it just doesn't wash, because the accusation seems to be that the rest of us really should be resigning, too, including the Secretary. And that's just silly.

tir. TVAMS: You testified, I believe, on this last Triday, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- I believe that's true.

MR. ABRANS: That's right.

MR. EVANS: Do you find any opposition, or any criticism, or any questioning up there, and is it left or right? Is it liberals or conservatives?

MR. ABRANS: I find questioning from liberal Democrats

MR. EVANS: Like?

MR. ABRAMS: Well, Senator Kerry, (or example, bae long "been--

MR. EVANS: Of Massachusetts.

HR. ABRAMS: --questioning--that's right. It's basically opponents, basically it's opponents of the policy who are, I would say, looking for yet another way to oppose it.

MR. EVAUS: And these are 1: becals?

MR. ABRAMS: Yes.

I.R. CVANS: Did you remind them that the liberals were behind the mevement to help the Spanish communists and socialists in the Lincoln Brigade in the 30's?

HR. ABRAIM: Ho, we didn't.

MR. EVANS: Didn't come up?

MR. ABRAMS: Didn't come up.

IIR. EVANS: Do you see an analogy there?

MR. ABRAMS: I would see an analogy. But I would also

. .

make a closer analogy today. There are thousands of Americans who are supporting the communist regime in Hicaregus, and the communist querillas in El Salvador--the Phild--and ue're not going after them. We're not trying to pursue them; we're not trying to find out who they are. They have a right to do that. And they have a right to support communist regimes. We have a right to oppose them.

MR. MOVAR: Let me follow that up closely. Andrew Messing, who I think you might know--

HR. ABRAMS: I do know.

hR. NOVAK: He's a fellow who helps fight these low intensity warfaces around the world, anti-communist. He says that there are Americans who are actually fighting in Niceragus on the communist side. Do you know that for a fact?

MR. ABRAMS: No. I don't recall any intelligence reporting about Americans being in combat.

MR. NOVAK: Let me ask you mother question about Micaragua. There are reports that the Sandinista army, armor, aircraft, artillary, is massing for an attack on the Hiskito Indians who have been in resistence before the American aid finally gets in there. Do you know that to be true?

HR. ABRAMS: I would rather not comment on the state of our intelligence about Sendinista Filitary activities. I'm sorry.

MR. NOVAR: Well, let me generalize the question, Mr. Abrams. Do you think it is possible that there will be some severe military blows suffered before the aid arrives? Is it possible, without talking about Sandinista intentions.

NR. ABRAMS: I think we're getting too close, now. We're a few days away. I think the real question is how do the Sandinistss react to the President signing that bill next week. We think they'll go to the U.M. But more than that, will they attack Honduras again? What will they do? Will they do a big internal attack? Me'll see.

HR. EVANS: We only have a moment left. The CIN is the rocket described to me as that which fixed against the plane that

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brought down Hasenfus. De you know what a C2M 187

MR. ABRAMS: No.

MR. EVANS: Do you know who makes se?

MR. ASRAMET My understanding is that: the place wesbrought down by a Soviet made tocket.

MR. EVANS: Maybe that's the C2M. Is there as increase in those Soviet rockets, right now?

MR. ABRAMS: There is an increase in tockets, and a massive increase in Soviet helicopters, and a massive Soviet erms inflow in 1986 into Micarague.

HR. EVANSI: But specifically on anti-aircraft rocket, does this worry you about all supply planes going in there now?

MR. ABRAMS: It certainly does. It's going to be a larger problem.

MR. MOVAK: We have just under 36 seconds left, Assistant Secretary Abrans. Just looking at this from the broad picture, do you think all this publicity, this hype, do you think this could yet turn around the question in Congress where the--although it's passed both houses--the hundred million dollars in aid would be denied to the contras?

 $hR.\ ABRAMS:$ No. People will try to do that, but the Intelligence Committees who know the facts know that there was no U.S. government role in this.

MR. EVANS: One last question. He only have two seconds left. Any new indications of fixed wing jet aircraft coming in soon to the Sandinistas from Cuba or the Soviet Union?

MR. ABRAMS: No.

HR. EVAMS: Is it a high concern of yours?

MR: ABRAMS: It is a great concern. It always is. But we don't see it happening.

HR. EVANS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary Elliott Abrams. My pertner and I, after these commercials, will be back with a comment.

MR. EVAMS: Seb, I den't know whether the Assistant

Secretary of State for Latin America has taken lessons on how to be cool under fire, couth under fire, but I gave him the worst pumpeling I could. I really tried to get in there. Of course, you were rather aggressive yourself. We didn't get anywhere in bending him out of his position that the U.S. government is no way, shape or form had nothing, in anyway, guidance, organizational, orders, et ceters, to do with this unfortunate, this tragic case.

MR. MOVAK: You know, I've seen a lot of cover-ups in this town, Rowland, and we both may end up with egg on our face before this is over, and this is all an elaborate lie, but this doesn't look like a cover-up, and it doesn't because there is no equivocation. He says it didn't come from a U.S. military base. He says that these companies are not CIA companies. The so-called Max Gomes, the CIA operative, supposedly hired by the CIA or Vice President Bush, doesn't even exist. No, no, no, he says.

MR. EVANS: He makes a good point, too, Bob. He made the point if the U.S. Congress had acted on President Reagan's request for a hundred million dollars worth of military aid, a month ago, weeks ago, or even yesterday, this might not have happened in the way it did. But as he pointed out, the Congress has been sitting and twiddling its thumbs on this issue month after month after month. Now, it's supposed to pass, we hope, before they adjourn next week. Ne're not sure.

MR. NOVAK: Elliott Abrens wrestled with his conscience and won, and criticized hr. Kalb, Dernard Ralb who resigned as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Information, on grounds of principle, and he was burned by that. He felt that Bernie Ralb was making him and the other people look like they didn't have any principle for staying on the job. And I think we got a little touch of reality there.

I'm Robert Movek.

MR. EVAMS: I'm Rowland Evans.

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
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
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Exhibit OLN-139

From NSRKS -- CPUA To: NSCPC -- CPUA HOTE FROM: Ron Sable Subject: CALLS eny ideas? -

Date and time ACCIFIFI

10/28/86 11-43:52

SECRET

Forwarding note from NSRKS
To: NSOLN -- CPUA

--CPUA 10/28/86 11:24 ***

8367

NOTE FROM: Ron Sable SUBJECT: CALLS SUBJECT: CALLS
TOH LATINER(HPSCI STAFF DIR.)CALLED ON B. HALF OF THE CHA.RMAN, INQUIRING ABOUT
THE NEWSWEEK STORY ON C"CALLS FROM EL SA; VADOR(ANTEL RECORDS) DURING THE
PERIOD SEPT 10-17% ethes on Septil) TO 1 OUR PHONE NUMBER(5887) AS Well as TO
YOUR PREVIOUS MARKER. THE QUESTION IS: "DC) YOU HAVE A PRONE LOG ETC. WHICH
WOULD SHOW THAT MONE OF THOSE CALLS WERE HADE TO YOU, OR THAT TITY HAD NOTHING
TO DO WITH THE CONTRA AID BUSINESS". I FUT RIM OFF FOR NOW, BUT WOULD
APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE ON WHAT YOU WANT HE TO SAY.

CC: NSFH --CPUA

NEPET --CPUA

SECRET



Date and time 10/28/86 13:57:06

From: NSRKS --CPUA To: NSRLE --CPUA

een Reply to note of 10/28/86 12:53 NOTE FROM: Ron Sable NOTE FROM: Eon mable
Subject: CALLS
Have talked to Hanley and will provide MF the cells referred to (from safe hou d his) LTC north has never received any of

145)

NSPST --CPUA

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cc: NSOLN --CPUA

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Ender May Addressed on 1 May 1987
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by P. Rugin, Holland Security Council



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By S. Rager, Matterial Security Council

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MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM IV MSC/ICS-402003 Re-do

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 6, 1985.

TOP SECRET

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ACTION


MENORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCFARLANE

OLIVER L. MORTEN

SUBJECT:

Micaraguan Arms Shipments

The Micaraguan merchant ship, MOMINGO, is now in port at Taichung, Taivan, where it is unloading cargo. It is estimated for departure on tomorrow, February 7, enroute to Shikama, Japan for main engine repairs.



At this point, there appear to be three options:

- The shigment could be seized and the weapons emilyored to the $FDH_{\rm F}$
- the ship could be sunk; or
- the shipment and the parties involved therein could be made public as a means of proventing the delivery.



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There is no apparent armed security detail aboard the MONIMBO, despite the sensitive nature of her cargo.

If asked, Calero would be willing to finance the operation. Re does not, however, have sufficient numbers of trained marriage special operations personnel or a method of delivery for seizing the ship on the high seas.

If such an operation were undertaken, it would be best to seize the vessel as it cleared the East China Sea enroute to Nicaraqua's Pacific port at Corinto. Arrangements would have to be made for removal of the cargo for further transfer to the FDN, since it is unlikely that any of the other Central American states would allow MONIMBO to enter their harbors once she had been pirated.

If time does not permit a special operation to be launched, Calero can quickly be provided with the maritime assets required to sink the vessel before it can reach port at Corinto. He is in contact with maritime operations experts and purveyors of material necessary to conduct such an operation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorise Calero to be provided with the information on MONIMBO and approached on the matter of seizing or sinking the ship.

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National Security Council
The White House

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
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Pebruary 6, 1985

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
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OLIVER L. HORTE

SUBJECT

Micarequen Arms Shipments

Control of Section of Section Council The Micaraguan merchant ship, MOMINGO, is now in port at Taichung, Taiwan, where it is unloading cargo. It is estimated for departure on tomorrow, February 7, enroute to Shikese, Japan for main engine repairs.



would be helpful to have it declassified so that we can have it placed the orderess nows media.

RECONCENDATION

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
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
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MEMORANDUM



SYSTEM IV NSC/ICS-400215

N 7

Section of Section 1235

March 5, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCFARLANS

PROM:

OLIVER L. MORTE

SUBJECT:

_Aid to the Micaraguan Resistance

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Secretaries Shults and Weinberger, Director Casey, and General Vessey asking for their views on increased U.S. assistance / Your memo is cast as suggestion which derives from trip to the region.

During one of the meetings; ;in, which the process above was arranged, one of presented a "wish list" of items which they desperately need in order to prosecute their war against the Cuban-supported querrillas. A copy of the list is etached at Tab III. Each of the items identified are in priority within four principal categories: Aircraft, Ground Forces Equipment, Weapons and Munitions, and Mon-Tactical Military Equipment.



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N 7185

Your memo at Tab I does not refer to the arrangements which have been made for supporting the resistance through.

does, however, urge that we take steps now to improve their situation. Once we have approval for at least some of what they have asked for, we can ensure that the right people in understand that we are able to provide results from their cooperation on the resistance issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and transmit the memo at Tab I. Approve 1 Disapprove ___

Attachments
Tab I - McFarlane Memo to Shultz/Weinberger/Casey/Vessey
Tab II - Shultz/Weinberger/Casey/Vessey
End-User Certificates
Military Equipment Requirements



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SYSTEM IV NSC/ICS-400215

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1985

N 7187 SENSITIVE

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTE The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER The Secretary of Defense

THE HOMORABLE WILLTAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT:

Assisting

Progress toward Democracy (C)

During my brief stop in/

'made a convincing case for their commitment to democracy. They also noted their critical need for relatively small amounts of security assistance, economic aid, and support for their struggling agricultural sector.

In recent weeks, there appears to have been an increase in querrilla attacks and subversion. It is entirely likely that we will see more polarising activity of this kind as the elections approach. Unless the Army has adequate support, certain elements may use the querrilla action as a reason to defer elections or to justify counter-productive, repressive measures. Unfertunately, the Congress only provided in FY-85 IMET funds from the Administration's accurately assistance request. While the FY-86 request for in security assistance provides hope for the future, It would seem that we need to look for ways in which we can help between now and their elections. (8)

It is, therefore, requested that State take the lead in developing imaginative alternatives. can be provided with assistance to improve their security situation. should consider / as wall

as activities by other U.S. agencies which could have a positive effect on internal security conditions.

Our goal in all of this should be to provide all possible assistance to progress toward democracy. assistance to

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Constitution of Designation of the

14 de febrero de 1,985.

Señores: EMERGY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 440 Maple Ave. East Viena, "a., 22160.

Sefores:

Nos diriginos a ustedes, para manifestarles que por eg
te medio estanos extendiendo CERTIFICADICH DE DESTINO FINAL
por DIEL MIL (10,000) rifles automáticos, los cuales serán
destinados para uso exclusivo del Ejército de
presenta reexportados ni vendidos a otro país, siendo
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CERTIFICACION DE DESTINO FINAL

14 de Sebrero de 1,965.

Sefores: INTEGY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 440 Maple Ave. East Viena, Va., 22180.

Sefores:

Nos diriginos : ustedes, para manifestarles que por eg
te medio estamos extendiendo CERTIFICACION DE DESTINO FINAL
por DIEZ MIL (10,000) libras de explosivo (AE) - C4 o TNT y
UN MIL QUINTENTOS (1,500) detonadores variados, los cuales
serán destinados para uso exclusivo del Ejército de
Ty no serán reexportatos ni venditos a otro país, siendo
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Sin otro particular, aprovecho la oportunidad para sug eribirmo atentamento.

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/14 de febrero de 1,985.


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Nos diriginos a usteles, para manifestarles que por es-te medio estamos extendiendo CERTIFICACION DE DESTINO FINAL del material que a continuación se detalla, el cual será des timado para uso emplusivo del Ejército de y no se-rá reexportade ni vendido a etro peis, siendo ; el -destino final:

- A. 190 ametralladoras
 B. 150 morteros de 60m. -completos-.
 C. 100 morteros de 81m. -completos-.
 D. 150 lansagramadas M-79
 E. -30 fusiles sin retroceso de 57em.

Sin otre particular, aprovecho la oportunidad para sus-cribirme atentamente.



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Sefores: EMERGY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 440 Haple Ave. East Viena, Va., 22180.

Sefores:

Nos dirigimos a ustedes, para manifestarlas que por ég te medio estamos extendiendo CERTIFICACION DE DESTINO FINAL del material que a continuación se detalla, el cual sará -destinado para uso emelusivo del Ejército de y po será reexpertado ni vendido a otro país, siendo. -el destino final:

A. 10,000 grandas K-79.

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Sin etre particular, aprovecho la oportunitat para sucribirme atestamente.

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CERTIFICACIO: DE DESTINO FINAL

14 de febrero de 1,985.

Seferes: ENTROY RESOURCES INTERNATIVAL 440 Haple Ave. East Viena, Va., 22180.

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A. 3,000 granatas EPG-7. B. --100 lansagranatas EPG-7.

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14 de febrero de 1,985.

Seferes: EFERT RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 440 Heple Ave. East Viena, Va., 22180.

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14 de Sebrero de 1,985.

Sefores:
EXERGY RISOURCES INTERNATIONAL

440 Haple Ave. East
Viona, Va., 22180.

Sefores:

Nos diriginos a ustedes, para manifestarles que por eg
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
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SeSores: ENERGY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 440 Maple Ave. East Viana. Va.. 22160.

Sefores:

Nos diriginos a ustries, para manifestarles que por este medio estamos extendiendo CERTIFICACION DE CESTINO FINAL por DEEZ (40) lansacohetes tidrra-aire y CENCUENTA (50) misj les tierra-aire, los cuales vienes destinados para uso exaly sive del Ejército de , y no sería reexportados ni -vendidos a otro país, siendo el destino final.

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CL TIFICACION DE DESTINO FINAL

14 de febrero de 1985.


Senores EMERGY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 440 Maple Ave. East Viene. Va., 22180.

Seācres:

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por CINCO MILLONES (5.000,000) de cartuchos Ball Asmo, cali
bre 7.62mm., los evales serán destinados para uso exclusivo
del Ejércite de y no serán reexportados ni vendides a etre país, siendo el destino final.

Sin otro particular, arrovecho la opertunidad para sul oribirmo de untedes atomamente.

"The Pa. Peints"



MILITARY EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

N 7199

The following military equipment and services have been identified as the highest priority. Army in combatting the Communist querrillas. They are listed in sequence of highest to lowest need within each dategory.

Airgroft:

- -- New or refurbished helicopters and spare parts for existing inventory.
- -- Spare parts for fixed wing cargo aircraft.
- -- New or refurbished ground attack aircraft and spare parts for existing inventory.
- .. New trainer sircraft and related spare parts.

Ground Forces Equipment:

- -- Communications equipment, including secure voice systems.
- -- Various vehicles for troop and logistical transport.
- -- Engineering equipment, including bulldozers, road-graders, and survey instruments.

Meanone and Meditions:

- -- Light and medium weapons, including M-16 rifles, M-60 machine guns, pistols (9mm and .45 caliber), 81mm and 60mm mortars, and 90mm recoilless rifles.
- -- Ground force munitiess, including mortar, receilless rifle, and artillery rounds, asserted mises and explosives, and 7.62 x 51 linked assumition, plus hand groundes.
- -- Aerial munitions, including 200 and 500 pound bombs and 2.7! inch rockets with appropriate various mixes.

Additional Mon-Tactical Supplies and Beginnent:

- -- Field hospital equipment, general medical supplies, and training for paramedics.
- -- Tactical radars for use in detecting border infiltration.

Start Start

Exhibit OLN-146

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SYSTEM IV MSC/ICS-400215 N 16352

March 5, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C.

PRON

OLIVER L. WORTH,

SUBJECT:

. Aid to the Micaraguan Resistance

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Secretaries Shults and Weinberger, Director Casey, and General Vessey asking for their views on increased U.S. assistance to . Your memo is cast as suggestion which derives from trip to the region.

Your memo at Tab I urges that we take steps now to improve the situation in

RECONSCINDATION

That you sign and transmit the seme at Tab I.

Approve .

Disapprove __

Attachments Tab I - McFarl Tab II -	ane Memo to Shults/Weinberger/Casey/Vessey End-User Certificates Military Equipment Requirements
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WASHINGTON

SYSTEM IV NSC/ICS-400215

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March 11, 1985

N 16353 SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HOMORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTE

The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER The Secretary of Defense

THE HOMORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT:

'Progress toward Demogracy (C)

During my brief stop in

made a convincing case for their commitment to democracy. They also noted their critical need relatively small amounts of security assistance, economic aid, and support for their struggling agricultural sector. (C) They also noted their critical need for

In recent weeks, there appears to have been an increase in querrilla attacks and subversion. It is entirely likely that we will see more polarising activity of this kind as the elections approach. Unless the Army has adequate support, certain elements /may use the querrilla action as a reason to defer elections or to justify counter-productive, repressive measures. Unfortunately, the Congress only provided in FY-85 IMET funds from the Administration's (security assistance request. While the FY-86 request for in security assistance provides hope for the future, It would seem that we need to look for ways in which we can help between now and their elections. (8)

It is, therefore, requested that State take the lead in developing imaginative alternatives; can be provided with assistance to improve their security situation. We should examine:

' as wall as actificated other U.S. agencies which could have a positive effect on internal security conditions.

Our goal in all of this should be to provide all possible assistance to progress toward democracy.

Partially Declassified / PeléasFd of Salas

under provisions of E.J. 12356

by 3. Mark. National Security Cour Declassify

SENSITIVE

"The A. Pants



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UNCLASSIFIED N 16355

COLDIFICATION DE DECIMA F. 115

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Defores: ALEGOURCES INTERMATIONAL 440 Maple .ve. Cast Viena. "a.. 22180.

Señores:

Tos dirigimos a untedes, para manifestarles que por eg
te medio estamos extendiendo CERTIFIC...JICH DE DESCINO FINAL
por JIEL MIL (10,000) rifles automáticos, los cuales serán
destinados para uso exclusivo del Ejárcito de y no serán reexportados ni vendidos a otro país, siendo

al destino final.

Sin ouro particular, aprevenho la coortunidad para de cribiras aventamente.

Bignit hadricht.





CERTIFICACION DE DEUTINO FINAL

. 14 de febrero de 1,985.

Ceñores: ELLESY RESCURCES INTERNATIONAL 440 Maple Ave. Sast viena, Va., 22180.

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CERTIFICATION DE DESTINO FINAL

14 de febrero de 1,935.

C lores: ENERGY RESCURCES INTERNATIONAL 440 Maple Ave. East Viena, Va., 22180.

Sefores:

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- A. 150 ametralladoras B. 150 morteros de COma. -completos-. C. 100 morteros de Sima. -completos-. D. 150 lansagranadas K-79 E. -30 fusiles sin retroceso de 5723.

Jin otro particular, aprovecho la oportunidad para suscritic



UNCLASSIFIED

CORTIGIOACION DE DESCRITO VICAL

/ 14 10 febrero 10 1,985.

Seficies: ENERGY RESCUTOES INTENTACIONAL 440 Maple Ave. East Viena, Va., 22180.

Señores:

Nos diriginos a ustedes, para manifestarias que por este nedio estanos extendiendo CERTETURACION DE DESTINO FINAL del material que a continuación se detalla, el cual será -- destinado para una exclusivo del Ejército de y no sauá reexportado ni vandido a otro país, siendo -- el destino final:

A. 10,000 grandes K-79. B. -3,000 grandes de 60mr. C. -2,000 grandes de 81ms.

 β in otro particular, aprovecho la oportunitad para ϵ cribinze atentamente.





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UNCLASSIFIEU M 16359

CARTIFICACION OF PLOTING SINAL

14 de febrero de 1,985.

Sefores: EMINOY RESURCES INTERMATIMAL 440 Maple Ave. East Viena, Va., 22180.

Cefores:

"D. diriginos a ustedes, para manifestarles que por este medio estados extendicado CARTIFICACION DE DESTINO FINAL del naterial que a continuación de dutalla, el cual será des tinado para uso exclusivo del Ejército del y ao será rexportado ni vendido a otro país, siendo" el destino final:

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3. --100 isnzagranadas RFG-7.

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CESTIFICACION OF DESITED PINAL

14 de lebrero de 1,995.

Señores: ELEGY RESCURCES INTERNATIONAL AAO Maple Ave. East Viena, Va., 22180.

Señores:

Sin etro particular, aprovecho la opertunidad para sug tribitme atentamente.





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
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Sefores: THERMY RESUURCES INTERMATIONAL WWD Maple Ave. East Viene, Va., 22180.

Nos diriginos a ustedes, para manifestarles que por eg Sañoresi te medio estamos extendiendo CERTIFICACION DE DESTINO FILLE por TRES LIL (3,000) LAW ROCKETS, que vienem destinados para uso exclusivo del Ejército de portidos el vendidos a otro país, siendo

Jin otro particular, aprovecno la oportunidad para se gribirme atentamente.





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N 16362

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
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Sin otro particular, aprovecho la oportunidad para su:





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
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Senores Edingy Resources International 440 Maple Ave. East Viena, Va., 22180.

Señcres:

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te medio estamos extendiendo CERTIFICACICH DE DESTINO FINAL
por UNICO MILIONES (5.000,000) de cartuchos Ball Anno, cali
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The following military equipment and services have been identified as the highest priority. Army in combatting the Communist guerrillas. They are listed in sequence of highest to lowest need within each category.

Alferaft:

- -- New or refurbished helicopters and spare parts for existing inventory.
- -- Spare parts for fixed wing cargo aircraft.
- -- New or refurbished ground attack aircraft and spare parts for existing inventory.
- -- New trainer aircraft and related spare parts.

Ground Forces Equipment:

- -- Communications equipment, including secure voice systems.
- -- Various vehicles for troop and logistical transport.
- -- Engineering equipment, including bulldozers, road-graders, and survey instruments.

Weapons and Munitions

- Light and medium weapons, including H-16 rifles, H-60 machine guns, pistols (9mm and .49 caliber), 81mm and 60mm mortars, and 90mm recoilless rifles.
- -- Ground force munitions, including mortar, recoilless rifle, and artillery rounds, assorted mines and explosives, and 7.62 x 51 linked ammunition, plus hand grenades.
- -- Aerial munitions, including 200 and 500 pound bombs and 2.75 inch rockets with appropriate warhead mixes.

Additional Mon-Tectical Supplies and Equipment:

- -- Field hospital equipment, general medical supplies, and training for paramedics.
- -- Tactical radars for use in detecting border infiltration.


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EXHIBIT OLN-147

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NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT



MEMORANDUM



NACH CE 2400246

March 16, 1985

202-000M07

SENSITIVE

ACTION

HENORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCFARLANE

PRON:

OLIVER L. HORTH

SUBJECT:

Fallback Plan for the Micaraguan Resistance

The plan attached at Tab I has been developed, pursuant to our discussion on Friday regarding fallback options. It is premised on the assumption of a major Congressional budget battle and an assessment that the Congress will not rescind the restrictions in Section 8066 of the FY-85 C.R. (Tab A). Should you determine in your meeting with Senators Durenburger and Lugar (Tuesday, March 19, 0730) that the Congress will not endorse a resumption of USG support to the resistance, the plan at Tab I provides a workable alternative.

Secrecy for the plan is paramount. We could not implement such an option if it became known in advance and it also mandates that present donors continue their relationship with the resistance beyond the current funding figure. The plan would require the President to make a major public pronouncement which, in turn, must be supported by other Administration officials, resistance leaders, and regional Heads of State once it has been announced.

RECOMMENDATION

Ybbroke _

That, if Durenburger and Lugar indicate an unwillingess to support resumption of USG aid to the resistance, you discuss the attached plan with Secretary Shults following your meeting.

Attachments	Pallbac	ok Option Plan Section 8066 of the FY-1	N
Tab I -	Tab A		A
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"The AFrings"

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UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE N 10614

PALLBACK OPTION PLAN FOR THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE

Assumptions. The Congress is unwilling to support release of \$14H in USG funds for the purpose of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Micaraquan. The FY-86 budget is seriously jeopardized by Congressional action and will require a major effort on the part of the Fresident immediately after the MX vote through mid-July. There will be insufficient time or assets available to organize the kind of Administration-wide effort required to achieve an affirmative vote in both Houses on the Micaraguan resistance program.

Section 8066 of the law (Tab A) expires on October 1, 1985. There are currently \$28M requested in the FY-86 intelligence budget for the purpose of supporting paramilitary operations by the Nicaraguan resistance. The current funding relationship which exists between the resistance and its donors is sufficient to purchase arms and munitions between now and October--if additional monies are provided for non-military supplies (e.g., food, clothing, medical items, etc.). The current donors will have to be convinced of the need to continue their funding for munitions after October 1, 1985. A commitment for another \$25-JOM from the donors will be necessary for munitions in 1986 in anticipation that the \$28M requested in the intelligence budget is not approved.

Concept. In lieu of forwarding the report to the Congress required by Section 8066 of PL 98-473, the President would announce on or about April 2 that the American people should contribute funds ("...send your check or money order to the Micaragean Freedom Fighters, Box 1776, Gettysburg, PA...") to support liberty and democracy in the Americas. He would note that the monies raised would be used to support the humanitarian needs of those struggling for freedom against Communist tyranny in Central America. By necessity, the speech must be dramatic and a surprise. It cannot be leaked in advance.

Prior to the speech, the following steps must be taken:

- -- Calero, Crus, and Robelo (the principle leadership of the Micharquan armed and unarmed resistance) must be covertly advised of this plan and must assure of their support.
- -- The Micaraguan Freedom Fund, Inc., a 501(c)3 tax exempt corporation, must be established and obtain a Post Office Box 1776 in Gettysburg, Philadelphia, Valley Forge, or Yorktown. (This process is already underway.)

Beclassity: OADR 1131100 SECRET

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under Joseph Col E J. 12255
by C. Reger, Not. Lal Sacus. Cruncil

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- Presidents Suazo, Monge, and Duarte (and the appropriate leadership of each of those countries) must be apprised of this plan 1-2 days in advance of the announcement. They must be prepared to fully support the President's proclamation.
- The current donors must be apprised of the plan'and agree to provide additional \$23-10M to the resistance for the pupchase of arms and munitions.
- Public groups and political action committees already mobilized for the Congressional campaign to relieve the 8066 constraints will have to be mobilized for the new approach (advertising, posters, mailings, phonecalls, etc.) several hours before the President speaks.
- Assuming a Presidential speech on or about April 2 at 8:00 p.m., a briefing for senior Administration officials should be held at 7:00 p.m. that day in Room 450 OZOS to ensure that public commentary after the speech by these official is supportive of this proclamation


Additional Requirements.


- Informal contact several months ago with a lawyer sympathetic to our cause indicated that such a procedure would be within the limits of the law. Fred Fielding should be asked to do conduct a very private evaluation of the President's role in making such a request.
- The same of one of several existing non-profit foundations, we have established in the course of the last year, will be changed to Micaraguan Freedom Fund, Inc. Several reliable American citizons must be contacted to serve as its corporate leadership on its board of directors along with Cruz, Calero, and Robelo
- Calero, Cruz, and Robelo will support support such an option if properly approached. They should then be photographed with the President on the day of his announcement and prepared to appear on U.S. and other media supporting the President's program.
- You will have to make a quick (one day) trip to the region, preferably the day before announcement in order to brief Reads of State and regional leaders. For obvious reasons, this must be a very secret trip.
- The President's speech must be prepared in total secrecy much the same as Ben Elliott worked on the Grenada announcements. Charles September 1

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SEMBITIVE

EXHIBIT OLN-148







N 16367

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 25, 1985 1915

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JINI

I xeroxed copies for CM from these originals.

I am returning them to you for the file.

Thanksi

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MÃ.

EYES ONLY

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCE, WASHISTON G.G. 2000

March 16, 1985

N 16368

SYSTEM IV MSC/ICS-400246

ACTION

HENORANDUN FOR ROBERT C. HCTARLINE

PROKI

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT

Paliback Plan for the Micaraguan Resistance

Congress is apparently rejuctant to rescind the restrictions in Section 8066 of the FY-85 C.R. (Tab A). Should you determine in your meeting with Senators Durenburger and Lugar (Tuesday, March 19, 0730) that the Congress will not endorse a resumption of USG support to the resistance, we will need to develop a fallback plan for getting on with support for the resistance. The best fallback we have is to stress that, while President Reagan is unwilling to use U.S. troops in Micaragua, all available intelligence supports the realization that we will have to in the 1990's, if there is not a democratic outcome now.

RECONSTRUCTION

That, if Durenburger and Lugar indicate an unwillingness to support voting on USG aid to the resistance again this spring, you ask them for fallback options.

Approve _/_

Disapprove ____

Attachment
Tab A - Section 8066 of the FY-85 C.R.

Declaration I calessed on SMay AP?


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HOR ASCHAED



N 16369

ATH'S PS. PRINTS"



N 16370

America States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and hold at the City of Fashington on Monday, the territy-third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-free

Joint Resolution

Making medicaling appropriations for the first year 1994, and for other purposes.

Resolved by the Synate and Mouse of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE

That the following sums are hereby appropriated, set of any manage in the Transacy and otherwise appropriated, and one of applicable surpresses or other processes, resslots, and pack hands, for the process departments, as include, corporations, and other organizational units of the Opportunity of the Special year 1908, and for other manages of the Opportunity of the Oppor

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H. J. Res. 645-96

Asserve, Army National Guard or Air National Guard occupied by, or prepressed to be compared by, persona in an active Guard or Receive States. Provided Author, That some of the funds appropriated by this Ast may be used to include (civilian) military technicians in comparing civilian personaled exilings, including statistically or administratively imposed ceilings, on activities in support of the Army Asserva. Air Force Reserva. Army National Guard or Air National Guard.

State Code, (a) The junyintees of protion 130(a)(2) of fitle 10. United States Code, shall not apply with respect to fixed year 1986 or with respect to the narrow/parts of fin do to that

Of During Same year 1865, the civilian assessment

to Derical mean year 1906, by dividing personnel of the Department of Delicate many not be managed on the basis of any and strength, and the management of anyl personnel during that final year shall not be subject to any confequent or limitedies (known as all quickerseagh) on the number of high personnel who may be offendered on the last day of mail final role.

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CHARGETIS OF PERSONS

Sec. 8005. Appropriations or funds available to the Department of Defines during the ourrost fiscal year may be transferred to appropriations provided in this Ast for research, development, test, and realizable to the expect assessery to meet increased pay extenently-fined by or pursuant to low, to be merged with and to be repliable for the same purposes, and the same time period, as the

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
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
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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MATOR SELECTION OF SELECTION OF

"April 11, 1985

N 10592

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT'C. HCFARLANE

THE SECURITY CONNECT

FROM:

OLIVER L. HORTE

SUBJECT


FDM Hilitary Operations

Attached at Tab A is a summary analysis of how the FDN has expended funds which have been made available since USG funding expired in May 1984. From July 1984 through February 1985, the FDN received S1M per month for a total of S8M. From February 22 to April 9, 1985, an additional \$16.5M has been received for a grand total of \$24.5M Of this, \$17,145,594 has been expended for arms, runitions, corbat operations, and support activities:

- most expenditures have been for purchases of arms, ammunition, and other ordnance items;
- the \$2.5M indicated for upkeep of base camps on the borders includes costs of approximately \$350K per month (an expense which will increase as the number of recruits continues to grow) and \$50K for the operation conducted in Managua against the ammunition de, at the EPS military headquarters;
- the funding has allowed the growth of the resistance-from 9,500 personnel in June 1984 to over 16,000 today--all with
- when the May 1985 sealift arrives (85M has already been deposited for this delivery), an additional 6,000 fighters can be equipped and fielded after a 3 week training period;
- the relocation of base camps along porder has been ordered for mid to late April 1965 in order to disperse the target for a Sandinista attack (cost for this relocation have not yet been fully quantified);
- the acquisition of two small transport aircraft at the cost of \$186K is prudent given the increased patrolling activity by the EPS along; border, thus complicating trail-borne resupply for columns operating deep inside Micaraqua.

Declassity, OADS

-ATMOSPONE



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Summary of Operations to Date

The FDN has grown nearly twofold since the cut-off of USG funding. In this period, they have reoriented from conventional to querilla warfare tactics. Despite the lack of any internal staff organization (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4) when the USG withdrew, the FDN has responded well to guidance on how to build a staff. Although there was a basic lack of familiarity with how to conduct guerrilla-type operations, since July, all FDN commanders have been schooled in these techniques and all new recruits are now initiated in guerrilla warfare tactics before being committed to combat. In short, the FDN has well used the funds provided and has become an effective guerrilla army in less than a year.

Puture Operations

Mark Street

Plans call for remaining resources (\$7,354,000) to be used as follows:

- --- increasing the force to a total of 25,000 by mid-furmer:
- a major special operations attack against Sandino airport with the purpose of destroying the NI-24 helicopters and the Sandinista Air Force maintenance capability;
- -- a major ground operation against the mines complex in the vicinty of Siuna, Bonanta, and La Rosita (Nicaragua) -- the purpose of the operation is to secure the principal lines of communication in and out of Fuerto Cabezas; and
- -- the opening of a southern front along the border which will distract IPS units currently committed to the northern front.

It is apparent that the \$7M remaining will be insufficient to allow the resistance to advance beyond these limited objectives, unless there is a commitment for additional funds. The \$14M which the USG may be able to provide will help to defray base camp, training, and support expenses but will not significantly affect combat operations until early Autumn due to lead-time requirements. Effects should, therefore, be made to seek additional finds from the current denors (\$15-20M) which will allow the force to grow to 10-35,600. If a commitment for these funds is made between now and June 1985, supplies could be ordered in July, allowing the force to reach these levels by the end of October 1985.



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That the current doiers be approached to provide \$15-20M additional between now and June 1, 1985.

_ Approve ____ D:

Disapprove _____

-Attachment Tab A - Summary Analysis of FDN Expenditures

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N 10596

As of April 9, 1985

FON Expenditures and Outlays July 1984 through February 1985

Quantity

Item

COSE

210,000

84,645 96,000

47,104-

Independent Acquisition

G-3 rifles Magazines Rounds 7.62 x 51 Rounds 7.62 x 51 Hand grenades



Airlift 61 - February 1985

81mm grenades 60mm granades 50 cal API Rounds 7.62 x 39 Rounds 7.62 x 51 -Ereight, Demurrage, Ins., etc.

Airlife +2 - Karch 1985



Rounds 7.62 x 19 RPG-7 grenades Rand grenades 60mm mortars C-4

Tuses and detonators G-3 rifles G-3 magazines Cleaning kits

40mm granades 50 cal links Freight, Demurrage, Ins., etc.

Sealift #1 - April Arrival

RPG-7 reckets Rounds 7.62 x 39 Rounds 7.62 x 51 Belts for 7.62 x 39 \$A-7 launchers \$A-7 reckets H-79 grenades Preight, Ins., and other exp

H-79 grenades

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N 10597

TON Expenditures and Cutlays
July 1984 through February 1985 (Cont'd...)

Quantity

Item

COSE

Sealife 02 - May Arrival

Rounds 7.62 x 39 Rounds 7.62 x 51 Rounds linked 7.62 x 51 Hand grenades H-79 grenades 60mm grenades 81mm grenades 82mm grenades RPG-7 rockets Claymore mines 50 cal API 12.7 amo 57mm recoiless rifles 57mm ammo Anti-tank mines G-3 rifles G-3 cleaning kits AK rifles G-3 magazines AR magazines Swedish K magazines HK-21 machine guns RPG-7 launchers M-79 launchers 9mm pictols AK-39 links or belts Fuses and detonators

Deposit paid Estimated cost

Miscellaneous Expenses Since July 1984


Uniforme Uniforms
Boots
Radio and comm equip
Air and ground transp
Hilitary gear
Aid to southern front
Aid to Hisuras
Food, family asst,
upkeep of base
camps, air force
hospitals, etc.
Political activity offices in various
countries and cities countries and cities, travel, p.r. Acquisition two transp simplemen

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April 11, 1985

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ACTION

HEHORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCFARLA

N 16375

OLIVER L. HORTES

SUBJECT:

FDM Military Operations

Attached at Tab A is a summary analysis of how the FDM has expended funds available to them since USG funding expired in May 1984. According to information they have given us, from July 1984 through February 1985, they spent \$1M per month for a total of \$8M. From February 22 to April 9, 1985, additional \$16.5M has been received for a grand total of \$24.5M. Of this, \$17,145,594 has been expended for arms, ammunition, combat operations, and support activities.

- Most expenditures have been for purchases of arms, ammunition, and other ordnance items.
- The \$2.5M indicated for upkeep of base camps on the borders includes costs of approximately \$350K per month (an expense which will increase as the number of recruits continues to grow) and \$50K for the operation conducted in Managua against the ammunition depot at the EPS military beadquarters.
- The resistance has grown from 9,500 personnel in June 1984 to over 16,000 today.
- An additional 6,000 fighters are undergoing a 3 week training period.
- -- The relocation of base camps along border has been ordered for mid to late April 1985 in order to disperse the target for a Sandinista attack.
- The acquisition of two small transport aircraft at the reported cost of \$186K will help ameliorate increased patrolling activity by the EPS along border. This patrol activity has complicated trail-borne resupply for columns operating deep inside Micaragua, thus necessitating aircraft resupply.

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Summary of Operations to Date

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Puture Operations

Plans call for remaining resources on hand (\$7,354,000) to be used as follows:

- increasing the force to a total of 2,500 by mid-summer;
- a major special operations attack equinst Sandino airport with the purpose of destroying the HZ-24 helicopters and the Sandinista Air Force maintenance capability;
- a major ground operation against the mines complex in the vicinity of Siusa, Semanza, and La Recita (Micaragua) -- the purpose of the operation is to secure the principal lines of communication in and out of Puerto Cabesas; and
- the complex of a southern front along the berder which will distract EPS tasts currently committee to the merthern front.

It is apparent that the 87M remaining on hand will be insufficient to allow the reciptance to advance beyond these limited objectives, unless there is a commitment for additional funds. The \$16M, which the USS may be able to provide, will help to defray base comp, training, and support empenses but will not significantly affect combat operations until several menths after Congressional approval due to load-time requirements. Efforts

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must be made to obtain Congressional approval for the \$14M supplemental to the program. If this effort fails, we should undertake a major Congressional push for next year in the \$75-100M range -- that is, obtain Congressional approval for a program sufficiently robust to achieve a democratic outcome.

That you brief the President on the current situation and urge concerted action on immediate Congressional approval of a \$14M CIA supplemental and \$75-100M for next fiscal year.


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Attachments

Tab A - Summary of Analysis of FDN Expenditures

(From FDN Sources)

Tab B - Summary of Combat Operations: Oct 1984 - Mar 1985



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Exhibit OLN-151



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SYSTEM IV NSC/ICS-400453

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MADISTON 0.6. 2000

May 1, 1985

N 16331

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HEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCFARL

FROM

OLIVER L. HORTH

SUBJECT:

FDW Military Operations

Partially Decisional Colleges on S. Read. 1987 by 3 Read, from 181 Security Council

Attached at Tab A is a summary analysis of how the FDM has expended funds available to them since USG funding expired in May 1984. According to information they have given us, from July 1984 through February 1985, they spent \$1M per month for a total of \$8M. From February 22 to April 9, 1985, additional \$16.5M has been received for a grand total of \$24.5M. Of this, \$17, 145,594. has been expended for arms, ammunition, combat operations, and support activities.

- Most expenditures have been for purchases of arms, amunition, and other ordnance items.
- The \$2.5M indicated for upkeep of base camps on the, porders include costs of approximately \$350K per month (an expense which will increase as the number of recruits continues to grow) and \$50K for the operation conducted in Managua against the ammunition depot at the EPS military beadquarters.
- The resistance has grown from 9,500 personnel in June 1984 to over 16,000 today.
- An additional 6,000 fighters are undergoing a 3 week training priod.

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Summary of Operations to Date

The FDM has grown nearly twofold since the cut-off of USG funding. In this period, they have reoriented from conventional to querrilla warfare tactics. Despite the lack of any internal staff organization (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4) when the USG withdrew, the FDM has responded well to quidance on how to build a staff. Although there was a basic lack of familiarity with how to conduct querrilla-type oprations, since July, all FDM commanders have been schooled in these techniques and all new recruits are now initiated in querrilla warfare tactics before being committed to combat. In short, the FDM has well used the funds provided and has become an effective querrilla army in less than a year. The listing of combat operations at Tab B (is indicative of what the FDM has been able to accomplish with funds already made available. It is important to note that, although funds started to flow in July, purchases made possible by this funding did not arrive in FDM hands until October 1984. The FDM has grown nearly twofold since the cut-off of USG

Puture Operations

Plans call for remaining resources on hand (87,394,000) to be used as follows:

- increasing the force to a total of 2,500 by mid-summer;
- a major special operations attack against Sandino airport with the purpose of destroying the MI-24 helicopters and the Sandinista Air Force maintenance capability;
- a major ground operation against the mines complex in the vicinity of Siune, Bonanse, and La Rosita (Micaragua) -- the purpose of the operation is to secure the principal lines of communication in and out of Puerto Cabesas; and
- the energies of a southern front along the porder which will distract EPS units currently demitted to the northern front.

It is apparent that the \$7M remaining on hand will be insufficient to allow the resistance to advance beyond these limited objectives, unless there is a commitment for additional funds. The \$14M, which the USS may be able to provide, will help to defray base camp, training, and support expenses but will not significantly affect combat operations until several months after Congressional approval due to load-time requirements. Efforts

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must be made to obtain Congressional approval for the \$14M supplemental to the program. If this effort fails, we should undertake a major Congressional push for next year in the \$75-100M range -- that is, obtain Congressional approval for a program sufficiently robust to achieve a democratic outcome.

RECOMMENDATION

That you brief the President on the current situation and urge concerted action on immediate Congressional approval of a \$14M CIA supplemental and \$75-100M for next fiscal year.


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Tab A - Summary of Analysis of FDN Expenditures (From FDN Sources) Tab B - Summary of Combat Operations: Oct 1984 - Mar 1985





SENSITIVE





As of April 9, 1985

FDW Expenditures and Outlays

N 16335

July 1984 through February 1985

Quantity

. Item

Cost

Independent Acquisition

G-3 rifles Magazines Rounds 7.62 x 51 Rounds 7.62 x 51 Hand grenades

Airlift 01 - February 1985

)

Airlift #2 - March 1985

210,000 265,000 84,645 96,000 47.104 Rounds 7.62 x 39 RPG-7 grenades Hand grenades 60mm mortars 750,000 1,000 8,910 1,472 Kqs __ C-4 Puses and detonators G-3 rifles G-3 magazines

Cleaning kits 60mm grenades 50 cal links

Preight, Demurrage, Ins., etc.

Seelift 81 - April Arrival

RPG-7 rockets
Rounds 7.62 x 39
Rounds 7.62 x 51
Selts for 7.62 x 39
SA-7 launchers
SA-7 rockets
N-79 granades
Yreight, Ins., and other exp

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Parkets Decision of Section of Se

M-79 grenades



PON Expenditures and Outlays July 1984 through February 1985

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Item

Cost N 16336

Sealift 02 - Hay Arrival

Rounds 7.62 x 39
Rounds 7.62 x 51
Rounds 1inked 7.62 x 51
Hand grenades
M-79 grenades
60mm grenades
81mm grenades
82mm grenades
61mm grenades
82mm grenades
61mm grenades
61mm grenades
61mm recoiless rifles
63 ramo
63 rifles
63 rifles
63 rifles
63 rifles
63 magazines
AK rifles
63 magazines
8K rifles
64 rifles
65 magazines
8K rifles
8K rifle

Puses and Deposit paid Sstimated cost

Miscellaneous Expenses Since July 1984




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Boots
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Air and ground transp
Hilitary gear
Aid to southern front
Aid to Hisuras
Food, family asst,
upkeep of base
campe, air force
hospitals, etc.
Political activity offices in various
countries and cities,
travel, p.r.
Acquisition two
transp airplanes

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N 16337

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
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N 10582

May 31, 1985

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ACTION

HITHORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCFARL

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

The Micaraguan Resistance: Near-Term Outlook

SUMMARY

During the month of May, the Micaraguan Resistance recorded significant advances in their struggle against the Sandipistas. Despite the adversity caused by the sandipistas closure of their struggle are today more combatants actively in the field than at any time in the last 12 months. Militarily, there was heavy action throughout Micaragua and on all three fronts: north, south, and Atlantic.

Politically, the resistance leadership has advanced to the point where they are prepared to form an umbrella alliance with clearly established democratic objectives and civilian control over the military forces. During meetings this week and last in Washington and San Jose, the Ladino leaders (Calero, Cruz, and Robelo) agreed to Indian/Creole representation at the leadership leadership and the Telling charge took importance stanks toward. Robelo) agreed to Indian/Crecle representation at the leadership level and the Indians themselves took important steps toward unifying the MISURA (Steadman Fagoth) and MISURASATA (Brooklyn Rivers) factions. After nearly two months of careful coordination with Rivers, he agreed on Saturday to break-off his discussions with the Sandinistas and announced the end of the Indian/FSLM dialogue from Bogota.

Military Operations

For the first-time in the war, the FDM succeeding in interdicting the Rama-Managua-road, launched simultaneous operations in the Boaco area less than 60km from Managua and inflicted heavy losses on Sandinsita truops in the vicinity of Siuna-Bonanta. These operations were conducted in response to guidance that the resistance must cut Sandinista supply lines and reduce the effectiveness of the Sandinista forces on the northern frontier. A new operations have at the purchased a buildozer for the established and the FDM have purchased a buildozer for the sandinista forces on the northern frontier.

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N 10583

requirement to move the FDN's strategic command from his now been met. Operations have resumed, albiet at reduced levels, from their new command post location--7km north of setween May 12 and 22, over 2,000 troops reinfiltrated into Nicaragua. Approximately, 4,000 remain at lawsiting additional quartermaster equipment. Approximately 150-200 volunteers a week continue to arrive at these locations. If all continues on schedule, a \$6.3% arms shipment will arrive Monday, June 3 for immediate distribution to the units awaiting weapons. Calero intends to launch a major offensive on June 2, the day after their cassefire/dialogue expires. He has also ordered an additional \$6M worth of weapons (including AX-47's and Selgian FAL rifles) which will allow the force to grow to 10,000.

The Miskito/Creole forces operating in the vicinity of Bluefields launched an attack against an EPS post quarding the access to the naval port. Their attack was confounded by one of Eden Pastora's units operating without coordination in the same area. During the two day engagement, it is reported that 25-10 Creole conscripts rebelled against their Sandinista officers and were executed. There are also reports that during the battle Sandinista airstrikes caused casualties among their own troops and their Cuban advisors. Efforts are underway to confirm this information and have it made available to the media.



Political Situation

Two weeks of intense dialogue with the resistance leadership has resulted in the preparation of a document on national democratic objectives and reconstruction. Calero, Cruz, Robelo, and their respective political directorates have concurred in the document and will publicly promulgate the doclaration at a news conference tentatively scheduled to be held in San Salvador on June 10. The document establishes civilian primary over a unified military organisation, commits the unified resistance to a democratic process, promises a plebecite to elect a new government, and

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confirms their intention to invite an international peacekeeping force to supervise the disarmament of the military forces in Nicaragua once democracy has been achieved. Their statement also calls for a new constitution and the reconstruction of the country once the provisional government is installed.

A similar effort has been underway with both MISURA and MISURASATA in an offort to unify their two forces.

Brooklyn Rivera broke off his three

month effort to achieve some degree of autonomy from the FSLN.

In a series of meetings with Rivera and his representatives and subsequent meetings with Steadman Fagoth and his directorate, it was agreed that the Moravian Church would sponsor a mediation between the two groups starting on June 2, 1985. The Indians and Creoles have also been told that they will have a representative to the provisional government and Calero, Cruz, and Robelo have agreed. The letter at Tab B was provided during meetings with the Indians on Thursday. Although it contains dated information, it may be useful for you to provide it to the Fresident.

In short, the political and military situation for the resistance now appears better than at any point in the last 12 months. Plans are underway to transition from current arrangements to a consultative capacity by the CIA for all political matters and intelligence, once Congressional approval is granted on lifting Section 8066 restrictions. The only portion of current activity which will be sustained as it has since last June, will be the delivery of lethal supplies.

Disapprove __

PECONDENDATION

That you brief the President on the above.

Approve

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Attachments	
Tab A -	Photograph
Tab B -	Steadmen Payoth Muller ltr to the President
	of May 11, 1985

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N 10587

May 11, 1985

Mr. Renald Reagan, President of the United States of America Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Indian communities of the East Coast of Nicaragua, and in particular MISURA (United Miskito, Sume, and East Nations), which is an honor to command, I would like to extend our appreciation for your continued interest in command, I would like to extend our appreciation for your continued interest in command. I would like to extend our appreciation for your continued interest in Sent, Jermany. "I am the Hiskito Indian of Nicaragua", was a most eloquent form of moral support of our secrifice, expressing in positive terms our vital participation in the redeeming of our country which is today, subject to the wishes and decisions of Soviet Communism.

The Indian resistance to the communist regime of Micarague, has caused savage repression by the Sandinista Government, which from it's inception has force: the exodus of our people, lead by Bishop Salvador Shaffer, to the Honduran Hiskitia the unqualified and indiscriminate massacre of our people; the disapropriation and destruction of our property, and of the confinement of innocent people in subhuman condition in camps, reminicant of Maxi concentration camps.

Of 236 communities existing before 1979 with populations of approximately 175.000, there remain only 117. The others were destroyed by the FSLN, their inhamitants forced from the Atlantic Coast of Micaragua, forced to abandon their natural habitat. 22,000 to Henduran Hishitis and 15,000 resettled by the Sandinista government, like prisoners into areas supervised by government troops to "avoid" annexatiof the East Coast to the Freedom Fighters, as you so aptly refer to those of us who fight for liberty against the traiters of the Micaraguan Revolution.

In spite of the need for economic resources it has not been difficult for MISURA to present a different perspective from that of the organization known as MISURASATA (sandinists unit of Miskite Sume and Rama Mations, lead by Mr. Brooklyn Rivers, and directed by the sandinists in order to have the Miskitos put aside the patriotic insurrection. Obviously MESRASATA and their traiterous campaign have ful support of the Sandinists Government and of Democrat and liberal senators, unfortunatly it is also backed a sandinists religious organization working in Micaragus.

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In the face of this unfair situation HISURA is confronted by a dangerous despair, a lack of excerpth in the fighting which brings grave circumstances. Of 1800 combetants who have been trained military during 1982 and 1983, only 1800 are cetually fighting in Micaragus. The rest of that 1800 are to be found in refugee camps or in our native villages, barofest and whithout equipment, avaiting orders.

The scarcity of economic resources has produced an alarming demonstration within our ranks. Demonstration when wen see their brothers-in-arms die from the lack of antibiotics. Demonstration when wen see their brothers-in-arm die from lack of outboard motor meeded to transport wounded and eich to a seme where they can receive medical attention. And finally, Mr. President, demonstration when a soldier must go into bettle armed with only one magazine of bullets because of their occurrity. This demonstration is accontrated upon seeing our moldiers without cloting with which to cover themselves.

Since economic aid was suspended 14 months age, MISURA has been funded as follows; as of Septimber 1984 our ally the FDN (Micaraguan Democrat Front) has provided our organisation with 36,000.00 monthly, increasing to 12,000.00 in January, 1985. In December 1984 during an intense money raising campaign held in Miami, Fig 320,000.00 and 683 pairs of beets were collected. In February \$10,000.00 plus 6 or beard motors were demand by the Daited States Council for World Freedom. These criticus all of the founds we have had at our disposal.

The economic needs plus the false constant up by the sandinistas and Broc Rivers is putting visible pressure on many Manual Research the according which wonly allow communities develope leisung the transfer of Riceregus.

In the first chief countie citation, thereof the sive areas vision of liberty as a large state of liberty and an your apportable evaluate for our region, representing MISURA, I have not receive a country to each for economic support, means of transportation, medicine, etc. In other words a specific budget proportional to or role in this historie, patriotic fight. As you have said, "Liberty gives results, is order to succeed it is necessary to wis it, so that it may serve as the foundat: and destiny of our peoply and develops naturally for the security of our continent

Mr. President, we 'are confident of your strong democratic characted which not allow you to abaden the fears fo my people, who want only to live with the pothat comes from justice and liberty, as Franklin D. Roosevelt said: It is a strengthat withstands all attacks.

Sincerely,

Steadmen Fageth Huller
Hiltery Leading of the Indian Hovement "MISS

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N 10589

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We the undersigned adhere ourselves with solidarity to the above text.

Vicini Diego, Political Coordinator.

Reefilo Archibal, Creele Cheif.

Marie Marios
Chest of the SUNOS

Majo Teofile, Hester Boad.

SPM: 45

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
EXHIBIT OLN-153

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	IRECT REPLY	RET	JRN	
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	REMARKS: cc: Oliver North Jim Radzimski			

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HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY

NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL RECURITY COUNCIL

SYSTEM IV. NSC/ICS-400564

May 31, 1985

N 41137

SECRET

ACTION

HEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCPARLAN

FROM:

OLIVER L. HORTEN

SUBJECT

The Micaraguan Resistance: Near-Term Outlook

Summary

During the month of May, the Micaraguan Resistance recorded significant advances in their struggle against the Sandinistas.

Despite the adversity caused by the closure of the chore are today more combatants actively in the field than at any time in the last 12 months. Militarily, there was heavy action throughout Micaragua and on all three fronts: north, south, and Atlantic.

Politically, the resistance leadership has advanced to the point where they are prepared to form an umbrella alliance with clearly established democratic objectives and civilian control over the military forces. During meetings this week and last in Washington and San Jose, the Ladino leders (Calero, Crus, and Robelo) agreed to Indian/Creole representation at the leadership level and the Indians themselves took important steps toward unifying MISURA (Steadman Fagoth) and MISURASATA (Srooklyn Rivera) factions. After nearly two months of careful coordination with Rivera, he agreed on Saturday to break-off his discussions with the Sandinistas and announced the end of the Indian/FSLM dislogue with Sogota.

Military Operations

For the first time in the war, the FDM succeeding in interdicting the Rama-Managua road, launched simultaneous operations in the Boaco area less than 60km from Managua and inflicted heavy losses on Sandinista troops in the vicinty of Siuna-Bonansa. These operations were conducted in response to awareness that the resistance must cut Sandinista supply lines and reduce the effectiveness of the Sandinista forces on the northern frontier. A new operations base at the purchased a bulldoser for established and the FDM have purchased a bulldoser for

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The requirement to move the PDM's strategic command from has now been met. Operations have resumed, albiet at reduced revels, from their new command post location--7km north of Las Vegas. Between May 12 and 22, over 2,000 troops rainfiltrated into Micaragua. Approximately, 4,000 remain at haviting additional quartermaster equipment. Approximately 150-200 volunteers a week continue to arrive at these locations. If all continues on schedule, a \$6.3M arms shipment will arrive Monday, June 3 for immediate distribution to the units awaiting weapons. Calero intends to launch a major offensive on June 2, the day after their ceasefire/dialogue expires. He has also ordered an additional \$6M worth of weapons (including the AK-47's and elgian FAL rifles) which will allow the force to grow to

The Miskito/Creole forces operating in the vicinity of Bluefields launched an attack against an EPS post guarding the access to the naval port. Their attack was confounded by one of Eden Pastora's units operating without coordination in the same area. During the two day engagement, it is reported that 25-30 Creole conscripts rebelled against their Sandinista officers and were executed. There are also reports that during the battle sandinista airstrikes caused casualties among their own troops and their Cuban advisors. Efforts are underway to confirm this information and have it made available to the media.

Political Situation

Two weeks of intense dialogue with the resistance leadership has resulted in the preparation of a document on national democratic objectives and reconstruction. Calero, Crus, Robelo, and their respective political directorates have concurred in the document and will publicly promulgate the declaration at a news conference tentatively scheduled to be held in San Salvador on June 10. The document establishes civilian primacy over a unified military organization, commits the unified resistance to a democratic process, promises a plebecite to elect a new government, and

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confirms their intention to invite an international peacekeeping force to supervise the disarmanent of the military forces in Nicaragua once democracy has been hieved. Their statement also calls for a new constitution and the reconstruction of the country once the provisional government is installed.

A similar effort has been underway with both MISURA and MISURASATA in an effort to unify their two forces.

month effort to achieve some degree of autonomy from the PSLM.

In a series of meetings with Steadman Pagoth and his directorate, it was agreed that the Moravian Church would sponsor a mediation between the two groups starting on June 2, 1985. The Indians and Creoles have also been told that they will have a representative to the provisional government and Calero, Crus, and Robelo have agreed. The letter at Tab B was provided during meetings with the Indians on Thursday. Although it contains dated information, it may be useful for you to provide it to the President.

In short, the political and military situation for the resistance now appears better than at any point in the last 12 months. Consultative capacity by the CIA for all political matters and intelligence, once Congression oval is granted on lifting Section 8066 restrictions. 146 ...

That you brief the Presid

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*PPTOVe Distpprove Man Care

Attachments

Tab A - Photograph
Tab B - Steedman Fagoth Muller ltr to the President
of May 11, 1866

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2 page withdrawn N 41140 - N 41141 Denied in full 5/27/17

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N 41142

May 11, 1985

Mr. Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America Washington, D.C.


Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Indian communities of the East Coast of Micarague, and in particular MISURA (United Miskite, Sumo, an. Rama Kations), which is my honor to command. I would like to extend our appreciation for your continued interest in our struggle for liberty, and for the generous reference to us in your speech in Bonn, Germany. "I am the Miskite Indian of Kicarague", was a most eloquent form of moral support of our sacrifice, expressing in positive terms our vital participation in the redeeming of our country which is today, subject to the vishes and decisions of Soviet Communics.

The Indian resistance to the communist regime of Micaragus, has caused savage repression by the Sandinista Government, which from it's inception has forced the exodus of our people, lead by Bishop Salvador Shaffer, to the Monduran Hiskitia, the unqualified and indiscriminate massacre of our people; the disapropriation and destruction of our property, and of the confinement of innocent people in subhuman condition in caupa, reminicant of Mazi concentration caupe.

Of 236 communities existing before 1979 with populations of approximately 175.000, there remain only 117. The others were destroyed by the FSLM, their inhabitants forced from the Atlantic Coast of Micaragus, forced to abandon their natural habitat. 22,000 to Mondaran Mishitia and 13,000 resettled by the Sandiniets government, like prisoners into areas supervised by government troops to "avoid" annexation of the East Coast to the Freedom Fighters, as you so aptly refer to those of us who fight for liberty against the traiters of the Micaraguan Revolution.

In spite of the mood for economic resources it has not been difficult for MISURA to present a different perspective from that of the organization known as MISURASATA (sandinista unit of Miskito Sume and Rama Mations, lead by Mr. Brooklyn Rivera, and directed by the sandinistae in order to have the Miskitos put aside their patriotic insurrection. Obviously MISRASATA and their traiterous campaign have full support of the Sandinista Government and of Democrat and liberal senators, unfortunatly it is also backed by some suspect religious organization working in Micaragua.





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In the face of this unfair elituation HISURA is confronted by a dangerous despair, a lack of strength in the fighting which brings grave circumstances. Of 3800 combatants who have been trained military during 1982 and 1983, only 1800 are ectually fighting in Micaragus. The rest of that 3800 are to be found in refugee camps or in our native villages, barefoot and whithout equipment, avaiting orders,

The scarcity of economic resources has produced an elarning decoralization within our ranks. Demoralization when men see their brothers-in-arms die from the lack of antibiotics. Demoralisation when men see their brothers-in-arm die from lack of outboard motor seeded to transport wounded and sick to a some where they can receive medical attention. And finally, Mr. President, demoralization when a coldier must go into battle armed with only one magazine of bullets because of their accordity. This demoralization is accentuated upon seeing our soldiers without clothing with which to cover themselves.

Since economic aid was suspended 14 months ago, MISURA has been funded as follows; as of September 1984 our ally the FOK (Micaraguan Democrat Front) has provided our organization with \$6,000.00 monthly, increasing to \$2,000.00 in January,
1985. In December 1984 during as intense money raising campaign held in Miami, Floric
\$20,000.00 and 683 pairs of boots were collected. In February \$10,000.00 plus 6 outboard motors were donated by the Daited States Council for filebld Freedom. These constitue all of the founds we have had at our disposal.

The economic meeds plus the false campaign run(by the sandinistas and Brook). Rivers is putting visible pressure on many Miskitos to give up the struggle which vil only allow communism to develope loisurely on the Atlantic Coast of Micaregus.

. In the face of this dramatic situation, in order not to give up our vision of liberty and in light of your usnegligable sympathy for our fight, representing HISURA, I have not besitated in coming to you to ask for economic support, means of transportation, medicine, etc. In other words a specific budget proportional to our role in this historic, patriotic fight. As you have said, "Liberty gives results, but is order to succeed it is necessary to win the security serve as the foundation and destiny of our people and develope naturally for the security of our continent.

Mr. President, we are confident of your strong democratic characted which vi not allow you to abandon the fears fo my people, who want only to live with the peace that comes from justice and liberty, as Franklin D. Roosevelt said: It is a strength that withstands all attacks.

Sincercity,

Steadman Tagoth Muller

Military Leader of the Indian Movement "MISUN



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We the undersigned adhere ourselves with solidarity to the above text.


Wicliss Diego, Political Coordinator.

Teofilo Archibal, Thufile to Creole Cheif.

Marino Marios
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SPH; df








Exhibit OLN-154

N 10964

		C/EUS	302
	SECURITY REPORT	ALARM	<u>0725</u>
. TYPE: SECURITY	11-17-66	4. NAME OF OCCUPANT:	
PIRE MALFUNCTION	- 0030 hrs.**	NBC -	
U STHER	3. TIME:	Control Con	nter
CEUS ROOM 9 302	(DING) 7. POUNG SY:	Control Ca	nter
On November 17, 1986 conducting a routine DEOB room #302 was 4 placed to the office responded to the off lock but the access officer Kozina clear	survey of the alar dund in access. A swith negative resu ice and found it lo switch was never pu end the area at OO40	s panel, zone 07: telephone call w its. Officer Ko cked with a cyph it in the secure (iina iina er mode.



Exhibit OLN-155

Co Ya Ail it again, North Such

1		SECURITY REPORT	9725 A LARM NO
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JOHN W MIRLES, JR., CHIEF COUNSES, W MES, SOCIETOR, SERVICE COUNSES, CASEY MIRLES, STAFF DIRECTOR U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH MAN
UNITED STATES CAPITOL
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-7502

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THOMAS R SMETCH, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR 800865 VAN CLEVE CHIEF MINORITY COURSEL RICHARD LEGIE DEFUTY CHIEF MINORITY COURSE

NORTH OBSTRUCTION: CHRONOLOGY

Friday, November	21, 1986
	Probably while riding back to DC in car with McFARLANE, NORTH says there has to be a shredding party. (McFarlane at 179).
	North speaks to Meese in West Wing, and asks him how much time he has. Meese responds that North may not have as much time as he asked. (Earl Dep. at 65-66). North indicates that AG people were going to be coming soon to review documents. (Id. at 73-74).
pm?	NORTH, in the midst of sorting through files, tells EARL he's been designated the scapegoat. (Earl Deposition at 64).
aftn.	NORTH gives HALL documents and asks her to make changes. (Hall at 249). HALL destroys the marked up originals. (Id. at 251). HALL fails to destroy her corresponding file copies. (Id. at 263).
early even.	NORTH begins shredding documents from the 5-drawer safe. HALL joins in the effort.
Saturday, Novem	per 22, 1986
	Reynolds and Richardson begin review of documents in North's office. (Earl Dep. at 76).
·	After Reynolds and Richardson leave for lunch, North apparently takes a folder with a bunch of

papers to be shredded. Thompson is with him when he leaves the office with "a hefting of documents." (Earl Dep. at 79-80).

Reynolds and Richardson return to NSC offices and tell North that Meese wants to speak with him. North calls Meese and arranges a meeting for the next day. (Earl Dep. at 81-82).

Sunday, November 23, 1986

12:30 pm

MORTH meets McFARLANE at McF's office. McF suggest that this might have been the time of NORTH's shredding party remark. (McF at 179). NORTH says that his only concern is the diversion. (Id. at 182).

Tuesday, November 25, 1986

NORTH informs HALL that he has been fired. noon

(Hall at 294).

Green arrives to see North pm

NORTH calls HALL from a hotel. HALL later puts a call from PRESIDENT through to NORTH at the hotel. (Hall at 296). According to NORTH, the President said NORTH was a hero and "that he just didn't know." (Id. at 297). pm

pm REGER seals NORTH's office. (Hall at 297).

HALL comes across the original altered documents from the previous Friday, and realizes she had not completed the process of replacing the original versions. (Hall at 298). HALL also notices PROF notes and minutes of the May Tehran meeting and became concerned that these had not been destroyed. pm

HALL calls NORTH in a panic. NORTH agrees to come back to office. He tells HALL to clear in Tom Green. (Hall 301-02). pm

pm

HALL takes materials which concorned her to the upper level of the office. There she stuffed the copies of the altered documents into her boots. HALL asks EARL to help her pull the PROF notes from the file. HALL puts these PROF notes "in my back." (Hall at 303-04).

NORTH and GREEN arrive at the office. HALL, NORTH, and GREEN leave together and go to pm

GREEN's car. HALL gives the docments she had removed to NORTH in the car. GREEN asks her what she would say about shredding, she says its done every day, he says "good."

Thursday, November 27, 1986


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Jay STEPHENS from White House counsel calls HALL and asks her about the shredding incident. HALL said "we shred every day" and "led him to believe that there was nothing unusual about what had occurred." (Hall at 308-09).


Friday, November 28, 1986

HALL and EARL agree not to discuss the removal of documents with FBI investigators. (Hall at 310-11).

EXHIBIT OLN-156



691 Exhibit OLN-157



*** Reply to note of 87/15/96 14:67 MTR PLOT: CLIVEP BORTH

fub foct: PATTREE BLADE CHPCE to are rapidly approaching the point where the Phoject DEROCHACE assets in contin need to be turned over to CIA tor use in the new program. The total sales of the assets (wir aircraft, varehouses, supplies, maintenence ignilities, ships, boats, leased houses, vehicles, erdeasce, munitions, maconications equipment, and a 6520° reason on property could by a Phobin Moprietary) is over

All of the ausets - and the personnel- are evend/paid by oversous compasies sith po 0,5. connection. All of the equipment is in first rate condition and as already in place. It od be ludicates for this to simply disappear just secause CIA does not want to be "tainted" with picking up the assets and then save then spend 30-100 of the \$1000 to ceplace it - seeks or months later. let, that seems to be the direction they are heading, apparently based on MSC Midances

If you have already given Casey instructions to this effect, I we wy much tibe to talk to you about it in hopes that we can teclass the issue. All melously tellere that identiately after the Senate vote the DOF will be mbjected to a major Sandinista effort to break then before the U.S. aid can secons effective. Phones currently has the only assets available to support the Day and the Class cont ambitious estimate is 30 days after a bill is siened before their our assets will be available. This will be a disaster for the ner if they have to wait that logg. Given our lack of neverent on other india, options, and Elliot ples for PRODER to get food to the resistance ASAP, Phopsh will have to borrow at least \$28 to pay for the tuel. that's O.K., and Dick is willing to do so toporcou - but only it there is measonable assurance that the lesders can be repaid. The only way that the 328 in lood downy can be repaid in if CIA perchases toe \$4.58+ worth of PROPLE My speed for about 42.258 when the las masses.

told then where they can jet then consettfally from the USAF as excess - the mase way PhOSEA bought then meer proprietary accomponents. It is just usbelievable. It you wish I can send you a copy of the PROJECT DENOCRACT status report which includes a promatdous of assets. It is esetul, someteributable reading, were heverds, locth

1 PATTETE BLANK CHICK

#36

N 12565

JMP 5/186 (18)

-- (204 ALTO4 G. ELLL u Poland TO: WSOLM 05/13/00 12:01:00 ULL(E BOATE -- SECRES --

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Campaign on Contral America Dill Campy was in this secuing and account other things be said that be still folt that we needed asserbedy in the BM fall time on Central America public Affiars. I think what be really has in mind is a political ejecative that can twist area and also can a high powered public aftairs campaige, best do you thleat

That about your priost (riesd, los?

POTE PROB: JOHN POINGETER

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Also wont over the Secord Satters. Bill agroes Secord is a patriot. He will check into our seepleions, 3 told bin be could get bore detail troo you. # Public Aftairs Compaign on Control America MRG FOOR: PSJNF --CPUA TO: 05508 --CEUA



Exhibit OLN-160

UNGLASSIT LLU

From: NSJMP -- CPUA To: NSOLN -- CPUA Date and time

09/13/86 12:09:04

*** Reply to note of 09/12/86 21:50

6234

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

Subject: Iran
I think you should go shead and make it happen. It can be a private deal
between Dick and that we bless. As I told you in the other note I talked
to Casey this morning about Second. Keep the pressure on Bill to make things
right for Second.

-- SECRET --



1...ly Declassified / Deleased on 5-19-87

Ender providing of E.J. 12356

Reger, Writing! Security Council



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"HAROBILLATIC . JURALT Z

*** Beply to acte of 09/13/06 12:09 ---Subject: feas

do the interia area. Ordere were passed to the ship this secures to proceed to Harfa to pick up the atom, Landing will be accomplished ducing one might and the ship will be back at sea before daws. Leading will be accomplished by Israeli cilitary personnel.

TOI DOOLE --CPOA

TO: MSOLW --CPWA

09/13/00 12:09:00

*** Bepty to note of 09/12/06 21:50

---Subject: Itan

I think you should yo should and make it bappen. It can be a private deal between Bick and rabse that we bless. In I told you so the other sots I talked to Casey this corning about Secord. Soop the presents on Bill to cate things fight for Second. [...

R'C PRIM: BSOLE --CPEA TO: PSJEP --CPUA To: 95398 -- CPUA

07/17/04 17:20:55

*** hopin to note of 89/17/84 88:15 MITE TROS: OLIVER BCATH





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Seclassified/Rubused on 9 June 1987 under provisions 1 E.O. 12250 By B. Reger, lection i focustly Council









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placed to toll shalts in general possess as after the interview I protested level Transan and that we would fill his is after the interview I protested that Shalts maid that is it to the source of the that separate staff we have seen periodically. Casey agreed to proceed with the the series process for the the series seen and the visa tor his except hat seem that he would still help printingly to shalts about this. We are seen can except the seed seemed of the seed seemed of the seed seemed of the seed seemed of the seemed of th

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4227	B. BUTTON SECURITIES T/B. BY DEPOT FROM	01 01 87 TO 31 (05 87		87 05 27	PAGE POR
A/C.	NAME & DESCRIPTION		BALANCE	DEBIT	CREDIT	PI
1129A	6.8750 MERRILL, LYNCH 8/7/87 87/8	7 US\$	214262+ 2	14 262.98		1
	TOTALS	US\$	2	14 262.98	•	
				 	H 027	78
	-					·
			. . .			
	- 					
	 		•			

EXHIBIT OLN-166

Funds on Deposit with CSF Investments

May 27, 1987

Albert Hakim

Regular	254,912.36
Sub A/C #1	2,170,844.85
Sub A/C #2	2,093,295.21
Sub A/C #3	160,210.89
Korel Assets	1,578,176.92
SciTech	193,717.36
Button	216,144.77

TOTAL ASSETS 6,667,302.36



EXHIBIT OLN-167

New. Wine H
RV. Second - Small fee
+ Mre. Bellyberton First ame Bank a 12.
lorench Mgr Beck Dale
Becky Ogden [703-827-873] \$100.
Malbyn Get Robert to
(5_) rémburse 70n 60°.093'.62 1 \$ 1700.
1520. The calls to
ur

EXHIBIT OLN-168

ISTA SCHOOL CONTROL THE ACCOUNT OF THE HITCHT AS PEN JAPAN J

CSF INV RE BUTTON




EXHIBIT OLN-169

6402

*5*6/ [1]

TO THE HOLDERS OF ACCOUNT A.H. SUB-ACCOUNT 1

We are pleased to confirm that during the lifetime of Albert HAKIM, we shall accept instructions with respect to this account and any assets therein from Albert Fell? alone, both with respect to the investment of assets and the payment of funds from the account, whether to nim or to any third party or parties he shall designate. Should Albert HAKIM die or become disabled so that he is unable to communicate with us (become "disabled"), or otherwise be unable to communicate with us, a decision we shall make in our best judgment, we shall then accept instructions with respect to this account from Richard V. SECORD alone, both with respect to the investment of assets and the payment of funds from the account, whether to him or to any third party or parties he shall designate.

Snould Richard V. SECORD after having qualified to give us instructions concerning this account, die, or become disabled, or otherwise be unable to communicate with us, a decision we shall make in our best judgment, we shall then accept instructions with respect to this account from Oliver NORTH alone, both with respect to the investment of assets and the payment of funds from the account, whether to him or to any third party or parties he shall designate.

In each instance we are authorized to accept instructions from the person being entitled to act with respect to this account, regardless of the content of said instructions, including to pay the totality of the

OLN-169

- 2 -

assets in this account to that person or his designee, in cash or otherwise, and we shall not be responsible in any way for the use and application of these funds.

Should none of the three individuals named above or alive, then upon receipt of proof of death in form satisfactory to us, we shall divide the then remaining balance in this account in 3 equal parts of equal value, and note one such part for the designees of that individual if he shall have left a written designation with us, or if he shall not, we shall pay that part to the properly designated representative of his estate.


we further confirm that although these instructions are not irrevocable, we shall accept a change in these instructions only with the written approval of any two of the three individuals named above, unless only one of the three shall be living, then on the written direction of the survivor. Nevertheless, we direct your attention to the fact that the person having the right to operate this account may withdraw any part or all of the assets in this account at any time without the consent of any third party.

CSF INVESTMENTS, LTU.

81: Druken Kepignet

Albert Hakim

EXHIBIT OLN-170



2 July 1986

Lt. Col. Oliver North 703 Kentland Drive Great Falls, Virginia 22066


For Installation of Security Equipment, Systems and
Services at 703 Kentland Drive, Great Falls, VA. \$8,000.00

(This equipment should prevent any further problems for you and the family. Please call me if there are any questions about the operation of the systems and/or any other matters regarding protective security)

Many thanks!



EXHIBIT OLN-171



(202) 966-5873

2 July 1986

Lt. Col. Oliver North 703 Kentland Drive Great Falls, Virginia 22066

For Installation of Security Equipment, Systems and Services at 703 Kentland Drive, Great Falls, VA.

\$8,000.00

(This equipment should prevent any further problems for you and the family. Please call me if there are any questions about the operation of the systems and/or any other matters regarding protective security)

Many thanks!

22 September 1986

Ollie,

Due to my schedule I have not found time to follow up on my paper work - as you can see from the dates. I'm sure that you have had the same problem. Please remit when you have time.

Many chanks!

EXHIBIT OLA-171

EXHIBIT OLN-172

LtCol Oliver L.North, USMC 703 Kentland Dr. Great Falls, Va. 22066

18 May 1986

Dear Mr. Robinette

My wife and I have considered your kind offer to expedite the installation of a security system at our house in Great Falls. In view of the recent threat by Abu Nidal my frequent absences from home, we would very much appreciate it if you could proceed in accord with the terms we discussed in our last meeting.

It is my understanding that the full system will cost approximately \$8000-8500; that it can be installed quickly; and that we have two options for reimbursing you for the expenses:

- 1. Loan of the equipment for a period not to exceed the expiration of my active service in the United States Marine Corps (June 1988), at which time we will make our home available for commercial endorsement of your firm and the equipment without fee; or
- 2. Payment in full for the equipment and the cost of installation in 24 equal monthly increments commencing on the date that the installation is completed and fully operational.

Given our current financial situation, we would prefer the first alternative if this is still amenable to your company. I am particularly concerned about the safety of the children given the unfortunate media visibility my position has generated. If the aforementioned terms are still acceptable to you, we would like to have you commence work as soon as possible. We are, of course, prepared to sign an endorsement contract now if you require more than this letter as indication of our intent.

2

Oliver L. North



EXHIBIT OLN-173

Oliver L. North 703 Kuntland Dr. Falls Church, Va. 22066 1 Oct 86

Duar Glunn.

Pluase forgive me for not getting back to you sooner. I've been out of town and we seem to keep missing each other on phone calls.

The reason for my first call was to inquire about your note of Suprember 22. We are a bit confused and surely don't want there to be any misunderstanding in that we are very pleased with the security arrangements at the house. I am also grateful for your looking in on Betsy and the girls now that Steart is off at school and my hectic pace does not seem to have slowed a bit.

Back to the point: your note of September 22. It was our understanding that we were going to go ahead with the first option for reimbursement - that is; commercial endorsement of your company and the equipment when I retire from the Marine Corps in 1988. If that is not your understanding, we need to get together and talk. While we are very pleased with the system and the fact that it "came in under estimate" (old Pentagon saying), we just don't have \$8,000 without borrowing it, and with Stuart in school, and Tait going next year, that is a real problem.

Pluase advise soonest. I don't want you to be cought short - but I don't want to have to resort to holding up gas stations on my way home from work at night either.

Warm rugards,

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EXHIBIT DUN-173

967	SOLAY	HT-Ray-86	SHIP EMERGES	(#PIA;H MAE HERRY ILASH MARKET)	5,1471,00		1,872,430,00
See L	98LW	17-Pay-86	SHIP	SHE (MANUE)	290,464,49		1,541,974,00
OMER	ALBON VALVES	12 Ray 66	MEINESS	IRIP - IRREL	2,793.00		1,777,181,00
OHER	PLROS VILLES	13-Hey-64	おいて知	IRIP - IRREL	3,460,60		1,734,181,60
HOME	LANE REMOMES	14-may-8a	INCOME.	FUNDS FROM INTERNACES	5,,.	10,000,010,00	11,776,181,00
PRES	RAM WILKS	14-Ray-86	NUCLEUS	TOO COOR IS (OF EXP)	101,300,00	10,000,000,00	11,454,481,00
PREN	WINDS AND ALL	15-Hny-86	BALKES.	BALIES ENGINE	2,776,00		11,451,743,50
PECIAL	PLEON VALVES	15-Rey-86	CVPNESS	BILL ACTECAME SER TO CHARGE	30,150,00		11,421,753,00
(40)	INTE PAR SUME	15-May-66	COSE .	CIA	4,300,000,00		4,921,733,00
THEME	LANE PERSONALES	14 Ray-86	19E/19E	PARK FROM MINISCEL	4,,, ,	5,000,000.00	7,921,753,00
INCOME	LINE RESIDENCES	10-Rey-86	IKUK	PARES FROM 1974EL			
CAPT NO.	RUION WALVES	la-Ray-86	CAP: IAL	SCINEDI TRIMENCOS COS	150,000.0-	1,440,000.00	11,361,753,66
o (MER	OAF HIMETI'A	70-Pag-86	P-SINCES	BENECOME FEES COF 188 Addition			11,231,733,00
UNITED	WALL	20-Fine 86	MA CE	SMI IN	2,570,00 84,874,00		11,227,233,60
WIRL	RADII WALKS	20-May 84	CAPITAL	SCI TECH			11,144,339.00
CEP110	ALMIN VALUES	39-Hau-86	UPTIAL	166	4,623,00		11,125,524,60
PHER	101(0	N-fray 85	MACHES	MIECHIS FEES	26,410.66		11,107,634.00
947	BOLIN	Ziv-Rey-Bé	Selb	CREEKLA INDUSTRE (MINURE)	2,740.60		11,104,2%,00
(TI'R	A DUR VALVES	29-May-86	4114		52,104,00		11,053,392,00
CONTRA	MOST ANGES		AIP NE	C. IEA	24,490,00		11,625,762,60
(AP) NO.	HARE MAIN SOMME	70 Toy-86			172,411,00		10,924,491,00
COMPA		20-Rey-86	(APITAL	puf lon	710,010.00		10,724,491.00
(#71 T/EL	10100	20-May-86	Meri	PORTUGAL ROUG SEE CAR (ROCT 67 866 SR)	13,154.00		10,711,741,00
CPTIAL	4.500 VALVES	20-May Ba	PIR	Mikir .	26,470.00		10,104,651,00
	HALE MANY BOTHE	21 -Hay-86	CONTR	HARTA .	₩, 300,00		10,124,951,00
947	BOLM	21-May-86	BAP ENFERES	COPTAIN FRAC HEND (CASH ROUNCE)	5,912,66		10,617,539,00
CONTRA	ALDEM WILLES	21-Hay-86	MA CPS	SOVINCIN ACT TRANSPORT LIVE	35,000,00		10,544,539,00
CHARLES	COM YELES	21- 110y-11 5	ALR OPS	SCHNEIM AER HUNGHANT JET STAN	39,000,00		10,514,537,00
COMPAN	ALDEN WILKES	21 - May - 66	MIR OFS	SOUTHERN AND TANGETON REPORT	44,449,60		10,074,539,00
CRP1 tot.	OUT HOMETING	21-May-66	(MIML	HOLLIN	10,400,66		10,444,539.00
CAPINE	WIE PARK SHARE	22- May-86	CAPITAL.	SCI MECH	100,000.00		10,314,539,00
ion	MINE PARK SOUTH	22 -Ray-86	ALE PROPRIE	MEMBLEPELING	33,471,00		10,331,016,00
CIA	HOME PARK SECRE	Ci-May Bo	rates.	PERTUGAL MINE SES CAN	200,000,00		10,131,068.00
1000	WE PAR SPARE	23 -may-86	MR (PS	Standing and transport	440,000,00		7,721,048,00
CAPI NO.	HARE PARK SCHOOL	23 -May-86	CAPI IAL	MACIN .	300,000.00		7,221,446.69
CIA	HARE MAIN SHARE	CI Pay-66	MAG	PRINTINGER, PRINTE TAILS CHA	200,000.00		7,421,048,00
SHIP	GOLIN'	23-May-86	MAY CHEMES	ACCREDIT SERVICES WATTIVE	20,000,00		1,001,045,00
	INSE PARY SUREL	22-Rey-86		CARN (CENERAL ENVENEES)	2,144,60		6,996,724,60
OHER	INTEL PRICE SURFE	27-May-86	MELIE'S	PHILICAL ENGINE	24,453.00		8,972,271,00
(PIM.	TORE	27-May-80	(MINL	edicini	10, 100,10		8,942,271,99
Tanan	HITE PAR SHARE	19-May-86	MIR OPS	SOUNCES AND TRANSPORT	700,000,00		8,742,271,00
OMEN	HITE PIEM SUITE	3 m , 86	HEINE 95	BASINESS ENTRACE	1,404.0		8,740,447,60
CAPTING	HIRE PARK SHARE	28-Rey-No	TUA	SCINCIA - STIC.	43,847,40		8,714,820,40
947	WITE PIEW WATER	3·m, 46	SHP	CURREDLY EXCHANGE	36.50.0		8,490,295,60
UP 1 10L	TOVCO	45-Jan-96	(MIN	MIKIN	79,167,6		8,611,128,00
PIN	IONCO	10.66	WITE	C. 76A	79, 167, G u		8.531,941,00
GTI€R	HITEE PARK SOUTH	e de la compansa de l	MISLINESS	MANUEL ENGINE	1,1041,100		8,570,961,60
- API 16L	HOYLO	0 - Jun-86	UN TIPL	MIREL	79,167,140		8,451,794,00
(P)10	TOPE O	UL Am M	(#::W)	91164	(6, jA), rm		8,475,444,14
MIP	50.Hf	of Jun 60		INTINEN APPE HEAVE	3,175,00		8,472,279,40
947	BOLIN	45·J·m·86		FACE MINCES - FACEF CITAL AND HATE	5,5(e),uti		8,414,777,00
					,,,,,,,		-,,

MMI 8,040,00

1,657,478,00

EXHIBIT OLN-174



NOVE	CCOM!	MAN .	TYPE	Tr AMERICA I Judio	OLDI ?	(16.94)	MME
(CITED)	ALDER VILLES	W-Jm-M	ARTER.	ON	7,000,00		8,407,777,40
	RID WAS	www as	AIR UPS	MITTERN, R.	5, 410 ,01		8,444,779,00
	COM WILES	No han-No	(Amen)	MODEL	10,170,00		8,374,777.00
1990	HARE PARK SQUARE	W- han-Bh	ale materali	MALEAGIA.	76,488.00		8,38,391,00
GAMES	ALIEN VILLES	47-Jun-86	MAN ACM	HEIMIC BACHGAGER CHERETH)	2,294,00		8,313,997,00
947	88,017	12-340-66	547	SAL REMINE ENGAGE	1,293,00		8,334,704.00
CAMPAN	TOPICO	14-34-96	ara ors	guration, A.	10,010,00		0,301,701,00
	OUT HANGING	14-5-06	VICE OF THE PERSON NAMED IN	CSF 10V 640601	2,540,00		8,362,134,00
*****	OUT THEFT!"	14-Jun-86		(FREINC ENINA	15,222,66		4,24,134,40
COPINE	HISE PARK SAME	18-34-86	COPING	elkin	200,000,00		1,40,101,40
CPREAM	WATER BARNET STANKE	10-340-06	MA 675	STATE OF THE PARTY	242,660,66 44,525,60		7,000,954,00
(MINE)	RIM WEES	18-34-46	MA CPS	MANUAL T	2,000,000,00		3,74,407,00
(4114)	ANGE LABOR SANGE	18-3-m-66	COPING.		11,141,00		3,76,23,60
(#1ML	1010	20-20-66	COPINA		300,000,00		3,765,236,00
(0770)	TOTAL	29-Jun-86	***	MINIST ALVANIA	75,000,00		3,200,730,00
COMPAN	RIM WHES	N-Jan-M	44 47	STATES AND TRANSPORT			3,241,443,40
COP1 WL	TOTEO	20-Jun-86	CAPT ML	HAKER	11,163,00		5,237,866.60
UP I ML	10/0	3r-3m-86	COP1 NA.	C. TEA	11,163,00		3,234,132,00
COPIE	10100	20-Jan-86	CAPITAL	SCI ICUI	3,720,00		3,227,747,66
	BELITY	2a- Jun-da	BAN EAGAGE		4,45,46		5,140,707,00
CHANNE	MALL	27-Jer-B	MR	CONTRACTE ALR SERVICES	32,000,00		3, (37, 747, 64 3, (37, 747, 64
((minute)	HARE LABOR SPILLE	30-Ja-66	CHARM	CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR O	M,600,60		1,131,731,00
247	10.17	30-340-86	94F CIPERES		3,454,60 7,600,60		5,149,253,44
CEMME	HIEE PARK SAMPLE	3~3m-86	Canada	GR4	3,000,00		3,144,233,44
CONTRA	HARE LAUK SANAE	30-Jan-li	NA 675	CONTROL R. SCINCO - STICL -	20,000,00		3,114,253,00
COPI NO.		30-30-66	SPECIAL.	MINE MEDIES CARD	1,000,00		3.113.733.00
	ALIEN WILLES	01-M-6	STREET	SAMES AN MASSAIT	20,00,0		4,913,233,00
CERTIFIA	THE	01-Jul-66	MR OF	PRINCE, AND THE CON MICCI AT MA SHI	95,400,40		1,000,253,00
CDA	10100	61-Jul-66			11,040.00		4,667,213,00
CHITTO	WILL	ω- 	AR 675	Springer Add Total PORT	21.574.00		4,653,737,60
CAPINE	WHILE	67-Jul -86	SECIAL	SCIRCO - SINCI	44,394,00		1,774,433,44
CENTRAL	MAIL LANK MARKE	67-34-66	48 65	ENGT 14C	2,340,00		1,41,421,6
	HOME PRINT SOUTH	67-Jul-86	PEES	Leaders, JELA	15,300.00		TAYOTO
947		₩₩₩	Set CALIFORNIE		13,325.00 3,125.00	ŧ.	1,931,341,44
90/		4-M-40		CAPTAGE REAL TERMS	2,778.00		1,430,530,64
200	ALDER VILLES	47-3-4	907	CHROCA EXCURSE	3,000,00		3,993,330,00
907		10-3-4-66		CAPTAGN ARME NEMP CORN WALES	3,700,00		1,974,439,00
Del P	SOLUTI	14-Jul-46	947 (PERE		6,230,00		1,931,300,00
947		10-141-66		COPTOLIS ARME NETAP	1,940,00		1.931.430.00
947		14-34-84	SHP EVENE	SELECT - MISP OF W.S.	8,277,00		1,921,321,00
COPIE	WALL	14-34-66	PELIA	C. 169	10,000,00		1,911,121.00
COPING	INDE LOST SPRINT	14-34-86	(PIN	CR OWNERSE (INDIANAL)	70,000,00		3,003,321,4
967		15-in-86			661,767.00		2,961,334.00
CIA	HARE WHAT SHAME	16-34-86	400	PORTION AND BUTS ((MRTERIUS ATS	5,430.00		2,935,904,00
247		16 Jul-86		AESO CANADOCTARS F18	95.377.40		2,910,512.0
Callege		JA-Jul-fa	AIR		125,000,00		2,765,312.00
COMPAN	WE HE SHALL	18-3-6-86		C-123 VINO PURDINE	15,00.0		2,440,512,64
LEMPER	INSE MIN SHIPE	14 30 - 86		C-123 FLIGHT HOUSEN PROLINGE	210°449° 60 172°446°44		2,230,512,4
	WHE PARK SUPPLE	19-3-m • 🍑	10000000	INMFER TO MINEL!	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		2,300,512,00
(#11AL	ALDER VALVES	_2-341-86	SECIET	HOEL - TON CREEN			2,2%,048,00
967	100 AT	23-3-4-64	S4P (SENE	CHALLERING REMICES	4,444,60		***

PROPER	ACCOUNT	BAIL	146	Hampil, Elvin	lebi:	riteb. 1 Breiter t
TOP	MALIN	25 54-84	÷i,	SHE CHARLES		
(un'an	FLERE WELF.	4 14 66	MF (PS	CAPT FILE	4,1 %,000	2,291,892,01
COS 1:0L	ALBON VALIES	4-3-4-86	96.18		67 ,840,194	2,334,432,44
0.44	ALIGN ANES	.4-Jul-86	PAG.	HAVEL INTERCONTINUENTAL	lii,apu,te	2,194,632,01
94+	BOLIFF	3-A-6		CA : VI & VANE 15 MP.	7,652.00	2,186,980,00
lade:	AFRE PRINE : MALE	28-34-66	MR	WENN CYTON	.125.**	2,143,405,141
Det	MLHV	20-1-d-66		(HORTERING SERVICES	196,251,00	.,9.7,645.40
IRAN	WITE PROV SOUNE	39-341-86	ZIVBY	EMIC SACIES (VIII)	14,440,110	1,771,665.00
LUMBO	MARLE THE STATE	21-34-66	NR OF		1,000,00	1,770,445,00
OTHER	WELL	A 14 8	MEI (FS	MMTERO, J. CCMMANA BEL BESDAM	16,204.00	1,75/,401,40
(RPL)AL	VENL	30-341-86	PECIAL	MANUEL STEEDS	3,973.40	, 17(,406, e)
I Ren		20-M-166	FRES		4,876,00	1,995,312,00
OTHER	VIIIL	21-Jul-86	PSIES	LADORAL, JILA	8,900,00	1,937,512,00
907	90,00	21 - 14 - 66	SAP EFFIRE	MAINES ENGINE	49,000.46	1,897,312.00
947	MARK		DAY (WENES	COPINE MEE INCH	3,125,60	1,894,307,00
(P) M.	MACH.	31-341-86 01-841-86	SECUL		7,100,00	1,467,257,60
(API No.	AGAT.			SCI (EC) - STICE	70,000,00	1,617,267,60
342	NA.W	44-Aug-86 44-Aug-86	96.10	MICH - SIMPON TECHNICA	13,000,00	1,801,787,00
COMMA	WALL.		MA CHEMES	CHRISTING SERVICES	12,000,00	1,712,287,40
199	WE BLAN AND FILES	U7-Ray-Ba		COMMUNE WIN ZEMNICES - RECORD	01,434,60	1,710,653,49
CIPINA		20-Aug-86	MENCES	DANIES EIPERE ITER QUESI	19,000,00	1,700,853,00
30P	RIGH VILVES	20-Pag-Bb	SECIA.	SCITECH - BANCO MEDICINTES (STICE)	10,000,00	1,460,653.00
	10.W	21-029-06	SAL CALIFFE		4,800,00	1,466,653,69
COMPA		22- Pag S a	MR 675	STATISTIC ALR TRANSPORT	125,000,00	1,361,653,00
	TOTAL	22-Aug-86	COMMEN	CINE	14,000,00	1,347,653,60
1000	WALL	22-Aug-86	NER THREE ORT		21,437,60	1,925,444.00
OMER	UNILL	22-44-66	MINER	BASINESS ENFORCE THIS (SECOND)	7,000,00	1,340,444,00
(CONTRA	TONEO	22-Aug-86	CENTRA	MORELA	20,000,00	1,490,414.49
(CONSTAIN	W LL	22-0-9-06	IMESTICHE	MODINETPE (IMPESTIGNAE CHOI MCCL*)	7,000,00	1,407,414.60
947	BOLON	22-frag-86		MAN AND TERM	6,25v.00	1,463,354,60
CONTRAC	VOALL	22-949-86	NA ers	EAST INC	34,000,00	1,427,384.00
CONTRA	19/09	22 Aug 86	ALR OFS	enturens, A.	10,000,00	1,417,364.00
CAPITAL	1010	25 Pagrata	SHEN.	9. I TECH - FORMY INDIGENSES (STICL)	79,400.00	1,347,344,00
947	DOLINY	23- 0-4-4 -6-	DOP ENFERES		7,100,00	1,320,254.00
SHP STIER	BOLFY TONCO	25 Aug Ba	SUP EMERS		4,30,00	1.234,014,09
		23-hay-86	MS14638	MANESA ESPERA	1,633,00	1,304,561.00
CONTINA	WALL	in Angrilla	MICHET	ALE	44,872,00	1,297,467,46
OMEN	1010	in-Ang-Ba	INGLESS.	DISTRESS ENFENSE	300,00	1,277,167,00
CPP I NA.	1914	7.44.86	· TIME	MOREL	256,390,40	1,438,771,60
(MP1 IAL	101(0	27-Mag-86	(m) the	MICH	270,370,00	760,373.00
COT IN	TONCO	77 Pag 86	UPIN	C. IEA	754,396,00	521,975,00
OHER	TOYCO	27-hag-86	BORINESS.	DISLIES ENFEME	1,000,00	320,975,00
CIPT NO.	1010	.7-Aug-86	CAPINE	SI EU	64,133,40	439,842.00
BUP		28-Aug-M	Seb (home?	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	15,000,00	417,842,00
PHER	TOTAL	W1-Sep-86	OMERIC SE	THE COMPLIS OF EMPI	51,000.00	34,842,00
COMMA	101C0	NJ-Sep-BA	MA	CONTRACTE ALS SERVICES	62,018,00	36,624,00
CENTRA	191(.0	OL Sup &	AI TORNEY	THE CHEEK	15,004.00	271,629,00
(ORTHA	101CD ,	05-Sep-86	MR 675	GALARENO, R.	5,000,00	264,624,46
1 (page)	TOVCO	05-Sap 86	FEES	LANGEROUS, JILA	5,000,00	281,629,00
CONTRAC	104CB TOVCB	09-Sep-86	COMPAN	CRAL	7,496,46	274,824,00
CONTRAC		UP Sup &	(100700)	MARELO	10,400,40	264,624,60
CONTRA	1010	11:Sep-86	AIR OFS	SOUTHERN ALS TRANSPIRE	50,000,00	214,824,00

PHOPOEE	ACCOUNT	MIE	1105	164 05 50 1150	DEP1:	(66.66)	M. (*)
CAPTIAL	101/0	12-Sep-84	SECIA.	Scriffer - Stice	15,460,40		
*****	TOYLO	1." Sec-86	·685	Laurand, Jila	13,400,40		199,824,14
CATTEN.	TONCO	12-Sep-86	ATTUME Y	ION CHEEN	10,000,00		189,824,00 179,824,00
A1.4EB	TONCO	18-Sep-86	DATE OF SE	BUSINESS EMPRISE - TON CLINES	2,000,00		177,624,00
JAMES	HATE PARK SCHOOL	24-5ee-84	AIR OFS	GULHTERO, fr.	10.000.00		147,824,40
, A49)	ALEN VALES	31-500-66	DAMES OF THE PARTY	SVEINESS EIPERGE (TON CLINES)	5,000,00		167,629.00 142,629.00
INCOME	HYSE PARK SOURCE	24-5ep-86	LIECTORE	FINES FROM CIA	,,440,440	1,200,900.00	1,347,624,69
(gartes)	LINE MERON'ES	23-Teo-Bi	NA OFS	EAST INC.	14,447.00	1,200,700,00	1,348,375.00
I Ada	HITE PARK SOURCE	73-See-86	AND TRANSPORT	AFFINE SAGE WE	5,777,00		1,342,646.00
CHARTES	TUTCO	3-1m-W	AND 675	STATISTICS AND PROPERTY	100,000,00		1,742,646,00
(COMPAN)	WILL	73 100 10	AND .	CORPORATE ALIR MEDIFICES	91,934,00		1,150,710,00
947		24-9up-66	MAP ENTERES.		7,100,00		
347		20-Sep-86	DAY ENGINES		3,175,00		1,143,440,60
947	BO.AV	3.5-6	DOP EPOSES		1,125.40		
242	MA.W	27- Sep-84	BOY CUPDINGS		13,340,60		1,137,340,00
LARGO	HYSE PRINC SIMPLE	20-See-86		INCHES ESPENSE MICES	31,000,00		1,124,000.00
1991	HITE MAK SHARE	2/- Sep-86	\$7407	BRIC PRIMER CARM	21,000,10		1,073,620,00
CONTRA	ME PAR SUME	W-81-86	ALR OFS	GRUTERO, R.			1,072,429,69
(#1 H)	MAK HARK SEASE	03-0:1-0	SECUR.		5,000,00		1,667,624.46
(#114	INTE HAD YOURS	ui-Oct Ma	COPTIAL	SCI NCH - STIGI	25,664,69		1,002,020,00
LENGTHA	HATE LANG STREET			HELD RETHRACIENT	230,000,00		792,636,66
CONTRA		0-0-1-86	(MINA	PORELO	10,000,00		762,629,60
(47) 149	WINE PRIN SOPHE	14-61-66	CHITTEN	CMAX	7,660,60		175,430,40
	MANE PARK SQUARE	06-Oct - 86	Secia.	HATH - STREETS JECHNEOCY	30,000,00		745,620,40
1000	INSE PROI SPACE	4-01-00	FEES	Lineathies, JILA	5,740,86		721,280,40
I REM	ME MAK SPAL	46-Uct -66	ALR TRANSPORT	UENCE FAMILIES	54,552,60		484,728,00
ADER	HARE LAURE BOTTON	1 6 -9:1- 8	Bulling 96	DERECTOR'S FEES	1,672,00		442,836.00
947		15-441-86	SHIP EMPERES		29,660,60		442,454,49
OTHER	INE MAK SOME	15-0 (-66	BABHES:	MILES EPPIE - WALL	2,746,68		446,656,00
1400	HARE WHAT SHAPE	29-4c1-66	MA	NEXID EXAM	251,440,40		447,854,40
COMPA	HALF LAND SERVE	27- 4 4 - 86	SA TORMEY	TÓN LIEÉN	20,440,60		307,654,44
SMEN.	MARE MADE SHAME	22-401-00	SMET NEWS	MINES EPRIC CO	2,000,00		397,856.00
	INTE PRIN SPORE	だっ火い 軸	MA PARENT	ACTIONAGENC	17,065,00		340,771.00
2000	HATE LAND MARK	27-tx1-86	M/SHESS	DIGINELIA ENPENEE HAKIN	31,900,00		317,791.00
1490	WE NO SHIEL	.7- 4:1-6 5		CIA	2,457,660,140		11,717,207,00
1000	WHE PRIX SOME	27- x1-86	(PURES	ENFENSES (SMITSHI)	40,000,00		11,770,200,00
947	88,47	.'4-0.1- 6 6	SALL FRANCES	CAPTALIN ARKE VETAP	7,100,00		11,744,307,00
967	BOLAN	31-0x1-M	94º EPERES	CAPTALL DIE IGNA	3,125,00		11,700,434,00
94P		26-W1-86	34P EPRIES	CA TALL AND HERY	3,175,00		11,772,977,00
9HQ3	HAVE PROM SOME	70-14(1-06	MICH !	INCHESS ENTINE	4,971,00		(1,776,737,00
HOME	INCE POR SPACE	29-01-1-84	140.00	PARK FROM TRUE	•	2,440,400,00	1,821,441,40
CHP1 NO.	UNITE PRINT SOUTH	61-ter-la	SPELIAL.	SCINEN - SIICI	39,000,00		1,771,441,60
(00100)	INSE PARK SHARE	15 Herr 66	MR 075	convicto, R.	5,000,00	•	1,764,441,60
ONEA	INSE PROG SHARE	45-th-4-th		PURITURE CHOICE	1,174,00		1,745,265,44
Cultura	HIRE PIECE SOURCE	45-May-66	(0000)	MONELO	111,000,00		725,245,60
PREE	HARE PARK SWARE	15-10-1-86	PRESIDENT	WRIESS ENDINE	10,000,00		1,705,216,00
CONTRA	MARE PARK SALAME	65-Bar-86	COMPA	1642	7,000,00		1,730,765,00
ONER	HITE PIEK SDOKE	fo the da	DELINE TO	PRIMEN (PRIME	4,471,19		1.732.794.0
(ARM)	HISE PARK SOUTH	46-477-86	MS	Line(ASAL, JILA	10,1501,00		1,72,,504,00
(47)	INTEL PRINT SUPER	11-10-04	MITA.	L. SEA	20,(10),(40)		1,443,394.40
947	SALW .	11-9			7,140,40		1,480,094,74
COLINE	HASE PORK SOME	12-hov-8e	SELIA.	HINGE - FORGER ICSF (INCSPENT)	340,1971,60		1,424,494,00

POPUE	· ·····	MAN.	.M.	16-male ()-is	wat.	(ML).	ris.
UNITED THE CAPE THE C	VOILL HOLE FROM SOMME	15-fave-\$6 16 16 - 36 18-11 to-36 21-fave-96 25-fave-86 26-fave-86 27-fave-86 27-fave-86	HONORAL SPECIAL SPECIAL SPECIAL SPECIAL AT HONEY SHOP COPONICS SHOP ESPENIES HONORAL	- vip at hopologic CLIRIUM - SINCE SCHIKIM - SINCE MOLIA - SINCE AND TECHNIQUE MOLIA - LI RE WINDE FROM CS SCHIKIM - SINCE DOBLOGISS EMPORE SIGN AND CHROMER CAPHONE MOLIE MONOP ALL HOMES AND MOLIONER CAPHONE MORE MONOP ALL HOMES	7,7 m, yes 15-yes, ye, 5-yes, ye, 25, yes, ye, 260, ye, 4,256, ye, 3,125, ye, 2,125, ye, 2,125, ye,	· ······ ·	1,420,700,00 1,270,700,00 1,270,270,00 1,270,270,00 1,270,420,00 1,270,420,00 1,270,420,00 1,270,980,00 1,270,980,00 1,270,980,00
			•	10 SMLINCE ,	(22,490,00) 46,167,496,00 47,6	71,436,60	1,201,430,60
				BARK CHANGE BLONGE JAME THERESE SECURE STATE THE CHANGE STATES THE	74.715.40 ²	2,440,40 10,237,46	1,305,405,60 1,507,407,60 1,477,377,60

| 0000 | 11/200 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 | 1/200,000 |

47,724,073,00 47,734,053,00

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PARTON.	ACCOUNT	ME	TWE	integration	MM.	(REMI	DALWEE
MONE	EMERCY RESONALES	21-be:-84	MACE	(No off)		475,000,0	475,000,00
Cilmpatri	EMERCY RESOURCES	28-984	nans.	HAMILANILD ROOK	414,357.W		10,443,00
HOME	BREACH MESONALT?	47 · Jan · 65	100,000	(ALDIO		%,450.00	107,473,00
COMMEN	DEBLY RESOURCES	16-Jan-65	MARK.	HANDLE AND	10,000,00		17,063,00
MEDINE	EFERCY RESIDENCES	16-Jan-85	IN.OFE	CALEM		137,000,00	354,693,69
MORE	INTERCY REBURCES	17-Jan-65	MOR	CALDIO		324,545.46	480,474,00
CENTRAL	BRINGS RESIDENCES	22·Jan-65	1005	THEORETICAL PROPERTY.	440,660,66		200,434.00
MONE	BIENCY WESOMALS	.7·Je-65	HOME	CALLED		138,0-0,00	416,436,00
CFINE	BEENLY RESOURCES	10 f ab - (1)	CIPTINL	HONER COMM	5,000,00		443,434,440
COPTINE	PRINCY RESMITCES	?+ f-0-6 5	CAPI ML	MANUAL COMMO	77,490,00		373,434,00
COTTO	BROWN MERBOURLES	34-Feb-45	CONTRA	HERED. ICANIAN	22,600,00		371,434,00
CHPS NO.	ENERGY RESIDENCES	D-F#+45	COP1 NR.	C, TEA OCHUM	15,000,06		234,434,00
(MGN	EMERCY NETWOYES	73-Feb-65	INCINESS	MANES: CIPERE	3,506,00		355,130, ∞
COPI NO.	BRENCY RESIDENCES	2 -10- 65	Secret.	SCINEON - BITCL	8,000,00		35,134,00
HERE	ENGREY REMARKETS	6 	LINCOME	(ALPR)		1,197,923.00	1,373,653,00
Contract	LIEBROY RESEMACES	4-4-65	MA US	STATEMENT WAS INTERPRET.	121,625,00		1,423,238,00
CENTRA	ENGINEY RETURNS.ES	97 -165- 65	Albeit.	PORTYCOL MONE SEE CAR	353,460,60		1,007,438.00
(10000)	ENERGY RESOLA ES	11-4-65	MAG.	PERTICOL ARMS SEE CAR	415,447,40		453,979,40
INCOME	EMERCY RESIMENCES	14-mar-65	MEANE	CALENO		977,107,00	1,153,000.00
COMPRE	ENERGY NESPONES	19-46-65	AND .	"MANDELD RIVE	400,000,00		773,000,00
	GRENCY RESOURCES	20- 	(SPT)	HERSP	3,000,00		230,680,60
	CHECK METERALIS	J-10-15	MINE'S	HARL BULLIESS CATINE ING (SECOND)	5,000,00		36.00.00
CET ME	CHENCY RESIDENCES	20-0ay - 85	(M21 No.	1000)0	3,000,00		207,600,00
CIP1 No.	SHEETA MEDICALES	3-4-6	(PLM	1018	3,000,00	•	227.482.00
10COME	BEACH RESIDENCES	77-10-65	10000	LINES O		2,997,922.00	3,539,010,00
COP1 NO.	MERCY 44 SMILES	£ 4-65	CAPITAL.	MALIN CASA METAMANIA	5,640,40	-,	3,534,840,00
CP1 No.	SHEET MESHALES	67	(471 10)	(, TEA	20,000,00		3,714,814,60
COMPA	MERCY REPORTS		***	PARTICUL MAIS SES CAR	34,000,00		1,714,800,00
CEP1 No.	CHECK NESTHALES	W-00-65	COP1 TOL	umit. (Sicho)	7,000,00		3,207,800,00
COPING.	SHIPLY IN SHIPLING	6-far-65	(MITTEL		10.000.00		1,177,810,60
	BERCY BESILECES	67-fev-65	COPT NO.	MANUA MANUFIA	17,800,00		I.165.000.00
COP1 NA.	BRACY SCHWOOLS	67-Arr-65	CAPT THE		7.000.00		1.178,000.00
HERE	BUILDY RESIDENCES	10-far-65	INCOME	COLUMN	,,	1,777,794,69	3,177,914,40
	EMERCY RESPONSES	19- 0ar-6 5	MR OFS	PTIMENO, A.	3,000,00		3,172,914.00
OPIN.	BESCY RESOURCES	17-4-6	COP1 FOL	MANEL - TON CHEEN FINNETS FEE	45,000,00		3,427,714,60
CAPING	DESCY SESSOCIS	111-4-1-65	SECIAL.	SCI SECH - SINCE	37,000,00		3,077,914,00
COMM	BEDGY BERNOLES	10-fer 85		TRANSPILLA PARE	47,444,68		5,430,470,00
CEPTER	MERCY MEDIUMES	12 64-85	(87) 16.	MIRE. (SCORE)	110.336.49		4,912,134,00
(10) 144		12-6	(17)	IFOR FEED	13.000.00		4,574,134,60
OPIN	OBC COM	12-04-05	C#116	mata (16000)	HI.977.00		4,712,207,00
COPI NO.	BERCY RESIDENCES	14-Apr-45	COPING	IGNAM (TRANSPER)	30,000,00		4,742,207,00
COP I REL	CHARLES RESIDENCES	14-44-40	(491)4	C. TEA	3,000,00		4,722,307,00
COPING	COLUMN CONTRACTOR	ia-ter-E	(APINL	MACON	1,000,00		4,717,207,00
COPINE.	BEECH MANAGES	3 44.60	LAPI NO.	MINISTER IN A. CHARLES	7.00.00		4,442,177,00
CONTRA	OFFICE ACCUMANTS	17-fer-65	-	PARTICIL RIPS 196 CA	15:40.00		4,532,177,00
CEP1 100.	DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTY OF THE	17-167-15 18-161-15	STELLA	SC1801 - STRG	4,300,00		4,323,477.00
OF IN	BERGY RESPALES		CAPINA	C. TER KARDO	15,000.00		4,386,477,00
PICONE.	DESC! MESPACES	19-Rev-45 23-Avr-65	(In ANE	COLUMN TO THE STATE OF THE STAT	,	1,117,716,00	3,746,363.49
CPINA.	REPORT RESPONSES		(P110.	9 I ECH BASHESS EXPENSE +. PHILLIPS	5,440,00	- 4 4	3,702,363,00
COPT INC.		25-145-155	(10°) THE	JAN 18E	(,000,00		5,760,560,49
	EMERCY MESOPOLES	3.4-6			10,000,00		5.672.362.00
CHARRA	BENCY RESPIRCES	75- 4	ALCOS.	PORTICAL AND PVS	10,000,00		·,•••,, ••

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Common C								
Common C	CHAMBLE	EMERGY RESOURCES	:3- 1 ≠ -85	ALL IPS	unional factorial factoria	4.846.00		5 AM 501 m
Commiss Select (1990mCS 17-ty-red 14,555 1405 1405 1405 12,107,66 1,255,755,66 1,255,755,66 1,255,755,66 1,255,775,66		DEKI NESDACES	5-4m-85	#D	PRE-HOOK HOME PAS			
Common Select Rispon-15 1-1-1-15 1-1-1-15 1-1-1-15 1-1-1-15 1-1-1-15 1-1-1-15 1-1-1-15 1-1-		ENERGY MESONACES	7-1er-85	INCHE	/ CREM	.,,,	*** ANT AN	
Commiss Design Processes 1986 Processes 1986		GENCY MESON (5	79-Aug-185	465	PORTICOL METER MAPS	21 207 40	,	
Carring Carr		EMERCY RESIDENCES	No Rey 85	ABPG				
Carry No. Carr	(PIN	CHECK REMARKS	New 45	CP1NL				
Cornel Subsect Responders -2-may-85 (ap) 15,	COPT NO.	CHARLE RESOURCES	15 Rev-65	CAPITAL.				
GP NO BESTON RESPONCES -0-4mg-65 miles mil	CRP1 NO.	EMBRCH RESOURCES	7-Rev-85	(PIM	C. NEA			
Compared	(D M	EMERCY MEMORIES	4-Hey-65	reference on the second				
CHI		(MERC) MESONALE)	VF-007-65	STECIAL.				
Description	CHINA	ENERGY NEST OLES						
Marker Carlot No. 1945 14-10pt	CP*1100	BERLY RE-MALES		CIPLIAL.	C. 15A			
CHINA	Jan (mf	CONTROL MEP JACER		INCOM.				
CHRIST RESPORTS 22-may-25	COPTINE	EMPLY RESIDENT		OPIN.		200 000 00		
UPT 100,	CENTRA	DIENCY RESOURCES						
Company Delicate Regional Company Delicate De	UP 1 10L	DEN HIMBLE						
Company Comp	(~400	DEACY RESPATES						
Mart	CENTRA							
CP1 NR DELLAY MES-MEE 01-3a-05 CP1 NR HELER 33,000,00 1,202,272,00	MEANE					,	-	
CPT TRL GREET RESPORTE 10-3cm-25 CPT TRL RECEN 3,000,00 1,307,272,00	(10) 164					~~~	211,540,44	
STATE STAT	COTTE							
CPT NR. CHERCY RESIDENCES 18-Jun-155 SPECIAL SCRIPT STYCES 00,000,000 1,500,200 1,500,201 1,500,20	100	EMPLY RESIDENCES						
CPT NR	COFT THE							
CPT NR. CPS	CIPI NO.							
CPT NR. DEED: ASSMES SI-Jul - SI CPT NR. C, TES T3,000,00 1,000,000,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,0	CFIN							
COPT NO. CONTIN. CON	COP1 THE	DEDC KINALIS						
CPT NR. BERTY RESIDENTS CP Jul - 95 CPT NR. DRICES 20,000.00 1,000.700.00 1,000.	CEPT NO.	OMC/ NUMBER	63- Jul -65					
MICHAEL MEMORIALS 19-34-55 MICHAEL CALLEDN 1,704,701,00 1,704,701,0	COTTO							
CRT NR	HOME					20,404		
CPT-MIL BEBECT RESIDELES 13-34-05 SPECIAL SCLIPCOT - STATCOT TO ,000,000 2,500,751,000 2,500,751,000 2,500,751,000 2,500,751,000 2,500,751,000 2,500,751,000 2,700,751	COPT NO.					4 600 60	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
CHITCH SHEET RESOURCES 1- Jul - 25 SHEE PRINCER, SHEE SHEET CON 103,252,00 1,775,279,00 1,775,2								
CPTINL DEBOT RESOURCES 15-3al-35 OPTINL BRICK BESCORE) 2,500,00 1,770,000,000,00 1,770,000,00 1,770,000,00 1,770,000,00 1,770,000,000,00 1,770,000,00 1,770,000,00 1,770,000,00 1,770,000,000,00 1,770,000,00 1,770,000,00 1,770,000,00 1,770,000,000,00 1,770,000,00								
CPT NR								
CPTINL GREEN RESIDELES 10-3ad-25 CPTINL C, TEA 200,000.00 1,300,200								
Company Comp								
CMTHNL SMERCY PERMITES 1a Jul -15 CMTHNL BRESH (EMEL) 2,300,00 1,200,000,00								
Cartino Parricy (Egoum 2.5 1a Jul - 25 Mail of 5 (RE-1970), 1, 7, 7,141,00 1,797,799								
Marting								
- 491 NR, SHEACY RESIDENCES 17 3-1-3-25 (APS) NRL PARTS, ESECURBS 7,000,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 200,000,000 200,000,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,000 2,000,700,700 2,000,700 2,000,700,700 2,000,700						1,017,00		
Contract	4110					7 000 00	********	
CHRONIX DEERCY RESPONSES July 25 PROSE PROSECUTION DEERCY RESPONSES DEERCY								
CHINCA C	CONTRACT							
CHT NR	4004400							
CPT NR	L#7170.				-			
					= =			
CPS1NL LINE RES-NRES 1-hap-25 DF11RL SELECTE 04,500,00 1,500,700,00 1,7	to and					4,144,44	* *	
CRETAL LINE RESON -5 . 8 for 25 PETAL VECTO LINE 17-100-01 1-7-100						44.44	J	
CONTROL LIME RESOURCES 27 Proj. 25 AND RTS QUELLEDIO, 6. A JUNIO, 6. 1,700,700,400 CONTROL LIME RESOURCES 20 Proj. 25 MARIE MINISTRAL PROJECTION 1,700,000,000 1,700,700,000								
Common Comit 41000m (5 30-A-6-25 more marger mundors 1,000,000,00 300,590,00								
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				(,1,144,141		,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

****	*CLEAR*	ME	~	lien de tijen	MM	·KM.	M.M.(
~## # #	EMERC: MESHALE:	··· Sec 85	HANEL	10 : 10764 (07,05,07m)	2.72.	**** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	570.442.49
(restant	LIME RESOURCES	1. mir. 65	MH. NO. 1	WALF IVELENET	1,00,00		347.442.#
COTINE	UNE RESOURCES	15-9-85	FELIA	SCIN N - SIIGI	15,450,140		795,642,600
(MIME	LAE REMAKES	15 5-9-85	ST. IAL	S.I.H COS. COST.	7.434.00		99,776.00
1,000000	LINE RESOURCES	12-5ep-85	NA O'S	WENTERS, R.	4,000,00		975, 776,00
(MIM)	TWE HARMER	1. 🖛 🚯	(MIN	matt regings	2,000,00		473, 776,00
CAPINE	LINE MERON ES	17-200-05	LPTIME	40RL (SE(MB)	19,000,00		41.71
HEAVE	LINE RESOURCES	.+·5m-#	医便	FUNDS FROM SHIR LOLU		1,000,000,00	1,42,776,00
(AP) ML	LINE RESIDENCES	2 1-549-85	(IPS MIL	SCINCA - N. PHILLIPS	2,60-,60		1,44,71.0
OP (16)	LINE RESYMPTES	23- 1-19-1 5	(#1ML	entrata	11,30-,40		1,470,474,40
(IP) IR.	LAME RESCHICES	22 Sep-85	CAPING	100(3))	1,300,00		1,480,776,00
CHANGE	LANE RESPORTES	2:-	ADDICATE!	MALE MIRCHIT	4,000,00		1,450,474.00
HOME	LINE MERONALES	23-149-65	LIKE	K	•	127,734.00	1,304,917.00
CENTRAL	LINE MERHALI	23- 5up-85	MA US	Qualification, A.	2,376,00		1,394,534.00
CAPS TALL	LANE RESIDENCES	24-Sep-85	(API NO.	MINIOP	3,000.00		1,377,334,60
CONTRACT	LINE RESIDENCES	>- 196 5	(matte)	CALIDIO	175,000,00		1,604,534.00
COMPAN	LINE MESSAN, EL	01-0:1-85		PARTICIA, ARRES SEL CAR	301,450,00		1,705,004.00
LEATER	LAKE MESOND EZ	01-0c1-05	AND OFS	Quinting, R.	4,000,00		1,077,005,00
COMPANY	LINE RESIDENCES	01-0:1-05	CHARGE	CALIDO	Z.000.00		1,071,424.00
CAPINE.	LONG MESSAGES	wt-fect -65	CIPI NA	S.LINEON	2,000,00		1,67,63.0
COPT NO.	LINE RESPONSES	441-6	CAPINA.	MINIST	1,200.00		1,070,535,00
HILDE	LINE RESIDENCES	11-4:1-65	MCDE	K	.,,	77,778.00	1,170,401,40
(0070)	LINE RESONALS	15-64-65	(.478)	Marine Contract Contr	2,465,69	11011	1,145,401,00
CRITTON	LANE RESINANCES	15-41-65	A-R 675	OCCIDIO, E.	1,000,00		1,144,494,89
CIPT ML	HITE PAR SARRE	15-001-05	CHP1 TRL	MINISTRA CARRIE	2,000,00		1,177,44,60
PINER	LANE IN SCHOOLS	17-61 65	Final L	HOME INTERCENTINGUE	1,812.60		1,171,472,60
CONTRA	LINE RESIDENCES	21-0:1-05	(2000)	AMELA	13,000,00		I.I.P.
COMPAN	LINE RESOURCES	21-61-65	MINCRAFT	MALE MINIST I	20.73.00		1,007,007,00
CAPI VA	LINE RESIDENCES	23-5.4-65	AP178		1,000,00		1,000,007,00
C#114.	LINE RESIDENT	25-0-1-15	#1 FB.	S.I SOI - II. PIBLLIPS	Z,000,00		.000,000,00
COPY NO.	LINE MESONACES	20 01-65	(67176)	MICH	107,000,00		774,007,00
HEAT	LINE RESPONSES	v4-tev-65	INCOM	K	,,	107,714,00	1,126,261,00
(person	LINE MEMORES	15:00-00	M4 075	generalis, A.	192.00	141,182,00	1,125,04,00
(97136)	LAME SCHOOLS	12-45- 65	CIPI HIL	MAR. (ADV METROMAN)	7,000,00		1,110,441,44
CETTEL	LINE MESPACES	14-15-15	UPTIA	10/15 THOUSES	4.40.2		1,673,431,69
COPIE	LINE RESIDENCE	14-4	CAPINA	SCIEGO TEMPER	₩.₩.₩		
COTING	UNE RESIDENCES	.: Nov-65	UPI II	HALLE THE THE THE THE THE	20,000,00		1,000,071,00 760,071,00
	LOSE RESPONDE		A STATE OF				
(·)m+44A		15 10~ 85		matte	15,000,00		773,670.00
CAPTIAL	LAME MESONACES	15-84- 65	CAPITAL MINUSET	entin	25,000,00		100,000,00
CONTRA	LINE RESYMPLES	14-10-45		ALL	₩.4.		97,44,00
HERE	LANE RESIDENCES	20-may-85	MORE	PRINCE FROM ISRAIL - NIMARODI		1,000,000,00	1,477,441.40
*****	LINE REPORTS	. i Nov-65	-	LEGIL PIPE	7,300,00		1,407,44,66
CENTRA	UNE RESIDENCES	22 🖦 65	400	PRINCE, AND THE CA	140,440,00		1,27,64,00
CAPI NO.	UME COMMITS	22 - 65	CAPITAL	HELLE	21,470,00		1,346,471.66
COMPAN	NE ASSOCIA	25-44-65	MA 075	QUINTED, R.	4,000,00		1,24,69,00
1000	LINE RESPONSES	29-Nev-85	AR	MORA LUCIA MANAS	127,700.00		1,25,79,00
COP1 NO.	LINE REPORCES	62-bec-65	COPI NA.	HOUGH .	4,000.00		1,232,791,00
CIP1 ML	LINE RESOURCES	6.; Bec : 65	COPT NO.	MAGA	9,527.00		1,773,762,00
CENTRA	C& INCEMEN	10-Bec -85	NIR OPS	SWINER AR WARPER	۵,000,00		1,141,342,40
COMPA	Cit. Innexprent	12-bec 65		PRETUGAL RAPE SAS OW	34,400.00		M.X., 60
INN	CR INCRMEN	16-Dec 85	ALS PROPERTY	MEMOLEMENT	21,983,00		BN1,279,00

PAPE	COMM	MALE	196	Maria Maria			
			1996	MASSA TIME	96341	LMEBET	MUNIC
COP'S MIL	LANE RESOURCES	14-Bec-85	(#11KL	elicin	•••••	********	
MACHE	LANE RESIDENCES	17-Box-85	HEAT	I.	:,:₩.⇔		639,873,w
(TIME	CR. THE? HERE	17-Bec-72	CONTRA	C. WA		297,942,00	1,123,7%,00
COPIE	CA IMPRIMEN	./·ks65	COPINA	Marin.	30,000,00		1,005,374.00
CAPINE	CA INCHIEN	17-Bec -65	COTIN	MARIA	100,000,00		107,7%.00
COST NO.	CO IMPERMENT	17-Bec -65	C#130	MACO	190,500.00		86,7%,00
COMPAN	CAL INCHIEN	17-Box -65	AIR UPS	CHINESE (BENESE (MERE)	67,451,00		894,765,60
	COF SINCENEUS	17-8ec-45	DOMEST.	SOCIALIS CARREST	10,000,00		774,765,60
COMPAN	COF INVESTMENT	18-Bec-65	MA 673	SEPTREME AND TRANSPORT	39,600,60		744,765,60
CONTRA	LANE MERINALES	18-9nc-65	AR 975	1016.40, J.	33,500,00		₩,265, #
CENTRA	CITY MAKESTREM	27-bec-65	ARR GTS	CHRIS THE	2,540,60		463,775,00
CENTRAL	CO. IMPERMENT	67-Jen-86	AND OF	Ortofilo, e.	140,500,40		963,225,60
	COF SOMESTICAT	66-Jan-64	DEDUCTO.	MACHINE POL	1,000,00		579,225.00
COMPAN	CF IMESHER	49-Jan-86	AUT IO.	THE PARTY OF SECOND OF SHIP IS NOT THE	882.00		574,341,00
MACHINE	LAME RESOURCES	10 Jun-66	SEPTEMENT.	MILES CHAMBONIANS	125,000,00		62,342,00
COMMO	CA INCLIEN	. Jan-86	CHIPTON			44,440.00	313,313,00
COMPAN	CO. THERMON	15-Jan-86	AMERICAN T	MINLE MINCHAFT	10,000,00		305,343,60
CAPTINE	COF EMESINGE	21 - Jan-86	COPIE	HUNCEL CHARGES MACE)	3,100,00		410,212,00
Clinitia	COF SINESTHEM	22-Jan-86	MACANE 1		3,400,60		476,243,00
HEAT	LAN MESMALES	27-Jan-84	LIKAN	12.	239,669,66		244,243,40
CENTRAL	CF IMESTICIA	22 Jan 86	Mik 4PS	STATES ALL MANUEL		340,000,00	466,213,60
(0.000)	UNIC HESINA ES	27- Jan-86	MIN-FELIA	SEFEI (PRIMACI)	20,000,00 26,174,00		380,213,00
CONTRA	CO INCLINE	Se-Jan-66	48 93	QUILLEGIO, R.			362,667,66
Contan	CF INCSINE	il-Jan-M	AMOUNT 1	ACE	4,000,00 130,000,00		730,041,40
COMMO	CO INVESTMENT	+3-F ch-65	AND COURT	MALE REACHET	39,335.00		440,407,00
COTTO	COT INVESTIGAT	to-fee-bi	CAPTING	SCITICO (CONTEXT)	100,000,00		257,534,40
COTTO	CSF (INESTIGAT	67-f-00-86	CAPING.	HOUR HOUSE	145.600.00		277,534,00
MERK	USE RESERVED	67-Feb-86	MORE	PORTS FROM INSTRUCT		2,390,000,00	7,531.00
(MA)	CALL MERONALES	10-Feb-06	AND S	CIA	1,600,600,60	4,,	2,912,534.60
MORE	LANE MESONALES	10-Feb-86	HICONE	PARS FROM MEDICOCI	.,,,	2,500,000.00	1,302,534,00
1000	LANE RESINALES	10-fab-84		CIA	1,870,000,00	4,500,000,00	1.302.534.00
COPING	CO. INVERNITA	13-Feb-84	CPIN	MARY.	35,000,00		1,257,531,00
COMMIN	LAME REMOVINGS	14-50-66	ASR (PS	CAST INC	10,000,00		1,307,534,00
140	LANE RESOURCES	[7-Fee-M	44	BARK OF OTHER IN	31,300,00		1,34,434,00
COPI DO	CAME MEDIUMCED	17-F-66-86	NA FS	manent, ;	10,417.00		1,385,647,60
	CO. INCOMEN	17-feb-86	COTTO	MATEL (ARMINEZ)	145,000,00		1,149,617,60
	LINE RESOURCES	17-f et - 86	Section()	INTIMESS EXPENSE CAPI	300.00		1,140,317,00
COMMO	LASE SERVICES	17- Fee-86	CONTRA	CPINI	1,300,00		1,120,817,60
COPTING.	CASE MESSALES	: * f ch - 86	COMMIN	MARCE	10,000,00		1,125,817,00
	CON WAR	17-5-00-06	UPTIME	C, TEA	15,000,00		1,111,807,66
9762	CIT MMESSMENT	17-Feb-86	MR 675	SOUTHERN MAR THANKFORT	274,000,00		841,817,80
	LANE RESIDENCES	17- f	MANUEL	HOLET EMBECHALINEALUT	445.00		044,157,00
NAC AND A	THE MERMACES	18-1-0-05		CASH VETRERING	39,125,00		791,027,00
HEAT	THE MERNY (C2	18-1-00-06	ID GE	FIRST FROM MEMORIAL	•	5,000,000,00	5,791,627,60
CPIN	CANE MERONICES	18-50-66	INCOME	FINAL FRAN SIN LIEV		1,999,000,00	6,771,6,7,00
(Onto)	COF LINESTREM	in-Feb-86	UPTIN	WEG #	1,231,00		4,707,474,00
CAP1 NO.	COF TIMESTHEM	20-f-m-66	MIR OPS	CHEL THE	20,440,60		6,767,676,60
(AP) IIIL	CO IMESTREM	26-5-46-86	(PIN	HATEL - SHOP CHEN MIS LINESCOO	1,671,00		4,740,005.00
(1070)	LANE RESONALES	20+co-%	AIR OFS	SOVRERU AIR TRUSPA'	240,461,46		4,328,465.46
	CW IMESTMEN	26-F++-86	MIR UPS	QUEWIEND, A.	5,490,00		4.323.00 .00
-	CSF 1mESMEIN	27-f-m-86	AIR OPS	EMBT 1ML	92,440,70		4,420,365.00
					-		

PURPORE	R((f-a)	MI	1964	THUSACL: 1	D BC1	- 4684	30,00 t
CONTRA	COF LIMESTHEM:	27-640-86	466	total and the same			••••
CONTRA	CS IMESINE	35 to 66	ME OF	MATE WAREL	222,1440,00		6,216,545.W
CONTRA	CSF 10MESTREAT	0: No - M	AIR OFS	MATERO,)	4,578,00		4,340,987,46
CONTRAC	USF IMPESTMENT	#4 - Rtu - AL	AIR OPS	PONES. 1	30,000,00		6,173,47,66
COMPRA	LINE REMALES	15-Har-86	ALR OFS	SOUTHERN ALS PROGRESS	21,000,00		6,152,967,00
(P) M.	CAL MANELLA	12-Rev-86	CAPITAL	MACIN (CAPITAL INVESTMENT ACCT)	50,000,00		4,102,767.00
(Chieffe)	OUT MINETING	()-Nor-44	ALR OFS	WHERE']'	2,000,000,00		4,162,987,00
ONER	A MIN VALUES	9- Nov-16	Minese	ACIDE	30,000.00		4,472,987,00
Litera	LANE REMAKES	10-70-04		THE TO I SHE	15,000,00		4,457,167,66
CPHTON	OIL MINETING	17-10-10	ALSCARE I		100,000,00		3,977,987,60
COPINE	COLF MINETING	10-7006	CAPITAL	HOLLIN CHOIC	473,000,00		3,42,90,00
COMMON	LINE REMOVES	10-70-44	CONTRA	Miles	23,000,00		3,454,967,60
CRP1 NO.	ON HOMETING	18-By-66	COPTING	HERE CIE	10,000,00		3,444,987,00
CHINA	OLF SERVICE	21-8	MR SPE		37,600,60		3,374,967,00
Crama	OAF MINETING			STATES AND TRANSPORT	71,000,00		I,III,907,60
COMPA	CAT INVESTMENT	21-Mar-86	ALROMATT	ACE.	27,000,00		3,274,767.60
CENTRA	CALF IMPLISHED	27-My-06	AUR OFS	gilliero, a.	10,000,00		3,284,987,60
COMM		43- 44-4 6	MA OS	SWREEN AIR THROUGHT (partial payment)	264,863.00		1,400,174,60
COMM	OLF MINETING	- Apr - 66	NER OFS	QUENTERO, R.	25,000,00		2,992,174,00
Christ	OAF MINETING	C-Ay-M	MR O'S	SHARES AND MARKETORY partial payment	125,167,00		2,654,967,60
		47-Apr-36		PRINCIL MAIS SIS ON	73,120.00		2,763,867.00
Chillia	OLF REPLETING	10-4	645 	PARTYCEL MINE SEE CHR	134,137,00		2,427,730,60
	OLF HIMETING	14 Apr 86	AIR CFS	EARL PIC	30,000.00		2,577,730,00
Michie	OLF MINETING	14-4-4	AIR (PS	SUPIEDO ALE TRAUPORT	150,000,00		Z,447,739,69
	LINE OLIVANIES	15-Apr-86	INCOVE	IC.		47,974,00	2,015,704,00
MA	LINE RESIDENCS	15-4-46	HOME	IK		M,653,00	3,145,737.00
	ADD VALVES	17-4-46	PARIESS	MACCIONS FEER CIE NOW ID	2,673,00		3,142,801,00
CAPITAL	HARE PROK SOUN-	17-ter-86	(#ila	MACE IN	3,000.00		3,137,884.00
LAPINE	ALDEN WAVES	17 Apr - 86	CAPINAL	editin	72,500.09		3,647,304.00
OMER	WIEL PARK SQUAFE	17- tyr - 86	WELHESS	BINE(1996 FEES	2,750,00		3,464,534.60
CRUSTA	MARLE	17- 197-8 6	MR OPS	ENST THE	140,337.00		2,964,177,00
LPSIN	WORLL	17-8086	S ECIAL	HOLIN - SHOP CHEEN AND LANGUAGE	294,00		2,963,965.00
CONTRA	WOLL.	17-4	ALR OPS	SOUTHERN ALT TRANSPORT	200,400,00		2,743,963.00
COPINE	PLEAN WALVES	17- 10-106	CAPTIAL	MEGR	15,660,60		2,746,963.00
WHO THE	ALDER VALVES	17-for 86	MARK BACKING	BEFEI	141,000,00		2,367,963.00
CONTRA	ALBON WALVES	18-Apr-66	ALREADY 1	ME	57,022,00		2,539,861,00
Cambing	MORLL	18-Apr - 86	aja	MENS CONTRACTORS LTB	17,435,00		2,511,24,00
CAPITAL	ALBOM WALVES	- 	DEC 14	HOKER - STANFORD TECHNOLOGY	20,000.00		2,471,244.00
CHIPPIN	WALL	.11 -14 - 14	MER OPS	SOUTHERN ALR TRANSPORT	120,000,00		Z,571,246,00
CRP1 I/AL	WIND MINES	28-Apr - 86	CAPI VAL	mac.	28,111,00		2,343,135,00
CIP ML	WHITE WATER	.8·Rn -86	(JP1ML	Milita	4,975,00		2,538,146,00
LAND	PLEASE WILLES	. B - Cape - Bb	ME	HEND EYTHI	145,000,00		2,153,140.00
COMME	ALBON VALVES	.7 Ar-66	MR 675	QUEMIEND, R.	5,460,60	•	2,100,140,00
COMMON	ALDEN WALKES	79 top - 66	(-CHIETRA	MARELO	10,000,00		2,138,140,00
CONTRACT	WIND MALKES	34 💝 · 👪	CONTRA	CUNT	7,000,00		2,131,140,00
947	99,177	01-Ray-86	SALL ENGINER		6,406,00		2,124,754,00
947		41-May-86	94P	SEP	31,078.00		2,013,456,00
CAPITAL	REPORT VALUES	02 my-86	CAPS TAL	MINISTR	943,00		2,072,713,00
CAPI TIL	4.00	Hi-Ray &	(APITAL	C. TEA	7,275,00		2,070,435.00
TECHAL	A SHE WELK'S	#5-fray-Ba	12.00	HERTH THUST BRICK HOMBIOLA	100,000,00		1,770,438.00
CRP1 NO.	ALBER WLVES	15-Ray-84	SECIO.	SCITECH - STICE	15,460,60		1,775,438,69
CONTRA	ALBOH WAYES	65-Ray-M	PILUIS	CHARGE S CLIENT - PILOTS SINVER WILIER	110,000,00		1,845,438,40

EXHIBIT OLN-175

MNFFA99ILIFI WASHING TON Erd M-4 SAS Capt. No i Brocker = 545 Gierry under provisions of E.O. 12356 ty B. Hager, Additional Security Council GE Lox Saychelles-Ruleasech December by H

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


Exhibit OLN-176




EXHIBIT OLN-177

MEMORANDUM

UNTOPRESSIFIED

SYSTEM IV MSC/ICS-400215

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

N 44842

TOP - SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCFARLANE

PRON:

OLIVER L. HORTELY COMETANTINE MENGES

SUBJECT:

Special Activities in Micaragua

Brufaltote

On the night of February 29, separate emplaced four magnetic mines in the harbor at Corinto, Nicaragua. No attempt was made by the Sandinistas to engage the during the mission. In accord with prior arrangements, ARDE's "Barracuda Commandos" took credit for the operation. ARDE has also declared that the entire Micaraguan littoral is now a "war zone" and that all shipping within the Micaraguan claimed 12nm territorial sea is subject to attack.

Out intention is to severely disrupt the flow of shipping essential to Micaraguan trade during the peak export period.

In this case, our objective is to further impair the already critical fuel capacity in Micaragua. This will substantially reduce EPS mobility and hamper their ability to support the ERP/FREM guerrillas in El Salvador.

while we could probably find a way to overtly stop the tanker from loading/departing, it is our judgment that destroying the vessel and its cargo will be far more effective in accomplishing our overall goal of applying stringent economic pressure. It is entirely likely that once a ship has been sunk

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no insurers will cover ships calling in Nicaraguan ports. This will effectively limit their seaborne trade to that which can be carried on Cuban, Soviet Bloc, or their own bottoms. The following plan has been developed:

No legal or financial action will be taken to determine the second of th

Given past performances by Sandinista military seamen under fire (surrender or jumping overboard), there is little reason to expect that the Nicaraguan civilian crews of a gasoline laden vessel will attempt to "run for it." It is anticipated that the operation can be safely executed without injury or loss of life. No American citizens will be directly involved in the operational event.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve this operation and brief the President using the points above.

Approve PCA

Disapprove ____

cc: Ken deGraffenreid

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRED IF

Exhibit OLN-178

UNG BISSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 22, 1984

. SYSTEM II 91097

N 2996

480752

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

OLIVER L. HORTH

SUBJECT:

FDW Manual on Psychological Warfare

BOJEL

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ADM Poindexter asked that you be provided with the four portions of the FDN Psychological Warfare Manual which contain objectionable material. Attached at Tab A are the relevant passages on pages 23, 24, 25, 26, 51, and 52 of the CIA's English translation from the original draft. The notes below are pertinent to the points in each section as indicated by underlining:

Page 23-24, "Shooting a Citizen." This is guidance to forces in the field who, presented with a potential compromise, are instructed on how to react. This should not be interpreted as guidance to kill civilians, but rather how to handle an incident once it has occurred. Obviously, a guerrilla force operating deep inside enemy territory cannot afford to be compromised. This section was not removed in either the FDM version or the CIA printing.

Page 25-26, "Selective Use of Violence for Meutralization."
The word neutralize appears only in the version translated from the Spanish FDW document. The original phrase in Spanish "puden neutralizarse" was put in the manual by the author from his Special Forces (JFK Center) lesson plan which had the word "remove" instead of "neutralize."

The specific intent in psychological warfare operations is to intimidate through minimum violence and thereby convince or coerce the enemy into a position of ineffectiveness or defection. Since this concept was difficult to translate into Spanish from the original English, the author used a Spanish phrase which now has been translated back into English as "neutralize."

It must be accepted that a minimum amount of violence is necessary in order to convince the adversary that he is indeed in jeopardy, if he does not comply with the wishes of the resistance. Since this manual was used both for training and as a political action/psychological warfare tool, it was important that the FSLM perceive that they were indeed threatened by potential violence.

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Finally, it should be noted that MSDD-138 specifically refers to "neutralizing" terrorist groups and movements as acceptable within the provisions of Executive Order 12330.29961 We chose this word specifically! ecause it met our requirements, short of the prainitions contained in the E.O. This section was not removed in either the FDN version or the CIA printing.

- Page 51, "Use of Professional Criminals." This section was removed verbatim from the lesson plan used at the JFK Center and is standard when there are undesirable activities which need to performed, but which will not point back to the resistance movement. For example, in a locale dependent on propane gas deliveries via truck transportation it may best to have a "known criminal element" blaimed for destroying the shipment rather than the resistance forces. The same can be said for bank robberies which help to finance the movement and deny the Sandinistas currency. It is also useful to demonstrate the inability of the local government to control criminal behavior/activity. This section was removed en toto in the CIA version and revised the earlier FDN version to show that these functions would be performed by "activists" rather than "professional criminals."
- Page 51-52, "Martyrs for the Cause." The manual calls for the propaganda teams to instigate disturbances/demonstrations which would lead the authorities (the Sandinistas) to react with violence. In these circumstances the psychological warfare teams are instructed to take advantage of this situation so that those who are injured/killed by the Sandinistas are portrayed as martyrs to the cause. Taken in the context of the overall document, this is not an odious exhortation. It should be expected that the resistance would indeed create, through political action, situations which the Sandinistas could only control through violence. The manual simply instructs on how to exploit this situation. The FDM deleted this section in its entirety from their version. The CIA printing left this passage unchanged.

After the briefing vesterday. Senator Wallop expressed dismay that the briefers were "two new guys" and not those who had been involved in the project until October 1, 1984. The Director has dispatched Claire George and to meet with Senators Goldwater and Wallop in Phoenix tonight. He also noted that the Agency was "too defensive" and "too ready to apologize." He also noted that Senator Munn was prepared to "believe our story" but that the gase had not been particularly well presented.

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Yesterday, when I asked Mallop if he could make a statument along the lines of "I have reviewed the preliminary investigation and do not see, from what has been presented so far, any evidence of wrong doing. I am withholding further judgement until the investigation is completed and would urge others to do the same." Wallop expressed consternation that no one had asked him to make this statement before he met with the press following the briefing. As it is, his statements have been rather non-committal. He has, however, supported our position that "neutralize" does not mean "assassinate."

At this point, it would appear that we have two courses of action:

- -- Encourage Goldwater and Wallop to issue a statement along the lines indicated above and hope that Moynihan and Munn would follow suit, or at least say nothing.
- -- Cause a friendly expert on psychological warfare/propaganda to publish a defense of the manual en toto, placing each of the offensive sections in context.

Director Casey's talking points at Tab B were developed along hose lines. Although he and I and his task force personnel worked on this in concert, the talking points ignore the coersive effect PSY OPS are designed to have on the adversary. The fact that scores of these documents were inserted into Nicaragua by balloon and airdrop adds to the credibility of apparent harshness in its tone. Unless the Sandinistas believe that they are in jeopardy, that the FDN is capable of violence; then there is no threat. It would seem then that we should pursue both courses of action indicated above, if the story does not go away by mid-week. If, on the other hand, the matter is no longer making the front pages by Thursday, we should stop briefing and backgrounding until the IG and IOB inqueries are completed and their reports are submitted.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the points above and the attachments and pursue the course indicated above.

	Approve	Disapprove
cc:	Ken deGraffenreid	

Attachments
Tab A - Pages 23, 24, 25, 26, 51, and 52 CIA English
Translation of FDN Manual
Tab B - CIA Talking Points

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- Explain to the population that first of all this is being done to protect them, the people, not the guerrillas themselves. 39963
- Admit frankly and publicly that this is 'an act of democratic querrillas,' with the appropriate explanations.
- That this action, although not desirable, is necessary because the final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society, where acts of force are not necessary.
- The force of arms is a need provoked by the oppressive system, and will cease to exist when the "forces of justice" of our movement assume control.
- If, for example, it became necessary for one of the advance posts to have to shoot a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which the querrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political proselytism, the following is recommended:
- Explain that if this citizen were able to escape, he would alert the enemy near the town or city, and they would come in with reprisals such as rape, pillage, destruction, captures, etc., terrorizing the inhabitants of the place for having been attentive and hospitable to the guerrillas in the town.
- If a querrilla shoots an individual, make the population see that he was an enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the querrillas recognized their primordial duty, which is protecting the citizens.
- The commando tried to stop the informant without shooting, because he, like all Christian guerrillan, advocate non-violence. Having shot the Sandinista informer, although it is against his own will, was necessary to avoid repression on the part of the Sandinista government against the innocent people.
- Make the population see that it was the regime's repressive system, which caused this situation, that really killed the informant, and that the weapon

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fired was one that was recevered in combat against the Sandinista regime.

- Nake the population see that if the Sandinista regime had ended 26964 repression, with the corruption sponsored by foreign powers, etc., the freedom commandom would not have had to take up arms to cut down the lives of their Micaraguan brothers, which huzzs our Christian feelings. If the informant had not tried to escape, he would be enjoying life together with the rest of the population, because he would not have tried to inform to the enemy. This death would have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in Micaragua, and this is exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.

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5. Selective Use of Violence for Propaganda Effects 29965

We could neutralize carefully selected and planned-for targets, such as court pridges, cattle judges [jueces de mesta], police or state security officers, CDS chiefs, etc. For purposes of the psychological effect, it is necessary to take extreme precautions, and it is essential to gather the affected population together to attend, take part in the act, and formulate accusations against the oppressor.

The target or person must be selected on the basis of the following:

- The spontaneous hostility which the majority of the population may feel against the target.
- Using potential rejection or hate on the part of the majority of the affected population against the target, rousing the population and making them see all of the individual's negative and hostile acts against the people.
- If the majority of the people supports or backs the target, don't try to change these feelings through provocation.
- Relative difficulty of handling the person who will replace the target.
 The person who will replace the target must be selected carefully, on the basis of the following:
- Degree of 'violence necessary to effect the change.
- Degree of violence acceptable to the affected population.
- Degree of violence possible without causing damage or danger to other individuals in the area around the target.
- Foreseeable degree of reprisals on the part of the enemy towards the offected population or other individuals in the area around the target.

 The mission of replacing the individual must be followed by:
- Extensive explanations to the affected appulation of why [this action]

was necessary for the good of the people.

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- Explaining that the Sandinists reprisels are unfair, indiscriminate, and above all, a justification for the execution of this mission.
- Carefully sounding out the reaction of the people to the mission, as well as controlling this reaction by assuring that the population's reaction is beneficial to the Preedom Commandos.

6. Conclusions

Armed propaganda includes all actions performed and the impact achieved by an armed force, resulting in positive attitudes on the part of the population towards that force, not including forced indoctrination. However, armed propaganda is the most effective instrument available to a guerrilla force.

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case (Location) will be additized in the largest number possible, together with individuals who have been affected by the communist dictatorship, whether it be that they have been robbed of their possessions, imprisoned, tortured or experienced any other type of aggression against themselves. They will mobilize to the areas where the (OU minel) and hostile elements of the PSLM, (CDS, and others live, making an effort to (QQ. QTAMIC) with clubs, iron (, 1885), placards, and if possible small arms, which they will carry concealed.

If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out specific selective "jobs."

The designated cadres will arrange in advance the transportation of the participants so as to take them to the meeting places in private or public vehicles, boats or any other means of transportation.

Other cadres will be designated to make placards, flags and banners with different types of slogans or watchwords, be they of the partial, transitory or of the more radical type.

Other cadres will be designated to prepare leaflets, posters, handbills and pamphlets so as to make the meetings more colorful. This material will contain instructions for the participants, and will also be useful against the regime.

Specific jobs will be assigned to other elements in order to create a



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"masses" for the cause, leading the demonstrators into a confrontation of with authorities, so as to provoke riots or shootings which may cause the rath of one or more persons who would become martyrs, a situation which should be taken advantage of immediately against the regime so as to create greater conflicts.

6. Way of Carrying Out an Optising in Mass Meetings

(It may be) affected by means of a small group of guerrillas infiltrated among the masses, those who will have the mission of agitating, giving the impression that they are numerous and that they have extensive popular support. Employing the tactics of a force of 200 to 300 agitators, a demonstration can be created in which 10,000 to 20,000 persons take part.

Agitation of the masses in a demonstration is carried out by means of socio-political objectives. One or several agents from our covert movement, highly trained as mass agitators, should participant in this action, involving innocent persons so as to provoke an apparently spontaneous protest demonstration. These individuals will direct the entire meeting until its conclusion.

External command. This group stays out of all activities, situated in such a way that it is able to observe the unfolding of the planned events from where it is stationed. As observation point, for example, he should look for a church steeple, a tall building, a tall tree, the highest tier of the stadium or an auditorium, or any other high place.

Internal Command. This individual will remain inside the crowd.

Great importance should be given to protect the leaders of these indivi-

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LKING POINTS

Hedra elscussion and pulitical dialogue about this document over the last several days has focused on four arief passages. A portion of the document containing these passages has been reprinted in The New York Times. As Senators Nunn and Wallow stated yesterday, and as indicated on pages 69-71 of a copy of the manual in English, you will see that three of these four passages were deleted by the FDN.

The Court passages were deleted by the FDN.

To understand the significance and intended meaning of those passages, it is necessary to grasp the context in which they appear. The menual was prepared by and addressed to people who had made the fageful decision to engage in armed combat in order to resist oppression by a totalitarian regime, a rusistance which the Central Intelligence Agency has been authorized and funded to assist by the President of the United States and the American "Congress. The purpose of this manual is that every combetant will be "highly motivated to engage in propaganda face to face, to the same degree that he is motivated to fight," and so that the "individual pulitical awareness. the reason for his struggle, must be as acute as his capacity to fight." It aims to make every FDM guarrilla "persuasive in face to face communication -- a propagandist combatant -- in his contact with the people; he must be capable of giving 5 or 10 logical reasons why, for example, a passant must give him fabric, needle and thread to mend his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves this way, enemy propagands will never turn him into an enemy in the eyes of the population." It goes on to deal with developing political awareness, using group dynamics, interaction with the people, "live, est and work with the people," respect for human rights, teaching and civic astion.

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It then goes on with envice on dealing with the problems any fighting force can face in handling local apposition when it visits or occupies a community. It specifies that the "enemies of the people, the Sandinista afficials or agents, must not be mistreated in spite of their criminal actions even though the guerrilla forces may have suffered casualtyes."

There is a section headed "discrible arms are the strength of the people against an illegal government." This deals with protecting this guarrillas and citizens when a town is occurred. There is also a section on the training

and operations of armed propaganist teams, made up of six to ten members charged with raising political consciousness within Nigaragua and personal persuasion within the population. Again, the emphasis is on education, avoiding combat if possible, "not turning the town into a battlefield."

That context puts into persimitive the four passages with which the whole document and the FIM psych-logical operations have been characterized. Two of these four passages were excited by the FDM.

- (1) "If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out specific selective jobs." This was deleted by the FQM in its review.
- (2) "Prior to shootings specific jobs will be assigned to other elements in order to create a mertyr for the cause, leading the demonstrators into a confrontation with authorities, so as to provoke riogs or shootings which may cause the death of one or much persons who would become martyrs, a situation which should be taken advantage of immediately against the regime so as to create greater conflicts." This also was deleted by the FRM.
- (3) "If a guerrilla shoots an individual, make the population see that he was an enemy of the people, and that they shot him pecause the guerrillas recognized their principal duty, which is protecting the citizens."

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it is followed by this paragraph

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"The commends tries to "up the informant without shooting, because to, like all Christian querrille . advocate non-violence. Having shot the bandinista informer, although it is against his own will, was necessary to evoid repression on the part of the Sandinista government against the innocent people."

(4) "We could neutralize carrefully selected and planned for targets, such as court judges (juwces de esta), police or state security officers.

CDS chiefs, etc." The Incture notes from which the document was prepared used "remove" rather than "neutr lize." In the translation into Spanish "remove" became "neutralize." The American Heritage Dictionary defines neutralize as "to make ineffective; counterbalance and bring to nothing."

'o convert this into assassinative and violation of the President's Executive inder as has been done in the media and the political ghalogue is an outrageous distortion. The words "assassination" or "murder" with which the document has been labeled appear nowhere in the document.

It is important to note that these two passages (2,4) are in the context of entering or occupying a community and dealing with a signation in which actual or potential resistance remains. They are precided by admonitions that the "enemies of the people, the Sandinista officials or agencies, must not be mistreated in spite of the criminal actions ever though the guerrilla forces may have suffered casualties" and also that "whenever it is necessary to use armed force during an occupation or a visit to a topy or a village," the guerrillas are to "explain to the population that first of all this is being done to protect them, the people not the guerrillas themselves" and that "this retiem while not desirable is necessary because the final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society where acts of force are not necessary."

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by Reger, Returnal Securic Council

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
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
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
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






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
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
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



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


EXHIBIT OLN-186

MEMOR. JOUN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNC

Non-Log

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EXHIBIT

SSORET-

ACTION

June 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. POINDEXTER

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Press Revelations regarding North's Role with Nicaraguan Resistance

For several weeks now there have been rumors of stories being prepared which allege an MSC connection to private funding and other support to the Micaraguan resistance. The rumors originally surfaced with a reporter Alfonso Chardi from the Miami Herald and now seem to focus more an Associated Press reporter named Robert Parry (note at Tab I). Parry is the reporter who "broke the story" on the so-called CIA "murder manual."

At my request went to Chardi before departing for Jamba and told Chardi that if he (Chardi) printed any derogatory comments about the FDN or its funding sources that Chardi would never again be allowed to visit FDN bases or travel with their units. According to Chardi promised to drop the story. At no time did my name or an NSC connection arise during their discussion.

The attached note from Karna is, however, more disturbing. Parry is an avowed liberal with very close connections in the Democratic party. It is also reported that he has a personal relationship with one of the NSC staff. In this regard, it should be noted that during December one of the SYSTEM IV papers on the resistance was circulated by Secretariat to other members of the NSC staff. It is subsequent to that circulation that my name began to be acceptated with fund raising activities for the resistance. associated with fund raising activities for the resistance.

It is currently rumored that Parry plans to break this story before the resistance funding vote--probably Thursday. Despite Bud's admonition on the attached note (Tab I), Parry has contacted members of this staff. It may be helpful to again circulate specific instructions regarding contact with the media for those who conduct such activities. It may also be useful to reconsider the proposal of some years ago for having the NSC staff take periodic polygraph examinations.

REC	010	Œ	ND)	NT:	I OM

That you reaffirm quiselines to the staff regarding contact with the media.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I - Small Note to RCM (w/reply) of May 31, 1985

TAIL JECIE

Declassify: OADR

Partially Declassified/Released on 29 June 1987

ander provisions of E.O. 12356 by B. Right, National Security Council

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 31, 1985

N 6416

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD MCFARLANE

FROM:

KARNA SMALL

SUBJECT:


Press request

Bob Parry, AP (who can be tough, but has awfully good sources) is working on a big piece on "the national security council involvement in Nicarac with respect to funding by private, outside groups." He says he understands there was a qualitative change made after latest Boland language last Oct., authorized by the Pres., to change the manner in which Ollie North handled outside contacts -- to be more at arms length. He says he knows about Ollie's involvement and is going to use Ollie's name in the story. He has a request in to talk to: North, Menges and Tillman. He also has one question for you -he requests a phone call from you between now
and early next week (I didn't hold out much hope , for that). He says his question for you is:

"It's my understanding that some day at end of 1983 or beginning of 1984, Reagan instructed McFarlane orally to arrange for private and other outside, non-USG funding for contras. Is that true? And what comment does McFarlane have about it?

What should I tell him: 14 CHIDOIN iso, is there anyone on the staff you would wish him to talk to? Tillman? etc. Thanks

(Parxy: Office: \$28-6448, Home: 920-7521)



\$19,000 per Two available and that Gorda protably lied to Scheseour and that Scheleges gradably lied to Sir to her each these was available, Sir to fully property to proceed may may to wigh but acted that time is could's

THE MARK CARCE CA LOI GENOS --CLOP G2C LOCA! REOFE --CLOP

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01/15/06 10:37:47

*** Bools to note of 00/31/05 13:26 **z** .

-- 3800887 ---

SOTE PAGE: OLIVER SOUTH Subject: PRIPATE BLAGE CORCE Fir just called again. To has advised that to believes the GOI is about to formally eithdraw its offer to assist on this motter so that it cases? be blood som the affirm are tilled. I ested his about the reser that see had already been hilled. To replied that it nos probably assister of the Jose store they (Dishalloh) will potentially \$111 the Jose (feet to habe

I then eshed BID to reconfire, the requirements on be enderstood them, seld that the Iranians went 1900 1900, 25 Boolean released by Labed and the taxife and any necriping jone of he telegod along of the Stit if they from IMS) can atill flad bio.

The formalis are very very conversed that they count onto a delivery of 1800 7000 0/0 a provise to replacion. Six points out that he is operating in an envicament objet to very testile since the 896 seres sade good on its precise to prooptly replacies the original 500 7000 that they shipped is Poptomber and that if so had but most those Potose promised it sight have been possible to take the factber risk of mother 1900. 150 instructions have invited for Copy to ste u/ Copy in pt ofc at 1700 on Thereday. It is my seaso that by that time we will have a see for the cof that they are withdrawing their offer. In it possible to arrange a

secore conference call tenight to see if so can make this sort? 7/8 Sorth PATTATO DEADE COOCE 856 FRUE: DEOLS --CPOS TO: USJEF --CPGA

To: STUDE --COM

01/15/06 22:29:26

*** Sepir to note of 00/11/05 13:26

-- SECORT --

POTE PORE OLIVED MARTE Subject: POIGNEE BLAGE COACE Por lastructions, I called OCA do understandings on the original 500 rome shipped by facuot to Econ. So I medecatedd it, there was a 836 consisteent to SPLL, over time, replacements to the formalis see what they sent for Boir. to \$4, according to BCB have a consistent to make this SALR. To did MOT have any agreement on prices or eltimate dates, though it was understood by both mides that the transaction of be concluded prooptly.

he I enderstand the correct problem w/ the perchase of the 500; -- The Inteelis received funda adequate to perchase only the Tou. Obother this is because Scheinser secteded the root of obother there see a lick-back to the political section bir nor I hoos, Gothe told so that he had pold \$10000 epice for those seeps and

EXHIBIT OLN-188

753

7 May 1987

sectated \$500 for each see delivered.

-- then the lorsell perchasing effice in STC, following their normal procedures, and inquiries of the Army Satorial Command (MSC) on the armiability and price of basic 198s, the SAC insudiately began to gooding sty the ESF seated to covert to the banks andel which was no looper in production and the 197 has already began purchases of the 1 700 for their investory approdu. BEC motes then there was an "understanding" with the offer set to compute of the production line by soiling the elder coops to army stocks and that calling to keep stocks of he the only source available for the basic 100. At this point, the perspening effice terminated the inquiry since they ballered that the prestage of cales so easy quantions that it od look and complicate factbor action which, by then, was to the planning stages. The incomis have gode as factbar effect to patchase the basic 700s bot hove been told to on oppolicated call from ARC that the basic model of tops to be the same price on the 1 100 so that the ACC con secores temberoscot conta-

-- Dir montiones to be apprehensive about going back in to ank his people to ship w/o seen bind of quecastes of capicalsboost shotber or put it secrete in getting the bastages ont. So is going to get back to on at THO PAY to consist of his mosting of the P.H. I presed ye may rechait to loughed and noted to include that the IDF would have even greater sepetes if the besteres were killed cother then released, thus there are none the bare argued against proceeding so this tack any further since it jeopardises Istant w/ no promise of cotors.

At this point I believe that we could proceed along the fellowing lines, lood gots Dir good directly to terbe (cottle) out Scholeger film for 1000 basic 100a, so thes made 1000 basic loss to Incoffi stocks to Iran. begoinly the bootages are then released. So gives Secord whatever the PST price to for 500 100s from the \$100 jobesid to about \$2,00). Secret then began and obliga 500 form to formel on replacement for the first exchange (Dair). This process of at least provide the IDF as one third of what they had eliberous from investory. It is important to note that in oy last discussion with dir the descent along addisc; he je very concerned about ercollelity all access. He noted that before they obligged the first 500, they had shot they believed to be an accepted proving to allow then to boy replacements but that all along the may there have been chatgries. Be has emplified that past of the processe is indeed political in that he is one correct about a leak healds the cablest free seconds the is displicated over the drawdown of stocks, but if so control him to push for it be seeid. I bollows that Fir biasolf to both so exhausted and to such jumperdy of leading his job ever this that he may no longer be factional. I do not believe that fit is lying to so. I do believe be is electrically concerned about the outcome and mosts to do what he can — for both Israel and the US. to her promptly exceed to every proposal we have made to date except the final one of shipping 1000 TOTO w/o procise of replectational.De will to back to on. Till advisor.

. PREPATE BLADE COOCS ASE FROM: MOULE --CPSA TO: DIAMP --CPUA TO: DSJUD -CPSA

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ATTS A MENORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 100 -arts a - SUBJECT:

Heeting with DDO / CIA

Enploye

North and Earl met with Claire George, Burt Dunn George Cave, and the to review status of the project. Claire had some basic questions:

- What should the role of the Israelis be in this? Their aircraft or ours?
- What is our overall strategy? What do we want at the end of it (i.e., beyond return of the hostages)?

North answered the first question by relating the substance of his conversation with the Israelis in New York last night. The Israelis want to be there and have offered two 707s. North pointed out that the Israelis provide some degree of plausible deniability if the project unravels. Claire agreed to Israeli participation. Nir will accompany the party to T. Thus, that party will be six persons: Bud, North, Teicher, Cave, communicator, and Nir. The

North answered question #2 by pointing out that our long-term objective was to end the Iran-Iraq war. Specific objectives in the near-term were to get the Iranians and to get them to cut off their oil to Nicaragua.

Question \$3 was addressed in erms of the intel package being developed by Cave and Dick . North wants it jazzier, more photos, more reports of ev Soviet deeds against Muslims and Question \$3 was addressed in ** ** rms of the intel package being developed by Cave and Dick ... North wants it jazzier, more photos, more reports of ev Soviet deeds against Muslims and mosques, etc. George will be the translator on this and needs to get together with Bud and North for a couple practice sessions before departure. The objective is to string this out (not just a two-hour slam bam, thank you ma'm). George suggested the theme that the Soviets are "one idea" people and that you (Iran) are OK now so long as the Soviets are preoccupied in Afghanistan. But afterwards, watch out.

We should also ask them for their views of the Afghan war. We should take along photos, but not leave them with the Iranians. (CIA action)

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Documentation: All will have (except Bud). Nir does his own documents.

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Afteraft routing: Dick's aircraft (C-1307) will pick up the parts at the party will fly by the military Gulfstream to Israel. The party will fly and the party will fly by the party military up there and fly to T on an israeli aircraft (with Israeli involvement agreed, no need to go via Frankfurt).

North reviewed the idea of giving the Iranians a few options for delivering the hostages -- e.g., a Western Embassy in West Beirut, our Embassy in Year Beirut, a Church, etc.

party should plan to ask for the return of Buckley's remains as well as those of the two Israelis.

Claire raised the contingency of the Iranians trying but being unable to deliver the hostages -- what does the party do then? North acknowledged the possibility; we've given them 48 hours (from time of the party's arrival in T) to safely deliver the hostages. We probably don't give them the parts and radars, but we also probably don't want to "go away mad" and give up the opportunity to develop some sort of on-going relationship.

Claire hopes that the party will be able to plant the seed of giving the Iranians a

Point out problems to date with dealing through intermediaries. Point out problems with the spare parts list they have developed -- that we don't believe this will entirely solve their problems. Suggest on-going dialogue. Suggest a visit by a few technical experts who might help identify and solve their equipment problems.

Some modest U.S. gifts ought to be taken along (e.g., Colt .45 replicas?) DDO will fund.

Claire wifited to ensure that Weinberger, Casey, and Shultz would all be briefed on the project (particularly regarding his second question, long-term goals).

A problem has arisen on the radars -- they are more expensive than estimated (i.e., \$5K each vice \$3K?), and only Phase II radars are immediately available. Two phase I radars are currently sitting in a warehouse in Pennsylvania, but it is unclear if we can get these released (e.g. to Israel?). Approval from several U.S. agencies might be required: Customs, Justice, State, DOD, and the Iranian claims commission...(CIA action).

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Loose Ends: First deposit hasn't hit yet... Weiling down the exact costs.. Solving the phase II/phase I problem. Developing a response to the Itahians not being able to deliver (or to a partial delivery). Ensure the intel package is up to speed.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC 2000

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INFORMATION

May 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FÖR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

Partially Declassified/Released on adjuny 1987 under provisions of E.O. 12356

FROM:


VINCENT M. CANNISTRARO

by B. Reger, National Security Council

SUBJECT:

Agenda for Your Weekly Meeting With the DCI, Thursday, May 15, 1986

You are scheduled to meet with Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates in your office at 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 8, 1986. The following items are on the agenda, according to the DCI's staff:



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THE OCCUPATION


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Danish vessel for He first offered the use of a Danish vessel for He first offered CIA a six month lease. CIA told me that they thought it was too expensive, and the cost and time involved in refitting the vessel for a mission made the alternative option of outfitting a CIA owned vessel more attractive. Ollie then offered to take

from his vessel, using his own resources, has told me that because of the alleged involvement of one rom Clines (who was involved in Wilson and Terpil era); CIA Will have nothing to do with the ship. Frankly, I can't tell whether this is just a convenient reason not to do what CIA was opposed to doing in the first place, or whether the concern about Cline is legitimate. In any event, Casey has a Driefing paper on this which he will use if the subject is raised.

You may wish to raise the following item:



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. Home on Combatting Terrories TO: BSOLE

HOTE PROU: JOHN POINGEITER

IN A MEMO PROCESS TO BE TOOK! HE TALKS ABOUT TOUR OFFINEING A DAVISH SHIP IN A MEMO PROCESS TO BE TOOK TO CIA FOR BROADCASTING LUTO, I AM AFRAID TOO ARE LETTING TOOK OFFINATIONAL ROLE ENCORE TOO PROLIC. FROM NOW OF I DON'T WANT YOU TO TALK TO ANYMOUT BLST, INCLUDING CASES, RICEPT HE ABOUT ANY OF TOWN OFFINATIONAL ROLES. IS FACT TOO BEED SO QUIELTLY GRUSDATE & COVER STORT THAT I MAYE INSISTED TRAT TOU STOP.

DE CAUTIONS ASG FROM: MEJEP --- CPSA To: USEDE --CPUA

BOD OCDARIBI

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JMP

Exhibit OLN-191

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NOTE FROM OLIVER NORTH Subject BE CAUTIOUS Done ·· SERRET ··

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5/6/87



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HOTE PHON: JOHN POINDEITER
Subject. IRAN AND TRESCRISK


GO ANYAD AND MGME OF THE PAPPE MERDED FOR THE \$15A ERPFUCKA. WILL EALL IS TO CHPCE WITH MICHEL AND CHENET TODAY. I UNDENSTAND YOUR CCYCENY AND AGREE. I JUST DIDN'T WANT YOU YELL GUING IT UP AT MSPG. I GUESSED AT WHAT YOU MYRE GUING TO SAY. TO MAKE THE ROOMS THE LITTLE OF TOUR OPERATION AND THAT IS JUST 55 WELL.

N 12533

IRPR AND TERRORISM
MSG PRON: BSJNP --CPU

TO: MSPUR --- CPUI

05/17/06 14:00:05



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NO. PRON: JOHN POINDRITER

Subject: IPAN AND TRENDRISH
I NAVE PHOBLEMS WITH THIS PLAN. AN A/C REQUEST IS TOO CLOSELY LINKED TO WHAT I
S MAPPETING. I DON'T SEE NOW WE CAN USE A MILITARY A/C. WHY DO TOU HAVE TO SA
AY SO LONG IN ISHARE? I MAD IN MIND TOU WOULD TRAVEL SEPALATELY, EDWN IN ISJAC
L AT A COVERT LOCATION, AND PROCEPTS TO IPAN. I DON'T WANT A RESTING WITH ME, S
MULTE AND WEINDRIGEN.

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Ехнівіт OLN-193

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BEST AVAILABLE COPY

This is further re transportation arrangements for BCB 6 party: Cave + feicher + Columnicators will depart IND about Private (Bedocracy IBC.) G-3, stops in 'C :0 p/w BCB. G-3 Proceeds direct to Building sinitary airfield,

For p/e RCB. G-3 Proceeds direct to picked up by Lear 35 owned by H-5-morracy IRC. Buropean subsidiary. Lear 35 drops North at connectial side of North passes thru custom/imaigration as Goode, proceeds to a litary side to res 0/ 200 party.


N 12536

SCH party
on arrival at 80 officeds from G-3, transloads to 707 (if available) or to
chartered Spins Challenger a/c for direct flight to tel aviv. Still having
clearance problems for bringing G-3 into e/o
const Num/16V.grations clearance.

Paril 10 hours do 5/4/8:

JMP 8/98 23

Exhibit OLN-194



where his conseque, the too state is being daid over the open telephone by the for these to be completely ignormat. Fibelly, no bette sorter policy was which made to be enterested:

IS and no able to segment to the Itables that or act villing to get a remarket Community late februs to for little feters berianges of information - 4/0 or aldilecte/

hat do so do if they one only apting out too or three of the bestages afthe dating a good faith effect?

that do so do if, after 72 her, nothing happine?

These are the first of things I had advisabled for discussion in the private at a 0/ No. At the tery least, you she talk to DCS about these things, protecting feet to form, this to all apport this thing to go planty search, it may not DCS to taking so deall risk in this collector - yout lifting around the earl to till have to. Do descrit here to take this find of chaose. I know have excepted in very bedg, but it on, in any broken existe, be thoughtful if you and that a row minutes to discuss the ideas about my his and any pool by. It is not read the till to be the tery bedg to the total total it are in the ideas about my his and any pool by. It is not look at the life to the till to be the about total, I would be strong and it aligns but the tery look that before abyets area his applie.

TAL BELL

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Tribung the bissuing of the analysis of \$/4/87 the regions of the today of history for our years of the

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here in CODOS shith does not have the range or speed of 4 to III had . There Are A/Ca It would on Caser trevels eversees be seemily flies by pear that this cilitary a/c thing is in the reals of too bard, whomis by 10 local, I will seek to bake other arrangements. Sorth

IRAS AND TERMORESS TO: USBEL 05/21/06 17:59:33

BOS LIBSARD : ISBEL



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
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Ехнівіт OLN-196

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-00 Reply to note of 07/15/86 19:07

MOTE PLOY: CLIVER BERTE

Inb fact: PATTERE BLANK CHPCK to are rapidly approaching the point where the PAOJECT DEBOCHACT Assets in tentag good to be turned over to CIA tor use in the new process. The total mine of the assets fair aircraft, warehouses, supplies, saintenence facilities, ships, bests, lussed houses, vehicles, erdeance, sunitions, "Describes equipment, and a 6520" curvey on property event by a PhODER reprietary) is over \$4.50.

All of the August - and the personnel- are evend/paid by overseas companies with me W.S. connection. All of the equipment is in first rate condition and us already in place. It ad be ludictons for this to simply disappear just meanne SIA does not want to be "talated" with picking up the assets and them have then signal 10-100 of the \$1000 to replace it - weeks or menths later. tet, that seems to be the direction they are beading, apparently based on MSC Midances

If you have already given Casey instructions to this effect, I od vr such tike to talk to you about it in boyes that we can teclara the issue. All mriously Laileve that idendiately after the Senate vote the DBF will be subjected to a major Sandinista effort to break thee before the U.S. aid can techn effective, Phoben correctly has the only assets available to support the boy and the Clat sout ambitious estimate is 30 dars after a bill is signed before their our assets will be available. This will be a disaster for the ner if they have to wait that lone. Given our lack of sevenest on other plea for PROBER to get food to the tending options, and fillet resistance ASAP, PROPER will have to borrow at least 328 to pay for the tool. that's O.K., and Dick is willing to do so temorrow - but only it there is reasonable assurance that the londers can be repaid. The only way that the 320 in toed donny can be repaid in if CIA perchases toe \$4.58+ worth of PROPLE squipment for about \$2.25# when the law passes.


told them where they can get then consettially from the USIF as excuss - the same way PhOSEA bought them under proprietary arrangements. It is just unbelievable. It you wise I can and you a corp of the PROJECT DEBOCRACT status report which includes a prostions of assets. It is esetal, sometributable reading. Warm becards. locth


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


MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.: 01

U.S.: Oliver North
'Richard Secord
Sam O'Neill

Iranian:



First session convened in the Old Executive Office Building at 12:15 p.m. on Friday, September 19, 1986. Opened the session, and after preliminary pleasantries, outlined four points which he wished to address initially. One, the Iranian position vs. what they perceive to be the U.S.'s number one enemy -- Russia. Second, their view of American and Iranian strategic interests in the area. Third, past relations of the United States with revolutionary Iran. Fourth, their views for future relations with the United States.

then launched into a lengthy exposition with fespect to the roregoing issues. He said that the Soviets are a great and aggressive power with a long border with Iran. They recognize that Russia is a direct enemy of the United States and that, with respect to Iranian interests, they do not wish to have antagonistic relations with the USSR, but on the other hand being a friend of the Soviets could be even more dangerous because Soviet ideology is directly opposed to Iran's. They also recognize that their brothers in Afghanistan are suffering under the Soviets. Finally, the Soviets are directly supporting the Iraqis in the war against the Iranians and killing Iranian soldiers. Back to the question of the long border with Russia and noted Second statement in Brussels to the effect that the United States would oppose a Soviet thrust into Iran with or without support of the Government of Iran. The Government of Iran found this statement to be interesting and comforting. The leaders of Iran are very worried today about the "fantastic" increase of Soviet intelligence operations in Iran in recent times


exploit Iranian internal problems. He went on to acknowledge that the revolutionary environment in Iran has many weaknesses. Their security services are weak for instance.

next turned to relations between Government of Iran and the United States Government. He say sthere some cooperation is necessary in their view.

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Next, Iran needs U.S. influence with the Arab countries friendly to the United States in order to help diminish support for Iraq. Third is the matter of oil, which is vital to Iranian economy. They need U.S. support in this matter. Fourth and most important, he said, is the security of the Gulf and terrorism against U.S. interests and hostages.

said he wanted to make these things clear and one of the Iranian leaders in particular has asked that he make this message very clear.

On the subject of security, said this has two aspects one is the fear of the flood of terrorism in the region and the second is the overall effects of the current war. With respect to terrorists and hostages, he said that the Shitte religion under the Aytollah is absolutely opposed to terrorism and the taking of hostages. For instance, after the explosions in Lebanon, the Aytollah wrote a "Fatwa," which is a religious ruling absolutely apposing terrorism and the taking of hostages. But, we the United States have to understand that Iran still does not have strong, effective security forces and firm control. States there are people within Iran who do espouse hostage taking and terrorism.



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more information in order to confront them and they would like to have this from the United States. Emphasized that from the standpoint of humanity, Iran is against hostage taking and terrorism and even has a certain amount of sympathy for the U.S. at the current time. In the case of Lebanon, Iran considers that they have in the past been helpful to the U.S. In the TWA hijacking, in getting information on the hostages and in the release of two hostages, Iran has already helped. Said that the Iranians have attraction in places like Lebanon because of the "right-minded masses of peoples' sympathy" for the Iranian revolution. But he said that both Iran and the United States are victims of this hostage business. He next turned to the Iran-Irag war. Iran, he said, needs a "victory" and that he will explain what he means by victory. Lack of security in Iran is a real problem for the United States. Secord's comments in Brussels were well received and his analysis of the war was keenly received by the leadership in Iran.

With respect to United States and Iran, provided a quick analysis. Until two years ago, it was difficult for anyone in Iran to consider any kind of United States Government/Iranian relations. There were several probes in the past two years and he wanted to know if they were real.

what regarded as the worst channel, they've also received numerous probes and letters from an unnamed arms dealer in Europe. Some in Iran believed in these probes from the arms dealers, but "I personally," said, "did not believe in them." claimed to have been working on this opening of relations

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with the U.S. for two years now and that the real problem is the lack of communications. "One and a half years ago, an arms dealer came, allegedly with word from about exchanging two hostages for arms. We don't trust this arms dealer. After the discussions with Second and Hakim in Brussels, the leadership has come up with the idea of forming a 'joint committee' that would sit down and resolve the problems step-by-step and that we have a great opportunity to do this now."

meeting here in Washington. "A stage-by-stage plan is needed with which both sides can agree and we need to get on with it quickly while the opportunity is still here."

North responded. "Happy you are here and hope that there is now no doubt that you are talking directly with the Government of the United States directly."

"We understand your problems with respect to channels of communications. We have had the same problem. In all honesty, we are still not in a position to have very good relations, but we are certainly interested in a step-by-step approach to the problem. We have received assurances from General Second about the genuineness of this particular channel to Iran and, therefore, the President has authorized this meeting. I understand your sensitivity on this, because it is important to have good communications in order to proceed.

dealer, chordenifer, was not acceptable and is not acceptable to us either. However, he did bring us into contact with an official of the Government of Iran official in over six years. As you know now after meetings in Germany with we arranged for a delegation to go to Tehran. The President choice a most trusted adviser to lead this mission -- Robert McFarlane. The reason why we went to Tehran was to try to establish the channel of which you now speak. Unfortunately, we met with only a few officials most of whom used false names. We met with none of the people that we expected to meet with and the meeting was a great disappointment to our President.

unterjected that it is important for him to know the names of the people. In the discussion insued as to what the people looked

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like and what assumed names they used. North continued. "You should understand that this meeting in Tehran was a great disappointment to us. It has been difficult since then to convince the leadership here of the need to try to continue in the face of that failure. While we were there, we even prepared a draft Memorandum of Understanding to establish this channel. We understood the need for secrecy and I can show you this draft here now, if you wish to read it.:

"There are a number of things which you should understand about why we have pursued this attempt to be in contact with your government. President Reagan is a very strong and popular President. He has helped the United States to recover from a period of economic and military weakness. He has restored economic and military strength to the U.S. Most important, he has restored the Will of American people. The U.S. is no longer afraid to use Sts power in its own defense, and it is not intimidated by the Soviets. Yestessay, the expetiled 25 Soviets from the United Nations. We will not give in to Soviet pressure in Afghanistan, Angola, or Central America. The United States wants relations on the basis of reciprocity with all states and, of course, this includes Iran. We want to solve our disputes through discussions not through fighting. The United States believes that many trends are working in its favor — economy, technology, politics, all working in favor of the United States. Reagan has two more years and has a strong moral position in the eyes of the United States and of the world. The President strongly believes in the words of the Holy Book as do you. He believes deeply in the teachings of the God of Abraham. Thus, he is very popular here and should be popular in the world of Islam. When we went to Tehran, he said to tell you that we accept your revolution as a fact. We admit that there have been missteps along the road since the revolution, but it is important to tell you that there is a responsible and sincere wish in the leadership here to establish communications/relations with Iran. Therefore, we must speak frankly in order to facilitate this. Our policy is based, not on emotion, but on perceptions built-up over the years. There are many things that you have said which we can agree to, but there is a perception that Iran has used revolutionary Islam against the United States. For example, it is clear that some in the Government of Iran have snoouraged the taking of U.S. hostages as a means of getting back





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questioned the basis for this information. North responded. This is all based on accurate intelligence. For example, in Nicaragua, Iran actively supports the communist government there and Iran plans to ship 10,000 rifles and other munitions to Nicaragua through North Korea. These activities serve Soviet interests and in the long-term jeopardize Tran and the United States. In spite of this the President has directed us to proceed with attempt to establish discrete and, when appropriate, a public relationship with Iran. The President's direction is based on two important priscipals: The, cancern over the Soviets vis-a-vis Iran and; two, our desire to ensure the territorial integrity of Iran and the other Gulf States. We accept the revolution as a fact. The territorial integrity of Iran and the other states in the region are of great importance to the United States.

wish to see Iran lose. We do not want to see an attempt against Iraq which will bring in the Soviets. The Soviets, on the other hand, are in a difficult position. Their economy is a disaster; they've suffered major reverses, for instance, Chernobol; Soviet defectors are showing up all over the world; Soviet ships run into each other in the Black Sea; Soviet submarine-launched missiles-accidentally land in China. Last week, six Soviets were killed-in Peru. They see the Iranicraq war and Afghanistan as very important to them, but maither of these wars are going well for them. They have two shings, however, that are advantageous to them. One is great military power, capable of intimidating their neighbors; and two is a very, very effective KGB. We believe that they are capable of using these two instruments of power. Therefore, we understand that Iran can be not their enemy, nor their friend. We have common interests. Iran's continuation as a sovereign state is something that we desire. We have no interest in an Iraqi victory. You might remember that we had no relations with Iraq during the years of the Shah or even during the revolutionary period right after the Shah. We're willing to serve in some role which would end the conflict honorably for Iranic.



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U.S. has no illusions, however, about future Iranian relations. The right way is to proceed carefully and quitely. For example, Soviet anxiety could be quickly raised if they knew that we were trying to reestablish relations. We have shared interests for the long-term. We are prepared to improve on the situation that exists now and to do it in a step-by-step way. However, it's really up to Iran, we are ready.

responded. "Regarding the need for Iran to achieve victory, it is not necessary that we achieve a big decisive military victory, but some kind of victory. Only in the last two years, has our approach with the United States been seen as possible, but it is most important to note that the important thing from Iranian perspective is to get Saddam Hussein out. This can be done by the Arabs. We have no territorial designs om Iraq. We have in fact given orders that no Iranian troops on Iraqi territory will display our flag. Iran wents a government in Baghdad that they can live with. The United States can help with the friendly Arabso"

North responded.

Intregard to the points to the letters provided by him to Iran describing our willingness to do certain things were not authorized. Only the document which we produced in Tehran, of which I have provided you a copy, was authorized.

I want to tell you that unless one of the three men sitting here in the room right now (Marth, Second, Sam O'Neill) contact you, there is no official message. With respect to the document we prepared in Tehran, you will note a considerable emphasis on hostages. We consider them to be an obstacle. An obstacle to the understanding of the American people. The widespread perception here in America is that Iran is basically responsible for these hostages. The issue of hostages and terrorism must be dealt with since it is a political obstacle. On the other hand, you should realize that 52,000 people in the U.S. died last feet in automobile accidents and 130,000 people died from lung cancer. Five U.S. hostages rarely make the newspapers or the television, but because this is a democracy, if the President is found to be helping Iran with this obstacle still in the way, it would be very difficult to explain to our people.

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"From the first, with and Ghorbanifar, we have said let's get this issue -- the hostages -- behind us. We recognized that this would be undertaken as a humanitarian gesture on the part of the Iranian Government.

demonstrate our sincerity, at one point, we directed the delivery of 500 TOW missiles and eight hours later they were delivered into Bandar Abbas. But instead of responding favorably, 'rug merchant' type moves resulted, prices were talked about, prices were established for human lives. For instance, 'so many items for so many hostages.' We don't consider this to be a responsible government action and not one that the United States is prepared to engage in."

"We are prepared to continue to provide to Iran items which will help in her defense; but we wish to see the hostage issue behind us so that we can move onward. We have certain items of equipment already prepared for shipment. But you must understand, we cannot give them away. They have to be purchased."

interjected with humor saying "haven't they already been paid?"

North responded saying that the TOWs and certain improved HAWK spares had been delivered and paid for, but the intermediary, Ghorbanifar, was complaining that the had not been fully paid.

interjected with a political point. He said he agreed that the obstacle had to be removed, but we have to make it much more official and deal directly. Our government thinks that dealing through someone like Second is a better way to go because they trust him. They deals expect factory prices, but they don't want the same situation to exist that exists today.

North responded saying that "Ghorbanifar always claims to be borrowing and then getting paid in part and rolling debts forward and raising costs and it is very, very confusing and its impossible for us to follow exactly what it is that he is doing. However, Chorbanifar knows a great deal and he could be harmful to us in were to go public and this is the problem which we wish to address. We think that Iran should pay him whatever they owe him so he will be quiet and stay off the air."

responded that he has gotten all his money but he will look into it.

North said that we would be happy never to deal with Ghorbanifar again but, if he is to keep quiet, his debt should be paid. "We risk a great deal if we are compromised this early in the game. To be honest, I would just as soon not deal with but this is an Iranian matter."

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continued. "It's good that you established your initial contact with This was important to the people in Tehran although it was not successful, and the proper people were never made aware and poor coordination was done and the meeting was not planned properly and it was, thus, very premature. Still it was important that we did establish initially at least contact with because this was a pioneering move and would not be in Washington now were it not for this initial opening."

North responded. "We are confident that you represent the Government of Iran and to his credit, as I said, did have the first meeting with us in six years. This meeting that we're having now should do much to instill confidence in our two capitals and, if we can proceed, it will be very good.

Earlier you mentioned concern for security and concern over terrorism in our airlines and this we appreciate. The Government of Iran announcement that the Pan Am aircraft hijacked in Karachi could not come to Iran was much appreciated. As a further demonstration of our sincerity, we will arrange that next week on Voice of America the United States Government will thank those countries who were involved in helping in the Karachi hijacking and, for the first time, we will mention Iran as having acted in a positive Way: It will be done very discretely in a editorial on VOA. Obviously, we cannot have the President go out announce an Embassy is being opened in Tehran. You would have a domestic, political problem and so would we. Thus, back to our obstacls: Truly we wish to get it behind us. We recognize that Tehran does not exermise absolute control over Hizballah, Amal, or Islamic Jihad, what we also know that you can help resolve this issue.

responded that the issue "would be resolved." The question of who is and what his background is was then raised by North and responded that he was a trusted agent of Iran; he had been a loyal officer and now was a businessman and that they had complete confidence in him. North responded we know very little bit about this man and we are obviously concerned for security; we are concerned with the KGB penetrations and so on.

responded that he too was concerned over this sort of thing. He also said that with respect to Mr. Hakim, whom he personally liked and wanted to see involved, some in Tehran regard him as a CIA agent. North responded that Hakim was never a spy for the United States; that he has been a consultant to our government on Iranian affairs from time to time; that he had full trust and confidence as a man who wanted to see improvement for the Iranian people and improvement in relations between our two countries.

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Because of the requirement for secret communications, he has acted on our behalf and we have investigated him as we investigate everyone. This is important to him because of his interest in the country of his birth and the country of his citizenship. We will include both he and the in whatever sessions that you wish to have them involved in -- you simply have to tell us.

turned back to He said that he is certain that has not been profiteering, but instead has been working sincerely but, he is a simple man and he could not continue on with this complex relationship.

North said we tend to believe this. "Sam, here, has often talked with and there is always inconsistency between what he says and what Gorba claims."

North said that we are concerned that the Soviets not become aware of any U.S. Government or Iranian Government relationship. "In Tehran, we recommended that we set-up a secure communication station and this would require us to send two of our men to Tehran to man and operate the station. This would give us good secure communications and would thwart the KGB. We are very concerned about KGB efforts to penetrate any relationship we might establish with the Government of Iran. The Iranian idea for a joint committee elsewhere seems to be a good idea, in principle. Meeting somewhere in Europe is probably the way in which we should proceed to manage this beginning relationship. The problem is that we have to set up some place where it won't be penetrated by the KGB. We are very concerned about communications and the Soviets' ability to intercept."

responded that he agreed about the KGB and would like to use a single courier from Iran to Frankfurt via Iran Air from now on until secure communications could be established.

North asked if he wants on this joint committee?

said, "Yes, but only for logisitical purposes. I want to give more thought to and how he can work with Hakim." With respect to Ghorbanifar, said they want to get him out of the loop as soon as they can. He's been profiteering and people in Iran fear that they will be accused of being profiteers.

N zell responded that Ghorbanifar has some strong Tehran connections that we know of and this remains a problem that needs to be solved. The said that our recent countries with the said that our recent coun

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the hostage issue, he wants to get it resorved as quickly as possible and he is confident that they can resolve it. He said

that Iran wants to make this a full exchange. For instance, "we have in mind to give you fellows T-72 tank, for example."

North again expressed concern about security and about Ghorbanifar, in particular. North also stated that we believe that the oil market is naturally depressed and there is certainly no collusion between ourselves and the Saudis or others to keep prices low, but he agreed that the U.S. and Iran have similar interests with

respect to oil.

returned then to the subject of Buckley.

wanted to assure us that Buckley was not killed; that he died of natural causes; the had three heart attacks. He also assured that he had been cold that the others are all in good shape. He said that there are video tapes of them recently, talking for 20 minutes each and that these will be distributed to news agencies. also said that there was one letter sent out.

North confirmed that one of the hostage rel/ ves received a letter within a day or so of it being written. North then said that we want all the hostages out.



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At 1800 hours, the first session ended with a short break and then Albert Hiskim and pointed the group. After being joined by the others, then said that he was growing tired and asked General Second to read off the list of Iranian needs which were headed up first by intelligence exchange.

North reviewed the list of logistics support items being requested and responded that, in principle, to the extent that items are available either here or elsewhere there isn't a particular problem. "But as we emphasized to in Tehran, we think that you might be thinking too small. People preparing lists are only thinking of the very short-term. We, the U.S., look at two million Iranians without homes; half the oil production facilities knocked out; yesterday's attack on Kharg Island, for instance, is a good example; medical supplies being in great shortage, even shortages of food; and so on We

States is interested in helping stop the killing and to provide for an adequate defense. We cannot just do these things willy-nilly. For example: 10,000 175mm RAP rounds is not a

being in great shortage, even shortages of food; and so on. We think that the Iranian planners should be talking to us about other than simple weapons requests.

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reasonable request. This is a huge number of items and it would take a long time to get them -- I doubt that we have that many in inventory. We do have packed and ready to go \$5M worth of HAWK spare parts and 500 TOWs. Additionally, you need technical assistance, if you don't have technicians who are adequately trained, all the things we ship to you are useless and just exacerbates the situation. One reason why the President agreed to the TOWs and the HAWK parts which have been shipped so far, is because they are defensive help against Iraq and the Soviets as well. Again, I say don't think too small. For example, we have offered to send free medical supplies through Albert Hakim's organization. We believe that medical suppliers could be more valuable perhaps than all the artillery ammunition we could send."

"The authorities recognize the need for technical assistance. This was pointed out by General Secord in the Brussels' discussions and we should understand that they really inherited nothing from the Shah in the way of an army. The army was disorganized and very disarrayed. The lower echelon officers, as well as the higher echelon officers, were worth very little. They picked the first steps in this war with the army of the people, the revolutionary guards." He recalled earlier that in a meeting with the some of the military officers said that they had to have one tank for every Iraqi tank, one plane for every Iraqi plane. "This was not practical and, therefore, over time it was decided that the Iranian revolutionary guard, the army of the people, would be used to repell the enemy. Since then, of course, it has become more technological in nature and there are minimum levels of technological assistance and equipment we badly need and the United States can be very helpful in providing these. Therefore, they are looking forward to trying to establish a decent relationship on a secret basis at first."

At 2015, it was agreed to stop for the day and reconvene on Saturday, September 20, for further discussions.

The session continued on September 20, at 0935 hours in an office near the Sheraton Tysons' Hotel, where was staying. Present for the U.S. side were Oliver North, Sam O'Neill, and R. Secord. Only represented the Iranian side during these initial discussions.

North opened the session by saying that he would like to make some comments about the logistics support items on the list had provided the day before. "We would like the leadership of Iran to know that President Reagan is aware that the Iranians have immediate needs; that, while we are sympathetic, we're not just interested in being simply an arms dealer; that we are

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interested in helping the immediate defensive needs in such a way that Iran does not lose the war. We also want to help you with some immediate domestic requirements and we want to help you end the war honorably. The President is willing to play whatever role necessary to help end the war in an honorable fashion."

said that perhaps we need a secret exchange of letters between our leaders and he will address this upon return to Tehran. Stated that after we establish a basis for a relationship, all problems can be addressed. He said that he is completely in agreement with the point about not relying on the arms dealers or other non-official entities. On immediate needs, he could right now order the money to be paid for any of the items that might be available. He said that he could even get the money by telephone.

North said that we believe that this has to done in absolute secrecy.

interrupted describ_ng the difficulty of conducting discussions in Tehran. For example, there are three different groups that usually have to be consulted. Also in preparing for the coming offensive, they have shortages in some of the equipments and these are the ones that are mentioned in his list

With respect to finances since we don't have a formal relationship, we have to do these transactions in a very secret fashion and since our laws are very specific, we have to have payment before delivery of any hardware.

At this point, requested that the entire group meet and and Albert Hakim joined the meeting.

North then stated again that we are trying to get past the issue of the hostages and, in the past, to show our good faith, we have moved certain items to Iran. We are also trying to do things with secrecy. We understand that with normal relations it's going to take time.

Secrecy takes longer and it costs more. With Ghorbanifar and we have had a lengthy debate about prices for HAWK spare parts, with claiming that we have charged six

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somewhere. "This has caused great of difficulty for us. has misinterpretated the microfische. We've traced it back to its origins; it's not relevant. But communicating adequately has been next to impossible." Then North gave a short description of how U.S. military equipment is priced; manufacturers' prices; prices to our own forces; prices to allies; and the impact on overall price for the different modes of transfer. North closed by noting that the President has authorized the transfer of a number of TOWs and some HAMK missile parts in connection with this relationship. "In order to maintain secrecy, we have to sanitize the equipment; that is to remove all the original identifying markings and then we have to ship these items through a circuitous route and Israel, as you know, has been involved in this in the past. Thus, not only the time but also the price goes up when using such a complex method to procure and deliver such items." If it is helpful in getting past this obstacle of the hostages, we are prepared to go forward as requested by the items which are already prepared to go forward with those items which are already prepared for shipment, i.e., additional HAMK missile spares and TOWs and with prices that are well understood in advance."

A discussion of the pricing then ensued and the price list was given to which he said he understood and so did North then noted that we needed to get rid of the hostage issue as soon as possible so that we could proceed on and establish a relationship which we both recognized as necessary and in the interest of both countries. "We recognize that the influence of Iran is indirect in many cases with the groups in Lebanon and we understand it is a difficult issue. We have offered in the past to give Iran credit as a humanitarian gesture if Iran wants this credit. It's an important point and we have to get past it. I want to tell you that with respect to the issue of the Da'wa prisoners held in Kuwait, we cannot go back to the Government of Kuwait on this issue. But I believe that the Government of Kuwait is prepared to release prisoners in a phased way if the Government of Iran goes privately to Kuwait and promises them no terrorism. This seems reasonable -- you should do it. I've been told to reassure the Government of Iran, moreover, that the U.S. citisen, John Pattis, has never been an employee of the United States Government. We did wilk to him quite openly, as we talk to many travellers, but he is not a spy and he's not employee of the CIA and he's hever employeed by the Government of the United States."

A short break was then taken and the abseting reconveged without and without Hakim at 1525 hours.

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North pointed out that in regard to list of equipment, "most of these items would have to come by ship because they are very big and heavy and only a few could come by aircraft." We need to exchange intelligence by courier.

we can do it and would be willing to do it if we can come to some understanding with the Government of Iran.

And, two, the Soviet propaganda organs would publicise our activities and cause great difficulties for both sides. We preerstand that you're prepared to go ahead and make transfers of money immediately in order to start shipment; but the U7S. is much more interested in doing it right than in doing it too fast.

then stated that trying to distribute to Mestern Towernments has created certain problems for the group in Tehran.

North then stated that we have differences, great differences here. "The situations are not the same. Our President is not running for re-election, as you know. There are two years left in his term and he is sincerely interested in changing the course of history with the U.S.-Iranian relations. He has close advisors and aides, who have seen much of war, and they want to see the war out there ended. There is no effect whitever on American elections, and these hostage is no effect whitever on seeldom even make the newspapers. Ronald Readin would like to end this Iran-Iraq war and you might remember that we talked last night about the United States had a long history of acting as a peacemaker. The United States always has great concern for the suffering of people and we know of the impact of this war overall on Iran."

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wants an honorable peace. In return, he expects that Iran will designate three very senior people to go to joint committee meetings. "We could have this joint committee meetings, if you want, by sending a letter to us could also always meet under the tover of a UN meeting. I guarantee you one thing though that I will look into this matter of help to Nicaragua immediately; and, if there is such a thing going on, I will stop it immediately. Again I say I will only use a courier until we can establish secure communications — until we can set-up these committee meetings." After the meeting, he wanted Secord to be available to talk to him some more. He states further that he will be giving a weekly report on the conditions of the hostages and is now certain that he can bring enough pressure to bear to get them released. He will give us at least two days warning before they're released. He hoped that the U.S. can play a predominant role in achieving a peace in Lebanon. "Iran agrees completely with respect to an honorable peace with Iraq; however, Sadam Hussein must go from the Iranian point of view." He knows that it is not our policy, but he knows that we can bring our influence to bear with certain friendly Arab nations and it is "within the power of the Arab nations to get rid of Sadam Hussein."

At this point, at 1710 hours, we agreed to summerize the two days of meetings. At that he manted to:

- A. Take steps to form a small, staff in Tehran for this project.
- B. Make instructions for the transfers of monies after lists are checked and agreed to.
- C. Inform his leadership about the Voice of America.
- D. Clear the way for the release and form a game plan for the hostages.
- E. As soon as possible, have a joint committee meeting which he, would attend. And, hopefully within a week or tendays, this could be arranged.

North interjected that he agreed with this summary, but that added the point about the Da'wa hostages and Kuwait and Kuwait's desire for a guarantee against terrorise took note of this

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as well. Closed the session by stating his great appreciation for the hospitality which had been showed by him and North and by all concerned. And, then agreed to establish a brief, very, very brief, ops code for use on the telephone -- simply for the purpose of establishing a place and time of meeting for the joint committee meeting. The meeting ended at 1800 hour.

Comment: During several asides with Sam's perception of estimate of the two days of discussions is that while and we both thought considerable progress was made, wanted to discuss the results of the meetings in Washington with responsible officials in Tehran before recommending specific actions and steps be taken. Specific proposals will come at the next meeting with the land, being Iranian, they will probably be gaged to further tests and assess our sincerity,

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
Exhibit OLN-202





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SUBJECT; Rundown of Visitor's comments on 19/20 Sept 86



serious debate took place in Tehran about how to proceed said they had to upgrade the channel and now think they have made the neccessary arrangements was told that the three persons in the room would be the only ones on our side until things got further along. It is aid that he would be in charge on their side. In an asid that he would be in charge to handle the channel. It is emphasized that they wanted to gradually improve relations with the United States because they fully realized they were between a rock and a hard place. The war will end soon and Iran must make the fateful decision about rebuilding the military and the country. Since the previous orientation was towards American equipment, they would like to continue in the same manner. They realize that American investment will be essential to the rebuilding of their country. However, for the time being, everything must be carried out in secret. If this were to leak, the radicals would have a field day, and would be able to oust the moderates and the conservatives. It is aid that when our delegation was in Tehran, the factions that were aware of our presence had put together a story to be released if word somehow got out about our delegation's presence in Tehran. We told him that we faced similar problems in the United States.

2. With regard to the Gorbanifat. We told him that we faced said flatly they mistrust Gorbanifat. We told him that we entertain similar views but are worried about his going public and destroying everything. It said that they think they car take care of Gorba. He was allost executed in 1981. They have

entertain similar views but are worried about his going public and destroying everything. Said that they think they car take care of Gorba. He was allost executed in 1981. They have a lot on his and he also has family back in Tehran. The U.S. side is doubtful. Believe this remains a problem since Gorba has told NIR that he would so public. He said that, although they are grateful to the for having the courage to get things started, they want his out of the loop because (A) he

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has not produced and (3) they do not think him smart enough to handle the contact.

In addition, said played a role in the Reed kidnapping. He did this as a seans of putting additional pressure on the U.S. to send the next shipment.

suggested that, i calls again, sas should tell him that everything is up in the air because of the two new hostages and that nothing can be done until they are released.

3. During our discussion, emphasized that they are also interested in relations with us on the strategic level. They are very concerned about Soviet machinations in the area as a whole and in recent months have had their eyes opened by how much effort the Soviets are putting into penetrating and manipulating the Iranian government.

that we should out the past behind us and said they regret our fruitless trip to Tehran in May. Proposed a joint committee which would handle the channel and establish secure communications between the two governments. The opening phase will be secret but we will then bring the relationship into the open at an appropriate time.

4. Hostages: The U.S. side dealt with the hostage issue as an obstacle, not a key issue in arriving at a strategic relationship. It is said that prior to coming on this trip he had talked with the "person directly responsible" twice on the telephone and once personally. He believes that this issue can be resolved and it will be one of the first things he devotes his attention to when he returns to Tehran. He said that it is now a matter of policy that the Iranian government opposes hostage taking and terrorism on humanitarian grounds. He reminded us that the Iranian government did play a positive role in the TMA highjacking case. He said that in addition to recent public statements, Khomieni has prepared a "fatwa" condemning hostage-taking as "unIslamic". We thanked him for the Iranian stance on the highjacking of the PanAm flight in Karachi. Was told that next week there would be a VOA broadcast in which Iran would be mentioned as one of the States we wished to thank for refusing to grant landing rights to the highjackers.

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had discussed the hostages with earlier and he was certain that the matter would soon be settled. Also stated that the Pattis case would be resolved satisfactorily. The people holding the hostages are very worried about a CIA operation to rescue the hostages. The urged that we not do anything to fan their fears, as this could make his job harder. He said that he would try to give us 2 or 3 days advanced motice before the hostages are released.

secret US-Iran Joint Committee. There was a lot of discustion about towards the end of the meetings, stated that they had already set up the people to

secret US-Iran Joint Committee. It towards the side of the meetings, stated that they had already set up move people to be on their side. We told him that ours would be three persons also, consisting of "Goode, Kopp and Sam". Said that they would pick a single courier would would carry things the Tehran to where ever we designate as committee Hdqs. We suggested that secure communications be established as soon as possible and served. We returned to our way suggestion of a two man commo team in Jehran.

possible and agreed. We returned to our way suggestion of a two man combo team in Jehran. Tiked this and said that he would bring it up in Jehran.

7. In provided a list of their urgent military which he said they needed desperately. This included technical intelligence on Jerk which he said they needed desperately. The said that they badly need 105 and 155 mm howitzers and 175 mm base plate Refrounds. He asked "Sam" to ship some of these (as much as we can assemble on short notice) as soon as possible. On the shipment that we have put tegether, he said to give him an account number as soon as we are ready, and he will have the money ready. He wanted to take the list back and make sure they really needed the spare parts before giving the go-ahead on the shipment. He said that their need for artillery is pressing because they need suppressing fire to make their infantry attacks more successful.

US PARTICIPANTS: George Cave as "Colonel Sam O'Neil"
Oliver North as "Colonel Goode"
Dick Seacord as "General Kopp"

IRANIAN PARTICIPANT:

of Majlis

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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISH

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Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

In the aftermath of the bijacking of PAN AN Plight 73 at Rerach airport is is time to reflect on the widespread reaction to this despicable and covardly stime. The response of mations around the world has hon a resounding rejection of this and other acts of international terrorisa, like the cruel marders in the synagogue of Istanbul. Regardless of political or religious persuasion, innocent men and woman from work continent are joining the call for a stop to the wanton, indiscriminate killing and destruction.

The hijackers of PAN AR Flight 73 remain in the custody of the Pakistani government avaiting trial for murder. The government of Pakistan is to be congratulated for its handling of the difficult and often confusing situation it faced on September 4. The United States government remains prepared to assist in any way that leads to the successful prosecution of those responsible for the unnecessary killing of twenty men, women, and children from India, Pakistan, Mexico, Britain, and the United States.

This hijacking further demonstrates the resolve of 1341

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
nations to work together to prevent and discourage these attacks on international civil aviation. Not only did Pakistan help in preventing the airplane from departing Karachi -- which properly kept the hijackers on the ground and avoiding a potential in-flight disaster. Other nations refused to allow the airplane to land in their countries were it to have the Pakistan. Nations throughout the region joined together to reject the hijackers from entring their airspace. Countries like Cyprus, Egypt Ruwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia; Irah and Italy deserve the recognition from peace-loving people everywhere for their courageous stand against these perpetrators of death and destruction.


President Reagan prays for the Tamilfes of thosekilled and injured in this tragedy. He remains committed to work with all nations to stop international terrorism from tearing at the fabric of our civilisation and to seek justice against those who would commit violent acts against innocent victims for political reasons. As all of our law-abiding citizens have long understood and governments must continue to learn -- just people with just causes do not resort to terrorism.

That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

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
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November 14, 1986

JECA?~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

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Investigation of Southern Air Transport (SAT)

At 11:10 a.m., Movember 14, Major General Richard Secord, USAP (Ret.) celled his office to advise that the President of SAT had just called him to inform that U.S. Customs officers had again requested all of the company's financial records. This request was being made pursuant to an investigation regarding SAT's role in supporting the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.

Secause SAT is involved in supporting the January 1986 Covert Action Finding on Iran, MGEN Secord was concerned that providing the company records for the Nicaraguan resistance investigation would reveal SAT's role in supporting the Iran covert action.

SAT aircraft and pilots were used to support the six deliveries to Iran in 1985 and 1986 and company records would reflect these activities.

This problem was discussed with Mr. Oliver Revell, Associate Director of the PBI, at 12:00 noon on November 14. He advised that ten days ago he had received guidance from Attorney General Mess to "suspend" the investigation of Major General Secord's involvement in support of the Micaraguan resistance and that the Attorney General had discussed the Customs' investigation of SAT with Treasury Secretary Jim Baker. On Mr. Revell's advice, North called Associate Attorney General Stephen Trott to solicit his advice on this matter.

At 12:10 p.m. on November 14, Trott advised North by secure phone that the Secord and SAT involvement with the Iran covert action had been the subject of a discussion between Trott and the Attorney General and a separate discourse between the Attorney General and Traesury Secretary Baker. Trott indicated that Secretary Baker had planned to advise Customs regarding sensitivity to SAT's involvement in sensitive U.S. Government coverations.

Trott informed that he would discuss this matter immediately with Attorney General Meese and indicated that he (Trott) fully understood the need not to divulge SAT or Second's roles in support of the Fran covert action. Trott indicated that he would advise us of the results.

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
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LMSG FROM: NSDLN --CPUA TO: NSPBT --CPUA
TO: NSPBT --CPUA

11/14/86 20:14:09

PREDLY to note of 11/14/86 20:00
NOTE FPOM: OLIVER NORTH
(SUBJECT>
Subject: findingon_Tean
CTEXT>
If this can wait until Monday, it wd be best to have Ken's office do this thru
their normal channels = rather than have North's fingerprints on it. If it
cannot wait = I will take care of it tomorrow a.e. with a cover memo from JMP.
Pls advise.



findingon Iran

THE SECRETARY'S WELCOMING REMARKS GCC LUNCHEON AT UNGA October 1, 1986

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WELCOMING REMARKS



Note:

As practicing Muslims, the GCC Ministers will not drink alcohol at this lunch. Consequently, a toast would not be appropriate. It would be appropriate, would not be appropriate to say a few words of however, for the Secretary to say a few words of however, for the Secretary to say a few words of however, for the Secretary to say a few words of welcome at the beginning of the lunch. At last year's welcome at the beginning of the lunch. They may do the same this oresentation of remarks. They may do the same this runen, the occ foreign ministers made a rormal presentation of remarks. They may do the same this year in response to these comments.

Your Highnesses, Excellencies and Distinguished Guests: Welcore. I am once again pleased and honored to meet here in New York with the heads of delegations and Ambassadors of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In the five years since its founding, the GCC has continued to grow as a source of stability and progress in a threatened region.

The GCC states live on the rim of the tragic Iran-Iraq War. This conflict has entered its seventh brutal year. Regrettably, it shows no sign of resolution. The heightened tempo of the fighting this year and the heightened threat that the conflict will spill over to GCC member states pose real risks to region and the people of your countries. The United States has made it emphatically clear that an expansion of the war to third parties would constitute a major threat to U.S. interests. Yet the unpredictable nature of this conflict remains a cause for constant concern and vigilance.

Attacks on Gulf shipping have intensified. No one can predict when neutral ships transiting international or GCC territorial waters will be hit again. President Reagan has affirmed our commitment to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. I reiterate that commitment to you here today.

The GCC states have shown that, when faced with threat, you can work in concert to assure your common defense. We support your individual and collective self-defense and are ready to work with you.

With you, we urge Iran and Iraq to seek peace, to negotiate an end to their bloody conflict. Iraq desires a negotiated settlement, but Iran remains intransigeant. For that reason, we have intensified our efforts to discourage our friends from selling arms to Iran-- with significant, but not complete, success.

An end to the war is a goal that unites the international community. In our recent discussions in Stockholm and Washington, we and Soviet officials agreed that we share a common interest in seeing an end to the Iran-Iraq war. However, the Soviets have not acted as forcefully as we in moving to block arms resupply to Iran from countries with which they have influence. We wish they would do more.

Elsewhere in the Islamic world, the senseless horror of international terrorism has struck again -- an airport in Karachi, the morning prayers at a synagogue in Islambul and yet two more kidnappings in Beirut. Your countries know all too well the terrorist plague. You have shown great courage in refusing to bow to terrorist tactics. We respect your strength and share your determination.

We all want peace in the Middle East. For forty years, the United States has worked for a just and lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. There can be no substitute for a political process involving direct negotiations to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict. Two important steps -- and powerful examples of the efficacy of direct negotiations -- were taken last month: agreement to submit the Taba dispute to arbitration, and a historic summit meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Peres and Egyptian President Mubarak.

Only through direct negotiations with all the parties concerned will the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people be reconciled with Israel's security requirements. We will persist in seeking ways to further the conditions toward this goal. We ask your understanding of our efforts and your continued support in promoting a peaceful solution to the issues that have for too long divided Arabs and Israelis.

Since we met a year ago, the United States and GCC have begun a dialogue on economic matters of mutual concern. In exploratory meetings, first in Riyadh and later in Washington, we have worked to identify areas where both sides could benefit from greater cooperation. Much work remains to be done, but we believe mutually beneficial results can be acheived. We look forward to continuing these important exchanges in the coming nonths.

We are aware of your concerns about the effect U.S. tax reform will have on GCC investments in the United States. The provision in question, now being finalized in Congress, aims at putting all commercial investors on an equal footing. It will inevitably affect the tax status of many -- private and public, domestic and foreign. This legislation may lead some investors to restructure their U.S. portfolios, but it is not directed against any geographic region. Most important, with tax reform the United States will remain a good place in which to invest.

Today as ever, the GCC is a force for stability and progress in a troubled region. GCC strides in security and economic integration strengthen its ability to resist threats to peace. We support your efforts and value the friendship GCC nations have shown the United States. My government -- and I personally -- will work to build even closer ties with the GCC. It is a pleasure to meet with you again. Let us continue our efforts to achieve a more peaceful world for all. Thank you.



THE UNITED STATES! COMMITMENT TO THE

REMARKS TO THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1986


BY

RICHARD W. MURPHY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTRODUCTION

I CONGRATULATE THE INSTITUTE AS IT ENTERS ITS 40TH YEAR AND APPRECIATE YOUR INVITATION TO BE WITH YOU TONIGHT. WHEN I WAS TOLD THAT THE THEME OF THIS YEAR'S CONFERENCE WOULD BE "4C YEARS IN A QUANDARY." I WAS ALSO TOLD TO FEEL FREE ABOUT WHAT I MIGHT WANT TO TALK ABOUT. WE HAVE MANY QUANDARIES IN THE BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS. THEY ARE A DAILY EVENT: SHOULD I, FOR EXAMPLE, DISCUSS SOUTH LEBANON AND UNIFIL IN THE LIGHT OF LAST TUESDAY'S REPORT TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. OR SHOULD I DWELL ON THE LAST THREAT TO STABILITY IN SOUTH LEBANON IN LIGHT OF THE LAST 48 HOURS OF VIOLENCE STARTING WITH A TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST ISRAELIS NEAR THE WESTERN WALL IN JERUSALEM AND CONTINUING THROUGH ISRAELI AIRSTRIKES NEAR SIDON?

I WILL FOCUS TONIGHT PRIMARILY ON THE NIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. BUT START WITH SOME GENERAL REFLECTIONS ON THE U.S.



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ROLE IN THE REGION, INCLUDING COMMENTS ON LEBANON. THE BULF WAR, AND TERRORISM.

U.S. ROLE IN THE REGION

THE QUESTION OF WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE POLE FOR OUR COUNTRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN AT THE HEAPT OF OUR FOFTY YEAR QUANDRY. THIS QUESTION CONFRONTS US ACROSS THE REGION AS WELL AS ACROSS A BROAD SPAN OF ISSUES. RECOGNIZING THERE APE UNDOUBTEDLY A VARIETY OF VIEWS IN THIS AUDIENCE ABOUT HOW TO ANSWER IT. I SUBMIT THAT THERE IS NO SINGLE VISION OR DEFINITION OF THE U.S. ROLE THAT CAN BE IMPOSED THROUGHOUT THE REGION OR SUPERIMPOSED ON ALL ISSUES.

OUR BROAD POLICY OBJECTIVES APPLY TO THE REGION AS A WHOLE AND HAVE REMAINED CONSTANT OVER A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME -- CERTAINLY LONGER THAN THE FORTY YEARS BEING CONSIDERED BY THIS CONFERENCE. FIRST AND FOREMOST, WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN THIS REGION OF GREAT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. CLOSELY RELATED TO THIS, WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ASSURE THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION. AN ADDITIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVE -- NOT FREQUENTLY NOTED BY HARD-NOSED STRATEGISTS BUT VERY MUCH IN KEEPING WITH THE STRONG AMERICAN SENSE OF COMPASSION -- WE HAVE TRIED TO AVEFT

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HUMAN TRAGEDY WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND TO ALLEVIATE IT WHEN IT COULD NOT BE PREVENTED.

THESE POLICY OBJECTIVES ARE CONSTANTS. BUT THE HOLE WE ARE ABLE TO PLAY AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME VARIES CONSIDERABLY WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONTEXT OF EACH CASE.

U.S. ROLE: LEBANON

LEBANON TODAY IS AN EXAMPLE OF A SITUATION FRAUGHT WITH HUMAN TRAGEDY AS WELL AS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STABILITY OF THE REGION. IT IS ALSO AN EXAMPLE OF THE REAL LIMITS ON THE ABILITY OF ANY OUTSIDE POWER TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IF THE PLAYERS ON THE SCENE ARE THEMSELVES UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO RECONCILE THEIR FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES.

WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AND SECURITY SOLUTIONS MUST COME INITIALLY FROM THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE FORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE OF DIALOGUE IN BEIRUT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE UNDERSTAND FULL WELL THAT THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH TRULY SUPPORT THE STRENGTHENING OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THE AND REASSERTION OF ITS AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT A UNIFIED AND

- 4 -

INDEPENDENT LEBANONTH HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE EFFORTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF DIALOGUE CAN SUCCEED.

IN THE SOUTH, WE BELIEVE THAT UNIFIL HAS A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN ACHIEVING THE GOAL WHICH ALL THOSE WHO WISH LEBANON WELL SHOULD SHARE: NAMELY, PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS BY WHICH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY DOWN TO ITS BORDER, SO THAT THE PEOPLE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND NORTHERN ISRAEL CAN RESUME NORMAL LIFE, FREE FROM FEAR OF ATTACK.

ANOTHER CRITICAL ELEMENT IN REACHING THE GOAL OF NORMALITY IN THE SOUTH. AND INDEED THROUGHOUT LEBANON. WILL BE THE REALIZATION BY ALL MILITIA LEADERS THAT THE RENAISSANCE OF LEBANON WILL DEPEND ON THE DISBANDMENT OF EVERY EXTRA-LEGAL ARMED GROUP. MY COLLEAGUE AMBASSADOR PARKER IS ONE OF MANY SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS WHO STROVE TO ACHIEVE LEBANESE CONSENSUS ON THE MILITIA PROBLEM. OUR CONVICTION REMAINS: ENERGIES CURRENTLY SQUANDERED IN SUPPORT OF MILITIAS MUST BE CIVERTED TO POSITIVE. ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND THE NATIONAL POLICE.

THE CHACS THAT AFFLICTS LEBANON TODAY HAS PROLONGED THE AGONY OF OUR HOSTAGES. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT STANDS READY TO DISCUSS WITH THEIR CAPTORS THE SAFETY AND RETURN OF THE HOSTAGES. BUT WE WILL NOT PRESSURE THE KUWAITI AUTHORITIES TO RELEASE THOSE IT HAS IMPRISONED FOR KILLING SIX IN THE BOMBING

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OF KUWAITI INSTALLATIONS THE U.S. AND FRENCH EMBASSIES THERE THREE YEARS AGO.

U.S. ROLE: THE GULF WAR

THE GULF WAR THREATENS TO CHANGE THE STRATEGIC MAP IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS RAVAGING HUMAN LIFE AND THE MATERIAL INFRASTRUCTURES IN IRAN AND IRAQ: ITS TERMINATION WILL HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY. WE SEE NO VICTOR WHEN THE END OF FIGHTING FINALLY ARRIVES.

AS THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION ESCALATES, SO DOES THE DANGER THAT THE WAR WILL SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE GULF.

ALREADY, GULF SHIPPING HAS BECOME A RENEWED TARGET FOR BOTH SIDES. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS OUR THREE YEAR OLD DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO PREVENT ARMS FROM FRIENDS AND ALLIES FROM GETTING TO IRAN. OUR PROGRAM HAS SLOWED THE WAR BUT NOT YET SERIOUSLY DISLOCATED IRANIAN STRATEGY. WE TARGET IRANIAN ARMS PROCUREMENT BECAUSE IRAN IS THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY IN THE WAR. REFUSING TO CONSIDER ANY NEGOTIATION OR MEDIATION PROPOSAL MADE TO DATE.

WE ALSO CONTINUE OUR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES -- AT THE U.M.

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AND ELSEWHERE -- TO SEE WHAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO TO HELP BRING THE WAR TO AN END.

FINALLY, WE MAINTAIN OUR EFFORTS TO KEEP OUR MODERATE AFAB FRIENDS IN THE PENINSULA STRONG AND PREPARED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST DANGEROUS THREATS. MAINTAINING OUR TRADITIONAL MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIPS, OFTEN DESPITE HEAVY OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS, IS CRUCIAL TO THIS GOAL. WITH THIS IN MIND THE ADMINISTRATION WILL STRONGLY OPPOSE THE BIDEN-LEVINE BILL TO BE DEBATED IN THE NEXT CONGRESS.

U.S. ROLE: TEPROFISM

IN THE CASE OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND ALSO OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT. THE CRITICAL VARIABLE. IN THE END. IS THE WILL OF THE REGIONAL PARTIES TO ACHIEVE PEACE. GUR CONTRIBUTION, HOWEVER ESSENTIAL, CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR DECISIONS THAT ARE THE HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY CONCERNED. BY CONTRAST, IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, WE HAVE INCREASINGLY TAKEN ON THE LEAD ROLE.

OBVIOUSLY. OUR SUCCESS SO FAR HAS BEEN ONLY PARTIAL. AND GRANTED. THE PROSPECT OF ENDING TERRORISM OR EVEN STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM AS A RESULT OF ONE CRASH PROGRAM IS

ILLUSORY. IT WILL BE A LONG BATTLE, AND IT IS JUST BEGINNING.

WHAT I AM SUGGESTING IS THAT THIS IS ONE INSTANCE WHERE OUR

POLITICAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES. OUR COMPARATIVE FREEDOM OF

ACTION AND THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. HAVE

ENABLED AND REQUIRED US TO TAKE THE LEAD IN RAISING THE COST OF

TERRORISM TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL. THAT SAID, WE DO NOT

BELIEVE COUNTER-TERRORISM IS EXCLUSIVELY OUR RESPONSIBILITY.

WE-SEE THIS AS A FIELD FOR UNIFIED INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS.

INDEED. WE HAVE SUCCEEDED TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE IN

GALVANIZING EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

MEASURES TO FIGHT TERRORISM.

TERRORISTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE FEW IN NUMBER BUT THEIR ACTIONS HAVE STIMULATED A TROUBLING GROWTH OF RACIAL SLURS ABOUT ARABS. I ALSO WANT TO MENTION A RECENT NEWS REPORT OUT OF DEARBORN, MICHIGAN WHICH SOME OF YOU MAY HAVE SEEN. IT SADDENED HE DEEPLY. IN THAT CITY, WITH ITS LARGE ARAB-AMERICAN COMMUNITY, CHILDREN HAVE TAKEN TO DENYING THEIR ARAB ORIGIN OUT OF FEAR THAT THEY WILL BE TAUNTED AS TERRORISTS BY THEIR SCHOOLMATES. THUS, THE BRUTAL AND TWISTING IMPACT OF TERROFISM AND THE RESULTING ETHNIC SLURS AFFECT THE PSYCHE OF CHILDREN IN CHR OWN MID-WEST. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE.

THE PEACE PROCESS WHERE WE ARE -- THE EVOLUTION OF PROCESS

IT IS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS THAT THE CHALLENGE TO DEFINE AND EXERCISE THE APPROPRIATE U.S. ROLE HAS RECEIVED THE GREATEST SCRUTINY. I WILL ADDRESS THE REMAINDER OF MY REMARKS HERE THIS EVENING TO THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH REMAINS OUR CENTRAL PREOCCUPATION IN THE REGION.

LET ME FIRST REVIEW WHERE WE ARE. THE LIST OF POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS IS LONG: PERMIT ME TO LIST SOME OF THEM:

- SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF A REGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE HAS EXPANDED SIGNIFICANTLY. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THERE ARE INCREASINGLY FEWER MIDDLE EAST PLAYERS WHO SEE THE DISPUTE BEING RESOLVED BY FORCE OF ARMS. AND MANY MORE WHO ARE PREPARED TO SAY. PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY. THAT ISRAEL AND THE ARABS # SHOULD REGOTIATE THEIR DIFFERENCES.
- O MOREOVER. PREVIOUSLY TABOO CODEWORDS ARE BEING SUBJECTED TO NEW SCRUTINY. BY ISRAELIS AND ARABS ALIKE. "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS." "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS." "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES" ARE

BEING ASSESSED BY DECISION MAKERS IN TERMS OF HOW THEY MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS. RATHER THAN BLOCK IT.

- O ARAB-ISRAELI CONTACTS ARE BECOMING MORE ROUTINE. THE MEETING IN IFRANE BETWEEN KING HASSAN AND PRIME MINISTER PERES AND THE ALEXANDRIA SUMMIT BETWEEN PERES AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK ARE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT EXAMPLES. PARTICULARLY SO IN THAT THE MEETINGS EVOKED LITTLE SERIOUS CRITICISM AND IN FACT SOME CAUTIOUS INTEREST ON THE PART OF SOME OTHER MIDDLE EAST. COUNTRIES.
- THE MOOD IN THE OCCUPIED "ERRITORIES IS CHANGING.

 ARAB MAYORS NOW RUN ALL WEST BANK MUNICIPALITIES: AN ARAB BANK WILL SOON OPEN IN NABLUS (THE FIRST ON THE WEST BANK SINCE 1967): THE BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT HAS BECOME MORE ENCOURAGING FOR INDIGENOUS ENTREPRENEURSHIP. TO BE SURE, AND QUITE UNDERSTANDABLY, THE DESURE TO END THE OCCUPATION REMAINS STRONG. BUT A POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IS EVOLVING THAT COULD OPEN THE WAY FOR THE EXERCISE OF GREATER CONTROL BY THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA -- NOT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS BUT AS A COMPLEMENT TO IT.

O FINALLY. I WOULD POINT TO A CONCEPTUAL CHANGE IN THE WAY REGIONAL PLAYERS VIEW A SETTLEMENT -- THERE IS MORE ACCEPTANCE OF "PROCESS." AND LESS INSISTENCE ON "GUARANTEED OUTCOMES" THAN WE HEARD A FEW YEARS AGO. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE BEEN REMINDED THAT, JUST AS IT IS UNLIKELY THAT PEOPLE WOULD EMBARK ON A CROSS-DESERT JOURNEY WITHOUT A SENSE OF WHERE THE MEXT WATER HOLE IS LOCATED. SO TOO A PEACE "PROCESS" MUST CARRY A SENSE OF WHERE IT IS HEADING.

WHERE WE ARE HEADING: THE ISSUES AT STAKE

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I AM SURE YOU ARE FULLY FAMILIAR WITH THE KEY SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES ON THE TABLE. SO I WILL NOT DESCRIBE THEM IN DETAIL. THEY INCLUDE:

- O NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. EMBODYING THE "LAND-FOR-PEACE" FORMULA.
- O THE SHAPE AND FORMAT OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

 INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR THAT PROCESS.

- !! -

O ISSUES RELATING TO PARTICIPATION. INCLUDING THE ROLE OF PALESTINIANS IN THE PROCESS.

INDERLYING THE WAY WE DEAL WITH THESE SPECIFIC ISSUES ARE TWO DUESTIONS OF HOW THE PEACE PROCESS CAN BEST BE APPROACHED. THE FIRST INVOLVES THE RELATIVE MERITS OF A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH VERSUS HOVEMENT ON ALL FRONTS SIMULTANEOUSLY TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THE SECOND CONCERNS THE RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE REGIONAL AND EXTRA-REGIONAL PARTIES.

STEP-BY-STEP VERSUS COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT

FIRST, A FEW WORDS ON THE RELATIVE MERITS OF PURSUING A PEACE PROCESS STRATEGY BASED ON A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH -- THAT IS. THE PURSUIT OF INCREMENTAL AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE IMPORTANT IN AND OF THEMSELVES BUT WHICH ALSO SEP/E TO STRENGTHEN THE FOUNDATION AND ENVIRONMENT FOR MORE FAR-REACHING SOLUTIONS -- OR. ALTERNATIVELY, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, ONE WHICH AT THE OUTSET LAYS BARE THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES AT STAKE AND SEEKS A PACKAGED SETTLEMENT.

HAVING NOTED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE PARTIES TO VIEW THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN TERMS OF A PROCESS. IT WOULD APPEAR TO

FOLLOW THAT AN INCREMENTAL STRATEGY SHOULD BE PURSUED. IN FACT, THIS WAS THE CASE DURING THE MID-1970'S. THEK, THERE WERE FEW BUILDING BLOCKS ON WHICH TO CONSTRUCT A VIABLE STRATEGY. ARABS AND ISRAELIS HAD NOT HELD NEGOTIATIONS OUTSIDE THE ARMISTICE CONTEXT SINCE 1948-9. THE MISPERCEPTIONS. PREJUDICES. FEARS AND HATREDS WHICH OFTEN BESET ENEMIES WERE RAMPANT. THE COMMON ARAB ASSUMPTION WAS THAT ISRAEL WAS AN INHERENTLY EXPANSIONIST STATE, WHICH DID NOT SEEK A PEACE THAT WOULD REQUIRE THE RETURN OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ISRAEL WAS ALSO SEEN AS AN ALMOST SUPERNATURALLY ENDOWED REGOTIATOR WHICH COULD SAFELY BE DEALT WITH ONLY BY A BLOC OF ARAB STATES. THE COMMON ISRAELI ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE ARAB WORLD WAS NOT PREPARED TO TALK TO ISRAEL, AND THAT THE MILITARY OPTION WAS AN ARAB STRATEGY FOR GRADUALLY WEARING DOWN THE WILL OF ISRAEL TO RESIST. IN 1974 AND 1975, THEREFORE, THE AFTERMATH OF WAR MADE IT NECESSARY TO CONSTRUCT A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH COULD BEGIN TO REDUCE THESE MUTUAL MISPERCEPTIONS. THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, AND BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA. WERE IMPORTANT NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS THEY BROUGHT ABOUT. BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY REPRESENTED THE BEGINNINGS OF DIALOGUE.

THE OFFSPRING OF THIS PROCESS -- THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE EGYPT-ISRAEL TREATY OF PEACE -- REPRESENTED BOTH THE

CULMINATION OF THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH AND THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF HOW A FINAL SETTLEMENT COULD BE REACHED. LET ME BE CLEAR: NO PARTY TO THESE AGREEMENTS EVER UNDERSTOOD THEM TO BE THE FINAL PRODUCT OF THE PEACE PROCESS. EGYPT AND ISRAEL CERTAINLY DIFFERED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THE FINAL PRODUCT SHOULD LOOK LIKE. BUT THEY SPECIFICALLY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO A NEGOTIATING PROCESS FOR ACHIEVING COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.

THE REASON I STEP BACK IN HISTORY THIS WAY IS TO UNDERSCORE A FUNDAMENTAL REALITY OF THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS: NAMELY. THAT ITS OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO WIDEN THE CIRCLE OF ARAB PARTIES PREPARED TO BUILD ON INCREMENTAL PAST STEPS AND MOVE TOWARD PEACE REGOTIATIONS. THE 1982 REAGAN INITIATIVE. KING HUSSEIN'S REPEATED EFFORTS TO REACH A COMMON BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. EGYPT'S CONTINUING REINTEGRATION INTO THE ARAB WORLD, KING HASSAN'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PERES, AND THE LIKE -- ALL THESE HAVE BEEN PART AND PARCEL OF THIS PROCESS. THEY HAVE FOCUSSED LESS ON NEW IDEAS THAN ON A NEW COMMITMENT TO FIND A COMMON BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ALL ITS NEIGHBORS. IN SHORT, A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IS OUR GOAL. BUT A HARD LOOK AT THE POLITICAL REALITIES IN THE REGION CONVINCE ME THAT THAT GOAL CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED STEP AFTER STEP.

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REGIONAL OF EXTRA-REGIONAL INITIATIVES: THE U.S. ROLE

THE SECOND CONTEXTUAL ISSUE IS THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE REGIONAL PARTIES -- AS OPPOSED TO EXTRA-REGIONAL PARTIES -- TO INITIATE IDEAS FOR MOVING THE PROCESS FORWARD. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW HAS BEEN THAT THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT ARE UNABLE TO OVERCOME BIASES. INHIBITIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES IN ORDER TO DEVELOP CREATIVE APPROACHES TO PROBLEM-SOLVING. AT FIRST GLANCE, THE PATTERN OF MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY MIGHT SEEM TO CONFIRM THIS THESIS:

- O NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS HAS BEEN REACHED WITHOUT SOME FORM OF OUTSIDE MEDIATION.
- O OUTSIDE MEDIATORS NORMALLY HAVE BEEN MORE THAN THAT.

 I.E. FILLING THE NEED TO TRANSFORM OFTEN INCHOATE

 IDEAS INTO PRACTICAL NEGOTIATING FORMULAS AND DRAFTING

 AGREEMENTS.
- O LOCALLY-DRAFTED PEACE PLANS HAVE NOT BECOME THE BASES FOR NEGOTIATIONS: RATHER, PLANS INITIATED BY OUTSIDE PARTIES CONSISTENTLY ARE SEEN AS FORMING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

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HISTORY, HOWEVER, DOES NOT FULLY SUPPORT THIS VIEW. SINCE 1967, INITIATIVES FOR BOTH WAR AND PEACE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE REGION — WITNESS EGYPT'S AND SYRIA'S DECISION TO GO TO WAR IN 1973, EGYPT'S AND ISRAEL'S DECISION IN 1977-8 TO ENGAGE DIRECTLY TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, AND THE AGREEMENT AT FEI ON AN ARAB POSITION ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE PARTIES THEMSELVES TOOK THE FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS: THOSE DECISIONS WERE NOT IMPOSED FROM WITHOUT. AS THESE EVENTS UNFOLD, OUTSIDE MEDIATION MAY BE REQUIRED TO CONCLUDE THE PROCESS. BUT OUTSIDE INITIATIVES DID NOT PROVIDE THE BASIC START UP OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY.

RECENT EVENTS CONTINUE THIS PATTERN. KING HUSSEIN'S

EFFORTS DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS TO FIND A NEGOTIATING FORMULA
WITH THE PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN DRIVEN BY LOCAL IMPERATIVES AND
FUELED BY LOCAL IDEAS. INDEED. I NEED POINT ONLY TO THE ISSUE
OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT.

HUSSEIN HAS INSISTED ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO
PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS
WITH ISRAEL: THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, WHILE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC
OVER THIS IDEA, HAS BEEN GRAPPLING WITH WAYS TO MAKE AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR NEGOTIATIONS ACCEPTABLE. OUTSIDE
PARTIES, INCLUDING THE U.S., HAVE BEEN REACTIVE TO THE IDEAS OF

THE LOCAL PLAYERS. TENDING TO VIEW THESE PROPOSALS THROUGH PRISMS WHICH INCLUDE -- BUT FOR US CANNOT BE LIMITED TO -- THE MIDDLE EAST. WHILE KING HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS HAVE NOT YET REACHED FRUITION. THEY ILLUSTRATE THE CONTINUING REALITY THAT THE PARTIES TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT ARE TAKING THE LEAD TO DEVELOP FORMULAS TO RESOLVE KEY PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

SENSITIVE TO THIS SHIFT. OUR GOVERNMENT HAS WELCOMED -- IN FACT. ENCOURAGED -- THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP TO TAKE SUCH A LEAD AND HAS WORKED STEADILY WITH THE PARTIES TO HELP BRING THEM TO A POINT OF TAKING DECISIONS. OUR VIEWS ON MANY OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES TO BE DEALT WITH IN NEGOTIATIONS ARE ON THE TABLE -- WE BELIEVE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242 AND 338, AND WE THINK THE POSITIONS OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN 1982 REPRESENT AN EQUITABLE GOAL OF NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO IMPOSE THESE VIEWS. RATHER. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO NURTURE THE TENDENCY TOWARD LOCAL INITIATIVE, LENDING ASSISTANCE TO THIS EFFORT WHERE APPROPRIATE AND REFRAINING FROM TAKING THE LEAD. THE ESSENTIAL IS THAT. HOWEVER SLOWLY. THE PROCESS IS MOVING AHEAD -- THE PEGIONAL PARTIES ARE APPROACHING FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS ON THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE, AND THE U.S. IS ACTIVELY HELPING THE PARTIES TO REACH THESE DECISIONS.

EXHIBIT OLN-209



1. 1985

The President's
News Conference of
June 18, 1985

Trans World Airlines Hijacking Incident

The President. I have a statement. One hour ago the body of a young American hero Navy diver, Robert Dean Stethem, was returned to his native soil in a coffin after being beaten and shot at pointblank range.

His murder and the fate of the other American hostages still being held in Beirut underscore an inescapable fact: The United States is tonight a nation being attacked by international terrorists who wantonly kill and who seize our innocent citizens as their prisoners.

In response to this situation, I am directing that the following steps be taken. I have directed the Secretary of Transportation, in cooperation with the Secretary of State, to explore immediately an expansion of our armed sky marshal program aboard international flights of U.S. air carriers for better protection of passengers.

I have directed the Secretary of State to issue an immediate travel advisory for U.S. citizens traveling through the Athens International Airport warning them of dangers.

This warning shall remain in effect until the Greek Government has improved the security situation there and until it has demonstrated a willingness to comply with the security provisions of the U.S.-Greek civil aviation agreement and the Tokyo, Montreal, and Hague conventions regarding prosecution and punishment of air pirates.

I've asked for a full explanation of the events surrounding the takeover of the air-

craft in Athens I have appealed through the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration for all U.S. air carriers to review the wisdom of continuing any flights into Athens until the security situation there improves.

And further, I have asked Secretaries Shultz and Dole to report to me on whether we should terminate the service of foreign air carriers whose governments do not honor appropriate international conventions or provide adequate security at their airports.

I'm calling upon all allied and friendly governments to redouble their efforts to improve airport security and take other measures to prevent the hijacking of aircraft

i will also be asking them to take steps to prevent travel to places where lawlessness is rampant and innocent passengers are unprotected. And I'm urging that no American enter any Middle Eastern country that does not publicly condemn and disassociate itself from this atrocity and call for the immediate safe release of our citizens.

Let me further make it plain to the assassins in Beirut and their accomplices, wherever they may be, that America will never make concessions to terrorists—to do so would only invite more terrorism—nor will we sak nor pressure any other government to do so. Once we head down that path there would be no end to it, no end to the suffering of innocent people, no end to the bloody ranson all civilized nations must pay.

This act of terrorism is a stain on Lebanon and particularly on those Lebanese in whose name it has been done. Those in Lebanon who commit these acts damage their country and their cause, and we hold them accountable.

I call upon those holding our people to release them without condition. I call upon the leaders of Lehanon, political and religious, to meet their responsibilities and to do all that is necessary to end this crime now in the name of the God they worship. And I call on other governments to speak out and use their influence as well.

This attack is an attack on All citizens of the world who seek to live free from the fear and scourge of terrorism. My thoughts and prayers are, as are those of all Americans, with the prisoners now being held in Lebanon and with their families

Let me conclude by stating the obvious. We're in the midst of a dangerous and volatile situation. Before taking your questions, I must stress that speculation tonight over what steps we might or might not take in hypothetical circumstances can only lead terrorists to work harder. Consequently, there are many questions to which I should not and cannot respond. I think I have in this statement covered virtually all the points that I can safely discuss, and I'm sure that you would understand the reason for that

And so, that said, Mike Putzel, Associated Press, has the first question.

Q. Good evening, Mr. President. The world's attention is focused tonight on the victims of TWA Flight 847. But as you know, there are seven other Americans who were kidnaped earlier and have spent 3 months to a year in captivity——

The President. Yes.

Q. —in Lebanon. Will you accept a solution to the current crisis in Beirut that leaves any Americans still in c. ptivity, either from the airplane or those kidnaped earlier?

The President. We certainly include those in every conversation we have with regard to our people there. And this has gone on—the instance of one of them—for a considerable period of time. And we have used every effort to see if we can locate who has them, where they are, whether they're together or separated, and where they might be, because we cannot give up on them. And I hope that they have confidence in that.

And yet, as you can imagine, it is an extremely difficult, seemingly impossible task in that area, with all the factions there, to know where—whether they are being moved about and what we can do. But no, we haven't given up on them, and we include them in all of our conversations about the present hijack victims.

Q. If I may follow up, sir. Can you tell us, sir, what happened to the policy of swift and effective retribution that you announced 4½ years ago to deal with international terrorism such as that that we've seen—

The President. Well, when I was speaking about that I was talking about a situation in which a government on the other side was involved—so there was a direct source there for the evil. I would have to tell you—and I can't go farther than this in telling you—that the problem is the who in perpetrating these deeds—who their accomplices are, where they are located—because retaliation in some peoples' minds might just entail striking a blow in a general direction, and the result would be a terrorist act in itself and the killing and victimizing of innocent people.

Now, as far as I can go is to tell you that we have used our utmost capacity and intelligence gathering to try and find these people and these places that I'm talking about. And I can only say that we have gathered a considerable body of evidence, but I'm not going beyond that.

Q. Mr. President, do you think that any of the U.S. policies, past and present, have contributed to the rise of radicalism and anti-Americanism in the Middle East? And I'd like to follow up.

The President. Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International], no, I don't believe that we have. Possibly when we had a peacekeeping force there in connection with our allies—the other countries that had forces in there—we realize that as they began to succeed in keeping some semblance of order in that turmoil, terrorism rose up to strike at all of us that were there in an effort to make our job impossible. And that's why the international force withdrew.

We seem to be a target, also, I'm quite sure, because of our friendship and support of Israel. It just seems there is an anti-Americanism that is rampant there on the part of those who don't want peace with Israel and who have consistently over the years committed terrorist acts against the Israelis.

Q. Mr. President, they wonder why you don't lean on Israel a little bit since the U.S. says that the holding of the Shiite prisoners is against international law—that's our position.

The President. Yes.

Q. Israel has said she is willing to, so why don't you promote it?

Exhibit OLN-210

Continuation of Iras Emergency

Notice of Manuscher 10, 1006

On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order No. 12170, the President declared a national emergency to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the situation in Iran. Notices of the continuation of this national emergency were transmitted by the President to the Congress and the Federal Register on November 12, 1980, November 12, 1981, November 8, 1982, November 4, 1983, November .7, 1984, and November 1, 1985. Because our relations with Iran have not yet returned to normal and the process of implementing the January 19, 1961, agreements with Iran is still underway, the national emergency declared on November 14, 1979, must continue in effect beyond Nevember 14, 1966. Therefore, in accordance with Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency with respect to Iran. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.

Ronald Reagan

The White House, November 10, 1986.

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 10:02 a.m., November 12, 1986]



EXHIBIT OLN-211



Mar. 26 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1987

Columbia, Missouri

Remarks to a Sixth Grade Class at Fairciew Elementary School. March 26, 1987

The President. Well, I've enjoyed this I wish it could go on longer. I hope that you all realize that you are part of a really exceptional school system. That's why we're here. The schools here in Columbia have achieved so much improvement over the years and such quality, that's why the Secretary and I and the others are all here.

But also in this civics class, and what you were doing—you know, it brings to mind about people like myself, like the Secretary and the people that you were talking about there in the Congress. We don't really make the country great, you and Mrs. Hassemer, and you and your parents and the people of this country determine the quality of the country, because all of us work for you. We're the employees of the people of this country. And if the people of America are good, and they are, and they're patriotic, things will go right.

Many years ago, in fact more than 100 years ago, when this brandnew country had suddenly achieved such stature and was so great and Lecoming powerful, a French writer came to this country. His name was de Tocqueville. He came because Europe was amazed. They wanted to find out: How did we do it? And he came and went all over America to meet the people and to look and to see, and went back and wrote a book about it. And he wrote one line in that book that was very wonderful in explaining things. He said: "America is great because America is good. And if America ever stops being good, America will stop being great."

And with all of this, and the checks and balances which you've been speaking about here today, the legislative, the executive branch, the judicial branch over all, to make sure we obey the law, all points up to the fact that, when we had our Revolution 200 years ago—there had been revolutions all over the world before and since. But most of those revolutions just changed one set of rulers for another set of rulers. Our Revolution was much deeper than that. We created something that had never before been done in the history of man. We cre-

ated a government that was run by the people. And that's the difference between our Constitution and all those others. 7

Eve read an awful let of constitutions. Eve read the Soviet Constitution It talks about right of assembly and freedom it speech and things of that kind. But what's the big difference, then, between theirs and ours? Well, all those other constitutions say we the government will allow you, the people, to do the following things. Our Constitution says we, the people, will allow the Government to do the following things, and the Government can't do anything that is not prescribed there in the Constitution.

And that makes us so totally different from anyone else in the whole world. And pretty soon, you're going to be growing up and be in a new century, and you're going to be running the country. And you to be to hold public office to do that You, the people, are in charge.

I could go on here, but I know I shouldn't. Could I, just as a closing in here—since you were all being usked so many questions, I know I've only have time for one. We have to move on to some other classes.

Would someone like to ask—well, my partner here would.

Student. All this publicity and the gress and stuff, they would scare me cut of insmind. I just wonder what is it that made it worthwhile to you?

The President. That had made it so what?

Q. Worthwhile to you.

The President. What had made it worthwhile? Well, this was one of the things why I asked for a commission to be appointed to bring out all the facts. You know, there was a revolution in a country called Iran, and the Ayatollah Khomeini took over and became the dictator of that country. Before that, it had a royal family, the Shah, the King. And he was thrown out of the country. But he had been—well, I knew him personally, and had met him and had been there in Iran. And he was doing what he thought was right for the people.

Then, this revolution decided that we, the United States, we were the Great Satan, we were the evil force. And yet, that's a very strategic country there in the Middle East, where there is so much trouble. And

yet, where so much trouble for the world can be caused. And we gat world that some people there in the government would like to talk to us about maybe reestablishing a friendly relationship between the two countries.

Now, there is a terrorist group in another country. Lebanon, that we believe also sort of may not take orders exactly, but it gets its direction from the Ayatollah Khomeini's government. And they are holding some Americans as hostages. They've kidnaped them, and they're holding them there. They've had them there more than a year.

And we thought this was an opportunity—if we could establish a better relationship with these people in the Iranian Government who wanted to have a better relationship, or said they did. And, so, we sent some people over to start talking to them. And they wanted us to prove that we really were serious. And, so, they asked us to sell them some weapons. We hadn't been doing that because they're engaged in a war.

But these people said they were opposed to the war themselves, and they would like to see it ended. So we agreed, but on a basis that we said you can prove your qualifications as you're asking us to prove ours by seeing if you could get this terrorist group to free our hostages. And we would each do this for each other

Well, this is what we started. And I'm afraid it wasn't carried out the way we had thought it would be. It sort of settled down to just trading arms for hostages, and that's a little like paying ransom to a kidnaper. If you do it, then the kidnaper's just encouraged to go kidnap someone else.

And finally, all of this came out into the open. Up until then, we'd had to keep everything very secret because we felt that the people who were talking to us from Iran would be executed by their government if they were found doing this. And it all came out in the public. I don't know what has happened to all those people there or not. And I have to say that I still think that the idea was right to try and establish a friendly relationship, try and bring about peace between the two countries that are at war, and try and get our people freed. But it kind of deteriorated into something else, and as I said the other

night on television. I won't make that mistake again.

Well. I know that I've talked too much here, and-

Mrs. Hassemer. Thank you for coming. We really appreciate it. I understand you need to get down to third grade.

The President. Yes.

Mrs. Hassemer. We do appreciate your coming today. Let's thank the President and Secretary Bennett for coming. [Applause]

The President. When you're studying these particular things, this particular course, remember how important it is. Because Thomas Jefferson—you all know who he was back in our history—Thomas Jefferson said: "If the people have all the facts and know the truth, the people will never make a mistake."

Thank you all very much.

Note: The President spoke at 12.10 pm. to Mrs Elaine Hassemer's sixth grade class.

Prior to his remarks, the President and Secretary of Education William J. Bennett listened to a classroom discussion on the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers.



Table 2 Micarogua - The Hilltary Buildup, July 1979 to 11 January 1985 (U)

•	No. Arms Shipments/ Period	Thousand Netric Tons/ Period	Million US Bollars/ Ported	Total Force*	Tenks	Other Armored Vehicles	Fix-Winged Aircraft/ Halicaptars**	Airfields	ADA Guns/ Hel Lehrs	Radors
Jul 79	-	-	•	6,000	J	31	30/8	4	2/0	ø '·
Jan 80	-	•	-	16,000	3	31	30/8	4	2/0	•
Jan 81	-	•	6	24,000	3	26	40/8	4	39/6	•
Jan 82	2	1	40	39,000	30	45	40/10	4	100/6	. 0
Jan 83	6	7	90	41,000	50	45	40/15	4	150/30	. •
Jan 84	25	10	120	46,000	50	90	44/15	4	150/30	Same
Jan 86	37	10	250	62,000	150	200	45/20	\$	200/300	Same
Jan 85	•	•. ,	•	62,000	150	200	45/20	54	200/300	Sane

Construction at Punta Nuote continues with approximately 2,470 meters of the new runney con. Lete. Concrete pouring in revetments and connecting universe also noted.

WICLASSIF IED



[&]quot;Active duty and mobilized militia/reserves.

^{**} In some years, deliveries and lesses (combat and otherwise) resulted in me not gain.

Exhibit OLN-213

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE "DOCUMENT ON NATIONAL DIALOGUE OF THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE" AS SIGNED BY THE VARIOUS RESISTANCE LEADERS AND READ TO MEMBERS OF THE NICARAGUAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, .11:30 A.M., COSTA RICA TIDG, MARCH & 1985.

We, democratic citizens, representatives of all sectors of the Nicaraguan Resistance, announce to the Nicaraguan people, to the governments and peoples of the Americas and of the world, the following manifesto:

THE PRESENT SITUATION OF NICARAGUA

In recent years, the Sandinista Front has submerged our people in a crisis without precedent in our national history.

At this time, the impact of this crisis is evident in the economic, political, social and moral spheres of the nation.

This situation is rooted both in the abandonment of the Original Program of Government and the Fundamental Statute as well as in the interference of the Soviet Bloc in our internal affairs.

Both factors, the sole responsibility of the Sandinista Front, have brought about a sharp conflict whose protagonists are the governing party on the one hand and the Nicaraguan people on the other.

The Nicaraguan people reject, of course, the imposition of a regime which in essence contradicts the values and aspirations which gave birth to the revolutionary process. They are founded on the recovery of freedom, democracy and social justice so often postponed because of the Somoza regime.

In conclusion, the national crisis we face did not grow out of a confrontation between imperialism and the revolution, as the Sandinista Front pretends, but out of the contradictions which emerge from the clash between democratic expectations of the Nicaraguan people and the imposition of a totalitarian system such as that which is being implanted in our country by the Sandinista Fro

This conflict, which has produced a civil war, today threatens to destroy the Nicaraguan nation. And as stated in the recent document of the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator, it cannot be resolved through negotiations between the governments of other nations and the Sandinista Front nor through sectarian dialo

From that perspective, it is clear that the elections of November 4, 1984, by virtue of having been a farse, contributed nothing toward the resolution of the national crisis. This view has been supported by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in its report for the period 1983-84, as well as by the political groups which decided to participate in the "elections", as they stated in the document entitled "Proposals of Minimum Concurrence for the Renewal of the National Dialogue," issued in January of this year.

The solution to the national crisis can only be found through a genuine understanding among all Nicaraguans that might end the civil war and lead to the reconciliation of the Nicaraguan family.

We wish to emphasize that this initiative is not taken merely to search for a quota of power, but rather it seeks only to establish in Nicaragua the rule of law which will permit the people to live in peace and to go about resolving our problems within a new constitutional order.

COMON ASPIRATIONS

We aspire to the democratization of Nicaragua, conscious that democracy is the only means to carry out an authentic revolution and rescue our national identity and sovereignty.

We aspire to reconstructing Nicaragua, to promoting its devolopment in accordance with a model which gives priority to the dispossessed sectors.

We aspire to the establishment of a political system which guarantees a real separation of powers, authentic pluralism and a just, efficient mixed economy.

in order to carry out the foregoing, the following is required:

- a) To recognize the primacy of civilian society with respect to the State and to assure through it the dissolution of the totalitarian state-party-army trilogy.
- b) Full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, religion and education.
- c) De-militarization of society and the absolute subjection of police functi to civilian authority.
- d) A foreign policy which has as ojbectives the preservation of national sovereignty, peace and harmony with neighboring countries in particular, and effective reactivation of the historical aspirations of Central American Unity.

- e) An economic system which provides for the development of the private sector which includes cooperative enterprises, as well as the clear definition of the participation of the State as a subsidiary economic agent and promoter of social development.
- f) Institutionalization of a multi-party electoral system which guarantees free elections, alternation in power and respect for the minority.
- g) Freedom to organize unions.
- h) A modern, productive process of integral agrarian reform.
- Administrative decentralization and effective autonomy for municipal government.
- j) Full recovery of the Atlantic Coast, integrating it completely in the national life, guaranteeing respect for the culture and traditions of the various ethnic groups of the region and of the rest of the country within a framework of effective municipal autonomy, exercised in the context of the insolubility of the Nicaraguan nationality.
- k) General amnesty and pardon for political crimes and related crimes.
- Expulsion from the country of all foreign internationalists, military advisors and troops, including those who may be found using the identity of deceased Nicaraguan citizens and those who have been improperly naturalized.

THE LAST AND DEFINITIVE SUMMONS

After having carried out multiple peace initiatives in the last three years directed toward establishing a constructive dialogue with the Sandinista Front that would end the civil war and lead to the reconciliation of the Nicaraguan family, we recognize that those efforts have been fruitless because of the intransigence of the Sandinista regime and because of the designs of the Soviet bloc.

The Sandinista Front, by ignoring and failing to comply with the agreements rade in the past, has lost the necessary credibility to reach a good faith understanding. Such is the case of the agreements reached with the XVII Consultative Meeting of the QAS Council of Ministers, the Original Program of Government, the Fundamental Statute, the Eighteen Points of Concurrence of the Forum for Discussion of National Problems, and the promises to carry out a free and honest election, among others.

Therefore, in view of the gravity of the moment, and conscious of our civic responsibilities and of the urgent need to save our people from greater suffering, we accept the call to convene issued by the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator and we call upon the Sandinista Front, for the last time, and in definitive and absolute fashion, to participate in a national dialogue which will end the national crisis. This dialogue should follow these modalities:

Convocation

The Nicaraguan Bishops Conference is the entity with the necessary moral authority to organize and coordinate the National Dialogue. In this regard, we reiterate the petition made to it by the Democratic Coordinator to convene the National Dialogue.

Participants

In order that the dialogue be efficient and produce the desired results, it is necessary to structure it in accordance with Nicaraguan reality. There are two political tendencies in Nicaragua: the totalitarian one which for the moment has — accepted the Sandinista Front as its vanguard, and the democratic one which is divided into armed organizations and civilian organizations; therefore, the Dialogue should be between these two political tendencies so that both can name their respective delegates, as many as the Bishops Conference feels is appropriat Observers and Guarantors

We suggest to the Bishops Conference that it request the participation of the Central American Governments in the Dialogue as guarantors of the agreements which may be reached, given the fact that the sister peoples of Central America are, in the final analysis, are those which have been most directly affected by the Nicaraguan crisis.

The presence of these governments as guarantors in no way hinders the presence as observers or even as guarantors of other governments and democratic entities of the American continent.

Minimum Requirements

We support fully the minimum requirements demanded by the Democratic Coordinator in order to initiate the National Dialogue. They are: Suspension of armed activities, with a cease-fire in situ; lifting of the state of emergency; absolute freedom of expression and assembly; general amnesty and pardon for political crimes and related crimes; entry into effect of the right of asylum and habeus corpus, adding the granting of full protection of the physical and moral integrity of those members of the Resistance who participate in the Dialogue, in the event that it should take place in Nicaragua.

The application of these measures should be carried out under the supervision of the guarantor governments.

Temporary Permanence of the Executive-

If this dialogue is carried out, we commit ourselves to accept that Mr. Daniel Ortega continue acting as head of the Executive Branch until such time as the people pronounce themselves in a plebiscite. During this period, Mr. Ortega should govern in fulfillment of the promises of the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Government Junta contained in the document of July 12, 1979 and directed to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, an in fulfillment of the Original Program of Government, the Fundamental Statute and the American Human Rights Convention and the Pact of San Jose.

Initial Points of the Agenda

Although it will be up to the Bishops Conference to establish a definitive agenda, by agreement of the parties, we urge it to include as of now the following points:

- That the legal procedure and actions of the government conform immediately
 to the American Convention of Human Rights, or the Pact of San José, which
 was ratified by the Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction on
 September 25, 1979, declaring it the law of the land and committing the
 national honor to its enforcement.
- The dismantlement and immediate dissolution of all the party repressive organisms such as the CDS (Sandinista Defense Committees) and the other para-military organs.
- 3) eduction of military strength, the apolitical nature of the army, an end to the arms race, and the withdrawal of all foreign military troops and advisors and internationalists.
- 4) Immediate dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly.
- 5) A new provisional electoral law.
- 6) A new provisional law for political parties.
- 7) Re-structuring of the electoral system in accordance with the above provisional laws.
- 8) Calling of elections for a National Constituent Assembly.
- 9) Calling of municipal elections.
- 10) Calling of a plebiscite on the conduct of new presidential elections.

Initiation of the National Dialogue, Instrumentation and Deadlines

In order to carry out the National Dialogue proposed by the Democratic Coordinator, on the basis of the statements contained in this document, and conscious of the leninist tactic of stalling in order to consolidate the totalitarian program of the Frente Sandinista, said Dialogue must begin by March 20, 1985. This date cannot be postponed. If by April 20, 1985 the National Dialogue has not begun or has not progressed in clear and substantial form, it will be definitely suspended by the Nicaraguan Resistance, thereby terminating the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the national crisis.

If the Nicaraguan Bishops Conference considers it useful to hold conversations with this group for purposes of preparations leading to the speedy realization of the Dialogue, we announce our immediate availability to participate in such conversations. To that end we appoint as our representatives Mssrs. Arturo J. Cruz, Alfonso Robelo and Adolfo Calero.

May love for our fatherland overcome selfishness and foreign involvement, so that the National Directorate of the Sandinista Front will respond positively to this our last effort to grant to our country a civilized solution.

God Save Nicaragua!

Ехнівіт OLN-214

March 30, 1985

*

THE ASHINGTON POST

'We Will Never Negotiate With The Contras'...

The Post arges the government of Nicaragus to negotiate with the CtA-supported contras, who have been fighting for four years to everthrow it editorial, ["A Fair Offer to the Sandinistae," March 17].

My government believes in negotiations, and is committed to seeking a peaceful solution to the current crisis through genuine negotiations with its adversaries, both foreign and domestic. We are active participants in the Contadora process (we alone accepted the Contadors peace proposal last September); we were participating in the Mansamillo talks; and we are carrying on a dialogue with the civilian opposition within Nicaragua. But we

will never negotiate with the contras. Here is why:

1. The contras are led by officers of the hated Guardia Nacional, the main prop of the Somo dictatorship that brutalised the Nicaraguan people for more than 40 years until our Sandinista Revohution threw them out in July 1979. This is con-furmed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, which has reported that the FDN, the main contre group, is "led by Col. Enrique V. Bermudes—for-mer GN member and last Nicaraguan military attaché to the U.S. under the government of President Anastasio Somoza—and by other ex-GN officers." All key military positions see filled by former GN officers, including Col. Ricardo Lau-chief of contra counterintelligence, who The Post recently reported, participated in the murder of Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero.

As revealed by contra commanders to Post reporter Edward Cody [Feb. 28], the civilians who comprise the FDN's. "political directorate" were actually handpicked by the Cld for the sole purpose of classics on the sole purpose of classics of the sole purpose of pose of cleaning up the contras' image. These front men, who are trotted out from time to time to lobby Congress and meet with editorial boards of major newspapers, have no influence whatever.

The Somocistas have all the guns.

2. The contras are terrorists whose attacks are directed primarily against our civilian population. From their bases in Honduras and Costa Rica, they penetraté our territory and murder, torture, muti late, kidnap and abuse defenseless women, children and men. They destroy farms, health centers, food storage depots and achools. Recent reports by Americas Watch and the International Human

Rights Law Group-respected American huma rights organizations—confirm dosens of My Laitype atrocities by contra forces and accuse the contres of a deliberate campaign of terror against civilians. Official reports from Honduras accuse the contras of murdering civilians there. And now we see that the contras were responsible even for

the killing of Archbishop Romero.

3. The contras are not an indigenous rebel group, but a collection of mercenaries recruited. paid, armed and directed by the CIA, and they would cease to exist without U.S. support. The Post simply ignores the facts when it says the United States is not the cause of the armed conflict in Nicaragus. In November 1981, when the CIA received President Reagan's authorization to create a counterrevolutionary army to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, there were only a few hundred ex-GN soldiers staging sporadic raids on farms along the border. Their principal occupations were cattle-rustling and extortion. It was the CIA, spending more than \$100 million of the American taxpayers' money, that created the cur-

cluding the right to return to Nicaragua and run for elected office. On Jan. 22, the government decreed a general amnesty for all contras, without exception, including their military and political leaders. The decree allows them to return to Nicaragus and to parocipate fully in the social and political life of the country. My government has also committed itself to repeal the state of emergency (imposed in March 1982 in direct response to the war) and fully restore ; ¿ all of the civil and political rights that the Sandinista Revolution promised the Nicaraguan people, including freedom of the press, now partially similed because of the war. To accept the benefits of this amnesty the contras need do just one things lay down their arms.

If they are really fighting for democracy, as their propagandists claim, they can have it. It has already been offered to them. It is, by any objectin e standard, a fair offer. It could lead to a just and lasting peace and to the complete democratization

of our country. That is what we wish.

The "offer" made by the contras is not an offer at. all R is another of the CIA's propaganda moves to . . make the contras appear to be peace-loving democrats-which they are not-and to justify more congressions, funding for this Begal and immoral war.

: —Carlos Tunnermann Bernheim : The writer is Niceregua's embassador to the United States.

Reagan aides and the 'secret' government

By ALPONSO CHARDY

WASHINGTON - Some of President Reagen's top advisors have operated a virtual parallel government outside the traditional Cabinet departments and agencies almost from the day Reagen took office, congressional seventigators and administration officials have concluded.

Investigators believe that the advisers' activities extended well beyond the secret arms sales to Iras and aid to the contras now under levestigation.

helped draw up a controversial plan to suspend the Constitution in the event of a national crisis, such as nuclear war, violent and widespread luternal discent or national opposition to a U.S. military Investor abroad

When the attorney general at the time, The arrangement percented Reagan William French Smith, learned of the administration officials to claim that they

proposal, he protested in writing to North's boss, then-netional security wiveor Robert McFarlane.

The advisors conducted their activities through secret contacts throughout the government with persons who acted at their direction but did not officially report

The activities of these contacts were coordinated by the National Security Council, the officials and investigators

There appears to have been so formal Lt. Col. Oliver North, for example, directive for the advisors' activities, which knowledgeable sources described as a parallel government.

In a secret assessment of the activities. the lead counsel for the Senate Iran-contra committee called it a "secret government-within-a-government."



Will North provide final pieces of puzzle?

By R.A. ZALDIVAR and CHARLES GREEN

WASHINGTON - LL Cal Oliver L' North, the gung to Mariae who led the Rongen administra-tion's charge into the Iron-coutra swamp, will finally get his chance Tuesday to tell his story to

the American people.
His sworn testimony before the congre tran-contra commi see may clear up whether Provident Reages know about the diversion of Iron arms profits to the Hicaraguan robets, or it may leave the nation with the feeling that the secrets of the Iran-costro affair were last to the paper

"I den't think ove're-galay to find a smoking a.".. and -Sea.4.William-Cohen, R-Malan, a

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were not involved in controversial or illegal activities, the officials said.

"It was the ultimate plausible deviabil-," said a well-briefed official who has served the Rangan administration since 1962 and who often cellaborated on covert assistance to the Micaraeusa

The roles of ten-level officials and of Reaces bisself are still not clear. But that is expected to be a primary tepic when North appears before the Irad-contra

lieved to be, trying to prove in his investigation of the iron-contra affair the arvernment officials engaged to a cris





EXHIBIT OLN-215

COVERT / from IA

and their sides were unaware of the advisers' activities. When they periodically detected operations, they complained or tried to derail them, interviews

But no one ever questioned the activities in a broad way, possibly out of a belief that the advisors were operating with presidential maction, officials said.

Reagan did know of or approve at least some of the actions of the secret group, according to previous accounts by aldes, friends and high-ranking foreign officials.

One such case is the 1985 widt to Libys by William Wilson, then-U.S. ambassader to the Vatican and a close Reagan friend, to meet with Libysn leader Col. Honmor Gadheff, officials said last week. Secretary of State George Shultz rebuiled Wilson, but the officials said Reagan knew of the trie in advance.

The heart of the secret structure from 1963 to 1966 was North's effice in the Old Executive Office Building adjacent to the White House, levestigators believe.

North's influence within the secret structure was so great, the sources said, that he was able to have the orbits of asphisticated surveillance satellites altered to fellow Soviet ships around the world, call for the lessaching of high-flying soy aircraft on secret

missions over Cuba and Micaragus and become involved in sensitive domestic activities.

Many initiatives

Others in the structure included some of Reagan's closest friends and advisors, including former national security advisor William Clark, the late CIA Director William Clary and Atterney Georal Edwin Moste, officials and investigators made.

Congrussional investigators sold the Iran deal was just one of the group's initiatives. They my exposure of the unusual arrangement may be the legacy of their inquiry.

"After we establish that a policy decision was made at the highest levels to transfer repeatability for centra support to the MSC..., we favor examining how that decision was implemented," wrote Arthur Limen, chief counsel of the Sease committee, in a secret unsureradent to panel leaders Sons. Daniel Incopye, D-Hawall, and Warren Rudmen, R-M.H., before hearings begin May 5.

"This is the part of the story that reveals the whole secret government-within-s-government, operated from the [Exacutive Office Building] by a Lt. Col., with its own army, air force, diplement: agents, intelligence operatives and appropriations capacity." Limm wrote in the menn, parts of which were shared with The Herald.

A spokesman for Liman declined comment but did not dispute the memo's existence.

A White House official rejected the notion that any of Reagon's advisors were operating secretly.

"The president has community expressed his foreign policy positions to the public and has committed with the Congress," the official mid.

Began in 1986

Congressional investigators and current and former officials interviewed — members of the CIA, State Department and Postages — said they still do not have a full record of the impact of the advisors' activities.

But based on investigations and personal experience, they believe the secret governing arrangement traces its rests to the last weeks of Reagan's 1900 company.

Officials say the generic may have been an October 1930 decision by Casey, Reagan's caupaign meanager and a fermer officer in the World Wor II precursor of the CIA, to create an October Surprise Group to moulter Jimmy Carter's feverish negotictions with Iran for the release of 52 American heatag-

The group, led by compaign foreign palicy advisor Richard Alies, was founded out of concern Carter saight pull off an "October surprise" such as a last-missue

deal for release of the hestages before the Nev. 4 election. One of the group's first acts was a meeting with a man claiming to represent from who offered to release the heatages to Reagan. Allon—Reagan's first notional

Allen — Reagan's first neithers security 'sdriver — and another campaign olds, Laurence Silbermen, teld The Hersid in April of the meeting, They said litefuriens, then a Senate Armed Services Counsities adds, arranged and attunded it. McPartines later became Reagan's neithers accurity, advisor and played a hey role in the impa-counts affeir. Alm and Silbermen seld they rejected the offer to belease the hestages to Reagan.

Briefing book theft

Congressional sides now link assether well-known campaign incident — the theft of coefficiential briefing majorials from Carter's campaign before the Oct. 28, 1988, Carter-Rougen debate — to the same group of advisors.

They believe that Carry obtained the briefing materies and passed them to James Baher, another top Resgan campaign aids, who was White Humy chiefof staff in Resgan's first term.

Once Reagan was swern in, the, group moved quickly to set itself up, officials said. Within months, the advisors were clashing with officials in the traditional agos-

SOME SECRET ACTIVITIES

Sources say the parellal government behind the Reagon administration engaged in secret actions inshaling:

- A CONTENSIBLEY plan to exepted Constitution and impose martial law jaylinked States in case affection war or nations rebellen.

, 1965 West' to Libya by William William, 'than U.S. embasseder to Valican and clean fragan friend, to inset with Libyan leader Col. Magazzar Badhali.

MAYOR ROUTES of explicitizated curvallance establish altered to follow Soviet ships around world.

LAUSCOMISS of apy strength on operal misplans over Cuba and

PROPOSAL in 1961 to provide covert expect of anti-Sandhista groups that Mearages other Sandhista revolution in 1978. BROSEMINATION of Information that quartifeorages as threat to existe or and United States.

Before Reagan was elected, compaign aldes who become the paraddent's top advisors conted out these excret activities:

CREATION in 1989 of Outsian Surprise Group to monitor
... President Carter's regulations with Iran for release of \$2
American heatiges. Group rest with man who claimed to
represent Iran and who citized to release heatings to Renge
Offer deafend, officials also.

ACQUIRITION of states confidential brising materials from Carter's exemption before Oct. St., 1898, Carter-Respon

Six weeks after Bingen was surers in, apparently over State Department objections, then-CIA Director Copys ophesisted a pro-

pend to Reagen calling for covert support of anti-Sandhirts groups that had the Mysrages after the

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About the sense sime. Herth completed his transfer to the MCC from the Morine Corps. These who worked with Merith to 1961 remonster his first conjuments as

North, they receiled were breefy, and preference of the continues of the c

National crisis plan

From 1962 to 1964, North absence FEMA, the U.S. poverment's chief national crusi-management unit, in revueng contigroup plant for dealing with nations was assurant or mandre mainter machineries.

North's involvement with FEMA act off the Brit major clash between the official proviment and the advency and had to the formal lotter of protect in 1864 from these-Attenty Goseral

Smith was in Europe but were and could not be reached for

But a government official familiar with North collaboration with FEMA used then-Director Louis O Guilfinds, a close freed of Moses's mensioned North in merciage during that time as FEMA's NSC contact.

Guilfrida could not be reached for commont, but PENA spokesman 365 McAds confirmed the

"Officials of PEMA met with Cat. North during 1962 to 1964." McAde ased. "These meetings were appropriate to Col. North's duties with the Notional Security Council and PEMA's responsibilition in certain arise of national

security."
FEE/A): clash with Santh orcurred over a securit casuageary
plan that called for suppresson of
the Coastration, turning restrict
or the United Stotes over to
FEE/A, apparetament of multiury
commonters in the state and local
governments and declaration of
martial leve during a medium

The plan did not define national crisis, but it was understood to be section war, violant and wide-spread internal discret or national opposition against a military invited bytes.

Plan was protested

The efficial said the contingency plan was written he part of an executive order or legislative package that Reagan would sign and hold within the MSC until a severy crisis areas

The merial law persons of the plan were excited in a June 30, 1892, means by Guilfride is deputy for astional propersions: programs, John Brinkerboff. A copy of the means was obtained by The

The scenario outlined in the Bristorhell means recenhile somewhat is paper Gulfrida hid written in 1870 at the Army War College in Carlain, Pa. In which he advocated martiel law in case of a material speciality by Mach milliants. The paper also advocated the residency of the material processing of the residency of the case of the residency of the case of the case

When he saw the PEMA plans.
Atterney General Smith became alarmed. He disputched a letter to McFarlane Aug 2, 1944, ledging his objections and urging a delay

"I believe that the role assigned to the Fodoral Emergency Management Agassey in the revised Emergency Order escools as proper function as a coordination alleftly

PRINCIPALS



William Clart Albert Separ Harth rels at NGC



Casep Kap pueri on President Carer

for emergency preparedness."
Smith gold in the terrar to Ref arhone, which The Hersild obtained.
"This department and others have repositedly raised seriest policy and legal objections to the creation of an 'emergency cam' role for

It is unclear whether the rescript order was signed or whether its contained for martial low plant. Congressional sources I smaller with hateful desired procedural and they believe Rengas did sign as essecutive order in 1864 that privide actional infilling mobilization features to deal with view of the contained of the contained and the contained of the contain

Orchestrated news looks

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The new autignment, plus florth's netural organizational shifty, creatively and the above energy le dedicated to the inner, gradually led to an expenditus of has prover and statute within the covert structure, officials and le-

Moore also was and to have played a role in the secret government, in votationary new believe, but has role at less class.

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Shortly thereafter, Mohry said, a vessel, who identified herself as hissested herself as hisses and phose number of methods as the same and phose number of methods accreting who, in turn, give him North and his secretary,

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urith North's relationship with that office said North was directly involved in many of the best publicated arrow tests, including the 30rs. 4, 1854, 190-tests Day consecurated that Sevisi-made and pri fighters were on their way in Necessay. McParlane is now believed to have been the penter administration official who teld reporters that the flories earge stay behaviant, on reset to Pitcoragus from print Black See part, was proto-

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Clark had her rate

The leak led to a new cleak between the regular between the regular between the procedural solviers. To official State Department speaked man, John Meglies, tried herd by play down the report, possessing or department of the processing of the same tests, employees of the control of the same tests, employees of the same tests, employees of the same tests, employees of the control of the same tests, employees of the same tests, employees of the same tests and tests and tests are tests and tests and tests and tests are tests and tests and tests are tests and tests are tests and tests and tests are tests and tests are tests and tests are tests and tests and tests are tests are tests and tests are tests and tests are tests are tests are tests and tests are tests and tests are tests and tests are tests and tests are tests are tests and tests are tests and tests are tests are tests and tests are tests and tests are tests are tests and tests are tests and tests are tests are tests and tests are tests are tests and tests are tests are tests are tests and tests are tests ar

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Harth was not the only services who operated estable traditional personnent channels. Investiga-

Others were known as the RGUET, a some-efficial unit made up of Hereit. Aim Florx a CA Control American ethics; officer, and Elbest Abrama, the current antiques exceeding of state for learn-American effeirs, occurring a harmonic mbordeaste Richard Mellen, Medicen, evveled the existence of the RGUET in a deposition given to the Iran-control committees. The same is a dimensional for RIG, which stands for matericals descriptors, over a dimensional for RIG, which stands for matericals descriptors.

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But purhaps the buy to the

played by Bengan's accord national security advisor. William Clark. It was during Clark's beauty that Horth Magan to gain influence in

Clark also recruited several midlevel efficers from the Pastapos and the CLA to work on a special Control American India force in 1933 to push and for El Salvador, 8 task force member

Judge Clark was the present

working at the Puntages or another lesse whos my best said that because of special circumstances. I was to be reasingsed to

A former administration official familiar with Cart's activities and Cart also had approved emiscie between Volces Anhermater Witson and Libry before Witson's Hovember 1989 Jeanney witch came after his/former replaced Cart at the HSC.

also had certised out secret misrious for the Ranges administrapes to a Latin American convery where Whise repercedly in Votoland ossilatio with high-in-videficials. The source and fed that the country not be identified because the system is not in place; and had reduced leadened by circumvestic and the regular beamson-roise of latin

Calls to Witnes's and Cart's offices to California were no returned.

EXHIBIT OLN-216


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August 7, 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

WALTER RAYHOND, JR. M.

SUBJECT:

Central American Public Diplomacy

In response to your PROF note, I have prepared a memorandum for you to send to Bill Casey (Tab I). Peter Dailey had a very good meeting with my Thursday morning group on August 7, and I think he can be very helpful as a adviser to this group. I do not think it is necessary to revise the current structure. As I told you in my earlier PROF note, I think the structure is in place, but it constantly needs to be energized. I do this on a regular basis. But having Peter Dailey available in Washington will be an enormously useful asset during this next year while we implement the \$100 million in Contra aid. I would propose to have him meet with the group periodically to critique and review programs and processes, to work closely with Bob Kagan, the Interagency Central Amerian Public Diplomacy coordinator, and to help coordinate private sector activities such as funding that currently cannot be done by either CIA or State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Bill Casey.

Ollie North, Ray Burghardt; and Vince Cannistrara concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Casey
Tab A Public Diplomacy Planning

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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5840

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY N=1 () The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Central American Public Diplomacy (U)

I have looked into the question of our overall public diplomacy effort concerning Central America. A great deal of hard and effective work is being done. It is clear we would not have won the House vote without the painstaking deliberative effort undertaken by many people in the government and outside. (3)

The departure of Otto Reich has not resulted in any reduction of effort. His public diplomacy coordination office (LPD) has continued. Although the independent office was folded into Elliott Abrams' bureau, the White House has sent a clear tasker to the community that this limited reorganization in no way reflected a dimunition of activities. On the contrary, the same interagency responsibilities are being exercised, and the group reports directly to the NSC. It continues to be one of the few-offices in the government that is staffed by a truly interagency team, including representatives from State, JSIA, AID, and Defense. The office chief is Bob Kagan, who is a young, bright and effective operator. In reality, the reorganization also means that Elliott Abrams plays a strong public diplomacy role, and in this way we have harnessed one of the best public diplomacy assets that we have in the government. (S)

There is a weekly Central American public diplomacy meeting which takes place in the Old EOB, chaired by Walt Raymond, and which includes not only the four organizations noted above but also the White House Press Office and Public Liaison Office, a representative from CIA's Central American Task Force, and key NSC Staffers. This group takes its policy guidance from the Central American RIG and pursues an energetic political and informational agenda. The group seeks to focus both on domestic public issues as well as the informational battle in Europe and Latin America. It generates requirements for major publication efforts. I will have the NSC Staff send you a package of some of the more recent publications. The group also works closely with the concerned legislative offices to be supportive in terms of the Congres-

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sional depate and in a practical way it deals with a number of on-going daily issues. As an example, issues the group dealt with last week included:

- -- Steps to undertake EC support to Nicaragua;
- -- Trips of U.S. and/or foreign persons to NicaWagua for the purpose of greater foreign awareness of developments in Nicaragua;
- -- Development of programs to publicize religious repression in Nicaragua;

-- Steps to strengthen the El Salvador public diplomacy effort. (S)

There is a comprehensive public diplomacy action plan for Latin America in Europe, and I am attaching a copy for you. This plan is monitored very actively by the LPD office, and periodic reports of activity are provided to the NSC. (S)

While this group ensures that the issue remains a high priority public diplomacy goal, I share your view that this program can certainly benefit by the professional skill and insight of Peter Dailey, and I am delighted that he is in Washington and available to provide time to help this effort. Peter met with the Thursday morning interagency group on August 7. It provided him an opportunity to hear first hand from the action officers and be briefed on their current programs. The exchange was useful, and Peter has committed himself to meet periodically with this group to help strengthen their effort. Bob Kagan, the interagency coordinator, will seek Dailey's counsel on a regular basis and will bring Elliott Abrams into this process. (S)

Peter underscored that the Nicaraguan issue remains a matter of great urgency and that the next year is critical. We must show progress both in Central America, but also in the eyes of the world community, if we are to sustain and support the democratic forces in Nicaragua. It will be necessary to "frontload" our public diplomacy on this subject so that we can strengthen our international support and change attitudes concerning this program. Certain themes that he recommended at the first meeting will be given serious consideration by the working group. One special area of importance concerns generating private sector support and funding. His assistance in this area would be of greatest importance. (S)

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
In summary, the public diplomacy community is hard at work and, I think properly focussed. Peter Dailey's input can be very valuable in energizing this effort, and we certainly intend to take advantage of his presence to strengthen and diversify the thrust of this program. (S)

N 16803

Attachments

Tab A Public Diplomacy Planning

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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June 16, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

N 16804

JAMES F. LEMON Executive Secretary Department of Defense

RICHARD MEYER Executive Secretary Agency for International Development

RONALD J. POST Acting Chief of the Executive Secretariat U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT:

Public Diplomacy Plan for Central America (U)

The NSC Staff approves the Public Diplomacy Plan submitted by the Department of State on this subject. We note that there has been considerable progress in the realization of our public diplomacy goals concerning Central America among European audiences. We must, however, continue to emphasize our comprehensive policy towards Central America at the same time that we focus on the specific question of Nicaragua. (C)

There is a need to maintain this as a high priority of our missions Europe and Latin America. The opposition is engaged in an intensive propaganda effort to sustain their point of view in these areas, and our activity must be at a high level to gain support for our policies. In addition to the continued provision of important materials to the field missions, we must keep up a flow of speakers to the target areas. We must also seek to utilize, as much as possible, Central American spokesmen to speak on their own behalf in Latin America and Europe. Posts in Europe and Latin America should find ways to encourage locals to travel to Central America to gain on-the-ground knowledge of what is happening. (C)

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The limited reorganization of the SLPD function should in no way suggest any dimunition of effort. (C)

The NSC requests a status report of activities undertaken to implement the action plan by August 31, 1986. (U)

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Rodney B. McDaniel Executive Secretary

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 23, 1986

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N 16206

MEMORANDUM TO VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Plan for Explaining U.S. Central American Policy in Europe and Latin America

The Department submits herewith a public diplomacy plan for explaining U.S. Central American policy to Latin Americans and Europeans. Parts of the plan focus on explaining those same policies to international political organizations such as the Socialist International, the International Democrat Union, and the Christian Democrats.

Micholes Platt Nicholas Platt Executive Secretary

Attachment: Public Diplomacy Plan

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLAN
FOR EXPLAINING U.S. CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY
IN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA

BACKGROUND

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The Sandinistas came to power in July 1979 in a coalition with genuine democrats. However, within weeks the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) began a pattern of actions reflecting a betrayal of the revolution: internal repression of genuine democrats and of non-communist institutions such as religious organizations; aggression against fellow Latin American countries through armed subversion; ties with terrorist organizations in Latin America, the Middle gast, and Europe; and a military buildup supported by the Soviet bloc and Cuba. That pattern continues today.

Under President Reagan, a balanced U.S. policy has been followed in Central America. It contains four mutually reinforcing elements:

- 1. Encouragement of democracy;
- Economic aid to improve living conditions;
- 3. Active diplomacy is realistic political solutions:
- Security assistance to give the people of Central America the means to defend themselves against expanded Soviet-bloc/Cuban/Nicaraguan subversion or armed aggression.

Much progress has been made in four of the five central American countries since 1981: Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala are democratic and are steadily strengthening their democratic institutions. The U.S. Congress has year by year provided support for the President's policy through increasing appropriations for economic and security assistance (total amounts by fiscal year 1933--\$513 million; 1934--\$933 million; 1935--\$951 million; 1995--\$1,014 million).



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GOALS

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- -- To convince audiences in Central and South America (particularly the Contadora and Contadora Support Group countries) and in Europe that U.S. policy toward Central America is balanced, workable, and the best alternative possible.
- -- To convince audiences in Latin America and Europe that the Nicaraguan democratic resistance has a cohesive and credible political program and that it is a viable, democratic force worthy of the support of the U.S. and other democratic nations.
- -- To demonstrate to audiences in Latin America and Europe that the Sandinistas support international terrorism and that Sandinista external subversion threatens the nascent democracies in neighboring countries.
- -- To demonstrate that the Sandinistas consciously and systematically violate human rights.
- -- To convince audiences in Latin America and Europe that the United States seeks only that the Sandinistas deliver on their promises of 1979 to the Organization of American States; that we believe that the best way to do this is for the Sandinistas-to engage in dialogue with the opposition; that the Contadora process, if it can meet our three requirements that it be comprehensive, simultaneous, and verifiable, is an alternative we can support.
- -- To demonstrate to audiences in Latin America and Europe how Sandinista ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union adversely affect U.S. and their own national security interests.
- -- To persuade the internationals (Socialist International, Christian Democrats, International Democrat Union, etc.) to speak out on their concern for civil and human rights in Nicaragua, Sandinista intervention in neighboring countries, and Sandinista ties with international terrorists; and to encourage the internationals to oppose aid to the Sandinistas for the same reasons.
- -- To counter Sandinista disinformation activities with facts.

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ADDITIONAL GOALS IN LATIN AMERICA

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- -- To convince the countries of Central America that the United States shares their political and economic goals and can be counted upon to stick with them for the long haul (the U.S. is a reliable ally).
- -- To persuade Central American government, political, church, and labor leaders to be more active in telling the Central American story in Europe, South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

ADDITIONAL GOAL IN EUROPE

-- To convince European publics that the U.S. is responding in a constructive manner to the desires of Central American nations for political and economic reform.

THEMES

- -- Stress positive aspects (economic development, promotion of democracy, security) of U.S. policy in Central America.
- -- Set record straight on U.S. policy toward negotiations with Nicaragua and on Contadora, including Nicaraguan refusal to negotiate a comprehensive agreement and U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan resistance.
- -- Emphasize democratic background and objectives of the Nicaraguan resistance, while reiterating totalitarian nature of the Sandinista regime. Point out militaristic and undemocratic Sandinista educational system; exploit existence of neighborhood committees and internal repression. Remind audiences of Sandinista efforts to crush internal opponents, especially the Catholic Church, political parties, and labor unions not controlled by the government. Focus on new Nicaraguan constitution when it is unveiled by the Sandinistas and on totally controlled process in which constitution will be subjected to "public discussion."
- -- Reemphasize progress and successes in El Salvador, while publicizing the destructive and totalitarian nature of the Salvadoran guerrillas.



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- -- gxplain that the United States supports those people and governments who are furthering the democratic process--in Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador--and seeking to foster reconciliation and the democratic process in Nicaragua.
- -- Remind audiences of Sandinista and Salvadoran guerrilla ties with terrorists in Latin America (example, M-19 in Colombia) and elsewhere (including Middle East), arms and drug runners, and of their Soviet-Cuban ties. Mention Sandinista practice of giving Nicaraguan passports to terrorists.
- -- Continue to present U.S. position on, and rationale for, withdrawal from Nicaraguan case before the International Court of Justice. Note: The ICJ decision on the merits of the Nicaraguan case, expected in May, will spark Nicaraguan attempts to garner support for calls for the U.S. to comply with the Court's rulings, likely including a Nicaraguan approach to the UN Security Council for enforcement of the ICJ's ruling under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter.

ADDITIONAL THEME IN CENTRAL AMERICA

-- guropeans do not have a clear understanding of progress toward democracy in Central America, nor do they understand the threat to democracy posed by the Sandinistas. The United States government cannot alone convey that story to Europeans. The Central Americans should take on a share of that task.

AUDIENCES

Political and government leaders in Latin America and Europe Media in Latin America and Europe The Internationals Religious leaders Academics

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Note: The following three audiences have ready access to the American news media and to U.S. public opinion data. This will affect their willingness to accept materials and information aimed directly at them.

European and Latin American delegations to the United Nations Latin American and European diplomatic missions in Washington, D.C. Latin American and European journalists in the United States

ACTIONS

- -- Make increased use of WORLDNET as an interactive medium for explaining U.S. policy in Central America (among officials to be sought as spokesmen on Central America are Vice President Bush, Ambassador Walters, Assistant Secretary Abrams, and Ambassador Habib).
- -- Speech by President Reagan describing his positive vision for Central Americans. This should note our greatly increased economic assistance, including scholarship programs, and our identification with the hopes of the people of the region for a better life. The speech should also note that the door is open for Nicaraguans to share in this prospect—if their Sandinista leaders will allow them the freedom to pursue it. This speech should be a major event delivered on some appropriate occasion, preferably during the June 10-11 visit of the four Central American democratic presidents. Other possibilities might be to have the President speak to the OAS or during either the President Sanguinetti or President Azcona visits.
- -- A senior Administration official, perhaps Secretary Shultz, should publicly unveil the second annual report on the implementation of the Rissinger Commission (or Jackson Plan) findings. This can be an opportunity to demonstrate that we recognize the North-South dimensions of the problem, and to stress the affirmative part of our strategy.
- -- For Socialist International in Lima, June 20-23, State will instruct embassies in the countries represented to make demagnes to party leaders. USIS Lima will try to place material on Central America in the Peruvian media at that time, and will also distribute ARA/LPD pamphlets presenting U.S. views on Central America.



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- -- USIA will maintain a steady flow of AMPARTS to Europe and Latin America to speak about Central America. These will be arranged according to the needs identified by posts in their country plans.
- -- In addition to continuous reporting by its own media, USIA will distribute abroad increased numbers of copies of studies produced by ARA/LPD. USIA will encourage its posts in Europe to translate more ARA/LPD documents into local languages.
- -- DOD will continue its series of research/study seminars in Latin America on the Strategic Challenges to Regional Security.
- -- DOD and USIA will distribute the 80-piece slide presentation "The Challenge and Response" to posts in Europe and Latin America. USIA will consider translating the show into local languages.
- -- Put ARA/LPD sponsored "Arms Display" exhibit at key points in U.S. and overseas.
- -- ARA/LPD will work closely with IO/UNP to prepare U.S. statements and rights of reply in multilateral for a to counter Sandinista disinformation.
- -- ARA/LPD and USIA will be prepared to exploit any Nicaraguan intransigence at the Esquipulas, Guatemala, summit (May 24-26), and at the June 6 Contadora meeting (possible Contadora conclusion), and at Contadora negotiating sessions leading up to June 6. ARA/LPD and USIA will also prepare to support positions taken by the Central American democracies.

ACTIONS (Latin America)

- -- During President Duarte's travel to Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay, and Brazil, May 9-22, USIS posts at each stop promoted media coverage; USIA media covered in depth.
- -- At the Costs Rican Inaugural, May 8, the U.S. delegation took the opportunity to meet with Contadors and Contsdors support country leaders to demonstrate U.S. support for their goals.



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
- -- During visit of Uruguayan President Sangufiletti to Washington in June, Administration leaders will underscore U.S. support for democracy and economic progress, emphasizing a positive vision, rather than roiterating well-known American opposition to oppression. USIA media will cover in full and also assist Uruguayan media traveling with the president.
- -- USIA will provide full media coverage and assistance to the working visit of Honduran President Azcona to Washington May 26-29. Appropriate quotes by Azcona will be played into Europe and Latin America.
- -- ARA/LPD will prepare a cable to Embassies in Central America instructing them to discuss with government officials, political, church, and labor leaders the need to tell the Central American story in Europe. A special effort will be made to persuade President Duarte to begin a public affairs effort in Europe.
- -- DOD Policy Support Staff prepared special briefing and display materials on Central America for use at the meeting with air force chiefs of staff from 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries May 5-9. Similar materials and briefings will be given to air force intelligence chiefs from 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries when they meet at Homestead AFB, Florida, in August 1936.



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March 20, 1985

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HEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCFARLANE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTHY

SUBJECT:

Timing and the Nicaraguan Resistance Vote

Attached at Tab A is the most recent version of the chronology of events aimed at securing Congressional approval for renewed support to the Nicaraguan Resistance Forces. This schedule results from the four communications/media meetings we have now had with Fat Buchanan's ad hoc working group. Please note that the schedule continues to focus on a vote at the end of April triggered by submission of the required report on or about April 15.

In addition to the events depicted on the internal chronology at Tab A, other activities in the region continue as planned—including military operations and political action. Like the chronology, these events are also timed to influence the vote:

- -- planned travel by Calero, Cruz, and Robelo;
- -- various military resupply efforts timed to support significantly increased military operations immediately after the vote (we expect major Sandinista crossborder attacks in this timeframe--today's resupply the from went well); and
- -- special operations attacks against highly visible military targets in Micaragua.

Some of these efforts will proceed whether or not the vote occurs as planned at the end of April. For example, today Bernardario Larios, former Sandinista Defense Minister, defected to Costa Rica and is now in Panama (you were briefed on this operation during the trip). Others, however, including actions by U.S., interests groups are very sensitive to the timing. Next week the networks auction their air time for 15, 30,-and 60 second commercials during prime viewing hours. These groups are prepared to commit nearly \$2M for commercial air time and the

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production of various advertising media. If we are to retain their support, we <u>must</u> let them know by Friday whether or not they should proceed. To the maximum extent we have tried to prevent the kinds of errors that will cost them financially or politically. Unfortunately, some, like the Young Republicans ad, get through—this has been fixed.

It is important that a decision be taken no later than noon, Friday, March 22, if we are to proceed with the events in the checklist (Tab A) and those activities which support a vote at the end of April.

Senator Durenburger plans to make a major speech on this issue at the National Press Club next Tuesday, March 26. We should at least give him a sense of what to expect before he speaks.

You should also be aware that Director Casey has sent, a personal note to Don Regan on the timing matter. We are attempting to obtain a copy for your use.

Worthlind has apparently completed an analysis on some recent polling data. It reportedly does not look good for a vote at this time.

Finally, Jim Michel reminds that in your meetings with the Central American Heads of State you told them that we would be quiescent during the early Spring, but that in April we would act. This description fits either scenario--going for the vote or a fallback option with sanctions. One way or the other, we need to have a decision.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss this matter with Don Regan and urge that a decision be made on timing by noon on Friday, March 22.

Approve	Disapprove

Attachments

Tab A - Chronological Event Checklist (dtd March 20, 1985)

Tab B - Young Republicans Ad

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CONSTRUCTION

CHRONOLOGICAL EVENT CHECKLIST

February 21-28, 1985 (completed)

Event	Responsibility
Send resource book on the Contadora process process to congressmen, media outlets, private organizations and individuals interested in Nicaragua.	State/LPD (Miller)
FDN to select articulate freedom fighters with proven combat records and to make them available for contact with U.S. media representatives.	NSC (North)
Assign U.S. intelligence agencies to research, report, and clear for public release Sandinista military actions violating Geneva Convention/civilized standards of warfare.	NSC (North) (Raymond)
Prepare themes for approaches to Congressmen based on overall listed perceptions which will directly attack the objections listed above.	NSC (North)
Encourage U.S. media reporters to meet individual FDN fighters with proven combat records and media appeal.	NSC (North) State/LPD (Gomez)
Contact internal eyewitnesses/victims to testify before Congress about their .bortive attempts to deal with the FSLN (deadline March 15).	NSC (North)

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March 1-8, 1985

Event

Prepare list of publicly and privately expressed Congressional objections to aiding resistance and voting record on the issue.

Provide State/H with a list of Nicaraguan emigres and freedom fighters to serve as potential witnesses to testify before hearings on aid to Nicaraguan freedom fighters (due March 15).

Nicaraguan internal opposition and resistance announce unity on goals and principals (March 2, San Jose) (completed).

Request that Zbigniew Brzezinski write a geopolitical paper which points out geopolitical consequences of Communist domination of Nicaragua (paper due March 20).

Briefings on Nicaragua for key Congressional members and staffers. North on NU aggression and external involvement, Burghardt on diplomatic situation.

Supervise preparation and assignment of articles directed to special interest groups at rate of one per week beginning March 18 (examples: article on Micaraguan educational system for NEA, article by retired military for Retired Officers Association, etc.).

Assign agencies to draft one op-ed piece per week for signature by Administration officials. Specify themes for the op-eds and retain final editorial rights.

Conduct public opinion poll of America attitudes toward Sandinistas, freedom fighters.

National Press Club news conference for FDN commanders Bermudez, Tigrillo, Mike Lima (March 5) (follow-on Congressional visits (March 6) (completed).

Martha Lida Murillo (9 yr old atrocity victim) visit to Washington--media interviews, Congressional visits, possible photo-op with First Lady (March 6-8) (completed).

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Responsibility

WH/LA State/H

NSC (North) State/APA (Michel) State/LPD (Reich)

State/LPD (Miller) NSC (North)

NSC (Menges)

NSC (North) (Burghardt)

State/LPD

NSC (Menges)

WH (Rollins)

State/LPD (Gomez) (Kuykendall)

State/LPD (Gomez) (Kuykendall) (WH/OPL)

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Responsibility

State/H(Ball/Fox)

CONSIDENSIAL

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March 9-15, 1985

Event

WH/Legislative Affairs, State/H and ARA complete list of key Congressmen interested in Nicaragua.

State/ARA (Michel/Holwill)
NSC (North)

WH/LA

Intelligence briefing for White House Administration and senior staff by CIA (Vickers, Room 208, 0208, 30 minutes).

meting with Lew Lehrman NSC (Raymond)

Brief Presidential meeting with Lew Lehrman and other leaders of the influence groups working on MX and resistance funding.

State/LPD and WH Media Relations prepare a list of key mediacutlets interested in

MSC (Morth) State/LPD (Miller)

(Morth)

list of key mediaoutlets interested in Central American issues, including newspapers, radio, and TV stations (including SIN). Where possible identify specific editors, commentators, talk shows, and columnists.

NSC update talking points on aid to Nicaraguan freedom fighters.

NSC (North)

Briefings in CEOB for members/Senators: Shultz, McFariane, Gorman, and Shlaudeman to brief Lehman (requires General Gorman to be placed on contract). NSC (North) (Lehman)

Call/visit newspaper editorial boards and give them background on the Nicaraguan freedom fighters.

State/LPD(Reich)
WH/PA
NSC (North)

Brief OAS members in Washington and abroad on second term goals in Central America. Explore possible OAS action against Wicaragua.

OAS (Middendorf) NSC (Menges) State/LPD(Reich)

VP at Brazilian inauguration. Discuss possible OAS initiative on Nicaragua with Core Four, Colombia, Brazil, and Uruguay (March 15 and 16).

VP (Hughes)

Prepare a "Dear Colleagues" ltr for signature by a responsible Democrat which counsels against "negotiating" with the FSLN. NSC (Lehman)

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March 16-22, 1985

Event	Responsibility
Results due on public opinion survey to see what turns Americans against Sandinistas (March 20).	NSC (Hinckley)
Joachim MaitreCongressional meetings, speeches, and op-ed pieces.	State/LPD (Kuykendall)
Review and restate themes based on results of public opinion poll.	State/LPD (Reich) NSC (North) (Raymond)
Presidential drop-by at briefing for American evangelicals on MX and Nicaraguan resistance.	WH/OPL (Reilly) NSC (Worth)
Congressional hearings (Foreign Relations/ Affairs) and testimony by Nicaraguan emigres and atrocity victims.	WH/LA NSC (North) (Lehman)
Prepare document on Nicaraguan narcotics involvement.	Justice (Mullen)
SSCI CODEL Boren, Rockefeller, McConnell, and Wilson for meetings with resistance (March 15-19).	NSC (North) (Lehman)
VP in Honduras; meeting with Pres Suazo (March 16).	VP (Hughes)
Argentine state visit; President emphasize need for OAS case (March 19).	WH (Elliott)
Pastora and Calero meeting with Congressional Hispanic Caucus (Jorge Mas) (March 20).	
Production and distribution of <u>La Prensa</u> chronology of FSLN harassment.	State/LPD (Reich)

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CONT. SOCKETING

March 23-31, 1985

Event

Rev. Vallardo Antonio Santelis (Pentecostal Minister atrocity victim) -- Congressional/ media meetings (March 22-23).

McFarlane, Friedersdorf meeting with key Congressional leadership (Rm 208 or WHSR) to brief situation and proposed course of action (March 23-25).

Presidential breakfasts, lunches, and WHSR meetings with key Congressional leaders (March 24 through vote).

Pedro Juaquin Chamorro (Editor La Prensa) U.S. media/speaking tour (March 25-April -3)

President to meet in Room 450 w/"Spirit of Freedom," concerned citizens for Democracy. Representatives from 8 countries {180} (March 25).

Release of DOD/State paper on Soviet/Cuban/ Nicaraguan intentions in the Caribbean; possible WH backgrounder.

Distribute Bernard Nietschmann paper on suppression of Indians by FSLM.

Antonio Farach (Former FSLM Intelligence Officer) --media and Congressional meetings regarding Sandinista espionage, intelligence activities.

Invite to a very private meeting in Texas with key Congressional leaders so that CODEL can hear unvarnished concerns re Sandinistas and Democratic leaders' support for the FDM.

Release paper on Micaraguan media manipulation.

Publish and distribute as State Department, document Nicaraqua's Development as Marxist-Leninist State by Linn Poulsen.

Declassify Nicaraqua's Development as a Marxist-Leninist State by Linn Jacobowits Poulsen for publication as State Department document (clearance request w/Casey).

Responsibility

State/LPD (Kuykendall) (Gomez)

WH/LA NSC (Lehman) (North)

State/LPD (Miller/Gomes)

State/LPD (Reich) WE/PA (Sime)

State/LPD

Republican Study Committee

(Kuykendall) NSC (North)

State/LPD

State/LPD (Reich)

State/LPD (Blacken)

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April 1-7, 1985

Event

Request Sernard Nietschmann to update prior paper on suppression of Indians by FSLN (to be published and distributed by April 1).

AEI: Sponsor media events w/print and television media for Central America resistance leaders (April 1-7).

European Parlimentary delegation to meet with President Reagan (April 2).

Visit by Colombian President Betancur (April 3-4); possible Joint Session speech by Betancur.

Proposed Presidential television address on Nicaragua (April 4).

Second round of STRC hearings on Soviet build-up in region (Helms) (prior to recess).

CODEL visits during recess (April 4-14). Nicaraguan refugee camps in Honduras and Costa Rica (include visit to freedom fighter base camp and hospital

CODEL visit during recess (April 4-14) with regional leaders of Central America. Regional leaders convey importance of resistance fighters in NU.

Administration and prominent non-USG spokesman on network shows regarding Soviet, Cuban, East German, and Libyan, Iranian connection with Sandinistas.

Publish updated "Green Book;" distribute personally to Congressmen, media outlets, private organizations, and individuals interested in Nicaragua. Pass to Lew Lehrman and other interested groups.

Distribute paper on geopolitical consequences of Communist domination of Nicaragua.

Release paper on Nicaraguan drug involvement.

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Responsibility

State/LPD (Blacken)

State/LPD (Reich) WH/OPL (Reilly)

National Forum Foundation WH/OPL (Reilly)

WMSpeechwriters (Elliott)
NSC (Morth)

State/H

NSC (North) (Lehman)

NSC (North) (Lehman)

WH/PA (Sims)
WH (Buchanan)
State/LPD

State/LPD(Reich) WH/LA State/H (Fox)

State/LPD

State/LPD (Blacken) NSC (North)

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N 40309

CONFIDENTIAL

April 8-14, 1985 (During recess)

Event

Responsibility

25 Central American spokesmen arrive in Miami for briefing before departing to visit Congressional districts. Along with national television commercial campaign in 45 media markets.

CFA (Abramoff)

Targeted telephone campaign begins in 120 CFA (Abramoff) Congressional districts. CITIZENS FOR AMERICA district activists organize phone-tree to targeted Congressional offices encouraging them to vote for aid to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua.

Lew Lehrman speaking tour of major U.S. cities. CFA

Telephone campaign.

Central American spokesmen conduct rallies throughout the country in conjunction with CITIZENS FOR AMERICA activists (starting April 12).

CFA

Nationally coordinated sermons about aid to the freedom fighters are conducted (April 14).

Naval Institute Seminar in Newport, RI (Lugar, McFarlane (April 12)).

CONTIDENTIAL

UNCHACOMFIED

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N 40310

CONFEDENTIAL

April 15-21, 1985

Event

Nicaraguan Refugee Fund (NRF) dinner, Washington, DC; President as Guest of Honor (April 15).

Presidential report to Congress on reasons for releasing funds to freedom fighters (April 15).

AAA available to Washington press.

Central American spokesmen visit Congressional offices on Capitol Hill (April 16).

SFRC Nicaraguan issues, open hearing (April 16-17).

Washington conference "Central America: Resistance or Surrender" (Presidential drop-by?) (April 17).

Barnes' subcommittee hearing on Nicaragua; Motley, public witnesses (April 18) (2170 Rayburn, 2:00 p.m.).

Presidential Radio Address (April 20).

Responsibility

State/LPD (Miller) NSC (Raymond)


NSC State

State/LPD (Gomez)

Abramoff

NSC Abramoff

WH (Elliott)





UNCEASSIFIED

N 40311

CONFERENCEAL

9

April 22-29, 1985

Event

Responsibility

House Appropriations (Obey subcommittee) intelligence brief on Central America/Latin America (April 23).

Obey subcommittee (panel on Central America), public witnesses (a.m.)/Administration witnesses (p.m.) (April 24).

Major rally in the Orange Bowl in Miami, Florida, attended by President Reagas and important Administration figures (April 28).

Presidential calls to key members.

Cuban American Mational Foundation State/LPD (Reich)

WH (Friedersdorf) NSC (Lehman)

CONTIDENTIAL



UNCEASSIFIED

N 40312

COMPRESENTATION

10

April 30, 1985

Event ----

Vote in the U.S. Congress on aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters (April 30).

President leaves for Europe.

Responsibility

WH (Friedersdorf)
NSC (Lehman)





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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PRESIDENTIAL EVENTS REGARDING NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE

Event

Responsibility

March 16-22, 1985

Argentine state visit; President emphasize need for OAS case (March 19).

WH (Elliott)

March 23-31, 1985

Presidential breakfasts, lunches, and WHSR meetings with key Congressional leaders (March 24 through vote).

President to meet in Room 450 w/"Spirit of Freedom," concerned citizens for Democracy. Representatives from 8 countries (180) (March 25).

April 1-7, 1985

Visit by various members of European parliments who support the President's policies in Central America (April 2).

NSC (Raymond) WH/OPL (Reilly)

Visit by Colombian President Betancur (April 3-4); possible Joint Session speech.

Presidential television address on budget (April 4).

WHSpeechwriters (Elliott)

Presidential meeting with AAA.

NSC (North)

April 15-21, 1985

Conference on religious freedom; Presidential drop-by in Rm 450, 0208. NSC (Raymond)

Nicaraguan Refugee Fund (NRF) dinner, Washington, DC; President as Guest of Honor (April 15).

State/LPD (Miller)
NSC (Raymond)

Presidential report to Congress on reasons for releasing funds to freedom fighters (April 15).

NSC State

Possible Presidential meeting with AAA.

NSC (North)

Possible Presidential visit with former Central American Presidents, Foreign Ministers, and Presidential candidates. NSC (North) S/LPD (Reich)

Presidential Radio Address (April 20).

WA (Elliott)

UNGEADOIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

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Event

April 22-29, 1985

Proposed visit to Washington by Presidents Monge, Duarte, and Suazo.

Presidential calls to key members.

Major rally in the Orange Bowl in Miami, Florida, attended by President Reagan and important Administration figures (April 28).

April 30, 1985

Proposed Congressional vote; President leaves for Europe.

Responsibility

NSC (North) S/ARA (Michel)

WH (Friedersdorf) NSC (Lehman)

> Cuban American National Foundation

CONSTRUCTAL

UNGLASSIMED

ONLY 53¢ A DAY WILL SUPPORT A NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTER

in many areas of the world there are children who spend their days fighting for survival.

Their parents were abducted by Communist forces because they spoke about "freedom." Some were asserted by firing squeek, others were shot in the back, still more died to neglitical process.

To you this may sound the a nightmare, comething you would see on the Late Show. Here in Niconamy is to your of this

I know My name is Charley and I am a Managues securitycommunist. A Contro. A Provident Publish.

I have taken up arms against the Soviet Empire and its assellin government in Micangue and I need your holp.

Last year, year Congress out off our funding People the Michael Barnes, Survey Selera, and Ted Research, who claim to be "Viscode of the sensie" and



that it was unothing to fund what hore in Nicorague is the "will of the people" There is no "trustly" asked Nicorague Only a notion of people living under a tetalitation regime funded by Cohe and the famint Lines.

> Aren's you as Americans, committed to generalized of the people, by the people and for the people" list that what you fought for just over 200 years ago? If we fought for just over 200 years ago? If we fought for just over 200 years ago.

> > For \$16 a month you can help bring domecracy to Castrel America

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In America you have so much We have weathing Our very future and the fature of the domestric world in at make Please help me and my billion parties.

bya con Dios, Charley.

SEND DEMOCRACY AROUND THE WORLD

SAVE THE CONT	RAS. PG. Box 7907s, Washington, DC 20013-4079
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"Sere the Control" is a project of the College	re Republican National Fund. Statement of income and expenses evallable

SAVE THE CONTRAS

UNCLASSIFIED

872

EXHIBIT OLN-218

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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RICH MILLER	5TA TE	632-7023
WALT RAYMOND	NSC	395- 6900 632-3220
Johnston Miller	State	632-3220
Jeff Bell	CFA	544 7888
Jack Abra M	CFA .	544-7886





Exhibit OLN-219

MEMORANDUM

112

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

May 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

11 30915

FROM:

WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT:

Weekly Report

Faith Whittlesey Effort. The Faith Whittlesey effort is off to a good start. She had meetings with governmental representatives on May 16 (Roger Fontaine and I attended from the NSC) and with private interest groups on May 18. As I've indicated previously to you, she has issued orders for a wide range of papers and background materials to be prepared. Her meeting on Wednesday—was largely with conservative groups, and as she told me privately, she says the Central American issue is a good one to reinvigorate support from the conservative sector for the President. She is aware that the group will need to be extended and be bipartisan. The private reps at the second meeting raised the question of establishing a "Coalition for a Democratic Central America." This would be helpful if it happens.

I had a very pleasant half hour meeting with Faith today. She is prepared to work very closely with us and Was concerned about Georgs Shultz's charge that she was just duplicating an effort. I described to her the NSDD-77 and our overall public diplomacy approach. She does not seek to preempt any position on policy. She defines her effort as one designed to build support for policy. She recognizes fully the need for substantive and quality control of the product and is quite prepared to depend on us (NSC, State) for policy correctness. She also is prepared to take any and all information we can develop.

We both agreed that the biggest problem will be packaging the product. She has asked for help and suggestions for writers who could possibly be made available. She does not have any hang-ups as to whether the writer sits in the White House on her staff (where she has a vacancy for one) or in the Department with Dick Stone. She is reviewing possible writers and I am too. I have several leads.

Private Funding Effort. I have provided Jeff Davis with a list of funding programs that require private sector support. He is enthusiastic about the package and proceeding forward. Roy Godson reported that he met early this week with a group of private donors that Charlie Wick brought to the sitroom two months ago. The group made their first commitment of \$400,000 which includes support to Freedom House, a pro-INF group in Holland, Accuracy in Media, and a European based labor program. These are useful steps forward. More to follow.

7-1-17 7-1-17 7-1-17

11.219

EXHIBIT OLN-220

6028

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

N 33440 G195

INFORMATION

August 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT:

Central American Outreach


As you are aware, I continue to get a number of proposals dealing with how we can generate a private sector program to support the President on Central America. A refinement of an earlier proposal from Roger Chapin is attached at Tab II. Chapin had earlier communicated with the Judge. I have sent this to Tony Motley.

Bill Casey called on August 26 and would like to follow up on his idea to have a meeting with five or six key public relations specialists. This is referred to in my earlier memorandum. I put him off until after Labor Day.

I think you are right about deflecting this to State. I believe that it is, however, going to be quite time consuming, even recognizing that the work done within the Administration has to, by definition, be at arms length. The more I reflect on Gil Robinson's probable move into State as Shultz's public diplomacy coordinator, the more I think he could be the glue to put this sort of public-private relationship together. He has done this sort of thing before. He has public relations experience, knows how to operate behind the scenes, has the political connections, and lastly, will be in the right place: The Department of State. I do not think it is overlapping with Motley or Reich. They will be plenty busy doing their regular jobs and will benefit from what Gil could do. You might want to touch on this with the Judge. When I philosophized a bit with Bill Casey (in an effort to get him out of the loop), he was negative about turning the ball over to State, but very positive about someone like Gil Robinson working on the problem from within State.

Attachments

Tab I My memo, same subj, Aug 9, 83 II Chapin memos, Aug 22 & 19, 83



5559

MEMORANDUM

N 33441

INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 83

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT:

Private Sector Support for Central American Program

Several Administration supporters have identified steps which they believe are important to generating public opinion support for our policies in Central America. The various proposals call for the creation of a bipartisan coalition of concerned citizens to generate majority support for the President's policies. This requires detailed informational programs which highlight developments and realities in the region. It also requires programs which are designed to go beyond simply reaching the committed. We must move out into the middle sector of the American public and draw them into the "support" column. A second package of proposals deal with means to market the issue, largely considering steps utilizing public relations specialists—or similar professionals—to help transmit the message.

A quick review of proposals which are known to me include:

- -- A group of public relations specialists met with Bill Casey a few days ago. Faith also met them. The group included Bill Greener, the public affairs head at Philip Morris and two or three others. They "stated" what needed to be done to generate a nation-wide campaign. Several elements were identified. The first, a fund-raising effort under the direction of someone like Walter Wriston. Secondly, an effective communications system inside the Government. The overall purpose would be to sell a "new product"--Central America--by generating interest across-the-spectrum.
- -- A group including Charlie Wick, Faith, myself, Alan Bell (Public Relations) and Tom Korologos (Lobbyist) met to discuss how to get the story out into the countryside. In addition, to traditional speaking tours by USG officials, Presidential statements, etc, the Korologos-Bell proposals focussed on the hiring of a public relations firm. They recommended Ron Nessen. Nessen has subsequently presented a proposal.
- -- Faith Subsequently advised Charlie Wick that she has the prospect of funding from the Mellon-Scaife organization (Terry Slease). Slease wants Tom Cantrell, currently number two in congressional relations in the Department of Energy, to run the program. This would rule Nessen out. Slease also speaks of a \$1000 per plate fund raiser to get the activity

- going. It is not clear whether Cantrell's role is Ms 33442 fund-raiser or as a political activist. Nor is it clear whether the goal is an "American Coalition" or simply a pressure group. It sounds like an expanded "Outreach Group."
- concerned that efforts undertaken by Faith's office tend to be confined to preaching to the converted. We recommended funding via Freedom House or some other structure that has credibility in the political center. Wick, via Murdoch, may be able to draw down added funds for this effort. Ron Nessen, or the Wagner-Baroody firm recommended by Cliff White, could be hired by Freedom House.
- -- Dan James. He has the support of Jeane Kirkpatrick, Leo Cherne, Al Burkholder and others. He has submitted a paper which spells out the parameters of the problem. He also wants to include Latin Americans in the activity. His. proposal calls for the creation of a bipartisan Americas Coalition. He believes he can get funding from Ross Perot, Clem Stone and others. Evidently Anne Armstrong will make calls for him. James would like to have a fund raising dinner in which Jeane Kirkpartrick has reportedly agreed to be a key note speaker. James is a good publicist but not a particularly good organizer. His role would be in support of a larger effort.
- -- Roger Chapin. He has a similar proposal for a group called Stand Tall America which would generate public knowledge and understanding of the Central American program. Chapin is untested on foreign policy issues although he has a track record of generating public support for causes. He believes the first issue is clarifying the message, examining marketing techniques and then generating a broad popular support base. He would play a support role. Chapin adds that he thinks the only way to mobilize the American people is to make it clear that the Central American issue is a threat because of the Russian involvement.
- Les Lenkovsky (Smith-Richardson Foundation) believes that we need to create the equivalent of a "Coalition for the Present Danger" to generate public support. Tom Korologos, in a private conversation, said what one needed to do was to identify a competent activist who would take on the organizational job-this includes principally fund raising, public relations/packaging, substantive input. He said someone like a Bill Greener or a Tom Cantrell might serve. Ultimately, we would want to flesh out the committee to make it suitably non-partisan. Several of the names we considered for the Central American Commission would be very constructive participants.

The conscience discussion identifies several issues. I think there is conscient that we should strive for the creation of a

Exhibit OLN-221

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EXHIBIT OLN-222

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Text of Memorandum dated 4/11/85

TO: Mary Norman (M/COMP)

FROM: Frank Gardner (S/LPD)

This is to request the usual timing of 25 to 30 days be set aside to make an emergency payment of \$12,858 to IBC in response to its bill dated 4/11/85. This action is of utmost importance, not just to the Department, but to the White House, and the NSC so that IBC, which finds itself temporarily in dire financial straits may have the funds in days ahead to intensify its its efforts in public diplomacy on behalf of the President's Easter Peace Proposal for Nicaragua.

(Contract # 1001-502160)



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September 23, 1985



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Fashington, D.C. 20520

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HUDHAROHEN

TO:

PER/HGT - Dorothy H. Sampas

FROM:

L/H - Dennis J. Gallagher DJ 50

SUBJECT: Proposed S/LPD Contract for Public Information Services

Cassie Sopko of your office has asked that I review: the scope of work proposed for a contract with Mark Richards Associatas. Inc., under which Col. Richards (USAF/Ret.) would provide public information and related Services to the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean (S/LPD). In particular, I understand that your office is concerned about the propriety of they portion of the scope of work under which Col. Richards would provide briefings and backgrounders to national and international members of the media regarding the current and developing situations in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ms. Sopko expressed concern that this would make Col. Richards appear to be the representative or spokesperson of the Department, and would thereby constitute performance of an inherently Governmental function. Cf. OMB Circular No. A-76 (Rev. Aug. 4 1983), para. S.b.

While most larger Government agencies have an in-house public information office, public information functions are not inherently Governmental, nor does performance of such functions necessarily connote employee status. Public relations services are in fact listed in OMB Circular Ne. A-76, Attachment A, as an example of services that are available from commercial sources. 'Assuming that no employer-employee relationship is created by the terms or actsal administration of the contract, media information and other public relations services may be obtained by contract.

This memorandum should not be understood as addressing the appropriateness of the terms of compensation suggested by S/LPD, nor as concurring in S/LPD's recommendation, which is stated in cinclusory terms without an adequate factual basis, that the contract be awarded on a sole-source basis without public notice. I would note that it is plainly inconsistent for S/LPD to assert in an unclassified draft sole source justification that these contract arrangements should not be disclosed to the public. If this is actually so, both the contract and requisition/solicitation documents should be classified. Please let me know if I may provide further information or assistance in this matter.

L/M:DJGallagher 9/23/85: Tel. 632-0767

cc. OPR/STP - Mr. Conway, Ms. Serryhill



United States Department of State

Coordinator of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean

Washington, D.C. 20520

3

September 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM

TO: _

S/S-EX - Mr. Pat Kennedy

FROM:

S/LPD - Otto Reich &

SUBJECT:

A Contract for International Business

Communications

This is to request a fixed-priced contract for International Business Communications (IBC) in the amount of \$278,725. This contract will begin October 1, 1985, and will end September 30, 1986.

Total cost of contract is based on mimilar services rendered in FY 1985 by International Business Communications to S/LPD, and additional services involving distribution of S/LPD publications, as follows:

Salaries .	
Two senior partners 50% of time \$5,000 per sonth for 12 sonths	\$60,000
Three I.B.C. staff members 35% of time \$1,500 per month for 12 months	18,000
Representation	4,000
Translation of articles, speeches, written materials	4,000
Interpretation fees	2,500

Materials and Distribution Postage Messenger/courser Telex Telephone Photocopies Purchase of books, materials Photographic services	2,000 1,500 2,000 3,000 2,000 2,000 1,500
Event Coordinaton Room Rental Audio-Visual, Equipment Rental Secretarial Services	3,500 1,000 1,000
Travel Expenses I.B.C. Principals Other Taxi	10,000 8,000 1,500
Sub-total	\$127,500
Distribution	
Salary for Direct Mail Professional (1 year)	50,000
Salury for Computer Specialist (1 year)	22,500
Furnishings/Equipment	17,500
Transportation	
Vehicle Parking Driver/Messenger/Clerk Maintenance/Gas Insurance	15,000 1,000 16,000 2,000 1,500
Telephone	2,000
Supplies	4,000
Overhead - 15%	19,725
Subtotal	\$151,225
Total	\$278,725

The services to be rendered by IBC are critical to our public diplomacy stratugy and toward increasing understanding of U.S. policy in Central America and the Caribbean.

The services and the contractual arrangement with IBC are not to be publicly disclosed because of their character, ingredients, and components.

Services will be performed at:

International Business Communications 1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036

A sole-source justification is attached.

John Blacken, Deputy Coordinator of Public Diplomacy for Latin American and the Cauthean, S/LPD, shall serve as the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR). His telephone number is 632-6751.

During FY-1986, IBC will provide services under the direction of S/LPD, as follows:

- Provide counsel and assistance to S/LPD for programs during visits to Washington and the United States of Central American representatives of political, business, and humanitarian organizations.
- Provide S/LPD contact to Central American refugee groups and exiles in Washington and the U.S., arranging their activities to include media events, interviews, and public appearances.
- Translate and distribute articles on Central America to United States news organizations and public-interest groups.
- Provide points of contact for congressional and public-interest offices seeking to interview exiles and refugees.
- Seek out and establish sedia and public-speaking opportunities for Sicaraguan exiles and refugees.

- 6. Brief correspondents and syndicated columnists on materials and sources. Where necessary, provide on-the-ground, in-country logistical support.
- Compose and edit letters to the editor of major newspapers and magazines in response to articles on Central America.
- 8. Provide S/LPD with op-ed pieces and feature articles for distribution to selected newspapers and magazines.
- Travel to and coordinate S/LPD-directed media visits to Central America.
- Provide source materials for journalists who contact S/LPD for information relating to the regional conflicts.
- 12. Provide and present briefings to individuals designated by S/LPD on security considerations, refugee problems, and political dynamics of the region.
- 13. Edit briefing materials created by S/LPD.
- Maintain contact with public-policy organizations.
- Design, organize and run a distribution system for S/LPD publications.
- 16. Design, develop, maintain and update specialized, computerized addressee lists.
- 17. Provide coordination with S/LPD and FAIM/PS for co-ordinating print runs of publications, and maintain S/LPD's publications for in-house distribution.
- 18. Provide inventory control, storage, mailing and shipping of S/LPD publications, both to lists and on a request basis.
- Conduct special studies and projects as may be required.

Because of the start-up investment required for the distribution segment of this contract, payment schedule should be as follows;

- 1. \$30,000 each month for October and November, 1985.
- 2. Beginning December, 1985, payments each month of \$21,872.50.

The completed contract and payment checks should be sent to:

• •

International Business Communications 1523 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D. C. 20036

Thank you for your assistance in processing this request.

Drafted by:S/LPD:FGardner:632-6751
9/24/85

Cleared:S/LPD:JBlacken

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SCLE-SCURCE GUSTIFICATION

c tpD is tasked with the coordination of Latin American ruptic diplomacy efforts. Some of the major components of this effort are as follows:

- An ability to respond to major media outlets and to inform the American public regarding current Administration policies and programs.
- A responsibility to present to American audiences, by way of public appearances, panel shows, and press conferences, those vicitims and eye witnesses from the region who can demonstrate the truth about communistsupported political and military oppression, human rights violations, and acts of terrorism.
- Formulation and maintenance of a basic kit for selected speakers to present declassified and unclassified material to a wide range of American audiences.
- The preparation and distribution of one-page briefs to address frequently stated criticism of U.S. policy in the region.
- Publication and distribution of documents involved with U.S. public diplomacy.

International Business Comunications (IBC), with its staff of ten persons, is uniquely qualified to continue its work in this effort, such projects which are beyond the capabilities of the limited S/LPD staff to undertake. Some of the unique features of IBC are as follows:

- Full-staff language capacity in Spanish.
- In-depth files on Central American countries.
- Trust of Ncaraguan refugee groups.
- Expertise in direct sail and distribution of documents.

The senior partners of IBC are:

- Frank Somez, former deputy assistant secretary of state for public affairs; later, director of USIA's Foreign Press Centers; former foreign service officer in Costa Rica, Colombia, and Haiti; bilingual in Spanish.
- Richard R. Miller, former director of public iffairs for AID.

Since their government service, both senior partners have traveled to and written about Central American countries and political groups.

In addition, the continuing project requires the following capabilities, all of which each senior partner has:

- Top Scret security clearance.
- Expertise in Central American affairs.
- Understanding of U.S. policy in the region .
- Knowledge of how the American news media works.
- Insight into the design of public information strategies.
- Superior writing skills.
- Care in the handling of sensitive documents.
- Good judgement in compling information for public consumption.
- Ability: To write "talking points."
 "To prepare and maintain speaker kits.

To analyze media reporting.

To interact with senior government officials.



United States Department of State

Coordinator of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 24, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO:

A/OPR/STP/P - Ms. Barbara A. Garland, Acting Chief

FROM:

S/LPD - John D. Blacken

SUBJECT:

Proposed Contract with International Business Communication, Inc. (IBC) - Requisition No.

1001-602066

RET:

Your Memorandum of 2/6/86

This memorandum is to acknowledge that we instructed IBC to continue its services PY-86 after the expiration of their prior year contract. As you are aware, our prior Administrative Officer believed that the 1985 Contract contained a renewability clause, and proceeded on that basis erroneously.

Further, our core programs were totally dependent upon uninterrupted services contracted from IBC. The services rendered by IBC since 1984 represent fundamental input to the documents and speeches prepared as part of the core activity of S/LPD. Without continuity of operations, serious detrimental effects on S/LPD's mission would have occurred. Additionally, throughout this period S/LPD was dealing with administrative levels in the Department to insure continuity of the contract under established sole-source purchase procedures.

The services provided by the contract are such that publication of the general nature of the performance would be detrimental to ongoing programs under S/LPD. Further, release of the general nature of the contract could allow elements unfriendly to the United States to deduce sensitive interagency operations of S/LPD, the secrecy of which is fundamental to their success. Revelation of certain operations or allowing speculation could result in serious damage to our relations with several allies and other sovereign states. This is a precise definition of "SECRET" information.

Text of 2/29/86 Memorandum from Thoman Calhoun to Barbara Garland

We have determined that the entire contract with IBC will be classified secret. The citations for this action are FAR 6.302-6 for national security considerations and FAR 5.202 for unusual and compelling reasons.



EFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVIC.

Mr. Nicholas G. Mariano, Acting Chief Procedural Security Division Overseas Security Programs Department of State Washington, DC. 20520

25 11.R 26 P1:20

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Dear Mr. Mariano:

Reference is made to your letter of February 5, 1986/which requested that we process International Business Communications, (IBC), 1912 Sunderland Place, NV, Washington, DC 20036, for a SECRET facility clearance.

By a copy of our letter of February 18, 1986, to the facility, you were advised that action was initiated in accordance with your request. During the initial telephone survey, we were advised that IBC was a sole proprietorship and that Mr. Richard R. Miller held all officer positions.

On the 20th of February we were advised telephonically that IBC was a partnership and that the partners were not individuals, but were facilities; namely, Miller Communications, Inc., and Gomes International, Inc., both at the same address as IBC. In an effort to comply with your request, surveys were conducted at the two partnership facilities. Both entities were advised of documentation that must be provided before the individual facility partnerships can be processed for a clearance, and each entity was given a deadline for submission of such documentation. Neither entity has responded.

Therefore, we have this date discontinued the processing of all concerned facilities. If you have any questions please contact Esther 3radsher at 202-323-9395.

Sincerely,

The w

Chief, Facilities Division

LEO J. BEAUMONT

Copy to: International Business Communications

> Miller Communications. Inc.

Gome z International, Inc.

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DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE CAPITAL REGION MOPPMAN BLOG I OM 148 4461 EISENNOWED AVE ALEXAMORIA. VA 12231-1-1000

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May 6, 1986

Attn of: \$1511 (Mr. Beaumont (202) 325-9395/rms)

U.S. Department of State

Attn: Kenneth E. Lopez, Chief Procedural Security Division

Washington, DC 20520

125 1 7 14 P2 32

Dear Mr. Lopez:

Reference is made to your letter dated April 17, 1986, in which you requested that International Business Communications (IBC), 1912 Sunderland Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 be processed for a SECRET facility clearance.

This office has made repeated attempts to contact Mr. Frank Gomes, all to no avail. This office has therefore discontinued processing IBC for a facility clearance.

Sincerely,

TO J. SEALMONT Accilities Division



DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CAPITAL REGION
MOFFMAN BLDG. L OM 146
3641 EIGENHOWEN AVE.
ALERANDRIA, VA 18381-1000

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June 3, 1986 Reply to Attm of: \$1511 (Ms. Bradsher(202)325-1352/ras)

Mr. Kenneth E. Lopes, Chief Procedural Security Division Overseas Security Program U.S. Department of State Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Lopez:

Reference is made to your letter of May 14, 1986, which is your third request that we process International Business Communications (IBC), 1912 Sunderland Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 for a SECRET facility clearance. International Business Communications has been identified to us as being a partnership composed of Miller Communications, Inc. and Gomes Interpational, Inc. both collocated with IBC.

This office, as well as our Washington Field Office, has expended considerable time and effort to comply with your request. We have made repeated and explicit requests that the partnership furnish the information required to place IBC in process for a clearance. As of 9:00AM on June 2, 1986 we were advised that IBC is not an officially organized partnership; there is no partnership agreement in existence. We have therefore again discontinued processing IBC for a facility clearance.

Sincerely.

TEO J. BEADMONT Chief, Pacilities Division

Copy to: S15DC IBC



United Succession Department of State / : 1

June 12, 1984

TO

OPR/STP/P - Rober

- Robert B. Dickson

FROM

OPR/STP/P/CT - Barbara A. Garland D. T

SUBJECT:

Services of International Business Communications

Inc. (IBC)

The attached draft memorandum is prepared for submission to the Office of the Coordinator for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean to rectify an existing situation.

A justification for award of a classified contract on grounds of national security was approved by the Acting Competition Advocate and a letter contract was reviewed and approved by Mr. Globe. Both actions took place some time ago. (A letter contract was prepared pending completion of an audit by the Department's Office of the Inspector General.) The requirements office acknowledged ordering the performance of the services without a contract in place and a draft ratification was prepared for the signature of the Procurement Executive to cover the period for which the services have already been performed.

The problem has been the receipt of the security clearance. Three times DISCO has attempted to obtain cooperation from IBC in order to process the clearance and three times the process has been discontinued because of IBC's lack of response.

As a contract has not been awarded, it would seem inappropriate for the Contracts Branch to issue a "Stop Work Order". However, I feel that the requirements office should be put on notice that IBC is to perform no further services nor incur further costs until the situation is resolved.

I think we need to discuss this matter immediately.

6/17/86

TO : S/LFD - hr. kopert Regan

THROUGH: OFK/SIP - Truman E. Brock

PROM : CPR/STP/F - RODGET D. DICKSON

SUBJECT: Survices of International business Communications,

Inc.

Reference is bace to requirement (Requisition No. 1001-001000) of the Office of the Coordinator of Public Diplomacy for bath America and the Caribbean (S/LPD) for the classified services of the fifth of international Business Communications, Inc. (IBC).

It is by understanding that IBC has been performing since october 1900 in the absence of a contract. During this period, the Contracts Branch (OPR/STY/P/CV) attempted to secure a secret facilities clearance (Form DDADA, Department of Defense Contract Security Classification Specification) and an addit report in order to award a contract to this firm. It appears the addit report will be forthcoming from the Orlice of the Inapector General (S/IG) the week of June 10, 1980.

with regard to the addrtity disatance, several attempts have been hade by representatives of the Delense investigative betwice (DIS) to obtain the the cooperation of the criticers of IbC. A further attempt is currently uncervay, we are requesting that your ordice take impediate steps to ensure that IbC complies with the requests hade by IIs. Otherwise, we will be taken with a rituation where pervices are being performed not only absent a contract but where there is no adequate assurance that the contractor is rotlowing security procedures for an effort that is dieserly sensitive in nature. Should this effort tail, there is no heads to assure that the services are being performed in accordance with 5/LPD's requirements and no contractual inattument will exist by which the contractor hay be paid tof ItB astronomy.

The Procurement Dividion cannot what a contract on this badis not can the services continue to be performed in the absence of a contract.

Drarted: UPR/STP/F/CT: NEBerrynf11:6/15/66: Cleareu: UPR/STP/F/CT: BAGartanu



DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CAMPAL REGION
POPPMAR BLOG, L. RM. 144
2441 BIOCHHOWER AVE
ALERANDRIA, VA 88381-1000

Reply to

Attm of: \$1511(Me. Bradsher/(202)325-9395/tmk)

July 30, 1986

SUBJECT:

International Business Communications, 1912 Sunderland Place, MV,

Vashington, DC 20036

TO:

United States Department of State Attn: Kenneth E. Lopes, Chief Procedural Security Division Overseas Security Programs Washington, DC 20520

1. In your letter, dated July 10, 1986, subject as above, you requested this office to process International Business Communications, 1912 Sunderland Place, MV, Vashington, DC 20036, for a Department of Defense security clearance. The facility's Federal Supply Code is 10092.

2. The facility was granted a INTERIM SECRET, LIMITATIONS PAR 20 c, ISM APPLY, security clearance on July 30, 1986, but does not have the capability to safeguard classified material. Please refer to paragraph 7-102, DoD 5220.22-R, if a classified contract or purchase order is swarded.

maief, Facilities Division

Copy to: \$15DC

PERMISSION .

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International Business Communications 1912 SUNDERLAND PLACE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 - 1608 TELEPHONE (202) 387-3002 TELEX 3718712 IBCUSA

Contract # 1001-602066 Invoice # DOS1-85A September 16, 1986

TO:

Robert W. Ragan
Office of Public Diplomacy for
Latin America and the Caribbean
Department of State
Room 6253
Washington, DC 20520

For services rendered, October 1, 1985 through August 31, 1986, in connection with Contract Number 1001-602066, including design and organization of a distribution system; direction of such system; creation of a segmented mailing list, including coding; distribution and storage of documents; and related services under the terms of this contract as requested by ARA/LPD.

Total due

...*******

\$216,381.16

Check should be made payable to International Business Communications, and mailed to Richard R. Miller, President, at the above address.

(Costs by month are attached.)

Think Rolling



United States Department of State /C

Weshington, D.C. 20520

October 3, 1986

<u>MEHORANDUH</u>

TO:

M/COMP/GS - Na. Anita Brown

Prom:

ARA - Robert Kagan

_ . . .

Subject: Payment to International Business Communications

Contract No. 1001-602066

This is to certify that International Business Communications has completed the first eleven months of their contract in the amount of \$216,381.16. This is the first payment under the above cited contract. A check can be sent to the following address:

International Business Communications 1912 Sunderland Place N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Enclosure: (1) International Business Communications Invoice of 9/16/86

STEPHEN STATE OF THE STATE OF T

Contract # 1001-602066 Invoice # DOS1-85A October 31, 1986

TO:

Robert W. Kagan Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean Department of State Room 6253 Washington, DC 20520

For services rendered, September 1 through September 30, 1986, in connection with Contract Number 1001-602066, including organisation of established distribution system; direction of such system; modification and update of the segmented mailing list, including coding; distribution and storage of documents; and related services under the terms of this contract as requested by ARA/LPD.

Total due

\$25,670.00

Check should be made payable to International Business Communications, and mailed to Richard R. Miller, President, at the above address.

___(See_attachment)-

Ruh Eller



United States Department of State 102

Weshington, D.C. 20530

November 12, 1986

MEMORANDUN

(

N/COMP/GS - Anita Brown

PRON:

ARA - Robert W. Ragan

SUBJECT:

Payment to International Business Communications Contract No. 1001-602066

This is to certify that International Business Communications has completed the last segment of their contract, covering the month of September 1986, in the amount of \$25,670.00. This is the second payment under the above cited contract. A check can be sent to the following address:

International Business Communications 1912 Sunderland Place, M. W. Washington, DC 20036

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Enclosurer

International Business Communications Invoice of 10/31/86



. DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE 19a

DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CAPITAL REGION
HOPPHAR GLOCI. PM. 144
BAGE ERRENHOUSE AVE.
ALERAHOMIA. VA 38381-11000

Reply to Atta of:

\$1511(Ms. Bradsher/(202)325-1352/1dc)

November 17, 1986

United States Department of State Attn: Kenneth E. Lopes, Chief Procedural Security Division Overseas Security Programs Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Lopes:

Reference is made to our letter, dated July 30, 1986, wherein we advised that International Business Communications, 1912 Sunderland Place, N.V., Vahington, D.C. 20036 had been granted an Interim SECRIT clearance. The facility's Federal Supply Code (FSC) is 1GC92.

The facility was granted a SECRET security clearance on Movember 17, 1986, but does not have the capability to safeguard classified material. In accordance with paragraph 73 of the Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information, classification guidance must be provided to this facility, when appropriate, with a copy to this office.

Sincerely,

LEO J. SEAUMONT Chief, Facilities Division

Copy to: \$15DC

786 EEC -2 MO 4/2

907

EXHIBIT OLN-224

(DELETED)

EXHIBIT 224

EXHIBIT OLN-225

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, O.C. 10306

Warrent German

August 15; 1985

Dear Spits:

Throughout the struggle for freedom and democracy in Micaragua, there are those who have carried this great burden with dedication and a true sense of patriotism. You and the people involved in the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty are at the center of the struggle.

In the Spring when we began our campaign to help the Micaraguan resistance in a crucial struggle for democracy in their native land, your resources helped carry the day. Without your fine efforts, their situation would have gone from desperate to hopeless. Yours was a key organisation in supporting President Reagan's legislative initiative for Congressional aid to the Nicaraguan fraedom fighters. Your paid advertising and support of the President's program was critical to our success.

In July when you began to help educate others to the needs of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, their chances were greatly increased. The special events you hosted and the generous support your people gave carried the day and helped to save freedom from extinction in Micaragua. Your continuing efforts have two very special values. The level of support you have brought to the struggle has been pothing short of monumental. The steadfastness and commitment you have maintained is the true sign of patriotism. When freedom and democracy are at stake, those who sacrifice without public acclaim it to the world are our truest patriots. our truest patriots.

The programs you have undertaken are crucial. Without the means you provide, those who seek a democratic outcome in Midaragus will fail. As always, in the hour of critical need, we find you and the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty ready to help.

For your past efforts and your present initiatives, we salute

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs

Mr. Carl Russell Channel National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty 305 4th Street, N.E. Weshington, D.C. 20002

MANIBIT. 6N-205

A 0037810

EXHIBIT OLN-226

THE WRITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

January 21, 1986

DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE DRESIDENT DIRECTOR, PRESIDENTIAL SCHEDULING

F::OM:

FRED P. FIELDING PFFIRATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT:

Aid to Contras Hesting

I have reviewed the proposal for a briefing for the American Conservative Trust and the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty on Central American issues. There is no legal prohibition that would preclude such a briefing. Objections may be raised that the President is violating the spirit of the anti-lobbying provisions by enlisting these private groups to lobby Congress. Care should accordingly be taken to avoid any suggestion of White House control of these groups, to minimize these objections. these objections.

Jan 20 All



N 13669

EXHIBIT OLN-227

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCL WAS-PIGTON D.C. BOSOL

' January 24, 1986

Dear Bill:

. •

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragus.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair. despair.

Last year was a challenging time for America and her President. But, we are headed in the right direction. Today, in all of Central America only Nicaragua is not a democracy. You can be proud that you have made a crucial contribution in helping our President in this vital endeavor. In the weeks ahead, we will commence a renewed effort to make our assistance to the Democratic Resistance Forces even more effective. Once again your support will be essential.

All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs

Mr. William B. Blakemore 200 West Illinois, Suite 200 Midland, TX 79701



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCL WAS PROTOL DC SMOL

January 24, 1986

Dear Inman and Ruth:

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During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Morth Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. and Mrs. Inman Brandon 3488 Knollwood Drive, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30305

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. SOOM

January 24, 1986

Dear Bill:

ı

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Worth Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs

Mr. Bill Bush P.O. Box 147 Brandon, MS 39042

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, B.C. SHM

January 24, 1986

Dear Barbara:

. .

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mrs. Barbara Bollitt Christian Frogs Jump Skylight 3601 Axton Lane - Thect, RY 40059

266 :

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.E. 19164

January 24, 1986

Dear Mr. Clagett:

. •

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragus would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. C. Thomas Clagett, Jr. 2700 Virginia Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 8000

January 24, 1986

Dear Frank:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. Frank Darlington 24 Winding Avenue Leetsdale, PA 15056

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. SMM

January 24, 1986

Dear Mr. Ferguson:

. .

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. Robert Bruce Ferguson 840 Newport Center Drive Suite 600 Newport Beach, CA 92660

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20104

January 24, 1986

Dear Ellen:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaregus.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragus would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

Last year was a challenging time for America and her President. But, we are headed in the right direction. Today, in all of Central America only Nicaragua is not a democracy. You can be proud that you have made a crucial contribution in helping our President in this vital endeavor. In the weeks ahead, we will commence a renewed effort to make our assistance to the Democratic Resistance Forces even more effective. Once again your support will be essential.

All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs

Mrs. St. John Garwood 1802 San Gabriel Street Austin, TX 78701

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D.C. SHOW

January 24, 1986

Dear Mrs. Haley:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragus was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micarague.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Worth Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mrs. Rosalind K. Haley Haley Library 5424 16th Street Lubbock, TX 79416

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.E. 2000

.anuary 24, 1986

Dear Mr. Hillman:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Nicaragus was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcom: in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. Tetnell Lea Hillman 422 Belrose Lane Randor, PA 19087

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000

January 24, 1986

Dear Bunker:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

Last year was a challenging time for America and her President. But, we are headed in the right direction. Today, in all of Central America only Nicaragua is not a democracy. You can be proud that you have made a crucial contribution in helping our President in this vital endeavor. In the weeks ahead, we will commence a renewed effort to make our assistance to the Democratic Resistance Forces even more effective. Once again your support will be essential.

All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Worth Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. Nelson Bunker Hunt 2400 Thanksgiving Tower 1601 Elm Street Dallas, TX 75201

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. SHIM

January 24, 1986

Dear Mr. Lee:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Nicaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

Last year was a challenging time for America and her President. But, we are headed in the right direction. Today, in all of Central America only Ricaragua is not a democracy. You can be proud that you have made a crucial contribution in helping our President in this vital endeavor. In the weeks ahead, we will commence a renewed effort to make our assistance to the Democratic Resistance Forces even more effective. Once again your support will be essential.

All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Worth Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. James Arthur Lee 3635 Ella Lee Lane Houston, TX 77027

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCE. WAS-PROTON D.C. SMAK

January 24, 1986

Dear Mrs. Lynch:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Nicaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

Last year was a challenging time for America and her President. But, we are headed in the right direction. Today, in all of Central America only Kicaragua is not a democracy. You can be proud that you have made a crucial contribution in helping our President in this vital endeavor. In the weeks ahead, we will commence a renewed effort to make our assistance to the Democratic Resistance Forces even more effective. Once again your support will be essential.

All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Olivir L. North Deputy Director

Political-Hilltary Affairs

Mrs. Hartha Lynch 4924 Briarwood Place Dallas, TX 75209

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. SOOM

January 24, 1986

Dear Mrs. McKinley:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Nicaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North

Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs

Mrs. Evelyn McKinley Sanko Route Robert Lee, TX 76945

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.S. MINI

January 24, 1986

Dear Mr. Mosbacher:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for 4 democratic outcome in Nicaragus would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragus. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. Robert A. Mosbacher, Jr. 6421 Vanderbilt Houston, TX 77005

January 24, 1986

Dear Mrs. Nelson:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Worth Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mrs. Page Nelson 3318 Southwestern Boulevard Dallas, TX 75225

January 24, 1986

Dear Barbara:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Morth Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mrs. Barbara Newington P.O. Box 1098 Greenwich, CT 06836

January 24, 1986

Dear Mrs. O'Brien:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragus was kept alive with the help of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Morth Deputy Director

Political-Hilitary Affairs

Mrs. Mary O'Brien Rt. 3, Warner Bridge Road Wilmington, IL 60481

January 24, 1986

Dear Mr. O'Neil:

. •

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. William J. O'Neil 11915 La Grange Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90025

January 24, 1986

Dear Ms. Parker:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Nicaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Morth Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Ms. Diane William Parker P.O. Box 1011 Thomasville, GA 31799

NATIONAL BECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, B.C. SHIM

January 24, 1986

Dear General Patton:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Nicaragua was kept alive with the help of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Major General George S. Patton (USA/Ret.) 650 Ashbury Street South Hamilton, MA 01982

January 24, 1986

Dear Nolan and Mary Jo:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North

Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs

Mr. and Mrs. Nolan Pentecost Sanko Route Robert Lee, TX 76945

January 24, 1986

Dear Mrs. Pierce:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Nicaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director

Political-Hilitary Affairs

Mrs. Julius E. Pierce 6040 Moss Ranch Road Miami, FL 33156

NATIONAL BEOURTY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D.C. SOLOT

January 24, 1986

Dear John and Nancy:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragus.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North

Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs

Hr. and Hrs. John Ramsey, Jr. 3510 Cranbrook Witchita Falls, TX 76308

January 24, 1986

Dear Fred:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Nicaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Morth Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. Fred R. Sacher 31632 Paseo Don Jose San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675

NATIONAL BEOUTITY COUNCIL WARPERTON BE BOARD

January 24, 1986

Dear Mr. Salvasser:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Nicaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs

Mr. Melvin Salwasser Salwasser Manufacturing Company, Inc. P.O. Box 548 Reedley, CA 93654

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WAS PROTON DC 10001

January 24, 1986

Dear Narry and Anne:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Nicaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Nicaragua.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. Morth Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. and Mrs. Harry Seggerman 5060 Congress Street Pairfield, CT 06430

January 24, 1986

Dear David and Paula:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director

Political-Military Affairs

Mr. and Mrs. David Warm Route 1, Maple Hill Farm Northport, MI 49670

NATIONAL BECUPYTY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D.C. SOLOL

January 24, 1986

Dear Mr. Witts:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been support for a democratic outcome in Nicaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Nicaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs

Mr. David A. Witts 5353 First International Building Dallas, TX 75250

January 24, 1986

Dear Mrs. Woodruff:

During 1985, the hope freedom and democracy in Micaragua was kept alive with the help of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and fine Americans such as you. Because you cared, the spark of liberty still glows in the darkness of Micaragua.

Without patriots like you, carrying out the President's policy of support for a democratic outcome in Micaragua would have been even more difficult. Your efforts and those of the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty continue to play a crucial role in the democratic drama unfolding in Micaragua. Your support has been essential to those who struggle against the tyranny and oppression of the totalitarian communist regime in Managua. You have given hope where there would otherwise be despair.

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All my best for the New Year and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Oliver L. North

Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs

Mrs. Emily Woodruff 1941 Stark Avenue Colombus, GA 31906

EXHIBIT OLN-228

A STATE OF THE STA

ACTION

January 28, 1986

PPPOPANOUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

r 50Ma

OUTLER L. HORSHI

SUBULCTR Mooting with 7:

Meeting with Therican Conservative Trust

Missella:

: 137

Attached at Tab I is a zono from you to Linda Chavez agreeing to accompany the Prosident when he "drops by" a neeting of American Conservative Trust (ACC) leadership on Thursday, Jamacy 30, 1996 at 3:00 p.m. in the Socievelt Teom. Your resolutional spords to Us. Chavez' mino at Tab II.

The meeting opens at 2:30 p.m. with introductory remarks by Minda Churez and Don Regan, followed a brief on Central A orice by North (2:15-3:15 p.m.), and a "drop by" by the President approximately 3:00 p.m. Pat Buchanan and Elliott Abrahms are also scheduled to participate. It is the first of the "drop by" with the President, it is recognized that the brief brief a conflict with a perviously scheduled Control of the President' involve and until last evening.

The memo at Tab II notes that the ACT has been a significant supporter of the President and his policies, especially Central America. They were very instrumental last year in helping us win the vote for aid to the Nicaraguan DRF through their television programs and advertisoments. For example, ACT funded and picduced the 13 minute documentary videotape on the DRF which you viewed after an ODSM last month. This video "documentary" has been shown on more than 500 T.V. stations since you previewed it.

The meeting is an opportunity to express Administration support for the efforts of ACT as we gear up for a Congressional vote during March. Your memo indicates that you will accompany the President to the meeting. Talking points for your brief remarks (3 minutes) are attached at Tab III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.	That	you	initial	and	forward	the	memo	at	Tab	Į.
										/

2. That you use the talking points at Tab III during your "drop by" with the President.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments

cc: Ray Burghardt

Tab I - Poindoxter Hemo to Chaves
Tab II - Chaves Hemo to Poindexter of January 15, 1986

Tab III - Poindexter Talking Points

ON-338

Exhibit OLN-229

Advancing the Conservative Agenda

CONTACTS: Jeff Reffer Jackie Clemons 202/659-6550

June 16, 1986

HEDIA FACT SEERT

Washington, D.C. - Today at a news conference at the National Press Building, Sentinel, a Vashington headquartered lobbying organization, announced an advertising campaign to support President Reagan's request for aid to Micaragua's freedom fighters. Making the announcement, Carl Russell "Spitz" Channell, President of Sentinel, said "We are targeting those Congressmen who have not supported the President in the past or have not made up their minds on this vital issue." With Sentinel's campaign beginning Tuesday, June 17 in eleven congressional districts the lobby expects to swaken the voting public to the rotes their representatives are casting on this issue.

The eleven Congressmen targeted by the new advertising campaign are:

Rep. Michael D. Bernes (D) Haryland 8th C.D. Rep. Romano L. Massoli (D) Kentucky 3rd C.D.

Rep. Charles O. Whitley (D) North Caroline 3rd C.D. Rep. W.G. (Bill) Hefser (D) North Caroline 8th C.D.

Rep. Jim Cooper (D) Tennessee 4th C.D. Rep. Bill Boner (D) Tennessee 5th C.D.

Rep. Bart Gordon (D) Tennessee 6th C.D.
Rep. Ed Jones (D) Tennessee 8th C.D.
Rep. J.J. (Jake) Pickle (D) Texas 15th C.D.
Rep. Albert G. Bustamante (D) Texas 23rd C.D.

Rep. Eika de la Carza (D) Texas 15th C.D.

The advertisements will be placed in prime time and late evening viewing segments for maximum saturation of the media markets corresponding to the congressional districts. Sentinel expects to spend \$200,000 in eight days. 000358





CONTACT: Dam Conrad Cliff Smith 202/547-1985

NEWS RELEASE

Washington, D.C., June 25 -- Eleven Congressmen created the margin of victory for President Reagan in yesterday's vote on aid to the Micaraguan Preedom Pighters. Six of these Representatives came under intensive lobbying efforts sponsored by Sentinel, a Washington based lobbying organization. Dan Conrad, Sentinel's Executive Director, said, "We undertook a broad-based program of personal contact, television messages and grass roots constituent education." The efforts by Sentinel began more than one year ago to help President Reagan change the climate on Capitol Will from weak support for humanitarian assistance to a strong message of military and humanitarian aid to the United Micaraguan Opposition.

Sentinel teamed up with the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, a Washington non-partisan foundation, that sponsored a 3.5 million dollar public education campaign throughout the Southeastern United States. Spits Channell, President of NEPL, announced the program on February 27, 1986 at a news conference at the National Press Club in Washington.

This new approach to addressing vital foreign policy issues is likely to become the way of the future for national security debates in Washington. "When we address issues vital to the President we intend to bring to bear a whole array of communications and political techniques," said Conrad. When the two

--more--

organizations focus on President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative in mid July they intend to repeat the efforts made to pass the President's Micaraguan aid package. Using television education, prominent speakers, political action programs at the grass roots level and lobbying on Capital Mill, the two organizations expect to focus public attention on Congressmen who have opposed the President.

....



2301 OLD-COURT BOAD. BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, 21206 (301) 204-5330

N.E.P.L. "Freedom Fighters" TV

National Spot Placement

Television Analysis

N.E.P.L. "Freedom Fighters" TV

National Spot Placement

Television Analysis

Harket Overview

Market	f of Spots	HH GRPs	Total Cost
MIAMI/WEST PALM BEACE	29	186	\$ 18,070.
orlando/daytona beace	62	568	\$ 27,250.
TAMPA/ST. PETERSBURG	42	289	\$ \$,920.
JACKSONVILLE	66	500	\$ 13,000.
SAN ANTONIO	29	430	\$ 18,430.
AUSTIN	73	605	\$ 16,950.
Mcallen/Brownsville	30	500	\$ 4,450.
CORPUS CHRISTI	40	571	\$ 4,905.
NASHVILLE	35	641	\$ 21,315.
MEMPHIS	48	389	\$ 10,530.
CHATTANOOGA	58	465	\$ 8,910.
RALEIGE/DURBAH	47	471	\$ 21,100.
GREENVILLE/NEW BERK	40	502	\$ 4,200.
GREENVILLE/SPART./ASBEV	ILLE 30	410	\$ 15,000.
COLUMBIA	35	277	\$ 6,290.
MACON	26	458	\$ 6,415.
SAVANNAE	67	532	\$ 5,465.
ALBANY	24	493	\$ 2,820.
JACKSON, MS	56	715	\$ 9,380.
COLUMBUS/TUPELO	62	374	* 4, 640 000250

N.E.P.L. "Freedom Fighters" TV National Spot Placement Television Analysis Market Overview

Page Two

Market	of Spots	RE GRPs	Total Cost
OKLAHOHA CITY	16	200	\$ 6,675.
TULSA	62	611	\$ 16,290.
LOUISVILLE	40	403	\$ 11,520.
		/	
NATIONAL MARKET TOTALS:	1017	10,590	\$262,525.
WASHINGTON, D.C. TOTALS:	101	867	\$ 99,225.
NATIONAL PROGRAM TOTALS:	1118	11,457	\$361,750.

N.E.P.L. "Freedom Fighters" TV National Spot Placement Television Analysis

MIAHI/WEST PALM BEACE

Fascell (D-19th CD)YesPepper (D-18th CD)YesLarry Smith (D-16th CD)YesShaw (R-15th CD)YesLEHMAN (D-17th CD)MONica (D-14th CD)Yes

29 Spots 186 HH GRPs \$ 18,070.

ORLANDO/DAYTONA BEACE

MACKAY (D-6th CD) NO
Chappell (D-4th CD) Yes
McCollum (R-5th) Yes
Nelson (D-11th CD) Yes
Ireland (R-10th CD) Yes

62 Spots 568 HH GRPs \$ 27,250.

TAMPA/ST. PETERSBURG

MACKAY (D-6th CD) NO
Gibbons (D-7th CD) Yes
Young (D-8th CD) Yes
Bilirakis (R-9th CD) Yes
Ireland (R-10th CD) Yes

42 Spots 289 MM GRPs \$ 3,920.

N.E.P.L. "Freedom Fighters" TV lational Spot Placement Television Analysis

Page Two

JACKSONVILLE

Sennett (D-3rd CD)	Yes
MACKAY (D-6th CD)	NO
Fuqua (D-2nd CD)	Yes
Chappell (D-4th CD)	Yes
Thomas (D-1st CD GA.)	Yes
Rowland (D-8th CD GA)	Yes

66 Spots 500 MH GRPs \$ 13,000.

SAN ANTONIO

DE LA GAREA (D-15th CD) NO
BUSTAMANTE (D-23rd CD) NO
PICKLE (D-10th CD) NO
GONIALES (D-20th CD) NO
Loeffler (R-21st CD) Yes
Sveeney (R-14th CD) Yes

29 Spots 430 MM GRPs \$ 18,430.

AUSTIM

PICKLE (D-10th CD) NO
Leath (D-11th) Yes
Sweeney (R-14th CD) Yes
Loeffler (R-21st CD) Yes

73 Spots 605 NH GRPs \$ 16,950.

MCALLEN/BROWNSVILLE

DE LA GAREA (D-15th CD) <u>MO</u>
Ortis (D-27th) Yes

N.E.P.L. "Freedom Fighters" TV National Spot Placement Television Analysis

Page Four

CHATTANOOGA

DUNCAM (D-2nd CD)	MO
LLOYD (D-3rd CD)	MO
COOPER (D-4th CD)	MO
Flippo (D-5th AL)	Yes
Darden (D-7th GA)	Yes
Jenkins (D-9th GA)	Yes

58 Spots 465 MM GRPs \$ 8,910.

RALEIGH/DURHAM

WHITNEY (D-3rd CD)	MO
HEFNER (D-8th CD)	NO
VALENTINE (D-2nd CD)	MO
Cobey (R-4th CD)	Yes
Coble (R-6th CD)	Yes
ROSE (D-7th CD)	MO

47 Spots 471 MM GRPs \$ 21,100.

GREENVILLE/MEN BERN

JONES (D-1st CD) NO
VALENTINE (D-2nd CD) NO
WHITLEY (D-3rd CD) NO

40 Spots 502 MH GRPs \$ 4,200.

GREENVILLE/SPARTANBURG/ASSEVILLE

DERRICK (D-3rd CD) HO
SPRATT (D-5th CD) HO
Campbell (R-4th CD) Yes

"T.E.P.L. "Freedom Fighters" TV
ational Spot Placement
Television Analysis

Page Five

GREENVILLE/SPARTANBURG/ASHEVILLE (Continued)

Hendon (R-11th CD HC) Yes Jenkins (D-9th CD GA) Yes Barnard (D-10th CD GA) Yes

30 Spots 410 HH GRPs \$ 15,000.

COLUMB IA

SPENCE (D-2nd CD) NO
DERRICK (D-3rd CD) NO
Tallon (D-6th CD) Yes

35 Spots 277 HH GRPs \$ 6,290.

HACON

RAY (D-3rd CD) HO Rowland (D-8th CD) Yes

26 Spots 458 MM GRPs \$ 6,415.

SAVAMAE

Thomas (D-1st CD) Yes Hartnett (R-1st CD SC) Yes

67 Spots 532 NN GRPs \$ 5,465.

ALBANY

Eatcher (D-2nd CD) Yes
RAY (D-3rd CD) NO

24 Spots 493 MM GRPs \$ 2,820.

N.E.P.L. "Freedom Fighters" TV National Spot Placement Television Analysis

Page Six

JACKSON, MS

Franklin (R-2nd CD) Yes
Hontgomery (D-3rd CD) Yes
Dowdy (D-4th CD) Yes

56 Spots 715 HH GRPs \$ 9,380.

COLUMBUS/TUPELO

WHITTEN (D-1st CD) NO
Franklin (R-2nd CD) Yes
Hontgomery (D-3rd CD) Yes

62 Spots 374 BB GRPs \$ 4,640.

OKLAHOMA CITY

Natkins(D-3rd CD)YesMcCURDY(D-4th CD)MOEdwards(R-5th CD)YesEnglish(D-6th CD)YesSYMAR(D-2nd CD)MO

16 Spots 200 MH GRPs \$ 6,675.

TULSA

٤.,

Jones (D-1st CD) Yes
Watkins (D-3rd CD) Yes
SYNAR (D-2rd CD) NO
Edwards (R-5th CD) Yes

62 Spots 611 MM GRPs \$ 16,290.

.E.P.L. "Freedom Fighters" TV Mational Spot Placement Television Analysis

Page Seven

LOUISVILLE

MASSOLI (D-3rd CD)	MO
NATCHER (D-2nd CD)	MO
Snyder (R-4th CD)	Yes
HOPKINS (R-6th CD)	NO
HAMILTON (D-9th CD IND)	NO

40 Spots 403 HH GRPs \$ 11,520.

EXHIBIT OLN-230

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ANTI-TENNORISH APERICAN COMMITTEE 1331 PENNSYLVANIA AVE Nº SOITE 350 SOUTH WASHINGTON OC 20000

THIS IS A CONFIRPATION COPY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES

2023030102 TOBM WASHINSTON OC 108 00-00 1125P EST
PMS LT COL OLIVER MORTM, DLR
MATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RPT DLY MEM, DLR
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLOB 17TM & PENNSYLVANIA AVE-MORTMUEST
WASHINSTON OC 20500
DEAR COLONEL MORTM
ME MAVE THE MONOR TO IMPORM YOU THAT COMBRESSMAM MICHAEL BARMES, FOR
OF THE FREEDOM FIGHTER MOVEMENT, ADVERSARY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
FOREIGN POLICY SOALS AND OPPOMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISION FOR
AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE FUTURE MAS BEEN SOUNDLY DEFEATED IN MIS BID
TO BECOME THE DEPOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR THE US BENATE FROM MARYLAND,

HIS DEFEAT SIGNALS AN END TO MUCH OF THE DISINFORMATION AND UNHISE EFFORT DIRECTED AT CRIPPLING YOUR FOREIGN POLICY GOALS.

AE AT THE ANTI-TERRORISH AMERICAN COMMITTEE (ATAC) FEEL PROUD TO MAVE PARTICIPATED IN A CAMPAIGN TO ENSURE COMMESSMAN BARNES SEPERT.

FOR THE ANTI-TERRORISH AMERICAN COMMITTEE SPITZ CHANNELL, PRESIDENT, CLIFF SMITH, DIRECTOR, KRIS LITTLEDALE, OIRECTOR 1331 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NU SUITE 350 SOUTH ASHINGTON DC 20004

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
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
954 Exhibit OLN-231



Ехнівіт OLN-232

Nor	Palue	Received,_	I, John F. Donahue
hereby s	ell, assign a	nd transfer unto th	e HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2,400 shares of t
below	listed ce	rtificate of Ca	pitol stock and the remaining 3,305 sha
are to	be re-is	sued in the nam	e of JOHN F. DONAHUE
		· entre of the second s	(5705) Shares of the Common
Capital S	Stock of the	Aetna Life and	Casualty Company
standing	inHy		name on the books of said Company
		represente	ed by Certificate No. NYD 30403 herewith
	-	-	ppoint Horgan Guaranty Trust Company the said stock on the books of the within named
	•	ower of substitution is	n the premises.
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
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APR 30 1985
MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMMANY
OF HEW YORK

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Atta Louis L. McCumid

EXHIBIT OLN-233

INSI—Institute for North-South Issues 1525 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Suite 200 Washington D.C. 2000936

* Telephone (202) 745-0360 Telex 3718712 IBC USA

September 12, 1985

Dr. Edwin J. Fuelner President The Heritage Foundation 204 Massachusetts Avenue, Northeast Washington, D.C. 20002


Dear Dr. Feulner:

The Institute for North-South Issues, is a 501(c)3 whose objectives are to provide for public education and information programs on the vital issues of Central America.

We are applying to the Heritage Foundation for a one hundred thousand dollar grant to perform the following programs:

- 1. The dissemination in Central America of materials designed to educate the public on the political and economic realities of United States policy objectives, and the collection of scholarly responses to the materials.
- 2. Phase one will be followed by a program of public information on the Central American view of United States foreign and economic policy and how it relates to the political and economic future of Central American countries. This element will be a feedback mechanism for a conference to be scheduled in 1986.
- 3. The collection and analysis of data in the first two phases will be completed prior to the conference. Then United States scholars and policy makers will be given an opportunity to react to the analysis before the conference.
- 4. The Institute will provide all conference arrangements and select the scholars to participate in this program from among U.S. and Central American figures.

We consider the questions of cross-cultural observation to critical to this program. It is as important that U.S. policy makers and political analysts understand the perception of the Central Americans, as it is for the Central Americans to have a



September 12, 1985 Page Two

similar observation opportunity. This program will apable U.S. policy makers to better understand the political impact of their actions. For the Central Americans it will put U.S. foreign policy and national economic concerns in clearer perspective.

We are prepared to begin immediately on this program and are grateful to the Heritage Foundation for its assistance.

Sincerely,

Richard R. Miller

Treasurer

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Ехнівіт OLN-234




EXHIBIT OLN-235

8064

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000

233

October 9, 1985

11 30482

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLENE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Presidential letter to Mr. John Donahue

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President requesting that he sign the letter to Mr. John Donahue at Tab A. The President's letter thanks Mr. Donahue for his support and encouragement of our policies in Central America. This letter fulfills a commitment we made to Dr. Godson during our discussions last month.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward your memo to the President at Tab I.

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Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President
Tab A - Presidential ltr to Donahue



-

OLM BOF BN 22 -18

8064

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION

11 30483

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

Letter to Mr. John Donahue

Issue

Letter to Mr. John Donahue (Tab A).

Facts

Mr. John Donahue has provided significant support and encouragement for our policies in Central America.

Discussion

It would be appropriate to acknowledge our appreciation for this support by means of the correspondence attached at Tab A.

Recommendation

<u>ok</u>

No

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Prepared by: Oliver L. North

Attachment

Tab A - Letter to Mr. John Donahue

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11 30A8A

Dear Mr. Donahue:

Thank you for your kind words of support and encouragement for the Administration's policy in Central America. Your patriotic effort on behalf of liberty and democracy has been invaluable to the millions who struggle for freedom in the region.

May God bless you for your dedication and patriotism.

Sincerely,

Mr. John Donahue Chairman, Federated Investors 421 Seventh Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Exhibit OLN-236



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A tan-anomyt public policy research institut

October 15, 1985

Mr. Richard R. Miller Treasurer Institute for North-South Issues 1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Millers

Thank you for your letter of September 12, 1985.

My colleagues and I have discussed your proposal in some detail, and are pleased to respond in a positive way to it. Therefore, I am enclosing a check from The Heritage Foundation in the amount of \$100,000 as you requested in your letter.

We would appreciate receiving reports from you as to the uses to which these funds have been put, and would also like to have a copy of your tax-exempt letter for our files.

It is our assumption, of course, that all of these funds will be used in accordance with the stated purposes of your 301(c)(3) organization.

Best wishes to you in your endeavors.

Min Jalun

EJF/kr Enclosure ON-336

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Hen. Clare Boothe Lose Richard M. Sestie Hen. William E. Simon Arthur Spinor Joy Van Ande

214 Mossochusette Avenut, N.E. . Weshington, DC. 20000 . (200) 546-4400

53835



A tax-exempt public policy research institute

October 18, 1985

Mr. John F. Donahus 1054 Beechwood Boulevard Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

15206

Dear Mr. Donahue:

Enclosed please find four stock certificates representing 3,305 shares of Aetna Life & Casualty common capital stock. These shares, reissued in your name, represent the difference between the 5,705 shares delivered to The Heritage Foundation and your contribution of 2,400 shares.

Thank you once again for your support of the programs and policies of The Heritaga Joundation.

Sincerely,

Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.

President

Enclosure

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
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David R. Brown, M.D. Joseph Coors Midge Decter Robert F. Dee Hon. Jack Eckerd Braid of Trustees
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Hon Clare Boothe Luce Richard M Scaife Hon, William E Simon Arthur Spitzer Jay Van Andel

214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.B. • Washington, DC. 20002 • (202) 546-4400

Ехнівіт OLN-238



966 Exhibit OLN-239

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INSI-Institute for North-South Issues

1812 SUNDERLAND PLACE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 - 1606
TELEPHONE (202) 397-3002 TELEX 3718712 IBCUSA

M 017210

May 12, 1986

Edvin J. Feulner, Jr., Ph.D. President
The Heritage Foundation
214 Hassachusetts Avenue, H.E. Vashington, D.C. 20002

Dear Dr. Faulzer:

I apologize for the delay in responding to your October 15, 1985 letter. I have enclosed a copy for your reference.

In your letter you requested a copy of our tax status letter. The letter was very long in coming and we discovered why an March 19, 1986. The IRS exceeded our request for 501(c)(3) status and of its own accord greated as 509(a)(1) status. We are now a tax except and charitable foundation. A copy of our determination ruling is attached for your review.

We are compiling several final information pieces and a report and will forward it to you when it is complete.

Sincerely,

Francia D. Gonos
Prancia D. Gonos
Pranciados



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INSI—Institute for North-South Issues 1912 SUNDERLAND PLACE, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 - 1609 TELEPHONE (202) 659-6556 TELEX 37 18712 18CUSA R M OTTEL

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

TO:

Pile

Anthony and Williams, CPA

INSI directors

PROM:

Richard R. Miller

Tressurer

DATE:

December 1, 1986

SUBJECT: Meritage Foundation grant of October 15, 1986

The attached correspondence is evidence of a grant given to IMSI by the Meritage Foundation. The grant was provided to IMSI at the request of an another 501(c)(3) organisation, the Mational Strategy Information Center.

The Wational Strategy Information Center had been approached to administer this grant and had not felt it was within their strategic and anti-terrorist mandate, therefore requesting that IMSI be given the grant for administration.

The grant required an investigation and analysis of the information available to international news organizations on the issues involved with the conflict in Central America. The grant provided money and resources to political and news organizations in Central America with resources to develop information channels on the evolving conflict in Central America. IMSI retained a twenty percent administration fee for its distribution of this grant. All other expenditures where made through latin American non-profit organizations.

The information feed-back, in the form of formal reports, from the Latin American organisations has been disappointing in regards to this grant but the effort to foster and strengthen Latin American news organizations has been quite rewarding, as evidence by the development of further program grants by such organizations as the Mational Endowment for Democracy and the Mational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty.



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 11-13-85 Heritage Foundation deposit from INSI ## 80,000.00

 11-13-85 Balance | 120,752.10

 11-14-85 Transfer to Lake Resources | 48,074.60

 11-14-85 Balance | 72,677.50
- (B) 11-13-85 Heritage Foundation deposit from IVSI 80,000.00
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
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DEPOSITION OF ROBERT EARL

Partially Declassified/Released on <u>20 Tags 1897</u> under provisions of E.O. 12356 by B. Reger, National Security Council

Saturday, May 2, 1987

House of Representatives,

Select Committee to Investigate Covert

Arms Transactions with Iran,

Washington, D.C.



The committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in

Room 901, Hart Senate Office Building, W. Neil Eggleston

(Deputy Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee) presiding

Present: W. Neil Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel; Mark
Belnick, Executive Assistant to the Chief Counsel; Terry
Smiljanich, Associate Counsel; Richard A. Arenberg, Administrative Assistant to U.S. Senator George J. Mitchell; Victoria F.
Nourse, Senate Select Committee; Richard Cullen, Administrative Assistant to Senator Paul Trible; and Dennis Dean Kirk,

Esquire, Counsel for Robert Earl.

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soon the Attorney General's people were planning to come over?

A- Yes. It was unclear whether it was going to be

A- Yes. It was unclear whether it was going to be Saturday, Sunday, Monday, or exactly when.

- Q You understood that by the time you started disposing of the files?
 - A Yes.
 - Q Anything more on Friday?
 - A Not that I can recall at the moment.
- Q When you left the office Friday, do you recall, whether Colonel North and Fawn Hall still were there?
- A I think when I left the office, that only Colonel North was there, but I am not positive of that.
- Q The next morning is Saturday, November 22. Did you go to work that morning?

A I got a call from, I believe, White House Signal, but I am not sure now whether it was Paul Thompson calling me or whether a message was relayed through the White House Signal, but somebody called me to say "Come and open up the office," that Colonel North wasn't available, couldn't be found. So I went in and opened up the office.

- Q Just let me ask you. Back on the 21st -- do you kno Tom Green?
 - A Yes.
 - Did he come to Suite 302 on Friday, the 21st, before

you left?

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A Not that I recall. He may have, but that I recall.

Q. Now we are back on Saturday morning. You get a contact from White House Signal, et cetera. Do you go to 302 and open up?

A I recall driving through the gate and parking on the street between OEOB and the West Wing. I wasn't sure whether I ought to go up to Paul Thompson's office or over to Paul's office. I recall considering that, but I don't recall what my solution to the dilemma was. I went to one of the two places first. I do recall I did eventually, either directly or secondly, go to the office and open it up.

- Q You were the first guy to arrive at 302 that morning?
 - A Yes.
- Q Now, do you remember, were files laid out when you opened the office up?
- A This is another one that I cannot recall, whether the circular table in front of Colonel North's desk had files on it at that point when I got there or whether it was empty and I added all the files for them to review.
- Q In any event, the table you are referring to -which I imagine you are going to tell me, the AG representatives reviewed documents, right?
 - A Yes.
 - Q That on Exhibit 2 is the table marked "conference

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 table" in Morth's office, right?

A - Correct.

Q Okay. Did the Attorney General's people arrive next or someone before them?

A At some point, I am not sure exactly how much later, but I think what happened next was that Paul Thompson brought over two representatives from the Department of Justice,

Bradford Reynolds, and I think his name is John Richardson, introduced me, said they were there to look at files on the Iran project, and then I think Paul Thompson left.

- Q And Richardson and Reynolds started their review?
- A Correct.
- Q Do you recall their asking you for any specific documents, files?

A I recall that they asked for more documents, or maybe all of them. If the table was empty, they asked for all the documents; if the table had some of them arranged, they asked for more. I recall going behind Colonel North's

into this credenza and going thorugh files in his crede. I pulling them out and looking at the subject title to see if they were relevant and putting some of them that were I believe relevant onto the table for their review.

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So I looked through all those documents behind Colonel North's desk, I couldn't find them. I will go into that more if you want. They were subsequently found.

- Q Where did you find them?
- A I didn't find them, Colonel North found them. When he came in, I told him of their request for them.
- Q Now, Richardson and Reynolds were in Colonel North's office, you were in there with them?

A Initially, I was in there looking for the files in the credenza, and I also from his desk placed a call to him to collet him know that I was in his office and the people were there, and to see if he had gotten the call and was en route, and he had said, yes, he had gotten the call, and he would be there in a while. I am not sure exactly how much later, an hour, or maybe two hours later.

- Q That was the substance of your conversation with him?
 - A Yes.
- Q He arrived next at 302. Was he the next person to come in?
- A No.

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- Q Who came next?
- A The next thing that happened is that they left to go to lunch with the Attorney General. On their way out,

in the passageway, they ran into Colonel North coming in.

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23 24 They had a brief conversation in the hallway, and then Colonel North came into the office.

Q Did you overhear their conversation?

A No. I observed it, I was on my way out and saw them down there talking to Colonel North. So I never got out of the office when Colonel North arrived.

Q North came into the office?

I told him of the request of the team

He said he didn't know where they were

filed and started looking around, and apparently found them.

I am not sure that he found them while I was still there or while I was on the same floor with him. My recollection is when Richardson and Brad Reynolds returned, there was a file, an empty file folder on the desk that had not been there before that Bradford Reynolds held up and said, "Now, that is very sensitive," because it was empty, and I couldn't explain why it was sensitive.

- Q We get protection of documents like that from the White House all the time.
- A Colonel Morth was out of the office at that time. When he returned, he explained they had been filed in one of these files over here.
 - Q In front of Barbara Brown's desk?
 - A Yes, and had taken them and put them with

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23 24 A Not that I can recall the substance of, although there were a couple little parts that I recall before the AG's teams -- before they returned.

Sefore the AG team came back, did you and North have

Colonel North continued to review documents, and I think found others that were suitable for the category that we had been looking for the day before.

- Q Termination?
- A Termination.

MR. LEON: Where was he looking for those, among the files they had just reviewed?

THE WITNESS: I don't think so, but I am not positive. I think it was other files back on his desk. I am not sure where -- oh, and one of the things he told me when he first came in was that the shredder had broken the night before, because I reached up to turn it on, and sure enough, it wasn't working. Then when he was compiling material --

BY MR. BELNICK:

- Q Can I stop you there for a second, Bob? Was the shredder bag full?
 - A I don't recall.
- Was the machine the kind of machine you could see the bag, or would you have to open it? Was the bag visible?
 - A T think it was.

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Q It didn't work. Did he ask you to find a working shredder?

A He didn't ask me: I intuited it from what he was doing. I told him I was going across the hall to CMC where I knew they had a shredder and see if we could get in there. The door was locked, so I couldn't get in. And at some point — the recollection that I had, rather than speculate how we get to it, is of Colonel North with a file and a stack of documents that I knew from all of this were to be shredded, had Paul Thompson standing beside him and in some way a reference to going over to the sift room with a hefting of the documents — I am not exactly sure what, but I knew what he meant, and I don't know what Thompson knew or inferred from that.

Q Did Ollie have the documents he was carrying in foldurs?

A I think it was one folder with a bunch of papers in them, but I am not sure.

Q Do you know what kinds of papers they were? You say they were the kind that qualified for the Termination Department. Do you remember -- what were they, PROF messages something else?

A I don't know.

MR. LEON: This kind of folder?

MR. BELNICK: The record can't see that.

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 MR. LEON: Accordian-type folder.

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THE WITNESS: I don't recall whether it was accordian or the kind that doesn't have sides on it, just a manila folder open. It could have been either.

BY MR. BELNICK:

- Did Colonel North and Thompson walk toward the West Wing together?
 - I am not sure. I think they did.
- In any event, they weren't there when the AG team returned?
 - That is right. I was alone. A
- The AG team came back, said hello, and they started to do that good work again?
- And asked about the new folder without any documents in it.
- Other than that, it was the same as the morning had been, more exciting review?
- At some point, Colonel North came back. I don't know which one it was, Raynolds or Richardson, told Colonel North the Attorney, General would like to speak to him. So. Colonel North called the Attorney General.
 - In his office, from his office?
- Yes. He was sitting back there talking to him. I believe it was to him. He called him sir, and yere arranging for a meeting the next day. WhatI heard from Colonel North's

Exhibit OLN-251

FROM THE MIDSHIPMEN'S REGULATIONS OF 1964

CHAPTER 4

HONOR CONCEPT

PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS

1. The Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen establishes ciples rather than outlining specific offenses. It demands the left that midshipmen must learn to make their own decisions based widelines or principles concerning their actions in any situation.

Honor Concept principles are:

- a. A member of the Brigade does not lie, cheat, or steal.
- b. The responsibility for the implementation and enforcement the Honor Concept rests with the Brigade.
- c. Regardless of the rank or position of the person who reports caber of the Brigade for an honor violation, the investigation and clustion of the accused is conducted by the Brigade.
- d. The decision as to whether a member of the Brigade will cort another midshipman for an honor violation rests solely with the dehipman observing the violation. This decision is of the gravest eponsibility. It is based on whether, in his judgment, the violator capable of assuming the high standards of personal integrity required a member of the Brigade. Is he entitled to continue being a midshipman?
- e. The decision of the Brigade in regard to an honor conaction is final, and will normally result in separation.
- f. Every midshipman is presumed to be honorable until tesonable doubt is created otherwise. A midshipman!s statements and tions must always represent the complete truth. In response to testions by competent superior authority, a midshipman shall answer to be the complete truth and truthfully, under any and all circumstances.
- 2. The following definitions are pertinent to the Midshipman concept:
- a. Lie: A deliberate or al or written untruth. It may be an real or written statement which is known to be false or a simple response a question in which the answer is known to be false.



- b. Mislead or deceive: A deliberate misrepresentation of true situation by being untruthful or withholding or omitting or subtraction in such a way as to leave an erroneous or false impression of the known true situation.
- c. Cheat: To intentionally mislead or defraud or endeavor mislead or defraud another contrary to the confidence normally placed a midshipman. To use unauthorized assistance in submitted work design to represent one's own efforts. Similarly, plagiarism, in which work copied or paraphrased without giving credit by quotation marks and/or footnotes, is cheating.
- d. Steal: To wrongfully take, obtain or withhold property from the possession of the true owner with the intention of permanents or temporarily depriving the owner of its use or possession.
- e. Intent: In lying, cheating, stealing, misleading, or deceiving, the intent of the accused midshipman is an integral part of the offense. Fraudulent intent or an attempt to mislead is germane to whether an honor offense has occurred or not.
- 3. The above guidelines should be the basis for a midshipman's conduct in all places and under all conditions, whether official or personal in nature. The Honor Concept is a way of life rather than a set of regulations.

0402. ORGANIZATION

- 1. The Brigade Honor Committee is an organization of midshipse charged with the responsibility to indoctrinate the Brigade, to insure high standards of honor, to keep the Honor Concept alive as an integral part of every midshipman's education, and to hear the cases of those midshipmen reported for violations of the Honor Concept.
- 2. Each class in each company will elect an honor representative Elections will be conducted just after completion of first semester examinations by the second, third, and fourth classes for the following year. The incoming fourth class will elect Company Honor Representation the second Tuesday following the reforming of the Brigade.
- 3. Company Honor Representatives from the prospective first claused will elect, from among themselves, a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Recorder and Coordinator for the Brigade Honor Committee. Replacement Company Honor Representatives will be elected for these committee officials in the company providing the individual.
- 4. In each battalion there will be a Battalion Honor Represent for each class. The first class battalion representatives will be apply the first class Brigade Honor Chairman. For the underclass the procedure will be by vote among the six newly elected company representation that battalion.

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- 5. The Honor Committee is composed of:
- a. Midshipman Presiding Officer (no vote) The elected irms or Vice-Chairman, Honor Organization.
- b. Midshipman Investigating Officer (no vote) A designated year Honor Representative of the class of the accused except that a tignated first classman will investigate fourth class cases and all reported by other than midshipmen.
 - c. Recorder (no vote) The elected Recorder, Honor Organization
- d. Five first class Company Honor Representatives (one from battalion other than the battalion of the accused - one vote each).
- e. Brigade Commander (one vote) On any case the Brigade mander may appoint a representative of the grade of Midshipman mander to sit in his stead.
- f. The Second, Third or Fourth Class President (one vote each) see sidshipmen sit on the committee when it is hearing cases concerning hers of their own class or junior classes. Any elected Class Officer substitute for the Class President.
- 6. A Class Investigating Committee, for each class except the st class, examines all underclass cases. This Committee will inquire reported honor violations concerning their classmates and either that the case to the Honor Committee or if suspicion of an honor lation is unfounded terminate the case. The Class Investigating Commete is composed of:
- a. Midshipman Presiding Officer (no vote) The elected President or Vice-President, Class Organization.
 - b. Midshipman Investigating Officer (no vote).
- c. Recorder (no vote) The elected Secretary, Class
- d. Five (same class as accused) Class Company Honor Repretives (one from each battalion other than the battalion of the led (one vote each)).

DUTIES

1. The Chairman, Brigade Honor Committee, has overall responsity for the dissemination of the Honor Concept within the Brigade Mahipmen. He will coordinate all aspects of Honor Indoctrination; ill conduct Honor Committee meetings; and he will coordinate with Brigade Commanders, Class Presidents, and Class Honor Representation ensuring a proper attitude toward Honor within the Brigade

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and the proper administration of reported honor offenses. He will designate the five First Class Company Honor Representatives to sit on each Honor Committee case.

- 2. The Vice-Chairman, Brigade Honor Committee, will designate Midshipman Investigating Officers. Further he will supervise the conduct of all investigations, providing guidelines for Investigating Officers which will ensure fair and impartial investigations prior to Honor Committee meetings. He will act as Advisor to the Fourth Class Investigating Committee. He will assist the Chairman in the execution of his duties.
- 3. The Coordinator, Brigade Honor Committee, will ensure that communications are maintained with all Company and Battalion Honor Representatives and with the Brigade. He will aid the Chairman in selecting the Liaison Officers for each academic department from the first class Company Representatives, and will coordinate these men in their work with the academic departments in regard to reported cases and other matters of honor in the Brigade.
- 4. The Recorder, Brigade Honor Committee, will act as reporter of Honor Committee meetings. Further, he prepares, according to prescribed format, a written report for submission to the Commandant when Committee findings show an honor violation has occurred.
- 5. The designated Midshipman Investigating Officer will investigate the case, collect the evidence, call witnesses, and in general conduct the case before the Investigating Committees and Honor Committee. He will specifically ensure that the accused has been afforded the opportunity to select a Midshipman Advisor, and that the charge is presented and explained to the accused. The Midshipman Investigating Officer has the obligation to investigate and present the case in a fair, impartial, and objective manner. The Investigating Officer will be a first classman for all cases reported by other than midshipmen, and all first and fourth class honor cases.
- 6. The Midshipman Advisor to the accused, if so requested by the accused, will accompany the accused before the Class Investigating Committee and before the Brigade Honor Committee. As an advisor he will ensure that the accused understands the Committee procedures and is given an opportunity to present evidence in his behalf. It remains the responsibility of the accused to present his own case, but he may be assisted by his advisor to the extent he desires.
- 7. The Battalion Honor Representatives will coordinate Honor Indoctrination within their respective battalions, serve as Investigating Officers, if so designated, and act as Company Honor Representatives for their respective companies.
- 8. The Company Honor Representatives are the link between the Brigade and the Brigade Honor Committee. Where designated they will serve on the Brigade Honor Committee or as Investigating Officers. When

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eflected, they will act as Midshipman Advisors to the accused. The first Class Company Honor Representative is responsible for indoctrination of his company in the Honor Concept. He will keep underclass honor representatives in his company informed on honor matters, ensure that prescribed Honor Concept material is covered during seminars within his company and work toward a high quality and effectiveness of honor presentations.

- 9. Underclass Company Honor Representatives will assist the First Class Honor Representative in the performance of his responsibilities, and ensure full awareness of the principles of the Honor Concept by the aidshipmen in their class within their company.
- 10. The Class Investigating Committee, under the Class President, will determine whether to forward the case to the Honor Committee or terminate it at the class level. The decision to forward or terminate case will be made on the basis of a simple majority vote by voting members of the Committee. The Chairman, Brigade Honor Committee, will render advice and counsel to the Class Presidents, as necessary or requested.

6404. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BRIGADE

- 1. In that the Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen is a set of principles, not a code of specifics, and the guidelines or principles are broad and general, an individual responsibility becomes the obligation of every midshipman. Each midshipman must know the Honor Concept, its principles, and its application. In the situations which he encounters daily, he must make the decisions and take the actions that are consistent with the Honor Concept.
 - Certain questions are to be considered when one midshipman elerves another committing an honor violation. They are:
 - a. Is the violation the first you have ever seen him $\boldsymbol{\omega}$
 - b. How serious is the violation in your own mind?
 - c. When all is considered, does the man who has committed the violation deserve to continue as a member of the Brigade?
 - 3. A midshipman observing another in a dishonorable act may report the incident to the Midshipman Honor Organization directly, may prefer to resifirm his observations and gain the offender's viewpoint through personal questioning prior to reporting him, or may choose to caution the offender personally. The responsibility for proper action rests with mach individual member of the Brigade.

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0405. INVESTIGATION

- 1. A midshipman who decides to report a suspected honor offense will first consult the Company Honor Representative of his class. The incident shall then be reported in writing by the accuser to the respecting Class President (Chairman, Class Investigating Committee). The Chairman, Class Investigating Committee, will forward the accusation to the Chairman, Honor Committee, who will determine whether or not the matter merits further investigation. If the Chairman, Brigade Honor Committee, determine that a possible honor violation has occurred, he will have his Vice-Chairman designate a First Class Midshipman Investigating Officer for first or fourth class cases and refer the case back to the appropriate Class President for investigation.
- 2. The Midshipman Investigating Officer will originate a statement of charges, then present the charges to the accused. Before obtaining asy oral or written response from the accused, the accused will be afforded the opportunity, if he desires, to choose a Midshipman Advisor who is a Company Honor Representative. The accused may respond in writing to the charges or may elect to make no statement.
- 3. The Midshipman Investigating Officer will inform the First Clam Company Honor Representative of the accused of the case pending. Upon completing his inquiry, the Investigating Officer will report his findings to the Class Investigating Committee. After hearing the matter the voting members of the Investigating Committee may by majority vote decide to terminate the matter or to refer the charge to the Honor Committee.
- 4. The Chairman Honor Committee, will convene his Committee as soon as possible after codes have been referred to him by Claus Investigating Committees. The midshipman Investigating Officer will present the case to the Honor Committee. Procedures for Honor Committee meetings are outlined in Commandant of Midshipman Instructions.
- 5. A two less than unanimous vote (4 of 6, 5 of 7, 6 of 8, 7 of 9) by the Honor Committee present and voting is required for a finding that the accused has violated the Honor Concept. If such a vote is achieved, a report of their findings and recommendations will then be

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invirded to the Commandant of Midshipmen, via the Head, Executive instrument, indicating the final vote and recommended action. The acommendations will be in writing.

6. The identity of the accused will be protected until final tion in a case is assigned and published. In any cases terminated at y midshipman level all records shall be destroyed, except a numerical court as to the number of cases considered.

Dec. 13.

106. HONOR INFRACTIONS OBSERVED BY OTHER THAN MIDSHIPMEN

- 1. It is intended, with very rare exceptions, that all midshipmen mor infractions observed or suspected by commissioned efficers or ivilian faculty members assigned to the Naval Academy be submitted to be Brigade Honor Committee. Disposition of cases suspected of involving moor as well as additional conduct infraction(s) will be determined by the Commandant of Midshipmen on an individual case basis.
- Two representatives from each Department of the Naval Academy ill act as liaison officials between the Brigade Honor Committee and beir respective departments. They will be responsible for informing he members of their departments of the Honor Concept, their responsiilities and the procedures concerning possible honor violations. e representatives will further act as a line of communications between the Brigade Honor Committee and their respective departments. Mose two persons will be the department head. The other will be selected ith the consent of the department head and the selectee, by the Brigade por Committee. The selected representative, for the academic departments, fill preferably be a senior civilian professor. In the case of the repremtative who is not the department head, his line of communications will wis his department head. The Chairman, Brigade Honor Committee, will appoint a first class Company Honor Representative to visit each Academic spartment on a continuing basis. He will act as liaison and further keep the department informed on honor matters.
- codesy who observe or suspect a possible honor infraction committed by midshipman will submit in writing, on the form specifically devised for this purpose (see enclosure (6) of COMDTMIDNINST 1610.7 series) the pertinent facts of the case. This will be delivered to the Chairman, brigade Honor Committee via: (1) Department Liaison Officer, (2) Department Head (if applicable), (3) Head of the Executive Department, (4) Officer Expresentative, Brigade Honor Committee. When a situation of this nature eccurs, it should be considered to be of the highest priority. Furtherware, the report of a suspected honor violation should be delivered by land within the chain of communications and marked in such a manner that will ensure rapid handling and its being seen only by the addressees in the chain. Addressees in the chain will not evaluate or comment on the case in forwarding but merely indicate that they have noted the case.

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- 4. The Vice-Chairman, Brigade Honor Committee, will, upon receipt of the report of a possible Honor Violation observed by other than midshipmen, ensure that a Midshipman Investigating Officer is assigned in accordance with Article 0403.2. The investigation will follow the procedures set forth in Article 0405, paragraphs 2-6 inclusive. If eligible, the midshipman assigned as liaison to the department where the possible violation occurred will be appointed as Investigating Officer for the case.
- 5. The Midshipman Investigating Officer will present the written statement of the reporting official to the Brigade Honor Committee during the course of its hearing of the case. If this report is carefully prepared, there should be no need for further information. However, if clarification or amplification of the reporting official's statement appears to be necessary or desirable, the Midshipman Investigating Officer will be directed by the Chairman to request the reporting official to prepare an amplifying written statement for presentation to the Honor Committee by the Midshipman Investigating Officer. In unusual cases, it may be necessary for the reporting official to appear in person before the Brigade Honor Committee, but such appearances will be avoided if at all possible. In no case will the reporting official be required to appear before a Class Investigating Committee.
- 6. If the Brigade Honor Committee determines the Honor Concept has been violated the finding along with recommendations will be submitted to the Commandant for disposition. After final disposition the findings will be communicated back through the same chain of communications used in transmitting the suspected offense to the Brigade Honor Committee. The same care will be exercised to ensure that the findings will only be divulged to the addressees. If no honor violation has been committed, then the Chairman, Honor Committee will brief the accuser on the findings and associated reasoning.

0407. DETAILED PROCEDURES

- Detailed instructions for class investigating and Brigade Honor Committees, sample charge sheets, and sample report forms are found in current COMDITION INSTRUCTIONS 1610.7 series.
- Instructions pertaining to honor matters will be promulgated by COMDTHIDNINST 1610.7 series, USNA Instruction or Brigade Honor-Committee notice.

Change 8

4-8

&-593 <u>37</u>



Oliver L. North National Security Council RM 192 CECOS Hashington, O.C.

Dear Ollie:



July 2, 1984

Privacy

Your commitment to this country, to truth and justice, to man's freedom is an example that so many people can and should learn from, four dedication is an inspiration to me and many others. Somewhere these ideals were in stilled in you; I wouldn't be surprised if at least some of them come from your fur-

Attached for your information is the information on Grenada with the appropriate references crossed out. Hope it is of some use in future planning.

As for the toys we talked about, I will be having a meeting this week to learn what clarifications are needed.

bisoch

You may remember we talked briefly about the life of this weekend he has a "vary high source" at the NSC who is feeding him information about Central America and possibly covert actions elsewhere. It is working on a piece on the Agency and its involvement in covert action. He will do maither the Agency or the Administration any favors. More importantly he is not to be trusted for he will take that trust and use it for his own good and not care who he hurts. Just thought I'd give you fair warning.

I spoke with the this morning. As can be expected, they are beginning to feel the heat from the decision to cut the aid.

paddlings

Granted they were possible to before the vote, but it is systematic of the feelings it to be feelings it to be the feelings it to be the same help but they have to understand between now and October it will be difficult.

I just returned from a secting with the individual who has access to the contacts for the toys. If this is to be a reality, he would like a meeting with you. He does not know whom I'm dealing with and won't until it is necessary. He believes it can be done, but as you suspected there probably will be some quid pro quo. It may only be assurances that come December or January certain equipment could be purchased from here or possibly even from a third country. He does not speak for the party in question, but does have an idea what they might went.

Would suggest a meeting to hear him out, then the next sove can be figured out. He will not make contact until there is an indication this possibility is known within curtain circles. Will be happy to meet anytime and anyplace. Hould suggest a neutral sight.

Tal-ked- ui My typewriter went amok.



(133)

950/cg

2444 2

UNCEASSIFIED

I talked with our friend in Florida this afternoon and he gave me the following information:

Immediate needs for the next 2 weeks: \$100,000 This would pay for rentals, food, medicine and certain necessities such as phone bills.

They are figuring on \$.50 perday per man for food as the majority are inside. Based on 10,000 people one month costs are: \$150,00

If they lowered the level of military actions they could get by on \$5.00 a day per man for firecracker costs. Per month this is: \$1.500,000 He believes this is the minimum.

As of yet nothing has come through from his fundraiser. To quote him, "Something must have got screwed up somewhere."

He plans on going to on Thursday and probably won't be back up here for 2 weeks. Said if he is needed for a meeting with the individual on the toys, he would come up before.

Told him about the idea. Thought it was good as he has never talked with them about money, but he did meet with them last year. His trip this weekend got him a pat on the back but according to him no money. "They are broke."

Any ideas and I'll be glad to help where possible. Would suggest a meeting does take place at the soonest about the toys. Obviously off-the-record with no promises, just feelers.

To close on a positive note, may I just say it is a pleasure and an honor working with you. I hope something positive comes out of all of this, but if nothing does we will have at least tried, although in this case that will not be good enough.

You and your family are in my prayers.

All the best

(

ild

P.S. Costs for refugees are estimated at \$6.00-\$10.00 a person per month. They estimate there are 7,000 refugees to look after. Therefore per month costs are between \$42,000-\$10,000.



MEMORANDUM



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 28, 1984

N 46204

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. NCFARLANE

OLIVER L. NORTHA

SUBJECT:

Official Travel

on August 31, 1984

. P.

In discussions today among the DCI, Clarridge, and North, it was agreed that immediate operational/logistics problems in the FDM needed to be addressed directly with Adolfo Calero. Calero suggested if he could not make it to the U.S. by the end of the week, North could meet with him on Friday in Notley has suggested that, if Calero cannot come to the U.S. as a consequence of recent reversals, Morth could accompany to and on Friday, August 31, 1984. 1984.

By agreement with the DCI and Motley, Morth would not meet with officials on this trip. Transportation would be via military alreaft accompanying MSC would only bear the cost of meals as outlined in the Travel Authorization Form at Tab I.

RE COMMENDATION

That you authorise travel orders to be cut for the trip described above. The orders will only be executed if Calero cannot come to the U.S.

Disapprove Exercise, obsolute "stealth" Ab Visible mireting.

Chment No press a very of you.

Tab I - NSC Travel Authorization Form

SECRET Declassify: OADR

Applicable Operated South Street Provider South South South

•	CHULHOOT WATE: August 28, 1984
1.	TRAVELER'S NAME: Oliver L. North
2.	PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To meet with Adolfo Calero in order to discuss next steps with the FDN. Will accompand on Friday, August 31, 1984.
3.	ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
	DEPARTURE DATE Fri, Aug 31 RETURN DATE Fri, Aug 31 TIME 0400 TIME 2300
4.	MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
	GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR POV RAIL OTHER
5.	ESTIMATED EXPENSES: (see attached sheet) TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM XX OTHER TOTAL TRIP COST
6.	WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC_XX OTHER
7.	IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: Not applicable.
8.	WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO_XX_
9.	IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): Not applicable.
10.	TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ 47.70
	REMARKS (Use This Space to Endicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
19	TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE:
	APPROVALS:
	UNCLASSIFIED

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Continuation Sheet (NSC Travel Authorization Form)

N 46206

Travel is via military aircraft (accompanying No expense to the NSC.

party).

\$20.00 (per diem) + \$33.00 (foreign travel) = \$53.00 (total)

\$53.00 $\frac{\text{x}.9}{\text{547.700}}$ Advance requested = \$47.700

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD

· September 2, 1984

N 3 , 5 ...

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

OLIVER NORTH

SUBJECT:

FDN Air Attack of 1 September (U)

OLN-254

Shortly after noon on 1 September, three FDN Cessna 0-2 (push-pull) aircraft, launched from the FDN Resistance Base attacked the Sandinista Military School at Santa Clara, Nicaragua with 2.75in. rockets (see map at Tab-A). Accompanying the strike aircraft, for command and control, was a Hughes 500-D helicopter Aboard the helicopter was a U.S. private citizen who apparently was killed when the helicopter was downed by Sandinista small arms/AA fire. We have no evidence that SA-7 missiles were fired at any aircraft. (TS)

This operation was not sponsored/directed by or briefed to any of our CIA personnel. In discussions with Adolfo Calero both last night and this morning, it is evident that the Resistance Forces launched the attack after being goaded by the non-official Americans on-scene at the FDN Headquarters. Calero, when he left the conflowing on Friday, 31 August left instruction that this operation should not be conducted until he had talked to us. At our meetings with Calero on 1 September, both Clarridge and North urged that the operation be postponed because the rockets necessary for the attack had to be saved for potential use against the next arms delivery. Calero agreed, and in discussions with him this morning, indicated that the attack was undertaken without his permission. He has further expressed concerns that the growing presence of non-official assistants will increase the likelihood of similar incidents. From a military perspective the loss of the only operating FDN helicopter on the Northern Front is a serious blow. The only remaining helicopter available to the Resistance Forces is located at a small private field. It may therefore be necessary to ask a private donor to donate a helicopter to the (DN for use in any upcoming operation against an arms delivery. We are knowledgable that FDM resources are not adequate to purchase a helicopter at this time. ITS

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TOP SECRE.

Calero has information from his sources on the ground Calero has information from his sources on the ground that there were no civilians casualties and that other foreign sandinista advisors (Monteneros [Argentine terrorists] and Chilinos) may also have been killed when rockets struck the instructors' barracks. This information is at variance with the instructors reporting we have already seen (Tab C). [Ta]

This afternoon the FDN will announce from the attack was indeed undertaken and that Cubans were killed. A summary of the FDN press statement is at Tab D. (S)

Given the President's trip this afternoon, there will undoubtedly be numerous questions by the media traveling with the party. We should have no official statement on the event, but a properly worded and used backgrounder could be helpful in emphasizing our need to re-involve the USG in the Resistance effort. Since our

benefit from this unfortunate event. Proposed press guidance is attached Tab I. (C)
RECOMMENDATIONS
 That you brief the President on this action using the points above.
Approve
2. That you approve the use of the press statement and guidance at Tab I and pass to Bob Sims.
Approve
 That you approve my approaching a private donor for the provision of a replacement <u>civilian</u> helicopter for use on the Northern Front.
Approve Disapprove 2-11/
Attachments:
Tab I USG Press Guidance
Tab A Map
Tab C Sandinista Press Releases 15 14 al.
Tab D FDN Press Statement (Summary)
OP SECRET

A THE SERVER State of the State

HITUCANOPINE

November 7, 1984

N 7858 EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM .

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Clarifying Who Said What to Whom

OLN-26

ADM Poindexter indicates that the Director called you expressing concern that I had discussed with a Mr. Myers: Calero, MIGs, dollars, etc. The following chronology may be helpful in clarifying the situation.

Monday, November 5 (p.m.). Calero called fror Miami, using appropriate one-time-pad, expressing grave concern about delivery of HIND-D helicopters at El Bluff. He was very distressed that the Agency had not forewarned the FDN of the delivery and that by the time he learned of it from his own assets, it was too late to position forces in an effort to interdict/destroy the helicopters. It was obvious that Calero was well aware of the threat the MI-24's pose to his forces in the field. Calero indicated that he was undertaking plans to "take-out" the HINDs and asked that he be given all possible information on the location of the helicopters. I told him I would try to get the information to him.

Later this same evening, I called Bob Vickers (NIO for Latin America) and GEN Paul Gorman and asked them for all we had on the location of the HIND-D's.

Tuesday, November 6 (a.m.).

Subsequent to this call, I called Calero, again using appropriate code, and advised that the HIMDs had been moved

and could be provide any HUMINT assets on-scene. At this point Calero suggested that he come to Washington to meet with me for a few hours prior to departing on Wednesday (Nov 7) for Tegucigalpa. I agreed to meet Calero here in Washington later in the afternoon.

TOP SECRET Declassify:

STAZ UNCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY

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EYES ON

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TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

N 7859

Tuesday, November 6 (p.m.). the new Ceptral American Task Force (CATF) Chief (who has recently replaced) called to provide additional information buring the course of his call, he indicate that

to Washington unexpectedly. I told that Calero was coming meeting with me and invited him to sit in. We discussed the matter and agreed that mould meet separately with Calero in view of the Agency's determination that Section 8066 of the CR forebade the Agency from providing any information or assistance to the FDN.

Calero and I met privately mid-afternoon. During the meeting, Calero advised me that he had undertaken a plan to "borrow" a T-33, which would be used to strike the location where the HINDs were being assembled. He indicated that the T-33 would be painted with Sandinista Air Force markings and that the aircraft would probably have to land at on its return leg. Calero asked for detailed information on the location of the HINDs and the Sandinista anti-air defenses. We also discussed longer-range planning for a Calero-Cruz coalition and the requirements for military cooperation with the MISURA in the seizure of Puerto Cabezas.

The meeting with Calero was terminated by the 5:00 p.m. CPPG and Calero returned to Miami on a 6:30 p.m. flight. After the CPPG, I again called asked for any further updates on the HINDs and new info on the MIG's. indicated that he was unable to meet with Calero on this trip due to the short lead time in notice of his arrival.

then asked if I was aware of a tasking to the NIO for an assessment of the Resistance capabilities. I told him that I was and that this was a fall out of the CPPG. I noted concern that State was of the opinion that the Resistance had become largely ineffective since our funding had run out in May 1984. Shared my assessment that quite the opposite was true and that the Resistance obviously had considerable outside support. I asked the first he was aware of the source of the Resistance funding. He told me no, that CIA had been trying to determine this, but that it was obviously substantial. I told that it was important that the SNIE reflect the fact that there was substantial outside support which had continued for some months and showed no signs of abating. Sugreed that this was the case. I asked him if the dollar amounts could be quantified.

Presponded that they were spending at least \$1 million per month. I told that the SNIE should include this estimate.

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY

EYES ONL

WHOLYOUR ...

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

buring this discussion, I apprised of Calero's plan to borrow a T-33 for an attack on the HINDs. agreed with me that this was a high-risk operation, but that there did not seem to be any real alternative if the FDN were to survive. At the conclusion of our discussion, we briefly reviewed the prospects for a liberation government in which Cruz and Calero would share authority. and I specifically agreed that our discussion would not be shared.

Wednesday, November 7. GEN Paul Gorman called at 1200 to rew information on collection efforts for MIGs and the HIND GEN Paul Gorman called at 1200 to relay aircraft.

At 1300 Calero called from Tegucigalpa again, using appropriate codes, and requested any available information on the HINDs and anti-air defenses.

He indicated that he had tasked one of his column leaders to insert a man into the control of the column leaders.

Calero advised that he would dispatch his pilote intelligence on the HINDs. as soon as he received

requests we had made and the At 1330 VADM Moreau confirmed modifications (

At 1345 called to report additional Honduran airspace incursions by Sandinista helicopters in the vicinity of Cerro la mole (southwest of Tegucigalpa). I again noted the need for additional intelligence on the HINDs and that Calero was moving to implement the T-33 option.

Thursday, November 8. At 1445 ADM Moreau delivered

At no time did I discuss with financial arrangements for the FDN. At no time did I indicate that Calero was attempting to attack the MIGs. I specifically told that Calero was attempting to collect information on the MIGS and would pass this information to a CIA agent was available.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to continue as planned with Calero.

Approve	Disapprove
ADDIOVE	DISTABLEDAG

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
EXHIBIT OLN-256




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THE WHITE HOUSE

Partially Declassified/Released on 230 1987 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by B. Reger, National Security Council





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NSC/ICS CONTROL NO.

HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY

NSC INTELLIGENCE **DOCUMENT**



Warning Notice

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED SECRE

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

SYSTEM IV NSC/ICS-402006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET MACTION

December 4, 1984

N 42473

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLATE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Confusion in the Nicaraguan Resistance

Adolfo Calero advises that this weekend a three hour meeting with held among Bosco Matamoros (local FDN representative), Constantine Menges, Jackie Tillman, and Bob Reilly. According to Calero, the purpose of the meeting was to address the strategy for Congressional and public diplomacy action for a resumption of USG support to the Resistance. Calero reports that as a result of this maeting:

- -- Matamoros sent a 22 page telegram (hopefully encoded) to FDN headquarters in
- -- The telegram specified that North was no longer involved in this endeavor and that a more forceful effort would be made to reinitiate funding between now and February.
- -- Congressional contacts were being worked out and a detailed strategy would be forthcoming.
- It was obvious that the State Department was opposed to any resumption of assistance, but that Kirkpatrick, Casey, and Weinberger would ensure that the program obtained renewed support.

Calero was pulled from the field in Nicaraqua to receive this message. He was, to say the least, distressed and confused. Not only was he placed at risk in moving back he feels that the mixed dignals he is receiving portends serious problems within the Administration. He notes that requested his urgent presence last week in for a meeting with a "high-level" U.S. official and that the vetting did not take place. Aside from these "cryptic orders he receives no advice, intelligence, or support. Now he is being "told of discord" about the "worthiness" of the FDN and the possibility that the Administration may not ask the Congress renew support.

Declassify: OADR

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N 42474

Up to this point, Calero has been told that we had every intention of making another try at the Congress. He is fully aware of the constraints imposed in the Continuing Resolution, but has never been apprised of any internal debate on the merits of whether or not we would pursue a further attempt to obtain funds for the Resistance movement. While I may not have been fully open with him on this matter, it did not seem to be relevant to his other important tasks given current funding arrangements. Yesterday's missive from Matamoras has now sown doubt which did not need to exist.

Calero has too much on his mind to be burdened with our internal differences. It is unfortunate that we now seem to have so many voices speaking for our intentions. Before this goes any further, it would seem appropriate to clarify the roles various people will be playing in the days ahead.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the points above and indicate your direction on who should be saying what to whom.

Approve	Disappr	cove

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-BERET

EXHIBIT OLN-257

ر ر الراغ الأنو

SUBJECT: Targeting
Stark just showed se a copy of the new proposed target list, citing
(which I thought Gabriel said would be hit as a matter of course)
as a first priority. I don't think this is acceptable. Also, I don't see
the logic in striking
It would seem to se the reverse sequence should be followed, both
with regard to the
like us to use to get greater clarity on this? Also, the Saudi arms sales
issue was supposedly discussed at an LSG last week. Do you know where this
stands? Is the next step that of Bud speaking to Bandar?

MSG FROM: NSDRF --CPUA To: NSRCH --CPUA

्**र** इं १

TO: NSRCH --CPUA

01/22/45 12:27:21

ÉXMIBIT

MN-257

.. SECRLT ..

NOTE FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER
SUBJECT: Contra Project
Ollie just debriefed me on your trip. When I meet with Memilton and
Fascell (which will be later this week, unless you see a reason for me
to postpone) I would like to begin by saying you wanted me to give them
the benefit of certain observations you drew on the besis of your recent
talks in the region. Then I would stress the unanimity of view on the
growing Sandinists challenge; the skepticism over successful negotiation
in the absence of pressure; the willingness of regional leadersto begin
providing quiet support for the Contras; and the everwhelming belief that
in some way the US has to get 'ack in the game. Bayond that, I will for now
simply confine myself to taking soundings (following the outline I gave you
of my 'talks with Durenberger). At some point soon, however, we need to
decide more clearly what end result we want to steer the consultations toward.
I still like the

Ollie believes we need to flag the possible option of a finding permitting us to seek third country support. John and I are both uneasy about reasing this. Finally, at the right moment, it will be important to find some methanism for bringing key Mill leaders together with regional leaders to hear first hand what walking away from the Contrast would mean. When I had lunch with Lugar's chief of staff the other day on the structure of the Senate hearings, he said this would be the single most effective action we could take. Let me know if this is not how you want me to proceed.

cc: NSJNP --CPUA




EXHIBIT OLN-258

My Friend:

this brist letter is among delivered via a trusted courier who has no knowledge of the contents but who can help carry out some of what this letter is about. We should not be made aware of the specific details in this letter.

The Situation in the nosehous area of Nituations is becoming that and more delicate. The Sandinistas centimes assault building and now have between 45,000 and 60,000 troops in the area as entime to the entire EPS. We have a second to the entire EPS. We seem is now in the vicinity of the frontier. The following points are relevant:

- The Sandinistas have moved additional helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to Esteli. They also have accepted delivery on two more MI-8 helicopters at Corinto last week.
- They have instructed their units to operate in the border region in small task forces and to continue mining the trails coming into Nicaragua from the border bases. They are telling their small unit commanders that the next 60 days are critical. Securious to believe that Major rocket and artillery attacks against Las Vegas, Banco Grande, and La Lodosa are children. Trails believe that HINDS and special troops will make raids against these bases. At the very least, they will be used in the next few weeks against the FDN task forces operating in the northen regions.

On the brighter side, the following information, some of which you may already know, is very important:

- has agreed to approve the arrival of FDN supplies on a blanket approval basis. They are willing to provide end-user certificates for munition orders.
- -- They are willing to continue to loan the FDN munitions when your supplies get unacceptably low and to sell essential quartermaster supplies.
- -- The Hondurans will also make available trucks to move FDN supplies from points of arrival all the way to Les Vegas.
- Minister of Public Morks

 repair of the road between Les Vegas and Cifuentes.

 Supposedly, they will charge only for the cost of fuel and drivers.

And now the best news of all:

texa week, sum in access of \$20M will be deposited in the usual account. While this must be husbanded carefully At should allow us to bridge the tap between now and men the wate is taken and the foods are turned on again.

me maa --

2

so that we have a plan. I propose the following steps as highest priority:

The forces in the northern part of Nicaragua need to be dispersed so that they are not caught in the firestorm as the Sandinistas intend. On the map, I have marked several areas in yellow where there are no Sandinistas and good protection from the helicopters and bombing raids. If the high ground can be be guarded, then those who harbor in those areas will be safe. The Sandinistas cannot endure much more than 60 days in the northern region without seriously complicating their own resupply problems.

Meanwhile, the forces and volunteers who have arrived at Las Vegas can be outfitted, provided with some training, and inserted into the eastern region marked in yellow as a means of reducing the population in the Honduran camps. Next week, I will try to convince and the others that they should allow 2,000 FDN at a time in the border camps. If a regular resupply program can be established using what will be deposited next week, we can start a regular logistics program of one flight every 10-15 days and the steady movement of supplies and ammunition to the forward bases.

Most important is saving the force from what I believe will be a serious effort to destroy it in the next few weeks. While I know it hurts to hide, now is the time to do it. While they are hiding, the man who is carrying this message can start the regular resupply process. I believe it would be wise to dedicate as much as \$9-10M for nothing but logistics. To coordinate a major effort such as this, I strongly urge that you bring aboard a logistics expert who is both knowledgeable and trusty. The courier should be able to help with this.

The battle plan for the near future should involve getting as many as possible out of the border camps and hiding them perhaps in the areas I have shown, while the logistics program is established. Once the regular resupply system is in place and the troops familiar with a rotation system of 1,500-2,000 being resupplied each week, attacks can be launched with great vigor against the Sandinista rear, hitting them hard as they phase down in frustration from their current operations and striking at selected strategic targets with your enhanced capability.

This new money will provide great flexibility we have not enjoyed to date. I would urge you to make use of some of it for my British friend and his services for special operations. I can produce him at the end of this month. Lastly, we may have to very soon assume the cost of what the company is providing to

Arturo. You and I both recognize his value and limitations. Some in our Congress are aware that the company is paying him and have threatened to expose the connection. This could be devestating to our forthcoming campaign to restore the funding. I will find out how much he is getting and let you know, but it seems as though something should be set aside for this purpose.

Finally, we ought to look at a maritime capability and something on the southern front. I had a very useful meeting with the Security Minister of the place down south. He has agreed to meet with you very discreetly, I will let you know when this can be arranged. He is anxious to help, but only if it can be done without exposing him or making operations visible in his country.

Request you advise me soonest regarding the deposit and destroy this letter after reading. The map can be passed Enrique, with my best wishes. Please do not in any way make anyone aware of the deposit. Too much is becoming known by too many people, she need to make sure that this new financing does not become known. The Congress must believe that there continues to be an urgent need for funding.

Warm regards, Steelhammer

EXHIBIT OLN-259

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March 1, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR VADM ARTHUR S. MOREAU, JR.

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Info for the Chairman, JCS

Had I gone on the trip as planned, I would have addressed certain issues with the Chairman regarding the resistance and those who are supporting same. The following points pertain:

- There are significant indications of a major attack against the resistance bases the resistan in the near future.
- Steps being taken by the resistance to reduce the population are appropriate and well timed.
- Calero and Bermudes have been advised that the objective in the next 30 to 60 days is to preserve the force
- The principal support following:

derives from the

guaranteed that the resistance can continue to deliver supplies through that the road will be repaired, and end user certificates will continue to be provided. Major munitions deliveries will occur on or about March 9 (aircraft) and March 25 (ship).

belief that we will continue to Support the resistance and help in its current economic crisis.

should be told that we are in the process of expediting our delivery of items on FMS backlog.

should be advised that we will be coming to him the interdiction efforts.

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PDN and ARDE. is justifiably concerned that any further support (e.g., end user certificates) would be detected by GNO investigators and result in a cut-off of U.S. security assistance

There is considerable sympathy for the FDM among particularly Both have been long-term supporters of the resistance and our known well by Calero. Calero met with them earlier this week. A simple word support for Calero from the Chairman would be useful.

Tomorrow's announcement of resistance unity is a most significant event. We need to note that in as many different places as possible. If the opportunity arises, it would be helpful if the Chairman could respond to a question on the matter with something similar to the following:

"The announcement by the unified resistance that they all endorse a common set of objectives and principals is very significant. Our own revolution began with a similar declaration. It is important to note that those who have endorsed this document represent the full political spectrum in Nicaragua--all except those supported by the Soviets and their surrogates."

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Exhibit OLN-260

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 1, 1985

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLADE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Using the March 1 San Jose Declaration to Support the Vote on the Funding for the Nicaraguan

In accord with earlier instructions, we advised State, CIA, and Defense that a draft Presidential report to the Congress should be prepared with three separate Presidential Determinations: lethal, non-lethal, and non-specific. We noted that a final decision on the appropriate Presidential Determination would be based on the effects of a major PR campaign waged by outside entities and on a final meeting with the Congressional leadership just prior to submitting the report.

A meeting was also held with Calero, Cruz, and Robelo in which:

- they agreed that, if "non-lethal" aid was all we could get from the Congress, they would make such a request publicly in a meeting with the President on or about April 15;
- they agreed that the premise for asking for only non-lethal aid would have to be based upon the viability of the peace offer they made in the unity document in San Jose on March 1 (Tab A);
- they were convinced to accept a plea from the Nicaraguan bishops to extend their April 20 deadline on the San Jose Declaration until May 5; and

The effort to conclude these arrangements were significant. three objected that extending the deadline (even for 15 days) or announcing their willingness to accept non-lethal aid would cause serious problems with their supporters in Micaragua. Calero made the point that many on the inside are waiting for the expiration of the offer before they commit themselves to oppose the Sandinistas.

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Before we decide to urge the resistance leadership to accept further extensions in the deadline, there are several important factors regarding the document itself of which you should be aware:

The document was written by Calero, Cruz, and North in my hotel room in Miami on January 29 and 30. They were convinced that this document was necessary in order to bring unity to the movement. It is significant that this is the first time in any resistance movement in which we have achieved unity among the diverse factions opposing a Communist-supported central government. We have never enjoyed this unity

The only reason Calero agreed to sign was because the criteria established for the Sandinistas were, he knew, impossible for them to meet. He personally wrote several of the democratization conditions. All agreed that the objective was but rather to galvanize the internal opposition and convince the U.S. Congress that the opposition was led by reasonable men. In fact, the unity document is a reasonable request and is in Calero's public words "nothing more than that which is expected of any civilized society." As expected, the Sandinistas have announced that they will not negotiate with the resistance (Tab B).



Our friends in Central America, particularly need to have a significant manifestation of our commitment in the very near future. During your trip to the region, all of the Central American Reads of State noted the urgent need for a visible signal of our steadfastness. They are all cognizant of the importance of the unity document and its deadlines. They will perceive that a significant delay by the resistance is the result of U.S. pressure and will see it as a further example of vascillating U.S. policy.

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It is my belief that urging the resistance leaders (particularly Calero) to accept a major delay and a U.S. mediation role in negotiating the San Jose criteria with the Sandinistas will result in a breakdown of the unity we have achieved. Calero is uncomfortable with both Cruz and Robelo in that they were in the Sandinista government which expropriated his property and jailed him. He has only cooperated to date in the unity effort because he trusts the only parsons in the U.S. Government who have supported the movement since October 1984--North and McFarlane. He has a deep and abiding distrust of the State Department, in general, and Tony Motley, in particular. He would probably view such a proposal as an effort to force the resistance fighters to accept an agreement which is contrary to their interest. It is unlikely that he would cooperate and would probably withdraw from the unified opposition.

Because all three of the principal resistance leaders are cognizant of our law, they had hoped for affirmative action on the resistance funding at the end of February. By direction. I assured them that, while the MX issue had to be our first priority, the resistance program would be our next. They have reluctantly agreed to further concessions only because they believe that the momentum of victory is on their side. They, like many others in the Administration, are convinced that we can win a vote on non-lethal assistance and that even this will be sufficient to further degrade the effectiveness of the Sandinistas.



Despite what you have heard from Max Friedersdorf and others, this vote is winable--if we move before its too late. We should not compromise the personal relationships that have been established and brought this operation so far since October. If a delay is necessary, it should not be based on a further extension of the unity deadline nor on an offer to have the U.S. supplant the Nicaraguan bishops as mediators. The unity document can still be used as an example of the flexibility and willingness to compromise on the part of an enlightened resistance leadership. A further extension or, worse yet, a protracted ceasefire can only work to the disadvantage of the freedom fighters.

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Lastly, in case you did not have a chance to read it at Tab D is a very clear statement of what we have been about in this effort. If Time magazine is running this kind of essay, we have indeed come a long way in this debate. We do have momentum on our side. We need not sacrifice our gains by changing all the signals we have sent so far to the resistance.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the points above with your breakfast meeting with Secretary Shultz.

į	Approve	 Disapprove	·
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Attachments

Tab A - March 1, 1985 San Jose Declaration
Tab B - Washington Post Article, "We Will Never Negotiate with the Contras" dtd March 30, 1985



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THE WASHINGTON POST

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'We Will Never Negotiate With The Contras'

The Post urges the government of Nicaragus to negotiate with the CIA-supported contrar, who have been fighting for lour years to overthrow it ["A Fair Offer to the Sandinistas," editorial, March 17].

My government believes in negotiations, and in committed to seeking a peaceful solution to the current crisis through genuine negotiations with its adversaries, both foreign and domestic. We are active participants in the Contadors process (we alone accepted the Contadors peace proposal last September); we were participating in the Mansimillo talks; and we are carrying on a dialogue with the civilian opposition within Nicaragus. But we will never negotiate with the contrast Here is why:

J. The contras are led by officers of the hated Guardia Nacional, the main prop of the Somora dictatorship that brutafized the Nicaraguan people for more than 40 years until our Sandinista Revolution threw them out in July 1979. This is confirmed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, which has reported that the FDN, the main contragroup, in "led by Col. Enrique V. Bermudez—former GN member and last Nicaraguan military attache to the U.S. under the government of President Anastasio Somora—and by other ex-GN officers." All key military positions—ore filled by former GN officers, including Col. Ricardo Lauchtel of contra counterintelligence, who, The Post recently reported, participated in the murder of Sahvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romera.

As revealed by contra commanders to Post reporter Edward Cody [Feb. 28], the civilians who comprise the FDN's. "political directorate" were, actually handpicked by the CIA for the sole purpose of cleaning up the contras' image. These front men, who are trotted out from time to time to lobby Congress and meet with editorial boards of major newspapers, have no influence whitever. The Somocistas have all the guns.

2. The contrar are terrorists whose attacks are directed primarily against our civilian population. From their bases in Honduras and Costa Rica, they penetrate our territory and murder, torture, mutice, kidoap and abuse defenseless women, children and men. They destroy farms, health centers, food storage depots and achools. Recent reports by Americas Watch and the International Human

Rights Law Group—respected American humanrights organizations—confirm dosens of My Laitype atrocities by contra forces and accuse the contras of a deliberate campaign of terror against civilians. Official reports from Honduras accuse the contras of murdering civilians there. And now we see that the contras were responsible even for the killing of Archbishop Romero.

3. The contras are not an indigenous rebel group, but a collection of mercenaries recruited, paid, armed and directed by the CIA, and they would cease to exist without U.S. support. The Post simply ignores the facts when it says the United States is not the cause of the armed conflict in Nicaragua. In November 1981, when the CIA received President Reagan's authorization to create a counterrevolutionary army to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, there were only a few hundred ex-GN soldiers staging sporadic raids on farms along the border. Their principal occupations were cattle-rusting and extortion. It was the CIA, apending more than \$100 million of the American tyxpayers' money, that created the correct 10.000-yan force:

rent 10,000-man force of the foregoing, my government has already made a fair offer to the contras, including the right to return to Nicaragus and run for elected office. On Jan. 22, the government decreed a general amnesty for all contras, without exception including their military and political leaders. The decree allows them to return to Nicaragus and to participate fully in the social and political life of the country. My government has also committed itself to repeal the state of emergency (imposed in March 1982 in direct response to the war) and fully restore of all of the civil and political rights that the Sandinista Revolution promised the Nicaraguan people, including freedom of the press, now partially limited because of the war. To accept the benefits of this amonesty the contras need do just one thing by down their arms.

If they are really fighting for democracy, as their propagandists claim, they can have it. It has already been offered to them. It is, by any objective standard, a fair offer. It could lead to a just and lasting peace and to the complete democratization of our country. That is what we wish.

The "offer" made by the contras is not an offer at.

all. R is another of the CIA's propagands moves to make the contras appear to be peace-loving democrats—which they are not—and to justify more congressional funding for this Begal and immoral war.

—Carlos Tunnermann Bernheim

The writer is Nicarague's embassedor to the
United States.

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We called

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE 'DOCUMENT ON NATIONAL DIALOGUE OF THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE' AS SIGNED BY THE VARIOUS RESISTANCE LEADERS AND READ TO MEMBERS OF THE NICARAGUAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, 11:30 A.M., COSTA RICA TIDE, MARCH 8 1985.

We, democratic citizens, representatives of all sectors of the Nicaraguan Resistance, announce to the Nicaraguan people, to the governments and peoples of the Americas and of the world, the following manifesto:

THE PRESENT SITUATION OF NICARAGUA

In recent years, the Sandinista Front has submerged our people in a crisis with precedent in our national history.

At this time, the impact of this crisis is evident in the economic, political, social and moral spheres of the nation.

This situation is rooted both in the abandonment of the Original Program of Government and the Rundamental Statute as well as in the interference of the Soviet Bloc in our internal affairs.

Both factors, the sole responsibility of the Sandinista Front, have brought abor a sharp conflict whose protagonists are the governing party on the one hand and the Nic>raguan people on the other.

The Nicaraguan people reject, of course, the imposition of a regime which in essence contradicts the values and aspirations which gave birth to the revolutionary process. They are founded on the recovery of freedom, democracy and social justice so often postponed because of the Somoza regime.

In conclusion, the national crisis we face did not grow out of a confrontation between imperialism and the revolution, as the Sandinista Front pretends, but out of the contradictions which emerge from the clash between democratic expectations of the Nicaraguan people and the imposition of a totalitarian system such as that which is being implanted in our country by the Sandinista Fr

This conflict, which has produced a civil war, today threatens to destroy the Nicaraguan nation. And as stated in the recent document of the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator, it cannot be resolved through negotiations between the governments of other nations and the Sandinista Front nor through sectarian dial

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From that perspective, is clear that the elegistors of November 4, 1984, by virtue of having been a farse, contributed nothing toward the resolution of the national crisis. This view has been supported by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in its report for the period 1983-84, as well as by the political groups which decided to participate in the "elections", as they stated in the document entitled "Proposals of Minimum Concurrence for the Renewal of the National Dialogue," issued in January of this year.

The solution to the national crisis can only be found through a genuine understanding among all Nicaraguans that might end the civil war and lead to the reconciliation of the Nicaraguan family.

We wish to emphasize that this initiative is not taken merely to search for a quota of power, but rather it seeks only to establish in Nicaragua the rule of law which will permit the people to live in peace and to go about resolving our problems within a new constitutional order.

COMMON ASPIRATIONS


We aspire to the democratization of Nicaragua, conscious that democracy is the only means to carry out an authentic revolution and rescue our national identity and sovereignty.

We aspire to reconstructing Nicaragua, to promoting its devolopment in accordant with a model which gives priority to the dispossessed sectors.

We aspire to the establishment of a political system which guarantees a real separation of powers, authentic pluralism and a just, efficient mixed economy

In order to carry out the foregoing, the following is required:

- a) To recognize the primacy of civilian society with respect to the State; to assure through it the dissolution of the totalitarian state-party-an trilogy.
- b) Pull respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, religion and education.
- c) De-militarization of society and the absolute subjection of police func to civilian authority.
- d) A foreign policy which has as ojbectives the preservation of national sovereignty, peace and harmony with neighboring countries in particular and effective reactivation of the historical aspirations of Central American Unity.




- e) An economic system which provides for the vevelopment of the private sector which includes cooperative enterprises, as well as the clear definition of the participation of the State as a subsidiary economic agent and promoter of social development.
- f) Institutionalization of a multi-party electoral system which guarantees free elections, alternation in power and respect for the minority.
- g) Freedom to organize unions.
- h) A modern, productive process of integral agrarian reform.
- i) Administrative decentralization and effective autonomy for municipal government.
- j) Pull recovery of the Atlantic Coast, integrating it completely in the national life, guaranteeing respect for the culture and traditions of the various ethnic groups of the region and of the rest of the country within a framework of effective municipal autonomy, exercised in the context of the insolubility of the Nicaraguan nationality.
- k) General amnesty and pardon for political crimes and related crimes.
- Expulsion from the country of all foreign internationalists, military advisors and troops, including those who may be found using the identity of deceased Nicaraguan citizens and those who have been improperly naturalized.

THE LAST AND DEFINITIVE SUMMONS

After having carried out multiple peace initiatives in the last three years directed toward establishing a constructive dialogue with the Sandinista Front that would end the civil war and lead to the reconciliation of the Nicaraguan family, we recognize that those efforts have been fruitless because of the intransigence of the Sandinista regime and because of the designs of the Soviet bloc.

The Sandinista Front, by ignoring and failing to comply with the agreements made in the past, has lost the necessary credibility to reach a good faith understanding. Such is the case of the agreements reached with the XVII Consultative Meeting of the OAS Council of Ministers, the Original Program of Government, the Fundamental Statute, the Eighteen Points of Concurrence of the Forum for Discussion of National Problems, and the promises to carry out a free and honest election, among others.



Therefore, in view of the parity of the models and conscious of our civic responsibilities and of the urgent need to save our people from greater suffering, we accept the call to convene issued by the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator and we call upon the Sandinista Front, for the last time, and in definitive and absolute fashion, to participate in a national dialogue which will end the national cuisis. This dialogue should follow these modalities:

Convocation

The Nicaraguan Bishops Conference is the entity with the necessary moral authority to organize and coordinate the National Dialogue. In this regard, we reiterate the petition made to it by the Democratic Coordinator to convene the National Dialogue.

Participants

In order that the dialogue be efficient and produce the desired results, it is necessary to structure it in accordance with Nicaraguan reality. There are two political tendencies in Nicaragua: the totalitarian one which for the moment ha accepted the Sandinista Front as its vanguard, and the democratic one which is divided into armed organizations and civilian organizations; therefore, the Dialogue should be between these two political tendencies so that both can name their respective delegates, as many as the Bishops Conference feels is appropriate observers and Guarantors

We suggest to the Bishops Conference that it request the participation of the Central American Governments in the Dialogue as guarantors of the agreements which may be reached, given the fact that the sister peoples of Central Ameriare, in the final analysis, are those which have been most directly affected by the Nicaraguan crisis.

The presence of these governments as guarantors in no way hinders the presence as observers or even as guarantors of other governments and democratic entities of the American continent.

Minimum Requirements

We support fully the minimum requirements demanded by the Democratic Coordinate in order to initiate the National Dialogue. They are: Suspension of armed activities, with a cease-fire in situ; lifting of the state of emergency; absolute freedom of expression and assembly; general ammesty and pardon for political crimes and related crimes; entry into effect of the right of asylum and habeus corpus, adding the granting of full protection of the physical and moral integrity of those members of the Resistance who participate in the Dialogue, in the event that it should take place in Nicaragua.

The application of these measures should be carried out under the supervision of the guarantor governments.

Temporary Permanence of the Executive-

If this dialogue is carried cut, we commit ourselves to accept that Mr. Daniel Ortega continue acting as head of the Executive Branch until such time as the people pronounce themselves in a plebiscite. During this period, Mr. Ortega should govern in fulfillment of the promises of the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Government Junta contained in the document of July 12, 1979 and directed to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, an in fulfillment of the Original Program of Government, the Fundamental Statute and the American Human Rights Convention and the Pact of San Jose.

Initial Points of the Agenda

Although it will be up to the Bishops Conference to establish a definitive agenda, by agreement of the parties, we urge it to include as of now the following points:

- 1) That the legal procedure and actions of the government conform immediately to the American Convention of Human Rights, or the Pact of San José, which was ratified by the Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction on September 25, 1979, declaring it the law of the land and committing the national honor to its enforcement.
- 2) The dismantlement and immediate dissolution of all the party repressive organisms such as the CDS (Sandinista Defense Committees) and the other para-military organs.
- 3) eduction of military strength, the apolitical nature of the army, an end to the arms race, and the withdrawal of all foreign military troops and advisors and internationalists.
- 4) Immediate dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly.
- S) A new provisional electoral law.
- 6) A new provisional law for political parties.
- Re-structuring of the electoral system in accordance with the above provisional laws.
- 8) Calling of elections for a National Constituent Assembly.
- 9) Calling of municipal elections.
- 10) Calling of a plebiscite on the conduct of new presidential elections.

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Initiation of the National Dialogue; Instrumentation and Deadlines

In order to carry out the National Dialogue proposed by the Democratic Coordinator, on the basis of the statements contained in this document, and conscious of the leninist tactic of stalling in order to consolidate the totalitarian program of the Frente Sandinista, said Dialogue must begin by March 20, 1985. This date cannot be postponed. If by April 20, 1985 the National Dialogue has not begun or has not progressed in clear and substantial form, it will be definitely suspended by the Nicaraguan Resistance, thereby terminating the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the national crisis.

If the Nicaraguan Bishops Conference considers it useful to hold conversations with this group for purposes of preparations leading to the speedy realization of the Dialogue, we announce our immediate availability to participate in such conversations. To that end we appoint as our representatives Mssrs. Arturo J. Cruz, Alfonso Robelo and Adolfo Calero.

May love for our fatherland overcome selfishness and foreign involvement, so that the National Directorate of the Sandinista Front will respond positively to this our last effort to grant to our country a civilized solution.

God Save Nicaragua!



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The Reagan Doctrine

"We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives an every continent from Alphanistan to Nicarague to dely Sonat-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from h . . . Support for freedom fighters is self-defense."
—President Reagan, in the State of the Union, February 1985

one id Reagan is the master of the new idea, and has built the most successful political career in a half-century faunching one after another. His list of credits includes small government (Barry Goldwater having tried, and failed, with it first), supply-side economics and strategic defense (Star Wars). These radically suce economics and strategic detense issuar warm. I ness reducitly changed the terms of debate on the welfare state, economic theory and nuclear strategy. All that was left for him to turn on its head was accepted thinking on geopolitics. Now he has done that too. He has produced the Reagan Doctrine.

You may not have noticed Doc-trines, like submarines, tend to be launched with fanfare. The Monroe Doctrine was instantly recognized, on both sides of the Atlantic, as a historic declaration, the Truman Doctrine was oeciaration, the fruman accurate was unveiled in a dramatic address to a joint session of Congress, and when President Carter announced a new aggressive Persian Gulf policy on Jan. 23, 1980, by the next morning the New York Times had dubbed it "the Carter Tork Time? But decome with the carest Doctrine. President Reagan saw \$1 to bury his doctrine in his 1985 State of the Union address beneath the balanced budget amendment, school prayer and the line-item veto. That he decided to make his a footnote is as much a tribute. to Mr. Reagan's prudence as to his modesty. Truly new ideas-what Democrats lie awake at night dreaming of— are as risky as they are rare. This one has already precipitated a storm. The Reagan Doctrine proclaims

overt and unashamed American sup-port for anti-Communist revolution. The grounds are justice, se-cessity and democratic tradition, Justice, said the President in his Feb. 16 radio address, because these revolutionaries are "fighting for an end to tyrnasy." Necessity, said Secretary of State George Shultz in a subsequent address in San Francisco, because if these Shout in a subsequent address in Sain Francisco, because it trees "freedom fighters" are defeated, their countries will be irrevocably lost behind an Iron Curtain of Soviet domination. And democratic tradition, said the President, because to support "our brothers" in revolution is to continue—"in Afghanistan, in Ethiopia, Cambodia, Angole... land) Nicaragus "—200 years of American support for "Simón Bolivar... the Polish patriots, the French Resistance and others recking frenchem"

sistance and others seeking freedom."

President Carter sent arms to the Afghan rebets and that Congress concurred Congress has also gone along with economic aid to the non-Communist resistance in Cambodia. However, since the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and to the confidence of the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and to any the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and to any the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and the confidence of the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and the confidence of the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and the confidence of the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and the confidence of the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and the confidence of the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and the confidence of the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and the confidence of the Clark Amendment of 1874 carchibition and the confidence of t to the non-Communist resistance in Cambodia. However, since the Clark Amendment of 1976 prohibiting aid to anti-Marxist fighters in Angola, Congress has refused to support war against indigenous Communist dictatorships, no matter how heavily supported by the Soviet Union or its proxies. President Reagan's program of CLA support for the Nicaraguan contrast who are not fighting foreign occupation, broke post-Vist Name greedent. At first, and for three long years, that new policy warphierthe filmstest of justifications, interdicting supplies to the Salvedoran

guerrillas The Reagan Doctrine drops the fig leaf. It is into to establish a new. firmer—a doctrinal—foundation for support by declaring equally worthy all armed resistan Communium, whether foreign or indigenously imposed to interpret the Reagan Doctrine as merely a puffed-time to fee histogram onlice is like calling the Trumph Doctrine as the control of the present of the control of the present of the calling the trumph Doctrine as the present of the calling the trumph Doctrine as the present of the calling the trumph Doctrine as the present of the calling the trumph Doctrine as the present of the calling the present of the pre

To interpret the Reagan Doctrine as merely a puriod-tionals for Nicaraguan policy is like catling the Truman Do-a cover for a new Greek and Turkish policy. In both case principles established have a much more profound implicat The Truman Doctrine set out the basic foreign policy a of the postwar era: containment. With J.F.K.'s pledge to

of the postwar era: containment, with JFK's pledge to any burden... to assure... the success of liberty," the icontainment reached its most expansive and consensual cepted stage. With Viet Nam, the consensus and the expanses collapsed. Since then the U.S. has oscillated, at times e

cally, between different approac different doctrines—for defendit ideals and its interests.

The Reagan Docurine is the The Reagan Docurine is the such attempt since Viet Nam. The was the Nixon Docurine: relysifriendly regimes to police their re. Unfortunately, the jewel in the cre this theory was the Shah of Iran him, it was retired in 1979 to a Panamanian shad. Next cam Carter Docurine, declaring a reti Carter Doctrine, declaring a reti-mulateral American action, if a sury, in defense of Western into That doctrine rested on the emer-of a rapid deployment force. Un-nately, the force turned out neithe id nor deployable. It enjoys a viju-theoretical existence in southern da, whence it is poorly situated to the Bed American the Red Army.
If regional powers prove uni

and projected American power table, what then? It is a precious that the answer to that question been suggested to Americans by a

been suggested to Americans by a of fanatical Islamic warriors in Afghanistan. Unaware of historic contribution to the theory of containment, they is the Soviet army, made it bleed and slowed its march to the covered goal, the warm waters of the Persian Gulf.

This insurgency, and those in Cambodia, Angola and ragua, pointed to a new form of containment, a kind of a facto containment; harassment of Soviet expansionism that the state of the city o

limits of empire. There is an echo here of the old 1950 wing idea of "rolling back" Communism. But with a diffe This is not the reckless—and toothless—call for reclaims core Soviet possessions in Eastern Europe, which the t claim for self-defense and, more important, which they a pared to use the most extreme means to retain. This is t eage to the peripheral acquisitions of empire

leage to the peripheral acquisitions of empara-The Brezhnev Doctrine procelaimed in 1968 that the sphere only expands. The Reagan Doctrine is meant as tithesis. It declares that the U.S. will work at the peripher, werse that expansion. How? Like the Nixon Doctrine, it is proxies. Uplike the Nixon Doctrine, it supports not the

prosses. Utilize the Nixon Docume, it supports not the quo but revolution.

And that brakes it so hard for both left and right to For the left it before it quite paradoxical, and hypocritic Administration deficiences Salvadoran guerrillas for blow power stations and stucking villages, while at the same



EXHIBIT OLN-261

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COMMENT			PREPARE REPLY		
CONCURRENCE		:٤	RECOMMENDATION		
DIRECT REPLY			RETURN		
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REMARKS: cc: Oliver North (#2 and 3) Jim Radzimski (#4)					

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
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
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
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions







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May 1, 1985

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SYSTEM IV NSC/ICS-400453

> # 34049 SENSITIVE

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

FDN Military Operations

Attached at Tab A is a summary analysis of how the FDN has expended funds which have been made available since USG funding expired in May 1984. From July 1984 through February 1985, the FDN received \$1M per month for a total of \$8M. From February 22 to April 9, 1985, an additional \$16.5M has been received for a grand total of \$24.5M Of this, \$17,145,594 has been expended for arms, munitions, combat operations, and support activities. No additional funds have been received by the FDN since April 9 even though there is a commitment for a total of \$25M. The following information is noteworthy:

- -- most expenditures have been for purchases of arms, ammunition, and other ordnance items;
- the \$2.5M indicated for upkeep of base camps on the state of borders includes costs of approximately \$350K per month (an expense which will increase as the number of recruits continuer to grow) and \$50K for the operation conducted in Managua against the ammunition depot at the EPS military headquarters;
- -- the funding has allowed the growth of the resistance from 9,500 personnel in June 1984 to over 16,000 today--all with arms;
- -- when the May 1985 sealift arrives (\$5M has already been deposited for this delivery), an additional 6,000 fighters can be equipped and fielded after a 3 week training period;
- the relocation of base camps along border has been ordered for mid to late April 1985 in order to disperse the target for a Sandinista attack (cost for this relocation have not yet been fully quantified); and
- -- the acquisition of two small transport aircraft at the cost of \$186K is prudent given the increased patrolling activity by the EPS along trail-borne resupply for columns operating deep inside Nicaragua.

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Summary of Operations to Date

The FDN has grown nearly zwofold since the cut-off of USG funding. In this period, they have reoriented from conventional to guerrilla warfare tactics. Despite the lack of any internal staff organization (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4) when the USG withdrew, the FDN has responded well to guidance on how to build a staff. Although there was a basic lack of familiarity with how to conduct guerrilla-type operations, since July, all FDN commanders have been schooled in these techniques and all new recruits are now initiated in guerrilla warfare tactics before being committed to combat. In short, the FDN has well used the funds provided and has become an effective guerrilla army in less than a year. The listing of combat operations at Tab B

is indicative of what the FDN has been able to accomplish with funds already made available. It is important to note that although funds started to flow in July, purchases made posssible by this funding did not arrive in FDN hands until October 1984.


Future Operations

Plans call for remaining resources on hand (\$7,354,000) to be used as follows:

- -- increasing the force to a total of 25,000 by mid-Summer;
- -- a major special operations attack against Sandino airport with the purpose of destroying the MI-24 helicopters and the Sandinista Air Force maintenance capability;
- -- a major ground operation against the mines complex in the vicinty of Siuna, Bonanza, and La Rosita (Nicaragua) -- the purpose of the operation is to secure the principal lines of communication in and out of Puerto Cabezas; and
- -- the opening of a southern front along the border which will distract EPS units currently committed to the northern front.

It is apparent that the \$7M remaining on hand will be insufficient to allow the resistance to advance beyond these limited objectives, unless there is a commitment for additional funds. The \$14M which the USG may be able to provide will help to defray base camp, training, and support expenses but will not significantly affect combat operations until several months after Congressional approval due to lead-time requirements. Efforts

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should, therefore, be made to have the current donors deliver the remainder of their \$25M pledge (\$8.5M) and to seek an additional \$15-20M which will allow the force to grow to 35-40,000. If a commitment for these funds is made between now and June 1985, supplies could be ordered in July, allowing the force to reach these levels by the end of October 1985.

RECOMMENDATION

That the current donors be approached to provide the remainder of their \$25M pledge and an additional \$15-20M between now and June 1, 1985.

Approve Con

Disapprove ____

Attachments

Tab A - Summary Analysis of FDN Expenditures
Tab B - Summary of Combat Operations: Oct 1984 - Mar 1985

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As of April 9, 1985

FDN Expenditures and Outlays

July 1984 through February 1985

Quantity

Item

Cost

Independent Acquisition



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G-3 rifles Magazines Rounds 7.62 x 51 Rounds 7.62 x 51 Hand grenades



Airlift #1 - February 1985



81mm grenades 60mm grenades 50 cal API Rounds 7.62 x 39 Rounds 7.62 x 51 Freight, Demurrage, Ins., etc.



210,000

265,000

Airlift #2 - March 1985

	Freight,	Demurrage, Ins., etc.
		50 cal links
		60mm grenades
		. Cleaning kits
		G-3 magazines
		G-3 rifles
		Fuses and det
,	1,472	Kqs C-4
	60	60mm mortars
	0,710	uana dienenes

750,000

1,000

Rounds 7.62 x 39 RPG-7 grenades Hand grenades 60mm mortars C-4 Fuses and detonators G-3 rifles
G-3 magazines Cleaning kits 60mm grenades



Sealift #1 - April Arrival



RPG-7 rockets Rounds 7.62 x 39 Rounds 7.62 x 51 Belts for 7.62 x 39 SA-7 launchers SA-7 rockets M-79 grenades Freight, Ins., and other exp



M-79 grenades

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FDN Expenditures and Outlays
July 1984 through February 1985 (Cont'd...)

N 34054

Quantity

Item

Cost

Sealift #2 - May Arrival




Rounds 7.62 x 39, Rounds 7.62 x 51 Rounds linked 7.62 x 51 Hand grenades M-79 grenades 60mm grenades 81mm grenades 82mm grenades RPG-7 rockets Claymore mines 50 cal API 12.7 ammo 57mm recoiless rifles 57mm ammo Anti-tank mines G-3 rifles G-3 cleaning kits AK rifles G-3 magazines AK magazines Swedish K magazines HK-21 machine guns RPG-7 launchers M-79 launchers 9mm pistols AK-39 links or belts C-4 Fuses and detonators

Deposit paid
Estimated cost

Miscellaneous Expenses Since July 1984



Uniforms
Boots
Radio and comm equip
Air and ground transp
Military gear
Aid to southern front
Aid to Misuras
Food, family asst,
upkeep of base
camps, air force
hospitals, etc.
Political activity uffices in various
countries and cities,
travel, p.r.
Acquisition two
transp airplanes





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Document

N 34055 - 34063 (Tab B) (9 pager)

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EXHIBIT OLN-262

MEMORANDUM

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May 24, 1985

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLAVE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH



Partially Declassified/Released on 22 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by S. Reger, Hational Security Council



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The CIA became aware of this proposal in general some weeks ago when the DEA rep to the BLTP described the contact which had been made in Lebanon. Since that time, two DEA officers have met in Gyprus with their contact...

Although CSA (Clair George) believes that this is a "scam, the DEA officers note the Tollowing:

- Their source needs to establish the credibility of the offer with the \$200K. The source has been told that if he "double-crosses" the DEA and does not produce for the \$200K that he will be exposed in Lebanon as a USG asset. The source is aware of the consequences of such revelation.
- Only the \$200K is placed at risk if the operation is not credible. According to the DEA, there are who must be bribed in order to implement the safe recovery described above. Thus, the higher cost than was originally forecast.

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
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success. The time on the property of the prope	plan since he th he feels wo terned that wh	has resisted thould likely leak ten the Congress	e use of t when bris ional com	icters are	:
RECOMMENDATIONS		*			, ^r
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Approv	·e	Disapprov	• 1	ىك ئىغىسى بلى «ماسىيىلى» :	-ب
2. That you aut \$200K to the DEA above.		transfer the pr	ivately pr	rovided	
Approv	• 7	Disapprov	•		
3. That you sen	d the CNBO ca	ble at Tab I .		••.	
ybbioa	Pare	Disapprov	e		
Attachments Tab I -	' /		4	·	
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United States

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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


Exhibit OLN-263

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
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MEMORANDUM

UNULADUTILLE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSC/ICS-400587

June 7, 1985

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ACTION

THE SECRET

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARI


FRON:

OLIVER L. MORTH

SUBJECT:

Status of Hostage Recovery Efforts

The two independent hostage recovery activities briefed last Saturday have proceeded as follows:



Particulty Declaration of the August Butter providence of E.O. 12556 by B. Rigor, Putienth's callby Council

UNGLASSIFIETES ONLY



DEA operation. At the request of the two DEA officers who originated the contact in Lebanon, I met with their asset in Washington. Last week, their intermediary expressed concern with proceeding with the operation based on the instability inside Lebanon. In response to their urgings (the EEA officers were made aware of the possibility that the Dava prisoners could be executed shortly after the end of Ramadan--June 19) and the death of one of his contacts inside Lebanon, he has now agreed to proceed as follows:

contact in Europe as well as the vest the secondary contact inside Lebanon. We will urge to return to Lebanon and errange for a meeting on Cyprus among one DEA officer than the contact inside Lebanon and contact inside Lebanon.

Once contact has been established and a meeting arranged, the two DEA officers will depart for Cyprus via Vienna where they will deposit the \$200K and establish an account for the \$2M (\$500K of which will be available imediately in U.S. dollars cash for use in Lebanon) will then proceed to the meeting indicated above.

LOS SPECIOSA

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- -- The primary DEA contact the hostages can be bribed free for six a yield as follows:
 - The stook will be sufficient to brib?
 - vill turn over the hostages to the vill trung fort
 - Transport will gost in excess of

establish bone fides to to agree to passage of at least 2 hostayes. Once the operation is underway pull be provided with \$500K in cash.

- Other the hostages over to Dhere them will be placed aboard a rented yacht for transport to Cyprus.
- one of the DEA officers will have proceeded to Cyprus to rent a safehouse to a temporary holding location in the event that all hostages are not recovered in the first attempt.
- The remaining \$1.5K made available by the donor will be released from the account in Vienna as soon as the hostages are aboard the yacht and at sea These funds will be used to pay the

It is assumed that the price cannot be negotiated dom given the number of people requiring bribes. Both the DEA additional betages will produce two hostages and that additional bestages will be released for SIM each. The safehouse will be used to harbor/treat the first two hostages while arrangements (both financial and operational) are being made for the remaining hostages. The policeves that 72-96 hours would be required for a second frunt. This assumes that additional funding is available on a near real-time basis. The donor is aware that the price being asked is SIM each. He is unaware that we are protecting with a plan to release only two if the price does not cree down.

TOP HERMI

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7422 N The DEA officers are prepared to take leave as soon as they are contacted by Travel arrangements and operational costs are currently being financed from funds normally available to the Nicaraguan resistance. Our normal point-of-contact in the resistance for these matters is not yet aware.

Summary. As discussed with ADM Poindexter, it appears that both these plans can proceed simultaneously without undue concern for compromise or mutual jeopardy. Given that arrangements for the DEA operation will take considerable time (contacts inside Lebanon, financial transactions, and rental of vacht/safehouse).

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.	Thet	you	approve	proceeding	with	the	plans	outlined	above
----	------	-----	---------	------------	------	-----	-------	----------	-------

1. Ther And abbtone blocsid!	nd with the plans outlined above.
Approve	Disapprove
2. That you contact the Attor DEA officers temporary detail to the NSC fo	they General and ask that the two the placed on the placed on the prior of 30 days.
Approve L'ac 4/9	Disapprove
Vo. to Filling	Une repACT
Attachments	

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EXHIBIT OLN-264

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by 03728

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2NY 88888 P 1822282 JUL SEROM: BAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (29-55)

(29-8504) (C-5) (

TO: DIRECTOR, FB1

PRIORITY

ATTN: SSA GEORGE LANE

FINANCIAL CRIMES UNIT

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ADIC. NEW YORK ROUTINE

SAC, PHILADELPHIA (29A-7374) SEQ S) PRIORITY

SAC, SACRAMENTO ROUTINE

WILLIAM PENN BANK, 230 SOUTH BROAD STREET, PHILADELPHIA, PA., BF&E, MF, F&W, OO:PHILADELPHIA

-ALC-MARKINGS, HOSATIONS AND LESSING OF INSCRINATION CONTAINED IN

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO WFO, 6/28/85.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND RECEIVING OFFICES, ON 7/L8/85, OLIVER NORTH, NATIONAL BECURITY COUNSEL (NSC), OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE

\$4-5504-6 \$11:1600 105:000 Face :

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on 4/29/87

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BUILDING, L7TH AND PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NO. TELEPHONE (202)

(.:

RICHARD R. MILLER, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS.

COMMUNICATIONS, L607 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, NW, WOC, HAS SEEN DOING CONFIDENTIAL CONTRACT AND CONSULTANT WORK FOR NSC AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE APPROXIMATE PAST 2 YEARS. MILLER'S WORK CONCERNS THE FUNNELLING OF PRIVATE FUNDS TO NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS WHO OPPOSE THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT, FOLLOWING SETS FORTH MILLER'S RELATIONSHIP TO CAPT ONED MATTER:

AT THE APPROXIMATE TIME OF THE PLANNED SECRET U.S. INVASION OF GRENEDA, NORTH WAS CONTACTED BY KEVIN KATTKE (TRUE SPELLING)

DBA WEAR AND ASSOCIATES, 111 BROADWAY, SUITE 2103, NEW YORK, NY.

LITKE ADVISED NORTH THAT HE (KATTKE) REPRESENTED A GRENADIAN

"TUDENT GROUP WHO WERE CONTEMPLATING AN OVERTHROW OF THE COMMUNIST

LEANING GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA. THROUGH CHECKING WITH NSC SOURCES,

NORTH DETERMINED THAT KATTKE WAS A "RIGHT WING IDEALOGUE" KNOWN.

TO FREQUENTLY CONTACT U.S. GOVERNMENT DEFENSE AND SECURITY AGENCIES

FOR A VARIETY OF CAUSES. NORTH CHARACTERIZED KATTKE AS LIKE A

"ROUGE CIA AGENT" WHO HAS NO IDENTIFIABLE TIES WITH THE U.S.

GOVERNMENT.

C J 08730

PAGE THREE DE UF #0033 GEORGE

DURING SOME LATER POINT IN 1884, KATTKE RECONTACTED NORTH TO ADVISE THAT HE REPRESENTED A MEMBER OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN ROYAL FAMILY, PRINCE EBROHIN SIN ABDUL-AZIZ SIN SAUD L-MASOUDY (HEREAFTER THE PRINCE). THE PRINCE WAS ALLEGEDLY INTERESTED IN PLACING A LARGE SUM OF MONEY AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS. NORTH ADVISED KATTKE THAT INASMUCH AS US PUBLIC LAW FORBID EXPENDITURES OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS TO AID NICARAGUAN INSURGANTS. IT WAS INADVISABLE FOR A MEMBER OF THE NSC (NORTH) TO MEET WITH THE PRINCE DIRECTLY. NORTH ADVISED KATTKE THAT RICHARD MILLER WOULD CONTACT WATTKE TO MEET THE PRINCE. KATTKE INSISTED THAT ALL CONTACT WITH THE PRINCE SE THROUGH NIM.

FOLLOWING KATTKE'S CONTACT, NORTH CAUSED A CHECK TO BE MADE OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN REGARDING THE OFFICIAL ROYAL SAUDI FAMILY AND NO INFORMATION LOCATED WAS IDENTIFIABLE WITH THE PRINCE, NORTH COULD NOT STATE WHETHER THIS CHECK WAS ALL INCLUSIVE. THE PRINCE MAS MANDATED THAT NO INQUIRY BE MADE OF HIS STATUS THROUGH THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT.

INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRINCE'S EXPRESSED INTEREST IN DONAT-ING TO THE NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS WAS DISCUSSED BY NORTH PERSON-ALLY WITH PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

J 08731

PASE FOUR DE UP 40033 GEORET ROBERT MAC FARLANEAS RECENTLY AS JUNE, LSSS.

SINCE MILLER'S CONTACT WITH THE PRINCE THROUGH KATTRE THE PRINCE HAS THUS PAR PAILED TO PLACE PUNDS IN THE HANDS OF MICARAS—
UAN PREEDOM PIGHTERS AS ORIGINALLY OPPERED. THERE IS SOME QUESTION AND RESERVATION, AT MSC TO THE PRINCE'S BONA PIDES AND 7/28/85, HAS BEEN INFORMALLY BET BY MSC AS THE DATE FOR THE PRINCE TO POLLOW THROUGH OR NOT. MORTH CONFIDENTALLY ADVISED THAT MSC MAINTAINED INDIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PRINCE THIS LENGTHY PERIOD OF TIME DUE TO THE DESPERATE MEED OF PRIVATE FUNDS BY MICARASUAN PREEDOM PIGHTERS SINCE SEING CUT OFF FROM U.S. FUNDING. THE U.S. CONGRESS IS EXPECTED TO APPROVE NEW FUNDING OF 38 MILLION DOLLARS TO THIS GROUP DURING THE WEEK OF 7/22/85.

IN JUNE, 1985, MILLER, AT THE REQUEST OF KATTKE AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF NORTH, CONTACTED THE WILLIAM PENN BANK, PHILADELPHIA, PA. REBARDING CAPTIONED MATTER. MILLER HAS MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH NORTH REGARDING THIS MATTER CONTINUALLY UP TO 7/L5/85, INCLUDING ADVISING NORTH OF MILLER'S INTERVIEW BY F81, PHILADELPHIA. MILLER MAINTAINS THAT HE HAS DONE MOTHING ILLEGAL IN CONTACTING THE BANK.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PAGE FIVE DE UF 60031 COORS

MILLER ADVISED NORTH THE PRINCE IS ALLEGEDLY OUT OF PAYOR WITH THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT DUE TO HIS SHITTE MOSLEM FAITH AS THE MAJORITY OF THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY ARE OF THE SUNNI MOSLEM FAITH. MILLER SELIEVES OR HAS BEEN LEAD TO BELIEVE BY THE PRINCE THAT THE PRINCE'S \$250,000 CHECK WAS NOT CLEARED BY THE SAUDI FRENCH BANK DUE TO THESE RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES.

DURING MILLER'S 7/LS/85 CONTACT WITH NORTH, MILLER ADVISED

NOATH THAT THE PRINCE IS CURRENTLY RESIDING IN WOC. NOATH SPECIFIC—

ALLY REQUESTED THAT ATTEMPTS BY THE FBI TO INTERVIEW THE PRINCE BE

MELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL AFTER THE WEEK OF 7/22/85, DUE TO THE

CRITICAL TIMING OF THE PRINCE'S POSSIBLE BUT REMOTE LARSE DONATION

TO THE NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS. IN NO WAY DOES NORTH WANT

2 INTERFERE WITH A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OF THE PRINCE, BUT

MORTH FEELS THAT CONTACT BY THE FBI PRIOR TO NBC DETERMINATION

OF THE PRINCE'S INTENTIONS MAY REVERSE ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE

PRINCE WILL FOLLOW THROUGH WITH HIS EXPRESSED INTENTION TO DONATE

THIS MONEY. NORTH WAS ADVISED THAT HIS REQUEST WOULD BE KNOWN TO FBIHREQUESS

SUREAU REQUESTED TO ADVISE UPO WHETHER TO HOLD IN ASEYANCE ATTEMPTS TO INTERVIEW THE PRINCE UNTIL A/TER THE WEEK OF 7/22/85 AS REQUESTED BY OLIVER NORTH, MSC.

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EXHIBIT OLN-265

TEXT: VECECUPOA2

RE NO
DE WFOA2 2120337

INT 8888
R B003372 JUL 85FM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (29A-5504) (C-5) (F)

TO: DIRECTOR, FB1 ROUTINE

ATTH: SBA GEORGE TONE, FINANCIAL CRIMES UNIT, CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

BT

11.4

WILLIAM PENN BONK, 230 SOUTH BROAD STREET, PHILADELPHIA, PEN-MSYLVANIA; BF6E; MF; PBW; OO:PH

RE WFO TEL TO BU, 7/18/85.

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU AND RECEIVING OFFICES, ON 7/30/85, OLIVER MORTE, MATIGNAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC), ADVISED UPO THAT RICHARD MILLER AND PRINCE EBRONIN BIN ABDULAZIZ BIN SAUD L-MASOUDY (MEREAFTER THE PRINCE) ARE CURRENTLY

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R337 2031 17 1935 DECLASSIFIED by G-3 on 4/29/87



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THE EUROPE REPORTEDLY ARRANGING TRANSPER OF PUNDS FROM THE PRINCE TO MICARAGUAN PREEDOM PIGHTERS AS SET FORTH IN REPERENCED TEL.

HORTH STATED THAT MILLER HAD ALLEGEDLY ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT

WHO RECENTLY FOR PURPOSES OF ARRANGING AN INTERVIEW WITH THE

PRINCE PERTAINING TO CAPTIONED MAYTER. NO RECORDS AT WHO HAVE

BEEN LOCATED TO INDICATE CONTACT BY MILLER. MILLER AND THE

PRINCE ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO WDC ON 8/1/85. NORTH WAS

ADVISED THAT WHO INTERVIEWING THE PRINCE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE

DATE.

BT

#0042

HHHH

J08734

Exhibit OLN-266

200 gaply to note of 08/31/85 13:26


F4. 11.

1 25725

NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: PRIVATE SLANE CHECK UPDATE AS OF 0920:

Bob Oakley is calling An D.C. to ask them to call their Embessy in Beirut -- at least until Sat a.m. before heaving feirut. Per Bob's request, I called Reg B. -- at least until and passed the same request to him, citing info from the same source which had forecast Veir's release.

مطاء ودلالا والمدارية



Please pass to RCM as avail.

,~

Ceclusatial 718 Second

> EXHIBIT OLN-266

1060

EXHIBIT OLN-267

Partially Declais: 20/38/7 30 Manual

by B. Raght, Justice. LD. 12356/ by B. Raght, Justice. James Bouncil

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WAS-INGTON D.C. 2000

December 2, 1985

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

OLIVER L. NORTH L

SUBJECT:

Trip to Panama and Honduras

N 31901

EXHIBIT oln-agt

Based on your guidance, arrangements have been made for you to meet with General Noriega in Panama (Dec 4) and General Lopez in Honduras (Dec 5). The itinerary and substance of your meetings have been discussed with State (DASS Bill Walker) and SOUTHCOM (General Galvin).

Attached at Tab I is a NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet for a proposed trip to Panama and Honduras on Decumber 4-5, 1985.

Participants: ADM John M. Poindexter Mr. Richard Armitage

LTCOL Oliver North Mr. Raymond Burghardt

William Walker

Depart	2:30 p.m., Wed, Dec 4	Andrews AFB
YLLIA	7:35 p.m.	Howard AFB, Panama
	• •	(Rémain Overnight)
Depart	9:00 a.m., Thurs, Dec 5	Howard AFB, Panama
Arrive	9:50 a.m.	Palmerola AB, Honduras
Depart	2:00 p.m., Thurs, Dec 5	Palmerola AB, Honduras
Arrive	7:10 p.m.	Andrews AFB

NSC will defray expenses for North and Burghardt's travel.

Attached at Tab II is a memo from you to Don Regan requesting a Special Air Mission (SAM) support for this trip.

Tabs III and IV provide an overview of the situation and the objectives we hope to achieve in Panama and Honduras, respectively. Detailed talking points for your use during the trip will be provided separately.

State (Walker), Defense (Armitage), Burghardt concur.

, and Ray available

Declassify OADR

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	*	W 3	1902	
REC	OMMENDATIONS	•		
1.	That you authorize Rick Beneral for North and Burghardt.	ner to cut the approp	riate travel	٠
	Approve	Disapprove		
2. req	That you initial and forwar uesting SAM support for the	d the memo at Tab II. trip.	to Don Regai	n -
	Approve	Disapprove	د شیهس ا	 .
3.	That you review Tabs III an	d IV prior to the tr	lp. 🔻	**
	Approve	D18approve	. 😤	
		•		* ··
cc:	Rick Benner (w/o Tabs II,	III, and IV) 👑	- ⁷ - 2 元章	* * *
Att	achments Tab I - NSC Staff Travel Tab II - Poindexter Hemo	Authorization Sheet	·	. €
	Tab III - Current Situatio Tab IV - Current Situatio	in and our objectives	for Panama for Hondura	18

BECRETTED

SECRET

PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): For	official meetings in Panam
and Honduras December 4-5, 1983.	W 31 ang
ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Pro	posed Itinerary): see me SYSTEM
DEPARTURE DATE_Wed, Dec 4	
TIME 2:30 p.m.	7:10 p.m.
ODE OF TRANSPORTATION:	
OV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR POV	RAIL OTHER
	. ' <u>~</u>
TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM XX OTHE	(\$126.00 per die R TOTAL TRIP COST \$2
	·
	OTHER
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IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRA	NGEMENTS: N/A NO XX If Travel Not Paid by Trav
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TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: MICH PAYS EXPENSES: NSC_XX NS	INGEMENTS: N/A S ES NO XX Ef Travel Not Paid by Travely N/A OO Any Additional Items You

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

N 31904

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT:

Special Air Mission (SAM) Support

It is requested that a SAM C-20 aircraft be provided for a proposed trip to Panama and Honduras on December 4-5, 1985. The purpose of the trip is to review the current situation in Central America with key government officials in these two countries. The itinerary for the trip is indicated below:

Proposed Itinerary:

Depart	2:30 p.m., Wed, Dec 4	Andrews AFB
Arrive	7:35 p.m.	Howard AFB, Panama
Depart Arrive	9:00 a.m., Thurs, Dec 5 9:50 a.m.	(Remain Overnight) Howard AFB, Panama Palmerola AB, Honduras
Depart	2:00 p.m., Thurs, Dec 5	Palmerola AB, Honduras
Arrive	7:10 p.m.	Andrews AFB

cc: The Honorable Richard P. Riley
Assistant to the President and
Director of Special Support Services

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify: OADR

CONTINUE DE LA COMPANSION DE LA COMPANSI

N 31905

ONE PAGE WITHDRAWN

PD- 4/25/87

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N 31906

Based on discussions with Walker at State and General Galvin, the following detailed itineary has been proposed for Panama:

Wednesday, December 4, 1985:

1935:	Arrive Howard AFB, Panama; proceed to USAF Hdqtrs
1940 - 2010:	30 minute briefing w/General Galvin at USAF Hdqtrs
2010 - 2030:	Proceed via USSOUTHCOM auto to SOUTHCOM Hdqtrs for mtg w/General Noriega
2030 - 2100:	Mtg w/General Noriega; attendees: Poindexter, Galvin, Walker
2115 - 2200:	Recap briefing at CG, USSOUTHCOM residence $w/U.S.$ team and General Galvin
2200 - morn:	Poindexter RON at Qtrs 1 w/General Galvin; remainder of U.S. team RON at Casa Carribe

Thursday, December 5, 1985

0700	-	0730:	Breakfast	(Qtrs	1	and	Casa	Carribe)


0730 - 0745: Proceed to USSOUTHCOM Op Ctr

0745 - 0845: USSOUTHCOM regional security briefing

0845 -0900: Proceed to Howard AFB, Panama
0905 - 0950: Enroute to Honduras via C-20

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Thursday, December 5, 1985

0950: Arrive Palmerola Air Base, Honduras (save one hour enroute -- 1 hour and 50 minute flight)

1000 - 1215: Discussions with General Lopez; attendees: Poindexter, U.S. team, and Amb Ferch

1215 - 1315: Working lunch at CTF Bravo (U.S. military exercise hdqtrs)

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1315 - 1400: Options:

B - Country team briefing by AmEmb Tequeigalpa


1400 - 1910: Foroute from Palmerola Air Base to Andrews AFB

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EXHIBIT OLN-268



I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national sequrity of the United States, [and due to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 500 of the Mational Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.]

[and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this Finding to the intelligence committees of the Congress pursuent to Section 501 of the Mational Security Act of 1947, as amended, and to provide such briefings as necessary.]

28

DESCRIPTION

Work with Iranian elements, groups and individuels, selected foreign lisison services and third countries, all of which are sympathetic to U.S. Government interests and which do not conduct or support terrories actions directed against U.S. persons, property or interests, for the purpose of:


(1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, and (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence and (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence framian Government's intentions with respect to its framian Government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts. Provide funds, intelligence, counterintelligence, training, funds, intelligence, individuals, liaison services and elements, groups, individuals, liaison services and third countries in support of these activities.

ritally proceedings patients on 12 May 1207 and increased by S. Rigge, National Security Council





Exhibit OLN-268A



; hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and due to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the Mational Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.

SCOPE

DESCRIPTION

Iran

Work with Iranian elements, groups and individuals, selected foreign lisison services and third countries, all of which are sympathetic to U.S. Government interests and which do not conduct or support terrorist actions directed against U.S. persons, property or interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, and (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current Iranian Government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts. Provide funds, intelligence, counterintelligence, training, guidance and communications assistance to these elements, groups, individuals, liaison services and third countries in support of these activities.

The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related materiel in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their effort to achieve a more pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S. Government learns that these elements have abandoned their goals of moderating their government and appropriated the materiel for purposes other than that provided by this Finding.

The White Rouse Washington, D.C. Date: 3 January 1986 OGCR 98-0801-86 COPY 1

Partially Declassified/Released on 223041987 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by 9. Reger. National Security Council

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Exhibit OLN-268B

CLASMILL

The foreign Assistance Act of [3].

As Amended, Concerning Operations
relations by the Central Intelligence
dency in Foreign Countries, Other Than
Those Intended Solely for the Purpose
of Intelligence Collection

9549

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and due to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the Mational Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.

DESCRIPTION

Iran

Assist selected friendly foreign lisison sorvices and third countries, which have established relationships with Iranian elements, groups, and individuals sympathetis to U.S. Government interests and which do not conduct or support terrorist actions directed against U.S. persons, property or interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current Iranian Government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of the American hestages held in Beirut and preventing additional terrorist acts by these groups. Provide funds, intelligence, counterintelligence, training, guidance and communications and other necessary assistance to these elements, groups, individuals, listens services and third countries in support of these activities.

The USG will set to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to astablish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related material in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their effort to achieve a more spo-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S. Government learns that these elements have abandoned their goals of moderating their government and appropriated the material for purposes other than that provided by this Finding.

TOP SECRET COPY The White House Washington, D.C. Date: 6 January 1986 1112 Actionated of 19 May 1987 PENFEIT frame modifical of 2.0. 12356 By S. Ramer, Mattoriel Saturity Council

EXHIBIT OLN-268C

WARSIFIE H 23723

Thereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to each operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and due to its entreme sansitivity and security risks; I determine it is essential to limit prior netice, and direct the Director of Control Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.

| DESCRIPTION | DESCRIPTION | DESCRIPTION | DESCRIPTION | DESCRIPTION | DESCRIPTION |

IFAR

DESCRIPTION

Assist selected friendly foreign lisison services and third countries, which have established relationships with Iranian elements, groups, and individuals sympathetic to U.S. Government interests and which do not conduct or support terrorist actions directed against U.S. persons, property or interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a mere moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current Iranian Government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of the American hostages held in Soirut and preventing additional terrorist acts by these groups. Provide funds, intelligence, counterintelligence, training, guidance and communications and other necessary assistance to these elements, groups, individuals, lisions services and third countries in support of these activities.

The USG will set to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related materiel in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their effort to achieve a more pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S. Government learns that these elements have abendoned their goals of moderating their government and appropriated the materiel for purposes other than that provided by this Finding.

The White Rouse Mauhington, D.C. TOP SECRET COPY (0U2 erionist. The in

Exhibit OLN-268D

Ν Pinding Purguant to Section 662 of the Porcian Assistance Act, of 181 Assistance Act, of 181 Assistance Act, of 181 Assistance Act, of 181 Assistance Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Acency is Porcian Countries, Other Them Those Intended Foliar for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and due to its extreme sensitivity and security risks. I determine it is essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of Contral Inculligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the Mational Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.

SCOPE

DESCRIPTION

. ...

Assist selected friendly foreign lisison services, third countries and third parties which have established relationships with Iranian elements, groups, and individuals sympathetic to U.S. Government interests and which do not conduct or support terrorist actions directed against U.S. persons, property or interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current Iranian Government's intentions with respect to its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and (1) furthering the release of the American hostages held in Beirut and preventing additional terrorist acts by these groups. Provide funds, intelligence, counter-intelligence, training, quidance and communications and other necessary assistance to these elements, groupe, individuals, lisison services and third countries in support of these activities. these activities.

The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related material in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their effort to achieve a more pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S. Government learns that these elements have abandoned their goals of moderating their government and appropriated the material for purposes other than that provided by this Finding.

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The thite House Washington, D.C. Date January 17, 1986 OGCR TE 0501-86

EXHIBIT OLN-2680

***** ***** ****** ****** Oce 100 dir has edulated that the 20th still appears good if we are proceeding of the first step of the loop coops plan to change the goot -- ending the bestage problem and porting rid of the 10 cours missiles still perhad in Tobras. So believes that if the first stop is excepted that the etg will be too. Do will to back to us on Tonaday must work to location and paybergo decision if -make additional more on the first stope to the bestope.

*** Don't to note of \$1/13/06 \$7:25

ME PROM: MORE --C-PA

To: FROM --CPUD

POTE PRODE OLIVED DOCTO Sobject: Ulcanades I agree. Mill take for action to our Tunnday etg s/ Millett's people t prior to pr otg of thilett & tool. TOC - 78446 856 F998; 850L0 01/16/06 13:50:55 To: 05.000 -- CP04

--- Peply to cote of \$1/10/06 10:57

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**** **** ***** ***** Sobject: Bles Lregge Bare teld this to Too should be sease, however, that it is of opinion, based on oy meeting of forbs on tooday night, that forts talls bedoon every thing, respects that there is probably a secret business accomponent acceptance, todays and dorbe that is being conducted mys the bosologue of any of the three compection personners and that this will result in at local sees cress-fortilization of information. This may not be altogether had al so can been in teach of Ledoth enough to get a feel for that he really going on. I have so problem of subsesse eating so become profit on become business. I do here a problem if it messes the compromise of associtive political or operational details. so sight consider asking Sibe a contract copiepes of the fit and regulated him to take a periodic polygraph, foot but 1 4164 100660

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January 24, 1986

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Operation Recovery

Please find attached at Tab A a notional timeline for major events in Operation Recovery. To my knowledge the only persons completely cognizent of this schedule are:

John Poindexter Don Fortier Oliver North

John McMahon Clair George

Dewey Clarridge

Richard Secord Amiram Nir Prime Hinister Shimon Peres RECEIVED FBI

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RECOMMENDATION

That you privately discuss the attachment with the President.

Approve ____ Disapprove

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Attachment
Tab A - Notional Timeline for Operation Recoverer

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
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Notional Timeline for Operation Recovery

Priday, January 24

- -- CIA provide cube and weight data to Copp for a/c loading.
- -- CIA prepare intel sample for pass to Gorba.
- -- Copp provide a/c tail # to CIA for pickup at

Saturday, January 25

-- Dispatch intel sample to Gorba via Charlie Allen.

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Sunday, January 26

- -- C. Allen deliver intel sample to Gorba at Churchill Hotel, London.
- -- Copp finalize a/c requirements w/air carrier in Oklahoma.

Monday, January 27

-- Gorba place intel sample on 1300 GMT flight to Tehran fm Frankfurt, Germany.

Wednesday, January 29

- -- Gorba transfer funds for purchase/transport of 1000 basic TOMs to Israeli account at Credit Suisse Bank, Geneva.
- -- Israeli account manager automatically transfers deposit fm Israeli account to Copp account in same bank (bank record keeping transaction).
- -- Copp's account manager automatically transfers \$6M to CIA account in same bank (bank record keeping transaction).

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Thursday, January 30

- Cooy is Receipt CIA transfers \$6H to DOD account by wire service transaction.
- CIA orders movement of 1000 TOW missiles fm DOD storage facility Anniston, Alabama, to
- CIA bills Copp account \$26K for coat of moving 1000 TQW missiles fm Annuston, Alabama, tq $\,$

Friday, January 31

Sunday, February 2

- Copp travels to Israel for site survey of transfer point (Eliat, Israel).
- Copp proceeds to rendezvous in Rome w/Clarridge to establish command post.

Monday, February 3



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Tuesday, February 4

-- 1000 TOWs sanitized and prepared for shipping

-- Ccpp a/c packers arrive at and arrange for Copp a/c to lift TOWs fm Kelly AF Base, ban Antonio, TX, on CIA contract.

Wednesday, February 5

- -- Copp a/c arrives Kelly AF Base for loading.
- -- CIA provides remainder of first intel sample to Gorba at Iranian Embassy in Bonn, Germany.

Thursday, February 6

- -- Copp a/c commence lifting TOWs fm Kelly AF Base to transfer point at Eliat, Israel.
- -- Israeli AF "sterilized" 707 a/c arrives at transfer point for loading.
- -- Copp aircrew arrives Eliat, Israel, to pilot Israeli a/c.
- -- Remainder of first intel sample flown fm Germany to Tehran in diplomatic pouch on scheduled Iran Airways flight.

Friday, Pebruary 7

-- Israeli "sterile" a/c piloted by Copp crew commences movement of TOWs fm Eliat to Bandar Abbas, Iran, via Red Sea route.

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Saturday, February 8

- -- Delivery of 1000 TOWs completed.
- -- 25 Rizballah released by Lahad.
- -- Returning Israeli a/c pickup 18 HAWKs at Tehran airport for return to Israel.

Sunday, February 9

- -- All U.S. hostages released to U.S./British or Swiss Embassy.
- -- Second group of 25 Hizballah released by Lahad.
- -- Israelis return \$5.4M to Gorba when HAWKs land in Israel.

Monday, February 10

- -- Gorba transfers funds to Israel account for purchase/transportation of 3000 TOWs (amount transferred is sufficient to cover purchase of 508 additional TOWs owed to Israel for Weir release and all transportation costs).
- -- Israelis transfer funds to Copp account at Credit Suisse Bank, Geneva.
- -- Copp transfers funds to CIA account for purchase/transportation of 3508 TOWs (\$21.048M).
- -- Four (4) remaining Lebanese-Jews released by Hizballah.

Tuesday, February 11 (Anniversary of Iranian-Islamic Revolution)

- -- Khomheini steps down.
- -- CIA transfers \$21.048M to DOD account for purchase of 3508 TOWs at \$6K each.
- -- CIA starts moving TOWs to Alabama, in lots of 1000.

fm Anniston,

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Thursday, February 13

-- Copp packers return to

RECEIVED Fig. NOV 29 1996 CODY 'S Receipt

Tuesday, February 18

- -- Copp a/c pickup 1000 TOWs at Kelly AF Base, Texas; deliver to transfer point (Eliat).
- -- Israeli "sterilized" 707 a/c w/Copp crew commences delivery of 1000 TOWs to Iran.

Thursday, February 20

- -- Copp a/c pickup 1000 TOWs at Kelly AF Base, Texas; deliver to transfer point (Eliat).
- -- Israeli "sterilized" 707 a/c w/Copp crew commences delivery of 1000 TOWs to Iran.

Saturday, February 22

- -- Copp a/c pickup 1000 TOWs at Kelly AF Base, Texas; deliver to transfer point (Eliat).
- -- Israeli "sterilized" 707 a/c w/Copp crew commences delivery of 1000 TOWs to Iran.

Monday, February 24

-- Copp a/c returns tá for delivery to Israel.

pickup 508 TOWs

-- Collett (British hostage) and Italian hostages released and Buckley remains returned.

Tuesday, February 25

-- Second sample of intel provided to Gorba at Iranian Embassy in Bonn, Germany.

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EXHIBIT OLN-271



Non-Log N 9884

February 18, 1986

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
HEHORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

OLIVER L. HORTH

SUBJECT:

Operation Recovery



MOV 29 1986
CODY IS RECEID!

The following is text of encrypted message from Copp at 0830 this morning:

"Aircraft returned safely to Ben Gurion this morning at 0730 EST. Savanteen HAWK missiles aboard. Gorba called one hour ago. will head Iranian side of meeting in Germany along with five others. Iranians will provide all names after we give names and titles to them through Gorba. Iranian delegation will include:

Frankfurt, Thursday p.m. Meeting to start at 1700 in Iranian Embassy (sic) for two hours. Iranians would then proceed back to Iran to check "quality" of data. Iranians have asked for second delivery of 500 Tows on Friday 1.m. They say they will release all hostages, if,

will get hostages Friday or Saturday. They envision a future meeting in Iran with us to consider next steps while we are delivering balance of Tows (3,000).

We have already rejected embassy

as meeting site. Suggested following names from our side: Nir (Office of Israeli Prime Minister)

Hir (Office of Israeli Prime Hinister) MGZN Adams (Director, Current Intelligence - DIA) (AKA - Second) William Goode (Office of President) Albert Hakim (Support Assistant to Director DIA)*

Based on the above, the CIA (Clarridge) has been asked to produce documents identifying Adams as DIA to avoid having Copp use his own passport. To date, CIA has refused to provide him with any alias documentation. Albert Hakim is VP of one of the European companies set up to handle aid to resistance movements. He is fluent in farsi and would need one time alias documentation as a DIA official.

by 3. Recently compared to the control of the contr

LASA RECKENED

TOP SECRET

PLEASE DESTROY AFTER READING

9885

It is recognized that there is a significant problem

Rowever, we appear to be much closer to a solution than earlier believed attendance at the Frankfurt meeting tends to support our hope that this whole endeavor can succeed this week, if we appear to be forthcoming.

RECONDIENDATION


That you urge Director Casey to provide on Thursday in Frankfurt.

Disapprove

PLEASE DESTROY AFTER READING

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Milling Correction




FILT: 8778

···· ··· ···· ······· UNULASSIFIE! Sabtest: 800 ate thiosel O /Just retorned lost night from sty s. to frontfact, is nothing also the section serves to captacine the cool for direct capatact with these people rather then continue the process by which on deal through intermediation like terbesifabe. Because CIA ad not provide a translator for the assertance, so appl ilbert Bodin, on hMLIT other runs the December operation for our Floatingson
resistance support certifity.

Lecemberlook on the latest the property of the latest the property of the latest the lates becomposted so that I we have suppose Throughout the ecosion, Corbonifabr intentionally distorted much of the translession and had to be corrected by our on occapions so assersos that finally bed tibent transfers buth seps, descensed at may 6 excesses toollol as follows: or reacted as follows: bas setterity to make his one decisions on mothers of proof impact, --De affect and bare to chart back of Touton on decisions take, -- the part. of Icas is terrified of a new Jorist threat. -- They are seeking a coppressional but are cilled my foor & eletrant, --All bestages will be released during tot during the most meeting. - They must ment aty ergently and have suggested docto In. all Doctor Miles. -- They are land interested in Branditog our then we originally believed. -They seek technical advice mare then ocon or intuitiquate, -- Toch advice and be an executable oilitery seintenance - set out tection -- They esquitted to end seti-6.5. terrories, -- They noted the problem of method then leternolies to profes - 41r. contact posted that this ups first est, see secret to sees then Sprag tesespiese time to both sides - outed most for sectory. "Limetteet bereased that there care our for, cores/threats that so care concern of telfo all of this could be so such samle, I believe that we say wall be on the series of a so jor breeksbrooph - aut only on the hestopes/terrories but so the series on a septe prostructory - our series on the mention continue of the con aphone error tree to issue to each error to receive the bearings are view to private the private field both lay and Casey -- eviltar very extheologically depicts. There are supported to the post of the faction that you still be extended to the the faction to be early sent if - or early table eached - but don't have been be take this happen. Some not told just that this each is being most, bull, the - despite cell as escate pr sections convenience. Sere, but festigued deparde, Botth 2 800 440 1010907 454 FARE: ESGLO ---(POL TO: USBCB --CPBA 02/27/06 20:11:31 TO: 930CB --CP06 *** map: to mote of 02/27/06 16:07 Partially Seclassified / Selessed on 5/4/47 from provisions of E.J. 12356 -- servet --'y ? Reger, 7: to that Section Council lob fort: Eorbonne Timer the otacion of this cotalog, ant of Caser, July and all have now accord to press on, believe on are different Actobe source direction, Just Claimbel longiby secules o/ Joy to indicated that he bee potent extenses to you and has given on dates that you are not small-Well endorses to actod, any so that these do not especially but noted to JEF that it not their call so to date of any, Jun 10" a may in Second the secure decise we say unless the space per selficed that more we have not a deries se ere sology date so shall been a very pillacent corprise, Fich & I believe that they may be projecting to release see of the business entire. Met also indicated that processes at the only of he define just. Sice error you are ofthe fed alliling





TO: NSOLN -- CPLA

...

Date and time | 02,27,86 21 37-48

*** Reply to note of 02/27/86 20:1

1363 N 41077

NOTE FROM: ROBERT HOTARLANE

Subject: Exchanges
No sweat GI. I just sent a separate note about not sharping with John because
I had forgotten to put it in the other note. And I fully understand the narrow
path he is trying to walk between those who want to go balls out for the wrong
reasons (Regan) and those who don't want to do it at all (GPS and Cap). So


it any way you must. As for my commitments don't worry about them; set it up any way you wish that it works for them. I only mentioned it to John to ask that he try to give me a heads up soon so that I can cancel--which I am glad to do--with some grace.

under profesors of E.O. 12253 by B. Sector Links in proceeding County

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UNCLASSIFIE



EXHIBIT OLN-273

L. LASSIFIE

TO: FROM: BG POR YOUR EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: PRESENT SITUATION

THE KEY POINTS YOU SHOULD WHOM ARE:

PERMAY 27, 1986

ON TUESDAY, ARTURO, ULVERT, CAMERON, AND ARMSTRONG WIGGENS MET WITH MCCURDY AND

ARTURO EXPLAINED UND IS MOVING FORMAD WITH FOSITIVE CHANGES, HCCURDY'S RESPONSE WAS THAT'S ALL. WELL AND GOOD AND WE TRUST YOU AND ROBELD, BUT WE DON'T TRUST THE FON. ACCORDING TO ULVERT, HE AND ARTURO DEFENDED ACCUPO AND THE FON.

MCCURDY PURPOSEPULLY ASKED WIGGENS TO SIT NEXT TO HIM. DURING ANSTRONG'S TORN TO SPEAK, HE REVILED CALERO, THE FON, KISAN, UND, THE AGENCY AND ANYONE ELSE HE COULD THINK OP, WHILE SPEAKING IN GLOWING TENES OF BROOKLYN AND BOS. HCCURDY IS REPORTED AS SAYING BROOKLYN WILL RECEIVE AID. WHEN THE PACKAGE IS PASSED. AS HE WAS STATING THIS, ANNSTRONG PIPED IN THAT BOS SHOULD RECEIVE ASSISTENCE TOO AS IT IS TRUELY A REPRESENTATIVE BODY. MCCURDY WAS SAID TO AGREE.


THE BOTTOM LINE FROM BOTH CAMERON AND ULVERT WAS THERE IS TREMEDOUS DISTRUST OF THE FON AND THE ADMINISTRATION, AND A SELIEF THAT ROSELO AND CRUZ ARE JUST WINDOW DRESSING TO APPEASE CONGRESS. THE MEMBERS ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS RELATED TO A HAMER THE PROGRAM IS GOING LONG TERM. WILL THE ADMINISTRATION BE SACK IN IS MONTHS FOR HORE AID?

A LIST OF FOUR_SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO ELLIOT FOR THE BROADENING OF UND. I UNDERSTAND HE THINKS THEY ARE A GOOD IDEA AND IS GOING TO ASK TO SEE THAT THEY ARE HOVED ON. ELLIOT, THROUGH BOB KAGEN, HAS STRESSED PLEXIBILITY IN REGARDS TO ALL OF THEM. THE LIST HAS PRESENTED BY ULVERT AND CAMERON ON BEHALF OF ROBELO AND CRUZ WHO ARE IN AGREEMENT, AT LEAST THAT IS WHAT I UNDERSTANC

THE POINTS-ARE:


- BOSCO IS SENT OUT OF MASHINGTON, CARLOS, OR MICEVER
 IS UND'S REP IN MASHINGTON, DOES NOT MANT TO HAVE TO
 MORK WITH A PARKALEL FON STRUCTURE, BOSCO IS NOT ACCEPTABLE
 AS A NUMBER 2 IN THE UND OFFICE.
- O. A NEW SECRETARY GENERAL IS NAMED FOR UND. VALDEVIA IS DUMPED FOR BEING INEFFECTIVE, THE NEW SECRETARY GENERAL WILL HAVE HORE FOMER AND SE HORE EFFECTIVE.
- MIL PLADE, BE THEY PROH OUTSIDE SOURCES OR USG SOURCES, 60 INTO AN UND ACCOUNT. NO HORE PRIVATE PON ACCOUNTS.
- A COORDINATOR FOR THE TRIPLE A BE NAMED. THE DEVIOUS PERSON BEING SUGGESTED IS CRUZ. THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY A MAJOR FOINT, AS IT IS NOT A MANDATORY CHANGE, JUST A SUGGESTION.

Box 5-13



3G 2/27/36 PAGE 2

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ULVERT HAS NEVER CONTACTED BY ANYONE ABOUT HIS APPOINTMENT, HE ONLY HEARD ABOUT THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE, AND IT HAS ASSUMED HE KNEW.

WHILE IN WASHINGTON, HE MET WITH A NUMBER OF PEOPLE INCLUDING: ABRAMS, KAGEN, MCCURDY ET ALL. NOT THAT IT MATTERS, BUT HE STILL IS AN ASSET.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, ULVERT, CRUZ, AND JAMES LEMOYNE OF THE N.Y. TIMES LEFT FOR THE AND THE GRADUATION, ROBELO IS SUPPOSED TO MEET THEM THERE.

r leght

THE LETHAL SUPPLIES PERE STILL IN AS OF THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEEK, THE AGENCY TOLD THE GOODS. THE STATE AND COMPANY ARE NOT TO MOVE THE GOODS. THE SAYS HE WILL, BUT HE JUST NEEDS ANOTHER ACCOUNT TO CHARGE IT TO, DO YOU HAVE ONE IN MIND?

THE CARLBOUS WERE NOT TO BE FLOWN OVER THE BORDER, AT LEAST THIS IS WHAT WASHINGTON WAS TELLLING. HE ALSO SALD IF THEY ARE FLOWN IN, GRINGOS ARE NOT TO FLY THEM, AND THEY CERTAINLY ARE NOT TO FLY LETHAL CARGO. EAST'S COMENT IS "I'LL FLY ANYTHING ANYWERE, JUST GIVE "E AN ACCOUNT."

- ** NEGRO'S PEOPLE ARE STILL WAITING FOR A DROP, AS A SHOW OF GOOD FAITH, THEY HANT ROS OF FAL AND ROS OF AK. ADVISE YOU CHECK ON WHERE THIS STANCE.
- THE TEAM OF BROOKLYN'S PEOPLE ARE STILL MAITING FOR SOME LETHAL MARDWARE TO TAKE IN WITH THEM, A REQUEST WENT FROM BUT UNDERSTAND THERE STILL IS NO MOVEMENT, AM TOLD MAX CAN ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY GOODS IN FOR UNDER \$6,000. 40.7 THOUGHTS!
- AM TOLD DUEHLING HAS ASKED BY ABRAHS TO STAY ON UNTIL JULY, IF THIS IS THE CASE,
 WOULD SUGGEST BUESSLER IS FIRED, HAVE MET NOONE WHO LIKES WORKING WITH HIM.

MY BIGGEST CONCERN IS THIS MADULE EFFORT HAS TURNED INTO A THREE RING CIRCUS WITHOUT A RINGMASTER. THERE IS NO CENTRAL LEADERSHIP, ELLIOT AND STATE ARE TRYING TO FILL PASS OF THE VACCUM, BUT THEY ARE NOT OPERATIONALLY ORIENTED.

I LOT OF LIP SERVICE IS BEING GIVEN TO THE EFFORT IN CONGRESS, BUT NOONE SEEMS TO KNOW RHO IS ORD-ESTRATING THE LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY ON THE HILL. CAMERON AND ABRAMS ALONG WITH KAGEN SEEM TO BE AT TH€ HELM.

* con mo Borse to 101 man

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Ехнівіт OLN-274

Partially Derivation/Rate 756 to 1. 1256 V Bader providing: E.D. 1256 V By B. Right, Badios. Jacobs Council

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT:

Special Mission and Letters to the Presidents of

El Salvador and Honduras

Issue

How best to reassure Presidents Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador and Jose Ascone of Honduras of our resolve and commitment.

Background

After the negative vote on military assistance in April 1985, the Honduran Government reacted


In El Salvador, President fuerte was severely criticized by his political left for supporting the U.S. proposal.

Today's House vote against additional assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is liable to have the same effect, unless steps are taken to reassure both Presidents.

by a high-level estegation will help to reassure them (and their military) of our determination to succeed in aiding the resistance and in easuring their security. Letters to both Presidents (Tabs A and B) address specific concerns raised in discussions with our embassies this afternoon.

Discussion

As a result of the National Security Planhing Group meeting this afternoon, it was decided to dispatch Assistant Secretary Elliött Abrams, General Jack Galvin (USSOUTECON), and a team of specialist to the region. The visit by the team and the letters at Tabs A and B will assure the Governments of El Salvador and



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N 6695

Ronduras that regardless of today's vote, you, personally, and the Administration are determined that the Nicaraguan resistance will receive the support their deserve. In Honduras, we are prepared to provide expedited and, if necessary, enhanced security assistance to deal with their border problem. We are also prepared to release a portion of the \$100M in Honduran ESF which has been withheld pending internal economic reforms. The visit to El Salvador and your letter to President Duarte are more symbolic but, nonetheless, essential.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you sign the letters at Tabs A and B.

Prepared by: Oliver L. North

Attachments

Tab A - Letter to Duarte Tab B - Letter to Azcona

Day Land In




EXHIBIT OLN-276

UNCLASSIFIED

Free: NSJRP --CPUA

Date and time

04/16/86 19:02:42

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*** Reply to note of 04/16/86 16:40 ... SECRET ...


NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDENTER
Subject: PRIVATE BLANK CMECK
You may go shead and go, but I want several points made clear to them. There
are not to be any parts delivered until all the hostages are free in
accordance with the plan that you laved out for me before, hone of this half
shipment before any are released crap. It is either all or nothing. Also you
may tell them that the President is getting very annoyed at their continual
stalling. He will not agree to any more changes in the plan. Either they agree
finelly on the arrangements that have been discussed or we are going to
persunently cut off all contact. If they really want to save their asses from
the Seviets, they should get on board. I am beginning to suspect that
doesn't have such authority.


cc: NSPBT --CPUA PAUL THOMPSON


UNCLASSIFF











MRITE MOUSE CORRUBICATIONS AGENCY

priot to releasing the Americans. George Cave, our temident expert believes had probably received more kind of authority to cause the release of the harrows prior to our tibras action and that the current delays and offerts to ferm sev concessions are a consectoncy of internal dispetes over that the Itanians and do about this matter in the take of the U.S. action in Libra, Gorba has been out of touch all day and Cave/Horth cancelled the trie to Frankfact for a second time because we do not west to neet Augin w/ only Cothe.

It the sty takes place this week it would still be a minisum of eight and a Satisse of 10 days from descrit of funds bufore we can assemble the revalence patts. de do not believe they will make this deposit entil after the sig. We also seed to date it knoon that we simply do not have some of the parts tequented since to have medernized our Will systems. I have sent Bit a coded Day deking him to detectibe whether or not they have in stock the items which - lack. If, it is determined that they do not have then we will have to determine the effect this vill have so the enderstanding so reached last wook "/ Gothe. Hit believes that the Istaelis will to able to give us an answer in the most 2 days. Care and North are propared to launch again concrev at Corba surfaces and has not up a Sty u/ Dettou line; marliost tisutrane for \$CA/Cave/Morth trip to Iran is 30 April and thin will slip a day for every day of dolar in the

"rankfort ote 6 its complementary financial transaction. Ware repards, Morta TPDATE FOR BUD CU ILLU

NEG PRORE REJEP --CPMA TO: BEOLD --CPEA Tu: 27014 --- CDES

04/22/46 14:49:16

*** Asply to note of 04/21/66 20:31

-- Jacobi---

distings of the form Teb fect: UPDAYE FOR DUE OF THAT

thanks. I have forested your note to ful with a cover that mays that this vill be wer last attempt to got agreement on a deal with them-

D 4504 15 502 540 68 1978

156 P9061 1939P --- CPUA or Bull -CPUL

. - - -

04/22/45 14:50:36

H 12503

JMP 1/1526

EXHIBIT OLN-280

SECRET

- Bank 0 - 12

Copp: 4/28/86 1035

2815152 Apr 86.

- 1. Olmstead here in office and is meeting with Grant at 1400 today. Abe still in Copenhagen with our lawyer finalizing purchase of ship. Deal has been made after thre days of negotiations. The Denish captain is up and eager for the mission he now works for us. We are asking Grant for firm fixed price contract of \$1.2M for six months. He will probably balk at this price since he wants to go month to month, but we have to self insure a vessel worth over 400K and a three-man crew. Our rough guess is that our monthly operating costs will be \$0K -- the average charge per month for a vessel fo this type is 150K. Therefore, we are asking 50K per month for risk.
 - Tem is in London now trying to get on road to complete SP deal.



4. Where do we stand with Adam?

y May & 7

5. No new deposits. Rgds. Dick. BT

6. WEED TO GCT COOKS ? PHOREY TO

-

SECRET



EXHIBIT OLN-281

UNEHALIED 6293

SECRET

Copp: 4/23/86 1330

2317452 Apr 86.

- 1. Infiltration of Blacky by maule delayed indefinitely bo . Seems Blacky has developed severe case of lack of guts. Drop to 20 Indians still on for end of week.
 - 2. Pls try and get Ob intel data for southern part of Nicaragua -- especially radar predictions.
 - 3. Olmstead meeting grant at 1400 today. Will advise.
 - thinks he will have a deal presented tomorrow for 5 launchers and 15 msls. They want to sell 10 launchers and 30 msls but will do it in 2 traunches if we want. Rgds. BT

SECPET

EXHIBIT OLN-282

= 2MPH

UNULASSIFIEL

HEER

101515EST APRIG

Part 1. Need EUC on letterhead as follows...

Certification de Destino final. Address to Lake Resources, Inc..

P.O. Box 7284, Panama, Rep of Panama. Suggested text is...

requires 30 man-portable, surface-to-air

missile systems of the British blow pipe type. These systems

are for the exclusive use of their pand for

defensive purposes. This systems should be symped to

Signed by pfficial.ietter

should be stamped with official seal if available.

Part 2. Good luck tonite.

Regards

87

4MMST



EXHIBIT OLN-283

TRAN AS

N 7514

Y May 67

exhibit can-283



UBOR SEUTET

4654 TV:TIBIES

RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN BEIRUT N 7515

Background. In June 1985, private American and Israeli citizens commenced an operation to effect the release of the American hostage. In Beirut in exchange for providing certain factions in Iran with U.S.-erigin Israeli military materiel. By September, U.S. and Israeli Government officials became involved in this endeavor in order to ensure that the USG would:

- -- not object to the Israeli transfer of embargoed material to Iran;
- -- sell replacement items to Israel as replenishment for like items sold to Iran by Israel.

On September 2. the Israeli Government, with the endorsement of the USG, transferred 508 basic TOW missiles to Iran. Forty-eigh hours later, Reverend Benjamin Weir was released in Beirut.

Subsequent efforts by both governments to continue this process have met with frustration due to the need to communicate our intentions through an Iranian expatriate arms dealer in Europe. In January 1986, under the provisions of a new Covert Action Finding, the USG demanded a meeting with responsible Iranian government officials.

On Pebguary 20, a U.S. Government official met with,

the first direct U.S.-Iranian centact in over five years. At this meeting, the U.S. side made an effort to refocus Iranian attention on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need t establish a longer term relationship between our two countries based on more than arms transactions. It was emphasized that th hostage issue was a "hurdle" which must be crossed before this improved relationship could prosper. During the meeting, it als became apparent that our conditions/demands had not been accurat transmitted to the Iranian Government by the intermediary and it was agreed that:

- -- The USG would establish its good faith and bone fides by immediately providing 1,000 TOW missiles for sale to Iran. This transaction was covertly completed on February 21, using a private U.S. firm and the Israelis as intermediari'
- -- A Subsequent meeting would be held in Iran with senior U.S and Iranian officials during which the U.S. hostages would be released.
- -- Immediately after the hostages were safely in our hands, the U.S. would sell an additional 3,000 TOW missiles to Iran using the same procedures employed during the September 19: transfer.

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Cave section

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N 7516

In early March, the Iranian expetriate intermediary demanded that Iranian conditions for release of the hostages now included the prior sale of 200 PMORNIX missiles and an unspecified number of MARPOON missiles, in addition to the 3,000 TOWs which would be delivered after the hostages were released. A subsequent meeting was held with the intermediary in Paris on March 8, wherein it was explained that the requirement for prior deliveries violated the understandings reached in Frankfurt on February 20, and were therefore unacceptable. It was further noted that the Iranian aircraft and ship launchers for these missiles were in such disrepair that the missiles could not be launched even if provided

Current Situation. On April J, Ari Gorbanifahr, the Iranian intermediary, arrived in Washington, D.C. with instructions from to consumate final arrangements for the return of the hostages. Gorbanifahr was reportedly enfranchised to negotiate the types, quantities, and delivery procedures for material the U.S. would sell to Iran through Israel. The meeting lasted nearly all might on April 3-4, and involved numerous calls to Tehran.

A Parsi-speaking CIA officer in attendance was able to verify the substance of his calls to Tehran during the meeting. Subject to Presidential approval, it was agreed to proceed as follows:

-- By Monday, April 7, the Iranian Government will transfer \$17 million to an Israeli account in Switzerland. The Israelis will, in turn, transfer to a private U.S. corporation account in Switzerland the sum of \$15 million.

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<u>SDISITIVE</u> N 7517

- -- On Tuesday, April 8 (or as soon as the transactions are verified), the private U.S. corporation will transfer \$3.651 million to a CIA account in Switzerland. CIA will then transfer this sum to a covert Department of the Army account in the U.S.
- On Wednesday, April 9, the CIA will commence procuring \$3.651 million worth of EAMR missile parts (240 separate line items) and transferring these parts to this process is estimated to take seven working days.
- -- On Friday, April 18, a private U.S. aircraft (7078) will pick-up the EAMK missile parts: ... and fly them to a covert Israeli airfield for prepositioning (this field was used for the earlier delivery of the 1000 TOMs). At this field, the parts will be transferred to an Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) aircraft with false markings. A SATCOM capability will be positioned at this location.
- on Saturday, April 19, McFarlane, Morth, Teicher, Cave, and a SATCOM communicator will board a CIA aircraft in Frankfurt, Germany, enroute to Tehran.
- -- On Sunday, April 20, the following series of events will occur:
 - U.S. party arrives Tahran (A-hour) -- met by Rafsanjani, as head of the Iranian delegation.
 - At A+7 hours, the U.S. hostages will be released in Beirut.
 - At A+15 hours, the IDF aircraft with the HAWK missile parts abourd will land at Bandar Abbas, Iran.

<u>Discussion</u>. The following points are relevant to this transaction, the discussions in Iran, and the establishment of a broader relationship between the United States and Iran:

-- The Iranians have been told that our presence in Iran is a "holy commitment" on the part of the USG that we are sincere and can be trusted. There is great distrust of the U.S. among the various Iranian parties involved. Mithout our presence on the ground in Iran, they will not believe that we will fulfill our end of the bargain after the hostages are released.

207-08CN00

-TOP-SECRET



Contact To

7518



Purther, the Iranians are well aware that the situation in Seirut is deteriorating rapidly and that the ability of the IRGC to effect the release of the hostages will become increasingly more difficult over time.

- -- We have convinced the Iranians of a significant near term and long range threat from the Soviet Union. We have real and deceptive intelligence to demonstrate this threat during the visit. They have expressed considerable interest in this matter as part of the longer term relationship.
- -- We have told the Iranians that we are interested in assistance they may be willing to provide to the Afghan resistance and that we wish to discuss this matter in Tehran.
- -- The Iranians have been told that their provision of assistance to Nicaraqua is unacceptable to us and they have agreed to discuss this matter in Tehran.
- -- We have further indicated to the Iranians that we wish to discuss steps leading to a cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq.
- The Iranians are well aware that their most immediate needs are for technical assistance in maintaining their air force and navy. We should expect that they will raise this issue during the discussions in Tehran. Further conversation with Corbanifahr on April 4, indicates that they will want to raise the matter of the original 3,000 Tows as a significant daterrent to a potential Soviet move against Iran. They have also suggested that, if agreement is reached to provide the TOWS.

) We have agreed to discuss

this matter.

-- The Iranians have been told and agreed that they will receive neither hlame nor credit for the seizure/release of the hostages. (



TOP SECRET

202-62-61-

5

SENSIT: VI

N 7519

- -- 'The residual funds from this transaction are allocated as follows:
 - \$2 Million will be used to purchase replacement TOWs for the original 508 sold by Israel to Iran for the release of Benjamin Weir. This is the only way that we have found to meet our commitment to replenish these stocks.
 - \$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Micaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces. This materiel is essential to cover shortages in resistance inventories resulting from their current offensives and Sandiniets counter-attacks and to "bridge" the period between now and when Congressional: approved lethal assistance (beyond the \$25 million in "defensive" arms) can be delivered.

The ultimate objective in the trip to Tehran is to commence the process of improving U.S.-Iranian relations. Both sides are aware that the Iran-Iraq Mar is a major factor that must be discussed. We should not, however, view this meeting as a session which will result in immediate Iranian agreement to proceed with a settlement with Iraq. Rather, this meeting, the first high-level U.S.-Iranian contact in five years, should be seen as a chance to move in this direction. These discussions, as well as follow-on talks, should be governed by the Terms of Reference (TOR) (Tab A) with the recognition that this is, hopefully, the first of many meetings and that the hostage issue once behind us, improves the opportunities for this relationship

Finally, we should recognize that the Iranians will undoubtedly want to discuss additional arms and commercial transactions as "quids" for accommodating , Micaraqua, and Iraq. Our emphasis on the Soviet military and subversive threat, a useful mechanism in bringing them to agreement on the hostage issue, has also served to increase their desire for meanito protect themselves against/deter the Soviets.

RECONDUCKDATION

Approve _

That	the	President	Approve	the struc	ture depic	bes	above	under
*CHII	PAL	Situation'	' and the	terms of	ture depic Reference	44	Tab A.	•

Disapprove .

Attachment Tab A - U.SIranian Terms of Reference					
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April 4, 1986

TERMS OF REFERENCE

N 7520

- 1. BASIC FILLARS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Optional)
- -- President Reagan cars into office at a time when Iran had had a certain impact on the American political process -- perhaps not what you intended.
- -- The President represented and embodied America's recovery from a period of weakness. He has rebuilt American military and economic strength.
- -- Most important, he has restored American will and self-confidence. The U.S. is not afraid to use its power in defense of its interests.
- -- At the same time, we are prepared to resolve political problems on the basis of reciprocity.
- -- We see many international trends -- economic, technological and political -- working in our favor.

II. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: BASIC PRINCIPLES

- A. U.S. Assessment of Iranian Policy.
- We view the Iranian revolution as a fact. The U.S. is not trying to turn the clock back.
- Our present attitude to Iran is not a product of prejudice or emotion, but a clear-eyed assessment of Iran's present policies.
- Iran has used "revolutionary Islam" as a veapon to undermine pro-Western governments and American interests throughout the Middle East. As long as this is Iran's policy, we are bound to be strategic adversaries.
- Support of terrorism and hostage-taking is part of the strategic pattern. We see it used not only against us but against our friends. We cannot accept either. Your influence in achieving the release of all hostage return of those killed (over time) is essential.

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- We see your activity in many parts of the world, including even Central America.
- The U.S. knows how Iran views the Soviet Union. But subversion of Western interests and friends objectively serves Soviet interests on a global scale.
- Thus, our assessment is that a decisive Iranian victory in the war with Iraq would only unleash greater regional instability, a further erosion of the Mestern position, and enhanced opportunities for Soviet trouble-making.
- The U.S. will therefore do what it can to prevent such a development. We regard the war as dangerous in many respects and would like to see an end to it.
- B. Possible Intersections of U.S.-Iranian Interests.
- Despite fundamental conflicts, we perceive several possible intersections of U.S. and Iranian interests.
 I propose we explore these areas.
- First, the U.S. has had a traditional interest in seeing Iran preserve its territorial integrity and independence. This has not changed. The U.S. opposes Soviet designs on Iran.
- Second, we have no interest in a lraqi victory over lran.

onflict and west to use an improved relationship with Iran to further that end.

 Third, we have parallel views on Afghanistan. Soviet policy there is naked aggression, a threat to all in the region.

But our objective is the same: the soviets must get out and let the Afghan people choose their own course.

- C. U.S. Objective Today.
- We have no illusions about what is possible in our bilateral relations. Ferhaps this meeting will reveal only a limited, momentary, tactical coincidence of interests. Ferhaps more. We are prepared either way.
- In essence, we are prepared to have whatever kind of relationship with Iran that Iran is prepared to have with us.

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III. SOVIET MILITAPY POSTURE

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; How they would do it.

- -- Moscow has designs on parts of Iran.
- -- Afghanistan illustrates the price the Soviets are ready to pay to expand areas under their direct control.
- -- Summarize Soviet capabilities along border and inside Afghanistan which could threaten Tehran.
- -- U.S. is aware of Soviet activity
- -- Soviet plans/
- -- Iranian support to Sandinista regime in Micaragua aids and abets Soviet designs -- makes U.S.-Iranian relationship mordifficult (\$100 million in oil last year, plus arms).
- -- U.S. can help Iran cope with Soviet threat.
- IV. AFGRAKISTAN
- -- May be real value for Iran and U.S. to find ways to cooperate against Moscow in Afghanistan.
- -- U.S. can provide humanitarian Assistance for refugeer
- -- We need to know who you work with, what you already provide and devise strategy to exploit Iranian comparative advantage.
- V. MARDWARE
- -- We may be prepared to resume a limited military supply relationship.
- -- However, its evolution and ultimate scope will depend on whether our convergent or our divergent interests come to loom larger in the overall picture.
- -- What does Iran want?

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EXHIBIT OLN-283A

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RELEASE OF AMERICAN ROSTAGES IN BEIRUT

Background. In June 1985, private American and Israeli citizens commenced an operation to effect the release of the American hostages in Beirut in exchange for providing certain factions in Iran with U.S.-origin Israeli military materiel. By September, U.S. and Igraeli Government officials became involved in this endeavor in order to ensure that the USG would:

- -- not object to the Israeli transfer of embargond Exteriel to Iran;
- -- sell replacement items to Israel as replanishment for like items sold to Iran by Israel.

On September 13, the Israeli Government, with the endorsement of the USG, transferred 508 basic TOW missiles to Iran. Forty-eight hours later, Reverend Benjamin Meir was released in Beirut.

Subsequent efforts by both governments to continue this process have met with frustration due to the need to communicate our intentions through an Iranian expatriate arms dealer in Europe. In January 1986, under the provisions of a new Covert Action Finding, the USG demanded a meeting with responsible Iranian government officials.

On February 20, a U.S. Government official met with

the first direct U.S.-Iranian contact in over five years. At this meeting, the U.S. side made an effort to refocus Iranian attention on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need to establish a longer term relationship between our two countries based on more than arms transactions. It was emphasized that the hostage issue was a "hurdle" which must be crossed before this improved relationship could prosper. During the meeting, it also became apparent that our conditions/demands had not been accurately transmitted to the Iranian Government by the intermediary and it was agreed that:

- -- The USG would establish its good faith and bons fides by immediately providing 1,000 TOW missiles for sale to Iran. This transaction was covertly completed on February 21, using a private U.S. firm and the Israelis as intermediaries.
- -- A subsequent meeting would be held in Iran with senior U.S and Iranian officials during which the U.S. hostages would be released.

-- Immediately after the hostages were eafely in our hands, the U.S. would sell an additional 3,000 TOW missiles to Iran using the same procedures employed during the September 1985 transfer.

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In early Merch, the Iranian expatriate intermediary damanded that Iranian conditions for release of the hostages now included the prior sale of 200 PROEMIX missiles and an unspecified number of HARPOON missiles, in addition to the 3,000 Tows which would be delivered after the hostages were released. A subsequent meeting was held with the intermediary in Paris on March 8, wherein it was explained that the requirement for prior deliveries violated the understandings reached in Frankfurt on February 20, and were therefore unacceptable. It was further moved that the Iranian therefore unacceptable. It was further noted that the Iranian aircraft and ship launchers for these missiles were in such disrepair that the missiles could not be launched even if provided.

From March 9 until March 10, there was no further effort undertaken on our behalf to contact the Iranian Government or the intermediary. On March 26, and an unsolicited call to the phone-drop in Maryland which we had established for this purpose. Asked why we had not been in contact and urged that we proceed expeditiously since the situation in Beirut was deteriorating rapidly. He was informed by our Farsi-speaking interpreter that the conditions requiring additional materiel beyond the 3,000 TOMs were unacceptable and that we could in no case provide anything else prior to the release of our hostages.

Cobserved that we were correct in our assessment of their inability to use PHOEMIX and HARPOON missiles and that the most urgent requirement that Iran had was to place their current HAWK missile inventory in working condition. In a subsequent phone missile inventory in working condition. In a subsequent phone call, we agreed to discuss this matter with him and he indicated that he would prepare an inventory of parts required to make their HAMK systems operational. This parts list was received on March 28, and verified by CIA.

Current Situation. On April 3, Ari Gorbanifahr, the Iranian intermediary, arrived in Mashington, D.C. with instructions from to consummate final arrangements for the return of the hostages. Gorbanifahr was reportedly enfranchised to negotiate the types, quantities, and delivery procedures for material the U.S. would sell to Iran through Israel. The meeting lested nearly all night on April 1-4, and involved numerous calls to Tehran.

A Parsi-speaking CIA officer in attendance.was able to verify the substance of his calls to Tehran during the meeting. Subject to Presidential approval, it was agreed to proceed as follows:

By Monday, April 7, the Tranian Government will transfer \$17 million to an Israeli account in Switzerland. The Israelis will, in turn, transfer to a private U.S. corporation account in Switzerland the sum of \$15 million.

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- -- On Tuesday, April 8 (or as soon as the transactions are verified), the private U.S. corporation will transfer \$3.651 million to a CIA account in Switzerland. CIA will then transfer this sum to a covert Department of the Army account in the U.S.
- -- On Mednesday, April 9, the CIA will commence procuring \$3.651 million worth of HAMK missile parts (240 separate line items) and transferring these parts to This process is

estimated to take seven working days.

- On Friday, April 18, a private U.S. aircraft (7078) will pick-up the EANK missile parts at MMD and fly them to a covert Israeli airfield for prepositioning (this field was used for the earlier delivery of the 1000 TOWs). At this field, the parts will be transferred to an Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) aircraft with false markings. A SATCOM capability will be positioned at this location.
- -- On Saturday, April 19, McFarlane, Morth, Teicher, Cave, and a SATCON communicator will board a CIA sircraft in Frankfurt, Germany, enroute to Tehran.
 - -- On Sunday, April 20, the following series of events will occur:
 - U.S. party arrives Tehran (A-hour) -- met by Rafsanjani, as head of the Iranian delegation.
 - At A+7 hours, the U.S. hostages will be released in Beirut.
 - At A+15 hours, the IDP aircraft with the HAMK missile parts aboard will land at Sandar Abbas, Iran.

<u>Discussion</u>. The following points are relevant to this transaction, the discussions in Iran, and the establishment of a broader relationship between the United States and Iran:

The Irahians have been told that our presence in Iran is a "holy commitment" on the part of the USG that we are sincere and can be trusted. There is great distrust of the U.S. among the various Iranian parties involved. Without our presence on the ground in Iran, they will not believe that we will fulfill our end of the bargain after the hostages are released.

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Chadhaffi's efforts to "buy" the hostages could succeed in the near future. Further, the Transans are well sware that the situation in Beirut is deteriorating rapidly and that the ability of the IROC to effect the release of the hostages will become increasingly more difficult over time.

-- We have convinced the Irarians of a significant near term and long range threat from the Soviet Union. We have real and deceptive intelligence to demonstrate this threat during the visit. They have expressed considerable interest in this matter as part of the longer term relationship.

-- The Iranians have been told that their provision of assistance to Micaragua is unacceptable to us and they have agreed to discuss this matter in Tehran.

-- We have further indicated to the Iranians that we wish to discuss steps leading to a cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq.

The Iranians are well aware that their most immediate needs are for technical assistance in maintaining their air force and navy. We should expect that they will raise this issue during the discussions in Tehran. Further conversation with Gorbanifahr on April 4, indicates that they will want to raise the matter of the original 3,000 TOMs as a significant deterrent to a potential Soviet move against Iran. They have also suggested that, if agreement is reached to provide the TOMs

-- The Iranians have been told and agreed that they will receive neither_blame nor credit for the seizure/release of the bostages.

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- The residual funds from this transaction are allocated as follows:
 - \$2 million will be used to purchase replacement TOWS for the original 508 sold by Israel to Iran for the release of Benjamin Weir. This is the only way that we "have found to meet our commitment to replenish these stocks.
 - \$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Micaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces. This material is essential to cover shortages in resistance inventories resulting from their current offensives and Sandinista counter-attacks and to "bridge" the period between now and when Congressional! "bridge" the period between now and when Congressionally-approved lethal assistance (beyond the \$25 million in "defensive" arms) can be delivered.

The untimate objective in the trip to Tehran is to commence the process of improving U.S.-Tranian relations. Both sides are aware that the Iran-Iraq War is a major factor that must be discussed. We should not, however, view this meeting as a session which will result in immediate Iranian agreement to proceed with a vettlement with Iraq. Rather, this meeting, the first high-level U.S.-Iranian contact in five years, should be seen as a chance to move in this direction. These discussions, as well as follow-on talks, should be governed by the Terms of Reference (TOR) (Tab A) with the recognition that this is, hopefully, the first of many meetings and that the hostage issue, once behind us, improves the opportunities for this relationship.

Finally, we should recognise that the Tranians will undoubtedly want to discuss additional arms and commercial transactions as "quids" for accommodating the society of the society and Iraq. Our emphasis on the Soviet military and subversive threat, a useful mechanism in bringing them to agreement on the hostage issue, has also served to increase their desire for means to protect themselves against/deter the Soviets.

RECONSTRUCTION

That the President approve the structure depicted above under "Current Situation" and the Terms of Reference at Tab A.

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Tab A - U.S.-Iranian Terms of Reference

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EXHIBIT OLN-283B

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RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN BEIRUT 590

Background. In June 1985, private American and israeli citizens commenced an operation to effect the release of the American hostages in Beirut in exchange for providing certain factions in Iran with U.S.-origin Israeli military materiel. By September, U.S. and Israeli Government officials became involved in this endeavor in order to ensure that the USG would:

- not object to the Israeli transfer of embargoed material to Irani
- sell replacement items to Israel as replenishment for like items sold to Iran by Israel.

on September 2, the Israeli Government, with the endorsement of the USG, transferred 508 basic TON missiles to Iran. Forty-eighthours later, Reverend Benjamin Weir was released in Beirut. Forty-eight

Subsequent efforts by both governments to continue this process have met with frustration due to the need to communicate our intentions through an Iranian expatriate arms dealer in Europe. In January 1986, under the provisions of a new Covert Action Finding, the USG demanded a meeting with responsible Iranian government officials.

On February 20, a U.S. Government official met with

the first direct U.S.-Iranian contact in over five years. At this meeting, the U.S. side made an effort to refocus Iranian attention on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need to establish a longer term relationship between our two countries based on more than arms transactions. It was emphasized that the hostage issue was a "hurdle" which must be crossed before this improved relationship could prosper. During the meeting, it also became apparent that our conditions/demands had not been accurately transmitted to the Iranian Government by the intermediary and it was agreed that

- The USG would establish its good faith and bone fides by immediately providing 1,000 TOW missiles for sale to Iran. This transaction was covertly completed on February 21, using a private U.S. firm and the Israelis as intermediaries.
- A subsequent meeting would be held in Iran with senior U.S and Iranian officials during which the U.S. hostages would be released.
- Immediately after the hostages were safely in our hands, the U.S. would sell an additional 3,000 TOW missiles to Iran using the same procedures employed during the September 1985 transfer.

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In early March, the Iranian expatriate intermediary demanded that Iranian conditions for release of the hostages now included the prior sale of 200 PHOENIX missiles and an unspecified number of MARPOON missiles, in addition to the 1,000 Tows which would be delivered after the hostages were released. A subsequent meeting was held with the intermediary in Paris on March 8, wherein it was explained that the requirement for prior deliveries violated the understandings reached in Frankfurt on February 20, and were therefore unacceptable. It was further noted that the Iranian aircraft and ship launchers for these missiles were in such disrepair that the missiles could not be launched even if provided.

From March 9 until March 30, there was no further effort undertaken on our behalf to contact the Iranian Government or the intermediary. On March 26, the standard was dean unsolicited call to the phone-drop in Maryland which we had established for this purpose. Wasked why we had not been in contact and urged that we proceed expeditiously since the situation in Beirut was deteriorating rapidly. He was informed by our Farsi-speaking interpreter that the conditions requiring additional materiel beyond the 3,000 TOWs were unacceptable and that we could in no case provide anything else prior to the release of our hostages. Observed that we were correct in our assessment of their inability to use PHOENIX and EARPOON missiles and that the most urgent requirement that Iran had was to place their current HAWK missile inventory in working condition. In a subsequent phone call, we agreed to discuss this matter with him and he indicated that he would prepare an inventory of parts required to make their HAWK systems operational. This parts list was received on March 28, and verified by CIA.

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A Farsi-speaking CIA officer in attendance was able to verify the substance of his calls to Tehran during the meeting. Subject to Presidential approval, it was agreed to proceed as follows:

By Monday, April 7, the Iranian Government will transfer \$17 million to an Israeli account in Svitzerland. The Israelis will, in turn, transfer to a private U.S. Corporation account in Switzerland the sum of \$15 million.

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<u>Discussion</u>. The following points are relevant to this transaction, the discussions in Iran, and the establishment of a broader relationship between the United States and Iran:

The Iranians have been told that our presence in Iran is a "holy commitment" on the part of the USG that we are sincere and can be trusted. There is great distrust of the U.S. among the various Iranian parties involved. Without our presence on the ground in Iran, they will not believe that we will fulfill our end of the bargain after the hostages are released.

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Chadharri's errorts to "buy" the hostages could succeed in the near future. Further, the Iranians are well aware that the situation in Beirut is deteriorating rapidly and that the ability of the IRGC to effect the release of the hostages will become increasingly more difficult over time.

We have convinced the Iranians of a significant near term and long range threat from the Soviet Union. We have real and deceptive intelligence to demonstrate this threat during the visit. They have expressed considerable interest in this matter as part of the longer term relationship.

The Iranians have been told that their provision of assistance to Nicaraque is unacceptable to us and they have agreed to discuss this matter in Tehran.

We have further indicated to the Iranians that we wish to discuss steps leading to a cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq.

The Iranians are well aware that their most immediate needs are for technical assistance in maintaining their sir force and navy. We should expect that they will raise this issue during the discussions in Tehran. Further conversation with Gorbanifahr on April 4, indicates that they will want to raise the matter of the original 3,000 TOMs as a significant deterrent to a potential Soviet move against Iran. They have also suggested that, if agreement is reached to provide the TOMs

The Iranians here been told and agreed that they will receive neither blame nor credit for the seizure/release of the hostages.

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- The residual funds from this transaction are allocated as follows:
 - \$2 million will be used to purchase replacement TOWs for the original 50% sold by Israel to Iran for the release of Benjamin Weir. This is the only way that we have found to meet our commitment to replenish these stocks.
 - \$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Micaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces. This materiel is essential to cover shortages in resistance inventories resulting from their current offensives and Sandinista counter-attacks and to "bridge" the period between now and when Congressionally-approved lethal assistance (beyond the \$25 million in "defensive" arms) can be delivered.

The ultimate objective in the trip to Tehran is to commence the process of improving U.S.-Iranian relations. Both sides are aware that the Iran-Iraq War is a major factor that must be discussed. We should not, however, view this meeting as a session which will result in immediate Iranian agreement to proceed with a settlement with Iraq. Rather, this meeting, the first high-level U.S.-Iranian contact in five years, should be seen as a chance to move in this direction. These discussions, as well as follow-on talks, should be governed by the Terms of Reference (TOR) (Tab A) with the recognition that this is, hopefully, the first of many meetings and that the hostage issue, once behind us, improves the opportunities for this relationship.

Finally, we should recognize that the Iranians will undoubtedly want to discuss additional arms and commercial transactions as "quids" for accomposating the source military and subversive and Iraq. Our emphasis on the Soviet military and subversive threat, a useful mechanism in bringing them to agreement on the hostage issue, has also served to increase their desire for means to protect themselves against/deter the Soviets.

RECOMMENDATION

That the President approve the structure depicted above under "Current Situation" and the Terms of Reference at Tab A.

Approve	Disapprove	
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Attachment
Tab A - U.S.-Iranian Terms of Reference

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April 4, 1986

TERMS OF REFERENCE

- BASIC PILLARS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Optional)
- President Reagan came into office at a time when Iran had had a certain impact on the American political process -perhaps not what you intended.
- The President represented and embodied America's recovery from a period of weakness. He has rebuilt American military and economic strength.
- Most important, he has restored American will and self-confidence. The U.S. is not afraid to use its power in defense of its interests. We are not intimidated by Soviet pressures, whether on arms control or Angola or Central America or Afghanistan.
- At the same time, we are prepared to-resolve political problems on the basis of reciprocity.
- We see many international trends -- economic, technological, and political -- working in our favor.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: BASIC PPINCIPLES

- U.S. Assessment of Iranian Policy.
- We view the Iranian revolution as a fact. The U.S. is not trying to turn the clock back.
- Our present attitude to Iran is not a product of prejudice or emotion, but a clear-eyed assessment of Iran's present policies.
- Iran has used "revolutionary Islam" as a weapon to undermine pro-Western governments and American interests throughout the Middle East. As long is Iran's policy, we are bound to be strategic As long as this adversaries.
- Support of terrorism and hostage-taking is part of this support of terrorism and nostage-taking is part of this strategic pattern. We see it used not only against us, but against our friends. We cannot accept either. Your influence in achieving the release of all hostages return of those killed (over time) is essential.

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- We see your activity in many parts of the world,
 including even Central America.
- The U.S. knows how Iran views the Soviet Union. But subversion of Western Interests and friends objectively serves Soviet interests on a global scale.
- Thus, our assessment is that a decisive Iranian victory in the war with Iraq would only unleash greater regional instability, a further erosion of the Western position, and enhanced opportunities for Soviet trouble-making.
- The C.S. will therefore do what it can to prevent such a development. We regard the war as dangerous in many respects and would like to see an end to it.
- B. Possible Intersections of U.S.-Iranian Interests.
- Despite fundamental conflicts, we perceive several possible intersections of U.S. and Iranian interests.
 I propose we explore these areas.
- First, the U.S. has had a traditional interest in seeing Iran preserve its territorial integrity and independence. This has not changed. The U.S. opposes Soviet designs on Iran.
- Second, we have no interest in a lraqu victory over lran.

We are seeking an end to this conflict and want to use an improved relationship with Iran to further that end.

Third, we have parallel views on Afghanistan. Soviet policy there is naked aggression, a threat to all in the region.

Objective is the same: the Soviets must get out and let the Afghan people choose their own course.

- C. U.S. Objective Today.
- We have no illusions about what is possible in our bilateral relations. Perhaps this meeting will reveal only a limited, momentary, tactical coincidence of interests. Perhaps more. We are prepared either way.
- In essence, we are prepared to have whatever kind of relationship with Iran that Iran is prepared to have with us.

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III. SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

- -- Moscow has designs on parts of Iran.
- -- Afghanistan illustrates the price the Soviets are ready to pay to expand areas under their direct control.
- -- Summarise Soviet capabilities along border and inside Afghanistan which could threaten Tehran.
- -- U.F. is avare of Soviet activity
- -- Soviet plans -- Bow they would do it.
- -- Iranian support to Sandinista regime in Nicaragua aids and abets Soviet designs -- makes U.S.-Iranian relationship more difficult (\$100 million in oil last year, plus arms).
- -- U.S. can help Iran cope with Soviet threat.
- IV. AFGRANISTAN
- -- May be real value for Iran and U.S. to find ways to cooperate against Moscow in Afghanistan.
- -- U.S. car provide humanitarian assistance for refugees,
 - -- We need to know who you work with, what you already provide, and devise strategy to exploit Transan comparative advantage.
- V. FARDWARE
- -- We may be prepared to resume a limited military supply relationship.
- -- However, its evolution and ultimate scope will depend on whether our convergent or our divergent interests come to loom larger in the overall picture.
- -- What does Iran want?

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EXHIBIT OLN-283C



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Background. In June 1985, private American and Israeli citizens commenced an operation to effect the release of the American hostages in Seiret in exchange for providing certain fictions in Iran with U.S.-erigin Israeli military materiel. By September, U.S. and Israeli Government officials became involved in this endeavor in order to ensure that the USG would:

- -- not object to the Israeli transfer of embargoed material to Iran;
- -- sell replacement items to Israel as replenishment for like items sold to Iran by Israel.

On September 14, the Israeli Government, with the endorsement of the USG, transferred 508 basic TOW missiles to Iran. Forty-eight hours later, Reverend Senjamin Weir was released in Beirut.

Subsequent efforts by both governments to continue this process have met with frustration due to the need to communicate our intentions through an Iranian expatriate arms dealer in Europe. In January 1986, under the provisions of a new Covert Action Finding, the USG demanded a meeting with responsible Iranian government officials.

On February 20, a U.S. Government official met with

the first direct U.S.-Iranian contact in over five years. At this meeting, the U.S. side made an effort to refocus Iranian attention on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need to establish a longer term relationship between our two countries based on more than arms transactions. It was emphasized that the hostage issue was a "hurdle" which must be crossed before this improved relationship could prosper. During the meeting, it also became apparent that our conditions/demands had not been accurately transmitted to the Iranian Government by the intermediary and it was agreed that:

- -- The USG would establish its good faith and bona fides by immediately providing 1,000 TOW missiles for sale to Iran. This transaction was covertly completed on February 21, using a private U.S. firm and the Israelis as intermediaries.
- -- A subsequent meeting would be held in Iran with senior U.S and Iranian officials during which the U.S. hostages would be released.
- -- Immediately after the hostages were safely in our hands, the U.S. would sell an additional 3,000 TOW missiles to Iran using the same procedures employed during the September 1985 transfer.

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Under provisions of E.O. 12356
by B. Reger, National Security Council

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In early March, the Marian expetriate intermediary demanded that Iranian conditions for release of the hostages now included the prior sale of 200 FROEMIX missiles and an unspecified number of MARFOOM missiles, in addition to the 3,000 TOWs which would be delivered after the hostages were released. A subsequent meeting was held with the intermediary in Feris on March 8, wherein it was explained that the requirement for prior deliveries violated the understandings reached in Frankfurt on February 20, and were therefore unacceptable. It was further noted that the Iranian aircraft and ship launchers for these missiles were in such disrepair that the missiles could not be launched even if provided.

From March 9 until March 10, there was no further effort undertaken on our behalf to contact the Iranian Government or the intermediary. On March 26, the same made an unsolicited call to the phone-drop in Maryland Value we had established for this purpose. The saked why we had not been in contact and urged that we proceed expeditiously since the situation in Beirut was deteriorating rapidly. He was informed by our Farsi-speaking interpreter that the conditions requiring additional material beyond the 3,000 Toks were unacceptable and that we could in no case provide anything else prior to the release of our hostages. The observed that we were correct in our assessment of their inability to use PHOEMIX and HARPOOF resiles and that the most urgent requirement that Iran had we so place their current HAMX missile inventory in working condit in. In a subsequent phone call, we agreed to discuss this matter with him and he indicated that he would prepare an inventory of parts required to make their HAMX systems operational. This parts list was received on March 28, and verified by CIA.

Current Situation. On April 3, Ari Gorbanifahr, the Iranian intermediary, arrived in Mashington, D.C. with instructions from to consummate final arrangements for the return of the hostages. Gorbanifahr was reportedly enfranchised to negotiate the types, quantities, and delivery procedures for material the U.S. would sell to Iran through Israel. The meeting lasted nearly all night on April 3-4, and involved numerous calls to Tehran.

A Farsi-speaking CIA officer in attendance was able to verify the substance of his calls to rehran during the meeting. Subject to Presidential approval, it was agreed to proceed as follows:

By Monday, April 7, the Iranian Government will transfer \$17 million to an Israeli account in Switzerland. The Israelis will, in turn, transfer to a private U.S. corporation account in Switzerland the sum of \$15 million.

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- On Tuesday, April 8 (or as soon as the transections are verified), the private U.S. corporation will transfer \$3.691 million to a CIA account in Switzerland. CIA will then transfer this sum to a covert Department of the Army account in the U.S.
- on Wednesday, April 9, the CIA will commence procuring \$3.651 million worth of MANK missile parts (240 separate line items) and transferring these parts to this process.le
- On Friday, April 18, a private U.S. giroraft (7078) will pick-up the RAWK missile parts at the and fly them to a covert Israeli airfield for prepositioning (this field was used for the earlier delivery of the 1000 TOWs). At this field, the parts will be transferred to an Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) aircraft with false markings. A SATCOM capability will be positioned at this location.
- on Saturday, April 19, McFarlane, North, Teicher, Cave, and a SATCOM communicator will board a CIA airgraft in Frankfurt, Germany, enroute to Tehran.
- -- On Sunday, April 20, the following series of events will occur:
 - U.S. party arrives Tehran (A-hour) -- met by Rafsanjani, as head of the Irabian delegation.
 - At A+7 hours, the U.S. hostages will be released in Seirut.
 - At A+15 hours, the IDF aircraft with the KAWK missile parts aboard will land at Bandar Abbas, Iran.

<u>Discussion</u>. The following points are relevant to this transaction, the discussions in Iran, and the establishment of a broader relationship between the United States and Iran:

The Iranians have been told that our presence in Iran is a "holy commitment" on the part of the USG that we are sincere and can be trusted. There is great distrust of the U.S. among the various Iranian parties involved. Without our presence on the ground in Iran, they will not believe that we will fulfill our end of the bargain after the hostages are released.

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Checkeffi's efforts to "buy" the hestages could succeed in the mear future. Further, the Iranians are well aware that the situation in Beirut is deteriorating rapidly and that the ability of the IRSC to effort the release of the hostages will become increasingly more difficult over time.

-- We have convinced the Iranians of a significant near term and long range threat from the Soviet Union. We have real and deceptive intelligence to demonstrate this threat during the visit. They have expressed sensiderable interest in this matter as part of the longer term relationship.



- -- The Irenians have been told that their provision of assistance to Micaragua is unacceptable to us and they have agreed to discuss this matter in Tehran.
- -- We have further indicated to the Iranians that we wish to discuss steps leading to a cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq.
- The Iranians are well aware that their most immediate needs are for technical assistance in maintaining their air force and navy. We should expect that they will raise this assue during the discussions in Tehran. Further conversation with Gorbanifahr on April 4, indicates that they will want to raise the matter of the original 3,000 TOMs as a significant deterrent to a potential Soviet move against Iran. They have also suggested that, if agreement is reached to provide the TOMs.

-- The Iranians have been told and agreed that they will receive neither blane nor gradit for the seisure/release of the hostages.

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
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- -- The residual funds from this transaction are allocated as follows:
 - \$2 million will be used to purchase replacement TOWs for the original \$00 sold by Israel to Iran for the release of Senjamin Weir. This is the only way that we have found to meet our commitment to replenish these stocks.
 - \$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Micaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces. This materiel is essential to cover shortages in resistance inventories resulting from their current offensives and Sandinista counter-attacks and to "bridge" the period between now and when Congressionally-approved lethal assistance (beyond the \$25 million in "defensive" arms) can be delivered.

The ultimate objective in the trip to Tehran is to commence the process of improving U.S.-Iranian relations. Both sides are aware that the Iran-Iraq War is a major factor that must be discussed. We should not, however, view this meeting as a session which will result in immediate Iranian agreement to proceed with a settlement with Iraq. Rather, this meeting, the first high-level U.S.-Iranian contact in five years, should be seen as a chance to move in this direction. These discussions, as well as follow-on talks, should be governed by the Terms of Reference (TOR) (Tab A) with the recognition that this is, hopefully, the first of many meetings and that the hostage issue, once behind us, improves the opportunities for this relationship.

Finally, we should recognize that the Iranians will undoubtedly want to discuss additional arms and commercial transactions as "quids" for accommodating and Iraq. Our emphasis on the soviet military and subversive threat, a useful mechanism in bringing them to agreement on the hostage issue, has also served to increase their desire for means to protect themselves against/deter the Soviets.

RECONCENDATION

That the President approve the structure depicted above under "Current Situation" and the Terms of Reference at Tab A.

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Attachment Tab A - U.S.-Irenian Terms of Reference

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PENSETSUA APRIL 4, 1986 N 28851

- I. BASIC FILLARS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Optional)
- -- President Reagan came into office at a time when Iran had had a certain impact on the American political process -- perhaps not what you intended.
- -- The President represented and embodied America's recovery from a period of weakness. He has rebuilt American military and economic strength.
- -- Most important, he has restored American vill and self-confidence. The U.S. is not afraid to use its power in defense of its interests. We are not intimidated by Soviet pressures, whether on arms control or Angola or Central America or Afghanistan.
- -- At the same time, we are prepared to resolve political problems on the basis of reciprocity.
- -- We see many international trends -- economic, technological, and political -- working in our favor.

II. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: BASIC PRINCIPLES

- A. U.S. Assessment of Iranian Policy.
- We view the Iranian revolution as a fact. The U.S. is not trying to turn the clock back.
- Our present attitude to Iran is not a product of prejudice or amotion, but a clear-eyed assessment of Iran's present policies.
- Iran has used "revolutionary Islam" as a weapon to undermine pro-Western governments and American interests throughout the Middle East. As long as this is Iran's policy, we are bound to be atrategic adversaries.
- Support of terrorism and hostage-taking is part of this strategic pattern. We see it used not only against us, but against our friends. We cannot accept either. Your influence in achieving the release of all hostages return of those killed (over time) is essential.

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- fares of the world, 28852 We see your activity in many pa including even Central America.
- The U.S. knows how Iran views the Soviet Union. Sut subversion of Western interests and friends objectively serves Soviet interests on a global scale.
- Thus, our assessment is that a decisive Iranian victory in the war with Iraq would only unless greater regional instability, a further erosion of the Western position, and enhanced opportunities for Soviet trouble-making.
- The U.S. will therefore do what it can to prevent such a development. We regard the war as dangerous in many respects and would like to see an end to it.
- Possible Intersections of U.S.-Iranian Interests. 3.
- Despite fundamental conflicts, we perceive several possible intersections of U.S. and Iranian interests. I propose we explore these areas.
- First, the U.S. has had a traditional interest in seeing Iran preserve its territorial integrity and independence. This has not changed. The U.S. opposes Soviet designs on Iran.
- second ve have no interest in a Iraci victory over Iran.

We are seeking an end to this conflict and want to use an improved relationship with Iran to further that end.

Third, we have parallel views on Afghanistan. Soviet policy there is maked aggression, a threat to all in the region.

objective is the same: the Soviets Bust get out and let the Afghan people choose their own course.

U.S. Objective Today. c.

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- We have no illusions about what is possible in our bilateral relations. Perhaps this meeting will reveal only a limited, momentary, tactical coincidence of interests. Perhaps more. We are prepared either way.
- In essence, we are prepared to have whatever kind of relationship with Iran that Iran is prepared to have with us.

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III. SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

Moscow has designs on parts of Iran.

- Afghanistan illustrates the price the Soviets are ready to pay to expand areas under their direct control.
- Summarise Soviet capabilities along border and inside Afghanistan which could threaten Tehran.
- U.S. is avere of Soviet activity
- soviet plans

Bow they would do it.

- Iranian support to Sandinista regime in Micaragua aids and abets Soviet designs -- makes U.S.-Iranian relationship more difficult (\$100 million in oil last year, plus arms).
- U.S. can help Iran cope with Soviet threat.

AFGRANISTAN IV.

- May be real value for Iran and U.S. to find ways to cooperate against Moscow in Afghanistan.
- U.S. can provide humanitarian assistance for refugees
- We need to know who you work with, what you already provide, and devise strategy to exploit Iranian comparative advantage.


MARDWARE ٧.

- We may be prepared to resume a limited military supply relationship.
- Rowever, its evolution and ultimate scope will depend on whether our convergent or our divergent interests come to loom larger in the overall picture.
- What does Iran want?

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EXHIBIT OLN-283D



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RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN BEIRT

Background. In June 1985, private American and Israeli citizens commenced an operation to effect the release of the American thostages in Beirut in exchange for providing certain factions in Iran with U.S.-origin Israeli military material. By September, U.S. and Israeli Government officials became involved in this endeavor in order to ensure that the USG would:

- -- not object to the Israeli transfer of embargoed material to Iran;
- -- sell replacement items to Israel as replanishment for like items sold to Iran by Israel.

On September 14, the Israeli Government, with the endorsement of the USG, transferred 508 basic TOW missiles to Iran. Forty-eight hours later, Reverend Benjamin Weir was released in Beirut.

Subsequent efforts by both governments to continue this process have met with frustration due to the need to communicate our intentions through an Iranian expatriate arms dealer in Europe. In January 1986, under the provisions of a new Covert Action Finding, the USG demanded a meeting with responsible Iranian government officials.

On February 20, a U.S. Government official met with

the first direct U.S.-Tranian contact in over five years. At this meeting; the U.S. side made an effort to refocus Iranian attention on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need to establish a longer term relationship between our two countries based on more than arms transactions. It was emphasized that the hostage issue was a "hurdle" which must be crossed before this improved relationship oould prosper. During the meeting, it also became apparent that our conditions/demands had not been accuratel transmitted to the Iranian Government by the intermediary and it was agreed that:

- -- The USG would establish its good faith and bona fides by immediately providing 1,000 TOW missiles for sale to Iran. This transaction was covertly completed on Pebruary 21, using a private U.S. firm and the Israelis as intermediaries
- -- A subsequent meeting would be held in Iran with senior U.S and Iranian officials during which the U.S. hostages would be released.
- -- Immediately after the hostages were safely in our hands, the U.S. would sell an additional 3,000 TOW missiles to Iran using the same procedures employed during the September 1985 transfer.

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In early March, the Iranian expatriate intermediary demanded that Iranian conditions for release of the hostages now included the prior sale of 300 PMOEMIX missiles and an unspecified number of EARPOOK missiles, in addition to the 3,000 TOWS which would be delivered after the hostages were released. A subsequent meeting was held with the intermediary in Paris on March 8, wherein it was explained that the requirement for prior deliveries violated the understandings reached in Frankfurt on February 20, and were therefore unacceptable. It was further noted that the Iranian aircraft and ship launchers for these missiles were in such disrepair that the missiles could not be launched even if provided

From March 9 until March 30, there was no further effort undertaken on our behalf to contact the Iranian Government or the intermediary. On March 26, and a made an unsolicited call to the phone-drop in Maryland which we had established for this purpose. It is asked why we had not been in contact and urged that we proceed expeditiously since the situation in Beirut was deteriorating rapidly. He was informed by our Parsi-speaking interpreter that the conditions requiring additional material by yond the 3,000 Tows were unacceptable and that we could in no case provide anything else prior to the release of our hostages. Observed that we were correct in our assessment of their inability to use PHOENIX and EARPOON missiles and that the most urgent requirement that Iran had was to place their current RAWK missile inventory in working condition. In a subsequent phone call, we agreed to discuss this matter with him and he indicated that he would prepare an inventory of parts required to make their HAWK systems operational. This parts list was received on March 28, and verified by CIA.


Current Situation. On April 3, Ari Gorbanifahr, the Iranian Intermediary, arrived in Washington, D.C. with instructions from to consummate final arrangements for the return of the hostages. Gorbanifahr was reportedly enfranchised to negotiate the types, quantities, and delivery procedures for material the U.S. would sell to Iran through Israel. The meeting lasted nearly all night on April 3-4, and involved numerous calls to Tehran.

A Parsi-speaking CIA officer in attendance was able to verify the substance of his calls to Tehran during the meeting. Subject to Presidential approval, it was agreed to proceed as follows:

-- By Monday, April 7, the Iranian Government will transfer \$17 million to an Israeli account in Switzerland. The Israelis will, in turn, transfer to a private U.S. corporation account in Switzerland the sum of \$15 million.

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- -- On Tuesday, April 8 (or as soon as the transactions are verified), the private U.S. corporation will transfer \$3.651 million to a CIA account in Switzerland. CIA will then transfer this sum to a covert Department of the Army account in the U.S.
- on Wednesday, April 9, the CIA will commence procuring \$3.651 million worth of HAWR missile parts (240 separate line items) and transferring these parts to This process is estimated to take seven working days.
- on Friday, April 18, a private U.S. aircraft (7078) will pick-up the HAMK missile parts at the and fly them to a covert Israeli airfield for prepositioning (this field was used for the earlier delivery of the 1888 TOWS). At this field, the parts will be transferred to an Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) aircraft with false markings. A SATCOM capability will be positioned at this location.
- -- On Saturday, April 19, McFarlane, Morth, Teicher, Cave, and a SATCOM communicator will board a CIA aiscraft in Frankfurt, Germany, enroute to Tehran.
- -- On Sunday, April 20, the following series of events will occur:
 - U.S. party arrives Tehran (A-hour) -- met by Rafsanjani, as head of the Iranian delegation.
 - At A+7 hours, the U.S. hostages will be released in Seirut.
 - At A+15 hours, the IDT aircraft with the HAWK missile parts aboard will land at Bandar Abbas, Iran.

<u>Discussion</u>. The following points are relevant to this transaction, the discussions in Iran, and the establishment of a broader relationship between the United States and Iran:

-- The Iranians have been told that our presence in Iran is a "holy commitment" on the part of the USG that we are sincere and can be trusted. There is great distrust of the U.S. among the various Iranian parties involved. Without our presence on the ground in Iran, they will not believe that we will fulfill our end of the bargain after the hostages are released.





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Gorbanifahr specifically mentioned that Ohadhaffi's efforts to "buy" the hostages could succeed in the near future. Further, the Iranians are well aware that the situation in Beirut is deteriorating rapidly and that the ability of the IRGC to effect the release of the hostages will become increasingly more difficult over time.

-- We have convinced the Tranians of a significant near term and long range threat from the Soviet Union. We have real and deceptive intelligence to demonstrate this threat during the visit. They have expressed considerable interest in this matter as part of the longer term relationship.



- The Iranians have been told that their provision of assistance to Micaragua is unacceptable to us and they have agreed to discuss this matter in Tehran.
- -- We have further indicated to the Iranians that we wish to discuss steps leading to a cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq.
- The Iranians are well aware that their most immediate needs are for technical assistance in maintaining their air force and navy. We should expect that they will raise this issue during the discussions in Tehran. Further conversation with Gorbanifahr on April 4, indicates that they will want to raise the matter of the original 3,000 TOWs as a significant deterrent to a potential Soviet move against Iran. They have also suggested that, if agreement is reached to provide the TOWs,
- -- The Iranians have been told and agreed that they will receive neither blame nor credit for the seisure/release of the hostages.

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- -- The residual funds from this transaction are allocated as follows:
 - \$2 million will be used to purchase replacement TOWs for the original 508 sold by lerael to Iran for the release of Benjamin Weir. This is the only way that we have found to meet our commitment to replenish these stocks.
 - \$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Micaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces. This material is essential to cover shortages in resistance inventories resulting from their current offensives and Sandinista counter-attacks and to "bridge" the period between now and when Congressionally approved lethal assistance (beyond the \$25 million in "defensive" arms) can be delivered.

The ultimate objective in the trip to Tehran is to commence the process of improving U.S.-Iranian relations. Both sides are aware that the Iran-Iraq War is a major factor that must be discussed. We should not, however, view this meeting as a session which will result in immediate Iranian agreement to proceed with a settlement with Iraq. Rather, this seeting, the first high-level U.S.-Iranian contact in five years, should be seen as a chance to move in this direction. These discussions, as well as follow-on talks, should be governed by the Terms of Reference (TOR) (Tab A) with the recognition that this is, hopefully, the first of many meetings and that the hostage issue, once behind us, improves the opportunities for this relationship.

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
RECOMMENDATION

That the President approve the structure depicted above under "Current Situation" and the Terms of Reference at Tab A.

Disapprove _

Attachment Tab A	-	U.SIranian	Terms	of	Reference

Approve _









TERMS OF REFERENCE U.S.-Iran Dialogue

- I. BASIC PILLARS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Optional)
- -- President Reagan came into office at a time when Iran had had a certain impact on the American political process -- perhaps not what you intended.
- -- The President represented and embodied America's recovery from a period of weakness. He has rebuilt American military and economic strength.
- -- Most important, he has restored American will and self-confidence. The U.S. is not afraid to use its power in defense of its interests. We are not intimidated by Soviet pressures, whether on arms control or Angola or Central America or Afghanistan.
- -- At the same time, we are prepared to resolve political problems on the basis of reciprocity.
- -- We see many international trends -- economic, technological, and political -- working in our favor.

II. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: BASIC PRINCIPLES

- A. U.S. Assessment of Iranian Policy.
- We view the Iranian revolution as a fact. The U.S. is not trying to turn the clock back.
- Our present attitude to Iran is not a product of prejudice or emotion, but a clear-eyed assessment of Iran's present policies.
- Iran has used "revolutionary Islam" as a weapon to undermine pro-Mestern governments and American interests throughout the Middle East. As long as this is Iran's policy, we are bound to be strategic adversaries.
- Support of terrorism and hostage-taking is part of this strategic pattern. We see it used not only against us, but against our friends. We cannot accept either. Your influence in achieving the release of all hostages return of those killed (over time) is essential.







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
- We see your activity in many parts of the world, including even Central America.
- The U.S. knows how Iran views the Soviet Union. But subvarsion of Western interests and friends objectively serves Soviet interests on a global scale.
- Thus, our assessment is that a decisive Iranian victory in the war with Iraq would only unleash greater regional instability, a further erosion of the Western position, and enhanced opportunities for Soviet trouble-making.
- The U.S. will therefore do what it can to prevent such a development. We regard the war as dangerous in many respects and would like to see an end to it.
- B. Possible Intersections of U.S.-Iranian Interests.
- Despite fundamental conflicts, we perceive several possible intersections of U.S. and Iranian interests.
 I propose we explore these areas.
- First, the U.S. has had a traditional interest in seeing Iran preserve its territorial integrity and ... independence. This has not changed. The U.S. opposes Soviet designs on Iran.
- Second, we have no interest in a Iraqi victory over Iran.

 We are seeking an end to this conflict and want to use an improved relationship with Iran to further that end.
- Third, we have parallel views on Afghanistan. Soviet policy there is maked aggression, a threat to all in the region.

 But our objective is the same: the Soviets Mist get out and let the Afghan peopls choose their own course.
- C. U.S. Objective Today.
- We have no illusions about what is possible in our bilateral relations. Perhaps this meeting will reveal only a limited, momentary, tactical coincidence of interests. Perhaps more. We are prepared either way.
- In essence, we are prepared to have whatever kind of relationship with Iran that Iran is prepared to have with us.

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III. SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

- -- Moscow has designs on parts of Iran.
- -- Afghanistan illustrates the price the Soviets are ready to pay to expand areas under their direct control.
- -- Summarize Soviet capabilities along border and inside Afghanistan which could threaten Tehran.
- -- U.S. is avere of Soviet activity
- -- Soviet plans -- Soviet plans -- Boy they would do it.
- -- Iranian support to Sandinista regime in Micaragua aids and abets Soviet designs -- makes U.S.-Iranian relationship more difficult (\$100 million in oil last year, plus arms).
- -- U.S. can help Iran cope with Soviet threat.

IV. AFGRANISTAN

- -- May be real value for Iran and U.S. to find ways to cooperate against Moscow in Afghanistan.
- -- U.S. can provide humanitarian assistance for refugees
- -- We need to know who you work with, what you already provide, and devise strategy to exploit Tranian comparative advantage.

V. HARDWARE

- -- We may be prepared to resume a limited military supply relationship.
- -- However, its evolution and ultimate scope will depend on whether our convergent or our divergent interests come to loom larger in the overall picture.
- -- What does Iran want?




EXHIBIT OLN-284

cc: NSPBT --CPUA PAUL THOMPSON NSDRF --CPUA DON FORTIER

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA

TO: NSDRF --CPUA

05/02/86 23:01:50

NSDRF --CPUA

*** Reply to note of 05/02/86 19:29

-- SECRET --

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDENTER Subject: CONTRA PROJECT


When Shultz, Regan and I discussed it yesterdeay on AF-1, we were a bit confused as to whether the expedited procedures in the legislation would apply to this proposal. What pressure could exist on Tip to take action on it? Please talk to Will Ball. What about the idea that Jim Miller and Dannis had about submitting an urgent-urgent supplemental containing among other things the Irish aid package?

Next, yesterday in a meeting that I had with the President, he started the conversation with "I am really serious." "If we can't move the Contra package before June 9, I want to figure out a way to take action uni-laterally to provide assistance." In other words he does not buy the concept of taking actions or talking about pulling out as described in the package. He has been reading Natanyahu's (sp?) book on terrorism and he was taken with the examples of Presidential actions in the past without Congressional approval. He also read an op-ed piece on the same subject. I believe that was the one by Dick Pipes' son. The President is recalling the 500A action we took on Honduras. I told him that I didn't think that it would apply here, since we are not dealing with a government. But the fact remains that the President is ready to confront the Congress on the Copnstitutional question of who controls foreign policy. We need to get Abe Sofaer and other stalwart lawyers thinking in these "ms to see if there is some way we could do this, if all else fails."

With your answers to the first question, we will discuss the package on the return trip and be ready to proceed on return. I have George's proxy on the package. George agrees with the President that we have to win some way and we will not pull out.


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
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
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
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
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


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Exhibit OLN-289

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05/19/06 10:50:34



EXHIBIT OLN-291

TO: R. V. Secord

FROM: Bob Dutton

DATE: June 4, 1986

SUBJECT: How to present the reorganization to ACE

Current Situation:

- ACE performance in getting capability up to an acceptable level has been unsatisfactory.
 - -- Aircraft that were purchased were not thoroughly or properly checked.
 - -- Major repairs in engines and avionics have taken excessive time, meaning A/C were not useable for training, basic missions or high tech work.
 - -- People that have been hired have been working with inadequate guidance or supervision.
- B. C. Washington has been paying a large % of past and current expenditures for Margin (G & A, Fringe) and O & M which, since we are already paying all of the operating and maintenance costs, amounts to an additional profit payment. The combinations of these payments have equalled 58.4% of a March ACE invoice and 57.6% of their April invoice.
- ACE states that the current arrangement is not making any money for their company for the effort expended.

Proposed Reorganization:

- ACE has put together a useful organization which we would like to retain to provide a means to contract both people



- and air support plus a means to make payments. For this they should be paid a service fee.
- B.C. Washington now has the capability to provide direct policy guidance and operational directives to the Project Hope personnel. This will give us the ability to hold one person totally responsible for the operational capability of the project.
- Some of the senior personnel at ACE have a great deal of background and experience in Project Hope type operations. It would benefit the entire program if these people were retained as professional consultants to B. C. Washington and paid on a scale to be determined by the corporate officers.

Benefits:

- We stop paying O & M, which is currently money tied up away from ACE personnel. This will reduce our cost anywhere from \$50K to \$100K per month.
- ACE will continue to be a part of the project and will get paid a service fee.
- The key ACE employees will start being paid consultant fees which is available money.
- Assumption: Throughout this proposal, I am assuming that ACE no longer intends to purchase the aircraft with the O & M money we currently pay them. If this is not a correct assumption, that fact should be formally acknowledged and

- 3 -

we can continue the O & M payments vice a much reduced service fee, but we will get the money back when we sell them the aircraft. We can still take the key ACE personnel on as part-time consultants.

EXHIBIT OLN-292



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June 10, 1986

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SECRET

ACTION

N 44482

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTHA

SUBJECT:

Hostage Rescue Effort

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President asking him to sign a letter (Tab A) to Ross Perot thanking Ross for his efforts to recover the American hostages in Beirut. Your memo at Tab I is self-explanatory.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward your memo at Tab I. Approve __

Disapprove _

Attachments

Tab I - Poindexter Memo to the President
Tab A - Presidential ltr to Ross Perot

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

N 44483,

PROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT:

Hostage Rescue Effort

Issue

Letter to Mr. Ross Perot.

Background

For several months,

the release of the American hostages abducted in Beirut. Three weeks ago, those working in the area developed a planf would undertake an operation to recover the hostages. The plan involved the use of privately-provided aircraft, personnel, and vessels. Unfortunately, the security situation inside Beirut deteriorated before this plan could be put into effect.

Discussion

Ross Perot provided the resources required to bring this plan to fruition. He dispatched one of his personal staff to oversee the mission and maintained communications between his offices in Texas and the forward operating team in Cyprus. Perot is, understandably, disappointed that this operation did not succeed, but should be commended for trying. Because it is possible that such a plan could well work in the future, a letter from you (Tab A) thanking him for his help would be most appropriate.

Recommendation

<u>ok</u>

No

That you sign the letter at Tab A.


Prepared by: Oliver L. North

Attachment

Tab A - Letter to Ross Perot

Declarative OADR

UBECRET []



THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

N 44484

Dear Ross:

I have been briefed on your effort over the past several weeks on behalf of our Americans abducted in Beirut. On behalf of the American people, I want to thank you for your discreet assistance in this regard. My hope is that we may yet succeed in reuniting these men with their families and loved ones. Thanks again and God bless you.

Sincerely,

Mr. H. R. Perot 7171 Forest Lane Dallas, TX 75203

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1161 Exhibit OLN-293

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:	GENERAL	•
::	OPERATING LOCATIONS	:
III	KEY PERSONNEL	2
ıv	ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM	7
v	ASSETS & EXPENDITURES	8
VI	WAREHOUSE INVENTORY NO 21 JUL 86	10
VII	DESCRIPTION OF PLANTATION	11
III	CURRENT SALARIES	13
	OPTIONS	14



- I GENERAL
- II OPERATING LOCATIONS
- III KEY PERSONNEL

GENERAL

Due to recent changes in operational requirements and increased tasking, the "Benefactor Company", hereinafter referred to as B. C. Washington, is taking more direct control of Project Hope and its supporting elements. The following outlines the structure, authorities, and responsibilities of the new organization. We intend to implement the reorganization on July 1, 1986.

- A. <u>Washington</u>: B. C. Washington will assume operational control of all assets in support of Project Hope. They will establish a separate secure communications facility that will act as the hub of all operational and other sensitive project information. ACE will maintain administrative command and act as the broker with SAT. All contracts and contract payments will be worked through ACE under the policy direction of B. C. Washington.
- B. <u>Cincinnati</u>: This military airbase is our primary operational support base. It provides a secure location from which we can operate our aircraft and perform essential maintenance. Within the city, we maintain four houses where we can quarter approximately 18 people. Transportation is provided by four vehicles with drivers. Besides the local telephone, communications are maintained between quarters and the base by mobile radio and between our major operating locations by HF radio.
- C. The Farm: This forward operating location (FOL) will provide the launch and recovery site for support missions

being flown in the north central operations. It currently has a very limited maintenance support capability. We will be looking to install a site manager/operations officer to coordinate support requirements and operational requests. We do not see crews operating from here for more than 2 to 3 days at a tir .

- D. The Plantation (West): This FOL gives us the capability to support central and southern operations. We will eventually install a permanent site manager plus an engineer; commo specialist here. The sensitivity and vulnerability of this site will limit its use and the number of people we assign. While training and actual missions may be launched from here, the prime purpose of the FOL is to provide an alternate refueling or emergency landing site to give us more flexibility in mission planning.
- E. Maintenance Support Miami: Due to the continuing requirement to locate, acquire and provide numerous logistic support and maintenance items for our operational assets, we will establish a one-man support element in the Miami area. He is to be responsive to the Maintenance Director and work closely with SAT for procurement and delivery of required items.

III KEY PERSONNEL

A. Manager: The project manager at Cincinnati is the sole focal point for site operation and coordination with B. C. Washington, from whom he will receive all policy and

operational guidance. Either he or the Operations Director will be on station at all times. Specific responsibilities include:

- Se responsible for the operational effectiveness of company assets and personnel assigned to the project.
- 2) Establish and enforce a security system that will ensure communications security and the operational security of our operations.
- Direct the daily and weekly flying and maintenance schedules.
- 4) Provide B. C. Washington a daily maintenance and training status plus planned schedules for the next seven-day period.
- 5) Through the Host Liaison Officer, interface with the host government and in-country U. S. Government organizations on behalf of the company.
- 6) Direct and be prepared to report on support activities for all personnel assigned to the project, whether they be permanent or temporary. This includes quarters, rations, pay, transportation and leave schedules.
- 7) Maintain detailed records of activities and expenditures to provide strict accountability of all company assets and monies. A written report will be provided B. C. Washington on a monthly basis.
- B. Host Liaison Officer: This officer provides the Manager the critical link to the host senior officials to coordinate

support and operational matters. He is the projects communication link and negotiator with both the host and in-country.

U. S. Government officials. He will be part of the secure communications link between B. C. Washington and Project Hope. Specific responsibilities include:

- Maintain a secure communications link with B. C. Washington to provide an alternate means of communicating with the Manager, the host or U. S. Government officials.
- 2) Brief and obtain concurrence from the minimum required host and U. S. officials on current operations that are of specific interest to them.
- 3) Maintain close contact with the host military to arrange support for our operations and maintenance.
- Keep the Manager informed of any problems our people or operations may be creating for our host or in-country
 U. S. Government representatives.
- C. Operations Director: Air logistics support being the primary service provided, it is necessary to install an experienced special operations aviator to act as senior air operations planner/coordinator and be second in overall command. Primary duties include:
- 1) Keep the Manger informed on all matters pertaining to operations.
- 2) Serve as the senior pilot.
- Coordinate work schedules and resolve all air crew issues based upon top-down guidance.

- 4) Maintain accurate and current records pertaining to air " graw flying hours and training status.
- 5) Function as senior air operations planner for training and actual logistic support missions.
- 6) Establish and enforce a set of standards for our aircraft commanders to evaluate all mission tasking for suitability, feasability and safety.
- D. Maintenance Director: All major maintenance operations will be conducted at Cincinnati with the support of the host and Maintenance Support Miami. The Maintenance Director will oversee and coordinate theater-wide maintenance activities in accordance with the Manager's guidance. Responsibili-

ties include:

- 1) Keep the Manager informed on all matters pertaining to maintenance.
- 2) Project and coordinate scheduled aircraft maintenance so that an operating capability exists at all times.
- 3) Maintain current and accurate records pertaining to scheduled and on-call inspections, servicing and maintenance for each aircraft.
- 4) Maintain accurate inventories of tools, equipment, materials and spare parts which are in the custody of the site maintenance section.
- 5) In coordination with Maintenance Support Miami, forecast and order spare parts, materials and equipment.
- 6) Order and control required maintenance publications.

- 7) Prepare maintenance reports in accordance with directed schedules and formats.
- E. Support Director: Because of our dependence on the cooperation and support of the host government, it is necessary that the Support Director work closely with the Host Liaison Officer to interface with the host on a regular basis in their language. Responsibilities include:
- Keep the Manager informed on all matters pertaining to personnel and site support.
- 2) In coordination with ACE, establish and monitor contracts for all quarters, transportation, telephones and domestic support.
- 3) In coordination with ACE, pay all bills and maintain detailed records of expenditures.
- 4) Establish and monitor a fuels account with the Air Force to provide timely fuel support. Keep a detailed account of all fuel expenditures.

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PINKLE. The runks, is oil. Cill' and capable of table of to a Coll Sile A.C. There are turn-around areas at poor \$-25. 1717 dia. at SW end and 180 dia. at NE end. The surface is prowned for drainage and dry compacted the full length. The turnaround areas are insufficiently compacted, but adequate at present for all A/C. The entire runway, and turnaround areas in particular, are subject to wind erosion damage. The rainy season degan last month, and if this problem is not handled correctly mud may become a problem also. The need for a vigorous and complete maintenance program is paramount. If continued compaction following the early season rains and surface grooming prove inadequate, it may be necessary to apply an asphaltur surface binding material such as Pentaprime.

The NE approach to the rinway is obstructed by a small nill and a bend in the valley immediately at the end of the runway. A/C have landed and taken off in this direction, but I would not advise if loaded or limited visibility. The SW approach is completely open.except for some trees which will be cut as time and equipment permit.

One drainage problem area has been identified and steps taken to remedy it. A concrete culvert should have been installed across the runway. Small drainage areas will be identified during the first rains and corrective measures taken.

A/C PARKING/SERVICE AREA: The parking area is at the north midpoint of the runway and is large enough to accommodate three C-123's. The refuel bladders will be located here along with the A/C maintenance and repair facilities. All loading and unloading of cargo will be done here also. Presently the AVGAS available is stored in 55-gal. drums in a GP medium tent at same place where bladders will be located.

BUILDINGS: The main building will be "L" shaped, 160' x 60' x 20' wide. It will contain 1700 ft² of warehouse space, an office, a radio room, living/eating area and eight bedroom/offices. The latrine will be 10' x 22' and contain three toilets, sinks and showers, and room for a washer and dryer. The buildings and vehicle parking area are almost entirely under trees. Both buildings were designed to use natural ventilation for cooling with only the radio room requiring an air conditioner, but fans will be needed on the hottest calm days. The buildings should be corrected by Monday 26 May, with only finish work needed. I will finish the buildings when I return. When the buildings have been completed and the carpenters departed, the facility will be operations capable and finish work can be completed as time permits.

COYMI: At present functional communications are noised in a temporary structure with contacts attempted 1600 hrs local date the radio is also monitored sporadically during the day as work schedule permits. P. McCauley did an excellent job of setting up commo that is extremely reliable. The radio will be moved from vicinity the AVGAS where they are now upon building completion.

WATER: Getting water has proved to be a problem. A well was dup to 30' near the building site without finding water. After consulting several knowledgeable locals, it was decided to pipe water 1500 meters across the valley from a constant supply sprint. This water will gravity feed to a holding tank and then be pumped to an elevated tank to get the required water pressure.

ROAD: The only way in and out of the site is via the road or light aircraft to the ranch. The Maule would require multiple trips almost daily to meet the transportation needs of the airfield. With careful and constant maintenance during the rainy season, it may be possible to use the road all year; depending on the amount and duration of the rain and how quickly the valley_____ drains.

During heavy prolonged rains, the site will be cut off and thought should be given to using a boat as an alternate means of supply/emergency evacuation. There are all weather roads to the coast north and south of the airfield within range of a small boat with outboard motor.

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Fuse starter...4500mts

7.62-51...270,000

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81MM Shells...1488

60MM Shells...7,975

HGM963...60,510

Uniforms...473

Caps...562

T-Shirts...720

Underwears...921

Belts...456

Pairs Socks...1,640

Boots Pairs...481

Hankerchiefs...441

Canteens...882

Backpacks...481

Poncho Liners...274

Magazine holders...295

Ponchos...475

Military Belts...478

Suspenders...476

Flashlights...452

Batteries...452.

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
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f. Parts movements	85,789.	
g. Food		3,5::
h. Telephone		1,500.
i. Electricity		150.
j. Drivers & Maids (9) salaries		1,000.
k. Local support (Max / Ramon)		6,000.
III Nonrecurring Costs:		
a. Commercial Operational Support	(L-100/2 msns.)	67,017.

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Subject: ASSETS EXPENDITURES FOR PROJECT HOPE

: Assets:	<u> </u>
a. 0-103 (HP-824) N 5677	475,000.
p. 3-123 (HP-825)	250,:::.
c. C-7 (HP-822)	450,000.
d. C-7 (HP-823)	530,000.
e. Maule (HP-821) N 4410F	60,000.
*f. Warehouse (Llopango) Main bldg. pd. by State, extension paid by us	5,200.
*g. Ramp area for our A/C	5,600.
h. Plantation (West) pers. 192,208; mat. 85,000	502,208.
i. Spare engines (R-2800, R-2000)	84,450.
j. Spare parts	150,000.
k. Parachutes/Rigging	10,000.
1. Radios/Antennas	28,401.
m. Mission Support (Xerox, freezer, refrigs.)	33,886.
n. Long Range Lorans (4)	11,040.
o. NVG's (4)	20,038.
p. Storm Scopes (4)	34,352.
q. Van (1)	5,000.
r. Survival Equipment (10)	4,837.
s. Fuel acct balance (El Salvadorian Air Force)	16,088.
t. Credit w/SAT (have repair bill on HP-824 outstanding)	58,909.
u. Munitions/supplies purchased to date	870,000.
v. Property for Plantation	500,000.
TOTAL	4,089,372.
* Non-recoverable costs	
2020-2020 200-2	00000

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la y	Garay	3000.
	Owens	-0-
51 K	Stemwedel	4250.
54 K	Sawyer	4500.
34 K	Cooper	4500. Up to 4700, when management is all being covered at Cincinnati, A I and crews ready, reports on time, manning complete, etc.
51 K	McRainey	4250. Up to 4400, when training program, NVG, forms, etc. working.
51 K	Prowaty	4250. Up to 4400, when A/C flying, parts flow and response working.
51 K	Kuney	4250.
42 K	Hughes	3500.
30 K	Stevenson	2500.
27.6K	Custodio	2300.
30 K	Shutt	2500.
27.6K	Bague	2300.
30 K 480 K	Coble	2500.
27.6K	Santucan	2300.
	Moesser	7
	Alford	7
36 K	Gamelin	3000.
36 K	Smith	3000.
36 K	Host Liaison (Max)	•
20 K	R/O Wash	1666.
	Bolton	? Going on contract
	Replaced	? Going on concrace
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El Salvador	Chicago
Ilo Pango	Cincinnati
Tacus.	New York
Agacate	Albany
BCCA!	Laredo
Sandinista Army	Crows
Sandinista AF	Ravens
AAA	Diodes
SAMS	Diesels
C130/L100	Locomotive
C123	Mule
Атто	Salt
Radar	Rain
Parachute	Cadillac
C-7	ACCOUNT

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- I Sale of entire operation and assets wherein CIA takes control of the entire operation plus assets valued at approximately \$4M. The price would be negotiated at some level below the \$4M.
- II CIA takes over operational control. We maintain the crews and assets and conduct the operations at the following rate.

C-7 at \$1300/hr, minimum of 50 hrs/mo. C-123 at \$1800/hr, minimum of 50 hrs/mo. Maule at \$300/hr, minimum of 50 hrs/mo.

Therefore, the basic cost per month to the CIA would be \$311,500 plus additive costs for operations in excess of the 50 hours per month.

- Note 1: We prefer option I with the proceeds from the sale going back into a fund for continued similar requirements.
- Note 2: With either option, the CIA should know that 4/C-123K's have very recently been delivered to Tucson (MASDIC). These should be procured by CIA as they are probably in good condition and there should be a good spare parts stock with them.

1178

Ехнівіт OLN-294

Status of main UNO south force deteriorated bedly past 7 days. Radio magn extremely bitter, accusing us of playing with lives. Force unable find 5 bundles efter 3 day search. Now do not believe bundles dropped. Force taking heavy cesualities, numbered captured rising. Cite 2 Cubens among other] Important comdrs retreat to leprosy widespread, complicated by lack medicine, food, clothes, amon. Suttom line rupture fragile allience ARDE with UNO. due inability resupply. Force believes fault ours they vehemently reject our reasons. Even so we making new effort, sending two qualified men [July. One to to set up secure OZ area and organize reception. will be quickly organized. Request you come work with us. on Monday to assess From Ralph: Planning to go to on request a depending on our availability. Advise on construction plans since I am supposed to give money expenses. I do not think I will have enough to cover any extras. V

Partially Declassified / Released on 12 / 1237
under provisions of E 1 12356
by S. Roger, Richard Security Control





--CPUL SCOPP

PARE IMPARAGE POSA PROCIOR

ILUANOL - WAR'S

- JACK GALVID TO: #3JRP E'S PROM: MOULE TO: BEJOR --CPUA

07/15/06 12:21:30

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N 12566

BUTC PAGE: OLIVER BURES Subject: PRIVATE BLASE CHECK The opportunity to discuss the Control Asserted asses with yes was volcase and at the mase time, disturbing. In view of last might's CSS piece and this dernisy's appalling Mashington Tials itee, I can understand uny you may well have reservations about both by involvement in Bicatajes policy and even by continued touses here. Since retorning a few minutes age I have been told that even of lunchesh segarement with of minter penturday is in question. Under these circumstances, and given your intention that I estricate specif entirely from the Bicarages issue, it probably od be best it I seco to move on as quivtly, but especitiously as possible. I want you to know that it is, for me doorly disappointing to have lost your contidence, for ! respect you, what you have tried to do and have emjoyed secting with you on a nester of insuen important to our nation. On the plus side of the ledyer we nate had a close relationship on meveral initiation that could not have been accomplished bitbook absolute trust between two protessionsis. At the same time yes smould not be expected to cotain on your statt second the you suspect could be talking to the media ur whom you believe to be too destionally involved in an inuce to so enjective in the development of policy options and tocoderodations. I know to dy boart that this is not the case, set as I said in our discussion yesterday, we live in a morid of perceptions, not realities. I have taken the liberty of (orwarding to you a seme transmitted too seeks ago which I od like to be sure you have had a chasce to see- costly because it produces the correct controversy. I want to see sure that you do taked know that I have and will continue to tell you the trata as I see it - for I deeply



Or they Declassified Contraced to 9 June 1977 inder provisions of E.U. 12356. by P. Reger, National Security Council

JMR 5/69 (1)



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PAG

FILE: JOLAG

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bollows that this is the only besetable thing to do. That this, and the teleticoships established in the region over the past five jours are he languar county to engale so to entry in the various policy fare on Electrops in, for each to entry to the county of the three heart to be active to, safetimate. Heart because, I cotalier specific to have been bleased to have to do the charce to se serve for as long as I did. Finally, to end on a select that the charce to select to select the select three for the select to the select to the select three for the select to the select to the select to the select three for the select three forms acceptable to provide the part section of the select that the charce to the select three forms acceptable. Six as selected that the selection of the

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EXHIBIT OLN-296

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TOP SECRET

July 29, 1986

WASHISTON, D.C. 20008 . Illuit

ACTION

N 44486

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FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: +

Next Steps on the American Hostages


Father Jenco is scheduled to meet with the President on Friday, August 1, at 2:00 p.m.

Based on information derived from discussions with Ghorbanifar, Mir, and

our and the we have drawn

the following conclusions:

Jenco was released as a direct result of action taken by on or about July 21.



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
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N 44487



- expectations regarding the immediate delivery of the 240 HAWK missile parts were apparently transmitted to higher authority in Iran. Discussions with in Europe (Sunday, July 27) and calls from him today indicate that the property is in considerable personal jeopardy as a consequence of not having received what he believed we promised.
- -- It is entirely possible that if nothing is received will be killed by his opponents in Tehran, Ghorbanifar will be killed by his creditors (they are the beneficiaries of a \$22M life insurance policy), and one American hostage will probably be killed in order to demonstrate displeasure.
- -- Although the Dawa 17 in Ruwait continue to be mentioned as the ultimate demand on the part of the hostage holders, we have not seen reserved to this issue since our meeting in Tehran (Tab B).

It is obvious that the conditions for the release of the hostages arranged between Ghorbanifar and are unacceptable.

Nonetheless, we believe that Ghorbanifar acted on what he considered to be the following arrangement:

- Step 1: One hostage released and \$4M to Ghorbanifar for items removed from the aircraft in Tehran during the May visit (Ghorbanifar received the \$4M on July 28).
- Step 2: Remainder of 240 parts plus full quota of electron tubes (Item 24 on Iranian parts list) and 500 TOWs delivered to Iran.
- Step 3: Second hostage released and Ghorbanifar paid for remainder of 240 parts.
- Step 4: 500 TOWs and 1 HIPAR radar delivered.
- Step 5: Third hostage released and Ghorbanifar paid for one radar.
- Step 6: Meeting in Tehran to discuss future followed by release of the last hostage and delivery of second HIPAR radar.

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We believe that the mixture of HAWK parts and TOWs is designed to satisfy both the military and the revolutionary guards in Iran. At this point, will probably be able to retain his credibility if just the 240 parts are delivered from Israel. We believe that he can be convinced to follow-up this delivery with a meeting in Europe to discuss next steps.

At such a meeting, we should endeavor to produce a concrete schedule that is agreeable to both parties and which allows all remaining hostages to be released simultaneously. The Jenco release indicate that this is clearly within the power of the Iranians, if they are so inclined. While they will continue to haggle over prices, timing, and sequence, the delivery of the 240 should help to assure the Iranians that we will keep our word. It is important that a face-to-face meeting occur so that we can establish the terms rather than having Ghorbanifar negotiate for us. Finally, even after the parts are delivered. delivered, we still retain some leverage over

RECOMMENDATION

That you brief the President regarding our conclusions on the Jenco release as indicated above and obtain his approval for having the 240 HAMK missile parts shipped from Israel to Iran as soon as possible, followed by a meeting with the Iranians in Europe.

7/30/8 Disapprove

Attachments

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






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	REMARKS:	
	ce: Oliver Mc	orth (#2 and 3)
7	Jim Radzi	lmski (#4)

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COMPARTMENTED INFORM

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N 49102

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Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
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27 June 1986

N 49103

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Lengthy meeting this afternoon with Gorba and Nir followed by discussion with via phone. Following are salient points.

Despite our feelieves he has demonstrated his ability to perform and has expectations we are now prepared to deal. Despite our earlier and current protestations that we want all hostages before we deliver anything, this is clearly not the way they want to proceed. They see clearly that the ball is now in our court. In discussion with the propagatedly asked quots—"When are you going to deliver". While the ball was an expected threat, he noted that he was under intense pressure and could not totally control events. We will call him back 28 July at 1100 Frankfurt time and urge that he come to Europe for a meeting and to do nothing rash in the meantime. We are trying to make this idea attractive—

desire to thank the three world leaders responsible for his release. The Pope, The Archbishop of Canterbury and RR. The first two intend to oblige. Can we deliver on the last? Unodir we will call in A.M. and urge him to meet us in Europe ASAP. Since it will take him several days to get authorization to come, we plan to return to D.C. via Pan Am 061 on 28 July and report to JMP in evening. Please advise via this channel if other instructions obtain. Warm regards. North/Cave

Bottom line, is that if we want to prevent the death of one of the three remaining hostages, we are going to have to do something.

MFR stone is:

"Put this in sealed envelope and have Ollie pick it up"

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SYSTEM IV MSC/ICS-42013 N 491C4

July 26, 1986

COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

PRONI

OLIVER L. HORTE

SUBJECT:

American Hostages

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the Fresident outlining what we know of the Jenco release. Attached at Tab II are talking points for use by Cave/Morth with Mir/Ghorbanifar/in Frankfurt, GE.

Cave is departing Geneva tonight to meet Morth/Secord in Frankfurt tomorrow (Sunday) morning. His and Ghorbanifar depart London tomorrow and have called to meet them in Frankfurt, GE, Sunday morning. The purpose of the meeting is to assess Iranian expectations and ability to release the remaining American hostages.

A draft of the DCI assessment on the American hostages and the Janco release is attached at Tab III. This paper was prepared by Charlie Allen and Dewey Clarridge and has been delivered to Director Casey.

RECOMMENDATIONS

l. Tab	That you initial and forward your memo to the President at Approve
2. des	That you approve North travel to and from Frankfurt, GE, as cribed above.
	Approve
3.	That you approve the talking points at Tab II.
	Approve Disapprove
Att	achments Tab I - Poindexter Memo to the President Tab II - Morth/Cave Talking Points Tab III - DCI Assessment of Hostage Situation

NOTE:

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

SYSTEM IV Mag/158-42013

COMPARTHENTED INFORMATION

Information

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PRONI

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT:

American Hostages

The release of Father Lawrence Jenco is a second positive step in our protracted and difficult dialogue with the Iranians. Jenco's release undoubtedly comes about as a result of Sud McFarlane's trip at the end of May and the continuing direct and indirect contacts we have had with Iranian officials. Our Israeli contacts and the Iranian intermediary in Europe advise that the Iranian Government now expects some reciprocal move on our part -- though exactly what, we are uncertain.

decision to release Father Jenco was made in Tehran on or about July 21. On Mednesday, July 23, our Israeli point of contact advised us that "if, as we hope, a hostage is released, it will be Jenco." It was also on this date that the Israeli point of contact (Amiram Mir) told the Iranian intermediary in Europe that the USG was breaking off all contact on this matter. We have also learned that July 24 was a key date in the most recent release. release:

The Iranian Government paid their European intermediary \$4M on Thursday, July 24, as partial payment for HAMK missile parts, which were removed from our mission aircraft at the end of May. (It is important to note that in order to pay the Israelio for the HAMK missile parts, the Iranian intermediary in Europe borrowed more than \$15M and has been under threat of death from his creditors. The Israelis regard this payment as further proof that the Iranians wish to continue the contact with the U.S. on the hostage issue.)



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COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

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Our next step will be to have two USG representatives meet with the Israeli and Iranians in Europe, if possible, tomorrow in an effort to determine Iranian expectations. This is not a negotiating session, but rather an attempt to maintain contact and, if possible, assess how we should now proceed. To our knowledge, no new Israeli deliveries have occurred and all remaining HAWK missile repair parts are still in a covert depot in Israel.

Prepared by: Oliver L. North



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UNCLASSIFIED COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

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NORTH/CAVE TALKING POINTS

- -- You have seen the President's statement regarding the release of Father Jenco. This is very much in line with what your people had suggested.
- -- Our government remains prepared to open direct and private discussions with your government leading to a normalization of relations.
- -- We recognize the important role played by your government in the release of Father Jenco and regard this to be a very positive step.
- -- It is important that there not be any misunderstandings or false expectations regarding the release of Father Jenco.
- -- On every occasion, including our meetings in Tehran, we made it clear that we were not going to barter over the lives of human beings.
- -- While we are not empowered to negotiate with you regarding any further deliveries of material, it is important that you recognize that the understanding we proposed in Tehran is still operative. We have been instructed to report back to our government any changes to this proposal.
- -- We continue to believe that a direct channel of communication, which will prevent misunderstandings is important. As we indicated in Tehran, we are prepared to dispatch a communications team to Tehran to faciliate this communication.

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I.

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BASIC PILLARS OF U.S. POREIGN POLICY (Optional)

- -- President Reagan came into office at a time when Iran had had a certain impact on the American political process -- perhaps not what you intended.
- -- The President represents and emb@lies America's recovery from a period of weakness. He has rebuilt American military and economic strength.
- -- Host important, he has restored American will and self-confidence. The U.S. is not afraid to use its power in defense of its interests. We are not intimidated by Soviet pressures, whether on arms control or Angola or Central America or Afghanistan.
- -- At the same time, we are prepared to resolve political problems on the basis of reciprocity.
- -- We see many international trends economic, technological, and political -- working in our avor.

II. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: BASIC PRINCIPLES

- A. U.S. Assessment of Iranian Policy.
- We view the Iranian revolution as a fact. The U.S. is not trying to turn the clock pack.
- Our present attitude to Iran Is not a product of prejudice or emotion, but a clear-eyed assessment of Iran's present policies.
- Iran has used "revolutionary Islam" as a weapon to undermine pro-Western governments and American interests throughout the Middle East. As long as this is Iran's policy, we are bound to be strategic adversaries.
- Support of terrorism and hostage-taking is part of this strategic pattern. We see it used not only against us, but against our friends. We cannot accept either. Your influence is achieving the release of all hostages/ return of those killed (over time) is essential.

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- We see your activity in many parts of the world, including even Central America.
- The U.S. knows how Iran views the Soviet Union. But subversion of Western interests and friends objectively serves Soviet interests on a global scale.
- Thus, our assessment is that a decisive Iranian victory in the war with Iraq would only unleash greater regional instability, a further erosion of the Western position, and enhanced opportunities for Soviet trouble-making.
- The U.S. will therefore do what it can to prevent such a development. - We regard the war as dangerous in many respects and would like to see an end to it.
- Possible Intersections of U.S.-Iranian Interests. 3.
- Despite fundamental conflicts, we perceive several possible intersections of U.S. and Iranian interests. I propose we explore these areas.
- First, the U.S. has had a traditional interest in seeing Iran preserve its territorial integrity and independence. This has not changed. The U.S. opposes Soviet designs on Iran.
- Second, we have no interest in a Iraqi victory over Iran.

We are seeking an end to this conflict and want to use an improved relationship with tran to further that end.

Third, we have parallel views on Afghanistan. Soviet policy there is maked aggression, a threat to all in the region.

objective is the same: the Soviets Bust get out and let the Afghan people choose their own course.

- C. U.S. Objective Today.
- We have no illusions about what is possible in our bilateral relations. Perhaps this meeting will reveal only a limited, momentary, tactical coincidence of interests. Perhaps more. We are prepared either way.
- In essence, we are prepared to have whatever kind of relationship with Iran that Iran is prepared to have with us.

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III. SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

- -- Moscow has designs on parts of Iran.
- -- Afghanistan illustrates the price the Soviets are ready to pay to expand areas under their direct control.
- -- Summarize Soviet capabilities along border and inside Afghanistan which could threaten Tehran.
- -- U.S. is aware of Soviet activity
- -- Soviet plans -- Soviet plan
- -- Iranian support to Sandinista regime in Micaragua aids and abets Soviet designs -- makes U.S.-Iranian relationship more difficult (\$100 million in oil, plus arms).
- -- U.S. can help Iran cope with Scriet threat.

IV. AFGRANISTAN

- -- May be real value for Iran and U.S. to find ways to cooperate against Moscow in Afghanistan.
- -- U.S. can provide humanitarian assistance for refugees



-- We need to know who you work with, what you already provide, and devise strategy to exploit Iranian comparative advantage.

V. HARDWARE

- -- We may be prepared to resume a limited military supply relationship.
- -- However, its evolution and ultimate scope will depend on whether our convergent or our divergent interests come to loom larger in the overall picture.
- -- What does Iran want?

-TECHES

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
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1 49114



July 26, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:

American Hostages

After discussing the release of Father Lawrence Jenco with Charlie Allen and Dewey Clarridge, I believe it is important that you have our assessment of this development and prospects for release of additional hostages.

First, it is indisputable that the Iranian connection actually worked this time, after a series of failures. You will recall that the Ghorbanifar connection also resulted in the release of Reverend Weir in September 1985.

After the impasse in Tehran over in late May, continued to initiat direct contact with one of My Officers, George Cave, even though the Iranians had been told that we were no longer interested in pursuing the matter. The fact that persisted in contacting us indicates his desire to arrange a 'deal' with Washington either through Ghorbanifar or, if necessary, with Cave. He also clearly wanted to keep a channel open. Amiram Mir, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Israel on Counter-Terrorism, has also played a critical role in a determined effort to force Iran to begin the release of American hostages. He has been supported by Prime Minister Peres and Defense Minister Rabin in this endeavor. In order to make the terms of the arrangements more palatable, Israel, on its own, offered additional arms "to sweeten the deal."

. On July 21,

commitment, he transferred \$4M to a MeSt European bank to pay h: European intermediary for the HAWK spare parts removed from our mission aircraft in May. On Mednesday, July 23, when no hostage



DR/

UKAFI



N 49115

had been released. Ghorbanifar was instructed to inform that "the deal was off."

In return for the release, probably expects to receive most of the HAMK spare parts not yet delivered, along with additional military equipment that Israel unilaterally has added to the arrangement. Once this equipment is delivered, stated that Iran would take action to obtain the release of one more hostage and would pay the remainder of the money owed to the Iranian intermediary for the HAMK spare parts.

moreover, indicated a willingness to meet with U.S. officials again on these matters, either in Tehran or "somewhere else" -- presumably Western Europe.

This is how we see the current situation:

- -- The Ghorbanifar connection has worked for the second time -- and another American has been released.
- -- Ghorbanifar is an uncontrollable factor, but appears to respond generally to Mir's direction.
- -- Wir has every reason to work for further releases of our hostages. Peres and Rabin have put their reputation on the Ghorbanifar connection and support Nir fully in his endeavors. There would be a considerable loss of face for Nir and his superiors if the link were broken. This connection appears to be the only hope they have for recovering their own missing soldiers.
- to respond quickly in turn by delivering most of the remaining HAWK spare parts. He probably believes the United States is also supplying the additional military equipment that has been promised.

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- -- If the deliveries do not occur, will lose badly with his superiors in Tehran and matters could turn ugly, especially since the Lebanese Hisballah captors probably are not pleased with the Jenco release.
- -- If there is no USG contact as a result of Jenco's release, it is entirely possible that Iran and/or Risbellah could resort to the murder of one or more of the remaining hostages.

In summary, based on the intelligence at my disposal, I believe that we should continue to maintain the Ghorbanifar-contact and consider what we may be prepared to do to meet minimum requirements that would lead to release of the rest of the hostages. Although I am not pleased by segmented releases of the American hostages, I am convinced that thi may be the only way to proceed, given the delicate factional. I also see resolution of the hostage issue as potentially leading to contacts with moderate factions in Iran that we may be able to deal with in the longer term.

William J. Casey


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DRA

remeter eschanged; i.e., segmential release for sequential delivertes. We cost, bowster remeive the problem of how to provide the parts which we promised but

3 3 c . Parel



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Exhibit OLN-298

1200

delective/econg parts back and that we will backbask them on the next delivery. Cryp has been told to teep a crev in readiness for a further, visation and has been apprised of the general parameters of the arrangement, so better that from a logistice parameter, the sequential arrangement is pre-evable in that it requires only one crev and one 8/C throughout thus reducing albility and enhancing OPSEC, we should have a better fix on availability of paces thereto the event in the event and enamble have told Gothe and that both circles should bring a technical expect familiar w/ the application system to the

logistics in an effort to fild (or pastacture, if necessary) the missing/wrong stone. Noth tothe and the bare been told not to make the 61

w/ se to Tehtan for the secting and he could see for hisself what the pinite water. Noving discussed this proposal this a.s. w/ both Clarridge and Cave we all believe this to be the best course of action, especially it we can leave our "technical espect" and a consestant behind in Tehran. Cla is now locally for a yead Ops officer who is familiar w/ the system. Bick already has one identified, but Cla wd prefer to use its own officer if they can find one. We should yet back to the class of the course o

has assigned as officer to work w/ Aces,

told Goo. this worning that it od be best to bring an expect

40 401 have to 310ch

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DECITY THE PARTY

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most those some toldestate

Sebject: Itas

100, I have about 360. I spoke to blises this secuing. I also talked to the Problems about it, de are saking attangements for interspent at Arlington. It dis over sad. Bakes you realise her suinctable we are.

on the hostages - I just don't know one of the things that has senseened no for some time was the report that you get tree Copp about new the parts wouldn't really help their problem for lack of test equipment, not endering all of the right parts and the lock of knowledge of the system. If we get into A 'edgential accompanyt, to coally have to be proposed to deliver a lot more ' . Baterial and arrange a rather continuing technical accompensate of course that apuld all be done, but after the hestages are released. I just don't dee her . We man have such a continuing tolationship until that happens. On the Sycies seals.

The could make close that if we get all of the hantages back that we that to accomplish the same long term goal that they do - A botter relationship with Iran. Before to a sequential Actubeacont I think we ought to atchighten out our counitinent on the 200 -that alone will bely establish our good faith that we aren't trying to cheat kobašnoj delivers. those then so should sait a bit and see that the We should read the Incoolin on the Shin's. Roop talking to

Itaa

Are flot: thols

---CPUA

Tot : BAJAF

to: Blue

06/23/06 15:52:52

PILT: DOTE PRITE BOUSE COGRUSTCATIONS ACCUST Š II VIOLO ---CPOA TC: PROCE To: USUCH -- CPTA

*** Seply to note of 09/02/86 21:06 BOTT FFOT: OLIVED BOOTS Subject: Aurthing going coll to still have no response to JEF to proceeding of the negocatial release proposal cotlined to you some time back, Have now codestates to have Campy taise made of JRF temotrow at the cookly atd. The things can cook do to get action, do hopeful Dall can push hard enough to more on the matter, Dir will be beco most week and will raise except bell to seen it if it beset all fallos sport by thes, the basic probles, as you have, is that so dither so loss so these things that by the time se're ready to go to bat, the reles have changed equie. I agree of it encounter that the cost mig in Tango is collibely to be for soon time. By hope to that we will not be trying to adjust ye ached for sent Jose for this next sty. HEN SUBJECT: It is surious to so that the effort down mosth is going to require an intensive effort that goes beyond the Clara ability to sepport (e.g. V.S. travel, speeches, pube, etc. by 700) and that a sechanten seeds to be estab by which these activities can be carried out fully oboveboard, Now abt a 50%()) Dicaragese Desectacy Institute, by in 7.5., buoled by sessess like Jack Carts of Jodge Clark, ask, Paul Gorges, at al so the board of directors. Sold 401 talson 1, pays tot 9/8, 400 ectivities to 4.5., does not treatment for percent Contras in 4.5., etc. which CIA connect do. These activities are now all done by Project Penecracy - which is Currently supposed to be out of the Coulds besiness on of about 7 Oct.





Factially Declaration 1/Released on 12-PV/PV/ Stader Emvisions of E.D. 12356 By B. Ragh, Balloud Brooms Council

PAGE 175

Tourholy has to do this stell and it strikes on that Sill 6 Booritos in abt to acquire the services of a bright yel who of handle intersectional and descentic P/F for the servenent protty well.

I thick we cd get some yood Sepublicans (Dill Saigh, et al) to only out and have the FOI publish rejuic financial statements (solike Project Semicracy) which will note this an attractive place for right Siedes people to make contributions. That think?





1205

EXHIBIT OLN-300



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCE WARRINGTON DC 2000



5968

September 2, 1986

SECRET .

ACTION

HEHORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT

Next Steps with Iran

Attached at Tab I is a non-paper summarizing the current eituation and proposals on next steps. This document has been reported in conjunction with CIA, which concurs in the proposed next steps.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve next steps as indicated on page 2 of the non-paper at Tab 1.

Approve V

Disapprove ____

Attachment

Tab I - Next Steps with Iran

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(1372)

Partially Declassified/Released on 25 January 87 under provisions of E.O. 12356
by B. Rager, National Security Council








HEXT STEPS WITH IRAN

Oneoine Attivities

There are currently five separate activities underway which are related to resolution or the American hostage situation and a potentially broadened relationship with the Government of Irani



In coordination with the CIA, Copp and two of his associates met for two days last week with indicated a full awareness of the May trip to tehran and the oneoing activity involving and Ghorbenifar. Clearly indicated that he had a specific mandate from

Declaratey: OADR

EAUSHIEU

THANK

to meet with USG officials seeking retting beyond the hostage issue and start with the USG. The has returned to Tehran an informed us of a pending TOW sale through indicated that he is prepared to proceed with the process of the process of the process of the process of the process of the process of the process of the process of the process of the process of the process of the USG for maintaining to establish the USG for mais anjantal faction within the USG for mais anjantal faction within the USG for main and the process of the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the process of the USG for maintaining the uSG for maintaining the USG for maintaining the USG for maintaining the uSG for maintaining the uSG for maintaining the USG for maintaining the uSG for maintaining the uSG for maintaining the uSG for maintaining the

chorpanifer: Since the release of father Jacob that portion of the 240 parts of the available has been delivered. The Iranians have deviced through the that at least-31 of the items defivered and improper integrable. Further, 309 of the items promise have not says provided. They have offered to return the design floor root parts, bot have been told to return themsen a requestion of the parts, bot have been told to return themsen a requestion of the parts, bot have been told to return themsen a requestion of the parts of the process and in a meeting in London with Mir a specific seven atep delivery/release pattern was proposed.

- Deliver 500 Tome and the 19 electron tubes for the HAMK system previously requested.
- Deliver 440 20Ms and one of the HAMK radars previously requester.
- Heeting to tehran to discuss broadened relationship, Soviet intelligence, etc.
- Deliver remaining rader and 1000 TOME while we are in
- delivered. Jacobsen released and

CIA concurs that the Ghorbanifar connection is the only proven means by which we have been able to effect the release of any of the hostages. Though the sequential plan is not what we prefer, the commodities and quantities are within the framework of our original understanding. CIA believes that we should proceed expeditiously with the Ghorbanifar connection and pursue the other five alternatives as subsidiary efforts.

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


EXHIBIT OLN-302

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON OC 20008

September 8, 1986

Non-Log

2807

TOP ---

SENSITIVE

ACTION

HEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

OLIVER L. NORTHA

SUBJECT:

Next Steps with Iran

Attached at Tab I is a non-paper which provides an update on the current situation for your use in discussing next steps with the President. This paper supplements the previous paper forwarded on September 2, 1986 and has been prepared in conjunction with CIA.



That you use the attached papers in discussing our next steps with the President.

Approve V

Disapprove ____

Attachments
Tab I - Supplement Paper on Next Steps with Iran
Tab II - Allen Memo to Poindexter of September 8, 1986

Patienty Dettistib. () Relianted on all quantity and E.O. 12356

[N. B. Ricce, Mational Security Council

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
Supplement

NEXT STEPS WITH IRAN

N 2808

Ongoing Activities

Last work, we summarized the five separate activities we have underway in our effort to resolve the American hostage situation and broaden our relationship with the Government of Iran:



Rafsanjani : In coordination with the CIA, Copp and his associates—nave kept in contact with Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani has now advised that "the several factions in Tenran have agreed to a serious discussion with American officials, preferably in Europe next week." As previously indicated is fully aware of the May trip to Tehran and the conoing activity involving and Ghorbanifar. Continues to indicate that he has a specific mandate from to meet with USG officials seeking a means for getting beyond the hostage issue" and starting a dialogue with the USG.

Ghorbenifer: Pursuant to guidance, efforts were made over the weekend to convince to release of all three Americans simultaneously. Steadfastly rejected this proposal citing the increasigence of the captors and Iranian inability to ensure results.

Since last week, CIA and Army Logistics have located a significant number of HAWK parts which had previously been listed as "unavailable." We now believe that the total "package" will be sufficient to entice the Iranians to proceed with the sequential release pattern proposed in the London meetings.

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N 2809

Since Sunday has sought, in dozens of calls, to contact Abe, Goods, cam, and Copp. This afternoon, when Sam returned call to him he told Sam that his boss approved of the neeting that was to take place and referred specifically to the meetings two weeks ago with Rafsanjani Brussels. CIA evaluates this information as confirmation that Rafsanjani may be moving to take control of the entire process of the U.S. relationship and the hostages.

Other Issues

urgency of calls from Iran and Rafsanjani's apparent willingness to endorse U.S./Iranian discussions, Iran may be making all nossible attempts to acquire requisite arm

Director Casey conducted a review of the Iranian project today and has directed his people to initiate necessary preparations for acquiring the parts promised in earlier discussions with the Iranians. CIA continues to believe that the Ghorbanifar connection is the only proven means by which we have been able to effect the release of any of the hostages. Though the sequential plan is not what we prefer, the commodities and quantities are within the framework of our original understanding. CIA believes that we should proceed expeditiously with arrangements to implement the sequential plan proposed by the control of the hopes that we could improve on it in discussions with Mafsanjani's representatives when they arrive in Europe. In this regard, our window of opportunity may be better than it will ever be again, if we are able to consummate the release of the hostages before the Iranian offensive begins.

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EXHIBIT OLN-303

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TOP SECRET	••			
ACTION	•	•		
MEHORANDUM I	FOR JOHN M.	POINDEXTER	۳	
FROM:	OLIVER L	. NORTH	•	7
SUBJECT:		n Meeting with A	miram Nir	
		esident on Peres	7/()//	
				•
RECOMMENDATI	CONS			
1. That you	privately o	discuss the pape	rs at Tabs	P Wind II v
1. That you Director Cas	privately of	cate next steps	after the c	onversatio
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N 2931

POSSIBLE PERES DISCUSSION ITEMS WITH THE PRESIDENT

Amiram Nir, the Special Assistant to Prime Minister Peres on Counter-Terrorism, has indicated that during the 15 minute private discussion with the President, Peres is likely to raise several sensitive issues:

Hostages: Several weeks ago, Peres expressed concern that the U.S. may be contemplating termination of current efforts with Iran. The Israelis view the hostage issue as a "hurdle" which must be crossed enroute to a broadened strategic relationship with the Iranian government. It is likely that Peres will seek assurances that the U.S. will indeed continue with the current "joint initiative"

Harrier constance on him your

In that neither Weir nor Jenco would be free today without Israeli help (particularly in logistics), it would be helpful if the President would simply thank Peres for

June 1 discrete assistance.

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EXHIBIT OLN-304

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#7

From: NSOLN -- 1214 TO: NS.RE --CPUA

Date and time

39/17.56 12 39 11

NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH

N 2892

Subject: Iran _ Per your note on the surveillance package I called Casey and cold him we need to get on with the parole paperwork in that you had already agreed - and had furthermore just endorsed the surveillance request. He acknowledged yr approval for the plan but said he was concerned about Shitz fe said he planned to tell Shultz in general terms that we were talking to another high level Iranian and that we would fill him in after the interview. I protested that experience showed that Shultz would then talk to

and could well be the source of the underwaywith getting aboard a chartered jet out C:A could not produce an aircraft on such "short notice" so Dick has chartered the a/c thru one of Project Democracy's overseas companies. Why Dick can do something in Smin. that the CIA cannot do in two days is beyond me - but he does. How the hell he is ever going to pay for it is also a matter of concern, but Dick is a good soldier and never even groused about it. You may want to talk to Sec Shultz about before Casey does. I will prepare a memo for you as soon as we talk to him

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Will proper to the second of

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EXHIBIT OLN-305

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D.C. 20008

September 17, 1986

Non-Log

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ACTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Support

under provisions of E.O. 1235G

By B. Reger, National Sociativ Control

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Don Regan regarding restoration of discrete transportation support. The memo is prepared so that you can pass it directly to the Chief of Staff without sending it through normal channels.

Over a year ago, with Bud McFarlane's concurrence, I arranged with Ed Hickey to have my name placed on the access list for a White House transportation. To my knowledge, this fact was made known to no one outside White House Military Office and the dispatchers at the White House garage. Bud endorsed this action based on the frequent need for me to travel quickly, on short notice, often transporting highly sensitive material. I do not believe that this service was ever abused. I certainly did not consider it to be "perk." Rather, it has been a means by which I have been able to get my job done.

Last Friday evening, while Defense Minister Rabin's aide waited, I was advised by the White House dispatcher that my name had been removed from the access list for White House cars. Eventually, after calling the President's military aide, a car was made available -- and I was a half-hour late for the short notice meeting with Rabin at 2130.

Yesterday, to save both time and money, I opted to go to the CentAm Conference in Miami via military aircraft. When I arrived at the White House at 0400, I tried to get a car and could not. A taxi took nearly 40 minutes to get here and was delayed 15 minutes at the Andrews AFB gate. I almost missed the flight. Last night, on return, I had to wait 2 hours for a taxi to pick me up and bring me back to the White House. On both trips, I was, of necessity, carrying significant amounts of classified material.

I have never whined before and do not mean to do so now, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to do my job. Mot only can I not get my secretary promoted, I cannot even get regular staff badges for two of the finest staff officers on the MSC.

: r - J

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N 5516

Your memo to Don Regan at Tab I notes only the issue of the White House transportation. I would, however, appreciate the opportary to talk with you further on these other issues. I am concerned that a very good team is about to become less productive than it should be for you and the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you	initial Approv	and	forward	the	memo	to	Don	Regen	at	Tab	I
	Approv	e			Dia	sapı	prove	• #	-		

Attachment
Tab I - Poindexter Memo to Regan

Paul

Linguyer en en transportitue vien

The Rich

- 2. Oblie should understand the NSC/Cr.

 press situation. Passes are not a bas
 of honor -- only convenience.
- 3. I believe our promotion policies are for
- 4. Tall he to guit bitching.



N 551;

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM:


JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT:

White House Motor Transport Support

My some time now, the White House Garage has provided discrete motor transport support for LTCOL Oliver North. As you know, LTCOL North carries out a number of sensitive projects for us which are facilitated by the use of secure transportation.

Last week, the White House Military Office removed LTCOL North from access to White House transportation. This action reopardizes several ongoing activities and places him at increased personal risk. It would be appreciated if you would direct that LTCOL North be restored to his previous access to White House transportation.



Talking Points for JMP

N 6353

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An immediate reprogramming of \$15M from DOD to CIA for humanitarian assistance to the DRF. These funds would reduce your subsequent request from \$100M to \$85M. This action would require approval in the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the Armed Services Committees, and the Defense Appropriations the Armed Services Committees, and the Defense Appropriations sub-Committees. We can make a good case that this humanitarian assistance (\$5M per month through August 1986) is essential to maintain the option of DRF pressure in order to improve prospects for a verifiable and enforceable Contadora agreement.

A Presidential appeal for private donations by U.S. citizens. Such a step would undoubtedly result in considerable domestic criticism and perhaps a Congressional move to much such activity unlawful.


under provisions of E.O. 12356
Ey B. Rager, National Security Council

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TOP COORST

September 24, 1986

ACTION

HEHORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Iran

7758

You are scheduled to meet with Director Casey, George Cave, and this afternoon at 3:10 p.m. in your office regarding our recent discussions with the Iranian Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani. Attached at Tab I'is George Cave's summary of the discussions. A full transcript, based on the tape recorded sessions, will be forwarded to your separately as soon as the transcript is completed.

During the discussions, asked for a "discrete public sign" that he could use to support his debriefing back in Terran. We decided that a VOA editorial, broadcast in Parsi, which mentions the Iranian Government's denial of flight clearance to the hijacked Pan Am flight, would suffice. At Tab II is a VOA editorial regarding the hijacking of Pan Am Flight #73.

We appear to be in contact with the highest levels of the Iranian Government. There is no doubt that is far more competent and better "connected" than our other interlocutor. It is possible that the Iranian Government may well be amenable to a U.S. role in ending the Iran-Iraq war. This, in and of itself, would be a major foreign policy success for the President. We, therefore, need to determine how we will proceed from here on with the Iranians. Specifically: therefore, need to determine how with the Iranians. Specifically:

Should we proceed with the "joint committee" proposed by during our discussions.

Who, if anybody, at the State Department should be brought into this activity.

RECOMMENDATION

actachments prior to your meeting. That you review the

Disapprove

Approve \ Attachments

George Cave's Summary of Discussions Tab

Tab II - VOA Editorial

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N 7759

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SUBJECT; Rundown of Visitor's comments on 19/20 Sept

said that they had had a real problem in rtures made to them were genuine or not.

He said they also did not know what to make of the approach because they had fielded many such

After our May visit, and their sishandling of t serious debate took place in Tehran about how to proceed said they had to upgrade the channel and now think they persons in the room would be the only things got further along. I said to on their side. In an aside said emphasize the channel. ones on our side until hat he would be in charge said that he said that on their side. In an aside, we said that they wanted to gradually improve relations with the United States because they fully realized they were between a rock and a hard place. The war will end soon and Iran must make the fateful decision about rebuilding the military and the country. Since the previous orientation was towards American equipment, they would like to continue in the same manner. They realize that American investment will be essential to the rebuilding of their country. However, for the time being, everything must be carried out in secret. If this were to lask, the radicals would have a field day and would be able to oust the moderates and the conservatives. the rebuilding of their being, everything must be were to leak, the radicals ld be able to oust the moderates that when our delegation was in aware of our presence had put if word somehow got out about hran. We told him that we faced would have a field day, and would be and the conservatives. It is all that Tehran, the factions that were aware together a story to be released if wour delegation's presence in Tehran, similar problems in the United State.

2. With regard to the Gorbanifar

2. With regard to the Gorbanifar connections of flatly they mistrust Gorbanifar. It told him that we entertain similar views but are worried about his going public and destroying everything. It said that they think they can take care of Gorba. He was allost executed in 1981. They have a lot on him and he also has family back in Tehran. The U.S. side is doubtful. Believe this remains a problem since Gorba has told NIR that he would so public. It said that, although they are grateful to the for having the courage to get things started, they want his out of the loop because (A) he

MARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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has not produced and (3) they do not think him smart enough to

Reed kidnapping. He did this as a means of putting additional pressure on the U.S. to send the next shipment.

suggested that, it calls again, San should tell him that everything is up in the air because of the two new hostages and that nothing can be done until they are released.

3. During our discussion, emphasized that they are also interested in relations with us on the strategic level. They are very concerned about Soviet machinations in the area as a whole and in recent months have had their eyes opened by how much effort the Soviets are putting into penetrating and manipulating the Iranian government. manipulating the Iranian government.

that we should out the past behind us and said they regret our fruitless trip to Tehran in May.

Committee which would handle the channer and establish secure communications between the two governments. The opening phase will be secret but we will then bring the relationship into the open at an appropriate time.

4. Hostages: The U.S. side dealt with the hostage issue as an obstacle, not a key issue in arriving at a strategic relationship.

It said that prior to coming on this trip he had talked with the "person directly responsible" twice on the telephone and once personally. He believes that this issue can be resolved and it will be one of the first things he devotes his attention to when he returns to Tehran. He said that it is now a matter of policy that the Iranian government opposes hostage taking and terrorism on humanitarian grounds. He resinded us that the Iranian government did play a positive role in the TMA highjacking case. He said that in addition to recent public statements, Khomieni has prepared a "fatwa" condemning hostage-taking as "unislamic". We thanked him for the Iranian stance on the highjacking of the Fankm flight in was told that next week there would be a VOA broadcast in which Iran would be sentioned as one of the States we wished to thank for refusing to grant landing rights to the highjackers.



N 7762

had discussed the hostages with earlier and he was certain that the matter would soon be settled. As also stated that the Pattis case would be resolved satisfactorily. The people holding the hostages are very verried about a CIA operation to rescue the hostages. The urged that we not do anything to fan their fears, as this could make his job harder. He said that he would try to give us 2 or 3 days advanced notice before the hostages are released.

secret US-Iran Joint Committee: There was a lot of discussion about the secret US-Iran Joint Committee. It towards the end of the meetings, stated that they had already set up the gasple to the on their side. We teld him that ours would be three persons also, consisting of "Goode, Topp and Sam". Said that they

also, consisting of "Goode, Kopp and Sam". Same that they would pick a single courier would would carry thing, the Tehran to where ever we designate as countries Hddg. We suggested that secure communications be established as soon as possible and segreed. We returned to our key suggestion of a two sam cosmo team in Tehran. But liked this and soid that he would bring it we in Tehran.

7. Provided a list of their urgent military.

7. Provided a list of their urgent milety requirements. This included testical intelligence entranged which he said they needed desperately. We have a said that they bedly need 185 and 185 am healtrers and 175 am base plate the rounds. He asked "Sam" to ship some of these (as much as we can assemble on short notice) as soon as possible. On the shipment that we have put tegether, and said to give him an account number as soon as we are ready, and he will have the money ready. He wanted to take the list back and make sure they really needed the spare parts before giving the go-ahead on the shipment. He said that their need for artillery is pressing because they need suppressing fire to make their infantry attacks more successful.

US PARTICIPANTS: George Cave as "Colonel Sam O'Nell" Oliver North as "Colonel Goode" Dick Seacord as "General Kopp"

IRANIAN PARTICIPANT:

of Majlis

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N 7763



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WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES DECL DECL

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7764

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UNULASSIFIED DRAFT

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISH

N 7765

Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

In the aftermath of the hijacking of PAN AM Plight 73 at Rarachi airport it is time to reflect on the widespread reaction to this despicable and cowardly crime. The response of nations around the world has been a resounding rejection of this and other acts of international terrorism, like the cruel murders in the synagogue of Istanbul. Regardless of political or religious persuasion, innocent men and women from every continent are joining the call for a stop to the wanton, indiscriminate killing and destruction.

The hijackers of PAN AM Flight 73 remain in the custody of the Pakistani government awaiting trial for murder. The government of Pakistan is to be congratulated for its handling of the difficult and often confusing situation it faced on September 4. The United States government remains prepared to assist in any way that leads to the successful prosecution of those responsible for the unnecessary killing of twenty men, women, and children from India, Pakistan, Mexico, Britain, and the United States.

This hijacking further demonstrates the resolve of 1341

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by B. Reger, millen, i Stourity Council

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N 7766


nations to work together to prevent and discourage these attacks on international civil aviation. Not only did Pakistan help in 5 preventing the airplane from departing Karachi -- which properly kept the hijackers on the ground and avoiding a potential in-flight disaster -- other nations refused to allow the airplane to land in their countries were it to have left Pakistan. Nations throughout the region joined together to reject the hijackers from entering their airspace. Countries like Cyprus, Egypt, Ruwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Italy deserve the recognition from peace-loving people everywhere for their courageous stand against these perpetrators of death and destruction.

President Reagan prays for the families of those killed and injured in this tragedy. He remains committed to work with all nations to stop international terrorism from tearing at the fabric of our civilization and to seek justice against those who would commit violent acts against innocent victims for political reasons. As all of our law-abiding citizens have long understood and governments must continue to learn -- just people with just causes do not resort to terrorism.

That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Governent.


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AFE FAU.: MEJAF To: USCLU MUTT FEDR: JOHN POINGE TOUR Subject: Public Atfairs Caspaign on Central Asetica I agreed. The didn't Low Tambe know that this was coming? N 1261 T Poblic Affairs Canadien on Contral America 09/25/40 11:23:45 TO: BSJRP --CFEA MSG face: MSOLE --CPUA TO: BSJMP --- CPU1 *** saply to note of 09/13/06 12:01 BUTS PROM: OLIVER BORTS Subjects Public iffairs Compaign on Control America Elliott abrans has just called from See tork, followed by an orgent call from Last night Costa Dican Interior Simister Carles beld a press conference In San Jose and especiated that Cesta Sicas authorities had discoveres a secret airstrip in Costa Rica that was over a mile long and which had been built and used by a Co. called Gdall Services for suspecting the Contras. In the press conference the minister mased one of bich's opents (Clostead) as the man who set up the tield as a "training base for U.S. elliter divisors." Danage assessment: Mall desources, Inc., 3.4. is a proprietary of Project Desocracy. It will cease to exist by seen today, there are so USG fingerprints on any of the operation and Clastead is not the mass of the agent - Clastead does not exist. We have deved all Edail resources (\$44K) to another account in Panada, where Mall Saintained as asserting service and cover office. The office is now your an are all tiles and papersock. the bottoniles is that will Elliott has said toat be and the Secretary



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EXHIBIT OLN-308



1.5. Beresac

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PLUS NEOKAL SUPPLIES PERS + TOWY (500)

ALL ALLERICAS HOSPIACEL BELGASCO

Team Reduces River For 1500 Towns


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
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EXHIBIT OLN-309



- AG. ... BY US

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 - HOSTAGES ARE OF NO VALUE
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S. Berrow

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Mr American Masterest Bereases

TEAN PRODRES PLUS FOR 1500 TOWNS

with 9 Days we will Delore

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- . Technical Suffort for Howks
- . UPDATED LOTELLESSON ON TORQ
- · Communications Train

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Ехнівіт OLN-310



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	WARRINGTON, DC 20040		
	TRANSLATION OF LETTE	ERS	
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or Committee	Assistance to Iran and the Micaraguan		
Material Submitted	Opposition .	Date of Material June 5, 19	87
Material Securities -	artiele		•
Name and Address			
of Sender			
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Suggested Salutation.		Can:	6.A.
Translated by Ibar	shim V. Pourhadi African and Middle Bast	ern Area Studies Research S	ervices
•	Name Othion	Department	
Dete June 8,	1987		
☐ Com	plets Abstract-Please call the Congression	ual Research Service (287-5700), if a con	riplete
.	translation is desired.		
	Mehr 16, 1365 (October 8, 19	86)	
1	Time of Discussion early afternoon to 1	ate at might.	**
			145
1. Iran pays	for 500 TONS to HAKIM and if willing, Ir	an will provide the runus	
FOR THE IMPRI			
2. In 9 worki	ng days, the 500 TOWN and the EDSE spare i from (gifted) medicines will be delive	parts (pending Izan's	200
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
the release o	n 4 as stated below is curried out, Albe I the 17 Kuwaitis imprisoned in Ruwait.	·	200
Southanne to be	ne-mail (I definitely and the 2 with expense, through the effort of Iran, will (3-4 days after the delinery of point	DE LICAG LIGHT CHE LINES OF	L AND .
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45. Establishing letter of Jacia method, will be studied by Albert and Camperow might. tamorrow night.



- .00 TUNE and maximum of 100 launchers), within 4 days after the execution of item mentioned above, will be selivered to IRWs. IRWs will pay the morry for 1500 TONS (the 500 TONS mentioned above and also additional 1000 TONS and these 1000 TONS will be delivered to IRWs within nine lays.
- 6. Amorica will support IRAN with technical assistance, unterial and specialized imon-how, reorganize the military intelligence, maps and communication links, also prepare the Cart related to the items provided by Ali problems provided by Ali problems and the indicating price and believe to 1988.
- 7. Before returning to lehized, the case of the health prisoners (Chi'ite) in Lebanon and the manner of their release chould be studied with Second and particle involved.**
- 8. IRAN will pursue its offerts for mobablishing the grounds for the ordered of the rest of the nestages.
- 9. The steps for delivery of items referred to in the second part of item 6 mentioned above will scart.
- *The letter of Credit will be opened in favor of Hr. <u>Husain?</u> and will make the money for the 500 1000 available by utilizing 60 percent of the Letter of Credit.
- **After discussion between Mr. Second and Mr. Samii, it was agreed regarding to thim prisoners that letter be written "Israel and its Labd organization". Text .11 be written in the following menner . . .

Translation by Albert Hakim of the Farse Original of the "9 Points"

Note: The date is the 16th day of the 7th month of the Iranian year which I believe corresponds to 8 October 1986, but needs to be checked. It also indicates the discussions started in the afternoon and lasted until late at night.

Summation of Us and Hakim

- Iran provides funds to Mr. Hakim for 500 TOWs and, if willing, Iranians will provide for the Hawk spare parts which remain from the previous agreement.
- Nine working days from now the 500 TOWs and the Hawk spare parts (if accepted by Iran) and the gifted medicines will be delivered to Iran.
- Before executing Item 4 below, Albert will provide the plan for the release of the Kuwaitis (17 persons).
- 1 1/2 (1 definitely and the 2nd with all effective possible effort) American hostages in Lebanon, through the effort of Iran, will be released by the Lebanese.
- as. Using the Letter of Credit method, (three to four days after delivery of shipment stipulated in Item 2) additional 500 TOWs (together with a maximum of 100 launchers), within four days after the execution of Item 4 above, will be delivered to Iran. The method of Letter of Credit will be reviewed between Albert and Olive (all) by tomorrow night. Iran will pay the funds for 1500 TOWs (the 500 TOWs mentioned above plus an additional 1000 TOWs) and the 1000 TOWs will be delivered to Iran within nine days.
 - 6. The United States will start with the technical support of the Hawks (material and know-how), update of the military intelligence and maps, establishment and commissioning of the special communication link,

and will prepare the chart related to the items (provided by Mr.) indicating price and delivery to Iran.

المعلملا

Israel and its cover organization, La Had, and the text written in the Seven Step Document of Mr. North (illegible)

Before the return of Mr. No NAM2 to Tehran, the subject of the Moslem prisoners (Shia) in Lebanon and the manner of their release by the involved parties will be reviewed by Mr. Second.

Iran will continue its effort for creating the grounds for the release of the rest of the hostages.

The steps for delivery of items referred to in the second part of Item 6 above will start.

The Letter of Credit will be opened in favor of Mr. Hopen and he will make the money for the 500 TOWs available by using 80% of the Letter of Credit.

After discussion between Mr. Secord and Mr. 5a.Mii (Romanit was agreed regarding regarding the Moslem prisoners that the sentence (text) will be written in the following manner:

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Shakastah = proken So orderag puom noned for house to read -Bogsen people -

EXHIBIT OLN-311

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D.C. 20105

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October 2, 1986

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

OLIVER L. NORTHA

SUBJECT:

Next Steps with Iran

called Dick this morning to advise that he had just returned from Beirut and would very much like to meet with us in Frankfurt, Germany, on Monday, October 6. He indicates that he has "good news" regarding the hostages and that he wishes to get past the "obstacle" as quickly as possible. An appropriate travel approval is attached at Tab I.

George Cave is taking a well-deserved "mini-vacation" in Rome. We are telling all callers that he is in the hospital for tests on his back. In accord with the request, the U.S. side would be represented by: Sam O'Neil, Copp, and Goode.

This meeting also affords us the opportunity to deal with the issue of Israeli cooperation. Nir has been calling daily (often several times) urging that we get on with the process in our "joint venture." He constantly cites his September 10 meeting with you as the basis for proceeding urgently. Because we have not told him about our intention to pursue the first, he continues to encourage Ghorbanifar to raise the requisite funds for another delivery. Ghorbanifar, in turn, has a frequent dialogue with the lin this regard. All of this tends to create confusion among the various participants and an unnecessary OPSEC vulnerability. We need to act now to reduce the number of channels into the Iranians (at least on a temporary basis) and clarify various roles and missions.

27

We (Cave, Clarridge, and Copp) believe that we should move promptly on both fronts as follows:

-- O'Neil, Copp, and Goode meet with in Frankfurt on honday, October 6. That indicated that he has an internal consensus on how to proceed with regard to the hostages "obstacle." He has said that he will bring with him to this meeting "one of the officials we met with in

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has said he is bringing a Koran for the President. As a reciprocal gesture, we have purchased a Bible which we would present to for him to take back to Tehran with him. Given our earlier discussions (see transcript), it would be very helpful if the President would inscribe a brief note citing a particular biblical passage (Tab III) in the front of the Bible. This particular excerpt is important in that it is a new testament reference to Abraham, who is viewed by Moslems, Jews, and Christians as the progenitor of all the world's nations. It would be most effective if the President hand wrote the inscription and initialed/signed it without addressing the note to any particular person.

Mir: When Amiram was here, we made a conscious decision not to apprise him of our near-term efforts with Rafsanjani's Me did inform him earlier of the contact and he continues to inquire regarding the status of this initiative. Meanwhile, lacking guidance to the contrary, Nir has sought to stimulate further activity between Ghorbanifar and Calling directly to George's home and office several times daily and considerable confusion regarding why we have not accepted the Ghorbanifar offer to purchase the remaining HAMK spare parts and 500 TOMs.

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From an operational perspective, the current communications arrangements are a command and control/OPSEC nightmare iTab III. Nir essentially controls our access to both and Ghorbanifar and, thus, we often find ourselves reacting to his well intentioned efforts. We believe that we now have an opportunity to change the relationship in such a way that Nir is placed in a supporting role rather than acting as a primary source of control. We also recognize that Israel's participation in this activity is both politically and operationally important. In altering Nir's status, we need to do so in such a way that he and those officials in his government who are cognizant continue to perceive that this is still a "joint venture."

In order to accomplish the objectives outlined above, we propose that on Saturday, October 4, Copp would fly to Tel Aviv and meet with Nir. At the meeting, Copp would use the talking points at Tab IV. In an effort to ameliorate Nir's angst over his "new status," we urge that the letter at Tab V to Prime Minister Peres be signed by the President. If you agree, we need your approval of the talking points at Tab IV and a Presidential signature (real or autopen) on Tab V by 3:00 p.m. Friday, October 3.

The steps above are designed to give us a chance to make the new relationship through the function without destroying the Ghorbanifar channel. We would, in effect, put Ghorbanifar on "hold" until we see what produces. Please note that when Copp briefs Nir in Tel Aviv on Saturday, he will not reveal that he is enroute to Frankfurt to meet () Given () strong antipathy toward the Israelis and our uncertainty as to whether or not he knows that Nir (aka Miller) is Israeli, we would tell Nir on Sucday night that we were going to a hastily arranged meeting with which he (Nir) will be unable to make due to lack of connecting flights to Frankfurt.

has already told us, that shortly after the October 6 menting, there will be a follow-on meeting of the "joint committee" in which will be a participant. Unless we are convinced that the Tranians would recognize Mir as an Israeli, we would intend to invite Mir to this follow-on meeting.

A memo from you to the President has not been prepared for obvious reasons. It is hoped that between now and 3:00 p.m. Friday you will have an opportunity to privately discuss this with the President and obtain his approvals/signatures on the steps indicated above.

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RECOMMENDATIONS	
1. That you initial/the t	ravel authorization sheet at Tab I.
Approve	Disapprove
2. That you tell Director	Casey to prepare an appropriate sturday, October 4, for the meeting with
Approve	Disapprove
the passage at Tab III (a place in the Bible)	ident inscribe the attached Bible with card is paperclipped at the appropriate
Approve	Disapprove
with Nir on Caturday Octo	alking points at Tab IV for use by Copp ber 4.
Approve J. see	Disapprove
	idential signature on the letter to
Approve 1	Disapprove
Attachments Tab I - Travel Authoritation Tab II - Diagram	orization Sheet

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Tab IV - Copp Talking Points
Tab V - Presidential ltr to PM Peres

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	UNILASSITE DATE: NOCESOPO 3. B
	TRAVELER'S NAME: Mr. William P. Goode
•	PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): Official travel to Frankfurt, GE Monday, October 6, to meet with our contacts regarding the current situation in the Middle East.
	ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): Depart 8:00 p.m. Dulles Airport PanAm 860 Arrive 9:20 a.m. Frankfurt, GE Depart 12:45 p.m. Frankfurt, GE PanAm 861 Arrive 4:40 p.m. Dulles Airport
, ,	DEPARTURE DATE Sun, Oct 5 RETURN DATE Tues, Oct 7
	TIME 8:00 p.m. TIME 4:40 p.m.
	MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
	GOW AIR COMMERCIAL AIR_XX POV RAIL OTHER
	ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
	TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM XX OTHER TOTAL TRIP COST
	WED PAYS EXPENSES: NSC_XX OTHER
	WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO XX
1	IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Travel Describe Source and Arrangements): N/A
	TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ 0.00
1	REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Wolke to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
1	FRAVELER'S SIGNATURE:

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
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September 30, 1986

N 9104

COMMUNICATIONS NETS



From an OPSEC perspective, there are too many channels into (and out from) the U.S. We can't hope to have this many players speak with one voice -- no matter how "good" they are individually.

Recommendation: Pare the U.S. communicators down to no more than two individuals (who either compare notes directly each day, or report to a common supervisor); e.g., Sam and Copp, who both report daily to North. Cut Charlie and anybody else out. Have them stop communications cold turkey (to support cover story of American being blown, rolled up, and finished).

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
N 9105

INSCRIPTION BY PRESIDENT:

"And the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, preached the gospel beforehand to Abraham, saying, 'All the nations shall be blessed in you'.

Galatians 3:8"

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SENSITIVE

INSTRUCTIONS TO COPP FOR MEETING WITH NIR

Saturday, October 4, 1986 Tel Aviv, Israel v 9107

You will have with you a letter from President Reagan to Prime Minister Peres thanking Mr. Nir for his courageous assistance to our mutual cause. You should initiate this discussion by presenting him with a copy of the letter and asking for his advice on delivering the original.

The objective of this discussion is to improve our control of events in this joint effort to establish a strategic relationship with Iran. The talking points below are intended to establish the parameters of your discussion and are designed to elicit further cooperation:

- -- ADM Poindexter has directed that I see you regarding our current Ghorbanifar Channel and discuss with you ways in which we can hove together to accomplish our mutual objective -- a strategic relationship with Iran.
- -- We believe that the first new hostage (Reed) was probably taken by elements other than Hizballah -- although they may have him in their hands now.
- -- We think that may have believed that he could bring additional pressure to bear on us to commence further deliveries by seizing another hostage (cr hostages).
- -- Quite the contrary is true. The President is adament that we will not move forward on this channel until we resolve the new hostage issue.
- -- We are also concerned that the two new hostages (or at least Cicippio) represents a clear violation of the "understanding" we have had with the Iranians on anti-U.S. terrorism since June of last year.
- -- We do not want to engage in a process that results in new hostages just to bring "pressure to bear." Nor will we continue this process if, when the current hostages are released, more are taken, simply to elicit further deliveries of arms.

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- -- Aside from this very strong policy objection to continuing, we have, as you know, had repetitive financial and communications difficulties with Ghorbanifar. While we could debate as to whether or not Ghorbanifar had received all that was due him by the Iranians, the most important factor is potential OPSEC risk.
- -- In an effort to "keep things moving," Ghorbanifar has made commitments in our name which are patently beyond our ability to meet. This has resulted in increased expectations on the part of the Iranians.
- neither nor other Iranian officials in Tehran trust
- -- Finally, both of us know that himself, is not intellectually astute enough to realize the importance of our contact nor the sincerity of our desire to establish an official government-to-government relationship.
- -- In short, this channel is <u>not</u> serving our mutual objective: the reopening of a strategic relationship with Iran.
- -- The President has directed that we will not proceed with any further receipt of funds from Ghorbanifar nor deliveries to until we resolve these issues.
- -- Several months ago, I apprised you of a contact with the of Rafsanjani. The USG decided to pursue this contact to determine its validity.
- -- We are confident that the man I met with in Brussels, is indeed Rafsanjan; and that he has been franchised to act as a liaison between the U.S. and Iranian governments.
- -- When Prime Minister Peres was in Washington last month, the President assured him that we are going to continue this effort as a joint project.
- -- I have been instructed to seek out a second meeting with as soon as it can be set up and that I will act as the U.S. intermediary until we establish direct contact with government officials from our side.

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- -- Once we have established direct USG contact with the we intend to introduce you into this process under the same conditions as obtained when you went to Tehran with us.
- -- Based on my one initial meeting with and the intelligence we have been able to collect, we believe that this contact may well prove to be the one that both your government and mine have been seeking.

(Remember Nir has been told that you "came upon" as a consequence of looking into the possible diversion of TOWs through during an investigation undertaken in late July/early August.)

- -- While we explore the sincerity of and confirm his ability to speak for the Iranian government, we want to keep the Ghorbanifar channel on "hold."
- -- To that end, we have told Sam -- who is in the hospital -- he is to contact land tell him that:
 - there must be a meeting with before we proceed any further;
 - the issue of the two new hostages has become a strong, negative factor in proceeding at all;
 - this matter (the two new hostages) must be resolved before we will take any further steps for any further deliveries;
 - the problem is not the merchant and his financing, but rather the two new hostages;
 - contrary to what he may expect, there will be no further deliveries until we have met and resolved this matter;
 - we have asked to meet with us in Frankfurt on October 9 -- we do not yet have an answer.
- -- I intend to meet with the property of Turkey, hopefully this week. I will then report back to Washington on my findings and a follow-on meeting will be set-up -- in which we will attempt to have you included.
- -- I want to caution you, however, that in my meeting in Brussels indicated that he and others in Tehran are aware that you are an Israeli -- and knew it when you went to Tehran.

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N 9110 SENSITIVE

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- -- Neither of us want this contact, if it is indeed what I think it to be, to founder because of this.
- I have been instructed to find a way to have you in the meeting in which Goode and Sam will serve as the USG representatives.
- -- If my meeting with this week goes well, I would expect that all of us could meet with him next week.
- In the interim, if does indeed agree to meet with us under the conditions we have established, we should proceed with that meeting.

Approved	
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Document N 9111 Deleted in its Entirety C: #SPR\ --(PVA #SPR --(PVA For HEARP --(PVA

10/10/06 20:55:51 UNGLASSICIEU

** Soping to note of 10/02/06 20:44

9: **93.107** --- CPM

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'PP has just returned from Frankfork, According to both be and Sam, my

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'at if he returned here without the hope of futther help that he "could be
'bt book to the freqt." have bick a proposed closer to the line in my

iginal movem points and asked Pick if there was any may that he could get us
'mout before the 3 New, secting I had suggested. Dick told him that he ud
'am the points as but of mot decreates saything, Points as follows:

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We send tech support for Mills, update on intel and sector cost tead to Tebram and provide location/svallability of artillery items botted on the original list provided by is Washington Sty.

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
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La add "you coll rescue his and not rule up (Iran) with the shallab."

th San and Copp believe that we abould let them step in Johan for a few bore ye and then accept the proposal indicated above.

Let Pattle was not now available, but that they were sure they could work it to each things were soving. Only changes from by proposed in sequential

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anima of their plan and lock of meeting and potting body & transcript of interresultion. We do not helders that they can be accord getting all three - all Le held electhers. Diet and Jan belleve available into indicates that so will, however, got two back for mothing more than the two mets of 500 tous. They point out that the test of othet the Inteless sunt to plan tou Approaching the Specials, the location, evallability of the extillery, and the intelly all one to employed that this is boot/lastest ony to jot the sect out the total that the situation is held in molting such verse and that we day be setting close to the end of the line for my fertuor andebatt. Finally, all born non bollors that there gain do not have seed. Cleistie, the are probable to heads of tibyes controlled arous which carlier bosshirtilled fillers. sed See believe that these gars mer be the ealy may so one ever got our hands on seed/Ciclosic slace their access and into in the telepoo are so both botter than ours. norred Lists Bessended that to wait for their call on Tweeler, if their position to make As shore or better, so she push thes to inclose Sentley source and transcript and then got on with it. Pin advise.

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
14 October 1986

DOCT

Attached is a memorandum on problems that I see with our initiative towards Iran. Also included are a number of recommendations that I believe should be implemented to prevent this initiative from floundering. I have not consulted with other individuals involved on the US side, nor have I discussed it with Ollie. If you require further

discussed it with Ollie. If you beckergand, please let as know.

Charles E. Allen MIO/CT





THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

14 October 1986

DCI

Attached is a mamorandum on problems that I see with our initiative towards Iran. Also included are a number of recommendations that I believe should be implemented to prevent this initiative from floundering. I have not consulted with other individuals involved on the US side, nor have I discussed it with Ollie. If you require further background, please let me know.

> Charles E. Allen MOVE

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EXHIBIT OLN-313

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Objectives of the Program!

- In the short term to resolve the American hostoge problem in Lebenon, through the offices of Iran, to include

return of all presently held American hostages, and cessation of hostage-taking;

and to accomplish this without jeopardizing our public policy of non-negotiation with terrorists and hostage-takers.

- In the longer term to establish contacts within the Transac Covernment that might test the possibility of

bringing about a change in the regime in Iran (or its attitudes), thereby

establishing gradually a rapprochaent between the United States and Iran.

<u>Ultimate</u>, <u>Strategic Objectives</u> remain an alliance which provider

containment of the Soviet Union on a crucial flank and preventing their move toward the middle east;

•





Problems with the Program:

For over a year the US Government -- using private and Israeli intermediaries -- has tried to resolve the hostage crisis by treating with Iranian officials; the long-term goal of eventually restoring a strategic relationship has remained in the background. The principal intermediary has been Ghorbanifar, and the principal official has been

In return for the shipment of American arms to Iran, the release of two American hostoges was achieved.

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slow and unreliable, the White House -- encouraged by Seccord and Makim -- has turned to a new channel. The new channel (d) involves an individual purporting Rafsanjani, Speaker of the Majlis and second most powerful man

Ra fran; om and his delegated authority are less clear.

There have been two covert nectings with end car in Europe. Another meeting is scheduled for the Circl week in hevenber.

While the zone of the meetings has been generally positive, the targaining has been tough and the negetiation; difficult; closure lengths elusive.

A problem that now confronts us is the disposition of the first chancel, from Cherhamifer to This first chancel to the chancel to the overall instructive. Springled by Green, far claims he was never compensated for some of the arms shapped to Iran, arms for which he arranged the financing.

Ghorbanifar and his creditors, including Adnan Khashoggi, appear determined to recoup their "losses", even at the risk of exposing US covert arms shipments in exchange for release of our hostages.

we have a festering sore for which no treatment has been prescribed. These demanded that the Ghorbanifar-channel be shut down. Indeed, claims

had approved of the way heretofore. Notwithstanding, spoken of "eliminating" sometime in the future.

Ghorbanifar appears to be harassed by his creditors, some of whom already have brought the problem to the attention of the DCI and Senators Leahy, Cranston, and Moynihan.

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- Chorbenifer claims to have secreted, for insurance purposes, documentation of events which have transpired so for. | 0190

Given this, the major elements of this initiative are likely to be exposed soon unless remedial action is tuken. There is no indication that the White House has a plan to prevent the exposure or a plan to deal with the potential exposure.

The Ghorbanifar the contains potential using the United States.

Fackground:

When the initiative began, National Security Advisor MacFarlane wanted to establish a channel to factions within the Iranian Government with which the United States might eventually deal, and which might secure incidentally the release of the American hostages in Lebanon.

Israeli officials like David Rimke put the White House in contact with Ghortanifar. Wirking with Jacob Nimrodi and other Israeli entrepreneurs, Ghortanifar introduced US intermediaries like Michael Ledeen to key Iranian officials influding. Ghorbanifar also established a direct link to Prime Minister's Office. A series of meetings ensued With negotiations sometimes appearing highly positive, sometimes near-disastrous.

- One hostage was released in September, 1985, as a result of this channel.
- A breakdown ocurred in Geneva, in late November 1985, when the Iranians accused the other side of knowingly delivering the wrong version of Hawk missiles to Yehran -- an accusation we believe and for which we blame Nimrodi, if not Ghobanifar.

Progress appeared dramatic in May 1986 when a US delegation led by MacFarlane secretly visited Tehran. The results, however, were disappointing. The Iranians were not prepared to deal directly with so high level a delegation. Still, another hostage was released subsequently, in late July.

Another channel, potentially more promising, was just then opening up through private efforts by Albert Hakim and Dick Seccord. Through a London representative of the Iranian Government, a meeting was held in late August in

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stressle with the two settings between the two settings between the two officials, one meeting in Washington, the other in Transfert.

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Ghorbanifer's Alleged Financial Straits:

The Ghorbanifar— channel is technically "on hold." Clearly, however, It is being supplanted by the Hakim-channel — a fact reportedly known by and resumably by Ghorbanifar.

The arms transactions in which Ghorbanilar and figured required that Ghorbanilar provide the financing. The US required money in advance of any arms delivery while Tehran, previously burned by other would-be arms providers, demanded shipment before payment. Thus, it fell to middle-man Ghorbanilar to arrange the financing.

Ghorbanifar, working with Adnan Khashoggi, got some Canadian investors to lend \$15 million to finance the shipment of Hawk spare parts to Iran. Khashoggi put up collateral to cover at least part of this loan. The interest on the \$15M, repayable in 30 days, was 20%. Ghorbanifar, then, would have to pay a minimum of \$16M. These financial arrangements were made at the end of April -- before MacFarlane's visit to Tehran.

Since the loan was agreed to, Ghorbanifar claims to have been paid only \$8M. He agrees that he received \$4M at the end of July follwing the release of Father Jenco. He claims, without proof, that only \$3M can be applied to repayment of the loan, the other \$1M being related to a separate transaction with Ghorbanifar admits to receiving \$5M two or three weeks later, but that no additional funds have been forthcoming.

- He states he has been able to repay about \$8M to his creditors, including \$6M to one financier -of which \$1M was interest.
- He states, too, that he paid other financiers \$2M for interest charged.

Ghorbanifar asserts that he now has a \$10-\$11 million shortfall that he cannot meet. The Greditors are becoming angry and have demanded additional interest because the principal is overdue. Ghorbanifar claims to be under tremendous pressure and feels financially discredited.

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Chorbenifer's figuration is murky, indeed. The hes claimed that he paid thorbenifer an additional \$8M in cash, an assertion that cannot be validated.

Regardless of who is cheating whom -- and we are not likely to be able to sort out these confused finances -- we face a situation where operational security has been forgotten and no one is prepared to deal with the issue.

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Rapprochment with Iran:

The broader, strategic objective has become subordinated to the tactical matter of the American horteger in Lebenon. Notwithstanding, we have obtained useful insights into the factious government of Iran.

for example, has focussed on long-term os economic investment in Iran, in addition to arms supply.

We have not yet developed a viable plan of action to utilize this information. Talk about ger-strategic relations it cheep and easy, hard options on how to accomplish this are harder to come by:

The Ghorbanifar- Channel:

Ghorbanifar is depressed and claims his financial situation has been damaged. On several occasions, he has said he would not sit idly by and permit himself to be made the "fall guy" in this matter. He claims to have given written accounts of all that has transpired to several persons in America and Europe. He has directed these individuals to make this material available to the press in the event that "something bad" befalls him. He believe this account would include statements to the effect that:

- the Government of the United States sold military material to the Government of Iran in order to gain the release of American hostages in Lebanon;
- a high-ranking US delegation met in Tehran with representatives of the Iranian government in order to discuss the future relations between the two countries, with various cooperative ventures discussed;

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the US Government made several promises to him (Ghorbanifar) that it failed to keep; and,

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the Government of the United States, along with the Government of Israel, acquired a substantial profit from these transactions, some of which profit was redistributed to other projects of the US and of Israel.

There is also likely to be material alleging poor judgement and shabby conduct by individuals of the US and Israeli governments.

0193

We face a disaster of major proportions in our efforts with Iran despite the apparent promise of the Hakim-channel. Too many know too much, and exposure, at a minimum, would damage the new channel badly, perhaps fatally.

 Rafsanjani cannot permit himself to be seen as dealing directly with the "Great Satan".

Explorate which is a result of the state of

- It is clear from s comments that he does not have total control over the Lebanese Shia holding the American hostages.

Because the risk of exposure is growing daily, the following actions are recommended:

(A) Establish a Senior-Level Planning Cell at the White House to focus on the potential for rapprochaent with Iran, the appropriate channels to be used, and the separation of the tactical hostage issue from the long-term strategic objective.

This group could consist of two or three experts and should be headed by someone with the stature of a Henry Rissinger, a Hal Sauders, a Don Rumsfeld, or a Dick Helms.

The group should have access to all data concerning the ongoing initiative(s), including White House records

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(8) <u>Develop Press Guidance in the Event of an Exposure</u>. We have no coordinated press guidance on how to deal with the Iranian initiative should it be exposed publicly. Press guidance must be prepared now. At least one, possibly two major US journalists have bits and pieces of the hostage story and know that Ghorbanifar was involved in it.

- The Israelis have exposed some of this.
- Khashoggi and the Canadian financiers are complaining to influential US individuals.

We could nown have an incredible mermion our hands and demage limitation number addictors in a linear convoly, systematic manners.

(C) Effect 6, Orderly, Damace-limiting Shutdown of the Gherbanifar Channel. It is unlikely we could totally discredit any reversions by Ghorbanifar; he has too much documentary evidence that implicates US officials.

- Besign tear suggested that research to fearly to it; you that united in the contraction.
- Ferhaps we can engage Ghorba: if at otherwise, in non-hostage-related projects -- say, in the area of Iranian, Libyan, and Syrian sponsored terrorism.


A small working group of those knowledgeable of the Ghorbanifar thannel should meet to consider how to cope with this problem. Clearly, there are some personal things that can be done for Ghorbanifar, for example:

- Arrange permanent alien residency for his girl friend in California.
- Arrange for visas for his family so they can visit relations in the United States, and so his mother can obtain medical treatment here.

These steps will not alleviate Ghorbanifar's financial problems -- regardless of their merit -- but may dispose him more kindly to the US Government and lessen his inclination to expose the Iranian initiative.

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EXHIBIT OLN-314



The Director of Central Intelligence Westington, D.C. 20105

National Intelligence Council

17 October 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

0198

FROM:

Charles E. Allen

National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism

SUBJECT:

Channel . Chobanifar

1. Hy meeting yesterday with Boy M. Purmark, New York representative of Adnan Khashoggi, only served to underscore the serious concerns that I outlined to you in my memorandum of 14 October. Indisputedly, we must endeavor to effect an orderly, damage-limiting shutdown of the Chobanifar channel now before serious—perhaps irrevocuble—duning done to current initiatives to free American hostages in Lebanon and to establish links with moderate factions in the Iranian Government.

2. Furmurk, in a brief conversation with mc on 16 October, made the following points:


--He has knownedlobanifar since January 1985 and has detailed knowledge of the Ghobanifar than the channel (although he never mentioned by name).

--He has met with Ghobanifar many times and participated in discussions in the summer of 1985 on the need for rapprochement between the US and Iran. He acknowledged that rapprochement was not just a national security issue, but that he, Ghobanifar, Khashoggi, and others saw a potentially lucrative market if relations were reestablished between Tehran and Washington.

-The idea of providing Iran with military equipment in exchange for American hostogse-mean as a key of commercing a dialogue with Iran—also originated in the cummar of 1985 and he along with Ghobanifar, traveled to Tel Awiy in August 1985 where they met with a number of Israeli officials Including Amiran Nir, Israeli Special Assistant to the Prime Minister for Commetting Terrorism. Subsequently, arms were delivered to Tehran in September 1985; a development that resulted in the re' Bénjamin Heir.

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--After a number of false starts in late 1985 and early 1986, Khashoggi agreed to finance another arms transaction in May 1985, Just prior to Bud MacFarlane's secret visit to Tehran. He borrowed money from a number of Canadian financiers. On the basis of a signature loan, he borrowed a total of \$15 million at 20 percent, agreeing to repay principal, and interest in 10 days. Everyone anticipated that the MacFarlane visit would result in resolution of the hostage crisis.

--Unfortunately, this did not occur, and only \$8 million has been paid by the Iranians for the equipment received. Of this, \$5 million has been used to pay back one creditor; the remaining \$3 million has been used to -, cover expenses and for other matters. No profit has been gentised, and Khashoggi owes the Canadians \$10 million.

--The current financing was complicated by the fact that Iranian officials in the Prime Minister's Office complained about the price of the Hawk spare parts that were shipped, asserting that the cost was five or six times what should have been charged. Many of the delivered items, insreover, did not work or were for a different model of the Hawk missile system.

-framman officials, after having paid \$0 million in Cash, claim that no additional funds are owed to Ghobanifar or Khashoggi. The shipment of the Hawk space parts to Tehran, however, resulted in the release of Father Limited en Agricia.

- All furnish stated that the current situation has left Globalitat unitalianshogy with \$10 million of indebtedness and no prospects for resolving this indebtedness. According to Furnish, Ghobanifar and, by virtue of his financial involvement in the scheme, Khashoggi, are being blamed by the Canadian creditors for this situation. The Canadian entrepreneurs, who have investments in oil, gold, mining, and real estate, reportedly are aggressive, tough-minded individuals who have influential contacts in Washington. They have told Khashugui that unless some payment on the principal is forthcoming, they would begin to inform individuals like Senators Leahy, Moyniban, and Cranston around 15 October about this back-channel deal with Iran and how they have been swindled. Furnish, while stating that he was not authorized to provide the names of the Canadian investors, asserted that we should not undgreatimate the determination of the Canadians. He claimed they have a reputation for dealing roughly with those who do not meet their obligations. Khashoggi allegedly is trying to get them to extend the 15 October deadline, lait, was uncertain as to whether he would be successful in this effort.
- 4. Purmark stated that he spent two days last week in London talking to Chobanifar. He stated that Chobanifar is telling the truth about these transactions and insisted that the Iranian entrepreneur had not made any profit off this deal. He stated that Chobanifar was in a "devastated" condition without any constructive ideas on how to pull himself out of his current financial morass. Khashoggi, who also has financial problems, is not in a position to repay the Canadian creditors. Furmark stated that he had worked for many years in the oil business and was a good judge of individuals who were attempting a swindle. In this case—regardless of other Chobanifar business deals—he was convinced that the Iranian was essentially telling the truth.

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- 5. Furmark stated that everyone had agreed to keep this back-channel arrangement with Iran "highly secret" but that if the situation remained static, he is absolutely certain that the Canadians will talk and that the matter will eventually become public knowledge. He recommended that the US consider at least a partial shipment of additional arms to Iran in order to maintain some credibility with the Iranians in the Prime Minister's Office and to provide Ghobanifar with some capital so that the investors can be repaid partially and so that Ghobanifar can borrow money to finance additional shipments. This would keep the process rolling and could result in release of additional hostages. Purmark offered to meet with me in New York next week in order to report fully on his involvement in these transactions.
- Ghobanifar link deeply troubling. Regardless of who is at fault on the financing—and we know that Ghobanifar is not to be trusted—the expande of them back—channel dealings will almost certainly have a crippling effect on the new channel that has now been opened between the United States and the new channel that has now been opened between the United States and and I again believe that you must advise Admiral bindexter that a group be formed that is knowledgeable of the Ghobanifar channel to consider how to cope with this burgeoning problem. If this is not done immediately, I predict an exposure of this activity in the near future. At a minimum, we need to find ways to stave off disclosure for 60-90 days while we work the hannel thetreally to get our hostages released. Furmark showed no indication that he was aware of the new channel, but we know Ghotanifar in

Charles E. Allen

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Exhibit OLN-315

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:

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Roy Furmark's Comments on the Hostage Situation

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
- 1. Charles Allen and George Cave went to New York on 22 October 1986 to meet with Roy Furmark. This was an extremely interesting meeting in that it revealed that the financial backers of Chobanifar have been aware of the operation since its inception and may actually have played a key role in getting it moving, possibly for altruistic reasons, but almost certainly for their own profit. Roy himself admitted several times during the evening that profit was certainly a motive but that the group did see their efforts as leading towards stability in the region and the release of the hostages. Roy appeared to be very open during the course of the evening and everything he told us tracked with what we know. The only doubtful answer he gave was in reply to a question as to whether some of the principals were involved in the sting operation. Roy said that none of the principals were involved, however, one of the players, lawyer Samuel Evans, was the major indictee and is free on \$4.5 million bond. Roy claims that Evans owes him \$200,000.
- 2. Khashoggi has been involved in this from the beginning as Ghobanifar's financier. Everything started in January 1985 with a meeting in Europe, Prankfurt apparently, involving Ghobanifar, Khashoggi, Roy, and others. This was followed up by subsequent meetings in Paris and London. These meetings culminated in a meeting in August 1985 in Tel Aviv. Roy went to Tel Aviv with Ghobanifar and while there they stayed with Nimrodi in his house. During the course of these meetings, Roy met Amiran Nir. At this meeting it was decided that it was necessary to get Hashington's approval for the overall plan. There were two basic objectives; one, get release of the hostages, and two open up a dialogue with Iran. Schimmer was sent to Washington to obtain this approval. Roy is uncertain as to whether he discussed this with North or HacFarlane in Washington. Ghobanifar also made a total of four trips to Washington. Ghobanifar represents the line held by the Prime Minister which Roy describes as "Moderate." (We did not tell him that the Prime Minister could not be considered as Moderate.) By Way of personal relationships, Roy

Partially Englished in Language on 29 June 1997

under an initial of Eld. 12355

by B. Reger, Fillianal Security Council

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said that he has known Khashoggi since 1966 and trusted him. Roy added that Schimmer and Khashoggi are close. Roy thinks this points up Khashoggi's breadth of vision. Roy pointed out that Schimmer had accually returned from a visit to China to make the August meeting.

- 3. The first transaction was in September 1985 and was for 500 TOWs. The cost of the TOWs was \$5 million. Khashoggi put up the money because he believes in Ghobanifar. The cost to Iran was \$6 million. This allowed for \$1 million to cover profit and expenses. The first shipment of TOWs was defective, so a second shipment was sent. There was a subsequent \$5 million deal that went off in the November-December timeframe. Khashoggi told Roy that they were not involved, but Roy is certain that this was a 0196 Khashoggi/Ghobanifar organized deal.
- 4. Roy said that prior to the next deal, there was a meeting in the Paris airport hotel; he forgets or never knew exactly who was involved in this meeting. The meeting concerned Hawk spare parts. The deal for the Hawk spare parts began to be put together in April 1946. Khashoggi raised \$15 million to cover the deal \$5 million from an Arab financier, and \$10 million from two Canadians. Khashoggi raised the money on 15 May. A group of Americans went to Tehran and took with them seven percent of the Hawk spare parts which consisted mainly of nuts and bolts. With regard to this deal, the financiers, Chobanifar, and Nir met and agreed that \$3 million would be added to the price to cover profit and expenses and also another \$2 million would be added to cover monies owed to Nir. The price to the Iranians would then be \$20 million. (Why did Ghobanifar charge \$24.5 million and with Nir's knowledge?) Neither Roy nor the financiers apparently know anything about the raise in the price by Ghobanifar, although they are aware that the Iranians objected strenuously to the price. Ghobanifar told Roy and Khashoggi that he believed the bulk of the original \$15 million price tag was earmarked for Central America. In this regard, Ghobanifar told Roy that he was relieved when the \$100 million aid to the Contras was passed by Congress.
- 5. The above requires clarification. In Tehran, Ghobanifar took Cave aside and told him that the Iranians would be questioning him about the price of the Hawk spare parts. Ghobanifar told Cave to insist that the price of \$24 million old dollars is correct. When asked about the huge jack up in price, Nir gave a long circumlocution on why the price of over \$24 million was correct. We were so concerned about this that we considered telling Ghobanifar exactly how much he could charge on any subsequent deals. From Roy's comments, it is clear that the 20 percent interest Ghobanifar told us about is in fact the gross profit margin agreed upon.
- 6. Roy said that Ghobanifar told them that he received two payments, one for \$3 million and the other for \$5 million. As originally agreed upon, the Arab investor was supposed to get back \$6 million for his cut and the Canadians would get back \$11 million. The other \$1 million was to go to Khashoggi. Ghobanifar's cut was to come out of the \$1 million. To the \$8 million that Ghobanifar received, he added \$100,000 of his own funds. The Arab investor was paid off (\$5 million). The two Canadians received \$1.1 million. Roy was not nure but presumably the \$2 million went to \$1.1.

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Originally, the Canadians were given a check by Khashoggi in the amount of \$11 million to cover the \$10 million they provided Khashoggi. The monies to cover the Hawk shipment were paid into an account of a company called Lakeside which is an off-channel company. The Canadians believe that the money was stolen and this is giving Khashoggi heartburn. (Note: This does not square with what we know. We know that Ghobanifar received \$4 million from the Iranians in July. He also received \$8 million into his Swiss bank account on 21 August. These two payments were cash. He may also have received a check for \$6 million in between these two payments. The Iranians raised a big stink about the price of the Hawk spage parts and Ghobanifar offered them a \$6 million deduction. According to the \$8 million payment on 21 August squared their accounts with Ghocanifar by mutual agreement. In fact, according to \$7 million covered the remainder of the deal, the other million was to help Ghobanifar finance the next deal.)

7. Roy's suggested solution to the problem is to let Ghobanifar handle the shipment of the remainder of the Hawk spare parts. Proceeds from this deal would allow them to ease the Canadian pressure. Then it would be 500 TOWs for one hostage and another 500 TOWs for a second hostage.

Sincerely,

William J. Casey



1270 EXHIBIT OLN-316

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CHD 0591

Partially Decisional College of Lo. 1987

under provisions of E.O. 12356

by B. Reger, National Security Council

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((INTERPRETS)) AS SOMEONE MHO'S INTERESTED IN SEEING THESE THINGS TAKE PLACE, 3'D LIKE TO TELL YOU THAT THERE ARE THREE STEPS, SEPARA FROM THE STEPS THAT WE ALREADY DISCUSSED. ?((THEY))? WILL SOLVE HA OF THE PROBLEMS.

((THE REMAINDER OF TAPEAT IS UNINTELLIGIBLE, ONLY A FEW HORDS COULD BE HEARD-HORDS LIKE: SPARE PARTS, SEVENTY, AND 1500 TOWS.))

((END TAPE A7))

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((BEGINNING TAPE AB))

((ENTIRE TAPE POOR QUALITY, BEGINNING FEW EXCHANGES COMPLETELY UNINTELLIGIBLE, INTELLIGIBLE PORTION SEGINS WITH THE FOLLOWING:))

SECORD: THEY MAVE A LIST OF SPARE PARTS FROM THE AIR FORCE, BUT I DON'T TRUST THE AIR FORCE, BECAUSE HE HERE JUST STARTING TO TRAIN THE HOMAFARS IN THIS FIELD, AND NONE OF THEM HERE IN... THEY HERE NOT PRINTING LONG?. YOU KNOW, THEY HERE NOT REAL PROFICIENT. NOME OF

((INTERPRETS FOR

CORD: CONTROL SYSTEM-THE (CHORD HISSED)) AND-9 FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM.

((INTERPRETS FOR HAKTH:

SECORD: AND IN THE COURSE OF ... UNDOUSTEDLY, THERE ARE PROBLEMS WITHIN THE AND IN THE COURSE OF... UNDOUBTEDLY, THERE ARE PROBLEMS WITHIN THE HISSILES THEMSELVES, BECAUSE THEY ARE ((FEW HORDS HISSED.))

I HAVE NOT SEEN THE LIST OF SPARE PARTS YOU TALK ABOUT, BUT I HOULD NOT... I DON'T IMAGINE IT'S A VERY GOOD LIST. I HOULD NOT BE INCLINED TO SAY THAT IT'S A VALID LIST UNTIL EXPERT TECHNICIANS

LOOK AT IT.

((INTERPRETS FOR HAKIH:

((MISSED))

SECORD: I ALSO SELIEVE THAT THERE ARE A LOT OF SPARE PARTS IN THE DEPOT AT ISPAHAN AND IN DOSHANTAPEN. ((SENTENCE MISSED)) BUT ANYHAY, BETHEEN THESE THO SITES, THESE THO DEPOTS, I AM CERTAIN THAT THERE ARE HANY HANY SPARE PARTS WHICH THEY CAN NOT IDENTIFY SECAUSE ?THEY'RE AN AUTOMATED? LOGISTICS SYSTEM. ((MORD MISSED.))

HI NAL ((INTERPRETS FOR

ORD: AND THEN FINALLY I HOULD SAY THAT IF YOU HAD TO HISSILES, GOOD TECHNICIANS COULD CANNIBALIZE AND HAKE OPERATIONAL SOME HISSILES, VERY QUICKLY--IF YOU HAD GOOD TECHNICIANS.

MIN: ((INTERPRETS FOR

((PERIOD IN WHICH SEVERAL PEROFF ARE THE

THAT CAN BE FIXED BOS NICHT. IT'S GOING TO TAKE A LITTLE BIT OF TIME. AND THE HITTE HOUSE IS ()DING TO HAVE TO AUTHORIZE US TO SEND IN SOME TECHNICIANS. AND HE'VE GOT TO GO THROUGH THESE STEPS BEFORE HE DO IT. 262 CCINTERPRETS FOR HAK IH: SECORD: ((PORTION MISSED)) THE TECH SUPPORT--THE HANGS THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT, YOU KNOW, I'M SURE THE PRESIDENT HOULD AUTHORIZE US TO HORK PHITH THEN ON IT? IF HE GOT OUR THREE PEOPLE. ((FEN HORDS HISSED)) OUR THREE PEOPLE YEAH, THAT'S EXACTLY THE PROBLEM. HORTH: SECORD: TO PUT IT ANOTHER HAY, YOU GIVE HE THE THREE PEOPLE TOMORROW, AND SY NEXT HEEK HE'LL TPROBABLY? HAVE SOME PEOPLE IDENTIFIED. ((INTERPRETS FOR THE). ((T ((THEN SPEAKS A FEW SENTENCES IN HAKIH: SECORD: PHE 187 SAYING THE SAME THING I JUST SAID. ((FEW HORDS HISSED))
WHICH IS I THINK THE PRESIDENT WILL AUTHORIZE US WE DO SOME
TECHNICAL WORK-HE'VE ALHAYS TALKED ABOUT THIS ((FEW HORDS HISSED))
IF WE GET OUR THREE PEOPLE BACK. THAT'S WHY I SAID, "GIVE HE THE TH
PEOPLE TCHORROW, AND I'LL SET YOU HE'LL SAY THAT THEY'RE GOING TO
OUT SOME TECHNICIANS ?IN ABOUT A HEEK?. THE BIG PROBLEM I'VE GOT IS THE WHOLE DAMN ((FEW WORDS MISSED))
I MEAN, IF WE'RE REALLY SINCERE ABOUT THIS WHOLE FRIGGIN THING,
WHAT WE DUGHT TO BE DOING IS, THEY OUGHT TO BE EXERCIZING EVERY
POSSIBLE AMOUNT OF LEVERAGE THEY'VE GOT TO GET THOSE PEOPLE OUT,
AND WE AGREE THAT AS BOON AS THEY'RE OUT, WE CAN DO ALL KINDS OF
COOD THINGS, BECAUSE THAT'S WHERE WE'RE THEADED?. WE THANT? A
FRIGGIN FMS CONTACT ((WORD MISSED)) OUT THERE. WHAT WE'RE TRYING
TO DO IS TO POSE ((WORD MISSED)) AND ALL THIS SECRET SHIT, AND GET
ON WITH THE REAL RELATIONSHIP. AKIH: (CINTERPRETS FOR YOU KNOW, WHEN HE WERE IN TEHRAN, YOU KNOW, FOULED UP THOUGH IT HAY HAVE BEEN, IF YOU LOOK AT THE DOCUMENT THAT I HROTE AND HICFARLANE HAS PREPARED TO SIGN. YOU WILL SEE THAT THAT'S WHAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT WAY BACK THEN, WAY BACK, IN MAY. ((FEW WORDS MISSED)) BEYOND THE HOSTAGES, WE CAN GET ON WITH A FORMAL RELATIONSHIP. ORTH:

AKIM: ((INTERPRETS FOR

ORTH: EVERYTHING HE HAVE DONE SINCE THE VERY FIRST CONTACT, MHETHER IT SE STEP BY STEP OR MHETHER IT SE ALL AT ONCE, THAT'S WHERE WE'VE BEEN TRYING TO GO.

IH: ((INTERPRETS FOR

THE YOU GUYS DON'T TRUST US. AND, HE DON'T TRUST YOU, AND SO HE END UP DOING IT A LITTLE BIT AT A TIME...

WIM: ((INTERPRETS FOR

UNINTELL TOTALE 11

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((UNINTELLIGIBLE))

WHEN WE WERE IN TEHRAN, ALL HOPASIAME SAID WAS SCHOOK, WE DON'T WAN'TOU DUYS TO COSE THE WART US HANT, AN MONOGRAPH SETTLEMENT. AND ALL YOU DESCRIPTION TO GET THOSE MOSTAGES OUT, AND WE'RE GOING TO BO ALL RINGS OF THINGS FOR YOU. " IN FACT, HE SAID, "DON'T LIMIT YOURSELF TO JUST THIS. THERE IS MUCH, MUCH HORE THAT COULD SE DONE. THE HOSTAGES HAVE TO GET BEHIND US." HE DON'T HANT

KIM: ((INTERPRETS FOR

((INTERPRETS)) THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT...HE HAS SAID IT BEFORE, HE SAID, "AFTER THINGS BROKE UP IN IRAN, AND YOU ((FEW HORDS HISSED)) TO SEND THE STUFF, THAT INDICATED TO THE IRANIANS THAT THE AMERICANS XIN: HAVE ((FEN HORDS HISSED)).

HOW THE HELL DO HE GET FROM WHERE HE ARE TODAY TO WHERE HE'VE GOT TO 90?

((INTERPRETS FOR KIM:

((INTERPRETS)) HE SAYS A COUNTRY LIKE THE UNITED STATES--A SUPERPOHER((PORTION MISSED)). THEN I SAID, "AN IMAM LIKE KHOMEINI--THE FIRST
SHIAM IMAM--THE FIRST ?00VERNOR? OF SHI'ITES IN THE HORLD-HE DOESN'T HAVE THE POHER OF GOING TO LEBANON AND TELLING THOSE
ASSHOLES TO RELEASE THE THREE HOSTAGES? SUCH A GREAT RELIGIOUS POHER?
NO. HE DOESN'T ((FEH HORDS MISSED.)) I SAID, "HELL, OUR PRESIDENT
DOESN'T ((FEH HORDS MISSED.))" I'M TRYING TO HAKE THE POINT THAT
IT'S THE HRONG ATTITUDE TO SIT BACK AND SAY THE UNITED STATES IS A
SUPERPOHER, AND YOU FORGET THAT THEY ARE ALSO A SUPER RELIGIOUS
COUNTRY, IT'S VERY EQUAL. 41M

WELL, ((FEW HORDS HISSED)) THE INFLUENCE THAT THE IMAM HAS OVER THOSE WHO HOLD THE HOSTAGES IS ((HORD HISSED.)) TH:

OF COURSE. HE CAN GET THOSE PEOPLE BACK WITH ONE WORD, ONE WORD. I AN CONVINCED. IT'S ((FE)) WORDS MISSED.)) IM:

((INTERPRETS FOR IM:

ARE YOU GOING TO STICK TO THE PAPER THAT YOU ONE THEN IN HAY, "IF IH:

SURE, AND YOU KNOW THE ((WORD MISSED)) PAPER ALSO TALKS ABOUT "ALL OF THE HOSTAGES," ALL THE HOSTAGES, ALL TERRORISM STOPS. :TH:

I UNDERSTAND. BUT YOU ARE PREPARED TO STICK TO YOUR PAPER OF MAY? IH:

OF COURSE. TH:

:

((INTERPRETS FOR

((FEW HORDS HISSED)) COPY IN THE FILE? IM:

YEAR AND THERE IS STILL A COSY THERE IN TURNAL TH:

CCINTERPRETS. THEN CON UNINTELLIGIBLE))

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NOR TH:

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE. WHAT CAN THEY DO? I MEAN THEY'RE

IRRELEVANT.

CANE:

((INTERPRETS FOR



CAUE .

((INTERPRETS. UNINTELLIGIBLE.))

NORTH:

CAVE:

((INTERPRETS FOR MAKES ADDITIONAL COMMENTS TO AND EXPLAINS TO NORTH WHAT HE HAS TOLD ONLY 8

OF WHICH WERE INTELLIGIBLE. 1)

NORTH.

WHEN MCFARLANE HAS IN ((HORD MISSED)), MY FRIEND HAS THERE. MCFARLANE KEPT SAYING THINGS LIKE, "COOK. PUT THIS SEMIND YOU. DON'T LIMIT YOURSELF TO THESE SHALL LITTLE THINGS. THINK SIG. THINK SEYOND THE HOSTAGES. THINK ECONOMICALLY. THOU ALL KINDS OF HAYS IN WHICH HE CAN HELP YOU, NOT JUST SENDING IN PHOENIX HISBILES. AND THAT'S THE IMPORTANT THING TO DO. BUT HE CAN'T THINK SIG WHEN HE'VE GOT THAT STARING AT US. THINK

((CH/:/ER ABOUT SOMEONE NEEDING AN ASPIRIN))

SECCAD:

TELL HIM THAT IF HE LET DOES OUT OR OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PRO DO TALK IN BUILT THAT AIR FORCES-

HAKIH:

(CINTERPRETS FOR

SECORD:

CONTENT THE THE SAN OO OUT YOU SER THE PEO L INDUSTRY.

HAXIM: ((INTERPRETS FOR

SECORD:

HE'LL SAY THEY'RE SHISS OR SCHETHING, YOU KNOW, AND IT'S NOT A PROBLEM. BUT IT TAKES TIME.

/E:

((INTERPRETS FOR

((UNINTELLIGIBLE CHATTER.))

SECORD:

I QUARANTEE HIM-THAT-IF HE LETA NO DED A POOPLE OF LOWISTICS EXPERTS INTO META UP TO THE TOTAL THE MORTH OF STUFF THEY DOWN

HE HAD AN IRANIAN AIR FORCE WITH THE MOST WELL-SUPPLIED AIR FORCE 19D: HOW ARE YOU GOING TO FIX KHARG ISLAND? ORTH: CCINTERPRETS FOR AKIM: HOW ARE YOU GOING TO PROVIDE HOUSES? ORTH: HE SAYS THAT'S NOT AN ISSUE. THEY ((COUPLE OF HORDS HISSED))
PRODUCE MORE THAN THO MILLION BARRELS A DAY. HE SAYS THE EXPERTS
KNOW THAT ((FEW WORDS HISSED)). AKIN. BUT THAT'S BECAUSE THERE HASN'T BEEN ANY NEW EXPLORATION PRINCE SATH: THE? HAR STARTED. ((INTERPRETS FOR AKIH: EVEN THE SHAH COULD NOT PRODUCE MORE THAN FOUR MILLION ((FEW HORDS AK IM: MISSED)). ((UNINTELLIGIBLE)) 'H: THE POINT IS THAT--AS I'VE SEEN TELLING THESE GUYS FOR OVER A YEAR HOH--A FEW WELL-PLACED TECHNICAL EXPERTS, IN WHATEVER FIELD THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT? THEY'LL SE WORTH MORE MONEY THAN THEY COULD EVER SPEND. ((FEW WORDS MISSED)) ECCRD: ((INTERPRETS FOR AKIH: THERE IS AN IMPORTANT POINT ON THE TECHNICAL ((HORD MISSED)), AND THAT IS: THAT ISSUE--IT'S JUST LIKE THE MCFARLANG THING--THAT WILL SECONE PUBLIC. ORTH: ((INTERPRETS FOR MIM: WE WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT HE CAN DO IT RIGHT, AND THAT IT'S NOT GOING TO COSE ANTHENS TIPLE BUTCH HISSES HE SUFFICIENT OF THE RISK OF THAT TO THAT THE SURE HISSED)). ORTH: PISK O HET TOTAL ((INTERPRETS FOR AKIM: IT'S TIME FOR YOU GUYS TO TAKE A CHANCE. ORTH:

THE OUTTHO RAN

APPARENTLY LEAVES

((SEVERAL EXCHANGES UNINTELLIGIBLE.))

((SEVERAL EXCHANGE UNINTELLIGIBLE.

THE HARK STARS ON TRAN FOR HE.

(CINTERPRETS FOR

. RD:

AKIH:

منه	Z JIMPLASCIEIEN
1/3	HO THE ((EXPLETIVE)) IS
•	HIS LAST NAME IS
:	((UNITATELLIGIBLE))
H:	HE'S THERE NOW
RD:	HERE IS THE BASTARD?
H.	HE'S IN TEHRAN AND HE'S GOING TO ((SENTENCE MISSED.)) AND HE'S AFRAID THAT HE'S BEING TAKEN OUT OF THE DEAL AND ((HORDS
RD:	TOLD ME HORLE YOU HERE OUT OF THE BOON DIAT HE HAS COING TO SOLVE THE BOOK TO THE THEFE HOSTORS LIFETH BORDS HISTERS BUT
H;	- 1 DON'T CARE HOW RIGHT NOW.
RD:	I DON'T CARE HOW EITHER, EXCEPT I HAVE SOME DOUBT THAT HE WILL.
H:	HE CAN DO IT. I KNOW THAT.
	HELL, YOU KNOW YOU SAID IT YOURSELF. THE ONLY THING THAT HAS NECESSARY IS FOR THE IMAN TO MAKE VERY CLEAR TO PEOPLE
H:	AND HIS SITUATION IS RIGHT FOR THEN TO DO IT.
:	((UNINTELLIGIBLE)) HAS TO GET ((FEW HORDS MISSED.)) HE CAN'T
H:	PDID HE SAY? HAS STAYING HERE?
RD:	NO.
	HOW'S HE GOING TO DO IT FROM HOW'S HE GOING TO THOSE GUYS RELEASED ((FEW MORDS HISSED.))
	((A NUMBER OF EXCHANGES MISSED)) ((CHATTER ABOUT GOING SCHEWHERE TO EAT))
₹D;	I DON'T UNDER MOMENTER THE PROPERTY FOR THE THE THE THE THE THE THE THE THE THE
4 ;	I DON'T EITHER
1 :	BECAUSE, I THINKYOU WANT AN ANSWER? BECAUSE ((FEW WORDS HISSED)) THEY'RE NOT COING TO USE KHOMEINI. ((FEW WORDS HISSED)) BUT THEY DON'T WANT TO USE THEIR BIG GUNS.
	((SEVERAL EXCHANGES MISSED.))
1:	THEY DON'T KNOW WHERE THEY ARE.
	THEY KNOW WHERE THEY ARE

THE ZOTH OF NOVEMBER?

HOPE THE DON'T HEED HIM THENT.

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NO. I HOPE HE DON'T EITHER.

HE'RE GOING TO BE REGOTIATING PAROUT? THE NEW HOSTAGES BY THEM. ECORD: ((LAUGHTER))

COOD-SYE GUYS. CRTH:

((SEVERAL EXCHANGES MISSED))

ECORD: WE MEET AGAIN TONIGHT.

((SEVERAL EXCHANGES HISSED))

DID YOU EVER FIGURE OUT WHAT TIME YOU'RE GOING IN THE MORNING? CORD:

((FEW EXCHANGES HISSED))

IF HE THINKS HE'S GOT TO GO BACK THERE TO HAKE IT HORK, LET HIM GO BACK THERE... :HTAC

ECORD AND CAVE: ((UNINTELLIGIBLE))

I'M REALLY SERIOUS ABOUT THAT. HTRC

SECORD?: LET HIM GO BACK THERE ((FEW WORDS HISSED)) CAN ?BACK OUT?

HE HAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE A MEETING ((FEW WORDS MISSED)).

NO, HE SAID, HE SAID FRIDAY. IAK IH?

FRIDAY? FRIDAY? IT ?HAY NOT BE DONE? BY FRIDAY. THAT'S ONLY THO MTH:

DAYS AHAY.

WELL, KIH: I'M TRYING TO FIND OUT WHAT SORT OF MIRACLE IS ABOUT TO

HAPPEN.

I NEED TO KNOW AT THIS POINT, THO THINGS. I NEED TO KNOW WHAT HE HANTS US TO SAY ABOUT.... RTH:

KIM:

((FEH HORDS HISSED)), YOU KNOW, I TOLD RICHARD A LONG TIME AGO. YOU GOT THE ?TCUSTOMER?? THROUGH ME. YOU GOT THE ((MORD HISSED)) FROM ME. I MANT YOU TO BE RIGHT BACK IN THE MIDDLE. I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY ARE GOING TO MEET THEIR ??DEADLINE??. I REALLY AM.

FOR YOUR SAKE, I HOPE SO. RTM:

((LAUGHE)) 41H:

((EXCHANGE HISSED))

. 0:

ITH:

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NOFORN

C(HAXIM ANSWERS PHONE. TALKS IN PERSIAN SRIEFLY. TURNS THE PHONE OVER TO NORTH FOR A COUPLE OF MINUTES AND TELLS THE PARTY ON THE OTHER END THAT HE IS DOING GOOD WORK AND THAT "WE HON'T FORGET" HOW WELL HE HAS RECEIVED ANY MAIL FROM HIS DAUGHTER. THEN HE TURNS THE PHONE BACK TO HAKIM WHO TALKS IN PERSIAN WHILE THE AMERICANS CONVERSE AMONG THEMSELVES ABOUT GOING TO DINNER. THEN THEY ALL LEAVE THE ROOM. THEN THEY ALL LEAVE THE ROOM.))

((WHEN TAPING RESUMES AGAIN, THE IRANIANS AND HAKIM ARE IN THE ROOM CONVERSING IN THE BACKGROUND IN PERSIAN. DNLY ISOLATED WORDS AND PHRASES COULD BE UNDERSTOOD.

SPEAKING ON THE PHONE, SAYING THAT SOME ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. "TCHORROW HORNING WOULD BE SETTER THAN THE DAY AFTER TOHORROW. THE DAY AFTER TOHORROW WOULD BE BETTER THAN THE NEXT DAY?. THE DEADLINE IS SUNDAY, AND ANY DAY IT COULD BE DONE WOULD BE BETTER THAN THE PREVIOUS ONE ((SIC))."

((END OF TAPE A9))

((BEGINNING OF TAPE A10))

((TAPE TEN CONSISTS ENTIRELY OF CONVERSATION AMONG THE PERSIANS IN THE BACKGROUND, AND ONLY ISOLATED HORDS AND PHRASES COULD BE UNDERSTOOD. HAKIN HAS PRESENT FOR AT LEAST PART OF THE TIME, AND MADE A PHONE CALL IN WHICH HE TALKED ABOUT ITEMS WHICH HE REFERRED TO AS 156'S.

((END OF TAPE A10))





...UNULASSIFIED...

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CA 39AT

(HEETING AT MAINS, W. GERMANY, 29-30 OCTOBER 1986)

IM: ((INTERPRETE IN PERSIAN)) AND IF THEY ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL, THEY HILL LEAVE THIS CHANNEL; THEY WILL PURSUE ((WORD MISSED)) CHARREL. IF THEY DON'T GIVE THEM A ((POSITIVE)) REPORT BY SUNDAY, THEY WILL AWARDON THIS ROUTE.

((IN PERSIAN)) I'D LIKE TO ADD SOMETHING. SINCE ((FEW HORDS MISSED)) FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, WE KNOW THAT IF HE DO NOT COMPLETE THIS, ALL THE ((FEW HORDS MISSED)).

E: ((IN ENGLISH)) I TOLD THEM THAT ((FEW NORDS MISSED)) IF HE ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL AND THIS CHARMEL IS ((FEW NORDS MISSED)), THEN ALL THIS WORK HE'VE DONE ...

THE AND IT HILL TAKE A YEAR ...

((INTERPRETS IN PERSIAN)) HE WAS EXPLAINING THAT IF WE ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL, NOT ONLY WILL THIS GROUP'S WORK COME TO AN END AND ((FEW WORDS HISSED)), BUT GROUPS IN THE FUTURE WHICH WANT TO MAKE CONTACT WILL USE THIS AS AN EXAMPLE—THAT TRANSANS PARE NOT RELIABLE?. THIS WILL BE STUDIED.

& HAKIM:

I: ((IN PERSIAN -- UNINTELLIGIBLE))

GRD: WHAT MORTH IS GETTING AT IS WE ARE GOING DOWN IN THE STEPS NOW-THE MINE POINTS. HE'RE GOING TO VERY QUICKLY. HE EXPECT THEM TO PHOVE? VERY QUICKLY SO THAT HE CAN MOVE TO THE NEXT STEP, AND THE NEXT STEP AND THERE WON'T BE ANY CPPOSITION.

IN: ((INTERPRETS))

IM: ((IMIERPRETS)) IF YOU DON'T HAVE AIN MORE 155UES ON YOUR SIDE, HE LIKES TO LET HE EXPLAIN WHAT'S MAPPENING ON THEIR SIDE.

THE WELL, I DO MANT TO HEAR THAT. LET ME JUST MAKE ONE POINT ABOUT THAT... ME ((MAKIM)) HORKS FOR ME-YOU ((CAVE)) TRANSLATE THIS--HE WORKS FOR ME AS A CONSULTANT. I DON'T KNOW THE FARSI WORD FOR CONSULTANT, DUT AS A PART-TIME CONTRACT EMPLOYEE.

((INTERPRETS))

THE MAS SEEN THIS FOR FOUR, FIVE YEARS, FOR ME SINCE I HAVE GESTANT THE UNITE HOUSE—IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. HE DOES
TRANSLATIONS. THE VOA BROADCASTS IN FARSI, WHICH YOU ASKED FOR AND ME GAVE, HE TRANSLATED THOSE FROM MY SELECT ACCORDING.

IC. (CINTERPRETA))



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CINTERPRETS): LITTLE A PEW DAYS AGO, SASED ON PREVIOUS
ARRANGEMENTS, HAD PROMISED THEM THAT HE HOULD APPROACH THIS IN A
VERY PROPER HAY AND HANDLE IT VERY CORRECTLY. AND THEY HAD DECIDED
TO KEEP THIS AHAY, SECRET FROM HOST OF THE PEOPLE, AND HE PERSONALLY
COORDINATED WITH A NUMBER OF THE PEOPLE, BUT HE DOESN'T SELIEVE IT'S
THE RIGHT TIME FOR HIM TO RELEASE THEIR NAMES. AND SROUGHT IT ID
THE POINT THAT ((FEW HORDS MISSED)) AND ONLY THO DAYS AGO THAT
SAID THAT HE THINK IKAN HAS REACHED THE STAGE THAT HE SHOULD
PRETURN? TO OTHER PEOPLE AS KELL.

((INTERPRETS)) IT GOT TO THE POINT THAT IT HAS DIFFICULT TO KEEP
IT SECRET BECAUSE, FOR INSTANCE,

-COULD HAVE FOUND OUT ABOUT THEIR TRYING TO
CET 10 HILLION DOLLARS OUT ((FEH HORDS HISSED)). THEY HAVE GOTTEN
8 HILLION DUT SO FAR. 4 AND 7 ((FEH HORDS HISSED)). THEY COULD
NOT HAVE KEPT THAT A SECRET, SO THEY DECIDED TO BRING EVERYBODY ELSE

WAIT A MINUTE. I'M CONFUSED. WITH THE TONS COMING WHERE?

IRAN, WHICH ARE THERE NOW.

THIS ONE ...

YEAM. THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE THAT THEY GOT, AND THAT IN ITSELF IS A REVOLUTIONARY ACTION AND EVERYBODY'S GOING TO GO CRAZY AND BERSERK OVER THIS, BECAUSE IT IS SUCH AN IMPORTANT EVENT IN THIS TYPE OF PICTURE.

BUT WHAT'S THE FOINT?

I STOPPED, YOU KNOW, I'M TRYING TO TRANSLATE.

"INTERPRETS)): THE IS EXPLAINING MAY THE ARRIVAL OF THE TOME--AND ILITARY INFORMATION IS COMPLETELY BACKED UP--FIRST: ONE:
-ARE GOING TO BE TOTALLY ELIMINATED. -- TUD HIE ORCUP --

((INTERPRETS)): TWO: THIS WILL ESTABLISH THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS CHANNEL AS THE CREVY CHANNEL, AS THEY HAVE BEEN CLAIMING, WHO SHOULD

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
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[P]

Denied in entirety

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by B. Reger, National Security Council





CONVERSATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY. THEN TAKES RESUME 1)

CRD: SEFORE YOU GO TO THIS ?INTEL?, MAY I ADDRESS THIS LIST?
I'M ODING TO ADDRESS THIS LIST. THERE ARE SOME TERRIFIC PRACTICAL
PROSLEMS HERE THERE ARE A COUPLE OF REAL, AS OPPOSED TO
FHILOSOPHICAL, PROSLEMS WITH THIS LIST.

((INTERPRETS))

CRO: THE FIRST IS POLITICAL.

LEAVES THE ROOM AT THIS POINT 210 GO TO SATHROOM? AND U.S. IRANIAN SHOPPING LIST. THEN HR. COMES BACK IN THE ROCH.))

-: THE FIRST PROBLEM IS POLITICAL. - BASED-UPON PREVIOUS OFFICIAL REQUESTS OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, I.E. AND VERIFIED, AND I HOULD UNDERLINE, DESPERATE REQUESTS FROM HIM, FOR TONS FOR HAMM PARTS AND FOR HIGH POMERED RADARS, HE HAVE ACHIEVED PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY FOR INHEDIATE AIR DELIVERY OF THOSE ITEMS.

((INTERPRETS))

CAN DENY THIS GR NOT DENY THIS. IT IS IRRELEVANT. HE HAVE COCUMENTARY PROOF, IT'S NOT EVEN WORTH DISCUSSING.

IIS TO COUNTERFRETSON

130: AND THE PRESIDENTIAF THE U.S. HAS APPROVED A SECRET OPERATION TO CELLVER THESE ITEMS IMMEDIATELY, AND HE NOWLD HAVE ALREADY DELIVERED THEM EXCEPT THAT HE HEPE ASKED TO HOLD UP SO THAT HE COULD HAVE THESE HIGHER LETEL DISCUESTONS.

111

CRD WHICH SEEMED FFARCHABLE TO US AND 1000, RECAUSE WE WANTED TO HAVE A NORE RELIABLE. FATIONAL TYSTEM FOR DISCUSSIONS.

((INTERPPETE

ME ALSO, I HOME, MADE CLEAR TO THE IN MASHINGTON THAT HE DON'T RESARD, THESE ITEMS BY THEMSELVES AS BEING PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO ACOULTER-SOME OF THE LARGE MUBBERS, FOR INSTANCE, TO THOUSAND INSTANCE, TO THOUSAND INSTANCE WOULD THE ALLOWS THE - William South

IN CLIMTERPRETED

HOL TO THE THE THAT HEN HE DELIVER THESE FIRST AIRPLANE LOADS
TO DIS POSTÁSES ARE SOING TO BE RELEASED. WE WILL STATT PRICING
THE MIGH SOING FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITY. AND SETTING (FEW MORDS
(FIGURE)), BUT WE CON'T DARE GO OUT AND START DOING SOMETHING LINE
THE UNTIL ME HAVE THE POLITICAL SUCCESS SENIND US.

ME ((INTERPRETS, BUT HIS INTERPRETATION DIFFERS SCHEMAT, HE SAID, IN PERSIAN)) THIS IS STILL PART OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEM. HE SAYS THAT THEN HE ARE THAT THE NATTER OF THE HOSTACES HAS SEEN RESOLVED AND WE HAVE PUT THIS PROBLEM SENIND US, ((INTERRUPTED BY KNOCK ON DOOR))

IRD: HE HOULD LOSE OUR SECRECY.

LA-EN YOU SAY THE ITEMS ARE NOT DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN, ((FEH WORDS (1)188ED))

THE LET ME, OKAY? EVERYTHING THAT THE GENERAL SAID IS ENTIRELY ACCURATE. WHEN WE LOCKED AT THIS LIST, WE ESTIMATED THAT, EXCLUDING THESE THO-ITEMS, THE HAWK AND THE TOWS, WE ARE LOOKING AT A MINIMUM OF FOUR SHIPLGADS OF EQUIPMENT.

IM. ((INTERPRETS))

THE THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE IN THE U.S. , AT A HIRIBU, HOULD KNOW ABOUT THAT,

IM: ((INTERPRETS))

THE IF HE ARE GOING TO DO SOMETHING LIKE THIS, IT HAS TO BE VERY CLEAR THAT HE ARE DOING THIS DECAUSE HE ARE HORKING FOR A MILITARY BALANCE IN THE PEGION HO A POLITICAL SOLUTION, AND HONCRABLE SOLUTION TO THE DRAW-1840 AND

IN: ((INTERPRETS)) ((SUT SAYS "THE WORLD MUST UNDERSTAND THAT HE ARE-EMBARKING ON A COURSE TO CREATE A BALANCE OF POHER. THAT MUST BE THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE WORLD HAS ())

THE THE OPEER FOR US TO BE SEEN AS THE LING A POLITICAL ROLE IN ACHIEVING A BALANCE IN THE FILITARY SITUATION, OUR JUSTIFICATION FOR THAT, HE INUST SE ASLE TO TELL OTHER PEOPLE, TO INCLUDE OUR OWN PEOPLE, THAT HE ARE CARPYING ON A GIALOSKE WITH THE SOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

IN. CLINTERFRETEL

IN ORDER FOR THE CARRY ON A DIALOGUE WITH THE POVERIMENT OF TRANSCORD THAT IS PULLTICALLY ACCEPTABLE TO OUR FECRLE, HE MUST HAVE TAKEN THAT ROLF IN THE ROAD, THAT OBSTACLE, AND PUT IT BEHIND US.

ACAGE 13 & REFERENCE TO THE HOSTAGES)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

AND LIST THE WOOD THINGS THAT THEY MAN FOR US.

THE LET HE HARE JUST ONE LAST POINT, AND TIPM IT'S YOUR TURK C 382
IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAID THAT OWN APPROACH IS NOT THAT OF
THE FRENCE HAD HAVE DIFFERENT OWNETIVES, AND SECAUSE FRANCE IS HUCH
SHALLER, AND HAS A SHALL ROLE IN THE HORLD, THEIR GOALS ARE HORE
LIMITED.

IN: (CEINTERPRETS))

ARRIVES))

RTH: RONALD REAGAN IS COINS TO SE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. FOR THO HORE YEARS AND WILL PEVER AGAIN SERVE AS PRESIDENT.

KIN: ((INTERPRETS))

THERE IS HOFARLANE.

TH. HE HANTS TO BE PRESIDENT?

43M ((INTERPRETS)) THEY ARE VERY ACTIVE IN TRYING TO MAKE HOFARLANE PRESIDENT. ((LAUCHTER))

THAT'S NOT BEYOND REASON. IT COULD HAPPEN. ((CONTINUES WITH PREVIOUS THOUGHT)) THIS PRESIDENT MOULD LIKE TO HAVE—I CAN TELL YOU BECAUSE I'VE LISTENED TO HIM--HIS VISION IS THAT WEN HE LEAVES OFFICE IN 1989 HE WILL HAVE FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SETWEEN YOUR COUNTRY AND OURS.

IM. ((INTERPRETS))

HE MOULD LIKE TO BE REMEMBERED AS A MAN WHO HELPED TO BRING PEACE, IF YOU WILL. TO THE CHRISTIAN AND MOSLEM AND JEWISH PEOPLE IN THIS GOOLD

((INTERPRETS))

THE THAT IS WHY HE HELECIED THE VEHER HE DID FROM OUR HOLY SOOK.

IN: ((INTERPRETS)

THE 11 ISM T WOME SHORT-TERM THING JUST TO SET PERLECTED OR TO SOLVE SOME IMPEDIATE PROBLEM, AND THEN FORDET ABOUT IT. HE PEALLY HAS LONG-TERM VIS OF

IN CHARRENES

THE HE KNOWS THAT GROWN HOSKIN IS A CLEXINETIVE)!

SA TRACTICA TRAINING THE TRACTICAL STREET, STR

GO AMEAD. THAT I HIS HORD, NOT HITH

. ..

CORPTED AROUT THE 420VE S

THE THEORY BURNEY OF THE ARE ASSOCT TO GIVE THE MANE HEVER GIVEN TO MANH HTTH VATHOOD A HTTH MAN 16 ST CHK HATES BINT I BELD VOUBTINA

1 CL ADD A LITTLE BILLE WAR HAS TO GO. BUT MAT BOTH ARECENTING 05

WHAT THEY CAN DO WITH THIS?

LET HE ANSHER IN GENERAL SECAUSE I DON'T HAVE A SPECIFIC ANSHER FOR YOU. AND I DON'T THINK YOU HAVE A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF WHAT YOU HOULD CONSIDER VICTORY FOR HE AT THIS POINT. THIS IS WHY OUR RELATIONSHIP IS SO VERY, VERY IMPORTANT. TH:

IM INTERPRETS.

HE HANTS TO KNOW.... THE SOTTON LINE OF EVERY TKING THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO SAY IS THIS THAT HE SOTH AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION AND SASE OF AN HONORABLE VICTORY HEANS FOR SADDAM TO GO. HE HAVE SAID ENOUGH AND HE SOTH UNDERSTAND THAT. WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW NOW IS WHAT SHOULD THEY DO FOR US TO TAKE THE NEXT STEP TOWARDS THAT AND HOW. YOU SHOULD COME UP AND SAY... FOR INSTANCE SANG ON THE TABLE AND SADDAM HUSBAYN WILL GO OR WHATEYER EXPLAIN TO US VERY CLEARLY THE METHOD THAT ME HAVE THE ACHIEVE THIS. iIM:



HE HANTS TO LEAVE THAT WITH YOU AS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE, SECAUSE YOUR ANSWER MAY VERY WELL AFFECT THEIR MOVES IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR OFFENSIVE AND THE KILLING OF THE PEOPLE.

I UNDERSTAND. AND THAT'S MHY WE RAISED THAT ISSUE IN HASHINGTON, MHY THE PRESIDENT HAD HE RAISE IT. THE IDEA THAT THERE HAD TO BE AN HONORABLE PEACE FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. RTH:

4IM INTERPRETS.

HE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT SADDAM HUSAYN MUST OF

LIM INTERPRETS.

I CAN NOT TELL YOU EXACTLY DAY BY DAY OR STEP BY STEP, AS I OUTLINE CERTAIN OTHER STEPS BETHEEN US, HOW THAT WOULD GO. YET THE GENERAL OUTLINE OF IT FOLLOWS THOSE STEPS THAT I GAVE LAST NIGHT.

KIM INTERPRETS.

HE HUST 3E ABLE TO CARRY ON A HIGH-LEVEL DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN IN SUCH A WAY THAT OUR PEOPLE ARE EVENTUALLY COMFORTABLE WITH IT AND THAT YOUR PEOPLE ARE EVENTUALLY COMFORTABLE WITH IT.

H.A INTERPRETS.

ALIM ALAL.

MOTORN

((IN PERSIAN)) ON THE LAST DAY HACFARLANE TOLD HE, THE I HOPE YOU KNOW THE HALLA TRADE, BECAUSE YOU HIGHT HAVE TO REMAIN HERE. T: ((LAUGHTER)).

HAKIH:

HE SAID IF HE HERE INVOLVED, HE HOULD HAVE CAUSED KHAMENE'! AND ALL THESE PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MEETING. I SAID. THANK GOD THAT YOU HERE NOT INVOLVED AND THUSE PEOPLE DID NOT PARTICIP SECAUSE IF THEY HOULD HAVE, THE DIFFERENCES HOULD HAVE APPEARED AND SECONE VERY EVIDENT, AND THEN YOU HAVE NO HORE THE EXCUSE THAT YOU DIDN'T HEET WITH THE OGVERNING LEVEL, AND HE HOULD NOT BE SITTING HERE TODAY. NOT BE SITTING HERE TODAY.

WELL, THAT'S BESIDE THE POINT. HE RECOONLIE THAT INSIDE YOUR GOVERNMENT THERE ARE PEOPLE IND ARE OPPOSED TO THIS RELATIONSHIP. THE SAME THING APPLIES INSIDE OUR GOVERNMENT. AND IMEN YOU CAME AND VISITED US, EVEN AT THE WHITE HOUSE, WHERE THE PRESIDENT LIVES AND HORKS, WE HAD TO SE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT WHO KNEW EXACTLY ?NORTH?: WHAT WAS GOING ON.

((HAKIM TRANSLATES.))

WHEN WE WERE IN TEHRAN, THE REASON THAT THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING THAT WE DRAFTED THAT NIGHT WAS DRAFTED THE WAY IT WAS, WAS SECAUSE WE THOUGHT THAT THAT WAS GOING TO HELP MOVE THAT PROCESS ALONG, AND SECAUSE WE THOUGHT THAT THAT WAS WHAT YOU WANTED US TO DO. NORTH:

WELL, CHORBANIFAR LED US TO BELIEVE THAT

((INTERPRETS)) HAKIM:

AND SO I'M SURE IT WAS DEVIOUS TO YOU AFTER HE HAD SEEN THERE
FOR A WHILE--YOU KNOW I COULD SEE ALL OF THIS WORK GONE TOWARD
THE DBUECTIVE THAT I THINK EVERYSODY IN THIS ROOM HANTS TO ACHIEVE,
AND THAT IS A STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP SETWEEN OUR THO COUNTRIES.
BUT OVER THERE, AFTER THE SECOND DAY, I COULD SEE THAT IT WAS GOING
DOWN HILL PRETTY GUICKLY. AND I SECAME VERY BEFONDENT. NORTH: BUT OVER THERE, AFTER THE SECOND DAY, I COULD SEE THAT IT MAS GO!
DOWN HILL PRETTY QUICKLY. AND I SECAME VERY DESPONDENT.
AND AFTER WE RETURNED TO MASHINGTON, THAT HORNING MACFARLANE...
AND I BRISFED JHE PRESIDENT, AND THE NEXT DAY WE HAD A HESTING
IN WHICH THO OF THE PRESIDENT'S VERY SENIOR ADVISORS, SHULTI
AND MEINSERGER SAID, "STOP IT. DON'T GO ANY FURTHER."
AND SHULTI, IN THE MEETING IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, --WHICH HE
SAW, AND YOU'RE WELCOME TO COME THE NEXT TIME---SHULTZ POINTED
OVER TO HE AND SAID, "WE HAVE TO STOP THIS, HE ((NORTH)) DOESN'T
KNOW HAD THE WEY RE TALKING TO, IT'S NOT THE WAY TO GO.

AND IN TRYING TO SAVE MY JOS. I SAID, US TO YOU KNOW

((TRANSLATES, PLUS AN EXPLANATION THAT NORTH HAD HADE THESE SUGGESTIONS SO THAT THE EFFORTS OF THE PREVIOUS FEW YEARS ((SIC)) HOULD NOT BE HASTED.))

NORTH:

M:

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THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TRANSPORT NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TRANSPORT NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TRANSPORT NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TRANSPORT NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TRANSPORT NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TRANSPORT NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TRANSPORT NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TRANSPORT NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TRANSPORT NAMED IN COLU

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SACK TO HORK ON SOMS INCO. LEAD A BOUTA LET'S CO.

M: ((INTERPRETE))

ALL OF THE TELLS HE AND THE SAVE THEM TO BASICALLY THE

MAKIN: ((INTERPRETS))

H

NORTH: ALL OF THIS TELLS HE THAT THERE ARE HANY, HANY PEOPLE WHO ARE SECONING INCREASINGLY AHARE AND CREATING SIGGER VALNERABILITIES.

HAKIM: ((INTERPRETS, ADDING HIS OWN COMMENT ON THE NEED FOR PROMPT ACTION TO BRING UNDER CONTROL ALL OF THE PHONE CALLS.))

NORTH: YES, THAT'S A PART OF IT. BUT IN A BROADER SENSE, IF HE OD BACK TO PHILOSOPHY, IN THE BROADER SENSE, HE HAVE OUT TO GET THIS THING MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, SENSIBLY, BEFORE IT LEAKS OUT.

HAKIM: ((INTERPRETS)) ((HIS INTERPRETATION HAD A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT SLANT, IN THAT HE SAID, "SOONER OR LATER THIS THING IS GOING,...
TO BE EXPOSED. AND IF OUR ACTIONS ARE NOT ON A FIRM AND PROPER COURSE BEFORE IT IS EXPOSED, HE HILL NOT GET ANYWHERE.))

CAVE: ((IN PERSIAN)) WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL TO KEEP OUR DEALINGS SECRET-TO KEEP THEM FROM BEING DISCOVERED.

H 'H: ((INTERPRETE)) IN THIS MEETING IS SURE THAT ALL THESE ISSUES WILL SE DISCUSSED AND TAKEN CARE OF. THAT IS, THE TELEPHONE CALLS AND ALSO ESTABLISHING A VERY PROFESSIONAL MAY OF CONTINUING WITH OUR RELATIONSHIP.

WAKIN: ((INTERPRETS)) HE SAYS HE HAS A RECOMMENDATION TO MAKE. LET'S OFT ON WITH THE SHOW. LET'S START DOING THINGS ABOUT IT, SECAUSE HE IS CONVINCED THAT IF WE MANT TO STICK TO THE ISSUES THAT WE HAVE BROUGHT UP AND HAVE TAKEN PLACE, BOTH PARTIES HAVE HANY STORIES TO SAY.

CAVE: ((COMPLETING THE INTERPRETATION)) A LOT OF HEARTBURN ON BOTH SIDES.

NORTH: DID I REASSURE YOU ABOUT THE TEHRAN SUSINESS? THAT IT IS NOT A PERSONAL THING, IT HAS WHAT HE HERE TOLD SEFOREHAND.

HAKIM: ((INTERPRETS))

CAVE: ((IN PERSIAN)) WE UNDERSTAND THE CAUSE OF THE "
HISUNDERSTANDING, SINCE EVERYTHING WE ****, CAME FROM
GHORSANIFAR ALONE, AND HE HANT YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT HE
NOW UNDERSTAND HOW THIS DISSATISFACTION CAME ABOUT.

HAKIM: ((INTERPRETE)) HE IS REFERRING TO A SESSION--AND HE DOESN'T HANT TO OPEN IT UP UNLESS HANT HIM TO DO THAT NOW--HE SAYS HE'S HOPING , THE DIRECTION THE DISCUSSION HENT THAT HE CAME TO THE

4 MIN: ((INTERPRETS)) ((IN PERSIAN)) FROM THE SECINAINO IT HAS CLEAR ME HANT TO GO ON A COURSE OF COOPERATION WITH ONE ANOTHER, YOUR MEDS AND OUR NEEDS SOTH ((HORD UNCLEAR.)) SUT AS OF YET, THERE IS NO PRACTICAL PLAN AVAILABLE, WITH A SCHEDULE AND WITH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE VARIOUS STEPS WHICH CAN BE SCHEDULED. ((FEW HORDS)) NOTHING TANGISLE IS IN HAMD. THE BEGINNING IT HAS CLEAR THAT

NOW, YOU HAVE ASKED US FOR INTELLIGENCE. WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE, AT LEAST INITIALLY, A START ON THAT INTELLIGENCE. YOU HAVE ASKED US FOR SOME WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF ACQUIRING THOSE ATH:

MITM: ((INTERPRETE))

MAEN WAS IN MASHINGTON A FEW MEEKS AGO. HE ASKED US FOR A LIST OF CERTAIN ITEMS OF MILITARY HARDWARE. SOME OF THOSE ARE EASIER TO DO THAN OTHERS, AND HE ARE PREPARED TO HOVE ON THOSE MITH:

THINGS.

((INTERPRETS)) KIM:

TODAY, YOU ASKED HE FOR SOME HORE INFORMATION. AND I'M GOING TO GO OUT AND GO FIND IT AND GET BACK TO YOU ON THAT. RTH:

((INTERPRETS)) WIM:

THINK THOSE ARE PRACTICAL NEXT STEPS THAT HE CAN TAKE ON OUR SIDE. HY FUNDAMENTAL PROSLEM IS THE SAME ONE THAT HE TALKED ABOUT HHEN HAS IN HASHINGTON. HE HAVE IN OUR DEMOCRACY A PERCEPTION PROSLEM-OF-A-MAJOR-DESTACLE—THAT—SITS—IN—THE MTH. MIDDLE OF THE ROAD OF PROGRESS.

((INTERPRETE)) AIM:

MY SENSE IS THAT IN ORDER TO PROGRESS ON THE VARIOUS ISSUES, IN A MAY IN WHICH HE DO NOT EXPOSE THIS RELATIONSHIP PREMATURELY. OR IN A MAY THAT DOES NOT CREATE A SENSE THAT THE SOVIETS FEEL THE NEED TO INTERVENE -- WITH EITHER THE KOS OR HILITARILY--SRTH. WE NEED TO WORK VERY QUIETLY TO ACCOMPLISH CERTAIN THINGS TOGETHER, AND TO SUILD THAT RELATIONSHIP I THINK HUCH THE SAME MAY YOU AND I HAVE TALKED FOR. I MOULD LIKE TO PUT, BASICALLY, A SCHEDULE OF HOW WE GROW THAT RELATIONSHIP TOGETHER, BEFORE MY PRESIDENT WHEN HE GO HOME.

((INTERPRETS)) KIH:

AND HAKIM DISCUSS HOW

SHOULD ANSWER.))

GENTLEHEN. I THINK HE ARE COMING TO AN UNDERSTANDING. I FELT THAT ((FEH HORDS UNCLEAR.)) AND I HAD TO DRAW SCHETHING TO EXPLAIN THAT. WHAT HAS MAPPENED, YOU KNOW, ISSUES I REPRESENT IN THE FORM OF BRANCHES... HERE TALKED ABOUT AND ALMOST AGRED ON, SOTH ON THE IRANIAN SIDE AND THE AMERICAN SIDE, THAT THERE HAS NO ODDDAWN STEM HERE TO HOOK THESE THINGS TO -- TO GET AT. ((FEW HORDS UNCLEAR.)) AND NOW HE EXPLAINS TO ME THAT, YES HE UNDERSTANDS THAT HE HAS TO DO THAT, SUT THERE ARE IMPORTANT ISSUES THAT YOU HAVE NOT CLARIFIED FOR THEM. THEREFORE THEY CAN NOT COME AND PUT THIS SKELETON TOGETHER FOR THE DISCUSSION. SUCH AS, IT IS NOT CLEAR TO THEM WHAT YOUR POLICY IS IN CONNECTION HITH SADDAM HUSAIN. THE MESSAGE THAT THAS SEETS MAY A LITTLE TO UNCLEAR. WIH:

HE RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE TOWS THAT ARE TO SE SHIPPED. HE SAID IT IS NOT CLEAR. I SAID THAT I DISAGREE! IT IS VERY CLEAR, HE ALL STUCK OUR NECKS OUT AND STARTED TO PACK THE DAWN THINGS SO HE CAN DELIVER THEM IN THE NEXT EIGHT DAYS.....

AHIH

((INTERPRETS)) WHAT ARE THESE ITEMS THAT ARE EASY FOR YOU TO HANDLE AND WHAT ARE THE DIFFICULT CHES? WE'RE GETTING TACTICAL HERE. THE ISSUE IS THIS LIST. HE WANTS TO KNOW IF YOU ARE GOING TO GIVE THEM, HOW MANY, AND WHEN. HE WANTS TO SE ASLE TO WRITE IN FRONT OF THESE ITEMS. . .

GO AHEAD AND GO DOWN THE LIST THEN. ORTH:

AKIH: OKAY. THIS IS THE 108 155'S TOGETHER WITH 500 BARRELS.

OKAY. YOU'RE TALKING SHIPLOADS OF STUFF. LET HE START AT THE OTHER END. LET'S START IN CHRONOLOGICAL TERMS, BASED ON WHAT, YOU HAVE TOLD HE SEVERAL DAYS AGO....DID YOU EXPLAIN THE VERY DIFFICULT PROCESS, SECAUSE HE DON'T HAVE A FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION, HE DON'T HAVE F.M.S. SALES, IT IS A VERY DIFFICULT PROCESS HE HAVE TO GO THROUGH TO GET THIS HITHOUT EVERYBODY IN THE WORLD KNOWING WHAT SHTR:

HE'RE DOING. HAS THAT BEEN EXPLAINED?

. H. IF HE UNDERSTANDS SAYS HE DOES.))

BECADEE THAT HAS GREATED ENORHOUS COMPLICATIONS WITH HR BECAUSE CHORBANIFAR AND

AND ALSO FOR AVE:

OH YEAM. JUST TERRIBLE PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF THE METHOD THAT HE MAVE TO USE TO OBTAIN THESE ITEMS. BASED ON HAAT YOU HAD TOLD ME SEVERAL DAYS AGO, I PUT MY ASS ON THE LINE WITH THE PARENT COMPANY—A CONMERCIAL COMPANY THAT HE USE TO HIDE THIS—AND HE STARTED ORDERING UP AND PACKING 500 TOMS AND THE REMAINDER OF THE HAMM PARTS THAT HE CORTH:

HAD AVAILABLE.

((INTERPRETS)) sADDS THAT MATERIAL CAN SE IN TEHRAN WITHIN S OR 9 WORKING DAYS. KIM:

THIS INCLUDES 285 HAMM PARTS AND 500 YOMS. 27 LINE ITEMS AND A CORTH. TOTAL OF 285 PARTS.

SECORD: PLUS THREE PALLETS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

FOR WHICH THERE IS NO CHARGE. HTROL

MAKIM: ((INTERPRETS))

•

-AKIM:

((THERE WILL PE)) THO FLIGHTS. THAT WAS ORDERED. 4:

((INTERPRETS)) ((FEH HORDS UNCLEAR)) BY

M: ((INTERPRETE)).

((INAUDIBLE))



(CINTERPRETS) AND IP THEY DO, IT WILL BE TOO LATE.

TELL HIM THAT I'M JUST JOKING.

HE LIEUNBERGER. IN OUR LAST SESSION WITH THE PRESIDENT, SAID, "I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD SEND ONE MORE SCREN--TALKING ABOUT THE MAIN PARTS--UNTIL WE HAVE OUR AMERICANS SACK FROM BEIRUT. SECAUSE WHEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FIND OUT THAT THIS HAS HAPPENED, THEY'LL IMPEACH YOU. "TALKING TO THE PRESIDENT.

IAKIM: ((INTERPRETS))

ME AND I WENT THROUGH THE LIST WITH THE GENERAL AND THE ADVICE THAT WE PROVIDED WITHIN THE CUIDANCE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD GIVEN US.

AND. AGAIN, BASED ON WHAT WE KNOW IS GOING ON IN THE REGION, AND WHAT WE EXPECT OF THE IRAGI PLANS, WAS IMPROVE AIR DEFENSE IMMEDIATELY, PROVIDE ANTI-ARNOR DEFENSE; AND GET YOU THE INTELLIGENCE YOU NEED SO THAT YOU DON'T DECIMATE WHAT'S LEFT OF THE PASDARAN; AND THEN SEE WHERE WE'RE GOING BEFORE WE MOVE ANY OF THIS HE, THE PRESIDENT, DIDN'T SAY NO TO ANY OF THIS.

AKIM. ((INTERPRETS))

AND WHEN HE'S TALKING ABOUT "SEE WHERE WE GO," WHAT HE IS
TALKING ABOUT IS, VERY PRACTICALLY, SEEING WHERE WE ARE GOING WITH
THE WAR. THERE'S NO POINT IN YOU SPENDING A BILLION DOLLARS, OR
WHATEVER THAT COMES TO: I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT ALL THAT COSTS...
IF YOU DON'T NOED IT BECAUSE THE WAR IS GOING TO SE OVER

.---- (INTERPRETS) -- ..

JAKIH ((INTERPRETS)) COULD YOU GIVE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ABOUT THIS LIST JECAUSE THIS LIST IS BASED ON AN OPERATIONAL PLAN THAT THEY HAVE

THE I UNDERSTAND THAT

IN AND THEY WANT TO UNDERSTAND YOUR COMMENTS ABOUT THESE LISTS.

I THIME, AFTER HE HAS SEEN THE INTELLIGENCE, HY PRAYER FOR THOUSANDS OF YOUNG IRANIA'S YOUNGSTERS, IS THAT SCHEBOLY THINKS VERY CAREFULLY AROUT THAT OFFERSIVE DRAY?

WIM ((INTERPRETS))

AND HAP IN TALK GUIETLY IN BACKGROUND INAUDIBLY.

(ITTIME OUT FOR NORTH AND CAVE TO MAKE PHONE CALLS))

SCRD LET ME THEN, WHILE YOU ARE DGING THAT, CO OVER THEN FOR SCHOOL OF THE THINGS HE SAID IN HASHINGTON ABOUT THIS LIST AND HOW IT RELATES TO THE STEP BY STEP APPROACH TO IT AND THE HOSTAGES

12 THEIR LIST OF OUR LIST?

UNCLASSIFIED

MTH THE INP

J THEIR LIST

:c

THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT WHAT HE DID HAS LOOK AT THE IMMEDIATE MEEDS OKAY I UNDERSTAND THE OFFENSIVE. I UNDERSTAND THE NEED

HE HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

((INTERPRETE))

. IF IT SECAME ANOMY WHAT HE ARE GIVING YOU. . WHAT HE ARE GIVING YOU SHOUL SOME SIGNIFICANT VULNERABILITIES ON THEIR PART.

((INTERPRETS)) .AVE:

IF IT EVER BECAME KNOWN WE HAVE DONE THIS, WE HOULD BE FINISHED IN TERMS OF CREDIBILITY AS LONG AS PRESIDENT READAN IS PRESIDENT. HT NON

CAVE ((INTEMPRETS))

WORTH: THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT ASKED FOR WHEN HE HAS IN HASHINGTON.

:AVE:

THE OILY DIFFERENCE IS THAT HE COULT HAVE IT ORTH

AND HE ARE COING ARE PRINTING THEM. THEN FOR YOU. THEY ARE ON PLATES AND THEY

:AVE: ((INTERPRETS))

YOR TH OKAY. LAST POINT, AND THEN GIVES THE INTELLIGENCE. HE KNOW THAT

ARE ((WORD MISSED)) WHO KMOME WHAT

((INTERPRETS))

RTH

AVE.

4

AVE:

THE REASON I TELL YOU THAT IS THAT IF FINDS OUT THAT HE IVE GIVEN THAT OFF FO FAST IT HILL HAVE YOUR HEME SPIN CATH TO SHUT THIS

4.E: TELLITERPRETS () · n

DETH. YOU REGINE DON'T KNOW THIS . ARE HE CETTING ENOUGH OUT OF THIS

EXHIBIT OLN-317

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NN-317

SUBJECT: CIA Aicline Involvement

In late November 1985, a CIA proprietary airline was chartered to carry cargo to Iran. The cargo was described to us as oil drilling spare parts.
Although we did not know it at the time, the cargo was actually 18 Hawk missles. The chronolgy of the incident is as follows:

On 22 November 1985, the NSC contacted the Agency with an urgent request for the name of a discreet, reliable airline that could transport bulky oil-drilling parts to an unspecified destination in the Hiddle East.

we offered the name of the CIA's proprietary airline as a company which could handle the MSC request. The MSC passed the name of outsitline to the intermediacy with the Iranians.

In the interia, we contacted our airline and told them that they would be receiving an urgent, legitimate charter request. The meaning of the management of the airline that evening (22) and are arrangements for the airline to pick-up the November) and made arrangements for the airline to pick-up the parts in

The destination was changed to Tel Aviv and two of the cargo was ultimately loaded onto only one of the aircraft. cargo was ultimately loaded onto only one of the aircraft.

Loading was completed by 24 November and the aircraft proceeded to Iran via a stop at then overflying At the NSC's request, and for the protection of our aircraft, we helped arrange for the overflight clearances.

The best of our knowledge, the three did not income that they will dealing with a CIA proprietary, nor did aircline that they were carrying. We in old did not find prpceeded

personnel know what they were carrying. We in the did not find out that our airline had hauled Hawk missles into Iran until mid-January when we were told by the Iranians.

The airline was paid the normal commercial rate which amounted to approximately \$127,700. I should stress that the airline does a considerable amount of normal business in addition to its support to CIA. It had, in fact, made aunthor to the stress of the to the 22-25 November incident.

Senior CIA management found out about the flight on 25 Rebeway. Although we did not know the nature of the cargo, thought that any future support of this type to the NSC would require a Finding.

Partially Declaration / February on 7 July 1987 ender provisions of E.S. 125% by S. Reger, Matternal Sepority Council

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EXHIBIT OLN-318

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November 7, 1986

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Mr. J. Robert McBrien Visiting Scholar Center for Strategic Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. -Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20006

***** 857-9836

Dear Bob:

As you requested in our conversation of last week, I am writing to outline for you the resources available in this firm to assist in resolving the legal questions you raised. The individuals involved may be facing investigations from congressional committees and federal grand juries regarding possible violations of the Neutrality Act and the Arms Export Control Act.

Changes in the make up of the U.S. Senate substantially enhances the likelihood of congressional investigations into the private aid activities of Americans assisting the Nicaraguan Contras. For example, it should be anticipated that the Senate Foreign Relations, Judiciary and Intelligence Committees and their House counterparts will initiate investigations and hold hearings on this subject. It is also likely that there will be remarked afforts through the Congress and the courts to pressing the U.S. Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate all possible criminal violations regarding these activities. We believe that our firm is uniquely qualifier to defend against legal action of this type because of our broad experience in handling legislative, litigation and criminal matters.

Wayne S. Bishop, the firm's Chairman, would direct all efforts on the part of our firm in defending these actions. Mr. Bishop has participated in defending clients on substantial legal and legislative matters for many years and understands the complexities of such matters as this type; he also is in the best position to direct the firm's resources in the most effective manner. Because of the nature of the matters involved, he would put together a team of lawyers with direct expertise in the legislative, litigative and criminal aspects of your situation.

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Mr. J. Robert McBrien November 7, 1986 Page 1

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I have discussed this at length with Mr. Bishop, and he has personally pledged to me that he would coordinate, staff and direct the entire project.

Legislative Matters

All legislative matters including congressional investigations, hearings and interviews by staff and members of Congress would be directed by Marlow W. Cook, former U.S. Senator from Kentucky. Since leaving the Senate in 1975, Senator Cook has practiced law in Washington and has represented a wide variety of clients before the Congress on many issues. Senator Cook's extensive experience has enabled him to understand all aspects of Congress as well as have a close working relationship with many of the present membership of both houses of Congress.

In addition to Senator Cook, former Representatives Graham Purcell and David Satterfield, who have over 35 years congressional experience between them, will also be available to assist in any matters where appropriate. They would be assisted by firm lawyers trained and experienced through service on legislative committees and the personal staffs of senators and congressmen.

Criminal and Litigation Matters

The firm is particularly well suited to handle any criminal, investigative or litigation matter which could arise under this case. The firm has more than 20 lawyers in its litigation practice group and tan dome from positions as Assistant U.S. Attorneys and other dovernmental prosedution bodies. The firm's litigation attorneys have direct experience in defending clients before drand pury investigations and FBI inquiries, as well as in U.S. District Courts. They would be prepared to defend any action or to intervene in any suit which might effect the position of our directs, e.g. suits by members of Congress to compel the U.S. Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor.

The firm's partners who would be assigned the primary litigation of the criminal aspects of this matter are Mark Davidson and Eric Hirschhorn. Each of these attorneys is fully qualified to deal with the various issues that could arise from such litigation.

Mr. Davidson, has an extensive background in the preparation and trial of criminal matters. Mr. Davidson was previously associated with one of New York City's premier Wall Street firms, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, where he specialised in antitrust and securities litigation. In that capacity, he was involved in the defense of clients in major grand jury investigations and in the trial of white collar criminal actions,

Mr. J. Robert McBrief November 7, 1986 Face 3

N 5559

involving price fixing and securities fraud. Mr. Davidson also served for three years as Assistant Director of Litigation at the Federal Trade Commission.

Mr. Davidson has recently represented clients before federal grand juries in the Southern District of Florida (West Palm Beach) and the Northern District of California (San Francisco). In recent weeks, he has successfully represented Senator Laxalt's interests, as part of the Sanator's \$250 million libel action against the Sacramento Bee, in preventing certain PBI files sought by the Bee from being disclosed.

Mr. Birschhorn, a trade and litigation partner, has extensive experience in handling criminal violations of the Arms Export Control Act as well as various types of actions which involve the intelligence community. In 1975-77, he directed the investigation conducted by the Bouse Government Operations Committee into the National Security Agency and the PBI. From 1977-80 he was an OMB Deputy Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, where he participated in the government's reorganization study of the intelligence community. Following his OMB service, Mr. Birschhorn served as Deputy, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration at the U.S. Commerce Department. In this position he was responsible for the management of the U.S. export control system (licensing and enforcement).

Since leaving the government in June 1981, Mr. Hirschhorn has been in private practice in Washington, D.C. Most of his practice involves civil and criminal matters relating to controls on militarily significant goods. He also served on the defense tear in the espionage case of <u>United States v Zehe</u> and <u>United States v Michaelsen</u>.

General .

In general, the firm has 75 attorneys in Washington. The bulk of there attorneys are involved in federal litigation and legislative matters. This depth permits the firm to apply substantial resources to any major litigative or legislative matter.

We recognize the significant legal problems that are presented in the matter you discussed with me, and our firm's Chairman has committed to the utilization of all the resources necessary to provide the appropriate defense. He has offered to discuss the matter with you and the interested party at any time.

Mr. C. Robert McBrien November C. 1986 Page 4

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I, of course, remain available to discuss this or any question you have concerning this letter and our firm's resources.

Sincerely yours,

David B. Reiner

EXHIBIT OLN-319

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Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents



Monday, November 17, 1986 Volume 22—Number 46 Pages 1549-1572



er united and committed to this cause, I think we represent a powerful force for humanity. And when that happens, there'll be no sanctuary on Earth for those who were pilfering human dignity and pandering despair.

So, I'm counting on all of you, and I'm looking forward to hearing your views now. Maybe you've heard enough from all of us at this side.

Note: The President spoke at 1:35 p.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

U.S. Ambassadors to 21 countries attended the 2-day conference, which was held at the White House.

Iran-United States Relations

Address to the Nation. November 13, 1986

Good evening.

I know you've been reading, seeing, and hearing a lot of stories the past several days attributed to Danish sailors, unnamed observers at Italian ports and Spanish harbors, and especially unnamed government officials of my administration. Well, now you're going to hear the facts from a White House source, and you know my name.

I wanted this time to talk with you about an extremely sensitive and profoundly important matter of foreign policy. For 18 months now we have had underway a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran. That initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons: to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody 6-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all hostages. Without Iran's cooperation, we cannot bring an end to the Persian Gulf war; without Iran's concurrence, there can be no enduring peace in the Middle East.

For 10 days now, the American and world press have been full of reports and rumors about this initiative and these objectives. Now, my fellow Americans, there's an old saying that nothing spreads so quickly as a rumor. So, I thought it was time to speak

with you directly, to tell you firsthand about our dealings with Iran. As Will Rogers once said, "Rumor travels faster, but it don't stay put as long as truth." So, let's get to the facts.

The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, that the United States undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists. Those charges are utterly false. The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And we will not. The United States has not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for the return of American hostages. And we will not.

Other reports have surfaced alleging U.S. involvement: reports of a sealift to Iran using Danish ships to carry American arms; of vessels in Spanish ports being employed in secret U.S. arms shipments; of Italian ports being used; of the U.S. sending spare parts and weapons for combat aircraft. All these reports are quite exciting, but as far as we're concerned, not one of them is true.

During the course of our secret discussions, I authorized the transfer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for defensive systems to Iran. My purpose was to convince Tehran that our negotiators were acting with my authority, to send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace the animosity between us with a new relationship. These modest deliveries, taken together, could easily fit into a single cargo plane. They could not, taken together, affect the outcome of the 6-year war between Iran and Iraq nor could they affect in any way the military balance between the two countries.

Those with whom we were in contact took considerable risks and needed a signal of our serious intent if they were to carry on and broaden the dialog. At the same time we undertook this initiative, we made clear that Iran must oppose all forms of international terrorism as a condition of progress in our relationship. The most significant step which Iran could take, we indicated, would be to use its influence in Lebanon to secure the release of all hostages held there.

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Some progress has already been made. Since U.S. Government contact began with Iran, there's been no evidence of Iranian Government complicity in acts of terrorism against the United States. Hostages have come home, and we welcome the efforts that the Government of Iran has taken in the past and is currently undertaking.

But why, you might ask, is any relation-ship with Iran important to the United

States?

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Iran encompasses some of the most critical geography in the world. It lies between the Soviet Union and access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Geography explains why the Soviet Union has sent an army into Afghanistan to dominate that country and, if they could, Iran and Pakistan. Iran's geography gives it a critical position from which adversaries could interfere with oil flows from the Arab States that border the Persian Gulf. Apart from geography, Iran's oil deposits are important to the long-term health of the world economy.

For these reasons, it is in our national interest to watch for changes within Iran that might offer hope for an improved relationship. Until last year there was little to

justify that hope.

Indeed, we have bitter and enduring disagreements that persist today. At the heart of our quarrel has been fran's past sponsor-ship of international terrorism. Iranian policy has been devoted to expelling all Western influence from the Middle East. We cannot abide that because our interests in the Middle East are vital. At the same time, we seek no territory or special position in Iran. The Iranian revolution is a fact of history, but between American and Iranian basic national interests there need be no permanent conflict.

Since 1983 various countries have made overtures to stimulate direct contact between the United States and Iran; European, Near East, and Far East countries have attempted to serve as intermediaries. Despite a U.S. willingness to proceed, none of these overtures bore fruit. With this history in mind, we were receptive last year when we were alerted to the possibility of estab-lishing a direct dialog with Iranian officials.

Now, let me repeat: America's longstanding goals in the region have been to help preserve Iran's independence from Soviet

domination; to bring an honorable end to the bloody Iran-Iraq war; to halt the export of subversion and terrorism in the region. A major impediment to those goals has been an absence of dialog, a cutoff in communi-cation between us. It's because of Iran's strategic importance and its influence in the Islamic world that we chose to probe for a better relationship between our coun-

Our discussions continued into the spring of this year. Based upon the progress we felt we had made, we sought to raise the diplomatic level of contacts. A meeting was arranged in Tehran. I then asked my former national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, to undertake a secret mission and gave him explicit instructions. I asked him to go to Iran to open a dialog, making stark and clear our basic objectives and disagreements. The 4 days of talks were conducted in a civil fashion, and American personnel were not mistreated. Since then, the dialog has continued and step-by-step progress continues to be made.

Let me repeat: Our interests are clearly served by opening a dialog with Iran and thereby helping to end the Iran-Iraq war. That war has dragged on for more than 6 years, with no prospect of a negotiated settlement. The slaughter on both sides has been enormous, and the adverse economic and political consequences for that vital region of the world have been growing. We sought to establish communication with both sides in that senseless struggle, so that we could assist in bringing about a cease-fire and, eventually, a settlement. We have sought to be evenhanded by working with both sides and with other interested nations to prevent a widening of the war.

This sensitive undertaking has entailed great risk for those involved. There is no question but that we could never have begun or continued this dialog had the initiative been disclosed earlier. Due to the publicity of the past week, the entire initiative is very much at risk today.

There is ample precedent in our history for this kind of secret diplomacy. In 1971 then-President Nixon sent his national security adviser on a secret mission to China. In that case, as today, there was a basic requirement for discretion and for a sensi-

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tivity to the situation in the nation we were attempting to engage.

Since the welcome return of former hostage David Jacobsen, there has been unprecedented speculation and countless reports that have not only been wrong but have been potentially dangerous to the hostages and destructive of the opportunity before us. The efforts of courageous people like Terry Waite have been jeopardized. So extensive have been the false rumors and erroneous reports that the risks of remaining silent now exceed the risks of speaking out. And that's why I decided to address you tonight.

It's been widely reported, for example, that the Congress, as well as top executive branch officials, were circumvented. Although the efforts we undertook were highly sensitive and involvement of government officials was limited to those with a strict need to know, all appropriate Cabinet officers were fully consulted. The actions I authorized were, and continue to be, in full compliance with Federal law. And the relevant committees of Congress are being, and will be, fully informed.

Another charge is that we have tilted toward Iran in the Gulf war. This, too, is infounded. We have consistently condemned the violence on both sides. We have consutently sought a negotiated settlement that preserves the territorial integrity of both nations. The overtures we've made to the Covernment of Iran have not been a shift to supporting one side over the other, rather, it has been a diplomatic initiative to gain some degree of access and influence within Iran—as well as Iran—and to bring about an honorable end to that bloody conflict. It is in the interests of all parties in the Gulf region to end that war as soon as possible.

To summarize: Our government has a firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist demands. That no concessions policy remains in force, in spite of the wildly speculative and false stories about arms for hostages and alleged ransom payments. We did not—repeat—did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages nor will we. Those who think that we have gone soft on terrorism should take up the question with Colonel Oadhafi.

We have not, nor will we capitulate to terrorists. We will, however, get on with advancing the vital interests of our great nation—in spite of terrorists and radicals who seek to sabotage our efforts and immobilize the United States. Our goals have been, and remain, to restore a relationship with Iran; to bring an honorable end to the war in the Gulf; to bring a halt to statesupported terror in the Middle East; and finally, to effect the safe return of all hostages from Lebenon.

As President, I've always operated on the belief that, given the facts, the American people will make the right decision. I believe that to be true now. I cannot guarantee the outcome. But as in the past, I ask for your support because I believe you share the hope for peace in the Middle East, for freedom for all hostages, and for a world free of terrorism. Certainly there are risks in this pursuit, but there are greater

risks if we do not persevere

It will take patience and understanding; it will take continued resistance to those who commit terrorist acts; and it will take cooperation with all who seek to rid the world of this scourge.

Thank you, and God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 8:01 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House. The address was broadcast live on nationwide radio and television.

National Philanthropy Day, 1986

Remarks at a White House Briefing for Philanthropists. November 14, 1986

Thank you very much. I have just read a clipping this morning from the United Press that shows how the private sector is spreading and things of this kind in philanthropy; that the First Lady of the Soviet Union has been named to the board of directors of a private, and privately financed, group in the Soviet Union. But I appreciate this opportunity to be with you today in recognition of one of America's greatest national

Exhibit OLN-320

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Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents



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But, my friends, that letter may have been addressed to me, but it wasn't written to me alone. It was written also to each of you, to all Americans, and to our allies as well. It was written in thanks to all those who've joined in our bipartisan crusade to make America stronger. And it was written in thanks to all of those who have returned us to our values and reminded us of what they mean in this world. At the National Review dinner last December, I closed my remarks by saying thanks to Bill Buckley for "setting loose so much good in the world." But tonight, Bill, Ernie, Paul, Don, Jeane, and everyone, others far away, thank you, too. Thank you, God bless you all.

Note: The President spoke at 7:32 p.m. in the International Ballroom of the Washington Hilton Hotal.

The President's News Conference of November 19, 1986

Iren-U.S. Relations

The President. Good evening. I have a few words here before I take your questions, some brief remarks.

Eighteen months ago, as I said last Thursday, this administration began a secret initiative to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Our purposes were fourfold: to replace a relationship of total hostility with something better, to bring a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war, and to bring an end to terrorism and to effect the release of our hosteness.

tages.

We knew this undertaking involved great risks, especially for our people and for the Iranian officials with whom we dealt. That's why the information was restricted to appropriate Cabinet officers and those officials with an absolute need to know.

This undertaking was a matter of considerable debate within administration circles. Our policy objectives were never in dispute. There were differences on how best to proceed. The principal issue in contention was whether we should make isolated and limited exceptions to our arms embargo as a signal of our serious intent. Several top

advisers opposed the sale of even a modest shipment of defensive weapons and spare parts to Iran. Others felt no progress could be made without this sale. I weighed their views. I considered the risks of failure and the rewards of success, and I decided to proceed. And the responsibility for the decision and the operation is mine and mine alone. As Mr. Lincoln said of another presidential decision, "If it turns out right, the criticism will not matter. If it turns out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right will make no difference."

I understand this decision is deeply controversial and that some profoundly disagree with what was done. Even some who support our secret initiative believe it was a mistake to send any weapons to Iran. I understand and I respect those views, but I deeply believe in the correctness of my decision. I was convinced then and I am convinced now that while the risks were great, so, too, was the potential reward. Bringing Iran beck into the community of responsible nations, ending its participation in political terror, bringing an end to that terrible war, and bringing our hostages home—these are the causes that justify taking risks.

In foreign policy the presence of risks alone cannot be resson enough not to act. There were risks when we liberated Grenada, when we went into Lebanon, when we added the Philippines, and when we acted against Libya. So, we'll continue our efforts. However, to eliminate the widespread but mistaken perception that we have been exchanging arms for hostages, I have directed that no further sales of arms of any kind be sent to Iran. I have further directed that all information relating to our initiative be provided to the appropriate Members of Congress. There may be some questions which for reasons of national security or to protect the safety of the hostages I will be unable to answer publicly. But again, all information will be provided to the appropriate Members of Congress.

And now I'll take your questions. Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International?

Q. Mr. President, in the recent past there was an administration whose byword was "Watch what we do, not what we say." How would you assess the credibility of

your own administration in the light of the prolonged deception of Congress and the public in terms of your secret dealings with Iran, the disinformation, the trading of Zakherov for Daniloff? And I'd like to follow UD.

The President. Well, Helen, let me take the last one first. I know some persist in saying that we traded Zakharov for Dani-loff. We did not. We said that we would have no dealings with the Soviet Union. even on going to Iceland, until Daniloff was

in our hands.

But to bring it up to date on this, there was no deception intended by us. There was the knowledge that we were embarking on something that could be of great risk to the people we were talking to, great risk to our hostages. And, therefore, we had to have it limited to only the barest number of people that had to know. I was not breaking any law in doing that. It is provided for me to do that. At the same time, I have the right under the law to defer reporting to Congress, to the proper congressional committees, on an action, and defer it until such time as I believe it can safely be done with no risk to others.

And that's why I have ordered in this coming week the proper committees will be briefed on this. And there are still some parts of this that we cannot go public with, because it will bring to risk and danger people that are held and people that we have been negotiating with. We were not negotiating government to government. We were negotiating with certain individuals within that country.

Q. You don't think your credibility has been damaged? And are you prepared now to disavow the finding which let you make end runs around the Iranian arms embargo?

Are you going to tear it up?

e President. No, as I say, we are going to observe that embargo. And it's part of the same reason that, as I've said, we were doing this in the first place: And that is to see, among the other issues involved, if we can help bring about peace between those two countries, a peace without victory to either one or defeat and that will recognize the territorial integrity of both. And this is something that all of our allies are seeking also.

But I think the people understand that sometimes you have to keep a secret in order to save human lives and to succeed in the mission, just as we went into Grenada without prior notice, because then we would have put to risk all of those men who were going to hit the beach.

Yes, Mike [Mike Putzel, Associated Press].

Secretary of State Shultz

O. Mr. President, has Secretary Shultz discussed his resignation with you? Have you agreed to accept it, or have you asked him to stay on?

The President Mike, he has never suggested to me in our meetings that resignation. And in fact, he has made it plain that he will stay as long as I want him, and I want him. So, there's never been any discussion there. He knows that I want him to stay, and he has, in advance, said that he wants to. There's been no talk of resigna-

Q. If I may follow up, sir: Has he made his staying conditioned on your agreeing not to send further arms to Iran?

The President No, there have been no conditions. As I say, we didn't discuss that. And as I've said now, there is no need to go further with this. The mission was served that made us waive temporarily that for that really minuscule amount of spare parts and defensive weapons.

Chris (Chris Wallace, NBC News)?

Q. Mr. President, you have stated flatly, and you stated flatly again tonight, that you did not trade weapons for hostages. And yet the record shows that every time an American hostage was released Last September. this July, and again just this very month—there had been a major shipment of arms just before that. Are we all to believe that was just a coincidence?

The President. Chris, the only thing I know about major shipments of arms I've said, everything that we sold them could be put in one cargo plane, and there would be plenty of room left over. Now, if there were major shipments-and we know this has been going on—there have been other countries that have been dealing in arms with Iran. There have been also private merchants of such things that have been doing the same thing. Now, I've seen the stories about a Danish tramp steamer and a Danish sailors unson officials talking about their ships taking various supplies to Iran. I didn't know anything about that until I saw the press on it, because we certainly never had any contact with anything of the kind. And so, it's just that we did something for a particular mission. There was a risk entailed. And Iran held no hostages, Iran did not kidnap anyone, to our knowledge. And the fact that part of the operation was that we knew, however, that the kidnapers of our hostages did have some kind of relationship in which Iran could at times influence them—not always—but could influence them. And so three of our hostages came home.

(2) But if I may follow up, sir: On that first point, your own Chief of Staff, Mr. Regan, has said that the U.S. condoned Israeli shipments of arms to Iran. And aren't you, in effect, sending the very message you always said you didn't want to send? Aren't you saying to terrorists either you or your state sponsor—which in this case was Iran—can gain from the holding of hostages?

The President. No, because I don't see where the kidnapers or the hostage-holders gained anything. They didn't get anything. They let the hostages go. Now, whatever is the pressure that brought that about, I'm just grateful to it for the fact that we got them. As a matter of fact, if there had not been so much publicity, we would have had two more that we were expecting.

Sam [Sam Donaldson, ABC News]?

Q. Mr. President, when you had the arms embargo on, you were asking other nations, our allies particularly, to observe it—publicly. But at the same time, privately, you concede you were authorizing a breaking of that embargo by the United States. How can you justify this duplicity?

The President. I don't think it was duplicity. And as I say, the so-called violation did not in any way after the military balance between the two countries. But what we were aiming for, I think, made it worthwhile. And this was a waiver of our own embargo; the embargo still stays now and for the future. But the causes that I outlined here in my opening statement—first of all, to try and establish a relationship with a country that is of great strategic im-

portance to peace and everything else in the Middle East, at the same time, also, to strike a blow against terrorism, and to get our hostages back, as we did. And this particular thing was, we felt, necessary in order to make the contacts that we made and that could lead to better relations with us. And there was a fourth item, also, as I pointed out

Q. Sir, if I may, the polls show that a lot of American people just simply don't believe you. But the one thing that you've had going for you, more than anything else in your Presidency, your credibility, has been severely damaged. Can you repair it? What does it mean for the rest of your Presidency?

The President. Well, I imagine I'm the only one around who wants to repair it, and I didn't have anything to do with damaging

Bill [Bill Plante, CBS News]?

Q. Mr. President, you say that the equipment which was shipped didn't alter the military balance. Yet several things: We understand that there were 1,000 TOW antitank missiles shipped by the U.S. The U.S. apparently condoned shipments by Israel and other nations of other quantities of arms as an ancillary part of this deal—not directly connected, but had to condone it, or the shipments could not have gone forward, sir. So, how can you say that it cannot alter the military balance? And how can you say, sir, that it didn't break the law, when the National Security Act of 1977 plainly talks about timely notification of Congress and also, sir, stipulates that if the national security required secrecy the President is still required to advise the leadership and the chairmen of the intelligence committees?

The President. Bill, everything you've said here is based on a supposition that is false. We did not condone and do not condone the shipment of arms from other countries. And what was the other point that you made here——

Q. There were the antitank missiles, sir. The President. Oh no, about the—that it didn't—no, that it didn't violate the—or that did violate the law. No, as I've said, the President, believe it or not, does have the power if, in his belief, national security can

be served to waive the provisions of that law as well as to defer the notification of the Congress on this.

Q. Isn't it possible that the Iraqis, sir, might think that a thousand antitank missiles was enough to alter the balance of that war?

The President. This is a purely defensive weapon. It is a shoulder-carried weapon. And we don't think that in this defensive thing—we didn't add to any offensive power on the part of Iran. We know that Iraq has already announced that they would willing to settle the conflict, as we've said, with no winners or losers. And the other parts happened to be spare parts for an antiaircraft Hawk battery. And, as I say, all of those weapons could be very easily carried in one mission.

Now, I think-Charles [Charles Bier-

bauer, Cable News Network).

Q. Mr. President, I don't think it's still clear just what Israel's role was in this. The questions that have been asked about a condoned shipment. We do understand that the Israelis sent a shipment in 1985, and there were also reports that it was the Israelis that contacted your administration and suggested that you make contact with Iran. Could you explain what the Israeli role was here?

The President. No, because we, as I say, have had nothing to do with other countries or their shipment of arms or doing what they're doing. And, no, as a matter of fact, the first ideas about the need to restore relations between Iran and the United States, or the Western World for that matter, actually began before our administration was here. But from the very first, if you look down the road at what could happen and perhaps a change of govern-ment there, that it was absolutely vital for the Western World and to the hopes for peace in the Middle East and all for us to be trying to establish this relationship. And we worked-oh, it started about 18 months ago, really, as we began to find out some individuals that it might be possible for us to deal with and who also were looking at the probability of a further accident.

Trudie? Q. Can I follow up please, if I may, on that? The contacts that you're suggesting are with moderates in the Iranian Government and in the Iranian system. Barry Goldwater tonight said in his judgment there are no moderates in Iran. I don't mean to suggest that there may not be, but how did you know that you were reaching the moderates? And how do you define a moderate in that kind of a government?

The President. Well, again, you're asking questions that I cannot get into with regard to the answers. But believe me, we had information that led us to believe that there are factions within Iran, and many of them with an eye toward the fact that they think sooner rather than later there is going to be a change in the government there. And there is great dissatisfaction among the people in Iran.

Trudie [Trudie Fieldman, Transfeatures]?

Arms Reduction Negotiations

Q. Mr. President, could we turn to U.S.-Soviet relations for a moment, please?

The President I'd be delighted [Laugh-

Q. Your chief arms negotiator, Max Kampelman, said that as a result of your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland that there indeed were substantial results and agreements. But the leadership of the Soviet Union say that there were no results. nothing positive, and the area is widely scattered still. How do you propose, in the remainder of your term, to close the gap for an agreement?

The President. Well, Trudie, the thing is. about that situation, they are not widely scattered. All the agreements, or the apparent places where we agreed at Reykjavik, are on the table now with our arms negotiators in Geneva. And for the first time there was an agreement reached on the desirable ity of eliminating all strategic nuclear missiles in a 5-year period and then dealing with the intermediate-range missiles in Germany. And just before the meeting broke up was the first time that-it had always been our purpose, and it was our purpose when we went there, to see if this-these are the destabilizing weapons, these are the weapons that people in their mind can picture someone pushes a button and lot of places blow up. And we always thought that if we could make a start on those, the destabilizing missiles, and then we could work on

to the other nuclear weapons—bombs carried by airplanes and so forth. And we had gone there with the express purpose of seeing if we could arrive at some kind of a settlement on one or the other of these other two missile types. And it was just before the meeting broke up that for the first time they suggested that they were talking about all nuclear weapons, not just the others. Well there was no time for us to discuss them—this new force that was in there.

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But I think Mr. Kampelman was saying right—that I just call to your attention that never in the history of the Soviet Union has a Soviet leader ever publicly proposed eliminating weapons they already have. And this Soviet leader has. He has talked actually of totally eliminating them. And so the only thing I can say to this is—I know they are difficult to deal with—but all I can say is they're still at the table in Geneva, and the proposals are still there. So, I continue to be optimistic.

Q. I just want to follow up. Do you think you're going to see Mr. Corbachev again during your term, or do you think he is thinking that he'll wait for the next President to negotiate an arms control agreement?

The President. Well, I have to believe there is reason for optimism, because he himself suggested the Iceland meeting as a forerunner to the summit that was supposed to take place in the United States. And all I can do is recall that when the Soviets, sometime ago, got up and walked out of the Geneva arms meetings, because we were installing medium-range—the Pershings and the cruise missiles in Europe. And they walked out and said, "That does it." Well, they came back.

Q. Do you have a date-The President. What?

Q. Do you have a date to meet them again?

The President. No, that's what we're waiting for—is for them to give us a date.

Iren-U.S. Relations

Q. Mr. President, going back over your answers tonight about the arms shipments and the numbers of them, are you telling us tonight that the only shipments with which we were involved were the one or two that followed your January 17th finding and that, whatever your aides have said on background or on the record, there were no other shipments with which the U.S. condoned?

The President. That's right. I'm saying nothing, but the missiles that we sold—and remember, there are too many people that are saying "gave." They bought them.

Andrea (Andrea Mitchell, NBC News)?

Q. Mr. President, to follow up on that:
We've been told by the Chief of Staff,
Donald Regan, that we condoned—this government condoned—an Israell shipment in
September of 1985, shortly before the release of hostage Benjamin Weir. That was 4
months before your intelligence finding on
January 17th that' you say gave you the
legal authority not to notify Congress. Now,
can you clear that up—why this government was not in violation of its arms embargo and of the notification to Congress for
having condoned American-made weapons
shipped to Iran in September of 1985?

The President. Well, no, I've never heard Mr. Regan say that, and I'll ask him about that. Because we believe in the embargo, and as I say, we waived it for a specific purpose, in fact, with four goals in mind. Yes.

Q. Can I just follow up on that for a second, sir, because what is unclear to, I think, many people in the American public is why—if you are saying tonight that there will be no further arms shipments to Iran—why you won't cancel the January 17th intelligence finding so that you can put to rest any suggestion that you might again, without notification and in complete secrecy and perhaps with the objection of some of your Cabinet members, continue to ship weapons if you think that it is necessary?

The Prevident. No, I have no intention of

The President. No, I have no intention of doing that, but at the same time, we are hopeful that we're going to be able to continue our meetings with these people, these individuals.

Q. But you won't cancel the intelligence Anding?

The President. I don't know whether it's called for or whether I have to wait until we've reported to Congress and all. I don't know just what the technicality legally is on that.

Q. Yes, Mr. President. Why do you think—its strategic position not withstanding—the American people would ever support weapons to the Ayatollah Khomeini?

The President. We weren't giving them to the Ayatollah Khomeini. It's a strange situation. As I say, we were dealing with individuals, and we believe that those—and some of those individuals are in government, in positions in government. But it was not a meeting officially of the United States head of state and the Iranian head of state. But these people, we believed, and their closeness to the Iran military was such that this was necessary to let them know, number one, that we were serious and sincere in our effort about good relations and also that they were dealing with the head of government over here, that this wasn't something coming out of some agency or bureau, that I was behind it.

Q. Well, sir, if that's the case, some have asked that if Libya occupied a strategical position as Iran did, would you then arm Qadhafi and bomb Khomeini?

The President. Believe me, that's about as hypothetical a question as anyone could imagine. The situations are quite different.

Q. Mr. President, you said that you were not swapping—or you did not think you were swapping arms for hostages. But did it ever occur to you, or did it never occur to you, that certainly the Iranians would see it that way and that they might take it as an inducement to take more hostages, especially in light of the fact that they've released three but taken three more?

The President. No, to the best of our knowledge, Iran does not own or have authority over the Hizballah. They cannot order them to do something. It is apparent that they, evidently, have either some persuasion—and they don't always succeed—but they can sometimes persuade or presure the Hizballah into doing what they did in this instance. And as I say, the Iranian Government had no hostages, and they bought a shipment from us. And we, in turn—I might as well tell you that we, in turn, had said when they wanted to kind of know our position and whether we were

trustworthy and all of this-we told them that we did not want to do business with any nation that openly backed terrorism. And they gave us information that they did not. And they said also that they had some evidence that there had been a lessening of this on the part of the Khomeini and the government and that they'd made some progress. As a matter of fact, some individuals associated with terrorist acts had been put in prison there. And so that was when "Well, there's a very easy way for we said. you to verify that if that's the way you feel, and they're being held hostage in Lebanon.

Q. Well, if I can follow up: If your arms shipments had no effect on the release of the hostages, then how do you explain the release of the hostages at the same time that the shipments were coming in?

The Previolent. No, I said that at the time I said to them that there was something they could do to show their sincerity. And if they really meant it that they were not in favor of backing terrorists, they could begin by releasing our hostages. And as a matter of fact, I believe and have reason to believe that we would have had all five of them by this last weekend, had it not been for the attendant confusion that arose here in the reporting room.

You don't have your red mittens on.

Q. On that point, you said earlier, and you said just now again, that, but for the publicity, two other hostages would have been returned home by now. As you know, the publicity began in a Syrian-backed, pro-Syrian magazine—

The President. Yes.

Q. —in Lebanon. My question is, therefore, are you suggesting that someone who was a party to this sabotaged it by deliberately leaking that original report?

The President. To our best information, the leak came from a person in government in Iran and not one of the people that we were dealing with, someone that would be more hostile to us. And that individual gave the story to the magazine, and the magazine then printed the story there in Beirut.

Q. Mr. President, there has been an obvious change in policy towards fran: from refusing to deal with a terrorist state to even sending weapons as a gesture of good will.

¹ Redicel Shi'ite group operating in Lebanon.

Would you consider, in the name of the same geopolitical interest that you invoked with Iran, changing your policy towards Nicaragua?

The President. No, and I believe that I've answered that question, I think, more than once here-that no, we still hold to our position, and Iran officially is still on our list of nations that have been supporting terrorism. But I'm talking about the people that we were doing business with, and they gave us indication and evidence that that policy was changing. And so, as I said, to give them more prestige and muscle there where they were, we made this sale.

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Q. Then, Mr. President, would you consider breaking diplomatic relations with Nicaragua to increase the pressure on the

Sandinista government?

The President. No, we have not thought of that, and we still believe very much in supporting the contras, because we believe the contras cause. The contras have made it plain that all they seek is to be able to put enough pressure on the Sandinista government for that government to negotiate with them and the people of Nicaragua for the kind of government that they altogether had promised when they were fighting the revolution against the Somoza dictatorship. And it was the Sandinistas who, as Communist groups usually do, simply, when the revolution was over, they did everything they could to get rid of their fellow revolutionaries, and they seized power and created a totalitarian Communist State.

Now, the Sandinists-or the contras have never proposed overthrowing the government. They have repeatedly offered and said: "We simply want to be able to negotiate and have a chance to have the government installed that we'd promised the Organization of American States we were fighting for." So, I think we continue to help them, but we believe that there is a alue in maintaining relations. It gives us a listening post in Nicaragua.

Iren-U.S. Relations

Q. Mr. President, there is a mood in Washington tonight of a President who is very much beleaguered, very much on the defensive. Why don't you seize the offensive by giving your Secretary of State a vote of confidence declaring that all future covert activities will have his support and by shaking up the National Security Council in such a way as to satisfy the concerns in Congress that it has been running a paramilitary operation out of the basement of the White House in defiance of the State

Department and the Congress?

The President. The State Departmentthe Secretary of State was involved, the Director of the CIA was involved, in what we were doing and, as I said before, there are certain laws in which, for certain actions, I would not have been able to keep them a secret as they were. But these people you've mentioned have been involved—do know what was going on. And I don't see that the action that you've suggested has called for it. But what you've disappointed me the most in is suggesting that I sound defensive up here. I've just been trying to answer all your questions as well as I can. And I don't feel that I have anything to defend about at all. With the circumstances the way they were, the decision I made I still believe was the correct decision, and I believe that we schieved some portion of our goals.

Q. Mr. President, do you believe that any of the additional hostages will be released? The President. I have to believe that.

Q. And during any of these discussions with your administration, was there ever any hint or suggestion that these weapons might be used to topple the Aystollah?

The President No, and I don't see in any way how that could be, with the particular things that we were using I don't see where the Ayatollah could be a logical target for an antiaircraft missile or even for a TOW missile for that matter.

Q. Mr. President, you made an exception for the arms embargo when you thought it was in the U.S. interest to do so. Why shouldn't other nations ship weapons to Iran when they think it's in their interests?

The President Well, I would like to see the indication as to how it could be in their interest. I know that there are other nations that feel as we do that the Western World should be trying to find an avenue to get Iran back where it once was-and that is in the family of democratic nations and the family of nations that want peace in the Middle East and so forth.

Q. How, Mr. President—if I may follow up—how does shipping wespons to Iran help bring them back into the community of nations? You've acknowledged that you were dealing with only a small portion of the government?

The President. I was talking of strengthening a particular group who needed the prestige that that could give them, who needed that, well, that bargaining power, themselves, within their own ranks.

Jerry [Jeremiah O'Leary, Washington Times]?

(2. Mr. President, I believe you may have been slightly in error in describing a TOW as a shoulder-mounted weapon. It's a ground-to-ground weapon. Red-eye is the shoulder weapon, but that's beside the point. TOW's are used to destroy tanks.

The President. Yes, I know, Jerry, I know it's a tank weapon.

Q. I don't think it's fired from your shoulder.

The President Well, now—(leughter)—if I have been misinformed, then I will yield on that. But it was my understanding that that is a man-carried weapon, and we have a number of other shoulder-borne weapons.

Q. I did have a question, though. [Laughter]

The President. You mean that wasn't a question? [Laughter]

Q. No, sir, I thought I knew what a TOW was.

I just wanted to ask you what would be wrong at this stage of the game, since everything seems to have gone wrong that could possibly go wrong, like the Murphy Law, the Resgan Law, the O'Leary Law, this week—what would be wrong in saying that a mistake was made on a very high-risk gamble so that you can get on with the next 2 years?

The President. Because I don't think a mistake was made. It was a high-risk gamble, and it was a gamble that, as I've said, I believe the circumstances warranted. And I don't see that it has been a fasco or a great failure of any kind. We still have those contacts. We still have made some ground. We got our hostages back—three of them. And so, I think that what we did was

right, and we're going to continue on this path.

Federal Aid to the Homeless

Q. Mr. President, Mr. President, please one domestic question, would you please? Sir, this is the question——

The President. Helen, will you yield to this?

Q. This is a question that will not wait. It's cold weather out there, and the growing number of hungry and cold people who are homeless in all of our cities—and these volunteers that you urge to take part in this and try to help have now made their surveys across the Nation. They've come back and said we can't feed the hungry and take care of the homeless by ourselves. We've got to have Federal help. You have no policy in the White House, I believe, to do this, and you're now just leaving this to local government and local groups. They can't take care of it. Won't you please give us a federally coordinated program with long-time planning?

The President I think that in things of that kind we are still spending more than has ever been spent before trying to help the needy. I will be very pleased to look into that particular facet and see if there is some snafu there, but I don't think so. But I do think that many of these programs are being undertaken at a State and at a local level and with the aid of Federal financing. But I'll look into it.

Q. They're doing a great job, sir, but they simply say themselves—the churches, the nonprofits—we can't do it sufficiently. The number is growing so rapidly. They've got to have Federal help.

The President. No, well, as I'm saying, I'm going to find out, because I think and believe that there is such help. I just read this morning in the paper about a needy family in New York that is being put up in a hotel, and the cost to welfare just for the rent of the hotel room is \$37,000 a year. And I wonder why somebody doesn't build them a house for \$37,000?

Note: The President's 39th news conference began at 8:01 p.m. in the East Room at the White House, It was broadcast live on nationwide radio and television.

Before answering the last series of questions, the President addressed Helen Thomas, who as the senior member of the White House press corps indicates when the news conference has ended.

Iran-United States Relations

Statement by the President. November 19, 1986

74

There may be some misunderstanding of one of my answers tonight. There was a third country involved in our secret project with Iran. But taking this into account, all of the shipments of the token amounts of defensive arms and parts that I have authorized or condoned taken in total could be placed aboard a single cargo aircraft. This includes all shipments by the United States or any third country. Any other shipments by third countries were not authorized by the U.S. Government.

Note: The President's statement refers to his news conference.

The National Floral Emblem of the United States of America The Rose

Proclamation 5574. November 20, 1986

By the Prendent of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Americans have always loved the flowers with which God decorates our land. More often than any other flower, we hold the rose dear as the symbol of life and love and devotion, of beauty and eternity. For the love of man and woman, for the love of mankind and God, for the love of country, Americans who would speak the language of the heart do so with a rose.

We see proofs of this everywhere. The study of fossils reveals that the rose has existed in America for age upon age. We have always cultivated roses in our gardens. Our first President, George Washington, bred roses, and a variety he named after his mother is still grown today. The White House itself boasts a beautiful Rose Garden. We grow roses in all our fifty States. We find roses throughout our art, music, and literature. We decorate our celebrations and parades with roses. Most of all, we present roses to those we love, and we lavish them on our altars, our civil shrines, and the final resting places of our honored dead.

The American people have long held a special place in their hearts for roses. Let us continue to cherish them, to honor the love and devotion they represent, and to bestow them on all we we love just as God has bestowed them on us.

The Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 159, has designated the rose as the National Floral Emblem of the United States and authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation declaring this fact.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the rose as the National Floral Emblem of the United States of America.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this twentieth day of November, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eleventh.

Ronald Reagan

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 11:02 a.m., November 21, 1985]

President's Commission on Executive Exchange

Executive Order 12574. November 20, 1986

ESTABLISHING AN EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM WITHIN THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON EXECUTIVE EXCHANGE


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
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
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
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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRETAL ACCITON December 4, 1984 ACTION

N 42473

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLAGE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Confusion in the Nicaraguan Resistance

Adolfo Calero advises that this weekend a three hour meeting with held among Bosco Matamoros (local FDN representative), Constantine Menges, Jackie Tillman, and Bob Reilly. According to Calero, the purpose of the meeting was to address the strategy for Congressional and public diplomacy action for a resumption of USG support to the Resistance. Calero reports that as a result of this meeting:

- Matamoros sent a 22 page telegram (hopefully encoded) to FDN headquarters in
- The telegram specified that North was no longer involved in this endeavor and that a more forceful effort would be made to reinitiate funding between now and February.
- Congressional contacts were being worked out and a detailed strategy would be forthcoming.
- It was obvious that the State Department was opposed to any resumption of assistance, but that Rirkpatrick, Casey, and Weinberger would ensure that the program obtained renewed support.

Calero was pulled from the field in Nicaragua to receive this message. He was, to say the least, distressed and confused. Not only was he placed at risk in moving back he feels that the mixed signals he is receiving portends serious problems within the Administration. He notes that requested his urgent presence last week in for a meeting with a "high-level" U.S. official and that the meeting did not take place. Aside from these "cryptic orders he receives no advice, intelligence, or support. Now he is being "told of discord" about the "worthiness" of the FDN and the possibility that the Administration may not ask the Congress for a meeting possibility that the Administration may not ask the Congress renew support.

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N 42474

Up to this point, Calero has been told that we had every intention of making another try at the Congress. He is fully aware of the constraints imposed in the Continuing Resolution, but has never been apprised of any internal debate on the merits of whether or not we would pursue a further attempt to obtain funds for the Resistance movement. While I may not have been fully open with him on this matter, it did not seem to be relevant to his other important tasks given current funding arrangements. Yesterday's missive from Matamoras has now sown doubt which did not need to exist.

Calero has too much on his mind to be burdened with our internal differences. It is unfortunate that we now seem to have so many voices speaking for our intentions. Before this goes any further, it would seem appropriate to clarify the roles various people will be playing in the days ahead.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the points above and indicate your direction on who should be saying what to whom.

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EXHIBIT OLN-323

MEMORANDUM

NSC/ICS-402006

December 4, 1984

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ACTION

NEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. HCFARLAGE

FRON:

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OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

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EXHIBIT

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Approve	Disapprove		
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EXHIBIT OLN-324

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December 2, 1986

COMPET SCHOOLS

BY HAND

Cdr. Paul B. Thompson, USN General Counsel National Security Council The White Rouse Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Commander Thompson:

LtCol North is herewith delivering documents to NSC. In order to insure that the documents are preserved, the pages have been number-stamped 1 through 168, inclusive.

Also delivered are the MHCA Motorola PageBoy, the Motorola hand-held portable telephone, and the NSC Government Transportation Request (GTR D-7,363,999) issued to LtCol North.

Mould you please arrange for the return of LtCol North's personal property which is located in his office. He is particularly interested in the prompt return of his Marine Corps uniform items, family photos and other personal effects.

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr. Attorney for LtCol Oliver L. North

BVS:lng cc: Ms. Brenda Reger Security Officer


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O-N-324

EXHIBIT OLN-325

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AFFIDAVIT



COMES NOW AFFIANT ROBERT B. OAKLEY, who states as follows:

- My name is Robert B. Oakley, and my current position is Senior Director of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and North African Affairs for the National Security Council.
- 2. From September of 1984 to September of 1986, I served as Director of the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, Department of State. My title was Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism. My responsibilities included coordination of activities regarding international terrorism and the United States response to terrorism.
- 3. I recall conversations in November 1985 with Lt. Col.
 Oliver North (North) regarding a problem with
 flight clearances. To the best of my recollection
 and belief, these conversations included the following:
 - North indicated that he had discovered this relationship when "one of his people" went to an arms warehouse to obtain arms for the Nicaraguan Resistance, and learned that the Israelis had been obtaining arms from the same source for shipment to Iran.

North stated that he was aware of Israel1 arms

Partially Declassified / Released on 60.1. 1987 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by B. Reger, National Security Council

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- b. North stated that a problem had been encountered with ______ on getting flight clearance rights for shipping the HAWK missiles through
- c. North stated that Secretary of State George
 Shultz was "aware" of this matter and that National
 Security Advisor Robert McFarlane was in overall charge of
 the operation, had been contacted in Geneva (where he was
 with the President and the Secretary of State) and had
 agreed to help get the flight clearances, if necessary by
 his personal intervention. Based upon these assurances by
 North, I authorized him to communicate with the United
 States Embassy and to advise it that the
 Department of State was "aware" of the matter and the
 Embassy could request clearances.
- d. At no time during this conversation did North mention "oil drilling equipment" as the cargo involved.
- 4. I recall an Operational Sub Group (OSG) meeting with North on or about May 22, 1986, at which North discussed release of the American hostages.

 To the best of my recollection and belief, that conversation included the following:
 - a. North stated that he was going to be travelling

THE WHATHER IN

-3-

to London

to Cyprus. He indicated had arranged

for a \$10 million contribution

- b. North stated that once the money was transferred, the American hostages would be released.
- c. North did not mention any planned trip to Teheran, Iran, nor any arms transactions that may have been contemplated at the time.
- d. I advised the Executive Secretary of the
 Department of State, Nicholas Platt, of my conversation
 with North and the information he had provided. I advised
 Platt that, based on North's recitation, I was hopeful that
 our American hostages would be released in the near future.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Robert B. Oakley

July 2, 1987

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EXHIBIT OLN-326

1 OBJECTIVE

N 5518

To create a conduit for maintaining a continuous flow of Soviet weapons and technology, to be utilized by the United States in its support of Freedom Fighters in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, etc.

2. PROBLEM

With each passing year, Congress has become increasingly unpredictable and uncooperative regarding the President's desire to support the cause of the Freedom Fighters, despite growing Soviet oppression. The funds have not been forthcoming to supply sufficient arms necessary for the Freedom Fighters to win. Therefor, in leiu of the necessary funding to support this goal, the following 3-Way Tyade is proposed:

3. PROPOSAL

Soviet-compatible arms. Is at the same time trying desparately upgrade their own military forces and equipment. They would like to purchase from a wide range of military equipment.


would like to sell to a support of supporting long-term credit or barter agreements. As such, the United States is the key in the successful 3-Way Trade.

COUNTRY "C": UNITED STATES. The United States is able to provide Israel widelined High Technology equipment and information. Sased on this commodify the Trade would operate as follows:

PAINCLY TO 2034



3 WAY TRADE



4. RESULTS

In return, **Preceives from the United States equipment and technology that it could not otherwise afford to purchase.

receives much-needed modernization for its forces, thereby presenting a stronger threat to the Soviet Union. In return, exports an ongoing supply of domestically manufactured arms, as per directions from the United States.

The United States then has at its disposal a large and continuous supply of Soviet technology and weapons to channel to Freedom Fighters worldwide, mandating neither the consent or awareness of the Department of State or Congress.

The United States would be in a position to dispense these shipments through a neutral Foreign Trading Company, established solely for this purpose.

China would only be aware of the fact that it is to ship to the Trading Company such specified goods as requested, comparable in USD value to the equipment received from Israel. China would not be aware of the final destinations of any of the exported arms.

Israel would only be aware of the buying power extended by the United States for US technology, again in comparable USD value to the equipment sent to

The United States at present holds to a policy of providing assistance to goal which would be forwarded through this transaction. Likewise, the United States is committed to extending financial and technological assistance to the State of This too would be accomplished. There are many avenues available regarding the forms of credit which could be extended to Israel.

This will serve to establish our initial parameters of equipment quantities, and the proportionate amount of credit required.



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EXHIBIT OLN-327

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
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
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Acctf 386 430-22-1
Credit Suisse Bank
Eaux Vives Branch
Geneva, Switzerland
Attn. Hr. Jacob Steger
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EXHIBIT OLN-328





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Marine Outboard Engine

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- 1. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. 4801 (amends Arms Export Control Act 22 U.S.C. 2771-2779 by adding a new \$) see \$ 509.
- D 2. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News Legislative . History 9L 99-399/22 U.S.C. 4881 (Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act of 1986).
- (). Ar8s Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 95 2751-2794 (1976 and Supp. 11 of 1978).
- 4. The Export Administration Act of 1979, 30 U.S.C. app. 58 2401-2420 (1976 and Supp. III 1979) (Evolved out of the Export Control Act of 1949) See 2405(3) and (1).
- 5. United States Munitions List 22 CFR § 121.01 (1982) "International Traffic in Arms Regulations" ITAR.
- 6. Foreign Military Assistance and Sales 22 U.S.C.A. § 2301-2348.
- 7. Rules and Regulations Department of Commerce 15 CFR 185, 190, and 199 Foreign Policy Controls on Exports to Iran of . Aircraft, Helicopters and Marine Outboard Engines.
- 8. Department of State, Office of the Secretary; Determination of Pursuant to \$ 6(i) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Iran 49 CFR 2836-02, 1984.
- 9. Executive Order 12470 of March 30, 1984 Continuation of Export Control Regulations.
- J 10. Mational Emergencies Act 50 U.S.C. 1601.
- 16-11. International Emergency Ecology 50 U.S.C. 1601.

So U.S.C. 9 413 Congressional Oversight (Reports to Congressional Committees of Current and Exoposed Activities).

Will. 22 U.S.C. \$2422 Intelligence Activities (Presidential Pindings).

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Exhibit OLN-330

T5 (c)	jgkg 1	Norton-direct # 2
	1		MR. SHAW: Your Honor, we call Oliver Norton.
	2	OLIVE	L. NORTH, called as a witness
	3	by th	ne defendant, being first duly sworn, was
	4	exami	ned and testified as follows:
xxx	5	DIRECT EXAM	
	6	BY MR. SHAW	
	7	. 0	How old are you, sir?
	•	A	42.
-	9	0	And where do you live?
	10	A	I live in Great Falls, Virginia.
	11	Q	And are you married and do you have children?
	12	λ	I am married and I have four children.
	13	Q	And how old?
	14	, A	I have a daughter of 16, a son 15, a daughter
	15	8 and a dau	ghter 3, sir.
	16	Q	Do you presently work for the National Security
	17	Council?	
	18	A	Yes, sir.
	19	Q	And how long have you worked there? Is that
	20	in Washingt	on?
	21	A	Yes. The National Security Council is at the
	22	White House.	
	23	Q	And how long have you worked for the NSC?
	ж	A	Since August of 1981.
	26	Q	Are you also presently in the military service?

POLEY EQUALE, NEW YORK, N.Y. - 7H-1650 Crelosure >

	jgkg 2	Norton-direct 83
1		I am.
2	Q	What branch?
3	A .	I am a lieutenant colonel of infantry inthe
4	United Sta	tes Marine Corps.
5	Q	It is all right not to call you Colonel Norton,
•	I take it.	
7	Α	Yes.
•	0	How long have you been in the United States
•	Marines?	
10	A	I was commissioned in 1968 as a second
11	lieutenant	•
12	0	So that is 17 years.
13	A .	Right.
14	0	What is your current position at the National
15	Security C	ouncil in Washington?
16	λ .	I am the deputy director of Political Military
17	Affairs.	
18	Q	And to whom do you directly report?
19	A	I report directly to the National Security
20	Advisor to	the President, who is now, this week, Admiral
21	John Poind	exter. Last week it was Robert C. McFarlane.
22	Q	How long have you been at the National
23	Security Co	ouncil?
×	A	I arrived there in 1981 and
36	Q	Let me ask you some personal questions. Where

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE POLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y. = 794-888

3	Norton-direct	8 3
you bo	xn, Mr. Norton?	
A	San Antonio, Texas.	
Q	And where did you go to colle	g•?
A	I graduated from the U.S. Nava	l Academy at
olis,	but I started out in pre-med at	Rochester.
Q	Pre-medical?	
A	Yes, sir.	
Q	And when did you graduate from	the United
. Nava	l Academy?	
A	1968, June.	
Q	Over the years, have you done a	iny
	THE COURT: And you were commis	ssioned at that
80 001	d lieutenant in the Marine Corp	>8?
	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I was,	your Honor.
an take	a commission either in the nav	y or the marines.
Q	Over the years, Mr. Norton, hav	e you done anu
te wo	'k?	•
λ	I have. I've taken graduate co	urses at
lic Uni	versity in Georgetown, both in	business and
itical	science.	
Q	What did you do after your grad	luation from the
State	s Naval Academy in 1968?	
A	I proceeded to our infantry off	icers basic
at Qu	antico, Virginia and then immed	iately to Viet Nam
Q	And what were your duties in Vi	et Nam?
	SOUTHERN DUTRICT ASPONTERS U.S. COURTMOINS	,
	you bo A Q A colis, Q A Q a Nava: A Q a secon an take Q ate wor A lic Uni itical Q I State A at Qu	you born, Mr. Norton? A San Antonio, Texas. Q And where did you go to collect A I graduated from the U.S. Naval colis, but I started out in pre-med at Q Pre-medical? A Yes, sir. Q And when did you graduate from a Naval Academy? A 1968, June. Q Over the years, have you done at THE COURT: And you were commis a second lieutenant in the Marine Corr THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I was, an take a commission either in the naval Q Over the years, Mr. Norton, have ate work? A I have. I've taken graduate collic University in Georgetown, both in citical science. Q What did you do after your grad States Naval Academy in 1968? A I proceeded to our infantry off at Quantico, Virginia and then immed Q And what were your duties in Vi

**

	1
	jgkg 4 Norton-direct 83:
1	A I was an infantry platoon and company commander
2	in the Special Operations Force, team commander.
3	Q And how long were you on active duty in Viet
4	Nam?
5	A From 1968 through the early part of 1970, and then
•	again in 1971.
7	Q Mr. Norton, did you receive any military
•	decorations for your service in Viet Nam?
. •	A I did.
10	Q What were they?
11	A Silver Star, Bronze Star, several Purple Hearts,
12	others.
13	Q What did you do, Mr. Norton, in the years
14	after your tour of duty ended in Viet Nam and before you
15	went to the National Security Council in 1981?
16	A I also served in a variety of command and
17	staff positions, in marine infantry units. I also served
18	as an instructor in a variety of schools and had been a
19	student in various schools.
20	Q Where did you teach?
21	A At our own officers basic course and I taught
22	at our officers candidate school and I taught at the FBI
23	Academy at Quantico.
24	THE COURT: In Quantico?
25	THE WITNESS: Yes.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS U.S. COURTHOUSE

4 3 :

jgkg 5 Norton-direct ı When you went to the National Security Counsil 2 in 1981, Mr. Norton, to what office were you assigned? 3 I was assigned to the Defense Policies Group within the National Security Council staff. 8 And how long were you there? I was there from my arrival in 1981 through the 7 summer of 1983. And in the summer of '83, what happened? I was promoted to serve as the deputy director 10 of Political Military Affairs. 11 And could you tell the jury what your 12 responsibilities are in that capacity? 13 I am charged with coordinating our economic 14 and diplomatic and military reponses to various crises that 15 occur in the world and hopefully prepare in advance for 16 those crisis. . 17 And recently what specific activities have you 18 been involved in? 19 We have been focusing principally on issues of 20 combatting terrorism, which has been a problem. My team 21 is the one that prepared and executed the Achille Lauro 22 rescue and the seizure of the hostages -- the seizure of the 21 terrorists who had taken hostages. 24 And I just returned from overseas, where we are 25 trying to effect the recovery of the five Americans who are

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MANY MYTHS HAVE **GROWN UP AROUND** OLIVER NORTH: RAMBO. THE COWBOY, ALMOST THE PRESIDENT'S SON. HERE'S WHAT HE REALLY DID, AND WHY HE DID IT.

> BY DAVID HALEVY AND **NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE**

n late 1984, in the omate Indian Treaty Room of the Old Executive Office Building, a young Marine officer's family and friends were gathered for a ceremony in honor of his promotion from the rank of major to lieutenant colonel. The President's national-security adviser, Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane, himself a former Manne beutenant colonel, performed the neual and pinned the silver oak-leaf insignia on the officer's shoulders. McFarlane administered the oath from memory and followed it with comments appropriate to the occasion "It would not be unusual," said McFarlane, "if Colonel North awakes one day to carry the same responsibilities that I carry right now.

Today Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's career is in shambles, and any suggestion that he would one day become national-security adviser to the President seems strange. But back in 1984 he was a man on the rise, the President's "fair-haired boy." Nothing seemed impossible.

Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, known as Ollie, burst into the national consciousness on November 25, 1986, in the wake of revelations concerning the Iran arms deal and covert efforts to aid the contras battling the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. A man with an intense, magnetic personality and riveting blue eyes, he looked as though he had stepped out of a Marine Corps recruiting poster. Perhaps that is why it was hard for many to believe that he had been anything other than a good soldier following his commander-inchief's orders, and not some kind of sinister operator pursuing a private foreign-policy agenda from his cluttered office in the Old Executive Office Build-ing adjacent to the White House, Indeed, on the day North was fired from his position on the National Security Council, the President described him as a 'national hero.'

A man of action, North became President Reagan's "Rambo," a characteri-

zation he disliked, and in the six years he served on the National Security Council. he was at the center of the administration's war on terrorism and its efforts to aid anti-communist insurgencies around the world

Ever on the move, North handled the sharing of intelligence with the British during the Falklands crisis and traveled to Argentina with then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig after the onset of fighting. He frequently went to the Middle East. He swept through the Caribbean on the eve of the US operation in Grenada He jetted back and forth to Europe when Aniericans became the target of Abu Nidal's hit teams, and journeyed to Cyprus each time an American hostage was wrenched free from the grip of the Shiite Hizballah. He made a memorable trip to Tehran in pursuit of a doomed policy, bearing a Bible signed by Ronald Reagan and a cake in the shape of a key. Wherever Americans were in trouble. North could be expected to show up. He spent so much time in the air that by 1986 a private jet reportedly stood by, around-the-clock, ready to respond to his summons.

He drew around him a collection of admirers and operatives, including conservative idealists, anti-Castro Cubans. counter-terrorism specialists, exspooks, and other Marine officers, and they became known as "Ollie's cow-

uney became known as "Ollie's cowAs a minary-affairs correspondent for Time magazane, covering terrorism, analyzencies, and intellipercon maters. David Halevy first met Oliver.
North in early 1985 when Halevy was preparing a
mory on the commus.
From that first menting usual North's firing m
November 1986, Halevy met with him at least once
a week, possibless reviou, often at the McDonald's
half a block from the Old Executive Office Building at 17th Suress and Pennsylvania Avenue.
Northwest.

Northwest
Neil Livingsione; a long-time winer and consultant on terrorism and low-untensity will affect.
first met Oliver North in 1933, At he followed the
evolution of the Reagan administration is smillerrorism policies; he became fascinated by the fact
that all roads seemed to lead on a first-kinows
lieutenast colonel at the Matienas' Security Council

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boys "Together they waged the "good fight" against enemies of the United States

Today North faces criminal prosecution. The Reagan administration is in disarray, and the President is in the position of looking as if he didn't know what was going on in the White House, or, if he did, looking like a liar.

Whether history ultimately regards Ollie North as a scapegoat, a rogue elephant, a national hero or some combination of all three it is too early to tell Whatever the outcome one thing is certain. Oliver North has, in the words of one congressman, "passed over the great divide into fame.

THE SHAPING OF OLIVER NORTH

Who is Oliver North, and what were the events that shaped his life and fore shadowed his fame?

He began life in San Antonio Texas, the eldest of four children born into an Army family. North's parents were strong disciplinanans with high expectations for their four children. From all accounts, Ollie-known in those days as Larry—was a model son, and his formative years were happy ones.

When it came time for college. North won a scholarship to the State University of New York at Brockport. It was there that he joined the on-campus Marine officer-training program and put aside thoughts of becoming a teacher in favor of a career in the military. He transferred to the US Naval Academy after his sophomore year, starting over as a plebe in the class of 1967. An auto accident forced North to start all over again, as a plebe in the class of 1968, his third year of higher education as a freshman.

The class of 1968 was to become one of the most memorable in the recent history of the Naval Academy, not only because of its many outstanding members but because its history was so configured by the Vietnam war—five members of the class would die in Southeast Asia. For those, like North, who served there, Vietnam would be one of the great passages of their lives. During his Marine cateer, including his years at the White House, Vietnam was always North's reference point, a yardstick by which he measured actions and motives.

He was 25 years old when he graduated from Annapolis, and few doubted that he would go for the Marines when it came time to take his commission. According to the yearbook. "No matter where his career may lead, we know his thoughts will always be of the corps, the

Ollie North in Vietnam in July 1969, just after taking a hill on Mutter's Ridge. As a platoon commander, he was wounded and decorated. But he was also scarred emotionally, upset by military red tape and bureaucrats, and frustrated that the US didn't have the power and determination to win.

corps and the corps. Upon graduation, he went directly to the Marine Corps officers, school at Quantico. Virginia, and soon found himself in Vietnam in command of a platoon. Although a straight-arrow officer, he was respected and even admired by the men of his platoon.

He saw extensive combat in Vietnam conducted reconnaissance missions behand enemy lines and won a Silver Star for valor. He was also wounded at least twice, although he was anothit the habit of applying for Purple Hearts.

After he returned to the U.S. North was hospitalized for ten days in 1974, suffering from delayed bentle stress. He was reportedly-found by a superior officer talking incoherently while running around naked waving a 45 pistol. Later, as a member of the National Security Council staff. North would only rarely reminisce about his combat experiences, but he would often refer to the lessons of Vietnam. "We can't afford losing," he once said. "We ought to train and operate with only one goal in mind, to win."

Five years after the fall of Vietnam, North would again see American military might come up short—this time in Iran.

North was involved in the attempt to rescue the hostages that left eight American servicemen dead at a makeshift landing strip in the Horasan desert. To North, the "debacle in the desert" was Vietnam all over again—further proof to "the such lacked the will and leadering to succeed in covert military operation.

tions. While on the National Security Council, he often remarked to friends that "the Army can't shoot straight, the Air Force can't fly, and the Nasy can't sail."

In the aftermath of Desert One. North became committed to doing everything in his power to restore the nation's ability to "win" militarily. He maintained that the US would never prevail over the Soviet Union unless it got off the defensive. Preserving the status quo was not enough, America must turn the tables on the Soviet Union and its allies and go on the offensive.

While imbued with all this passionate desire to change things. North in 1980 was a major in the Marine Corps and in no position to change the system. One year later it would be different.

NORTH MOVES IN MEXT DOOR TO THE WHITE HOUSE

After his service in Vietnam. North taught special-warfare courses at Quantico, as well as to the Third Marine Division and the Fifth Special Forces Group based in the Philippines. Following a stint as a plans-and-policy analyst at Marine headquarters, he was sent to the Navy War College in Newport, Rhode Island. There he met John Lehman, who would become Reagan's first Secretary of the Navy. It was Lehman who recommended North to Richard V. Allen, Reamended North to Richard V.

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Oliver Lawrence North and his wife. Betsy, who calls him Larry. except when she is upset with him-then she calls him Lawrence Their youngest child. Dornin, on her father's shoulders. broke her arm earlier this year. not long after this picture was taken

gan's national-security adviser. Allen was impressed with the young Marine officer with the sparkling blue eyes, who seemed to combine the attributes of a tough combat commander with those of an able staff officer.

When the offer came to join the National Security Council. North grabbed at the opportunity with both hands. Finally he would have an impact on things that mattered to him. Within a year, the young Marine major emerged as the National Security Council's chief trouble-shooter and covert-operations specialist, as well as secret emissary for highly sensitive missions. He quickly grasped the power of information and took on whatever needed to be done, quickly making himself indispensable.

To prepare himself for the 7.45 AM NSC staff meeting. North began his workday at dawn, and he could often be found in his office at midnight, even when there was no crisis. His ability to put in eighteen-hour days—sometimes sleeping on the couch across from his desk—gave him an advantage when it came to turning out work.

Reflecting little interest in the trappings of power, North's office, Number. 392 on the third floor of the Old Executive Office Building, was a monument to organized chaos. It was small and stuffy. furnished with a desk, couch, and chair and its walls were covered with maps of Nicaragua, Libya, the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, Beirut, El Salvador, and assorted aerial phoros. There had been an oil painting over the couch once, but it had been on loan from the National Gallery of An to a former occupant and was taken back when it was deemed that North's status did not ment such a piece of art. An old Marine uniform hung on a rack in one corner, and there were small, framed pictures of his wife and children and of President Reagan and three con-tra leaders (with North characteristically in the background).

Taped to the wall behind his desk were drawings and finger-paintings by his chituren. A Chinese People's Liberation Army fur hat emblazoned with a red star sat on the windowsill. North's desk always seemed to be littered with phones, computer terminals, reports, and paperwork, and when the desk couldn't hold any more, the floor became an extension of its work surface.

Outside North's office in the recep-

tion area, there was a coffee machine that always seemed to be on. Tacked above the machine was a mock movie poster promoting a film entitled The Return of Walter Mondale, which promised that the candidate would be "more boring than ever."

The guardian of the door was North's fanatically loyal secretary, Fawn Hall, whose mother served as secretary to national-security adviser Bud McFarlane. In the wake of the Iran-contra revelations, Fawn Hall has provided the "sex angle" to the media, some of whom have portrayed her as little more than a decoration in North's office, a blond airhead who surely had to be involved with her boss.

Nothing could be further from the truth. North was aware of the office gossip and frequently joked that "everyone thinks. I'm having an affair with Fawn because she's so good-looking. Now and then a White House staffer, hearing of Hall's attractiveness and personality, would find an excuse to visit. North's suite just to get a look at her, and may be even meet her. But she was more than a pretty face. Hall was North's right arm and protector, and woe to anyone who she felt wanted to hur Ollie.

If North was out of the office, and he frequently was, it was Hall who kept things running, sorting out the stacks of messages, relaying instructions and messages to and from North, and keep ing a lid on things. A visitor waiting for Office would always be surprised by Hall's ability to handle what seemed like a dozen différent tasks at once. She was a blur of activity, pounding the keys of the word processor, answering the constantly ringing phone, responding to inquiries from other NSC staffers, and greeting visitors. Like North, she put in extraordinary hours, and when reports later surfaced that she was a professional model on the side and had dated Arturo Cruz It, son of the contra leader, many who had known her wondered when she had found the time



The first major crisis in which North played a significant role came in 1982, when the Israelis invaded Lebanon. Attached to the entourage of special Middle East presidential envoy Philip Habib. North arrived in Israel on June 6, just as Israeli armor was about to push into Lebanon and lay siege to Beitrut, the "international capital of terrorism."

While Ambassador Habib was dining Connued on page 140

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The Ollio We Knew

Continued from page 74

with Israel's prime minister. Menachem Begin, at his official residence in Jerusalem. North was invited by Ariel Sharon, the nation's defense minister and the architect of the invasion of Lebanon, to join him for dinner at his desert ranch. During what North recalls as a cordial meal, Sharon pulled out detailed maps of Lebanon and showed him Israeli troop positions throughout the country. Referring to high-resolution maps of the Bekaa Valley, he described how four Israeli tank divisions, under a unified command structure, were just beginning to enter the Valley, where the Syrians were on the withdrawal.

Then, according to North, "Sharon laid down his secret plan to push an Israeli tank division to the Chouf Mountains and with the two forces, at the Chouf and the armored corps in the Bekaa, to encircle the two Syrian tank divisions that were positioned at the northern section of the Bekaa Valley. around the Beirut-Damascus highway Once this was achieved, said North, Sharon's secret plan called for the United States to rush to the rescue of the Syrian divisions, in a replay of Kissinger's design to rescue the Egyptian Third Army after it was trapped by the Israelis in the Sinai Desert during the 1973 war. Sharon was convinced, North maintained, that such an act would have brought Syria to the American camp of Arab states and would have put an end to Soviet influence in Syria.

After dinner, North rushed back to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv and, bypassing diplomatic channels, sent a report of Sharon's secret war plan and political proposal to his boss, national-security adviser William Clark, who was with the President at Versailles. He then rejoined Habib, and they made the rounds of other Middle East capitals, arriving in Damascus two days later.

As it turned out, no one at the White House or elsewhere in the government, including Clark, took the time to give serious attention to the Sharon proposal. It was during this period that North began to think that it was all but impossible to overcome bureaucratic indifference or opposition to the Reagan agenda.

Intelligence information arriving on the desk of the commander-in-chief, which was supposed to help the President and the NSC create specific policies, was often inadequate or biased, tailored by the bureaucracy to produce an anticipated outcome. The President and his advisers, North thought, simply ratified the conclusions already reached by national-security bureaucrats because

they had no way of independently collecting intelligence. North's frustration with the bureaucracy is evident in his private communications report. At one point, he complains that the CIA tried for two days to get a plane that he needed, and in the end failed, whereas it took retired Major General Richard Secord, a key figure in North's network of special operators, only five minutes.

This frustration over an often intractable and self-centered bureaucracy was at

North complained that the CIA tried for two days to get a plane that he needed, and in the end failed, whereas it took retired Major General Richard Secord only five minutes

the heart of the NSC's gradual transformation from a consultative unit into an operational one. And as the NSC became ever more operational. Oliver North's power expanded, for he was the premier special operator on the NSC staff, the seat-of-the-panis tactician willing to try anything that might bring results. That sort of freelancing was found to ruffle feathers in the administration. When North bypassed diplomatic procedure by alerting Washington about Sharon's secret war plans, newly appointed Secretary of State George Shultz confronted North during one of Shultz's first NSC meetings.

meetings.
"Son," said Shultz, grabbing North
by the arm, "don't you ever dare to get
involved in diplomatic matters again."
Shultz then turned and walked away. It
was the last time the Secretary of State
spoke to him.

LEARNING WASHINGTON'S WAYS

From late 1982, North was involved in every major foreign-policy crisis, and began to travel extensively throughout Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe on secret missions, shedding his role as White House adviser for that of White House special operations and becoming the White House point man on the scene when there was a crisis somewhere in the world.

North was also becoming a talented bureaucratic infighter, adept at manipulating the system to get what he wanted. Through use of White House stationery and the telephone swirk-jboard—few

people are unimpressed by the operator's saying that "the White House is calling"—North rapidly developed the reputation of a doer.

North was traveling continuously on White House jets, chartered private jets CIA aircraft, and commercial flights, meeting with foreign officials and intelligence operatives, conducting secret diplomacy. Sometimes he would put in his regular fourteen-hour day at the office, then slip away to some foreign destination for a meeting during the night, and be back behind his desk the following morning, having caught only a catnap while in the air.

He traveled under a variety of assumed names, including "Mr Goode" "Mr Johns," and "Mr West," using false passports provided by the CIA or diplomatic documents obtained from the Department of State. When involved in highly secretive missions abroad. North would travel in a variety of disguises, sometimes dying his hair or wearing a wig, donning eyeglasses, and dressing in casual aftire.

"YOU OUGHT TO HAVE FAITH"

On October 25, 1983, less than a week after the murder of Grenada's Marxist leader. Maurice Bishop, by another Marxist faction, the United States invaded the tiny Caribbean island, ostensibly to restore order and to protect some 1,100 Americans living there from being taken hostage. US troops encountered resistance from Cuban soldiers and airport workers, and the final American toil was out at 18 dead and 91 wounded.

North coordinated military and policy-planning groups in preparation for the invasion and fought a losing battle to persuade Pentagon brass to use only Marines in the operation instead of a combined force of Mannes, the 82nd Arborne, elements of Delta Force, Navy SEALs, and Army Rangers. He also traveled to Caribbean nations to enlist support and approval of the operation, and put together the regional multinational force that never went ashore. During this period, he slept in his office

It wa North who was dispatched by McFar = ie to get President Reagan's signature on the presidential order authorizing the deployment of the 22nd MAU (Marine Amphibious Unit) to Grenada so that the invasion could proceed. When "Operation Urgent Fury" was launched on the 25th with a predawn landing by Navy SEALs, North monitored the drama from the White House Situation Room. "I couldn't do anything more," he said later. "At that stage it was up to the invading troops."

was up to the invading troops."

A key element of his plan was for transport planes to leave Miami and fly

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to Grenada, where they would evacuate the Americans residing on the island. including many students attending a medical school in St. George's, the capital Intelligence briefers were scheduled to go along with the planes and brief the evacuees on the return trip.

To his chagrin, North learned that the Air Force planes had not picked up the intelligence briefers and had gone to Grenada without them. He feared that without an understanding of the administration's motivations and its estimate of the danger they were in, the students would accuse the President and the US government of conducting a needless military operation. He feared that criticism by the students would play into the hands of members of Congress and the media waiting for Reagan to stumble

North decided to report the impending disaster at once to his boss, national security adviser Bud McFarlane, and to admit personal responsibility for not adequately supervising that stage of the operation. He ran upstairs from the Situation Room and poked his head into the Oval Office in hope of glimpsing Mc-Farlane Instead he saw the President, who called him into his office

According to those close to both men. the President's relations with North were informal and warm. Reagan probably saw in the dashing young Marine. with his quick mind and easy humor. something he never saw in his own sons

When North met with Reagan, he often entered the Oval Office through the side door, and his meetings were not logged in

North reciprocated the President's trust and affection, and more than once told friends he would stand in front of bullets for Reagan. He idolized the man who, he believed, was responsible for making America "stand tall."

'What's the problem, Ollie?'' Rea gan asked "You appear to be disturbed

by something

North told the President what had happeired and took responsibility for having failed his commander-in-chief

Where are the planes now?" asked the President.

"On their way back from Grenada with the students," North responded. "Come with me," said the President,

leading the way into an adjacent room, where there was a TV cabinet with three

'Sit down and let's watch their arri-Reagan consoled the younger man in a fatherly way. "Everything will be fine. You ought to have faith."
While the battle for Grenada was still

under way, the President and North sat opposite the three TV screens and vatched the arrival of the American st dents. When the first student, Jeff Geller, deplaned at Charleston Air Force Base in South Carolina, he dropped down and kissed the tarmac

Reagan turned to North and said. You see, Ollie, you ought to have more faith in the American people

THE SPECIAL OPERATOR

North also developed a very close relationship with CIA Director William Casey, who was engaged in what amounted to a personal crusade to revitalize the

The story of the two gringos who had risked their lives to save two Salvadoran soldiers made the rounds in Central America, and it made North very popular in Salvadoran military circles.

nation's intelligence capabilities, which had suffered during the traumas of Vietnam, Watergate, the Church Committee, and other inquiries into CIA wrongdoing Casey, who had learned his trade with the OSS in World War II, had a special taste for covert operations and secret diplomacy and liked to roll up his sleeves and immerse himself in various operations. He often said that the US must roll back the Soviet empire in just one place, and then it would begin to From Casey's standpoint, collapse Grenada didn't represent a significant roll-back, and he continued to probe for the opportunity to demonstrate that Soviet ascendancy over the West was neither inevitable nor historically ordained

Casey recognized North's aptitude as an operator, noting the spark in his eyes and the desire to do whatever was called for to ensure that the US did not come up second best. Casey soon began channel-ing covert operations through North and, by so doing, avoided the requirement to report such operations to congressional oversight panels

In his official position as deputy director for political-military affairs at the National Security Council, North was responsible for terrorism issues, the handling of American hostages, and the planning and coordination of almost anything that fell under the rubric of wintensity warfare, including El Salvador, the contras, and support of other anti-communist rebels. In this capacity, he was the NSC's representative on the Intergovernmental Committee for Combetting Terrorism and, under NSC adviser John Poindexter, often served as acting director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group

One of North's strengths was his ability to work with people, although some-times he was accused of being highhanded. He got so deeply involved in his work that he often clashed with the Pentagon and the State Department. He began to develop a reputation as "the world's most powerful lieutenant colo-Other times, with more than a little jealousy, he was referred to in some quarters as "Field Marshal North

He was aware of the barbs but rarely took offense. Most of the time he tool the humor in stride, as when he told a friend. "I must be doing something right. They've named a parking for at the

Pentagon after me

During 1983 and 1984. North spent a lot of time in El Salvador monitoring the situation firsthand, traveling with Ambassador-at-Large Richard Stone and meeting in the field with the Green Beret advisers to the Salvadoran Army one occasion. North was flying in a small plane to get a closer look at the action in El Salvador, accompanied by another American, when they heard over the radio that a Salvadoran Army unit was under heavy fire from an enemy position they could not locate Their des perate calls for a spotter plane and a helicopter to evacuate the wounded were turned down because all available aircraft were engaged elsewhere didn't hesitate to aid the unit. They overflew the area, located the enemy position, and directed Salvadoran mortar fire Then they wheeled the plane about and dived toward the ground while North informed the Salvadorans that he was landing on a dirt strip. Enemy gunfire raked the small plane, shattering one of the windows. The wounded were loaded aboard, and they took off in a hail of bullets. Once airborne, they trans ported the two wounded Salvadoran soldiers to a military hospital in San Salvador. Neither survived

Later the story made the rounds in Central America of the two gringos who had risked their lives to save two Salvadoran soldiers, and it made North very popular within Salvadoran military circles. When he needed some assistance or a special favor from the Salvadoran military, North had only to ask

THE ISRAELI CONNECTION

"Ollie North's biggest contribution to the Western society." observed a top Israeli intelligence official. his ability to persuade American deci-sion makers to take active measures against international terrorism Reagan administration had come to power with tough talk against terrorism

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but few initiatives

It was not until the traumas of 1983—the bombing of the US Embassy and the US Embassy and the US Embassy annex in Beirut, the destruction of the US Marine headquarters at the Beirut airport with the loss of 241 American lives, and the bombing of the US Embassy in Kuwait—that the administration began seriously to address terrorism.

On April 3, 1984. President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 138 (NSDD 138), which amounted to a declaration of war against terrorism. In the preamble to the still-classified document, the US stated that "states that use or support terrorism cannot be allowed to do so without consequences," and went on to note that when all other efforts to dissuade states from supporting terrorism fail, "the United States has a right to defend itself." Ollie North was one of the architects of NSDD 138

self "Office North was one of the architects of NSDD 138
"Office," said a close friend and colleague at the NSC, "took an oath to hunt and bring to trial the Shiff terrorist who was responsible for the bombing of the Marine headquarters." The quest for those behind the October 23 bombing brought North together with Israel intelligence. "The Israelis," said North later, "were far ahead of us. They had better intelligence, kept it updated." and were—as a small nation without global responsibilities—able to conduct surgical counter-terrorist operations in a fair-

ly unrestrained fashion

The Israelis quickly saw North as a power behind the scenes at the National Security Council. Thus, when the Israelis spotted Imad Mughniya—the mastermind of the bombings of the US Embassy, the Marine headquarters, and the French paratrooper barracks—on the French Riviera, they alerted North. Mughniya was traveling under an assumed name and using a false passport North decided to hunt Mughniya himself, one on one

Not a lot is known about Mughniya. Unlike Carlos or Abu Nidal, Mughniya has attracted little attention in the Western media. Yet he is perhaps the most ruthless and successful terrorist in the world today. In little more than three years, Mughniya managed to destroy the US Embassy in West Beirut, killing most of the Cla station in that country and forcing. American diplomats to retreat to East Beirut. In the aftermath of the bombing of the US Manne barracks, he forced the United States to withdraw its military contingent from Lebanon. His men also drove the Foreign Legion and French "paras" from the country. With a single car bomb, Mughniya was able to nearly wipe out Israel's counter-terrorist network in southern Lebanon.

He orchestrated the kidnapping of the new CIA chief of station, William Buckley, and many of the other Western hostages. By 1985, Mughniya was the most wanted terrorist in the world.

Learning of Mughniya's where-abouts, North went into action. He asked his Israeli contact at the embassy in Washington. Colonel Moshe Zur, as well as Major General Uri Simhoni and the Israeli prime minister's anti-terrorism adviser. Amiram Nir, to maintain surveillance of Mughniya and not let

When the Israelis spotted Imad Mughniya—the most wanted terrorist in the world—on the French Riviera, they alerted North, who decided to hunt Mughniya himself, one on one.

him slip away. He told the CIA and his superiors at the NSC of the development, and a task force of CIA operators and representatives of military special-operations forces was established to monitor the situation. One ingredient was still missing cooperation from the French. Although impressed with the Soviet

Although impressed with the Soviet method of handling terrorists, North knew there was little support in the administration for assassinating them. It was more consistent with US values to shell the Chouf Mountains with a battle-ship, killing and injuring many innocent people, than to target an individual terrorist, known to have been involved in the murder of American citizens, and shoot him between the eyes. Thus North had only one choice, to capture Mughniya on French soil and bring about his extradition back to the US to stand trial. At first all went well. The French

At first all went well. The French promised cooperation and assumed prime surveillance of Mughniya. But problems began to anse: The US could not get French assurances that Mughniya would be extradited; it appeared that they wasted to the but them assurances.

would be estimated, it appears that they wanted to try him themselves.

While North, in a senes of transatiantic shuttle missions, tried to iron out differences between the two allies, the situation began to unravel. In view of growing French recalcitrance, the US and Israel had maintained their surveillance of Mughniya and were alarmed when he was plucked from under their noses by French police. The French bundled Mughniya off to the airport and put him on the first flight to the Middle East, later claiming that American and Israeli operatives had been mistaken in their

identification, and boasted that they had actually saved both services a major embarrassment

It was North's first major failure, and one that he would not soon forget. The United States would have to rely on its own devices to fight terrorism, at least until the Europeans could be convinced that cooperation was preferable to the use of military force by the US. He began the quest to find an opportinity to strike a decisive blow against terrorists, hoping such an action by the US would bring the Europeans to their senses.

In retrospect. North's frustration and bitterness over having failed to catch the man responsible for the murder of his fellow Marines may have played a role in his later willingness to consider any means to deal with terrorism, and in so doing sowed the seeds of "Trangate" The one thing he was never shy about saying was that what we were doing isn't working. He often blamed those in key government positions who wanted to remain safe spectators. The way he saw it, too many people at State, Defense, and in the intelligence agencies were more interested in protecting their own behinds than in accomplishing anything. At every meeting there seemed to be a dozen naysayers dedicated to es plaining why something was impossible Unlike those he saw all around him. North did not have his next promotion as the overriding factor determining his actions. He seemed to have an all-consuming desire to accomplish the task at hand. especially if he believed it to be the President's will. North's goals were straightforward enough: to fight terrorism, to give form and substance to the Reagan doctrine, to bring down the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, and ultimately to achieve the release of the American hostages in Lebanon. As he saw it, these were Reagan's goals and he was Reagan's instrument. With luck, courage, and imagination they could give the nation victories it would be proud of

But North also knew there would be a price. Beginning in 1984, he remarked to friends that he had flown too close to the fire and that the day "will come when I have to resign in disgrace from the administration" and "take the heat for the President." But he never expressed doubts about what he was doing, and appeared resigned to the fact that his Marine career would be at an end when he left the White House.

ik leli die wilke House.

NORTH'S LIFE AT HOME

The North household was a traditional one. Ollie was the breadwinner, and his wife, Betsy, was a homemaker and full-time mother to their four children: Tait, Stuart, Sarah, and Dornin. With the

profits from the sale of previous homes. North bought a large, rambling old house in Great Falls, across the Potomac from the White House. The house cost a small fortune to heat, and the North family found they could not afford to keep the central heating system on all the time. North chopped a big stack of wood, and they kept a fire going around the clock in the main fireplace for heat. "The house is just too big to get really warm," said North. "So on very cold nights, everybody moved to the living room and slept there."

When North returned home from one of his trips to the Middle East, where he had been working to free the American hostages in Lebanon, he found that his entire family was ill. It was the winter of 1985, at the end of a protracted cold spell. When the family had moved to the living room, Betsy and the four kids had all contracted pneumonia. Trying to cope with a sick family and the demands of his job taxed North's energy. Although he managed to leave the office a little earlier each day, before long he was back to the same grinding pace. At one point, after a crisis, he promised Betsy that he would come home at least once a week.

Even when he managed to make it home, the phone would ring at all hours. There was no hiding from the White House signal switchboard, and North was forever responding to calls from contro leaders, government officials, and assorted operatives. But despite his absences, he and Betsy managed to maintain a semblance of family life. Deeply religious, North and his family attended church on Sunday whenever they could.

Though not without ups and downs, Ollie and Betsy's relationship remained strong. For her, he was always Larry; if he had slipped from her good graces, he was Lawrence. She never adjusted to calling him Ollie, as his friends did.

Betsy was working at a Montgomery Ward store when she met him through a cousin when he was a young midshipman. To hear her tell it, she was not impressed with him. "He had to persuade me, to make a big effort, before we started dating on a regular basis," she recalled.

The Norths were not part of the Washington party circuit, and they socialized primarily with friends in one another's homes. When he had free time, North would almost always spend it with his family. The family owned a horse, and he took a keen interest in the kids' riding lessons. For North, the family was his private world, and he rarely admitted outsiders.

As his name began to pop up in the media, he worried about his family's 144. The Washingtonson/July 1987.

safety. On one occasion, fearful that they might be a target, he moved them to a military base in the Washington area for a short time.

After North was fired from his White House job, there was no way he could shield his family from the media. He despaired when some of the particularly vicious stories, accusing him of all sorts of transgressions, began to affect his children. When his oldest daughter, bitter over the way her father had been treated, began to criticize the United

At one point, after a crisis, North promised his wife he would come home at least once a week. But even when he managed to make it home, the phone would ring at all hours.

States, North was deeply hurt. Responding to her anger, he tried to give her some sense of perspective. "If this were any other country in this world and your father fell from grace." he told her, "he would leave for work one day and never return."

He later confided to a friend, "Maybe it was not worth it after all."

TWA 847 AND THE ACHILLE LAURO: THE START OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

On June 14, 1985, a TWA airliner, Flight 847, was seized by Shifte gunmen over Greece, beginning a seventeen-day hostage ordeal that saw the aircraft forced to fly to Algiers twice and Beirut three times. On the second day of the crisis, a young American Navy diver, Robert Stethem, was murdered by the terrorists. Some passengers were released in Algiers and Beirut, but on June 16, after the plane touched down in Beirut for the third time, the remaining 39 American passengers and crew were broken up into groups and dispersed throughout the city so as to make any rescue attempt more difficult.

In the end, with the threat of US military intervention looming over the region, negotiations secured the release of the remaining 39 hostages. As part of the agreement, Israel released—in an ostensibly unconnected move—more than 700 Shiite prisoners. According to North, the agreement had broken down late on June 29 when Hizballah terrorists, holding the four Jewish passengers, refused to go along with the deal.

The Reagan administration had taken the position that it wanted all the hostages back or there would be no deal North, already deeply involved in secret diplomacy with a faction of the Iranian government headed by Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hojatolislam Hasheimi Rafsanjani, said that the White House had made an urgent plea to Rafsanjani and that he had intervened to secure the release of the remaining hostages, permitting them to be transported to Damascus in a Red Cross convoy.

In addition to playing a key role in overall crisis management from the White House. North became immersed in the unfolding events in both the Middle East and El Salvador. One colleague remembers him taking time to secure the order lowering the flags to half-mast in honor of the slain. Stethem. North personally made the arrangements for the return of the bodies of the four murdered American Mannes to the United States. He felt that the dead American servicemen deserved no less, and he distrusted government bureaucrats to get such action taken quickly. North had little time for excuses and bulldozed his way through red tape, regardless of the noses he bent out of joint.

he bent out of joint.

During the TWA hijacking crisis, the United States and Israel had reached a new level of cooperation. For the first time since the establishment of the "special relationship," that cooperation reached into areas of strategic cooperation, military options, and joint covert operations. A secret channel of communication was established between the two nations, and Oliver North was the US point man. The decision to name North as the American liaison was ratified by top Pentagon and intelligence officials, and known to only a very small group at the National Security Council.

It was also during the TWA hijacking that the role of the Iranians as leading sponsors of Middle East terrorism became firmly established to everyone's satisfaction. This, ultimately, would lead to the decision to open a secret dialogue with Iranian "moderates" and to sell arms to Tehran. Although no one recognized it at the time, the US was becoming sucked into a pattern of doing business "the Israeli way," in which the counter-terrorists were in the driver's seat and running roughshod over traditional foreign-policy and defense considerations.

Appearing before a closed-door session of the Senate Intelligence Committee on June 19, 1985, CIA Director William Casey said, "The United States is at war" with international terrorism and "the TWA hijacking is just the beginning." Casey's words proved to be prophetic. While North had little room

to operate during the TWA 847 crisis. perhaps his finest hour would come three months later in the wall oil the scapacking of the Italian crysse liner Achille Lauro

At 8.45 AM on October 7, 1985, Palestinian seajackers burst into the ship's dining room with weapons fring, slightly injuring two passengers. Once in controt, they demanded the release of 50 Palestinians being held in Israel When negotiations began to falter the follow ing day, the terrorists mundered wheelchair-bound Leon Klinghoffer of New York and dumped his body over the side of the ship. They had shuffled the pass-ports of the Americans, and Klinghoffer's had come up on top

From the moment that news of the seizure reached Washington, the Reagan administration, its patience already worn thin by the TWA 847 incident. began planning a military rescue of the ship in case the situation began to deteri-orate. The Navy SEAL commando frogmen capable of operating in water. in the air, and on land-were chosen for

the mission

The operation was scheduled for the night of Wednesday, October 9, and it was at this point that detailed intelligence became critical. North, coordinating the operation as head of a special White House counter-terrorist force, was stunned to learn that US intelligence had lost track of the ship on Tuesday, despite all its sophisticated satellite and communications monitoring equipment.

Actually, ship detection in mid-ocean is not that easy. A ship can be located through the signals emitted by its own navigational radar, by its radio communications, or by means of aerial reconnaissance and photos. US intelligence was configured to track the Soviet Navy, not commercial vessels. But the Israelis had suffered a number of terrorist pene-trations involving "mother" ships off the coast and had sophisticated monitoring devices capable of locating and tracking threatening vessels.

In desperation, North turned to his Is-

racli friends for help, using the channel established during the TWA 847 crisis. He called Major General Simhoru at the Israeli Erribassy in Washington and explained the situation. Minutes later, Simhoni was back on the line with the vital information requested by North The Israelis, fearing that the terrorists on board might try to carry out their oneinal plan of anacking the Israeli port of Ashdod, had kept the ship under surveillance

At this mamont, the ship was sailing close to the Syrian count, with the goal of entering the Syrian military and oil terminus of Tarties Broth passed the Israeli information at me to the National Secu-



A woman of striking appearance, who was also a part-time model. Faum Hall was considered Othe North's right arm and a very efficient, hard-working secretary

rity Agency (NSA), which had managed to locate the ship. But on Wednesday, the day of the planned operation, NSA once again could not locate the hostage cruise liner, and an embarrassed North again had to turn to the Israelis for help As before, Simhoni was quickly able to supply North with the ship's exact coordinates. From that point, "we kept a secure line open between military intelligence headquarters (in Israel) and my office at the embassy." General Simhoni later confirmed. Preparation for the nighttime assault went forward, but the operation was never launched

After the Syrians refused to let the ship dock at Tartus, the Achille Lauro sailed back to Port Said, where Mohammed Abul Abbas, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Front, a PLO splinter group, convinced the piretes to surder to Egyptian authorities.

It seemed there was little left for the American commandos to do at Akrotin. so they were ordered home. Meanwhile diplomatic efforts were under way to convince the Egyptians to turn the terrorists over to Italy or the United States. The following morning. Washington time, an NSC staff meeting was inter-rupted with a message from Egyptian President Mubarak informing nationalsecurity adviser Bud McFarlane that the terrorists had already left Egypt. President Hosni Mubarak had given the same information to US Ambassador Nicholas Velicies and repeated it publicly

McFarlane turned to North and asked him where the US commandos were

'On their way home,' answered North, knowing that some members of SEAL Team Six were already in Gibraltar, en route back to the United States

Not trusting the Egyptians, McFarlane asked North to "check where the

terrorists are "Will do," said North, who began polling US intelligence sources Failing to get definitive information, he called General Simboni again

"Uri," North inquired, "where are the four thugs?

"Give me 30 minutes and I'll get back to you." Simhoni answere Simhoni answered

At 8 45 AM. General Simhon: report-

ed: "The four are still in Egypt"
"Are you sure?" North demanded
"Absolutely," came the reply. It turned out that a special Israeli monitoring unit was keeping tabs on preparations to ship the terrorists out of Egypt A short time later, the NSA was able to verify the Israeli intelligence but unable to identify the plane on which the terrorists were scheduled to be flown to Tunis Simhoni's sources were quickly able to pin down the location of the EgyptAir jet

North rushed upstairs from the White House Situation Poom to McFarlane's office. There he found McFarlane, preparing to board the Marine One helicopter to accompany the President on a campaign swing to Chicago, McFarlane's uty, Vice Admiral John Poindexter. NSC spokesperson Karna Small, Near East and South Asian specialist Jock

North launched into a report "The friends," he began, using the common euphemism of the US intelligence community-until the arrest of Israeli spy Jonathan J. Pollard—when referring to have confirmation. Then he spoke for everyone in the room. "We have to do something about it

'What can be done?" Poindexter asked

"Do you remember Yamamoto?" answered North, referring to the Japanese admiral whose aircraft was intercepted and shot down by American P-38 fighters during World War II. It was Yamamoto who had led the attack on Pearl Harbor.

"You don't want to shoot it down?" Poindexter asked.

'No," answered North "Just force it to land at Sigonella, Sicily "

McFarlane told North to "get moving." Then he rushed out to the White House helicopter landing pad.

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North went to work at once. A short time later, North presented the outline of his plan to Poindexter, who approved it, and contacted McFarlane, via a secure communications link, in Chicago.

Once Reagan's approval had been secured, the Sixth Fleet was given new orders and the sircraft carrier Saratoga directed to sail in the vicinity of Crete at full speed. Timely and precise intelligence still remained a hurdle. By this time, US intelligence was able to keep the NSC advised as to the whereabouts of the terrorists, but the tail number and the departure time of the EgyptAir flight still remained a mystery.

North again called General Simhoni.

North again called General Simhoni, who had an open line to Major General Ehud Barak, chief of Israel's military intelligence branch known as AMAN. Simhoni passed along North's request to AMAN and established an open line to the White House Situation Room, from which North was monitoring the operations of the Sixth Fleet.

"The Israelis had it all," said North later. They provided the US with the plane's identification numbers and call sign seconds after it was in the air. North, from his desk in the White House basement, transmitted the crucial information to the Saratoga. While the Saratoga was launching its F-14 fighters to carry out the interception and takedown, North watched the US commandos, now over the Atlantic, turn around and make for the NATO air base at Sigonella.

For the Saratoga's fighters, it was a little like trying to find a needle in a haystack. They had to single out the EgyptAir jet from among 67 other airliners flying in the international air corridor that skirts the southern littoral of North

McFarlane had communicated some doubts about the operation to North, who shared them with Simhoni. Accordingly, Simhoni began planning a backup operation that would have brought the Egyptian jet down at an Israeli military base.

"Will you be able to move in time?"
North double-checked.

"We will give you all the assistance we are able to provide," responded Simhoni.

Then North asked the question that was already beginning to trouble administration planners about Sigenelle: "Will you hand them [the terrorista] over to us or bring them to justice yourselves?"

"Whichever suits you better," came the response.

The Israelis were soon on the line again with even more stunning intelligence. Mohammed Abul Abbas, the leader of the PLF, was on board the

EgyptAir jet, not to mention a number of armed Egyptian commandos. North knew that Abbas was the likely mastermind of the seajacking. The chance to bring a top terrorist leader to justice for his crimes was too good to be true.

The key now was to buy more time for the Saratoga's Tomcats so they would have time enough to make a positive identification of the jetliner and force it to Sigonella. North asked the Israelis if they could isolate the jetliner by jamming all its communications, except

The Israelis were soon on the line again with even more stunning intelligence.

Mohammed Abul Abbas, the leader of the PLF, was on board the EgyptAirjet, not to mention a number of armed Egyptian commandos.

those they wanted to get through, and at the same time so intimidate the air-traffic controller at Tunis that permission for the EgyptAir flight to land would be denied.

When the pilot of the EgyptAir jetliner bearing Mohammed Abul Abbas and his gunmen sought permission to land from what he thought was the Tunis air controller, his request was denied. Unknown to the pilot, he was really communicating with an Arabic-speaking Israeli military officer in a flying intelligence center.

Shortly thereafter, the Tomcats, flying with darkened cockpits and without lights, intercepted the jetliner near the island of Crete. The pilot of the jetliner urgently tried to contact Cairo for new orders but was prevented by a US EA-6B, which was jamming his radio communications. In case the pilot decided to try to make a run for Athens. Beirut, or some other "friendly" city, the US sent a strong warning to those governments not to let the aircraft land.

Finally, the desperate EgyptAir pilot capitulated and agreed to follow the warplanes that surrounded his aircraft. Meanwhile, the Italians were cutting a new deal with the Egyptians. According to North, "The Italians promised the Egyptians that Abu Abbas [Mohammed Abul Abbas] would be saved, as he was the only link between the terrorist attack and the PLO chairman [Yasir Arafat]." The Italians would keep the four sesjacters, they promised, but would permit Abbas to escape. "Once the second deal was

in the malung." North recalled afterward. "the Italians ordered their carabiniers to Sigonella Air Base to prevent us from taking Abu Abbas to the US.

The EgyptAir jetliner had just landed when the transporters carrying Army General Carl W. Stiner and the other members of his command touched down on the runway. As the Egyptian plane came to a stop and stairs were rolled toward the door by ground personnel, black-clad US commandos surrounded the jetliner. General Stiner handed his Uzi submachine gun and pissol to one of his men and climbed the steps to the plane. The plane's door opened and the American general faced two Egyptian commandos, who pointed their Sovietmade AK-47s at him.

After some discussion—during which an open line to Oliver North and the White House Situation Room was maintained—the Egyptian commandos laid down their weapons and Mohammed Abbas and the four seajackers were escorted off the aircraft toward a waiting American plane with its engines running. Suddenly, Italian carabinieri rushed to the parked US plane and, with weapons leveled, formed a circle around the American commandos and their cantives. Steiner was on the radio, describing the drama to North. It was at this moment, North later recalled, that he 'knew it was all over. We were not going to clash with one of our allies over

The US commandos ultimately permitted the Italians to spirit Abbas and his companions away. Abbas was then allowed by the Italian government to slip quietly out of Italy on a chartered Yugo slavian plane, ignoring a US request for his detention and extradition. His four companions were detained by the Italian government and ultimately forced to stand trial

For the Reagan administration, the midair interception of the Achille Lauro pirates was a triumph. "We Bag the pirates was a triumph. Bums," trumpeted the A trumpeted the New York Daily News. Oliver North later had the front page framed and mounted on his wall. The President's approval rating sourced to 68 percent. But for North, it was, at best, a mixed success. He believed that the Craxi government's capitulation to the terrorists demonstrated once again that America's European allies could not be counted on in the war against terrorism, and that the United States would be forced to take even more drastic steps to protect its citizens.

"It was a piece of art," North reflected sadly, describing the operation. "It was a masterpiece of intelligence work, and there was smooth cooperation with some allies while others chose not to cooperate, fearing terrorist retaliation.

The interception was a model of US government agencies working together. He faulted the Italians for their lack of courage, and while the rest of the nation was savoring the triumph, he returned to the drawing board to plan the next US blow against terrorism.

Around Washington, the young Marine officer suddenly became a celebrity of sorts when his role in the daring op eration was reported. At the White House his star was clearly on the rise; as a result of the triumph, he was virtually

Around Washington, the young Marine officer suddenly became a celebrity of sorts when his role in the daring operation was reported. At the White House, his star was clearly on the rise.

given a free hand to carry the war to the terrorists and their state sponsors with as much creativity and energy as he could muster.

"No lieutenant colonel ever had been given as much power-to rewrite US counter-terror policy-and to have such a huge impact on our foreign policy," reflected one senior State Department official close to North. He viewed it as 'a colossal mistake.

"THE SHORES OF TRIPOLI"

Despite North's expanded portfolio and the daring seizure of the Achille Lauro pirates, terrorism was soon on the rise again. Terrorist organizations such as Abu Nidal's Black June, Yasir Arafat's Force 17, and the militant Shiite sect known as Hizballah were involved in new attacks, and nations such as Libya, Syria, and Iran showed little sign of reducing their support of terrorist proxies.


North believed that the only real answer was to strike at the "heart of the beast -the terrorist-sponsoring states themselves-and make it clear that they would have to pay a significant price for supporting terrorists. Thus, he began to draft detailed contingency plans for striking directly at Libya, the most vulnerable of the state sponsors of terrorism. Unlike Syria, Libya was militarily reak and possessed only a limited airdefense system; and unlike Iran, which presented logistics problems, Libya was vulnerable to US military power, in the form of the Sixth Fleet and various NATO bases scattered across Europe.

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target, its leader, Colonel Moammar Gadhafi, was often called a "loony tune," and he had little international support, even in the Islamic bloc. His repeated threats to join the Warsaw Pact had been brushed aside by the Soviets. The late Egyptian president Anwar Sa-dat had once described Gadhafi as "100 percent sick and possessed of the de-mon," and former president of the Su-dan Gaafar Nimeiri was even more direct. According to Nimeiri, Gadhafi had

"split personality—both evil."
On March 27 and March 29, 1986. Libyan classified messages were inter-cepted and decoded by Western intelligence. The messages, which had originated at the Libyan intelligence headquarters in Tripoli, ordered Libyan intelligence attachés posted in the "Peo-ple's Bureaus" around the world, in a clear and unambiguous manner, to initiate terrorist attacks on American and

other Western targets.
"Gadhafi's orders were such," North that we had to move very quickly in order to prevent a major disaster. The intercepted message ordered the following: "Cause maximum casualties to US citizens and other Western people. The message had originated in Tripoli under Gadhafi's personal authority and outlined operational plans for more than ten terrorist attacks.

There was growing concern at the NSC that the Libyan terrorist attacks were imminent, but the problem for the North team was to identify specific targets before they were hit. By Friday, April 6, the NSC team was able to piece together enough of the puzzle to figure out that one target chosen by the Libyan operatives was a West Berlin bar, disco. or nightclub frequented by US service-men. MPs were dispatched throughout West Berlin to pull American service-men out of all night spots. Five minutes before MPs would have arrived at the La Belle disco, a powerful bomb ripped through it.

At this exact moment, Gadhafi-perhaps fearing that he had gone too farinitiated secret contacts with the Reagan administration, using a series of semiofficial channels and private individuals. including Italian businessmen and oilindustry sources. The administration, however, had lost all interest in Gadhafi's unorthodox overtures to Washington. "All the messengers and well-wishers were told to lay off," North said. They were told to tell Gadhafi that he could approach us through Belgian dip-lomatic channels," the only approved point of contact.

The administration rejected Gadhafi's overtures not only because of the pending Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks. but also because US intelligence had un-

covered a Libyan plot to "buy" American hostages from a Shiite terrorist group. "We have solid intelligence that Gadhafi was trying to buy the six American hostages held in Lebanon from Hizballah terrorists that were holding them North contended captive.

North said that Gadhafi had offered the Hizballah \$100 million for the six Americans and another \$50 million for the French hostages they were holding

The NSC team was able to piece together enough of the puzzle to figure out that one target chosen by the Libyan operatives was a West Berlin

bar, disco, or nightclub frequented by US servicemen.

Most of the hostages were imprisoned in a four-story building near one of the runways at Beirut International Airport. in cells two floors below the ground. The building also housed Hizballah families on the upper levels. To block Gadhafi's offer of cash in exchange for the hostages, North said in April 1986: ' US has moved to free the hostages " refused to elaborate on the details of the US countermove at that time, but it is evident today that secret contacts with Iran were under way and that North hoped they would deliver the American hostages from Libya's grasp.

It was evident to North and other administration planners that the La Belle disco bombing had been the opening salvo of the new terrorist offensive ordered by Gadhafi in late March. North explained, "We were running out of time and working against the ticking terror clock." North knew that protective measures were not enough and that the time was rapidly approaching when the US would have to launch pre-emptive military strikes against terrorists and their state sponsors.

On Wednesday, April 9, during an NSC meeting in the Oval Office, the President was provided with additional information on the Libyan terrorist cam-paign. The President concluded, "The evidence is irrefutable. It is conclusive. We have to move to stop them from carrying out those terror operations.

North wanted to employ surgical means to hit Gadhafi. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon wanted to repeat the strategy employed in the March skirmishes for the Gulf of Sidra, which saw US warplanes attack Libyan petrol boats and land-based radars, and the 1981 sorties in which US F-14s shot down two Libyan fighter-bombers over the disputed waters. North failed to win agreement on using a SEAL team to infiltrate Libya to plant homing devices capeble of guiding "Smart" bombs. Had one of the laser projectors been secretly positioned on the grounds of the Azziziya barracks, where Gadhafi lived, he might not have survived the attack and civilian casualties might have been reduced.

The April 9 NSC meeting concluded without the issuance of an executive order for the Libyan air raid. After the NSC meeting, two NSC staff teams met and prepared a target list. Five targets were selected and quickly approved. First on the list was the Azziziya barracks compound, which housed command and communications centers for Libyan military and intelligence operations. It also contained Gadhafi's personal quarters, where his family lived, and the Bedouin tent where Gadhafi often slept.

With up-to-date intelligence from the Israelis, several members of the NSC staff felt that there was a strong probability that "we will get Gadhafi himself." While there was concern that Gadhafi's death not appear as an assassination, but rather fate-being in the wrong place at the wrong time—the replacement of the Gadhafi regime was clearly the Reagan administration's unspoken goal in the raid. Whether Gadhafi was killed in the actual raid or whether he was toppled by a coup triggered by the attack made no difference. What was important was that the Libyan government be dissuaded from using terrorism as an instrument of national policy, and if the best way to achieve that result was the removal of

the existing regime in Tripoli, so be it.
On Thursday, April 10, North and
Navy and Air Force planners completed
the final political and military review in advance of the raid, recommending that the attack be carried out at 2 AM, Tripoli time. This decision, North later confirmed, was predicated on new intelligence information from the Israelis on the readiness of Libyan air defenses. It had been learned that the last Libyan duty officer left his post at midnight, whereupon the entire Libyan air-defense system was shut down. The only remaining threat came from Syrian MIG-21 pilots that manned the Libyan first interceptor squadron on a 24-hour-a-day besis. The Syrian interceptors, however, were not operationally independent and therefore could not engage an enemy attack without clearance. Each of their sorties had to be cleared in advance with the Libyan supreme command or with Gadhafi personally. Based on that information, said North, "we were rather sure that at 2 AM it would take the Syrians hours before they could obtain clearance for an interception sortie."

Although the actual date of the attack had not yet been set and was awaiting final presidential action, by April 10 "everything was in place and all systems were ready to go," observed a Joint Chiefs of Staff source. When the National Security Council met the following day to select a date for the raid, based on commendations from Bill Casey and North, it was decided to postpone the

The decision was taken to postpone the operation mainly because of Casey's insistence that more time be given to pull his agents-"who risked their lives for us''-out of Libya.

operation. The decision was taken mainly because of Casey's insistence that more time be given to pull his agentswho risked their lives for us" -out of Libya or permit them to reach more secure locations. Despite the delay, not all the CIA's agents were able to get out of Libya before the raid, although there is no evidence that any of them were later killed or captured.

North wanted to postpone the operation for a few days to obtain more exact intelligence from NSA and the Israeli spy plane on targets. North also was concerned that "too many operational details were being kicked around and too many administration officials and press people were involved in irresponsible speculation" about the possibility of US military action against Libya. "Those who leaked and talked publicly about sensitive intelligence and speculated about the military operation," North argued, "jeopardized the lives of US servicemen and US citizens overseas.

On April 12, Casey informed those gathered for a Saturday meeting at the White House, who by this time were working around the clock, that all his ople were safe. Meanwhile, the media had begun to downplay the chances of a military strike against Libya, thus making surprise more likely. The extra time had also resulted in the collection of far more precise data on targets and the location of Gadhafi and other senior Lib-yan officials. Thus, "at that Saturday meeting," North later observed. recommended that the air strike be carried out on Monday night, April 14, or on Tuesday morning, April 15, according to Libyan local time."

When the President returned from

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Camp David on Sunday afternoon, April 13, the NSC was convened. The President was briefed by the national-security adviser on preparations. Then he presented Reagan with options and a draft of the final operational plans. No objections came from any of the NSC members. Admiral Crowe did a short briefing on the final military plan of action. The President asked if his request for a mechanism to recall the planes short of their targets had been implemented. Assured that the command post maintained the ability to abort the operation up to ten minutes before the attack, or at 6:50 pm Eastern Standard Time, the President appeared to be satisfied

As the final details were being discussed, Reagan instructed aides to prepare a meeting the following afternoon with congressional leaders. Around 4 PM, the President gave final approval to the operation, but not before making angry comments concerning leaks, which he regarded as endangering the safety of the entire mission. The executive order drafted for the operation called for an air strike against "terror targets inside Lib-ya" on Monday night, April 14, 1986

The President met with congressional leaders on Monday afternoon. The F-111s were already in the air, and he told the assembled members of Congress that if anyone demurred, he would recall the planes at once. No one voiced any objections. The air strike went forward

Before they left, members of Congress were warned by the President to be extremely careful with their statements to the press. "Whatever you say to the press outside," one participant recalls the President as saying, "will affect the lives of the US pilots.

Despite the President's admonition. House Majority Leader Jim Wright and Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd told reporters after the meeting that the President was expected to address the nation that evening at 9 PM. To anyone reading between the lines, it was clear that something big was afoot, and because Libya was the issue dominating the headlines, an unexpected presidential address to the nation could mean only one thing. But despite the flurry of media speculation, the Libyans apparently did not get wind of the attack.

At 6:53 PM, EST, the first F-11

crossed the Libyan coastline. The F-111s were flying into the Libyan desert in order to wheel around and attack their targets from the south. At 7 pm, the Sixth Fleet launched its fighter-bumb-ers. Five minutes later, Cable News Network broadcast the first news of the attack from Tripoli, and White House spokesman Larry Speakes was directed to meet with the White House press corps. He changed his tie and rushed to 150 The Washingtoman/July 1987

the press room. At 30 seconds after 7:30 pm, the attack was broken off and all planes were reported to be leaving the area.

The mood in the White House Situation Room was one of jubilation. National-security adviser John Poindester was moving around the room shaking hands with his staff. Upstairs in the Oval Office. President Reagan was preparing his address to the nation. North was continuing to monitor the returning warplanes, and reports that one of the planes might have gone down were beginning to reach

North received a copy of the President's remarks only minutes before Reagan was supposed to go on the air. Suddenly North leaped from his chair and bolted from his office, running for the Oval Office.

him. Soon it was confirmed that one of the eighteen F-111s was unaccounted for

North received a copy of the President's remarks only minutes before Reagan was supposed to go on the air, and he gave them a furious once-over. Suddenly, he leaped from his chair and bolted from his office, running for the Oval Office.

Seconds before 9 PM. North burst into the Oval Office and made a direct line for the Teleprompter. The President looked up from his papers and stared at North, who was erasing a line from the speech on the Teleprompter.

As North finished erasing the line, which said "and they have all returned safely to their bases." he turned to the President: "Sir, we have lost a plane over the Libvan coast

Reagan continued staring at North in silence for several seconds as if the news had hit him hard.

In retrospect, the mission was to some extent a failure, as neither Gadhafi nor his regime was eliminated.

But as a political counter-terrorist operation, the raid was highly successful. The United States had turned the tables on Libya's erratic strongman: The hunter had become the hunted.

The raid was also aimed at Washington's European allies as a demonstration that the US was prepared to go it alone if necessary, to protect its citizens and national interests.

OPERATION "EL DORADO CANYON"

Despite the fluidity of the situation in Libya after the US bombing raid, Gadhafi was able to exact a minor degree of revenge on the US and Great Britain One day after the raid, two British and one American hostage were executed in West Beirut. According to North, "The Libyan military attaché in Damascus Major Halifa, was personally responsible for the kidnapping and handling of the three hostages murdered in West Beirut on April 16. North said that it was Halifa who actually killed the three

The three hostages were being held by a Hizballah splinter group controlled and financed by Gadhafi. A note found with the bodies indicated that they had been killed in retaliation for the US raid. Initially it was believed that all three men were British citizens Leigh Douglas, a lecturer at the American University in Beirut; Philip Padfield, director of a private language school in West Beirut, and freelance journalist Alec Collett Later. it was learned that the body believed to be Collett's was in reality the remains of American Peter Kilburn, a 60-year-old librarian at the American University

The murder of Peter Kilburn was particularly painful for North, because he had come very close to securing the release of the quiet American librarian North and other US officials had hoped to win Kilburn's freedom with a multimillion-dollar ransom payment made with chemically treated bills that would disintegrate within 72 hours, thereby denying the kidnappers any reward for their efforts.

The killings in Beirut were not the only act of revenge. In the weeks that followed, one American diplomat was shot in Aden. South Yemen, and another in Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan. In the two months following the raid, the United States experienced eleven terrorist attacks that could be linked to the action against Libya

TRYING TO SAVE THE HOSTAGES

The failure to rescue Peter Kilburn was one of many setbacks in the effort to free American hostages in Lebanon No problem consumed more of North's time during his last two years on the NSC staff, with the possible exception of trying to keep the contras resupplied. North regarded the hostages, at least initially, as a group of addle-brained dogooders who had failed to exercise good judgment, or who wrongly believed that their "love for the Arabs" would render them secure in a city that was coming



David Jacobson (left) was running the American hospital in Berrut when taken hobtage, he was freed in October 1986. He met North in Cyprus, and then again at dinner at the Chevy Chase home of David Halery (right), then a Time correspondent, and his wife, Mikhi (next to North)

apart at the seams

William Buckley was not in this category. He was the CIA chief of station in Beirut, and his kidnapping had elicited much concern within the government. The CIA was said to possess a tape of Buckley's torture that brought tears to the eyes of all who heard it. North and the CIA went to extraordinary lengths to get Buckley back.

Of the other hostages, North felt that only Terry Anderson, a reporter for the Associated Press, had had any business being in Beirut after the situation began to deteriorate in late 1983. North felt that the hostages had put their ration in an awkward position because of their egocestrism and arrogance, and he railed at the media for its willingness to portray US foreign policy in the region as itself bostage to the hostage issue

What changed North's position was the President's deep concern over the plight of the hostages. The hostages' families put pressure on the administration through the media to do something, and Reagan was touched by their pleas. Later, North would remark bitterly of attacks on the President and the administration by some relatives of the hostages, saying, "Nor a day goes by that the President does not ask about the hostages." Reagan directed North to do everything in his power to secure the release of the captive Americans.

North dutifully threw himself into include.

task. He met frequently with family members and tried to assure them that everything possible was being done.

Carol Weir, wife of hostage Reverend Benjamin Weir, later observed that North was the "most humane" person ask dealt with in the administration.

North explored many channels in his quest to free the hostages, and virtually all were dead ends. Finally, he turned to Iran, because the Shiite factions holding Western hostages in Lebanon took direct orders from, or at least were influenced by, Tehran Secret diplomacy with Iran was already under way, involving direct links to the Iranian faction headed by Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hojatolislam Hasheimi Rafsanjani. It was by this means that North and his colleagues were able to secure the release of four hostages: Jeremy Levin, Reverend Benjamin Weir, Father Lawrence Jenco, and David Jacobsen There is evidence that they were on the verge of freeing Thomas Sutherland and Terry Anderson when first reports of the secret US Iran dialogue surfaced.

OUT FROM THE SHADOWS

As North began playing an increasingly important role on the NSC staff, he became the darling of the right, who saw in him the embodiment of all the so-called Reagan virtues. He was tough, virile, religious, and a "real Reaganite" in a foreign-policy establishment viewed with distrust and suspicion by conservatives. Former White House political adviser and conservative activist Morton Blackwell described North as "our man." His White House briefings on Central America were praised by almost all who heard them, and he began speaking to select groups of administration supporters in other cities.

North's rising profile elicited attention in the media. It also brought him to the attention of the Soviets, who, on August 22, 1985. in Isvenia, published the first profile of him in any publication Written by Isvestia correspondent A. Palladin, it called North "the face behind the make-up the favorite of the American extremists. The Isvestia story described his origins and background some detail, reporting that he was 'the 'brains' behind the formulation of the plans for the invasion of Grenada It said that "he compiled a treatise on combatting "international terrorism" [Washington's name for national liberation movements] in which he persistently argued that 'neutralization' in other words murder, should not be shunned It also accused him of acting as an intermediary between the contras and the White House, the CIA, the Pentagon, the State Department, and extremist organizations thirsting to battle with the Reds

Once he was profiled in Moscow's state-run press. North not only felt that his position as a covert operator was compromised but recognized that the Soviets had targeted him in a way that increased the risks to his own safety and that of his family. Only weeks later, his name appeared on a "hit list" released by Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal. North and those in the US intelligence community were convinced that the Isvesna profile and the Abu Nidal hit list were the work of the Soviet KGR.

But if international terrorists and the Soviets were gunning for Oliver North, so were a number of liberal members of Congress who viewed him as the power at the White House that kept the contrast fighting against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua North had been part of the planning group that ran the mining op-eration of Nicaraguan harbors, and he evolved into the chief cheerleader and quartermaster of the ramshackle army based in southern Honduras. He supervised "Project Democracy. which found funds and weapons for the contras during the congressional ban on aid, arranged meetings with President Reagan and other senior administration officials, mediated their internal disputes, and assisted them in their dealings with Central American governments

According to his critics. North was the Svengali of the contra movement, to his admirers, he was more their Lawrence of Arabia, as passionately dedicated to their cause as he was opposed to the Sandinista meaning they were fighting.

Sandinista regime they were fighting. In the end, the contras would be part of Oliver North's undoing. Ironically, North's congressional foes such as former representative. Mike Barnes and Senator John Kerry were never able to lay a hand on him while he was at the NSC. It would be the exposure of the administration's secret diplomacy with Iran and the diversion of arms profits to

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the contras that would ultimately bring about his downfall

"THE BOYS DOWN SOUTH"

For the Reagan administration, the war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was an obsession. North and many of his colleagues believed that the "poison of communism." long confined to Cuba in this hemisphere, had finally reached the American mainland, and unless it was excised, it would corrupt all the nations in the region.

the nations in the region.

CIA chief Bill Casey passionately thought that it was enough for the United States to win one nation back from the Soviets in order to start an avalanche that could bring down the Soviet empire.

President Reagan and a number of other senior administration officials shared Casey's commitment to finding the Soviet Achilles' heel. No one was more committed to the Reagan doctrine than Oliver North, and if Casey was the architect of the policy, North was its sword.

"What we are facing in Central America and in Nicaragua," contended North, "is much more than just a regional crisis. We are fighting for our ability to survive and to prevent another world war." North never hid his support for the contras, and made only a minimal effort to hide his role in providing them with weapons, intelligence, and supplies. His role was widely known around Washington, and many people were given glimpses of his operation from time to time. It was not unusual to be sitting in his office in the Old Executive Office Building and to hear Fawn Hall interrupt him with an urgent phone call from "the boys down south." North would occasionally admonish the visitor to "forget everything you're about to hear," and then, without hesitation, pick up the telephone and bark commands to his field operators in Central America. One of them joked that North had come to be known as "Mr. Sir" because whenever he got a call from North, the field operator's end of the conversation went some-thing like: "Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Affirms-

tive, sir. Right, sir. Okay, good-bye, sir."

From his office, which served as a kind of command and control center for the courra war. North would be patched through to creaky prop-driven planes overflying Central America and dropping supplies and arms: "Echo, Charlie. This is Tango One. Where are you?"

North's transformation into a master of an army in the field, like some nineteenth-century adventurer, left many of his friends and journalistic acquaintances almost speechless.

As he was liked and admired by most of those who knew him, there was also 154. The Washingtonian/July 1987.

concern as to where his mandate originated, or whether he had a mandate at all. He often was asked, "Who gave you the authority to carry out these operations?" The answer was always it same: "You don't believe I would be doing this without authority, or without proper clearances, do you?" Sometimes he would add, "The President knows every move I make." It was hard to believe that anyone at the White House could be oblivious to North's activities.

North was simply the most visible contra supporter, beyond the President,

North never hid his support for the contras, and made only a minimal effort to hide his role in providing them with weapons, intelligence, and supplies. His role was widely known around Washington.

at the White House. Despite the congressional ban on aid to the contras, many officials at the White House and the CIA played continuous and uninterrupted roles in developing and supporting the contra army, and as a part of this process maintained secret but intimate ties with the FDN (Front for Democratic Nicaragua) and its political and military leaders.

In reality, according to one high-ranking Reagan-administration official, "It was a CIA-run operation from day one." From the very beginning, the CIA had full control over the contras' military operations, budget, political alignments, and quartermastering.

"Without CIA authorization, the contras could not carry out one mission," maintained the official.

Even before the Boland Amendment, the CIA had faced a major problem: What had started out as a relatively small guerrilla band had mushroomed into a major military and political movement, compelling the agency to search for a new mechanism to oversee a covert operation that was no longer covert. In a sense, the CIA's problems were a result of its success.

Bill Casey in particular had grand designs. "He saw this as a great opportunity... not so much for the agency but for the Reagan ideology," explains one ClA official who believed that Casey hoped the contras would one day topple the Sandinista regime. From the outset the contras received mixed signals from Washington, which sowed confusion.

and distrust within the movement.

During the three years that the CIA managed the contra operation, the agency spent between \$60 million and \$80 million to train and build up the force. Once Congress compelled the CIA to abandon the contras, control was passed to the National Security Council, and North was the point man. Initially, the NSC sought to maintain an appropriate distance from the operational needs of the movement, but North and his White House superiors could not long remain indifferent to pleas for help from the UScreated army, which was sweating and dying on the field.

First came requests for money, and North responded by using his offices as a White House staffer to encourage wealthy Americans to contribute to the contra cause. In this, he was assisted by the President and other White House officials. No NSC staffer, however clever, could have collected millions of dollars for the contra cause from nations like Saudi Arabia, Brunei, South Korea, and Taiwan without the unambiguous support of top White House officials.

Soon the contras were in need of weapons and ammunition, and once again North used his position at the White House, approaching arms dealers with close ties to the CIA and the Defense Department and keeping his superiors informed each step of the way. Not only did he directly approach Mrs. Thatcher for the British-built blowpipe missiles needed by the contras to counter the threat from Soviet MI-24 gunships. but he helped them purchase small arms and ammunition directly from Eastern Bloc nations. None of this would have been possible without the support and backing of the President and CIA Director Casey. None of the arms and materiel would ever have reached the contra camps along the Rio Coco if there had been the slightest doubt by anyone that North's activities were sanctioned by higher-ups.

THE POLISH TRAIN ROBBERY

North's most audacious effort to supply arms to the contras involved the outlawed Polish trade union Solidarity. Because the Sandinistas were almost entirely outfitted with Soviet-made and Eastern Bloc weapons, emphasis was placed on supplying the contras with similar weapons. It was believed that providing the contras with American-made weapons would focus too much attention on the US supply link, not to mention that Soviet-made weapons are generally more simple to operate and could use captured ammunition.

After being turned down by the Israelis, North went to the CIA and, using



Dr. Jonas Sammbi, trader of the Angulan 'fre '-lom fighlers. came to Washington last year and appeared with Office North and Neil Limngstone (left). a CONNET-LETTOTISM expert.

CIA connections, made contact with a French businessman, Glenn Souham, who had close ties to Solidarity. Souham assisted North in opening a channel to the Solidarity underground.

Souham reportedly served as an adviser to the White House Advisory Council on Private Sector Initiatives and is alleged to have met with North on several occasions and with President Reagan at least once. His meeting with Reagan was as part of a group of busi-nessmen who had traveled to Grenada in the wake of the US invasion. Souham was shot to death in September 1986 in front of his Paris apartment, at the moment his father, the head of a wellknown European public-relations firm, was in Washington meeting with White House officials. There is speculation that Souham was murdered by Eastern Bloc agents because of his activities as a White House channel to Solidarity.

Solidarity leaders promised to help North and turned to their supporters in the Polish railway union. Using false documents provided by North and the CIA, a train loaded with Soviet arms intended for the Polish Army, including AKM assault rifles and SA-7 missiles, was diverted from a Polish pier to East Germany. From East Germany, the arms were smuggled into West Germany after bribes were paid by Western agents to local officials, and subsequently shipped to contra warehouses in Honduras. The operation lasted for two weeks, during which members of Solidarity risked their lives. To reroute the train to East Germany, it had been necessary at times to hide it at remote stations and on isolated railroad sidings.

Despite the money and weapons, the contras didn't emerge as a real threat to the Sandinista regime. In late 1984 and 1985, contra leaders blamed their inactivity on resupply problems. "We are

able to fly into Nicaragua for a supply drop only when the weather is too bad for the Sandinista pilots to take off. said Juan Gomez, a former National Guard pilot and contra officer, "but not so bad that it will force us to ground our planes. Many times we fail to establish radio contact with the drop zone. Our people are either on the run from the Sandinistas or simply did not make it.

North stepped in to reorganize the resupply effort. He brought in Southern Air Transport to run the operation. Southern established a Panamanian company to operate the C-123s that would be used. The C-123 was quicker than the C-47s used by the contras and could avoid radar detection by flying very low.

In August 1985, the new operation was launched and quickly became more reliable. As the operation was run as a covert enterprise, the manifests had to be rewritten in order to satisfy the Federal Aviation Administration and not arouse suspicion. The Central American countries needed flight manifests that would enable them to claim ignorance.

The amount of paperwork required to mask the mission when the planes traveled to Dulles International Airport to pick up military supplies was immense. In addition to manifests, landing rights, and other paperwork, the pilots needed detailed maps of the regions over which they would be working, up-to-date intelligence on Nicaraguan air-defense systems, and current weather reports. As the supply runs were routinely done on a twice-weekly basis, the amount of planning and support needed could not have been done without considerable assistance from within the US government.

When one of the supply planes, a C123K with an American crew, was shot down on October 5, 1986, it presaged the beginning of the end for the

secret contra resupply effort run out of North's office. A former Manne Corps parachute rigger and ex-CIA employee. Eugene Hasenfus, the plane's cargo "kicker," survived and was put on trial in Managua Hasenfus described the resupply team based at liopango, including two Cuban-Americans who he indicated had CIA connections. He even suggested that the effort had the personal sanction of Vice President George Bush The downing of the cargo plane and revelations from Hasenfus set off a firestorm of controversy

Just as the controversy was beginning to die down, more sensational revelations followed in the wake of an article published in Al-Shiraa, a weekly magazine published in Moslem West Beirut. concerning clandestine American deal ings with Iran and allegations that the US was swapping arms for hostages

CRACKUP

Late Monday afternoon, November 24. 1986, a grim-faced Attorney General Edwin Meese went to the White House to report on the Justice Department's investigation into reports that the United States had secretly shipped arms to Iran Meese had been summoned to brief his long-time friend Ronald Reagan.

Meese told the President not only that some arms had been shipped to Iran, but that as much as \$30 million in profits from the arms sales had been diverted to fund the contras, despite the congressional prohibition on all US aid. The action, according to Meese, had apparently been engineered by members of the National Security Council, with the full knowledge of national-security adviser John Poindexter. Reagan assured Meese that he had not been aware of the covert funneling of money to the contras or of any details of the Iranian arms transfers.

Oliver North had no idea that he was about to be fired. He knew that his tour of duty on the National Security Council was over, but being fired was something else. On the morning of November 25. the mood in his new office, overlooking the South Lawn of the White House, was one of calm resignation to his impending departure. Only Fawn Hall, who was crying bitterly, betrayed the emotion that everyone felt that morning. North's other secretary, Barbara Brown, who normally served as file clerk and backed Hall up, was handling the five-line tele phone.

Sometime after 10 AM, one of North's close friends, a former Marine officer walked into the office, unaware of the unfolding events. He found North coo and collected, working at his desk and packing his personal belongings.
"How you doing, pal?" he asked.

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"Fine, fine," North responded. As his friend took a seat. North informed him that he had been told to prepare for his abrupt departure from the NSC staff and that the President would soon appear on national television in connection with the Iran-contra affair. "From the moment I walked into his office until I left. much after noontime, the phone rang constantly," recalls North's friend. Among those who called were North's mother and his wife

"Everything was in order and under control, and he was looking forward to his next assignment," the friend says. Barbara Brown was not putting

through most of the calls from journalists, most of whom were simply looking for a quote from North. Others, like Diane Sawyer from CBS, called to offer their help and support, as did many others from the CIA, the Defense Department, and even State. "I don't recall any phone calls from the President or the Vice President or other top-ranking administration officials," says the friend. But aside from the top guys, everybody called either to say good-bye, to offer help, or just to have a quick chat with a colleague in need.

While North, between telephone calls, gathered up his mementos and put his desk in order, he and his friend reminisced about their days in the Marines, trips they had taken abroad togeth-

er, and mutual acquaintances.
"I know you, North," concluded the friend, looking for something positive to say. "This is not the end, but for you it is

just a new beginning."
As they spoke, North's office was slowly filling up with people: Hall, Brown, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Earl, Commander Craig Coy, and former CIA and NSC staffer Vince Canistraro. Earl and Coy sat at the conference table while North's friend, the former Marine officer, was seated in a chair opposite North's desk.

Hall was composed by now, and she and Brown were rushing in and out of the room to handle the endless stream of telephone calls. North was behind his desk, tense and alert, waiting to hear what the President had to say.

There was no sense of panic, or of an unfolding tragedy. Rather the mood was one of transition, of the passing of an era. North continued to shuffle the papers on his desk in a distracted fashion. as if forcing himself to stay busy, while the media were assembling in the White House press room. As they waited for the President to appear, he began to talk about the things he had tried to accomplish-in Central America and against international terrorism—and spoke sadly about his failures and unfinished agenda.

Offie was completely convinced that

he had never deliberately broken the law," observes his friend "But he was deeply concerned that in the end he had not served his President well."

Sometime during the long wait, North's attorney called, and after a brief conversation North asked him to come over to his office. Hall once again became emotional. While expressing the fear to those assembled that "they would try to crucify him. North never indulged in self-pity. His only thoughts

Finally, the President came on the television, and North learned that, far from being transferred to a new assignment while the dust cleared, he had been fired, summarily dismissed.

were for the President, whom he had served with loyalty and conviction.

Finally, the President came on the television and North learned that far from being transferred to a new assignment while the dust cleared, he had been fired, summarily dismissed

He was stunned. No one had told him, or even given him a heads-up. He was now an outsider, and if he was not careful it was evident that the President's handlers had already decided to cast him overboard in an attempt to see if it would satisfy the circling sharks. While no one mentioned the word, everyone in North's office was thinking scapegoat.

Sometime later, North's lawyer showed up and the little gathering adjourned to permit North to confer in private with his attorney. The whole na-ture of the drama had changed in an instant; lawyers were now a very big part of his life.

Oliver North, the Marine, the fighter, was now engaged in what would surely become the most interna and compelling fight of his life—a fight for his reputation, his honor, his sense of what was right. In the months ahead he would be portrayed as everything from a thick-headed Marine with "tunnel vision" to a crazed, Vietnam-scarred special operator running amok throughout the world. The Senate/House hearings would reveal that he had cashed nearly \$2,500 in traveler's checks given to him by contra leader Adolfo Calero at such locations as supermarkets and gas stations, thus calling into question his integrity and honesty.

No one precent in ' orth's office on ould know the magnitude Novem



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of the crisis or where it would lead, but one thing was certain: Things would never be the same for any of them again

OLIVER NORTH: THE LAST CAVALUER

Someone said that Oliver North did not belong to this century. He was a throw-back to an earlier, simpler time—an anachronism. One can imagine him leading a charge on a galloping stallion, waving his sword high over his head, more easily than one can picture him in the control room of the modern electronic battlefield, fighting with telephones and computers, drones and remote weapons.

President Reagan's former spokesman, Larry Speakes, says of North.

'The thing with Ollie—I think he was a patriot; I think that's true. But I sometimes felt that he thought he was playing some lund of role, that he was watching a movie on the screen with himself the

There is little doubt that North had a swashbuckling self-image, but whether he ever lost touch with reality is open to question. There is an obvious irony in North as the star of Ronald Reagan's movie, played out not on the sound stages of Hollywood but on a global stage using real soldiers. The truth is more complex.

North was the quintessential romantic who always stood up for women, who could not look at an American flag without becoming misty-eyed. He had little patience for the pettiness and shallow vision of other men. He was a man who wanted to do great things in the pursuit of great ideals.

More than any other quality, it is his daring that one remembers most about North. His contempt for naysayers and the timid of heart was known to everyone; others would ask, "Why?" when a bold plan was put forward. North would ask, "Why not?"

It may be that North was not the kind of man who should have been given a sensitive position on the National Security Council and that the real fault lies with those who hired him and used him for so long.

"Do you know why we get along with him so well?" General Simhoni once observed. "It's because he is more of an Israeli than we Israelis."

It was true. North had the same romantic, audacious, pioneering spirit that is so identified as part of the Israeli character. Like the Israelis, he reveled in cutting corners, in improvising, in getting things done—damn the ruffled feathers and the hurt feelings. He had chutzpah, and along with it the kind of arrogance often attributed to the Israelis, who have little time for excuses and failure

In some respects, North's problems stemmed from his admiration of the Israelis and their methods. What North apparently never grasped was that the United States, a great power with global commitments, could not behave the same way that Israel, a tiny nation surrounded by enemies, routinely oues.

He lacked, one must conclude, perspective. It was one thing for the Israelis to carry out high-risk, seat-of-the-pants

North often boasted, in a quiet way, of his ability to strike up a rapport with terrorists and extremists. "I'm the only one who can talk to revolutionaries," he would say.

operations or to strike back at their enemies with a damn-the-consequences attitude. It was another thing for the US to operate the same way.

North's powerful personality, and the depth of his convictions, attracted others to him, and those men became his informal network. Like a good combat officer, he never asked them to take risks that he was unprepared to take, and they repaid his concern for them with intense loyalty.

Yet despite his rigid personal standards and the machismo he radiated, North was surprisingly tolerant of others with different lifestyles and personal habits. He often boasted, in a quiet way, of his ability to strike up a rapport with terrorists and extremists. "I'm the only one who can talk to revolutionaries." he would say. While he despised everything they represented, there was something deep within him that empathized with them and their lonely struggles. Perhaps it was because revolutionaries are, at their most elemental, also romantics.

North found it convenient to use the services and skills of two gay men in raising funds for the contras, without any jokes or comments regarding their proclivities. For North, values came first; if you were on the right side, for the right reasons, he could forgive a lot.

On the other hand, no matter how distinguished an individual's service record or contributions, if North perceived he was injuring the nation through his support of wrong-headed policies or just plain stupidity, he could not forgive him.

North was never a consensus man, the truth was not something to be brokered—it was an absolute Perhaps it was because of his righteous certitude that he felt so little trepidation in getting down in the gutter and slugging it out with the seum bags of the world. North possessed an almost mystical certainty that he would never be tainted, that the filth would never rub off on him.

While North could be a charmer to those outside government, to those inside he was often a terror. He was not cowed by rank or position, and he regularly walked over or pushed aside those he regarded as impediments to carrying out the President's will. His real ability was as a mover and shaker, the man who could get things done. It was his ability to deliver when others could not that permitted him to amass so much power.

For the past six years there was no one at Langley, Foggy Bottom, or the Pentagon in a senior position who did not know that North operated under the presidential shield. He had the President's personal protection and support. and no one dared oppose him. Despite the Secretary of State's animosity toward North, he walked carefully around him, never taking him on directly. North even met with foreign leaders, highly unorthodox for an NSC staffer, and all assumed that he represented the President of the United States. A note from North opened doors in Honduras, even to the presidential mansion, and as the Tower Commission reported, he was so certain of his position that he was unafraid to threaten the President of Costa Rica on the telephone.

Oliver North was created by the frustration that every President since Kennedy has felt in trying to move the government. Without exception, they have complained of the intransigence of the federal bureaucracy and meddling by Congress in areas normally reserved for the executive. That the National Security Council became operational under Ronald Reagan is not in question. But the blame is not Reagan's alone. A bloated federal bureaucracy incapable of moving to protect American citizens and national interests from terrorism is also to blame. By mandating extensive oversight of covert operations, Congress made it inevitable that the administration would find a way of avoiding oversight requirements. The result was an operational NSC and a network of private contractors

While he lasted, North gave flesh and blood to the Reagan doctrine and passion to the war against terrorism. In a world beset by enemies, the United States will be less secure without him

198 The Washingsonian/July 1987

EXHIBIT OLN-332



UHUENGUALICU

September 20, 1985

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Dear Pelix:

AFTER READING THIS LETTER PLEASE DESTROY IT. You may keep the photographs.

Within the next 15 days, the Unified Wicaraguan Opposition (UNO)/ Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDM) air arm will commence operations with two new types of aircraft: the C-7, CARIBOU and the M-740, MAULE STOL (see enclosures). These aircraft will be used for air drop/aerial resupply to units inside Wicaragua.

Two contract C-7s are scheduled to arrive in on or about October 10. Initially the aircraft will be flown by U.S. citizens who are employees of the firm contracted to provide delivery services for the FDM. It is intended that these aircraft will operate primarily at night, performing paradrops to units deep inside. Micaraguan aircrews will be trained to fly these missions as soon as possible.

The resistance has also purchased a number of new MAULE aircraft shown in the enclosed photograph. These STOL a/c will be used for day and night short-haul missions to include MEDEVAC and aerial resupply. Each aircraft comes with a spare parts package and a maintenance line has been established. Two aircraft have already been delivered. More will follow. All will be flown by Micaraguan pilots or other Latin Americans -- not U.S. citizens.

Eventually both types of aircraft will also operate in support of the control of

Since this is a completely compartmented operation, being handled by the resistance, you are the only parson in the area who can set-up the servicing of these aircraft with both have a high regard for you and you may use my name privately with either of them but no others. You must not advise the project from the who is not working with our people.

Mould you, therefore, approach the following proposal:

Service space for one C-7 on a one day a week basis. A representative of the C-7 contractor will ensure that all parts and maintenance items are delivered to FDM service technicians (three) as needed. No maintenance will be required.

and

Partially Declassified/Released on 127% 1983 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by C. Reger, Roticinal Security Council

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-- Service space for occassional MAULE maintenance with parts and supplies handled the same as above. Again, no parts or labor will be required.

-- This plan requires only discrete use of the space and no use of 7/10, HAF; and/or Agency funds, equipment, and/or personnel. The contractor will guarantee discretion.

Please advise soonest as to acceptance of this proposal. If and and agree, a representative of the maintenance contractor will arrive and seek you out. He will identify himself as coming from Mr. Green.

Marm regards, hope all is well with you. We hear nothing but good reports about your work. Reep it up. Vaya con Diosi






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CARIBOT C-7 11 30468

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
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EXHIBIT OLN-333A

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18 March 1985

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The Honorable Dave Durenberger, Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to questions raised by the Committee regarding the Agency's plans to provide certain defensive intelligence to opposition groups in Nicaragua in light of the statutory restrictions contained in Section 8066 of the FY85 DoD Appropriation Act (incorporated in the FY85 Continuing Resolution).

We do not intend to provide intelligence to Nicaraguan opposition groups on any systematic or continuing basis. Our goal is humanitarian in nature and any intelligence we would pass would be strictly limited, on a case-by-case basis, to information which in general affects the lives of U.S. persons or third-country noncombatants or which suggests that a holocaust-type situation involving substantial loss of life may occur.

The enclosed guidelines have been developed by the Agency's General Counsel for assessing the provision of defensive intelligence to resistance forces in Nicaragua. The guidelines require that, where time permits, the General Counsel's concurrence be obtained. It is our view that these guidelines will assure careful scrutiny by Agency officials at appropriate levels for this necessary but limited activity.

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The Agency will obviously inform the Committee when defensive intelligence is provided to such groups. This letter is also being provided to Chairman Hamilton of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

incerely,

William J. Cases
Director of Central Invelligence

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Enclosure

BRITANSIFIED

Guidelines for Providing Defensive Intelligence to Groups Engaged in Military or Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua

5073

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Within the constraints of the FY85 statutory prohibition on the obligation or expenditure of Agency funds for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, the guidelines set forth below should be followed in determining whether defensive intelligence may be provided to Nicaraguan opposition groups who engage in paramilitary activities.

Defensive intelligence may be provided on a case-by-case basis where:

- the lives of U.S. persons are at stake either inside or outside Nicaragua,
- (2) the lives of third-country non-combatants are at stake either inside or outside Nicaragua, or
- (3) a holocaust-type situation may occur involving substantial loss of life, or threatening the continued existence of the opposition groups (for example, ambush or imminent attack).

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In each instance where a determination is made to provide 5074 defensive intelligence to the Micaraguan opposition, the information will be supplied only in general terms as necessary to accomplish the defensive objectives outlined above. Where time permits, the General Counsel's concurrence will be obtained in each case. Intelligence will not be provided for the purposes of enabling or assisting the Micaraguan opposition to conduct offensive military or paramilitary operations.

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The Honorable Edward P. Boland Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairmant

In keeping with my commitment to apprise you of significant intelligence matters. I am writing to advise you that we are contemplating providing defensive intelligence to the FDM. We believe that it is essential to provide this information to enable the Organization's leadership to safeguard the lives of its troops. This intelligence would be furnished exclusively for the purpose of precluding hostile actions against the FDM. We would ensure that the information provided does not contain the specific details requisite for the planning/launching of offensive operations.

We are fully aware of the current restrictions pertaining to Agency support for the insurgent forces. It is our belief, however, that provision of this information is consistent with our long-established practice of providing intelligence as appropriate to prevent loss of life.

Sincerely.

LaL William J. Casey

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMADENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, DC 20518

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Executive Registry 143

N 31228 January 14, 1985

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Monorable William J. Cassy Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

Thank you for your letter of December 19, 1984 concerning CIA plans to provide "dafensive intelligence" to the Contra focus within Micaregue. We appreciate your decision to discuss this issue with the Committee before

The thrust of the public debate initiated by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and culminating in the enactment by Congress of Section 8066 of the FY 85 DOD Appropriation Act (incorporated in the FY 85 Continuing Resolution), was clearly directed at the complete severance of all intelligence community connections with the Contras and the end of all support for anti-Sendinista military activity. Therefore, your stated intention to provide "defensive intelligence" to the FDN is troubling. So, too, is the inability of the CIA officials who brisfed the Committee's staff to articulate the guidalines under which the provision of such information will be approved.

It is our opinion that, at a minimum, section 8066 prohibits the provision of intelligence information to the FDN on any systematic or continuing basis, perticularly if such information will enable a FDN force to avoid tactical contact with the enemy and thus be in a better position to continue military operations of its own.

On the other hand, the unplanned for, isolated provision of incidentally acquired information to a person threatened by imminent assessination would seem reasonable.

In any event, on the besis of the impracise information given to us, we are unable to approve or disapprove any contemplated CIA activity. Some examples of intalligence you would provide to the FDN could, in our view, violate the law, yet not every example seemed illegal. While we applied the humanitarian impulse that is part of your proposal, we do not want to suggest by this letter that we approve your concept of "defensive intelligence." In evaluating each instance of passing intelligence to the FDN, the key question should be whether it would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, the FDN.

75-544 4389

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we suggest that you take whatever steps are appropriate to evoid furnity entanglement with enti-Sendinista military activity. Recent events clearly suggest that activities such as those you propose can develop a momentum of their own that takes them far beyond the initially contemplated level of support.

Finally, we request that you notify the Committee of your final decision in this matter. If your decision is to proceed, we sak that you provide the Committee with the guidelines under which your General Counsel will approve or disapprove the furnishing of intelligence to the FDM. The Committee should thereafter be informed of each instance in which intelligence was provided to the FDM.

___ Sincerely,

Hamilton Member of Congress

1374

EXHIBIT OLN-333B

TO: NSOLN -- CPLA

see Reply to note of 07/29/86 20:36

2945

NOTE FROM: ROBERT HOFARLANE

NOTE FROM: RUBERT PAPARLANE
Subject: Father Jenco's Release
Roger; take your time. Two things have come into my life which are of interest
to you. The first is word from one of the few politicians I respect that Mike
Barnes doesn't have a chance in the Maryland Senate race. The second is that G
eorge shults finally realizes what an enormous job you have done (if he didn't

before, he does now after four hours this evneing at his place with just the four of us preaching the gospel to him (to include Eliott's key role

Get some rest.



Exhibit OLN-333C

TEHRAN AGREEMENT (May 27, 1986)

On this twenty seventh day of May 1986 and the sixth day of Khordad in the year 1365, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a spirit of mutual understanding, and recognizing the importance of building respect, trust and confidence hereby agree to the following sequence of steps designed to lead to a new era of bi-lateral relations:

The United States Government will cause a 707 aircraft to launch from a neutral site at 0100 in the morning to arrive in Tehran, Iran at 1000 on the morning of May 28, the seventh day of Khordad. This aircraft will contain the remainder of the HAWK missile parts purchased and paid for by the Government of Iran, a portion of which was delivered on May 24.
 The Iranian Government, having recognized the plight of

2. The Iranian Government, having recognized the plight of the hostages in the Lebanon, and in the spirit of humanitarian assistance, agrees to cause the release and safe return of the living American hostages and the return of the body of the deceased American and that this release will be completed not later than 0400 Tehran time.

3. It is further agreed by both sides that if by 0400 Tehran time, the hostages are not safely in the hands of U. S. authorities, the aircraft with the HAWK missile parts will be turned around and will not land in Iran and the U. S. delegation will depart Tehran immediately. If, however [sic], the hostages are released at 0400, as indicated above, the U. S. delegation will remain in Tehran until 1200 Noon on

May 28, 1986.
The Government of the United States commits to deliver to Bandar Abbas, Iran, two phase one IHIPIR radar sets, fully compatible with the HAWK missile system now in the possession of the Iranian government. This delivery to take place after the arrival of the hostages in U.S. custody and within ten days after the receipt of payment through existing financial channels for these radar systems. It is further agreed that the government of the United States will make every effort to locate and identify those items from the original list of 240 parts which were not immediately available, and to provide those available as soon as possible after payment is received and the hostages are in U.S. custody.



5. Both Governments agree to a continuation of a political dialogue to be conducted in secrecy until such time as both sides agree to make such a dialogue public. It is agreed by both sides that this dialogue shall include discussions on the Soviet threat to Iran, the situation in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and other political topics as may be mutually agreed. Both sides agree in advance that these discussions will include consideration of further defense needs of Iran.

6. Both Governments recognize that the lack of a clear channel of communications has contributed to misunderstanding and confusion in the past and agree that this problem is best resolved by having the United States provide a secure channel of communications between our two governments by placing a secure satellite communications team, and appropriate equipment secretly in Tehran. The Government of Iran agrees that the U. S. communicators will be accorded normal diplomatic privileges and immunity on an informal basis and without attribution.

better not be any more terrorist activity directed at the Royal family in Kuwait.

The draft agreement was the subject of intense negotiations with the Iranians making some counter proposals which were designed to gain them more time. Talks broke off around midnight with the Iranian delegation saying it wanted to caucus. For the next two hours, heated discussions were held within the Iranian delegation. [The Iranian officials] both said that the other would be responsible if nothing comes of the negotiations. Finally, shortly before two on Wednesday morning, [the Assistant to the PM] asked to see McFarland [sic]. He wanted assurances that we would deliver the remaining spare parts two hours after the hostages were released. and would stay after the arrival of the spare parts to discuss additional Iranian needs. He also asked for more time to get control of the hostages. McFarland gave [the Assistant to the PM] until 0630 wednesday (sic) morning to arrange for the release of the hostages. The American delegation retired to grab a couple of hours sleep knowing that we had at least out-frazzled them.

Cave's account terminated with the last conversations before the delegation returned to Israel. Washington reported before they left that it had seen no evidence that "the hostages were about to be released or that anything unusual was taking place." (Id.)

The agreement drafted during the evening of May 27 provided:

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- (2) The Iranian Government, having recognized the plight of the hostages in the Lebanon, and in the spirit of humanitarian assistance, agrees to cause the release and safe return of the living American hostages and the return of the body of the deceased American and that this release will be completed not later than 0400 Tehran time.
- (3) It is further agreed by both sides that if by 0400 Tehran time, the hostages are not safely in the hands of U.S. authorities, the aircraft with the HAWK missile parts will be turned around and will not land in Lan and the U.S. delegation will depart Tehran immediately. If, howerver [sic], the hostages are released at 0400, as indicated above, the U.S. delegation will remain in Tehran until 1200 Noon on May 28, 1986.
- (4) The Government of the United States commits to deliver to Bandar Abbas, Iran, two phase one IHIPIR radar sets, fully compatible with the HAWK missile system now in the possession of the Iranian government. This delivery to take place after the arrival of the hostages in U.S. custody and within ten days after the receipt of payment through existing financial channels for these radar systems. It is further agreed that the government of the United States will make every effort to locate and identify those items from the original list of 240 parts which were not immediately available, and to provide those available as soon as possible after payment is received and the hostages are in U.S. custody.
- (5) Both Governments agree to a continuation of a political dialogue to be conducted in secrecy until such time as both sides agree to make such a dia-

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Tehran. The Government of Iran agrees that the U.S. communicators will be accorded normal diplomatic privileges and immunity on an informal basis and without attribution.

Cave's report ended with comments and a recommendation, including:

- 2. It is quite possible that the franian side was negotiating under the impression that we were only interested in a deal for the hostages. This would explain why they tried so hard to get us to do more in exchange for the hostages, i.e., the 20 hawk (sic) batteries and 18 additional hipar radars. It was therefore a good idea to leave a translation of the draft agreement with them as it will give them something to chew on. McFarlane issued a stern warning that we are getting fed up with overatures [sic] from them that don't pan out. We are interested in a long term political and strategic relationship, and if Iran does not pick up on this opportunity it may be years before there is another one.
- 5. Ramadan was certainly a factor in how the negotiations went. also [sic] the problem caused by not being able to see anyone in a position of power. The people we were negotiating with were a couple of rungs down the ladder. The fact that [the Iranian official's] breath could curl rhino

hide was no help either. On the positive side was the change in the attitude of the Iranian delegation. By tuesday [sic] they were begging us to stay.

- 4. We also may have the problem of the dishonest interlocutor. The Iranian side made it clear that one of the problems in our negotiations was the fact that prior to our meeting. Gorba gave each side a different picture of the structure of the deal. O'neil made the point to [the Assistant to the Prime Minister] that the letters they received [sic] were from Gorba, not the U.S. government. We will have to lean heavily on Gorba in the future.
- 5. Since both Gorba and [the Iranian official] stand to make a lot of money out of this deal, they presumably will work hard to bring it off. Gorba has very special reasons for seeing that the deal goes through. The serious problem we must address is whether the Iranians can gain control of the hostages. The French don't think they can. This could be our real problem. The Iranian side may be most willing, but unable to gain control.

RECOMMENDATION

Through hindsight it would have been better for Goode and O'neil to have gone in first to handle the initial negotiations. We should not have subjected a senior U.S. official to the indignities he was forced to endure. We have made the point to the Iranians that the draft agreement must be finally negotiated by senior responsible officials from both sides. If we have a subsequent response from the Iranian side it is strongly recommended that Goode and O'neil meet with the Iranian side somewhere in Europe to continue the negotiations.

(May 1986 Hot Docs.) .

E. Post Mortem

Most American accounts of the meetings conform more or less faithfully to the contemporaneous written record. Ghorbanifar's account is different.

NORTH NOTES (UNDATED)

- - [illegible]Iran will then work to release other hostages

- believe we can bulp (after abstites go) with diplomage in Anat world, say, Saudio. - SAUDL DO NOT LIKE HIM GITHER - Continuel military pressure OIL

U.S. Barosac

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- 2) WITHIN 9 DAYS WE DELIKE FLETS + TOWY (500) Aus Mexica Survives
- 3) ALL ALLEHOAD HOSIEGEY RELEASED
- TEAN PROGRES PLUS FOR 1500 TOWNS
- 5) within 9 Days we will Delore
 - · 1800 TOWS
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"HAKIM ACCORDS" (Lib. Cong. Translation) Mehr 16, 1365 (October 8, 1986) Time of Discussion early afternoon to late at night. Formation of us and Hakim

- Iran pays for 500 TOWs to HAKIM and if willing, Iran will provide the funds for the HAWK spare parts which remain from 1. the earlier agreement
- In 9 working days, the 500 TOWs and the HAWK spare parts 2. (pending Iran's approval), and free (gifted) medicines will be delivered to Iran.
- Before item 4 as stated below is carried out, Albert will 13. present the plan for the release of the 17 Kuwaitis
- imprisoned in Kuwait.
 One and one-half (1 definitely and 2 with empathic (sic) effort) American hostages in Lebanon, through the effort of Iran, will be freed from the hands of the Lebanese. (3-4
- days after the delivery of point 2 item).
 Establishing letter of credit method, will be studied by ***5.** Albert and ____ by tomorrow night.

(500 TOWS and maximum of 100 launchers), within 4 days after the execution of item mentioned above, will be delivered to IRAN. IRAN will pay the money for 1500 TOWS (the 500 TOWS mentioned above and also additional 1000 TOWS and these 1000 TOWS will be delivered to IRAN within nine days.

- 6. America will support Iran with technical assistance, material and specialized know-how, reorganize the military intelligence, maps and communication links. Also prepare the chart related to the items provided by _______ indicating price and delivery to IRAN.

 Before returning to Tehran, the case of the Muslim prisoners
- 7. (Shi'ite) in Lebanon and the manner of their release should
- be studied with Secord and private parties involved.**
 IRAN will pursue its efforts for establishing the grounds -8.
 - for the release of rest of the hostages.

 The steps for delivery of items referred to in the second 9.
 - part of item 6 mentioned above will start.
 The Letter of Credit will be opened in favor of Mr. and will make the money for the 500 TOWS available by utilizing 80 percent of the Letter of Credit.
 - , it was After discussion between Mr. Secord and Mr. agreed regarding to Muslim prisoners that letter be written "Israel and its Lahd (sic) organization" Text will be written in the following manner [Translation and Test End]



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TRANSLATION OF LETTERS

Congressional Member	Senate Select Comm on Secret M	ilitary Language Pe	rsian
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LW 2/78 (m 8/85)

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*5. Establishing letter of Credit method, will be studied by Albert and tomorrow night.



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- 7. Before returning to Tehran, the case of the Muslim prisoners (Shi'ite) in Lebanon and the manner of their release should be studied with Second and parties involved.**
- 8. IRAN will pursue its efforts for establishing the grounds for the release of the rest of the hostages.
- 9. The steps for delivery of items ϵ eferred to in the second part of item 6 mentioned above will scart.
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- **After discussion between Mr. Second and Mr. it is agreed regarding to Muslim prisoners that letter be written "Israel and its Lahd organization" Text will be written in the following manner . . .

NORTH SEVEN POINTS (PROF NOTE October 10, 1986)

3.

They pay \$3.6M next week.
We deliver 500 TOWs (no Hawk parts) 9 daysafter (sic) 2. payment.

Two hostages (if possible, but no less than one) released w/in 4 days of the TOW delivery. If only one hostage released, whole process stops and we meet again. 4.

Repeat funding and Delivery cycle as in steps 1 & 2 5. above.

We send Tech support for HAWKs, update on intel and secure comm team to Tehran and provide location/ 6. availability of artillery items noted on the original list provided by [the Relative] in Washington mtg. Iran does utmost to secure release of remaining

7. hostage(s).

SEE OLN 312

N 2832

October 14, 1986

E/CT PRESS GUIDANCE

LEBANON HOSTAGES! "NEWSWEER" STORY

- Q: Any comment on the "Newsweek" story entitled "America's Forgotten Mostages?"
- THE ADMINI CATION IS DOING ALL THAT IT CAN TO SECURE
 THE SAPE RELEASE OF THESE AMERICANS.

 -- WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE PAMILIES OF THE AMERICAN

 -- THE INDUITION IN THE "NEWSWEER" STORY THAT THE

 UNITED STAT HAS PORGOTTEN THESE HOSTAGES IS WRONG.

 THE ADMINI CATION IS DOING ALL THAT IT CAN TO SECURE
 THE SAPE RELEASE OF THESE AMERICANS, AND WE CONTINUE TO

 WORK HARD AND FOLLOW EVERY LEAD ON THIS PRIORITY ISSUE.
- Q: Have the hostages been beaten?
- A: -- WE HAVE MEARD REPORTS OF BRUTALITY BY THE
 KIDNAPPERS. WE REPEAT THAT WE HOLD THE KIDNAPPERS FULLY
 RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF ALL THE AMERICANS WHO ARE
 WELD.
- Q: Do we know where the hostages are?
- A: -- WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE THE HOSTAGES ARE AT THIS TIME.

اريا[،]

- Q: Can you confirm that the tidnepress belong to the Mugniyah family, part of the Musevi clan, and that some of the prisoners they want released from Kuwait are their courins?
- A: -- WE ARE AWARE OF A POSSIBLE PARILY CONNECTION SETWERN
 THE RIDHAPPERS AND SOME OF THE PRISONERS THEY WANT
 RELEASED FROM KUWAIT. (No further comment on this.)
- Q: Mould the kidnappers settle for the release of three Lebanese Shiites held by Ruweit instead of all 17 Dawy-prisoners?
- OFFER OF DIRECT DISCUSSIONS. HECAUSE OF THEIR REFUSAL,
 WE REMAIN UNAWARE OF ANY CHANGE IN THEIR DEMANDS.

 THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER WE WOULD SEEK THE RELEASE
 OF 3 OR 17 PRISONERS. WE WILL NOT REGOTIATE THE
 EXCHANGE OF INNOCENT AMERICANS FOR THE RELEASE FROM
 PRISON OF TRIED AND CONVICTED MURDERERS HELD IN A THIRD
 COUNTRY, NOR WILL WE PRESSURE OTHER NATIONS TO DO SO.
 TO MATE SUCH CONCESSIONS WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF
 OTHER AMERICAN CITISENS AND MOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE MORE
 TERRORISM.

.;;

N 2834

- Q: Did the U.S. ever demand that the families keep quiet or the hostages would be killed?
- A: WE HAVE NEVER DEMANDED THAT THE PANILIES REMAIN

 SILENT. WHAT WE HAVE TRIED TO STRESS IN MEETINGS WITH

 THE PANILIES IS THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF OUR EPPORTS TO

 GAIN THE HOSTAGES' RELEASE COULD LEND ENCOURAGEMENT TO

 THE RIDHAPPERS IN LEBANON THAT THE U.S. WIGHT SUCCURS TO

 THE PRESSURE AND TO CRIMINALS ELSEWHERE AROUND THE WORLD

 THAT AMERICANS ARE PAIR GAME.
- Q: Did the U.S. tell Peggy Say during the TMA 847 hijacking "not to even ask for Terry and the others (hostages), and don't say anything to connect your hostages to the TMA ones?"

THE FACT IS

THAT EACH GROUP OF HOSTAGRS WAR REING HELD INDEPENDENT
OF THE OTHER GROUP, AND THE U.S. WAS MORKING TO RESOLVE
BOTH SITUATIONS

WE HAD HOPED THAT THE TWA
INCIDENT COULD BE USED AS A CATALYST TO FREE ALL THE
REMAINING HOSTAGES, AND WE WORKED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS
TO BRING THAT ABOUT. UNFORTUNATELY, HE WERE
UNSUCCESSFUL.

- 4 -

N 2835

Q: Did the U.S. ever withhold from the hostage families letters written by the hostages?

A: -- WE HAVE NEVER WITHHELD SUCH LETTERS FROM THE MOSTAGE FAMILIES.

Or Did Libys purchase and subsequently murder three hostages following the U.S. military strike in April?

A: -- THAT REPORT IS NOT NEW. POLLOWING THE MURBER OF THO BRITISH HOSTAGES IN APRIL, BRITISH FOREIGH SECRETARY...


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APPENDIX B: OTHER DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS INTRODUCED AT THE HEARINGS

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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ELANGESTINE RADIO VENEREIRES IN SPANISH TO EL SALVADON BERT EST 22 JAN 35

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THE R. R. FAILURE IN THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROJECT, PARKED BY THE

. THE U.L. FAILURE IN THE STATE SMETTER PRELICT, MAKED BY THE SALLIKEET'S ACCIDENT, REPRESENT AN OPENHELISING BLOW TO THE SPACE FOR MAKE. THE WHITES STATES WANTED TO BEE DOTTO SPACE FOR RELITANT PROPERTY TRANSPORT WITH PROGRAM, REASON MAKE AMERICAN THAT ALL THE FLIFTES TO MOTHE SPACE MAY BEEN RESPRESSED. AMMENDED THAT ALL THE FLIGHTS TO SOTTE FRACE MAY BEEN EXPERIMENT AS DISCUSSIONS. THE CHALLESSET'S EXT WENTED AS PLICETS IN THE VISITABLE WAS: IN STREET WORST, THEY WENT THE FILLESS WAS SAMED REPAIR IN THE MAINTHILES VISITABLES LANCE. GIVEN THAT THE CHALLEMENT'S STREETAILOUSE FAILURE REPRESENTS AN OVERWINDINGS IN THE CHALLEMENT'S THANK TO EXTEND THE WAS TO SOTTE SPACE, AND SIMPLE THAT THIS WAS CHIMINALLY BARY BIED ANDARES THE CHALLEMENT, HE SHARE THE MAPPINGS THAT THE REPLIES THE THAT THE REPLIES THE THAT HE PRINTED THE PARTY OF THE PRINTED THE PRINTED RELIEF AND CONDERN THE R.L. INTERINGENT'S WERRONGETHING THE INTERING.

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SUBJ

CUBA: "SAL VADORAN YOUTHS" DISCUSS RADIO VENCEREMOS

HAVANA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN SPANISH 8888 GHT 12 JUN 87

({INTERVIEW WITH SALVADORANS BANIRO MENDOZA AND ANTONIO GUTIERREZ BY BANON KNOWG AT THE JOSE MARTI INTERNATIONAL JOURLAISM INSTITUTE IN MANAMA; DATE NOT GIVEN; INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWEES NOT IDENTIFIED -- RECORDEDI)

(TEXT)) ((CHONG)) THES IS YOUR REPORTER AND FRIEND, RAMON CHONG, SPEAKING FROM THE JOSE MARTI INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISM INSTITUTE IN NAVANA WITH TWO SALVADORAN YOUTHS, RANIRO MENDOZA AND ANTONIO GUTIERREZ. THEY HAVE JUST FINISHED THE EIGHTH COURSE GIVEN BY THIS INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISM INSTITUTE. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THEIR PRESENCE HERE, WE WILL DISCUSS SOME ASPECTS
THAT SHOW THE PROGRESS OF GUERRILLA RADIO BROADCASTING IN EL SALVADOR. THEREFORE, WE WILL TALK REDUT RADIO VENEERENDS, WHICH WAS BORN WITH THE WAR AND WHICH HAS GROWN WITH THE WAR IMPOSED

BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON THE SALVADORAN PEOPLE.

(SALVADORAN') <u>DE CAU SAL THAT RADIO VINCEMENOS WAS</u>
ESTABLISHED AS THE FPILE S OFFICIAL WOLCE. IT S ONE OF THE FIRST
EXPRESSIONS OF PEOPLE'S POWER IN EL SALVADOR. ITS CONSTANT TRANSMISSIONS CREPORT) TO THE PEOPLE AND GIVE THEM SPECIFIC GUIDELINES FROM THE FIRM GENERAL COMMAND. RADIO VENCEREMOS

NATIONAL THAT HAS COMPANIED THE PEPPLE AT EACH JUNCTURE OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS OF EL SALVADOR.
LEBOMES THAT IS RIGHT. RADIO VENCERENOS IS THE STATION
THAT PARTICIPATES IN THE GENERAL DEFENSIVE TO REPORT THE VICTORIOUS
ACTIONS THAT ARE CARRIED OUT, TO GUIDE THE MASSES, AND ALSO TO
COUNTERACT THE REGIME'S PROPAGAMENA MARGUMERS.

GOAL PARKET, THE PROPERTY OF THE PARKET STATES THE U.S. STRATESY IN EL SALVADOR IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE THROUGH WHICK IT SEEKS TO BISTORT OWN STRUGGLE, TO DISINFORM, AND TO MAKE ERROWEOUS AMALYSES OF THE WAR TO (MORDS IRDISTINCT) FROM THE PASSES. #ADIO VENCERENOS HAS THE ESSENTIAL TASK OF PROVIDING TRUTHFUL REPORTS ABOUT THE COURSE OF THE WAR, INCREASING THE MORALE OF THE MASSES, AND WINNING THEM OVER TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CAUSE.

(ACHORGE) RAMINO, NOW FAR CAM THE RADID VEHICLEEMOS TRANSMISSIONS BE HEARD!

(MEMDOZA)) AT THE SHORTWAYE CEVEL, WE MANE RECEIVED RECEFTION REPORTS FROM BRAZIE, COLOMBIA, MEXICO, AND EVEN FROM THE 1/2 S. SOUTH, WHERE RADIO VENCERCHOS CAN BE REARD ITMITHOUT SPECIAL COULTRE NT.

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(ICHONG)) ARTONIO, WIAT ABOUT THE AUDIENCE OF RABIO

VEHCEREPOS? ((GUT/ERREZ)) THROUGHOUT THE PAST & YEARS, RADI: HENCERENCS

HAS BEEN GAINING CROUND IN THE HATIONAL TERRITORY. IT IS NOT JUST HEARD BY THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES OR THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES COMMITTED TO THE RE-OUTSDARY AND L'REFACTION CAUSE. IT 15 42-RD BY LABGE SICTORS OF SALVADORAN SOCIÉTY, EFER BY ENEM- ESCIONS, BY ARMY AND COUPEMENT SECTORS THAT LISTER TO IT 7. RECEVE A TRUTHFUL VERSION OF THE DAR SECAUSE THE REGIPE'S LIES ARE NOT EVEN BELLEVED BY THEM

EXCHONGEL ME ARE THE LESTINERS OUTSIDE EL SALVIDORS (GALVADORAN) DIE OF THE MOST IMPERTANT DECTOR: THAT IT COVERS IS THE REFUGEES - THE WAR (14090S INDISTINCT) NA. FORCED HUNDREDS TO THE REPORTED OF SALADDRAWS, FRACTICALLY A 18TH OF THE FORLATION, TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. THEFE ARE APPROXIMATELY ASS 025 SALADDRAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, MORE THAN 120,023 IN MEXICO, 42,223 IN MICRAIGA, (15,888) IN ANDROUGHS, AND ABOUT 10,839 IN COSTA RICA (CHORDE) WE MUST STREET THAT TABLED VENUEREDCY ALES THE TOPONICIONAL STRUGGLE BY USING THE EDSENTIAL MEAPON OF RAISING THE

PEOPLE'S AVARENESS. FIFTY PEDIUM-MAYE STATIONS, SINEN FM. STATIONS, FIVE TELEVISION CHANNELS, AND OTHER PREIS PEDIA TRY TO SILENCE THE VOICE OF THE OCCERTILLA RADIO. HAVE THEY BEEN ABLE TO WEAREN THE RISSION OF RADIO STREETENDS?

(ISALVADORANI) NO, NOT ALL. IT HUST BE POINTED OUT THAT EVEN THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN NEWS ACENCIES CONSTANTLY USE RADIO

VENETRENDS'S REPORTS BECAUSE THEY PROMINANT IT IS REPORTING THE TRUTH. IT IS INFORTANT THAT ME POINT OUT (NORDS INDISTINCT) BECAUSE THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM IS THAT BY MAGICA AFE TO WHICH THE INTERESTS OF CLASS PREVAIL, THE MASSES DO ADI IDENTIFY WITH (MORDS INDISTINCTI).

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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ACTION INR-10

INFO FILE-81 ARA-05 PPC-81 RPP-81 CAS-81 PPA-81 SEE-81 LPD-81
CU-82 DCEN-01 REG-81 ES-01 CS-82 DNCO-81 NCO-81 LARA-61
/822 A3 DM

INFO LOG-88 ARA-08 HA-09 PM-18 PA-82 INRE-88 SP-02
DS-81 DSE-88 SCT-02 /836 W

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AUSSECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC:/ARA/CEN/ES//
US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC:/ARA/CEN/ES//
UNCLAS 60
SUBJ
HAVANA: SALVADDRAN GUERRILLAS REJECT ARIAS PEACE PLAN
PA158229
HAVANA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN SPANISH 8888 GMT 14 MAY 87
(ITEXT)) THE SALVADDRAN GUERRILLAS HAVE REJECTED AN
ALTERNATIVE PEACE PLAN FOR CENTRAL AMERICA PROPOSED BY
COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT OSCAR ARIAS. THE FMLN AND FOR REJECTED THE PLAN IN A PRESS BULLETIN RECENTLY ISSUED BY
THE GUERRILLAS.
THE DOCUMENT STATED THAT THE PLAN IS NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE REALITY PREVAILING IN EL SALVADOR. IT POINTED OUT THAT THIS PROJECT FAILS TO INCLUDE AN END TO U.S.
INTERVENTION IN THE CENTRAL AMERICA OF IN THE REGION.
THE INSURGENT FRONTS ALSO ARGUED THAT THE SOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE COSTA RICA PRESIDENT FAILS TO CONSIDER
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THE INSURGENT FRONTS ALSO ARGUED THAT THE PLAN THE REGION OF THE PLA

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE #1 1816722 ACTION INR-18

INFO FILE-81 ARA-85 PPC-81 FFF-81 025-81 PPA-81 SSE-81 L*0-81 DCEM-91 REG-81 <u>{1-81</u> DRCO-81 NCO-91 LARA-81 /318 A3 YC

R 1812252 MAY 67 TO A16 4677 FT GEO 6 MEADS MD//G002// JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO PALMEROLA AS NO SECSTATE WASHINGTON CC/ZARA/CEN/ES// US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON BC//IC-FIB// AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR -CTF SEVEN SIX XXX COMUSTORCARIS NET WEST FL ACCT FREA-ENDS



UNICLAS SP

BEF PA121224 HADRID EFE SPANISH 128486 -- EL SALVADOR: FMLN-FDR REJECTS ARIAS PLAN AS 'NOT FEASIBLE'

EL SALVADOR: FMLM-FOR ISSUES BULLETIN ON ARIAS PLAN

CLANDESTINE! RADIO VENCEREMOS IN SPANISH TO EL SALVADOR

(BULLETIN FROM THE PRESS OFFICE OF THE FILM ISSUED IN MEXICO CITY ON 11 MAYIT

(TEXT)) THE FOR AND THE FILM HAVE STATED THEIR POSITION ON THE ARIAS PLAN TO SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS. THE ESSENCE OF THAT

1. TO REITERATE THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE ARMED CONFLICT OR EL SALVADOR WOULD BE A DECISIVE FACTOR FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN CERTAIL AMERICA.

IN CERTIFICAL AMERICA.

2. THE CHARACTERIZATION THAT THE ARIAS PLAN MAKES OF THE SITUATION HE EL SALVADOR DOES HOT REFLECT OUR TRUE SITUATION AND THEREFORE THIS PLAN CHANDT BE A GOOD STARTING POINT IN THE SEARCH FOR A RESCLUTION OF THE CONFEIGHT. IN EL SALVADOR THERE IS NO DEMOCRACY, THE GOVERNMENT MASSIVELY VICLATES NUMBAN RIGHTS, THERE IS NO DIALOGUE, AND THERE IS NO SOCIAL JUSTICE. MOST OF THE INTERNAL FORCES IN THE COUNTRY AGREE IN POINTIVE CUT THAT THE DUSAR'E REGINE HAS SUMM THE COUNTRY LOTD THE NOST PROFOUND ECONOMIC, POLITICAL,

3. THE PROPOSAL OF A DIALOGUE WITH UNAPPHED OPPOSITION GROUPS
DOES NOT APPLY IN THE SALVADORAN CASE ESCURS IT VOLUD REING THE RESOLUTION OF THE COUNTRY DOWN TO A DEPART WHAT THE FILE PUT DOWN TO A DEPART WHAT THE FILE PUT DOWN TO A DEPART WHAT THE FILE PUT DOWN TO A DEPART WHEN COULD REVER THE SOLUTION OF THE COUNTRY DOWN TO A DEPART WHEN COULD REVER THE POWN TEST ARMS AND IN ADMITCH DOWN TO A DEPART WHEN COULD REVER THE PROPOSAL STILL VOULD RIVER PROPOSAL STILL VOULD NOT BE VALID BECAUSE IT CALLS FOR THE EXCLUSION

PROPOSAL STILL WOULD NOT BE VALID BECAUSE IT CALLS FOR THE EXCLUSION

IN EL SALVACOR, A DIALOGUE WITHOUT PRIOR CONDITIONS BETWEEN THE FREE-FOR AND THE GOVERNMENT IS LEGITIMATE AND IT HAS BEEN DEPONSTRIED THAT THERE CAN BE NO RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT WITHOUT THE FMLH-FOR.

INTEGRAL, A PROFESAL THAT CALLS FOR A PLANTING RELIGION INC.

4. A CESSATION OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFLUENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF EL SALVADOR REPRESENTS AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION TO MAKE YIABLE ANY PEACE

INITIATIVE IN OUR COUNTRY THEREFORE, THIS PROBLEM CAUNOT BE IGCORD AS AN APPENDIX OF THE PROCESS, AS THE ARIAS PLAN PROPOSES.

S. WE RESTERATE OUR ACKNOWLEGGERENT OF THE EFFORTS BY THE

CONTADORS AND SUPORT GROUPS AND OF OTHER INITIATIVES FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA THAT SEES A PECCLUTION OF THE INTERIES CONFLICT IN EL SALVASON AND THAT DISRESAND EFFORTS TO FIND FALSE SIMILARITIES WITE PROS.EMS CF OTHER COURTRIES IN THE MOME OF RESC. VING THE SOLUTION FROM THE COURT AGREEMENTS OF MICH.

ETTER . . . TO ACT OF THE COLUMN OF PRESIDENT ARIAS OF COSTA RICA TO STREATHER HIS GOVERNMENT S NEUTRALLITY POLICY, THUS RICH TO STREAGHER HIS GOVERNERS S REUTALITY POLICY, THUS COMPRIBUTION OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CRISTS - D. EUTED LLTY, FRONCISH TOLIFICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE WITERIAL CONFLICT OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. PALIFIC, IS MAY 1987 PRESS OFFICE OF THE FELM GENDALL 152300 RN/BESTOR/AF 18/16/32 MAY

UNCLASSIFIED Department of State PINS 4-5 INCOMING

PAGE #1 8282252 ACTION INT-18

THEO FILE-BE ARA-85 PPC-81 RPP-81 DAS-81 PPA-81 SSE-81 LPD-81 MX-83 DCEM-8) SEG-81 PM-82 <u>{S-91</u> GT-82 CS-81 MU-82 D4CO-81 MCO-81 LARA-91 SIG-81 /838 A3 DM

HMFO LOG-E8 ARA-88 PH-18 PA-82 1986-20 SP-82 /824 V

R 8281187 MAY 87 FR FRIS CHIVA CHIVA PR TO A16 4677 JOINT TASH FORCE BRAVO PALMERCLA AS HO . SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//ARA/CEN/ES// US SECRET SERVICE MASHINGTON DC//ID-F+B// CTF SEVEN SIX ANT COMUSFORCARIS MEY WEST FL PDG COROZAL PM ACCT FEPA-EVOL

UNCLAS SP

EL SALVADOR: UNGO ON DIALOGUE, U.S. AID, ARIAS PEACE PLAN

SAN SALVADOR CHANNEL & TELEVISION IN SPANISH #2## GHT

(GUDDINAS HI ZUNTI LINAKOR VE TROSTED)

(STEATS) FOR PRESIDENT GUILLERMS UNGO SAID DUPING AN INTERVIEW FOR EL NOTICIERO NEWSCAST THAT THE DEMOCRATS BICTORY IN THE U.S. SENATE WILL STRENGTHEN A DIALOGUE IN OUR POSITIVE FACTOR IN ENCOURAGING PEACE IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN

COFFEIR UNCO RECORDING! SEMERALLY SPEAKING, DEMCCRATIC ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE TRUSTED POLITICAL ALLIANCES AND DIALOGUE, SO I THINK THAT THE SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICERS SHOULD BEGIN TO MORN ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' RILITARY AID. THIS AID WILL HOT LAST FOREVER. (EAD RECORDING))

WHICH ADDIT THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING CONTACT

WITH DEMOCRATIC SENATORS, PROVIDED THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ALLOWS THIS.

ALLOWS THIS.

(@ECHN UNGO RECORDING!) WE NOPE SO, PROVIDED THAT THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S ANTI-DEHOCRATIC AND REPPESIVE
POLICY ALLOWS 11. WE HAVE BEEN DENIED VISAS, BUT THE DEATH SOUAD
THE OPPORTUNITY TO HOLD TALKS WITH U.S. POLITICIANS AND CONGRESSMEN
IN REXIED, PANNA, NICARAGUA, AND COSTA RICA WE RELIEVE
THAT THESE TAIKS WILL INCREASE MOW THAT THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN HAS
REGUN IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS MUCH MORE INTEREST.

BEGUN IN THE UNITED STRIES. THERE IS MUCH MORE INTEREST,
PUBLICITY, AND OPERMESS ABOUT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL INTERESTS. (MED RECORDING)'
UNGO ALSO SAID THAT THE PEACE PROPOSAL PRESENTED BY COSTA
RICAN PRESIDENT SCAN ARIAS IS BOTH POSITIVE AND MEGATIFE. THE
FIVE PRESIDENTS FROM THE AFEA WILL DISCUST THIS PROPOSAL
ESQUIPULAS, GUATERALA. HE SAID THAT THE REGATIVE THING ABOUT
THE PROPOSAL IS THAT IT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE ARRED OPPOSITION.
(WEETH UNGO RECORDING)' FIRST OF ALL, THE PROPOSAL
EXCLUDES THE FRUN. THEY HAVE NO REFERENCE TO THE MATTER AND
THINK THAT THEY CAN SIMPLY STATE THAT THE DIALDGUE SHOULD ONLY
HICLUDE THE UNLYING OPPOSITION. I THINK THIS IS A COMPADICTION,
AND A SERIOUS AND GRAVE INCOMEDITY. NOW CAN AMPOSE

AND A SERIOUS AND GRAVE INCOMPRUITY. HOW CAN ANYONE DISCUSS AND AGREE ON A CEASE-FIRE IF THE DIALOGUE DOES NOT INCLUDE THOSE WID HAVE THE MEAPONS? (CHO RECORDING!)

THE FOR LEADER IS CURRENTLY IN MANAGUA TO HOLD MEETINGS .

WITH SEVERAL PARLIANCINTARY MEMBERS WIG ARE ATTENDING THE IPU CONGRESS AND ARE INTERESTED IN PROVING ABOUT THE SALVADORAN STITUTION AND THE ETTERPTE AND INCREASED WAS THAT AFFECTS
CENTRAL ARCHICA. GUILLERNO UNED SAID THAT THE WORKING CLASSES
REPRESENT THE BASIE FOR A MATION'S DEVELOPMENT, AND HE ADDED
THAT THE POLITICAL-INLITARY STRUGGE BEING WASTO IN EL SAIVADOR IS THE RESULT OF A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CRISIS.
CHOOLLY 858288 MSY/BESTCR/AF 82/82862 MAY

like juma

good foul. ~?

EOT

UNCLASSIFIED Department of State PINS 4-5

9516 ARAS764 ACTION 198-18 18FO FILE-81 ARA-95 PPC-81 SPP-81 DAS-81 PPA-81 SSE-81 LPS-81 DECR-81 REG-81 <u>ES-81</u> DECO-81 RCO-81 LARA-91 /818 A3 RD INFO LOG-DE ARA-DE PR-18 PA-82 DSE-88 SCT-82 /827 V INRE-88 SP-82 -----251723 #3#5#62 /34 8 #223582 JUL 87 TO FRIS VASHINGTON DC COMUSTORCARIO NET WEST FL
USCINCLUST NORFOLM VA//12//
CDM4THPSYOPOP FT BRAGG NC//SB//
AFOSI DISTRICT 7 PATRICK AFB TL///VO// INTEL FACILITY 23AD TYRDALL AFE FL//IN// USIA MIAMI FL WSTA PIAM! FL
RAYSTA PAMAMA CAHAL RODMAN PM
RAYSECGRUACT GALETA ISLAMD PM
CORUSAFLOSTA GALETA ISLAMD PM MAYOPIKTCEM IFE VASHINGTON DO FBIS LONDON UK
FBIS LONDON UK//BW//
NR DA WASHINGTON BU//DANO-SSN// COMMAYBASE GUANTINAMO BAY CU HAVINGSERVER GUAN'ANAMO BAY CU JOINT TASK FORCE BLAVO PALMEROLA AS NO YDA WASH BC STORAGE CENTER FBIS WASHINGTON DC VOA MEXICO CITY MX AFE/PAS HOMESTEAD AFB FL SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//ARA/CEN/ES//
USIA WASHINGTON DC//YOA/R//
US SECRET SERVICE WASKINGTON DC//ID-FIB// USINT MAYANA DEFINITAGENCY WASH DC DEFINITIONED WAREH REIGHTS PH//IBW/SCJ2/SCPA//
CDR 28TH HI BH FT WILLIAM D DAYIS PH//AFZU-HI-C//
CDR USARSO FT CLAYTOM PH//SDBA// COR478THMISP COROZAL PH//IAGPP-0-AS// FRIS CHIVA CHIVA PR FBIS OKINAVA JA USCOMS OL ANT COMMANDE ARTH ROOSEVELT BOADS BO AFOST DET 721 HOVARD AFB PRI/TYD// USAFSO HOVARD AFB PRI/LA// USAFSO HOWARD AFE PH//IN// ACCT FBFL-EVOK

SHELAS SA/LD PHU

SHELL

CUBA: SALVADORAN REBEL MIDIA D'AZ RETURNS FRON HOSCOV

MAYAMA RABIO PERIODICO DEL AIRE IN SPANISH 2139 GHT 2 JUL 87

(TEXT)) GUERRILLA COMMANDER HIDIA BIAZ TODAY DEHONICED IN BAYAMA THE REGATIVE RESPONSE OF THE SALVADORAN REGIRE TO THE PROPOSALS FOR THE MUMARIZATION OF THE USE, WHICH WERE FORMULATED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY DEPOCRATIC FRONT, FR.M. ARRIVING IN HARMA AFTER PARTICIPATING IN THE WORLD CONCRESS FOR MOMEN IN MOSCOM, THE REBEL LEADER SAID DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE SENSF'ESS POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RAPOLEON DUARTE WILL ONL! INCREASE THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON THE POPULATION ENDALLE 872139 SEPZEOPET DE PUGE 82/23592 JUL

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PAGE BI 8384682 ACTION INR-18

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RURAL AREAS; SYSTEMATICALLY APPLY PREVENTIVE MEDIC NE. 18. CONSTRUCT SCHOOLS WHERE MEEDED; RECOMSTRUCT BUILDINGS IN POOR COMBITION AND GUARANTEE THE REQUIRED MAINTENANCE. ASSIGN RESOURCES TO ONIGHH ECUCATIONAL MATERIALS AND WIRE TEACHERS (PASSAGE HOUSTINGT)) PRIUME OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PEOPLE TO THEIR PLACES OF ONIGIN BY RESPECTING THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS AND GIVING THEN RESOURCES TO RECONSTRUCT THEIR LIVES (PATRIMONICI). (PASSAGE INDISTINCTE)

INFO LOG-88 ARA-88 PH-18 85E-88 SCT-82 /827 W PA-82 INRE-86 SP-82

13. GUARANTEE EMPLOYMENT, MOUSING, AND BASIC SERVICES TO SALVADORANS DEPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES.

FR FRIS CHIVA CHIVA PR 10 AIS 4577 JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO PALMEROLA AR NO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//ARA/CEN/ES// US SECRET SERVICE VASHINGTON DC//ID-FIB// AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

CTF SEVEN SIX FT GED & MEADE MD//6222// KHT COMUSFORCARIE KEY WEST FL PDG CORDIAL PR

SALYADORANS DEPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES.

18. GRANT LEGAL STATUS TO ALL DRGANIZATION REQUESTING IT.

18 THE IMPEDIATE TWITE, SIVE LEGAL STATUS TO THE COMPARENS

OF GRASSELY, ISTITUTED, ACRIMA CACKERAL ASSOCIATION

OF FIRRACE HIRISTET EMPLOYEES -- FRIST), CITAS, AND SO OM.

15. RESPECT THE FFECOMO OF GREANIZATION AND HOS LITATION OF

GUILDS, UNIONS, AND COOPERATIVES. IN THE IMPEDIATE FUTURE, RETURN

THE OFFICES AND LAND TO THE KNOROVERMENTAL ANTS CONTIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF SALVEDORM NUMBERS -- THIST) AND THE PROPLE'S

DEFENSE COOPERATIVE, WHICH BELONGS TO FEDECOPADES

GUIDERATION OF COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS OF

UNICLAS SF

AGRICULTURAL-LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION OF EL SALVADOR -- FBISH.
16. ISSUE A NEW LABOR CODE DRAFTED BY THE WORKERS; ENSURE

THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL ABSTAIN FROM APPROVING ANY OTHER CODE NOT PROPOSED BY GUILD AND LABOR GROUPS.

EL SALVADOR: REBEL RADIO CITES UNTS DOCUMENT OF DERANDS

17. REPEAL ALL DETRIES AND LAWS RESTRICTING INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE RIGHTS. THIS INCLUDES THE TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF THE INTELLECTUAL AND PACTUAL AUTHORS OF HUNDERS, KIDAPPINGS, TORTURES, AND ANY DIMER FORMS OF NUMAN RIGHTS VID.4110WS.

18. IMMEDIATLY EXPEL FROM OUR COUNTRY THE AMERICAN ENSTITUTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE LABOR UNIONS ((INSTITUTO

CLANDESTINE) RADIO FARABUNDO MARTI IN SPANISH TO EL SALVADOR 2288 GMT 1 JUN 87 (CTEXT)) THE WORKING CLASS HAS TAXEN AN IMPORTANT STEP BY

AMERICANO PARA EL DESARROLLO DEL SINDICALISMO LIBRE)).
19. RECOVER MATIONAL SOVEREIGHTY BY ENDING U.S. GOVERNMENT MEDDLING IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ESTABLISM RELATIONS WITH ALL THOSE GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE WILLING TO PESPECT OUR NATIONAL

CREATI) THE WORKING CLASS HAS TAKEN AN INPORTANT STEP BY CONSOLIDATING POPULAR ASPIRATIONS INTO A SINGLE PLATFORM. THE WORKING CLASS, WHICH IS MADE UP OF VARIOUS POPULAR SECTORS IN THE COUNTRY, IS EXPERIENCING THE WORST ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CRISIS IN THE HISTORY OF OUR FATHERLAND.
THE DURREE GOVERNEENT, WHICH IS HETTIMER WILLING NOR CAPABLE OF RESOLVING THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FACING THE SELVADORAM PEOPLE,

SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE SALVADORAN PEOPLE.
28. IMMEDIATELY END THE FORCEFUL RECRUITMENT OF SALVADORAN

LLY REPRESSES THE PEOPLE AND ISSUES ANTIPOPULAR DECREES AND DEMAGDGICAL STATEMENTS.

2). DECREE A GENERAL APPRESTY FOR BLL POLITICAL AND LABOR

DEFINE COLORS STATEMENTS.

DESPITE THIS, IN A MESSAGE TO THE NATION VESTERDAY IN WHICH
THEY ANALYZED THE 3 YEARS OF DUARTE'S ADMINISTRATION, THE
ORGANIZED WORKERS GATHERED TOGETHER IN THE NATIONAL UNITY OF
SALVADORAM WORKERS (WINTS)). PRESENTED A PLATFORM OF THE WORKERS

22. SEEK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE NECHANISMS TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE ARMED CONFLICT AND THE STRUCTURAL CRISIS OF THE HETEYE SIRCHOSE-0150E

TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS FACING THE FATHERLAND. (GEGIN RECORDING OF UNIDENTIFIED UNTS OFFICIAL!) THE DEMANDS OF THE WORKERS AND THE PEOPLE:

SO AREAD BROTKER WORKER, THE TIME WAS COME TO INCREASE THE LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION AND COMBATIVE STRUGGLE! (END RECORDING!) ENDALLI 812288 JAL/SMITH/HF 83/83262 JUN

ME DEMAND THE IMMEDIATE RESIGNATION OF JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW GOVERNMENT THAT HAS THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL SECTORS OF OUR COUNTRY. WE ASK THAT THE FOLLOWING

DEMANDS BE MET: 1. REPEAL ECONOMIC PACHAGES (PINTRODUCED) BY DUARTE AND ENSURE THAT HO HEW ECONOMIC REASURES ARE APPROVED AGAINST THE PEOPLE

- 2. DECREE MAGE INCREASES FOR ALL URBAN AND RURAL WORKERS IN REEPING WITH THE WIGH COST OF LIVING.
- APPROVE THE DIRATT BILL ON CONSUMER PROTECTION.
 EXEMPT AGRARIAN COOPERATIVES FROM PAYING AGRARIAN DEBTS AND MAY OTHER UMPAYABLE DEBTS CAUSED BY REPRESSION, UMEATHER COMDITIONS,
- COMMERCIALIZATION, AND SO ON. S. BISTRIBUTE LAND AMONG ALL PEASANTS AT NO COST TO THEM BT
- ALLOCATING (GOODS INDISTINCT)) AT 1965 PRICES.

 6. HALF THE FIRING OF WORKERS AND OPEN NEW SOURCES OF EMPLOYMENT BY CHELPING SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZE BUSINESSES THROUGH AN ACCESSIBLE SOFT CREDIT SYSTEM.
- 7. IMMEDIATELY SUSPEND THE PATIONING OF ELECTRIC FOWER AND POTABLE MATER AND CUT THEIR COST TO CONSUMERS BY SO PERCENT.
 - S. DO NOT PAY THE FOREIGN BEST.
- S. SUPPLY EQUIPMENT, MEDICINE, PERSONNEL, AND MAINTENANCE FOR POPULAR CLINICS SO THEY CAN DIFER EFFICIENT AND FILE SERVICES TO

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PAGE 31 -918 AZ CM

INFO LOG-88 COPY-81 ADS-88 EUR-88 EAP-88 OIG-81 /882 N

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APPROVED 61: AXX. CEA:E R WINCOUN

APA/CEN:1 P CALLARAM, EUR/F:D SHITH, EUR/CE-D HILLER,

EAP/ANX:S FISKER

1813387 JUN 87

FM SECSTATE WASHOD

AREMASSY ROME

AREMASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY STOLAHOLM
AMEMBASSY STOLAHOLM
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AMEMBASSY SAM SALVADOR

UNCI AS STATE 187678

E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PINS, PIER, PHUM, PREF, ES SUBJECT: FRONT GROUPS IMPLEMENT FOLK ACTION PLAN

FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT QUOTE

1 8223812 JUN 87

FH AMERIBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSIATE WASHOC
INFO USIA WASHOC
AMERIBASSY GUATERIALA

AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE AMEMBASSY MADRIO AMEMBASSY MANAGUA USHISSION GENEVA USHISSION USUN NEW YORK INCONTROLOGIARRY NES PH

UNCLAS SAN SALVADOR 7381

MADRID PLEASE PASS TO PASTOR RIDRUEJO

E.O. 12356: NA TAGS: PINS, PTER, PHUM, PREF, ES SUBJECT: FRONT GROUPS IMPLEMENT FININ ACTION PLAN

REF: A. SAN SALVADOR 6754
- B. SAN SALVADOR 6752
- C. SAN SALVADOR 6784

1. SUMMARY

QUEING AN APRIL 27, 1937 RAID ON A POPULAR LIBERATION FORCES BPLY SAFLHOUSE IN MORTHERN SAN SALVADOR CITY, THE MATIONAL POLICE FOUND DOCUMENTS DETAILING INSPRINCTIONS

STATE 1876'S

FROM THE FINE CEREFUL COMMUNE FOR SQUERRILLA FRONT GROUPS
TO UNCERTANE AND RESERVE COMMUNE FOR SQUERRILLA FRONT GROUPS
TO UNCERTANE AND RESERVE THEOLOGY PRISON GLOTS, AND VIOLENT
DEMONSTRATIONS CALLING FOR GENERAL ARMSTIT. THE DOCUMENT
STATES THE FINE GENERAL COMMUND HAS DETERMINED THAT THE
NEXT TWO MERS CONSTITUTE A CAUCIAL PREPARATION FAIRS OF
THE GENERALLA CONTREOFFERSIVE STRATEGY. THE CALCETIVE IS
FOR THESE FRONT CEGANIZATIONS TO CREATE THE "MECCIGARY
COMMITTIONS" FOR SUCCESSIVE HEQURRECTION. THE PASSES ARE
TO BE PREPARED FOR AN ESCALATION IN VIOLENCE, AND
AUTHORITIES PROJUCED INTO COMPONITATIONS AIPED AT CAUSING
ONE ON TORSE DEATHS TO BE USED AS MARTIES.

2. IN THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, THE FRUM PLAN OF ACTION HAS BEEK CARRIED OUT BY THE FRONT GROUPS ALPOST EXACTLY ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTIONS. CHILY AR EMBASE MAS YET TO BE TAKEN. WHILE CAPABLE OF MOUNTAING LIMITED OPERATIONS SCON AS CHURCH TARROWERS AND INCLINET PROTECT MARCHES, THE FRONT GROUPS HAVE THUS THE FARILED TO MOBILITE POPULAR SUPPORT, AND THE DEFOURTRAINCH MULTE BECOME INTERESTINGLY WICLERT.

FRONT GROUP ACTIVITIES CLEARLY REYEAL THE FHUN/FRONT GROUP MASTER/SERVANT RELATIONSHIP. END SUPPLARY.

THE FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM THE DOCUMENT:

MEGIN EXCERPTS

THE GENERAL COMMAND HAS CONVEYED A SERIES OF INDICATIONS OF COMDITIONS THAT LE MUST PREPARE. THE IDEA IS THAT WE SHAIL MUST CONTINUE ADVOCATING OR CREATING COMMINIONS FOR THE PRE-INSURACCION MOMENT. THE GENERAL COMMAND HAS DEFINED THAT THESE FLEET LOW TERS ARE "PREPARATION FOR THE CONTEROFERSIVE STRATEGY" AND THIS MUST NOT BE DULT "DECLARATIVE" BUT MUST BE PUT INTO PRACTICE.

4. PLAN FOR METROPC, ITAN AREA (SAN SALVADOR)

A) SEIZURE OF CHURCHES AND CATHEDRALS IN SANTA ANA LAND OTHER METROPOLITAN PREAST BY DISPLACED PERSONS (CRIPDES --CHRISTIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE DISPLACED).

BY SEIZURE OF AN EMBASSY ON EMPASSIES BY THE CO-MADRES COMMITTEE OF MOTHERS AND FAMILIZES OF MOTHICAL PRISONERS, DISAMPERADE PRECODE AND ASSACSIMATED OF EL SALVADOR -- MORSENOR OSCAR ARMULFO ROMEROY.

C) UPRISINGS BY THE COMMITTEE OF POLITICAL PRISCHERS OF EL SALVADOR (COPPES) WITH MOSTAGES TANEN FROM THE PRISON GUARDS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

SIMULTAMEOUS TAMEOURES ARE PREFERRED TO DEMONSTRATE STRENGTH. THERES WHICH CAN BE PURSUED INCLUDE: 1) THE MEED OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO RETURN TO THEIR FORMER RESIDENCES IN TIME FOR PLANTING CROPS, AND TERMINATION OF BONDINGS WARE FORCE!

2) JUSTIFICATION OF THE OPERATION:
-- AT THE REPRESSION, BOMBINGS, MASSACRES THAT THESE
PEOPLE LIVED THROUGH BEFORE ABANDOMING THEIR LAND.
-- BY THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE PRESENT-Y LIVE; AND
-- C) THAT THE DEMANDS OF THE DISPLACED FOR THEIR
RIGHTS HAVE HOT PEEM HEARD AND THE ONLY WAY IS TO THAKE
REFUGE! IN THE CATHEDRAL AND CREATE A TRIBUNAL OF
DEMUNCIATION.

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EMBASSY MOTE: THE INSTRUCTIONS EMPHASIZE THAT THE WORDS, TRAKE REFUGET BE USED AND MENER TRAKE OVER.TH

THESE ACTIVITIES COULD LAST THREE DAYS EACH IF COME CONSECUTIVELY OF FOUR TO FILE DAYS IF DAYS COULDIFICATION THE RETURN OF SEIZED CHURCHES MUST BE PLANNED TO COMMITTEE ACTIVE FACING THE TAREDURA ATTENTION TO THE INCIDENT. ATTER EACING THE TAREDURA, ATTENTION IS MAINTAINED THROUGH STALL RELIES AND METINGS THREE OR FOUR ELOCAS FROM TRE SITE.

S. CO-MADRES ACTIVITIES

DEMONSTRATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE CO-HIDRES SPOULD CONSIST OF PAINTING SLOGARS DALLING FOR AMERITY FOR POLITICAL PRESONERS ON THE HATLOVAL ACCERBLY VALUES AND VEHICLES, AND ISSUING DECLARATIONS TO THE VARIOUS COMMUNICATIONS PEDIA. THE CHITRAL IDEA IS THAT WE ARE BOT CONTENT VALUE FOR POLICY CONTINUES AND GENOUSING THE JESTICAL OF CEFICIALS TO RECEIVE OF, BUT THAT WE ADJANCE TO MORE BY THE HASSESTIVE ACTIONS TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR VICLENCE BY THE HASSES, THE CO-HIDRES HAVE INCORPORATED GREAT ACCRESSIVENESS AND WICLENCE IN THEIR LATEST OPERATIONS.

A STRETCH OF ROAD BY THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE OCCUPIED FOR TWO HOURS. OTHER TEAMS SHOULD BE READY TO MAKE DEAUNITATIONS TO THE LORG AND EMBASSIES IF SOMEOME IS MUL-OUTER.

PRECICAL TEAMS SHOULD BE ENLISTED TO PREPARE FOR THE EVENTUA-TY THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL EPPLOY FORCE TO EVICT AND CONTAIN THE CHORD STRATEONS. IN THE EVENT OF DEATHS, THE WARE AND BURIAL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE WARE COULD THAN PLACE IN FRONT OF OR ADJACENT TO THE U.S. EMPASSY.

6. DEMAND FOR AMMESTY

PLANS FOR THIS INCLUDE ENUMERATION OF ALL ACTIVITIES PROMOTED BY CO-HADRES TO WIN ITS CENTRAL DESCRIVES:

-- DEMOUNCE THAT DESPITE THE LONG STRUGGLE, THE PROBLETS OF THE DISAPPEARED, ASSASSINATED AND CAPTURED PEOPLE REMAIN.

-- DENOUNCE THE REPRESSIVE RPPARATUS THAT JUSTIFIES HUMAN BIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

-- SINCE IT ICO-MADRES) HAS HAD SO LITTLE SUCCESS IN GETTING ATTENTION, IT IS FORCED TO RESORT TO AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS, TANING OVER A STREET, A CHURCH, AN EMPASSY, ETC., SO THAT PERHAPS IMPRESIDENT' DUARTE, (ACSEMBLY MESICENT) GUEVARA LOCATO, AND THE ARMY WOULD LISTER TO THEM AND FULFILL INCIR FROMISES.

TRIS ACTIVITY SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH COPPES. A REETING COULD BE HELD TO DETERMINE WHAT OTHER RELEVANT ACTIVITIES THEY COULD DO.

7. COPPES ACTIVITIES

REGARDING THE UPRISINGS BY THE POLITICAL PRISONERS CITED ABOVE, THIS MAY NOT BE PRODERT DUE TO THE LACK OF A CAPABLE CADAL AND BECAUSE CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE POSSBILLITY THAT LOSS OF LIFE WILL OCCUR INSIDE THE FACILITY.

THE PLAN IS A COORDINATED OPERATION WITH CO-MADRES WORKING ON THE OUTSIDE WHILE COPPES OPERATES WITHIN THE PRISON

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STATE TO BE A TO PER COMPATED OPTIONE, POST OF THE ACTIVATIES ARE TO BE CARRIED DUT BY COMPATED THE TEAL IS TO MAKE COMPATED THE TEAL IS TO MAKE COMPATED THE TEAL IS TO MAKE COMPATED AMELITY FOR THE UNIDERTIFIED IMPORTANT FERSON TO COMMING COMPITIONS. THE PRESS WALL BE INLIFED TO THAT MEETING THE DESCRIPTIONS. THE PRESS WALL BE INLIFED TO THAT MEETING THE DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPATED THE DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPATED THE PART OF

THE PRISON TAKEOVER SHOULD NOT LAST INDEFINITELY. IT SHOULD LAST 5-8 DAYS AND DURING THIS TIME CO-MODES ACTIVITY OF COLD COSTINUE SEASON OF PERSO CORRESPOCE, DISTRIBUTION OF POPAGANDA IN MERSON PLACES, UNIVERSITIES, ETC., DELIVERY OF DOCUMENT CEMBERS LAND MEMBERS AND DEBUNCATION OF NUMBER REGISTS TO REMAINS LAND STRUCKES OF THE REGIST OF THE RESISTS.

UF NO EXCERPTS)

a implementation of the PLAR

THUS FAR, TWO OF THE THREE ACTIVITIES DETAILED IN THIS DOCUMENT AVE BEEN CARRIED OUT KINDST EXACTLY RECORDING TO THESE INSTRUCTIONS. ONLY AN EMBAGSY HAS YET TO BE TAKEN. THE ACTIONS SO FAR INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING.

9. PRISON UPRISINGS AND CEMAND FOR AMMESTY

ON MAY 13, IN MARICHA PRISON, 158 OF THE 200 TOCREE SPPRISONES STAGED A PEACEFUL TOYPOUTOT TARE-OVER OF THE PRISON'S ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES CILLING FOR GENERAL ARMSTY. PRISON AUTHORITIES MEN OF THE PLAN EFFOFFAMO. THERE WAS NO VIOLENCE AND IT US OVER IN A PLITTEP OF MOURS. ON MAY 23, PRISONERS AT MARIONA ECOLA A MUNCLE STRINE TO FRESUME THE GOVERNMENT TO GRANT INCONDITIONAL GENERAL AFMESTY TO ALL POLITICAL CETAINESE. ACCORDING TO COPPES, 23 PRISONERS EGGAN FME STRINE AND OFFE WILL JOIN AS THE MUNCLES STRINE PROCESSES. THE MUNCLE STRINE OF TOWN AS THE MUNCLES STRINE PROCESSES. THE MUNCLE STRINE OF TOWN AS THE MUNCLES STRINE FOOCESSES. THE MUNCLE STRINE OF TOWN AS THE MUNCLES STRINE AND THE MUNCLES STRINE AND THE MARICHES THE SECAUSE BY ISSUED AND THE METERATIONAL COMPRIST WITH A FALSE TRADE OF MUNCHASTERS TO STRINE OF MUNCHASTERS TO STRINE AND A SUPPOSED INFONEMENT OF MUNCHASTERS THE STRINE OF MUNCHASTERS OF THE COSE AFMEDY PROPOSED WHICH AS THE SECAUSE CONTROLL COMPRIST WITH A FALSE TRADE OF MUNCHASTERS TO STRINE OF THE COSE AFMEDY PROPOSED WHICH IS CONTROLLED THE SECAUSE THE COULD FREE AROUT OR OF THE SECAUSE OF PRISONERS, EARPHTONG, NOWENESS, CASES OF THE SECAUSE OF PRISONERS, EARPHTONG, NOWENESS AND DANG TRAFFICKERS.

18. ON MAY 31, ABOUT 288 MEMBERS OF CO-MADRES AND UNITS CITIE MATIONAL UNITY OF SALVADORAN WORKERS' WATHERED OUTSIDE MARIONA PRISON IN SUMPORT OF THE MUNGER STRIKE. THE REFERENCE WITH FIRM, WASTERCTIONS, THE DEMONSTRATOGS. PAINTED THE DUTSIDE OF THE PRISON S WALLS, SCALED THE DUTE PRISON WALL TO MANG BANKERS, AND PLACED LOGS ON THE BODD WANTER OF THE PRISON TO TRAFFIC. THE DEMONSTRATORS ALSO DEMANDED ARMESTY FOR ALL "POLITICAL" PRISONERS AND THE TELLURY OF THE DISPLACED. UNDEF CIRCUMSTANCES SHILL WHITE EXCLUSIVE COMMITTEE AND FPL MEMBER -- WAS SHOT AND WHITS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND FPL MEMBER -- WAS SHOT AND WORKER REMAINED DETECTION OF THE THE MEMBER AND SHOULDES.

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11. CO-MACRES SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

CO-MADRES IS CLARNING OUT 173 FART OF THE FLUX AND IS SUPPORTING COPPED WITH DAILY STATEMENTS AND DEPONSTRATIONS BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY AGAINST THE COST PROCESS MAY BE REFORED AT A GREEKAL AMBESTY AND IN FAVOR OF A GREEKAL AMBESTY OF AND INFORMATION AND UNIVERSITY FOR AN ISLICATOR SUCH AS FEWAVAGEUS HAVE SHOULD FARRE LABOR FROM COST, AND UNIVERSITY FOR AN ISLICATOR SUCH AS FEWAVAGEUS HAVE SHOULD FARRE FOR THE COST OF A HAVE BLATARHLY TREED TO PROCOSE THE FULL OF FOREST PROTECTING THE ERRASSY THRE WIDLENES GREEKANT DEMONSTRATIONS OF A HAVE RAND DECIDED TO TAKET ONE. OF HAVE A MANDE OF A HATTER AND DECIDED TO TAKET ONE. OF HAVE A MANDE OF A HATTER AND DECIDED TO TAKET ONE. OF HAVE BOTH OF A HATTER AND THE MARKET OF AN EXPLICE OF HAM BE DONE OF A WORN A LICE OF HAM BE PRACEDED FOR THE CONTROL OF A WORN A LICE OF HAM DONE HAD BEEN ASSET WHENCE DERING A DEMONSTRATION IN FEROM COST OF THE EMBASSY HAVE REPROCEDED THE COST OF A WORN A LICE OF HAM DONE HAD BEEN AS THE FRENCH OF THE FEB ON THE COST OF A WORN A LICE OF HAM DONE HAD BEEN AS THE FRENCH OF THE FEB ON THE FRENCH OF THE FRENCH OF THE PROCESSION OF A WORN AS THE PROPERTY AND THE VEHICLE DEBTIFIED BY THE WITHEST SELECTION TO A PREVATE FILLING.

12. CATHEDRAL TAREOVERS

ON PAY 27, PERBERS OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMITTEE FOR DISPLACED PERSONS CRIPCES TODE OLEF THE MITTOPOLITAN CATRODAY. IN SAN SALVADOR AS YELL AD THE CHACH OF THE CALVARY AND ANNOUNCED THEIR DEMANDS. THESE INCLUDED PERMISSION TO RESUM TO TREIR MORES IN USU,UTAN AND CHALATENNAMO DEPARTMENTS, AN EMD TO GROCE SECULITARITY, GENERAL ARMESTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND ESTIFE LIVING COMMITIONS FOR DISPLACED PERSONS. ON PAY 25, COMPADES TOOM OVER THE SAME CHARCEST HAD THEN LED A MAJOR OF SOME 3P DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE U.S. EMBASSY WARR THEY THAT PAYAR AND ROCKS AT THE CHACKET IN AN EFFORT TO PROJUDE AND THE PASSES WARRE THEY THAT PAYAR AND ROCKS AT THE CHACKET IN AN EFFORT TO PROJUDE THE MOST VIOLENT PROJECT THROW IN FRONT OF THE FRESSY INVESTIGATION OF THE FRESSY INVESTIGATION OF THE FRESSY INVESTIGATION OF THE FRESSY INVESTIGATION OF THE FRESSY INVESTIGATION OF THE FRESSY INVESTIGATION OF THE FRESSY INVESTIGATION OF THE FRESSY INVESTIGATED ONLY A FEW PONTS AGO

33 RADIO FARABUNDO MARTI BROZDCASTS UNTS PROCLAMATION

ON JUNE 1, FP1-SUPPORTED MADIO TARABUNDO PIRTI BROCOCAST AN UNTS "PLATFORM OF THE WORKERS TO ACCOUNT PROSECUS FACING THE FATHEFLAND." THE PLATFORM EASICRLY FOLLOWS THE SCRIPTED FRUN LINE. CALLING FOR THE RESIGNATION OF

PRESIDENT DURTE, A REPEAL OF CURTE S'ECOLOT C'HESSURES, THE SUSPENSION OF ELECTIFICTY NATIONING, AND GENERAL AMMESTY FOR BLL POLETECAL AND LABOR PRISONESS. THIS IS ONE OF THE FEW TIMES A GUERRILLE RADIO STATION HAS BROADCAST AY UNTS RESSAGE, MAKING MORE DEVIOUS THE TIES BITMEN THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS.

14. "NO PEACE UNLESS DUARTE RESIGNS"

ON JUNE 4, THE THEFE CO-MARKES GROUPS NOW AFFILIATED IN TEFORALEM TUBLISHED A FULL-FAJE AD EXCOUNTING THE SHOLE BARGE OF ALLEVED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS THE DO SERN SMIRTMIFFICATION FOR THE DAMAGES GROUPED BY THE DEATH SQUADET TO THE CO-MARKES OFFICES AND DEPRHASE FULL AMBIESTY AND IMPERMIFICATION FOR ALL TPOLITICAL FRISCHESS AS WILL AS TRIALS ON AIRMATHIN CHARGES OF THE JUDGES SHOT PUT THEM IN PRISON THE PROPERTY SHALL HAVE WILL HOLD PRESIDENT DURREE AND THE COMEINED GENERAL STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR MAY ACTIONS REGISTS PROPULAR ORLANIZATIONS FROM TOOM OUT THE AD CONCLUDES IN LARGE LETTERS TSTOM THE ATTACKS AND REPRESSION STAINST THE SALVADORAN PROPIE. HO TO DESTAINST THE SALVADORAN PROPIE. HO TO DESTAINST SEE HALVADORAN PROPIE.

15 COMERT: FRONT GROUPS WITHOUG A FIG LEAF

THE FRIR IS COUNTING PERVILY ON THE FRONT GROUPS TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE PLANNED COUNTERDEFENSIVE ESPECIALLY IN THE CAPITAL OF SAM SALVADOR WHILE THE FRUNCCHTROLLED LABOR CONFECERATION UNTO AND THE TWO UNIVERSITY STICENTS LISSOCIATIONS WELL AND FEUS ARE HOT MENTIONED IN THE FER HALLOLLAR DOLLECTS. THEIR FEALINT PARTICIPATION IN THE WIGLENT DEPOSITATION OF THE PIST MONTH INDICATES THAT THEY ARE AS CONSTITUTED TO THE CLUSE AS THE CHARGE SESLUTE SHE LEAST TWO PORTES THAT THEY ALL AST OF THE THAT THEY THAT THEY HAD THE CLUSE TOPPOSIS. OF DORES, UND THE UNITS HAD THEY THAT THEY HAD IN THE PAST. CRIPOSE SHAT SO FAR AS TO JOIN UNITS THAT THEY HAD CHARGE THAT THEY ALL CONTACT AND WITS SCHOOL OF THE LABOR CRIPOSED THAT THEY HAD SOURCE TO THE AST THE MATIONAL UNIVERSITY AND WITS SIGNED AN AGREFIANT OF COOPERATION. ON JUNE 2, IN RESPONSE TO GENERAL GOLCHE S SPECIAL DETAILING THE FRUNK SCHOOL THE SEPTIME THAT THEY FRUIT COOPERATION. ON JUNE 2, IN RESPONSE TO THESE FRUIT GROUPS, CETTOSIS MEANING THE FRUNK SCHOOL TO THESE FRUIT GROUPS, CETTOSIS MEANING THE FRUIT SCHOOL THE FIRM AFFILICATION. DECLARING THAT ITS DEPAYOR. CE. RETURN OF DISPLACED FRESCHS TO THE FRUIT THE FIRM THE THEED OF BOTHING, ARE NOT ISSUES THAT AFFICE THE FRUIT. THE THREE COST-DRESS.

ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO DENY ANY AFFILITATION WITH THE

- 16. WHILE THE FRONT GROUPS ARE CAPABLE OF MOUNTING RELATIVELY LOUGOT OPERATIONS SUCH AS CHORCH TENCHES AND MIDLENT DEPONSTRATIONS, THEY HAVE FARLED CONFLETELY IN THOBELIZING THE MASEC, HAS CALLED FOR BY THE FILE CORRESPOND IN FACT, FEMER AND FEVER PROPIE TEEM TO BE TAKING PART IN THESE EVENTS. AT THIS FOIRT OF IS UNCLEAR IN THE CALC OF POPULES SUPPORT HAS DRIVEN THE FROM GROUPS 1870 INCREASINGLY DESPERATE ECTIONS OR IT THE MIGLET ACTIONS ORDERED IN THESE MASTELLOTIONS FROM THE FILM HAVE FREIGHTERED OFF POTRETICAL DEMONSTRATORS.
- 17. THERE IS NO DOVET THAT THE GROUPS ARE SERRING TO CREATE A HARTER OR PLATTES. THEY NOW MAYE THE WORAL SUPPOSEDLY RUN OVER LICE THE EMECOSY ON MINT 13, THE OFFICE OF THE CO-HARRES WAS BORNESC ON MAY 23, AND ON MAY 31, WATS FRONT OF PRECISE POSTITLED WAS SHOT IN A DETECTION ON IN FRONT OF PRECISE POSTITLED WAS SHOT IN A DETECTION OF SERVICE OVER BY THE FRONTS TO THE CHERGE THAT THE NOMAN WAS RUN OVER BY THE FRONTS TO SUITAOUT FOUNDATION THE SOME ANY ICC-MARKES AND THE PROBLEM AND WAS BEEN THE NOME IN THE SALVADOR, RASING SERIOUS OVESTIONS ABOUT WHAT RAPPENED AND WHO PLANTED THE BORNE. THE CRIME, NOR WOULD THEY ALLOW AN FRI BORN EXPERT TO CHARMES THE CRIME, NOR WOULD THEY ALLOW AN FRI BORN EXPERT TO CHARME THE CRIME, NOR WOULD THEY ALLOW AN FRI BORN EXPERT TO CHARME THE DEADLY SHOT INFELLS OR WAS SHOT BY FIRM, MITTERES OR PRESON GRANDS IS STILL IN DISPUTE. FELLOW UNITS LEACERS REFUSED TO TAKE WITH TO A ROSPITLAL FOR TEACHTORY AND MAYE MET HIM IN HIDING, REPORTEDLY ON THE DISPOSIT CAMPUS.
- 18. THE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS TOUGHER WITH THE EMEDICADE OF RECENT TORMS GROUP ACTIONS MALE THE ATE ACCUST THE OF A DEADLE PLAN SCRIPT BEING ACTED OUT ON THE STREETS OF SALVADORADS AND OF WILL-FLANING LABOURD TO THE ACCUST AND ACTION OF SALVADORADS AND OF WILL-FLANING LABOURDESS IN THE WHITED STAILS AND EVEROFE ARROWS WERE ADDITIONALS. IN THE WHITED STAILS AND EVEROFE ARROWS WITHOUT THE STAILS AND EVEROFE ARROWS WITHOUT THE STAILS AND EVEROFE ARROWS WITHOUT THE STAILS AND EVEROFE ARROWS WITHOUT THE STAILS AND EVEROFE ARROWS WITHOUT THE STAILS AND EVEROFE ARROWS WITHOUT THE STAILS AND EVEROFE ARROWS WITHOUT THE STAILS AND EVEROFE ARROWS WITHOUT THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH THE STAIL ARROWS WITH T

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REGITS (CO-MADRES), LHEDE 100085 (MTD), THE BIOPLATED

REGITS (S), THE UNIVERSATE 1825-FELD , AND TROLTY ON

PRIORIEST (COPPES) LETHIC THESE 100-FES, THESE 600-FE

RAYE COLLECTED FUNDS, DOBOUTED TOURS FOR POLITICAL

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ARROAD IN THEIR HINDLESS COPP TO FLAY THEIR APPOINTED

BOLES, THE FROM: SCOUND HAVE BEEN LEFT WITHOUT IS FIG LEAT

10 COVER THE MASIES CERTAINT, BELGATIONANCE BETWEEN THE FRUN

AND THERSELVES. THESE 6400-FS ARE NO LONSER FRONTS

OPERATING IN THE FORZY LEGALITY OF BAPELY NON-HIOLENT

POLITICAL ACTIVITY - THEY ARE PART AND PATCEL OF THE FIRM APPRIATUS READY TO USE NITY PEARS INCESSARY TO BEING MARKIST-LEWINIST GOVERNMENT TO POWER IN EL SELVIDOR

19 DEPARTMENT HAY WISE TO DISSENIENTE THIS IMPORTATION HORE MIDELY TO EUROPEAR POSTS, INTERNATIONAL BUTTER ALGETS ORGANIZATIONS, AND HERBERS OF CONCRESS. UNDOOTE WHITEHERS

100th Congress
1st Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

No. 6

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET SPECIAL OPERATIONS

A STUDY BY THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

prepared at the request of the SPECIAL OPERATIONS PANEL

OF THE

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION



APRIL 28, 1987

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ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
LES ASPIN, WISCONSIN, CHARMAN

April 28, 1987

NELLINE L. BICKERSCH, M. AMMINA ROUBERT & BADDHAIL CALIFORNA STORM & BADDHAIL CALIFORNA STORM & BADDHAIL CALIFORNA STORM & SHOW JERRY LARDY & HOPKERS, ESPITICKY GOSETT W BANG, BEDWIAN BURCHAIL & HANTER, CALIFORNA BURCHAIL & HANTER, CALIFORNA BURCHAIL & HANTER, CALIFORNA BURCHAIL & HANTER, CALIFORNA BURCH & HANTER, CALIFORNA MINES Y MORRESTY, TEMAS SEE STALL GAMES

S. KAN WINDLESS STAFF BREETON

Honorable Les Aspin Chairman Committee on Armed Services U. S. House of Representatives Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the Readiness Subcommittee and its Special Operations Panel, I herewith forward a copy of a study commissioned by the Special Operations Panel entitled "U. S. and Soviet Special Operations." This study was prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress and was authored by Mr. John M. Collins, Senior Specialist in National Defense.

In order that this report may be shared with our colleagues, I request your authorization to print the study as a committee print.

In appreciation,

Sincerely,

Barl D. Hutto

Chairman, Special Operations

Approved for printing: April 28, 1987.

To:

U.S. special operations forces, military and civilian, whose contributions to national defense are needed and unique, because they dare to be different.



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U.S. AND SOVIET SPECIAL OPERATIONS

John M. Collins Senior Specialist in National Defense December 23, 1986

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FOR EWORD

The United States, Soviet Union, associates on both sides, and third parties conduct special operations in "peacetime" and war. This Panel therefore asked John M. Collins, Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Library of Congress, to appraise U.S. competence and suggest optional ways to improve U.S. posture (see request letter on the following page).

His report provides top-level policymakers, planners, and supervisors a broad perspective, because it ranges widely, taking pains to explain why U.S. and Soviet policies, programs, and performance are so different. Perhaps 40-50 highly-respected professionals critiqued the draft (see Acknowledgements). Many useful amendments followed.

The author contends that "virtually every U.S. macro command/control, planning, and SOF force posture problem derives mainly from misunderstandings. Few members of the U.S. Government and military establishment fully appreciate special operations threats, capabilities, limitations, and relationships with the rest of our security apparatus." Five other findings merit repetition:

- --Humans are more important than hardware.
- --Their quality is more important than quantities.

- --Special operations forces (SOF) cannot be mass-produced.
- -- Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.
- -- Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.

The glossary contains many special operations definitions that the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms omits and modifies others realistically. It clearly differentiates, for example, "low-intensity conflict" (a form of warfare) from "special operations" (a capability). The identification of "freedom fighter" depends on motives, not actions, and "terrorist" on actions, not motives. The 322 source notes facilitate further study, because most contain multiple entries.

John Collins, in short, has produced a special operations handbook that could serve the Congress and the Executive Branch for a long time.

Earl Dutto

Earl Hutto Chairman Special Operations Panel

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Congressman Earl Hutto (D.-Fl.), Chairman of the Special Operations Panel, House Armed Services Committee, started this study in September 1985, when he requested an unclassified survey "covering the complete range of U.S.-Soviet competition in this complex field, which is assuming ever greater importance." Tom Tamura, his Legislative Director, working closely with Ted Lunger, a professional staff member on the Readiness Subcommittee, supervised publication.

A parade of special operations experts provided indispensable advice and assistance during production, reviewed various versions for factual accuracy, emphasis, and interpretations, then recommended additions, deletions, and other amendments. Central points of contact contributed directly and, in many instances, collated input from assistants. I salute them all, including those I cannot name.

Two retired Army generals gave invaluable guidance. "Barbwire Bob" Kingston was my basic sounding board for the full year. Richard G. Stilwell scrubbed two drafts. Both belong to DOD's Special Operations Advisory Group (SOPAG), and both are "voices of experience" with different perspectives. Reviewers assigned to Central Intelligence Agency must remain anonymous. Several Defense Department officials were particularly helpful: Lynn Rylander and Lt. Col. Tim Davidson, Directorate for Special Planning (OSD); Ed Abood, Special Advisory Staff (OSD); Col. Bob

Murphy, Col. Gene Russell, and Lt. Col. Mike Roche (JSOA); Lt. Col. Rick Kiper and Majors Andy Berdy, Jack Caplin, and Don Jagger (Army); Capt. Ted Grabowski and Lt. Bill McRaven (Navy); Col. John Roberts (Air Force); Maj. Bobbie Martin (Marine Corps); Dr. Jack Dziak and Capt. Rick Brown (DIA); Col. Paul Fisher (1st SOCOM); Capt. Bill Burgess (6th Infantry Division, Fort Richardson, Alaska).

Colleagues in the Library of Congress, who asked hard questions, were also sources of information that kept me from straying too far afield in their subject areas: Senior Specialists John Hardt and Joe Whelan (Soviet Affairs); Ray Celada (American Public Law); Stan Heginbotham (Chief, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division); his deputy, Bob Sutter; Larry Storrs (Latin America), Ray Copson (Africa), Rich Cronin (most of Asia), and Clyde Mark (Middle East); Dick Grimmett (economic and military assistance); Ted Galdi (political economy); Joel Woldman (public information); Steve Bowman and Jim Wootten (assorted aspects of special operations). Jim Robinson, Chief of the CRS Review Section, clarified imprecise words and phrases. Winston Woodland, Carolyn Hatcher, and Ida Eustis as usual supplied unbeatable library support. Jeanne Hamilton arranged for Art Services, Inc., to final form. Dianne Rennack turned my "chicken-track" writing into professionally styled text and tables. Finally, I thank Swift, my spouse, whose special operations at home were a huge help.

Many participants, in short, can take partial credit for any bouquets the report attracts, but are absolved of any blame, because none ever saw the final product before publication.

John M. Collins

Senior Specialist in National Defense

BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I-I took the one less travelled by,
And that has made all the difference.

Robert Frost
The Road Not Taken

Soviet leaders, in their quest for a favorable correlation of forces, deploy a panoply of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional military power. 1/ They also take a less travelled road, marked "Special Operations," trying to outflank rivals at global, theater, and local levels across the politicomilitary spectrum. Vehicles include covert/clandestine activities of all kinds, with particular attention to insurgencies, transnational terrorism, and psychological operations (psyop). De facto proxies augment Moscow's capabilities, when direct Soviet involvement might be imprudent or too expensive. Massive internal security measures simplify counter-terrorism and make it difficult for counterrevolutions to flourish at home or in satellite states. Overall performance is by no means perfect, but regard for special operations remains unflagging.

U.S. appreciation, defined narrowly in mainly military terms, is

trendy and intermittent. Elite Ranger battalions, lionized for daring deeds during World War II, later left Army rolls for 35 years, until admirers restored them. Green Berets, briefly popular when Kennedy was President, fell from favor for a decade after the Vietnam War, before they began to revive. Psyop, which should underpin or supplement most special operations, attracts scant attention. Tactics outshine strategies. Forces outrank employment concepts, which presently emphasize so-called "low-intensity" conflicts that U.S. leaders largely overlooked when nuclear deterrence and NATO defense were their only serious national security concerns. 2/*

This unclassified net assessment and critique has a three-fold purpose:

--To compare U.S. and Soviet special operations competence;
--To isolate resultant U.S. problems; and

^{*} Some senior U.S. cificials believe that "special operations" and "low-intensity conflict (LIC) are interchangeable terms, but they are not synony-mous. LIC is a form of warfare that may slight special operations or make them the centerpiece. Special operations, which constitute capabilities, can complement every type of combat, regardless of intensity.

-- To establish objective standards for improvements.

ja. .

Chapters 1-3 cover U.S. and Soviet priorities, force postures, concepts, and performance, with particular attention to relative strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and vulnerabilities. Chapter 4 silhouettes U.S. shortcomings and lists requirements that corrective courses of action should observe. Chapter 5 compiles findings. Annex A, flagged throughout the basic text for easy reference, summarizes tasks across the conflict spectrum; describes skills needed to accomplish them successfully differentiates unipurpose from mathiarpose special operations rouses (SOP); then outlines command/control, accouterments, and esoteric support requirements. It also addresses tradeoffs between political, economic, military, social, and psychological tools, which vary in value, depending on goals, targets, and available time. Discussion throughout is designed to make fundamental information available in minimum time. Documentation, which provides depth, facilitates further study. Several figures graphically compare U.S. and Soviet special operations. A glossary (Annex B) and list of abbreviations (Annex C) clarify many terms in this arcane field.

Special operations, as defined herein, embrace a wide range of unorthodox, comparatively low-cost, potentially high-payoff, often covert or clandestine methods that national, subnational, and theater leaders may employ independently in "peacetime" or to support nuclear, biological, chemical, and/or conventional warfare of low-, mid-, and high-intensity. Special operations forces (SOF), which are small, carefully selected,

and superlatively trained for specific rather than general purposes, can accomplish some missions unassisted, but non-SOF formations often are synergistic, as well as essential.

U.S. "core" SOF, for example, are confined to covert action components of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); military elements assigned to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC); Army Special Forces and the Ranger Regiment; Navy SEAL teams with delivery units; and 2^d Air Division, plus (some say) search and rescue squadrons.3/* Those forces, however, cannot perform foreign internal defense (FID) or unconventional warfare (UW) missions una sisted. Psyop and civil affairs assets, among others, are equally (sometimes more) important. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies are the sine qua non for KGB Border Guards counterterrorism. and MVD Internal Troops are not strictly SOF, but the Soviet State relies extensively on their counterrevolutionary capabilities. Appraisals that overlook such relationships put special operations in false perspective, and ensure that the whole will be less than the sum of its parts.

The consequent compendium is intended as a tool to help U.S. policymakers and planners determine the optimum civilian/military mix, size, structure, and characteristics of U.S. special operations forces, together with proper doctrines, strategies, and tactics for their employment. It takes political, legal, moral, and budgetary limitations into account, and pays particular attention to pertinent trends that could increase or reduce future needs.

^{*} Chapter 2 describes each component in some detail.

Chapter 1

COMPARATIVE PRIORITIES

Dissimilar aspirations, institutions, cultures, experience, threat perceptions, and security problemsolving styles are a few among many factors that make U.S. and Soviet special operations very different.

The United States is a democracy responsive to people steeped in Judeo-Christian ethics, who generally respect the spirit, as well as the letter, of laws; fight "fairly," in accord with "rules;" and find "dirty tricks" repugnant. Free and competitive news media representatives make it difficult for the government to conduct secret operations. Safeguards against aggression depend primarily on deterrence and defense, defined mainly in straightforward military terms. U.S. leaders normally acknowledge a sharp boundary between peace and war (many believe the latter is an aberration, despite conclusive evidence to the contrary), 1/ and severely restrict domestic security activities. Traditionalists in charge of our military establishment dislike elites. Those proclivities, in various combinations, account for the low priority U.S. policymakers historically have assigned most special operations. They also limit allowable targets, as well as techniques.2/

The Soviet Union, conversely, is a totalitarian state governed by a small, secretive group of atheistic activists, selected by Communist Party competition, rather than popular will, who are guided by Leninist convictions that ends justify means. Carefully controlled news media shape public opinion, which has very limited influence. Leaders remain dedicated to revolution, which they hope will weaken, and eventually replace, non-Marxist governments everywhere. A favorable correlation of forces, according to their calculations, often depends more on sociopolitical strength than on military power.3/ So-called "peaceful coexistence" is not a substitute for combat, but a form of indirect conflict that replaces conventional military assaults with clandestine violence and overt nonlethal activities. Soviet leaders consequently have found special operations inviting since 1917.4/

SOVIET CONSISTENCY

Consistently strong Soviet emphasis on offensive and defensive special operations, as defined by this study, spans the complete scope of politico-military competition.

Some tasks receive more attention than others, but all options seem open (Figures 1 and 2).*

Stress on subversion and psyop is strong in "peacetime," as well as hot and cold wars. Straightforward propaganda, disinformation, and infrastructure development in foreign countries appear to predominate.5/ The Soviet Constitution promises support for "national liberation" movements by insurgents who might help "ensure international conditions favorable for . . . consolidating the p o s i t i o n o f w o r l d socialism . . . "6/ Soviet policy-makers seem somewhat more moderate about transnational terrorism, 7/ perhaps because they can neither control practitioners nor predict outcomes of such free-form combat.8/ No such vacillation is evident at mid- and high-intensity conflict levels, where Soviet concepts indicate that special operations customarily complement other kinds of warfare. Raids, ambushes, sabotage, "surgical" strikes against key enemy personnel, and unique intelligence missions all are important.9/

Internal security, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, shares top priority with defense against external aggression. 10/ Long-standing Soviet policies, presently expressed as the Brezhnev Doctrine, "resolutely oppose the export and import of counterrevolution" anywhere in the socialist sphere. Their logic rejects the right of self-determination. "Each Communist Party is free in applying the principles of Marxist-Leninism... in its own country, but it cannot deviate from these

principles . . . " The Kremlin, in short, considers all socialist gains irreversible and "defends" that status quo when required by invading allied states, as rebels discovered in the German Democratic Republic (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979 to present). 11/

Low-priority tasks fit four categories: mainly conventional conflicts limit special operations by definition; direct involvement of Soviet SOF in transnational terrorism is nearly nil; political, economic, and social reform to strengthen popular support of foreign regimes never has been a Soviet objective; Soviet doctrine reduces interest in, and needs for, unit exfiltration.

U.S. INCONSISTENCY

U.S priorities overlook a large slice of the conflict spectrum, and in any case are inconsistent. Figures 1 and 2 reflect the mid-1980s, when military special operations, unpopular after the Vietnam War, reached a periodic peak. Central Intelligence Agency and its covert activities are still in a trough.

Peacetime psyop to support U.S. strategies is low priority, compared with focused Soviet efforts, despite increased emphasis since President Reagan took office. Theater and tactical applications, often after-thoughts, are usually slighted. 12/This nation is not innocent of subversion--actions in Iran (1953).

^{*} Section 1, Annex A relates special operations to cold war, as well as low-, medium-, and high-intensity conflicts. Section 2 explains tasks and skills.

Guatemala (1954), Cuba (early 1960s), and Chile (1970-73) are among those most often cited--but the priority, which never was high, has been exceedingly low since Congress tightened control. 13/

The Reagan Doctrine, freely interpreted to mean "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," fosters military and economic assistance on a modest scale for anti-communist insurgencies and resistance movements. Priority for such support, however, is much higher in principle than in practice, and few advocate more active U.S. participation. 14/ America's decisionmakers exclude domestic and transnational terrorism, despite Soviet contentions to the contrary, 15/ and legally proscribe political assassinations which, directly or indirectly, they condoned in decades past.*16/ AirLand Battle doctrine pays lip service to SOF intelligence, direct action, deception, and psyop missions, 17/ but the Department of Defense as a general rule slights special operations during mid- and high-intensity conflicts.

Counterinsurgency, which fell from favor after the Vietnam War, is enjoying a revival in parts of the Executive Branch, but congressional inhibitions and preconditions

proposed by the Secretary of Defense severely limit active U.S. combat involvement. 18/ Counterterrorism has been a matter of importance since former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, in his first news conference, branded transnational terrorism as "the ultimate abuse of human rights." George P. Shultz, his successor, declared that "democracies must... tackle this menacing problem or else they will not be in much of a position to tackle other kinds of problems." President Reagan refers to "atrocities which have shocked the conscience of the world." Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, seem less enthusiastic when it comes to military countermeasures. 19/

Uncertain priorities provide a shaky platform for U.S. special operations planners, who cannot be sure which view will prevail. It is also difficult to select personnel and train units, when the popularity of roles changes rapidly. The purpose of Army Special Forces, for example, has switched from direct action to civic action and amorphous middle grounds since the first group was activated in 1952.20/ Every U.S. special operations component experiences similar problems.21/

^{*} U.S. efforts to assassinate Castro backfired. U.S. officials were privy to plots that caused violent deaths of Lumumba (Congo), Trujillo (Dominican Republic), Schneider (Chile), and Diem (Vietnam). 22/

-6-

Figure 1

U.S. AND SOVIET SPECIAL OPERATIONS PRIORITIES RELATED TO CONFLICT INTENSITIES 1/ 1986 (Author Judgements)

•	U.S. PRIORITIES	SOVIET PRIORITIES
Cold War 2/	LOW	High
Low Intensity 2/ Insurgency, Resistance 3/ Counterinsurgency 3/ 4/ Transnational Terrorism 5/ Counterterrorism Hainly Conventional	Medium NA	Hoderate
Medium-Intensity	Low	High
High Intensity	Low	High

- 2/ Priorities indicate politico-military interest, not the extent of activities nor their type. They are not determined by SOF.
- 3/ The Reagan Doctrine in principle supports the U.S. priority shown. A residual "Vietnam syndrome" produces a very low priority in practice.
- 4/ U.S. and Soviet special operations take precedence during Phase I insurgencies (underground activities). Conventional military power tends to predominate during Phase II (which adds guerrilla warfare) and even more during Phase III (which adds larger-scale armed combat).
- 5/ The United States neither instigates nor supports terrorism, as defined in this document.

Figure 2

U.S. AND SOVIET SPECIAL OPERATIONS PRIORITIES RELATED TO TASKS (Author Judgements)

•	U.S.	SOVIET
	PRIORITIES	PRIORITIES
Direct Action		
Assassination 1/, 2/	NA	
	NA	
Hostage Taking 2/		
Random Killing & Maiming 2/		
Sabotage		
Capture 3/		
Termination 4/	H18µ	High
Ambushes	H18h	High
Raids	High	H1gh
Rescue		}
Hostages	High	Lov
Military POWs 5/		Low
		ļ
Indirect Action		
Subversion	FOA	High
Psychological Operations		
Hilitary Assistance 6/	Moderate	Moderate
Economic Assistance 6/		
Refore	Moderate	Low
		!
Intelligence 1/		
Unique Reconnaissance	Moderate	Moderate
Unique Surveillance	Moderate	Moderate
Target Acquisition		
Key Personnel	[OM	High
Critical Weapons	FOA	Moderate
0. ==41		}
Survival		
Infiltration		
Peacetime		
Wartine	HIRU	HIRD
Exfiltration (Wartime)		
Preplanned		
Search & Rescue		
Escape & Evasion		
Site Security		
Public Education		HIAN
<u>-</u>		//

- 1/ U.S. SOF are forbidden to assassinate in peacetime. The high Soviet priority applies only to vartime operations.
- $\underline{2}/$ Both superpowers back associates that sometimes employ tactics shown, but the United States disapproves in principle.
- 3/ Legal steps seize individuals or groups engaged in illegal and/or warlike activities.
- 4/ Legal steps to kill individuals or groups engaged in illegal and/or warlike activities.
- $\underline{57}$ -U.S. attempts to retrieve MIAs from Southeast Asia are diplomatic, rather than SOF rescue operations.
- $\underline{6}/$ Security assistance primarily to recipients engaged in insurgencies, resistance, transnational terrorism, or countering such threats.
- $\underline{\mathcal{I}}/$ HUMINT by individuals and groups other than those engaged in full-respionage.

Chapter 2

COMPARATIVE ESTABLISHMENTS

The Soviets possess a large, diversified special operations establishment that is relatively simple and synchronized. The U.S. counterpart, small by comparison and less comprehensive in purpose, is complex and loosely linked.

HIGH COMMAND AND CONTROL

It would be hard to devise two more different special operations command and control structures than those of the United States and Soviet Union.* The former is fragmented. The latter features single management of three closely connected components.

SOVIET CENTRALIZATION

"The leading and guiding force . . . of all state organizations . . . is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," according to Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution (Figure 3).1/ Party leaders, who

also hold key governmental posts, are in total control at the top. The Politburo and Central Committee set priorities, shape or approve policy for, direct, and supervise the Committee for State Security (KGB), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and Ministry of Defense (MOD), which plan and implement special operations. Several Central Committee departments control strategic psyop.


KGB, which performs by far the greatest assortment of special operations tasks, also influences and oversees MVD and MOD activities (Figure 4).** Its First Chief Directorate conducts so-called "active measures" abroad in "peacetime," with particular attention to subversion and disinformation; infiltrates individual agents and teams into hostile territory for special missions that include target acquisition and sabotage; administers economic assistance to selected insurgents and Soviet associates embattled by resistance movements or counterrevolutionaries; and arranges "wet affairs" (assassinations) whenever required.3/


 $[\]star$ Section 3A, Annex A outlines some characteristics of centralized and decentralized control.

^{**} Espionage, a basic KGB function, is beyond the scope of this report.

-10-

Figure 3
SOVIET SPECIAL OPERATIONS HIGH COMMAND





NOTE: MO and GOF become fronts under three theaters in wartime.

-11-

Figure 4

SOVIET HIGH COMMAND RELATED TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASKS (Author Judgements)

-	KC	HVD	MOD
-			
Direct Action			
Assassination 1/			х
Abduction 1/	X		x
Hostage Taking 1/			
Random Killing & Maining 1/	x	x	
Sabotage	x		x
Capture	x	x	x
Termination	x	x	x
Ambushes 2/	x	x	x
Raids 2/	x	x	x
Rescue			
Hostages	x	x	
Military POWs			x
,	i		
Indirect Action	}		
Subversion	x		x
Psychological Operations			x
Military Assistance 3/			
Economic Assistance			
	NA	NA	NA
RELULA		i	
Intelligence			i
Unique Reconnaissance			x
Unique Surveillance			x
Target Acquisition	-		i "
Key Personnel		y	x
Critical Weapons			
Cilical Heapons			1
Survival			
Infiltration	İ	į	!
Sleepers	x		x
Other			х
Exfiltration 4/	į	i	
Preplanned	x		x
Search & Rescue 5/			x
Escape & Evasion			x
Liscape a Livation	`	ì	1
Security			ı
Personnel	x	į	1
Installations		, 	:
Population Control		ı	•
Armed Forces Control			
		!	i
Border Control	:	;	:
Communications Control	:	! !	
Rear Area Security			x
Convoy Security		x	!
Public Education	x	[!
	l	L	<u> </u>

^{1/} Rarely employed transnationally by Soviet SOF in "peacetime," but the Soviets support de facto proxies who routinely undertake such tasks. High priority tasks in wartime.

^{2/} Military and paramilitary only; includes KGB Border Guards and MVD Internal Security troops.

^{3/} Includes training for terrorists.

^{4/} Exfiltration is an infrequent operation. Mainly individuals, except for MOD units.

^{5/} KGB search and rescue is by Border Guards.

Other KGB directorates, which specialize in counterintelligence, seek out and stifle potential sources of opposition at home. Civilians (especially ethnic minorities, who make up half of the population), members of the armed services, and foreigners are subject to close and constant scrutiny. The Ninth Directorate does nothing but safeguard Party leaders and key installations, such as nuclear weapon stockpiles and critical communications. KGB Border Guards patrol Soviet frontiers to keep inhabitants in and intruders out.4/ The Ministry of Defense is responsible for military special operations. Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of its General Staff recruits, organizes, equips, and trains agents and units that serve 3 theaters, 16 Military Districts (MD), 4 Groups of Forces (GOF) in peacetime (fronts in war), and all four fleets. Whether GRU, like the KGB, exercises central control is unclear (only one unclassified source--Viktor Suvorov--is flatly affirmative), but the MD and GOF, better able to coordinate nuclear, chemical, biological, conventional, and special operations, probably take charge. The Tenth General Staff Directorate handles military assistance.5/

The MVD supplements KGB and MOD counterterror/counterinsurgency capabilities on home territory. Its ubiquitous militia, a national police force, is concerned essentially with internal security. Paramilitary troops, similar to, but less elite than, KGB Border Guards, provide a backup. They also perform prosaic peacetime tasks, such as convoy and labor camp safekeeping. Rear area defense against guerrillas, saboteurs, and assassins is a salient wartime duty. Some regiments, however, are trained and equipped for offensive operations. NKVD, the MVD predecessor, followed Soviet advances outside the homeland late in World War II; MVD formations helped suppress Czech rebels in 1968.6/

Soviet special operations high command lines, taken in toto, are neither as centralized nor quite as clean as Figure 3 suggests. Serious rivalry sometimes is evident. Nevertheless, they are simple compared with the U.S. apparatus. Deliberate interlocks and overlaps to ensure that all tasks are well covered degrade efficiency to some degree, but not effectiveness.

U.S. DECENTRALIZATION

Decentralization dominates the top-heavy U.S. special operations structure. The President, assisted by the National Security Council (NSC) and other advisers, exerts chief executive powers. Congress, which controls force authorizations and funds, also initiates, approves, or precludes legislative change and oversees sensitive activities (Figure 5). Nine committees participate directly in that process: Armed Services (2), Appropriations (2), Select Committees on Intelligence (2), Senate Judiciary (Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism), Senate Foreign Relations, and House Foreign Affairs. High command arrangements currently are an important concern. 7/ Covert/clandestine programs attract continuing attention.

Six federal departments, three agencies, and the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), plus state and local structures, share U.S. special operations responsibilities (Figure 6)—three times the equivalent Soviet number. The State Department helps shape policy. The Department of Defense (DOD) deploys all military SOF. Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the parent organization of all civilian SOF that conduct covert and clandestine "special activities" overseas.8/Justice, Treasury, Transportation, Energy, and state/local law enforcement units subdivide internal defense of the United States (counterterrorism, counterinsurgency). U.S. Information Agency and the Agency for International Development are respectively occupied with public aspects of psychological operations and economic assistance. No national center connects the lot.9/

Divisiveness also is evident at the next-lower level. There are 10 U.S. participants compared with 6 Soviet, not counting individual psyop elements, whose Soviet equivalents do not show on Figure 3. The Secret Service (Treasury) and U.S. Marshals Service (Justice) safeguard senior U.S. officials. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Border Patrol (both Justice), together with the Coast Guard and Pederal Aviation Administration (both Transportation), include counterterrorism in their charters. No homegrown group has seriously tried to overthrow the U.S. Government by force since the Weatherman faction and Black Panthers announced that intent nearly two decades ago, 10/ but federal SOF of all sorts might have to supplement police and the National Guard, if a serious insurgency ever developed.

The U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force maintained separate special operations establishments through most of 1986. Each dealt directly with the Secretary of Defense, represented by a Deputy Assistant Secretary, and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), whose Chairman gets staff support from a small Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA). Each service allocated SOF to five area-oriented unified commands as directed (European Command, Pacific


Command, Central Command, Southern Command, Atlantic Command). They also fed Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which reported to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS.11/

Central control began to replace that loose arrangement in October 1986, when Congress amended Title 10, United States Code. The new law directs the Secretary of Defense to create for SOF a "major force program category [within DOD's] Five-Year Defense Plan." It also designates an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, whose principal duty is "overall supervision" of those fields, particularly policy formulation, program recommendations, and budgetary proposals. 12/

A unified combatant command that includes all active and reserve SOF in the United States is to be "implemented" not-later-than April 1987, 180 days after President Reagan signed H.Res. 738. Its four-star commander "shall be responsible for, and shall have authority to conduct, all affairs of such command," which prepares subordinate forces "to carry out assigned missions." Priorities, concepts, SOF-peculiar force development, and readiness are particularly important. He monitors SOF personnel management by U.S. military services, advises the Assistant Secretary of Defense about budgetary matters, reviews the capabilities of SOF overseas, and may undertake "a selected special operations mission if directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense." Most SOP employment, however, remains the responsibility of geographicallyoriented unified commands overseas. 13/ Whether the infant Special Operations Command, as it is called, will work well or be largely symbolic depends on the competence of its commander (who must be a well-

<u>+</u>

Figure



- 15 -

Figure 6 U.S. HIGH COMMAND RELATED TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASKS (Author Judgements)

1	PEDEIAL 1/						STATE	LOCAL			
	STATE	USTA	ALD	000	DOT	800	JUSTICE		CLA		
	DEPT		<u> </u>	2/	3/	4/	DEPT 5/	DEPT 6/	1 7/	ı	
Direct Action 8/			ļ								
Sabotage											
Capture							X	x			
Termination				X				X	x		
Ambushes 9/				x						1	
Raide 9/									x		
Rescue	l	1	•		1						
							X				
Military PoWs				x							
ndirect Action		[
Subversion	K			x					x	1	
Psychological	1 .		ŀ				ŀ		ţ		
Operations 10/	K	X		X					x	1	
Operations 10/				x					x		
Proposic Assistance	K		X		,				i		
Reform	X			X					x		
ntelligence		[1						İ	į	
Unique Reconnaissance				x			X	x	x	ļ	
Unique Surveillance				X			x	X	x	!	
Target Acquisition	•	ĺ	l	l	l		ţ	Į.	į.	!	
Key Personnel				x			x	X	x	!	!
Critical Wespons				x			ļ		l	i	
urvival			1		1		Ì		Ì	į	
Infiltration 11/				x			x		x		x
Exfiltration		ĺ	1	İ	ŀ	Į	;	[!	i	<u> </u>
Preplanned				x					x	!	1
Search & Rescue				x			Į	!	!	Ì	}
Search & Rescue				x					x		i
ecurity	}	1		ĺ	•	İ	i	i	į	İ	İ
Parancal 12/								x	!	x	x
Incre11401000 12/				X		x			1		i
Civil Mannethannesses	I				X		X		,		x
Bandan Cantenlaneumannen					x		x			X	
Base Aces Convellyneeses				X			X	X			x
Public Education	x	x		x					••••		x
	i	ĺ	1	:	1	1	!				

- 1/ Congressional oversight, not shown, covers federal policies, programs, budgets, and employment, with particular attention to covert/clandestine operations.
 - 2/ DOD conducts special operations outside the USA, with rare exceptions.
 - 3/ DOT is Department of Transportation
 - 4/ DOE is Department of Energy.
 - 5/ 7BI, Border Patrol, and U.S. Marshale Service jurisdictions are within the USA.
 - 6/ Secret Service operates in the USA and elsewhere, as directed.
 - 2/ CLA jurisdiction is outside the USA, with rare exceptions.
- 8/ Excludes political assasination, which is illegal; also political abduction and terrorist acts listed on Figure 2, because of official and public disapproval.
 - 9/ Military and paramilitary only.

- -

- $\underline{10}/$ Excludes Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which ostensibly are unofficial organizations.
 - 11/ Includes infiltration of subversive and terrorist groups.
 - 12/ Excludes commercial security organizations.

well-qualified organizer and administrator, as well as a special operations specialist), the staff he picks, support from superiors, and cooperation from peers. Joint doctrine, strategies, tactics, plans, and programs, tested by joint training and operations, must precede meaningful progress.

The new law also specifies a Board for Low-Intensity Conflict within the National Security Council. Its purpose is to "coordinate" related U.S. policies, but neither that board nor any existing substitute possesses powers to issue interdepartmental/interagency guidance and compel compliance, unless the President, in accord with "the sense of Congress," names a Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to handle such matters in the MSC and vests him with sufficient clout. 14/ The U.S. special operations apparatus therefore still fosters jurisdictional disputes that appear more serious and widespread than those on the Soviet side, where policymaking and implementation are less fractionated.

FORCE POSTURES

Open source literature about Soviet special operations forces is lean. The personnel strengths, organization, arms, equipment, disposition, and effectiveness of U.S. counterparts are publicly displayed, except for JSOC. America's military and civilian non-SOF organizations routinely handle some special operations, such as

economic assistance and installation security. This section concentrates exclusively on SOF.*

SOVIET SIMPLICITY

Soviet Voyska Spetsial'nogo Maznacheniya, a mixed bag of military and civilian SOF, commonly are called Spetsnaz. KGB forces probably emphasize political missions, while the GRU features war fighting, but boundaries are blurred and overlaps are common. 15/ Psyop is a separate category.

Internal Security SOF

Homeland defense forces, illustrated in Figure 7, are by far the most numerous. There are no reliable organizational charts or counts of police and quasi-civilian officials whose full-time occupation is population control, rather than traditional law enforcement, but KGB Border Guards (230,000) and HVD Security Troops (360,000) both are larger than the active U.S. Marine Corps (199,000). Taken together, they total three-fourths the size of our Army (781,000). Border Guards boast regimental-sized and smaller paramilitary formations, replete with armored vehicles, artillery, light aircraft, and coastal ships. About 30 MVD divisions, organized and armed much like motor rifle divisions, have been identified.16/

^{*} Section 3, Annex A discusses SOF characteristics, accounterments, and support requirements in generic terms.

Offensive Spetsnaz

Vital statistics concerning Soviet offensive SOF are even scarcer and less reliable. How many KGB and GRU operatives (excluding traditional espionage agents) ply their trade in foreign countries is an open question. U.S. authorities, however, generally agree that many deep cover "sleepers," positioned during peacetime in prospective operational areas, lead apparently normal lives waiting to be "awakened" by some signal. They then are expected to perform predesignated tasks, such as assassination and sabotage, or act as pathfinders for other special operations forces. 17/ Proxies supplement or replace Soviet citizens, when conditions for doing so are favorable. Training centers, including those the KGB and GRU support in satellite states, open such options. 18/

Large military Spetsnaz organizations are slightly more visible. U.S. analysts must speculate to some extent about their structure, size, and activities, but new units reportedly are being created and others are being enlarged. Figure 8, derived from data Viktor Suvorov furnished, is incompletely confirmed. He counts 3 Spetsnaz sabotage regiments (one each for Western, South Western, and Far Eastern Theaters), 24 diversionary brigades (one each for 16 military districts, 4 groups of forces, and 4 fleets), a separate company for each of 40-some armies, and GRU intelligence/direct action agents. Surorov estimates the total is 30,000 or more active personnel at full strength. Major formations may function intact, but allegedly are equipped to form small teams for sabotage or other "surgical" missions. The maximum number is about 135 teams per brigade and 15 per separate company. Realistic

training includes practice with mockups of U.S. and allied weapons and installations.19/

Those oft-repeated postulations20/ engender false impressions, and some assertions are shaky. Accurate tallies are difficult to compile, because Spetsnaz units, like chameleons, change color to suit circumstances. Members, who have dedicated training facilities, but no cantonments, uniforms, or insignia of their own, take on the guise of other troops.21/ No theater commands now exist; 10 continental and 4 oceanic subdivisions apparently provide the focus for plans and force develop-Whether interior MDs ment.22/ Whether interior MDs maintain a Spetsnaz brigade apiece is ment.22/ debatable. Designations also mislead. Brigades and regiments, for example, are equivalent in size to U.S. battalions, if estimated manning authorizations are authentic. Spetsnaz naval brigades may be somewhat smaller; some observers believe platoon or company would be a better description. (DIA counts 24 brigades, total active wartime strength 12,000, not 30,000, plus 40,000 reservists with various degrees of proficiency.)23/


Strategic Psyop

Soviet strategic psyop programs at home and abroad are pervasive. Publications and telecommunications all parrot the Communist Party line: two newspapers (Pravda, Izvestia), Tass news service, two periodicals (New Times, International Affairs), Novosti Press, and Radio Moscow constantly trumpet open propaganda. KGB covert and clandestine instruments augment those of the Central Committee.24/ Foreign communist parties, other leftwing factions loyal to Moscow, and unwitting fellow

-18-


Figure 7
KGB BORDER GUARDS AND MVD SECURITY TROOPS

..,



- 1/ KGB Border Guard districts vary in size and composition according to the population, topography, and other factors in each operational area. Average strength is 25,000-30,000. Each district usually controls several detachments roughly equivalent in size to a regiment. Each detachment usually controls several komendatura roughly equivalent in size to a battalion, plus a company-sized maneuver group that amounts to mobile reserves. Each komendatura posts and patrols a particular land or coastal sector.
- 2/ MVD divisions are similar to, but lighter than, Soviet motor rifle divisions. Three regiments per division and 3 battalions per regiment appear to be typical.

SOVIET MILITARY AND NAVAL SPETSNAZ **Derived from Suvorov**



	_	SPETS	NAZ	
	Sabetage Regiments**	Brigades	Seperate Companies	Agent Detachments
Supported Forces				
Theaters (3)	3			3
Frents (20)*				
MO (16)		16		16
GOF (4)		4		4
Fleets (4)		4		4
Armies (4)			41	
Spetsnaz Ferces				
Unit Total	3	24	41	27
Personnel				
Each Unit	700-800	1000-1300	115	
MD, GOF,				80-110
Floets				20-30
Subtetal	2100-2400	24,008-31,000	1715	1680-2320
Grand Total		29,495	37 435	

Det GOF Octachment Group of Forces Ηę **Headquarters**

MD - Military District

Para Parachute
VIP Very Important Persons

Military Districts and Groups of Forces became fronts in wor.
 Not explicitly identified by Viktor Suvorev

travellers facilitate Soviet psyop endeavors around the globe. Fronts, such as the World Peace Council (about 140 branches), the World Federation of Trade Unions (which claims 200 million members), and the International Organization of Journalists are among the most prominent psyop aids, according to most reports.25/

Soviet military psyop remains a mystery. Unclassified sources mention no specialized units, which may be administered at many levels by Deputy Political Officers (Zampolit).

Capsulized Appraisal

Soviet special operations structure is comparatively simple. Most SOP, including those for security purposes, share materiel and some tactics with conventional ground and coastal defense forces. Sophisticated devices are available for covert/clandestine surveillance, communications, killing, and "dirty tricks,"26/ but specialized and expensive delivery vehicles for surreptitious infiltration, such as mini-submarines able to "walk" on harbor bottoms, are rare. Most agents and units emphasize skillful techniques, instead of hardware. Bxfiltration by land force teams seems to be low priority; most apparently are expected to disperse and fend for themselves, after accomplishing missions.27/

Offensive Spetsnaz are designed primarily for reconnaissance and direct action missions during mid- to high-intensity conflicts. Preparations apparently concentrate very little on tasks that call for a lighter touch, as unimpressive performance in Afghanistan seems to confirm.28/

The quality of Soviet SOF, deployed in such great quantities, inevitably is uneven. Not all are equally elite or well trained. KGB and GRU, which divide some responsibilities, sometimes seem to work at cross purposes. "Sleepers" cannot be left alone indefinitely, but long-term relationships with "handlers," who must reconfirm their reliability, are difficult to maintain without arousing rival suspicions. Assorted exploits and scenarios nevertheless suggest that high-class assets are numerous enough to pose serious threats about the globe and discourage dissidence at home.29/

U.S. COMPLEXITY

The U.S. system, which parcels out special operations to SOF in several coequal and sometimes competitive organizations, is highly complex. Some components are unable to accomplish assigned tasks without assistance from, or collaboration by, forces from other compartments. Employment concepts put a premium on expensive technology.

Internal Security SOF

There is no U.S. equivalent of the massive internal security apparatus that Soviet leaders deploy to keep the lid on domestic dissidence, subversion, insurgency, and/or transnational terrorism. Only four U.S. elements devote full-time to those defensive special operations tasks: about 40 percent of the FBI, including its hostage rescue team; 30/60 percent of the Secret Service (the remainder covers counterfeiting); 31/anti-skyjacking air marshals that

belong to FAA; $\underline{32}$ / and, if so directed, DOD's JSOC, which concentrates on counterterrorism. Some or all such missions occasionally occupy small parts of the U.S. Coast Guard, 33/ Border Patrol, Marshals Service, and state/local law enforcement units, such as special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams. The National Guard, under state or federal control, could help suppress insurrections, but has not been needed for that purpose since the Civil War. Altercations such as Little Rock school integration (1957) and Kent State riot control (1970) were not attempts to overthrow the U.S. Government.34/

CIA SOF

Most CIA SOF are civilians, who mingle with selected military personnel on loan from U.S. armed services. Total numbers are classified, but certainly small, because they conduct covert special activities individually or rely extensively on foreign resources (such as tribes in Laos and Vietnam) for large-scale operations, according to accounts by advocates and detractors alike.35/

Military SOF

U.S. military SOF bear little resemblance to those in the Soviet establishment, in terms of structure, tasks, and accounterments. Our Army maintains the largest and most versatile agglomeration. Many U.S. SOF are "switch hitters" suitable for offensive and defensive missions as required (see Figure 9).

Joint Special Operations Command

JSOC was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1981 to consolidate control of, help develop doctrine for, train, deploy, and employ DOD hostage rescue and other counterterror elements. reportedly have expanded since then to encompass additional direct action missions that require rare skills. Open publications, which the Pentagon does not confirm or deny, * indicate that principal components include the Army's Delta Force and parts of the 160th Aviation Group, especially superspecialized helicopter elements nicknamed the "Night Stalkers"), plus sea-air-land (SEAL) Team 6. Elements of the 2d Air Division assist as required. JSOC enjoys high priority for equipment and personnel, which approximate 1,000 highly-trained specialists.36/

^{*} The standard Pentagon response to questions about JSOC is: "The U.S. Government has trained forces and equipment from all four services to cope with terrorist incidents. We have also said that command and control elements for these forces exist and have been exercised. These elements report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as do other command and control elements for military operations. We do not want to comment further on any details concerning the circumstances under which these forces may be deployed, their identity, or tactics."

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	Delta	Ave Cp	Forces	Esnaere	Payop	Affairs		SEALS	82008	Heles		Cuashi pe	(80C)
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 $\frac{1}{2}$ / Specialization is compared to other SOF. SEALs are more specialized. but less versatile, than Army Special Forces, because their nursel area of operation is confined to coasts and inland unterways.

 $\frac{2}{L}$ - wreatest eiger-aft specialization applies only to those intended turishment elamestime flights while blacked out.

3/ Indicates primary emphasis for forces that have additional utility. "P" is permissive unvironment only.

4/ Army Special Forces can conduct strike and sabotage missions, but primarily teach those subjects to indigenous forces.

2/ Submarines may be strategic (intertheater) or tactical (intratheater) transportation.

ABBREVIATIONS

Aviation C)

Command, Control, Compunications


Fiv Foreign Internal Defense Croup

Marine Amphibious Unit

(NA) (Special Operations Capable)

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in contracts with earthful



JSOC originally reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By law, it now is subsumed in the unified command for special operations. Its designation probably will change to avoid confusion.

Army SOF

1st Special Operations command (SOCOM), activated at Fort Bragg, NC, on October 6, 1983, is a major subordinate element of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).* It comprises an organizational umbrella for active Army SOF in the United States, except those under JSOC jurisdiction. The current contingent includes 4 Special Forces groups, a Ranger regiment, an aviation group

(battalion size), a psychological warfare group,** and civil affairs battalion (See Figure 10 at the end of this chapter). SOCON also provides a rotation base for SOF personnel and units overseas, which come under operational control of unified commands where they are temporarily or permanently deployed. Army Reserve (USAR) SOF receive training policy and guidance directly from FORSCOM, which relays instructions to Army National Guard (ARNG) SOF through state Adjutants General.37/

Special Forces. There is no Soviet counterpart of U.S. Army Special forces (SF), which lack sufficient firepower for shock action, staying power for sustained combat, and mobility for use as maneuver units.

^{*} U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) retains control of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, MC, which is part of its school system.

^{**} The DOD Psyop Master Plan, approved by the Secretary of Defense, will separate the 4th Psyop Group from 1st 80COM at some unspecified date.

Deactivation late in the Vietnam War reduced active SF groups from 7 to 3 between 1969 and 1974, and left the residue substantially understrength. Rebuilding restored one in 1984, by stripping an Λ Detachment from each company in the three active groups; another will be reborn in 1990-91. All 5 are (or will be) stationed in the United States, but 3 subordinate battalions and 2 separate SF detachments are permanently deployed abroad.38/

Each group prepares for operations in a particular geographic region. The 1st SF orients on East Asia and the Pacific. The 5th covers Southwest Asia and Mortheast Africa. The 3d SF Group (still on paper) will assume planning responsibilities for sub-Saharan Africa. The 7th and 10th Groups look toward Latin America and Europe/Mediterranean Africa respectively. Two reserve component groups concentrate on Europe, another pair on the Pacific.39/

Every SF group at full strength possesses capabilities to establish a Special Forces Operating Base (SFOB) and two or more satellites, called Forward Operating Bases (FOB), assisted by company and battalion headquarters, known as B and C detachments.40/ Cross-trained experts in each 12-man A detachment (54 per group at full strength) excel at five fundamental pursuits: light weapons; demolitions; field communications; combat intelligence; and paramedical support.41/ Personnel consequently are proficient at raids, ambushes, and sabotage, but employing Green Berets for such purposes when suitable alternatives are available wastes their special talent, which is to develop, organise, equip, train, and direct indigenous military and peramilitary forces in unconventional warfare (UW) and foreign internal defense (FID). UN assists selected insurgents and resistance movements,

with particular attention to subversion, other underground/auxiliary activities, and guerrilia tactics. FID assists friends with counterinsurgency efforts, including military assistance and civic action. Unique reconnaissance and intelligence skills are essential in both instances. So is escape and evasion (E&E).42/

"Force multiplication," rather than direct force application, in short, is the Special Forces forte.43/ Units can perform such functions as an adjunct to nuclear, chemical, and conventional operations during mid- and high-intensity combat, but their primary purpose is low-intensity conflict of types just described.

Rangers. U.S. Army rolls list one Ranger regiment, an elite light infantry organization with three subordinate battalions (strength 575 each). All officers and men eventually will be airborne-ranger qualified, if plans reach fruition. Three teams in the regimental headquarters company are skilled at using self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA), as well as high altitude high opening and high altitude low opening (HAHO, HALO) parachutes.44/

Ranger specialties are quick strike and shock action over short periods, such as raids, ambushes, interdiction, and temporary seizure operations deep in hostile territory, during high-, mid-, and low-intensity conflicts. Recovery of captured personnel and equipment is a less common Ranger task. Long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP), rear area security, and other passive employment fail to exploit Ranger capabilities fully. They are not trainers, but fighters whose "job is to kill people and destroy things."45/

The Ranger regiment is somewhat analogous to a Soviet Spetsnaz brigade, because it is not armed, equipped, or trained to undertake sustained combat missions in a high threat environment. Two 60mm mortar squads in each company comprise the only organic "artillery." Dragon antitank missiles and 90mm recoilless rifles afford the only defense against enemy armor and mechanized formations. Organic air defense weapons are nil. A few communications vehicles afford the only motor transportation. U.S. Rangers, however, normally commit no element smaller than a battalion and retain company integrity in combat, while Spetsnaz brigades break into many small, semi-autonomous units.46/

Psyop and Civil Affairs. Psychological operations and civil affairs (CA) have important applications across the spectrum of conflict intensity, regardless of warfare type, as Figure 9 indicates. Most U.S. military capabilities are vested in the Army, which maintains a 4battalion psyop group and one CA battalion in its active inventory, currently collocated with and subordinate to 1st SOCOM. Reserve components account for 90 percent (9 psyop battalions and three groups; 24 CA companies and three commands; there are no CA battalions).47/

The purpose of Army psyop units, expressed simply, is to apply overt, covert, and clandestine propaganda, or provide advice and hardware for others to do so, in ways that improve U.S. and allied security postures.* Perhaps 90 percent support conventional operations; the remainder complement SOF. Psyop commonly may be more important than military

action in special operations. Civilian audiences may be more important than those in uniform. Typical tasks in support of unconventional warfare (UW), for example, are to help insurgents or resistance groups strengthen their cause, encourage civil disobedience, publicize successes, and disguise or soften failures. Tasks associated with foreign internal defense (FID) conversely assist host country efforts to undercut rebel causes, enlist and consolidate approval of the incumbent regime, encourage defections from the enemy camp, and maintain a favorable U.S. image. 48/

U.S. Army civil affairs units, for which the Soviets have no close analogy, facilitate civil-military cooperation between U.S. armed forces and allied governments at national and local levels, before, during, and after hostilities or other emergencies, in accord with host nation support agreements. They may also exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority in occupied territory. Fundamental functions in any event are to identify and coordinate the acquisition of indigenous resources and facilities, such as labor, transportation, communications, supplies, and miscellaneous services; minimize civilian interference with U.S. military activities (refugee movement and crowd control are important concerns); assist military commanders in meeting legal/moral responsibilities to the populace; advise U.S. and host country authorities on civic action; and train allied counterparts.49/

Army psyop and civil affairs forces both have been historically understrength and undertrained.50/

^{*} Section 28, Annex A, summarizes prerequisites for successful psyop.

Some recent progress is evident, but few U.S. planners or combatant SOF in any service appreciate their potential.

Navy SOF

Naval Special Warfare Group (NSWG) One, subordinate to the Surface Force Commander, controls Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams, special boat squadrons, and supporting SOF assigned to U.S. Pacific Fleet, NSWG Two performs the same function for Atlantic Fleet. Both are located in the Continental United States. Three small Naval Special Warfare Units (NSWU), in Puerto Rico, Scotland, and the Philippines, prepare for and control the operations of naval SOF when they forward deploy (See Figure 11 at the end of this chapter). Naval Reserve SOF receive guidance from the appropriate active NSWG, are generally clustered with or located near active forces, and train with them routinely.51/ About one-third, active and reserve, are dedicated SOP for joint special operations. The Navy retains tight control of the rest to support its fleets and amphibious forces.* 52/

SRALS. SRALS, like Army Special Forces, were sharply reduced after the Vietnam War, then revived. Fourteen-man platoons with two squads apiece totalled less than 20 as late as 1981. The current count of 41 platoons will reach 70 by 1990,

according to Pentagon plans. Those figures are significant, because squads and platoons, rather than complete teams, undertake most SEAL missions. 53/

Equipment includes bubbleless closed-circuit underwater breathing apparatus (UBA), open-circuit SCUBA, pumps, compressors, and associated diving support. Steerable parachutes, inflatable rubber raiding craft with power packs, and nonstandard ordnance are regular issue. So are secure voice manpack radios, digital coded burst communications, satellite relay transceivers, and other signal items that SEALs and Special Forces share. Individual skill requirements are extensive.54/

SEAL missions are similar to, but much more specialized than, those of Army Special Forces. targets to reconnoiter and attack along coasts in support of naval operations range from shore-based weapon systems and beach defenses to harbor installations, merchant ships, and men-of-war in port. A wide variety of clandestine infiltration modes are available: submarines (large and small), high-speed surface craft, HAHO/HALO parachutes, and helicopters (surface landing, low-level free fall into water, or rappelling). Exfiltration may be overland, by sea, or by air, including "snatch pickup."** SEALs also SEALs also wage riverine warfare; many, for example, fought in the Mekong Delta during the 1960s. They train naval guerrillas, but not undergrounds, and

^{*} Headquarters of NSWGs One and Two by law must transfer to the new unified command for special operations. What subordinate units the Navy will retain for fleet and amphibious support is not yet resolved.

^{**} Aircraft fitted with the Fulton surface-to-air recovery system (STARS) can extract 1-2 people or 500 pounds of cargo, day or night, from land or sea while flying as fast as 140 knots.

instruct allied SOF in maritime counterinsurgency/counterterrorism techniques.55/

Special Boats. A pair of former Polaris submarines and an attack submarine are being converted for special operations use, but are not yet certified. Plans to double that number eventually will provide U.S. Atlantic and Pacific fleets with three each. All have a "dry-deck" shelter that enables SEALs to load and unload with equipment while the vessel is submerged. Two SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams (SDVT) are equipped with about 10 free-flooding, 6-man mini-submarines apiece, which larger submarines and surface ships transport to objective areas and later retrieve. 56/

U.S. Atlantic and Pacific fleets each possess a special boat squadron (SBS) with a mix of units (SBUs). Coastal units rely mainly on 65-foot Spectre class fast patrol boats (PB) and Seafox, a 36-foot light special warfare craft (SWCL). The former features modular payloads that adapt to patrol, surveillance, interdiction, SEAL insertion/extraction, and fire support missions against targets ashore or afloat. Eighteen Sea Vikings, presently in late development, are prospective replacements. Piberglass Seafox can carry 10 combat troops and accompanying equipment 200 nautical miles at speeds exceeding 30 knots. Both boats function well after dark on rough seas, have low radar cross-sections, and are quiet. Seafox also serves riverine SBUs, along with 36-foot, all-aluminum mini-armored troop carriers (MATC) and 31-foot river patrol boats (PBRs). MATCs can transport 15 troops, carry cargo, or act as weapon platforms. Like PBRs, they employ pump jet propulsion that functions well in shallow, debris-filled water. Every boat but Spectre can load aboard Navy ships or fit into Air

Force C-5 aircraft (3 PBR or 2 MATC or 1 SWCL). C-141s can lift 1 SWCL.57/

Naval Air SOF. One light attack helicopter (HAL) squadron supports U.S. Atlantic Fleet SOF. Another serves the Pacific. Each UH-1 helo in gunship configuration or carrying a SEAL squad can reach out 100 NM and return. Armed infiltration/exfiltration missions over the same radius limit the load to four passengers and two door gunners. C-5 aircraft can carry 8 UH-1s. C-141s can accommodate 2 and C-130s 1, but disassembly and reassembly take many more manhours.58/

Air Force SOF

Army SOF are hitchhikers who depend wholly on the Air Force for intertheater airlift and, except for the 160th Aviation Group, most tactical air transport and heavy fire support as well. Four helicopters in each Special Forces group are mainly administrative. The Ranger Regiment has none. Navy SOF airlift is limited and entirely tactical.

U.S. Air Force SOF (See Figure 12 at the end of this chapter), like those of sister services, were slashed severely in the aftermath of Vietnam. Seven well-established squadrons disappeared, starting in 1969. There is no Soviet counterpart of remaining assets, which are assigned to 2d Air Division. They presently are a major subordinate command of Twenty-Third Air Force, Military Airlift Command (MAC), but probably will pass to the new unified command for special operations.59/

Most components are part of, and collocated with, the 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW) at Hurlburt

Field, Florida: a special ops squadron (SOS) of MC-130E Combat Talons; an AC-130H Spectre gunship squadron; an SOS with HH-53H Pave Low; a special operations combat control team (SOCCT); a weather detachment; and a photo processing/interpreting facility. One separate MC-130 squadron is forward deployed in Germany, a second in the Philippines. A UH-IN detachment is positioned in Panama. MAC scatters search and rescue (SAR) units worldwide. The Air Force Reserve (AFR) and Air National Guard (ANG), with less sophisticated but nevertheless useful aircraft, reinforce active airlift and fire support as required for peacetime training and combat operations. 60/ Four Volant Solos in the ANG are the only dedicated psyop aircraft, suitable for broadcasts and leaflet drops.

Fixed Wing SOF. Combat Talon, a 1965 C-130 airframe with state-ofthe-art improvements superimposed, is a versatile aircraft refuelable in flight that can undertake clandestine infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, and aerial reconnaissance missions. It can fly a high-low-high profile blacked out for 1,400 NM, with two hours at tree-top level; deliver personnel, cargo, or both onto short landing strips or small drop zones that have neither markings nor communications, then return on one tank full. Some MC-130Es come equipped for surface-to-air recovery; others can refuel helicopters aloft. Preflight planning in such stringent circumstances takes about 48 hours, to determine optimum flight paths, configure aircraft, pick crews qualified for particular tasks, and complete essential coordination at both terminals and en route.61/

There are, however, only 14 Combat Talons in MAC's inventory. The first 7 of 24 new MC-130H models are not due until 1988, the last in

1992. Inferior non-SOF forces act as augmentation in the interim. One C-141 wing and a C-130 wing presently provide 9 crews apiece that are proficient at special operations low level (SOLL II) missions blacked out. Plans call for 11 more C-141 and 16 more C-130 crews so trained by 1990 (grand total 45). Two other wings maintain crews that can contour fly under less demanding conditions (SOLL I).62/

Ten all-weather AC-130H Spectre gunships furnish aerial fire support day or night for SOF in permissive environments, where opposing air power is slight or suppressed. Each is armed with two 20mm automatic weapons, one 40mm, and a 105mm cannon. Electronic warfare and target acquisition suites include, but are not limited to, a 2KW searchlight, low light-level television, an infrared reconnaissance set, and laser target designator. Ten A-Model AFR Spectres, patterned after "Puff, the Magic Dragon" AC-47s of Vietnam War fame, are in reserve.63/

Rotary Wing SOF. HH-53H Pave Low helicopters are top-of-the-line Air Force rotary wing SOF. Missions duplicate most of those described for Combat Talon, but performance characteristics are much different. On the plus side, they are somewhat less expensive and routinely operate from locations that lack runways. Helicopter cruising speeds, however, are slower (HH-53H 140 knots, MC-130E 240; the Pave Low avionics package is optimized for 110 knots in complete darkness), and maximum unrefueled combat radius slightly exceeds 300NM at best. In-flight refueling theoretically can extend that reach indefinitely, but must be accom-plished under fighter cover or in benign airspace, because HC- and MC-130 tankers cannot fly nap of the earth at night; KC-10s and KC-135s cannot serve helps at all. MAC

presently possesses only eight Pave Lows. Reserve components have none. Eight active non-SOP HH-53s and eight HH-60s must take up some of the slack until 1987, when eleven HH-53 rescue helicopters will complete modification for Pave Low missions, if plans reach fruition.64/

UH-1N Hueys are multipurpose, twin-engine helicopters intended primarily for shallow infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, psyop, medical evacuation, and fire support missions within a 100-mile radius (less, if auxiliary fuel tanks are unavailable). Optional delivery and retrieval methods include airlanding, airdrop, rappel, rope ladders, hoist, and pickup harness. Operations normally demand daylight, periods of morning and evening twilight, or at least a half moon, but well-trained crews wearing night vision goggles can sortie after dark. UH-1Ns, like Pave Low HH-53s, are scarce. The SOF total is four.65/

Special Operations Combat Control Team. SOCCT personnel essentially are specialized air traffic controllers and aerial fire support facilitators skilled at covert and clandestine activities in hostile territory. They normally deploy as 2-3 man elements to preserve low visibility, but some missions require more. One particularly important joint task that often involves foreign nationals is to select, survey, prepare, mark, install communications, and operate surreptitious reception sites (landing zones, drop zones, and They also assist recovery zones). preplanned air strikes by positioning navigation aids and target designators. SOCCT members are quelified at HALO/HAHO parachuting and waterborne transport, including USA, SCURA, with inflatable boats. Pinally, they instruct U.S. and allied forces on

the proper application of air power in special operations.66/

Marine Corps SOF

The Marine Corps, except for small reconnaissance elements that support landing forces, is not organized, equipped, or trained for covert/clandestine operations or irregular warfare. The Commandant, however, recently designated one Marine Amphibious Unit as special operations capable--MAU (SOC). It is deployed with Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The intent is to create another by 1987 to support Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. That initiative, when complete, will confer limited special operations skills on essentially conventional forward deployed forces intended mainly for direct action missions, much like those assigned Army Rangers. A helicopter squadron (reinforced) furnishes lift for the maneuver element, which is a battalion landing team replete with tanks and artillery.67/

Strategic Psyop Forces

Strategic psychological operations at national and theater levels overlap all other special operations. The American apparatus is predominantly civilian.

U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the primary instrument, is intended by law "to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and increase mutual understanding between the people of the united States and the people of other countries." USIA, in pursuit of those aims, disseminates

information abroad about this nation, "its people, and policies promulgated by the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State, and other responsible officials of Government having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs."68/ Means of communication encompass personal contacts between opinion-shaping foreigners and USIA officers at 217 posts in 129 countries; artistic performances, lectures, seminars, and symposia; academic and cultural exchange programs; invitations to international visitors (about 3,000 were extended in 1986); libraries in 94 countries; television and cinema; press releases; USIA periodicals (Topic and Problems of Communism are representative). Voice of America, a global subsidiary, broadcasts daily in English and 41 other languages to an audience estimated at 120 million. Radio Marti, which commenced service in May 1985, concentrates on Cuba. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, separate from USIA, ostensibly are unofficial, but the U.S. Board for International Broadcasting, a federal activity, funnels congressionally appropriated funds to and oversees both organizations, which cover the Soviet Union and Central Europe. Radio Liberty also beams programs at Afghanistan. 69/

The State Department, but not the Pentagon, provides some guidance. The proportion of policy-supporting themes to straight reporting, however, varies widely with Administrations. President Reagan's team tends to focus on psyop more than predecessors, but the percent is minuscule, compared with that of Soviet competitors.

F 1.

Capsulized Appraisal

Some U.S. SOP are optimized for particular tasks, such as hostage rescue, clandestine infiltration/exfiltration, and psyop. Superspecialization by proliferate civil and military counterterror forces complicates planning and makes teamwork difficult. Several elements with predominantly conventional characteristics are considered SOP for the sake of convenience or political expediency. Army civil affairs, not considered "core" SOF, are assigned to 1st SOCOM mainly for administrative reasons. Cannonfiring gunships and Marine MAU (SOC) are orthodox, compared with Combat Talon and SEALS. Such emphasis on forces more useful for semi-conventional low-intensity conflict than on special operations confuses issues and diverts attention from pressing needs.

Authentic military SOF are relatively few. Mismatches between present deployments and contingency plan requirements are marked, despite ongoing "revitalization" programs. Resultant reliance on non-SOF augmentation and reserve components increases casualty prospects and, according to special operations spokesmen, impinges on abilities to accomplish important missions. 70/

Low SOF priorities in relation to conventional forces have left most U.S. special operations forces chronically understrength and undertrained. Much of their hardware is makeshift and antiquated. Communication equipment shortfalls

limit the ability of Special Forces and SEALs to cover assigned areas or control isolated teams as doctrine prescribes. 71/ Linguistic deficiencies are glaring (competence is least in Middle Eastern, Asian, and African languages/dialects). The

list of such problems is lengthy. Organizational reforms that recently became law should expedite improvements, but nevertheless corrective action will take money and attention over a long time.*


^{-*} A SOF aircraft bonanza may be in the offing. The Army's four-company aviation group will expand to a brigade during the period FY 1987-89, if plans are fully implemented. Funding for Army and Air Force augmentations recommended by the JCS Chairman and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is to start or accelerate in FY 1987, if possible, and be complete not later than the end of FY 1992, except for 49 CV-22A Ospreys, which are future Pave Low platforms: 72/

Type Aircraft	Number
MH-60X	23
MX-60 (PLIR)	11
MH-53H/J	35
MH-47E	17
CV-22A	55
MC-130E (with tanker mod)	14
MC-130H	24
HC-130 tanker	31
AC-130H	10
AC-130U	12
C-141 (SOLL II mod)	13
C-130 (SOLL II mod)	11
	256

Note: PLIR is forward-looking infrared radar.

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Figure 10
U.S. ARMY SOF



AAF	Army Airfield	MI	Military Intelligence
ARNG	Army National Guard	Psyap-	Psychological Operations
Ave	Avieties	Regt	Regiment
Ba	Battalion	ROK	Republic of Korea
C.	Company	SF	Special Forces
Oet	Detachment	Sig	Signal
ft	Fort	SOCOM	Special Operations Command
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany	SOF	Special Operations Forces
G p	Group	Svc	Service
Ne	Headquarters	TF	Task Force

Figure 10 (con't)

		HUNCHER C	J HATTE		7	CURRENT LOCATION
	Active		AME 2/	Total 3/	Ţ	
SOCOM	1			ı	Let SOCOM 75th Ranger Regt	Ft. Bragg, M.C.
Rangers Ragt Nq No	3			3	Hq; 3rd Bn lst Bn 2d Bn	Ft. Benning, Ga. Hunter AAF, Ga. Ft. Lewis, Wa.
Special Forces Groups	4	2	2	8	let SF Gp Hq; 2d Bn; 3d Bn let Bn 5th SF Gp 7th SF Gp Hq; let Bn; 2d Bn 3d Bn 10th SF Gp Hq; 2d Bn; 3d Bn let Bn lith SF Gp (USAR) 12th SF Gp (USAR) 12th SF Gp (USAR) 20th SF GP (AMG) 20th SF GP (AMG)	Ft. Lewis, Wa. Torii Station, Okinewa Ft. Campbell, Ky. Ft. Bragg, N.C. Ft. Gulik, Panama Ft. Devans, Na. Bad Tölz, FRG Ft. Heade, Md. Arlington Heights, Il. Salt Lake City, Ut. Birmingham, Al.
SF Detachments	2	;		2	SF Detachments Det Det	Serlin, FRG ROK
Delta Force 1/	1			ı	Delta Force 1/	Ft. Bragg, N.C.
SOF Aviation Group 1/ Ba Co Fayop Groups	1 1	3	ı	1 1 1 4	SOF Aviation 160th Gp 1/ 45th Bn (ANG) 129th Co Payop Groupa 4th Gp 2d Gp (USAR) 5th Gp (USAR)	Ft. Campbell, Ky. Speery, Ok. Hunter AAF, Ga. Ft. Bragg, N.C. Cleveland, Oh. Washington, D.C.
Civil Affairs Ba Commands	8,600	3	300	1 3 1 21,900	7th Gp (USAR) Civil Affaire 96th Bn 35lst Cod (USAR) 352d Cod (USAR) 353d Cod (JSAR)	Presidio, Ca. Fc. Bragg, N.C. Mountain View, Ca. Everdale, Md. ronx, N.Y.
Letzouser	1 0,000	,		1 1/00	•	


^{1/} Delta Force is subordinate to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Parts of the 160th Aviation Group support; the group is battalion-size.

 $[\]underline{2}/$ Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) oversees USAR and ANG units.

^{3/} Flanned additions to active SOF by 1990 include 1 SF group, 1 payop battalion, and 3,800 personnel. USAR SOF plan to add 400 personnel.

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Figure 11 U.S. NAVY SOF



	LEGEND									
1	HAL	Light Attack Helicopter	PI	Philippine Islands						
	Hela	Helicopter	₽R	Puerto Rico						
1	Lt	Light	SBR	Special Boat Squadron						
i	NR	Naval Reserve	SBU	Special Boat Unit						
1	NSW	Naval Special Warfare	SD	SEAL Detachment						
	NSWG	Naval Special Warfare Group	SDVT	SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team						
1	NSWU	Naval Special Warfare Unit	Sada	Squadron						
1			SŤ	SEAL Team						

Figure 11 (con't)

	T-30	MER CF US	432
	Active	Haval	Total 2/
	-	Reserve	2/
NSW Groups	j 2	0	2
	1	l	1 1
WSW Units 3/	,	,	4
4 51	1	, ,	1 ' 1
	ł	1	j i
	i	i	1
•	i		
		(1 1
SEAL	i	i	i i
Teams 1/ 4/	6	5	[11]
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	!	l	1 1
Detachments		,	5
Detechments	١ ،	,	
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	ł		1
	ļ	1	1
Special Boat	l		1 1
Squadrons	2	1 2	1 . 1
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	i	į	li
	İ	j	j j
Units	6	4	10 1
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	1	ł	!!
			!!
TVO	2	٥	2
90 7 L		, ,	•
			i i
Lt Attack Helo Sqdn	2	0	2
•			i i
Personnel	2,085	3,180	5,265


 $[\]underline{i}/$ SEAL Team 6 is subordinate to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

^{2/} Planned additions to active SOF by 1990 include 18 neval special warfare craft and about 750 personnel.

^{3/} MSWU are command and control headquarters with 17 personnel each.

 $[\]underline{4}/$ Each SEAL team is authorized 175 personnel.

Figure 12
U.S. AIR FORCE SOF



	NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT 2/				
-	Active	AFR	ANG	Tetal	
Core SOF					
MC-138 Combat Talon	14			14	
AC-130 Spectre	10	10		- 20	
EC-130 Volant Sele			4	4	
HH-53 Pave Low	8			i	
UH-1 Huey	4			4	
CH-3		6		6	
Augmentation					
C-141 (SOLL II) 3/	9			9	
C 13" (SOLL II) 3/	9			9	
HC 130				8	
HH-53	1				
HH- 60	8			8	

LEGEND						
AC-	Attack Transport Aircraft	MAW	Military Airlift Wing			
AFB	Air Force Base	MC.	Special Mission Transport			
AFR	Air Force Reserve	Ops	Operations			
ANG	Air National Guard	Pi	Philippine Islands			
ARRW	Aerospace Rescue and	RWRW	Rescue and Weather			
	Recovery Unit		Reconnaissance Wing			
CH-	Cargo Helicopter	SOCCT	Special Ops Combat Control Team			
Det	Detachment	SOG	Special Operations Group			
Oiv	Division	SOLL	Special Operations Low Level			
EC.	Electronic Warfare Transport	sos	Special Operations Squadron			
Fld	Field	SOW	Special Operations Wing			
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany	TAW	Tactical Airlift Wing			
H-	Helicopter	UH-	Utility Helicopter			
HH-	Heavy Lift Helicoster		•			

Figure 12 (cont.)

		Mileta O	F 68175			CURRENT LOCATION	AUTHORIZES ALBERAFT A
	Active	A		fetal			
Air Divisies	1.	1	İ	1 .	24 ALT DEV	Burlburt Fld. Fl	
			1	1 :	let SOV	Muriburt 71d, Fi	
Special Ope Ving	1 : 1		1	1 1	Bch sos		6 HC-130E
Special Ope Squadrons	,			• ;	16th 505	j	10 AC-1308
	[1	1 ;		1	
		i		1 1	20th 508		6 MI-534
	[i	l	[[let 905	Clark AB, PI	4 MC-130E
		•	1	! (7th 505	Dete-Hain AS, FBG	4 MC-130E
	ł		1		3024 SOS (APR)	inko APB, Ar.	6 CB-)
	1 1) ,	1 .	1.1	1934 SOG (AMG)	Harrisburg, Pa.	8 SC-130E
Special Ope Groups		} •	,	1 : 1	919th SOG (APR)	Duke 714, 71.	10 AC-130A
Special Ope Bot	1 1		1	1 1 1	Detachment I	Housed AFS, Passes	4 (41-1)
Special Ope Combat		l	1	1 1			4 04-18
Control Tem		l		1	SOCCT	Murlburt Fld, Fl.	1
Personnel	4,100	17,	000	21,100		1	L
Anagostatios			Т	,		T	T
SOLL II Vince 3/			ſ	2 (317th TAW	Pope AFB, NC	9 C-130E Crews
seer it staffs To	, - 1	i	ł	- 1	437th MAN	Charleston, SC	9 C-1418 Creve
	1 . 1	ı	1	1 . 1	39ch ARRY	Eglin AFD, FL	4 HC-130; 8 H-63
Other Vings	, z	l	1	1 * 1	- ALSE BURY	McClelland AFB. Co	4 MC-130; 8 MH-53

 $\underline{\mathrm{I}/\mathrm{I}}$ - Elements of 24 Air Division respond to Joint Special Operations Command (JSCC).

 2ℓ -Search and rescus (SAR) units worldwide are not shown. EC-130E Valuet Soles are payop.

3/ SOLL II cross are qualified for clondestire, low-level infiltration/atfittration blacked out, using special techniques and equipment. SOLL I cross can fly modified contour paths as low as 300 feat above local terrain.

6/ Planned additions to active 50F by 1492 are noted at the end of Chapter 2 text, plus II MI-3M, and 1700 personnel. SOP organization is scheduled to add 10 G-161 and 35 G-130 60th II crove during the seas period.

Chapter 3

COMPARATIVE CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES

The United States and Soviet Union approach most special operations from nearly opposite quadrants of the compass. Respective concepts shape the forces just described and dictate employment practices in conjunction with non-SOF implements.

COLD WAR

U.S. and Soviet leaders define true "peace" in totally different terms. Our side conceives a period of friendly competition. Soviet scriptures contend that the socialist system must prevail before "peace" as we see it is possible. 1/ Their side, according to repeated pronouncements by successive regimes, "struggles" ceaselessly with non-communist countries. 2/ Those incompatible positions form quite different foundations for special operations during cold wars.*

SOVIET ACTIVISM

Soviet strategies consider "peacetime" special operations very important, if open source accounts

are even close to correct. Two types of so-called "active measures" appear to predominate: fifth column-style forward deployment and strategic payop, especially subversion and disinformation. 3/ Professional observers find that hard evidence often is scant, because "active measures" epitomize the indirect approach to problem-solving. All embrace Sun Tzu's sage advice (circa sixth century B.C.) that "the acme of skill" is to subdue foes without fighting. 4/

Fifth Column Deployment

U.S. and allied analysts must supplement facts with informed speculation about the extent and effectiveness of Soviet clandestine efforts to preposition illegal "sleepers" in prospective operational areas for purposes other than espionage and develop supporting onsite infrastructure. Highly classified estimates of quantities in any given country, together with qualitative assessments of associated threats, consequently may be too optimistic or too pessimistic by orders of magnitude.5/

 $[\]star$ Section 1C, Annex A hypothetically connects cold war with special operations.

Even a scattering of Sovietcontrolled assassins and saboteurs, however, could savage rival nerve centers at the onset of surprise hostilities. Serious problems would persist, if counterintelligence identified them all, unless U.S. and allied leaders risked unpredictable repercussions and declared the lot The FBI quickly persona non grata. neutralized would-be Nazi saboteurs and terrorists who infiltrated U.S. territory after World War II began,6/ but free societies in peacetime cannot legally lock up suspects who have broken no law, and they lack sufficient means to maintain continuous surveillance until awakened "sleepers" make the first moves in a conflict that enemies start.

Political Warfare

Psychological operations for persuasive, coercive, deceptive, and subversive purposes have always been a Soviet specialty.* They consistently support zero-sum cold war strategies intended to deplete opposing power and, if possible, add it to their own.

Dynamism

Soviet "active measures" seek to exploit endemic instabilities in selected locations around the globe, participate in the replacement of capitalist institutions and structures with Marxist-Leninist models, promote radical regimes sympathetic to Kremlin causes, and encourage

defection from camps that are not. Influence remains an intermediate or fall-back position when behind-thescenes control is incomplete or impossible. 7/ Economic and military assistance programs administered by Soviet agents frequently assist political penetration. Syria, Iraq, Libya, Vietnam, India, Algeria, Cuba, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Angola presently are top recipients, in that order. 8/

Words are the principal weapon system. White, gray, and black propaganda, which respectively publicize, conceal, and misrepresent the true source, are instruments the Soviets use to manipulate public opinion in ways they hope will divide opponents and consolidate support. Personal contact with local elites, such as politicians, military officers, journalists, labor leaders, teachers, and clergy is a customary supplement. The Soviets particularly try to turn key individuals into "agents of influence" (Lenin called them "useful idiots") who, for reasons that vary from altruism to avarice, attack their own social institutions and/or defense establishment.9/

Preparations are extensive and continuous. Many Soviet students prepare for careers in political agitation and propaganda, which are considered professions comparable in prestige to medicine, law, and engineering. The Lenin School, founded in 1926, trains cadres from other countries; Gus Hall (USA), Maurice Thorez (France), Ernest Thaelman (Germany), and Chou En Lai (China) are among its distinguished graduates. 10/

 $[\]mbox{\scriptsize \#}$ Section 2E, Annex A discusses psychological operations in generic terms, including disinformation and subversion.

Disinformation

Strategic disinformation, a facet of psyop, is the province of top-level politico-military policy-makers in the Soviet Union, according to a KGB training manual. Tactical disinformation assists.11/ Both deliberately feed inaccurate, incomplete, and insidious data to, and/or "confirm" it for, particular target audiences. Success causes recipients, who may be friends and neutrals as well as foes, to respond in ways senders want.12/

Freedoms of speech and press, which are hallmarks of democracy, invite Soviet disinformation architects, particularly when "agents of influence" in the Fourth Estate are available. The Kremlin apparently finds net effects productive, even if frauds eventually are unveiled, because disavowals seldom receive as much publicity as the original plant. The closed Soviet establishment is almost invulnerable to counterattacks in kind. 13/

Techniques vary with time and place, but media manipulations, word-of-mouth rumor campaigns, and blind broadcasts are standard practice. Soviet propagandists consider newspapers and periodicals banner outlets, partly because distorted stories inserted in presumably unbiased foreign publications look legitimate, and partly because begus accounts frequently gain credibility through repetition. 14/ Fabrications and forgeries, some clever, others clumsy, serve as "evidence" when genuine proof is nonexistent. 15/ Themes that burnish the Soviet image and tarnish rivals cover a wide range. Alleged U.S. aggression and

refusal to agree on arms control are two typical topics.16/

Dividends and Disappointments

Disinformation, subversion, and other covert/clandestine forms of political warfare are like fifth column deployment: only failures are found prematurely. What percentage pays off is problematic, since no one in the West knows whether we see most of the iceberg, or only the tip.

Interim estimates and postmortem appraisals suggest that Soviet successes occur most frequently in Third World countries, where unpopular regimes and cronies are ready-made targets for "active measures." Dissidents eager to undermine the Government are receptive to Soviet guidance. Well-placed "agents of influence" routinely funnel falsifications to uncritical media representatives, who shape public opinion in large measure. 17/ Advantages also are available in politically naive neutral nations that welcome Soviet economic and military assistance without full appreciation of concomitant risks and, being little schooled in countersubversion, recognize warning signs late. Capricious clients and crude Soviet practices nevertheless limit leverage. The Great Russian superiority complex,* accompanied by contempt for non-Slavic nationalities, clearly is a minus, not a plus. The Soviet foreign service which, in fear of defections, forbids its members to fraternize with native populations, prevents many potentially remunerative contacts. 18/

^{*} Hany U.S. Sovietologists say that brash behavior and public arrogance mask a fundamental feeling of inferiority.

Results among industrialized nations have been mixed, even though strong peace movements provide a fertile field for disinformation and subversion, particularly in NATO Europe. Soviet leaders repeatedly must be most disappointed with "active measures" in the United States ("sleeper" programs may be a prominent exception). Attempts to sway U.S. public opinion are not entirely wasted, but independent U.S. news media are a poor target for manipulation. The FBI presently sees "significant impact on U.S. decisionmakers" and "has uncovered no evidence that suggests [they] have been induced to adopt policies against this country's interests . . . "19/

On balance, however, the Soviets seem to believe that overall efforts are useful. There was, for example, no noticeable decline during detente. Their long-term strategy accepts two steps forward and one back, because cumulative gains accrue. Swift success is a windfall. 20/

U.S. PASSIVISM

The scale of clandestine and covert U.S. special operations in peacetime was small compared with Soviet ventures, even before Congress legally curtailed the CIA's "special activities," which a Presidential decree artificially differentiates from military "special operations."*

The climate in any case is inclement. Secrecy is most difficult to maintain in this open society, whose citizens generally regard such machinations as imprudent, immoral, or both, and expect Congress, as well as the news media, to root out and report potential "scandals." Disgruntled former agents expose erstwhile colleagues and mechanisms with impunity.21/

Open sources are silent about any U.S. equivalent of direct action "sleepers" the Soviets allegedly preposition in enemy territory before combat begins. They likely are foreign nationals already on site if, in fact, any exist. Army Special Forces "stay behind" teams that remain in place after shooting starts bear some resemblance, but differences exceed similarities: operations, unlike those of Spetsnaz "sleepers," are strategically defensive, in support of nuclear and conventional forces that withdraw, instead of attack; their leeway for initiative thus is less; their numbers are relatively few; and their pre-employment vulnerability is greater, because U.S. SOF forward deployed in peacetime are easily identifiable candidates for preemptive attacks at the onset of hostilities.22/

Distaste for covert direct action during "peacetime" carries over to surreptitious psyop.24/Psychological warfare is not a major instrument of U.S. statecraft, centrally controlled and globally

^{*} Special activities, "planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly," are solely a CIA responsibility in peacetime. Military special operations, whether overt (sic) or clandestine, are acknowledged by U.S. officials, if discovered. Covert special operations must be "approved by the President in accord with [Executive Order] 12333. Only a small percentage . . . are clandestine."23/

No college or university employed. offers courses, much less confers degrees in psyop. Clinical psychologists, whose vocation is human behavior, and cultural anthropologists, who compare different cultures, write few handbooks on that subject and rarely counsel professional planners.25/ Congress and the people disapprove of U.S. "propaganda," which has a pejorative connotation, and disallow disinformation; the slightest indication causes clamor. America's public information media, a dominant influence on domestic and world opinion, freely criticizes official policies and practices.26/ Economic and military assistance programs are seldom covers for covert operations. Neither civilian agencies nor the Department of Defense are well equipped to exploit possibilities, even if policies change.27/

Truth, in the final analysis, has proved to be America's most important cold war special operations instrument. It exposes Soviet falsehoods (if and when discovered) and publicizes U.S. foreign policy/national defense positions in positive ways.28/ Sixty-two USIA themes on seven subjects disseminated to many countries on every occupied continent vary from general to specific. Arms control, human rights, terrorism, Soviet misconduct, and America's commitment to Middle East peace are among those with national security implications.29/

INSURGENCY/RESISTANCE

Insurgency involves extended, organized efforts by disaffected parts of a population to overthrow established order, seize political power by subversive and coercive means, and sometimes alter the existing social system. Resistance employs similar forces and tactics to unseat the winning side of a successful insurgency or to importune and, if possible, oust an occupying power.*

SOVIET SPONSORSHIP AND SUPPORT

Soviet words and deeds match well. At least 17 insurgencies scattered around the world have received direct Soviet assistance since World War II, mainly in the form of advice, training, arms, equipment, military supplies, and money (Figure 13 and Map 1).30/Results mixed success with failure, but the intent in each case was clear. That count excludes suspected, but unconfirmable, support in places like the Philippines, past and present; support for small groups that conducted coups (Grenada is one good example); "band wagon" support that began after rebels won their war (Egypt, 1952; Cuba, 1959; Algeria, 1962) and support for pro-Soviet subversives who overcame rivals

^{*} Section 1 B(2), Annex A summarizes the nature of insurgencies and resistance movements for purposes of this report. Section 2A outlines the elements and implications of cellular organization.

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Figure 13 SOVIET AND SURGANIE SUFFREE FOR LINGUISTICIES SINCE WHILE WERE ET

]	THE RESERVE TO SERVE	AVA	ARICA	ATT METER	WAL.
Soriet Miss	W. Ireland (1966s,70s) Gyprus (1990s, 60s) Greece (1966s)	H. Yenen (1970) S. Tasan (1940) Flatnam (1950-70) Lase (1950-70) China (1950-70)	9. Africo (1966-) Hembio (1966-) Ziobobo (1970-79) Angelo (1970-75) Hosanbique (1970-75) Geico-Gissou (1970-75) Ethiopia (1966-76) Zaire (1960-61)	Mcoragus (1999s)	
TOTAL					17
Cube			Hemibia (1970s-) - Angela (1940s-75) Hesembique (1940s-75) Ethiopia (1960s-74)	El Salvador (1970s-) Gustanala (1960s-) Bitarqua (1970s) Osiumia (1960s, 70s) Brugary (1960s, 70s) Bolivia (1960s) Venceusia (1960s)	
TORAL					
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)		Ierael (1940e-) Labanem (1970e-) Jordan (1970-71)		El Salvador (1980s) Ricaragus (1970s)	
TOTAL					
Salected Other Surregates Vietods		Theiland (1970s) Cambedia (1970s-) Lase (1950s-70s)	·		3
Libps			Sudat (1980e)	El Selvador (1980s) Hicaratus (1970s)] ' }
Sicaragua E. Germany			Mamibia (1970s-)	Calcubia (1980e) El Salvador (1980e) El Salvador (1980e)	2 2
i. 4,	'				· •
Ethiopia			Sommatia (1970s-) Sudam (1970s-)	i !	1 2
S. Youes		3. Yomes (1960s-) Omes (1960s-70s)		<u> </u>	1
Caechoolovakia		Palestine (1940s)		1	
Syria TOTAL		Lobason (1980s)		1	14
TOTAL SITES		1 12	10		1 31
COURT STIES					

^{1/} Support includes político-military training in the U.S.6.B. or surrogate states and situation-specific payop, as well as on-site economic and military assistance. Eatries indicate involvement, without differentiating successes from failures.

 $[\]frac{2}{2}$ Subversive activities in the absence of significant insurgencies and support for coups d'etat are excluded.


^{1/} Total sites count each supported insurgency only once.

SOVIET AND SURROGATE

SUPPORT

FOR INSURGENCIES

2



LEGENO A. Seviet Only B. Serrogets Only C. Seviet and Serrogets 12. Zaire (Congo) - A 22. Palestine - B 23. Israel - B 24. Jorden - B 16. Sentese - C 16. Zimbahwe (Rhedesia) - A 17. Mezambique - C 18. Herthern Ireland - A 25. Herth Yemen - C 4. Venezuele - B 28. South Yemen - A 27. Oman (Dhefar) - B 28. China - A 29. Loss - C 38. Cambedia - B 5. Colombia - B 6. Belirie - S 7. Uraguey - B 19. Greece · A 8. Guineo-Sisson - A 9. Suden - 8 10. Ethiopia - C 11. Somelia.- 8 28. Cyprus - A 21. Lubeson - B 31. Vistnem (Indechine) - A 32. Theiland - B

without resort to armed insurgency, which is what happened to countries currently in the Warsaw Pact.

Assistance to "progressive" revolutionaries who oppose nonsocialist regimes implements Article 28 of the Soviet Constitution, which Breshnev punctuated in reports to three successive Communist Party Congresses between 1971 and 1981. His successors reduced rhetoric, but not deeds.31/ Calculated self interest takes precedence over compassion and ideology. Sudanese splinter groups got short shrift in the early 1970s, after the central government severed ties with the United States. Relations with Iraq took precedence over Kurdish separatists, who Kremlin occupants left in the cold a few years later. visitation privileges apparently are more important than Tamil independence from Sri Lanka today.32/

Soviet leaders respond well to targets of opportunity, and occasionally create their own, but history shows that most often they merely exploit, rather than instigate, revolution and help associates consolidate gains. Planners habitually favor low-cost, low-risk, potentially high-payoff operations that permit graceful egress, if liabilities begin to exceed benefits. There was no public compunction, for example, about dumping Grenada's dissidents after President Reagan raised the stakes. 33/

Soviet combat forces have never intervened heavily to reverse insurgent losses, although their ability to do so helps isolate battlefields by giving outsiders pause. Soviet leaders instead prefer to apply power indirectly through de facto proxies who receive wherewithal from the USSR. Figure 13 reflects activities of 10 such assistants, starting in the 1960s. Occasional

surrogates, such as Bulgaria, and marginally reliable partners, such as China before the Sino-Soviet split, would lengthen the list considerably. Proxy motivations are relatively unimportant from Moscow's perspective, as long as junior partners cooperate. Problems crop up only occasionally, when part-time collaborators who pursue semi-independent foreign policies work at cross-purposes with their patron. Hoscow, for example, must have been miffed when Fidel Castro, who is no puppet, sided with Argentine insurgents despite contrary Soviet intents; he also assisted Britrean "freedom fighters" against the Ethiopian Government, which the Kremlin favored.34/

Eurasia retains top attention, but the Soviets began to embrace African revolutionaries about the time decolonization terminated and currently are active across that continent.35/ Latin America, which remained very low key until recently, seems a special case. Proxies predominate, probably because critical (some say vital) U.S. interests make Moscow move cautiously, while testing the limits of American tolerance. East Germany, Libya, Nicaragua, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) all are involved. Cuba, however, bears much the largest load (Figure 13). Its Constitution, like that of the Soviet sponsor, supports revolution. Castro publicly subordinates Cuba's foreign policy "to international needs of . . . socialism and the national liberation of peoples."36/ Resultant threats to U.S. security vary from insignificant to intense, depending on the evaluator's perspective.37/

Soviet connections with insurgencies share several characteristics, wherever they occur. 38/ Friends must count first on self-help. Military assistance predominates, because beneficiaries, being out of power,

could not easily convert economic largess to political capital, even if the Soviets were positioned to supply what the people need, which is seldom the case. Training for revolutionary cadres and military tacticians receives consistent stress; Ho Chi Minh may be the most famous alumnus, but lesser luminaries from many countries are legion. Soviet and Cuban educational programs to shape political attitudes and thought processes among the common people also are conspicuous.39/ Psychological operations, without exception, are important. Pavorable world opinion for Soviet-backed insurgents is one objective, with particular attention to audiences in the United States and United Nations. Opinion in contested areas is a second target. Disinformation and what Moscow euphemistically calls "propaganda of deeds" both play eminent parts. The latter includes terrorist attacks on key individuals who oppose the revolutionary cause, calculated to make personal survival the ultimate value for local leaders at every level.40/

"There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that [their] goal must be reached at any given time." The Kremlin "consequently cannot be easily defeated or discouraged . . . And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered . . . only by intelligent long-range policies" pursued with equal fortitude. That statement of the problem, which George F. Kennan penned in 1947, applies perfectly to Soviet/surrogate support for insurgencies in the 1980s.41/

U.S. SPONSORSHIP AND SUPPORT


U.S. traditions favoring self-determination (sometimes disregarded for expedient purposes) date to our Declaration of Independence, which asserts "That to secure [unalienable rights], Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from consent of the governed.—That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it . . . "

A long string of U.S. covert actions applied that preference to support elitist coups against repressive regimes (more on the political right than the left) at least eight times since World War II: Marcos, Philippines, 1986; "Baby Doc" Duvalier, Haiti, 1986; Somoza, Nicaragua, 1979; Allende, Chile, 1973; Sukarno, Indonesia, 1966; Diem, Vietnam, 1963; Trujillo, Dominican Republic, 1961; and Mussaddiq, Iran, 1953. U.S. assistance for large insurgent groups during the same period was scant (Figure 14 and Map 2), especially when compared with similar Soviet activities depicted in the preceding section. 42/

Support was forthcoming for bona fide insurgents when the United States backed rebels against President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán of Guatemala in 1954. The Shah of Iran, as a de facto U.S. surrogate, helped Kurdish separatists devil pro-Soviet Iraq two decades later. Six resistance movements, however, received most attention. Two took place in the distant past: Hungary, 1956; Cuba (Bay of Pigs), 1961. The

MAP 2

U.S. AND SURROGATE Since World War II SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES



LEGEND

- A. U.S. Only B. Surrogate Only C. U.S. and Surrogate
- Gustomela A
 Micarague C
 Gube A
- 4. Angole A 5. Hungary A
- 6. Iraqi Kurds B 7. Afghanistan A 8. Combodia A

U.S. AND SURROGATE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES
Since World War II

	EUROPE	ASIA	AFRICA	LATIN AMERICA	TOTAL
United States	Hengery (1956)	Afghanistan (1986s) Combodia (1988s)	Angola (1996) (1975-76) (1962-89)	Niçorague (1986s) Cube (1961) Guetamele (1954)	
TOTAL	1	2	1	3	,
Contres Iron		Iraqi Kurds (1878-75)		Nicorogue	1
TOTAL		1		111	2
TOTAL SITES	1	3	1	3	•

^{1/} Support includes politico-military training in U.S.A. and situation-specific psyco, as well as on-site economic and military essistance. Entries indicate involvement, without differentiating successes from failures.

remainder currently comprise four counterrevolutions where Soviet-subsidized insurrections triumphed in the 1970s (Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua). U.S. decisionmakers cannot agree whether assistance to recalcitrant groups against Marxist Ethiopia and Mozambique would help or harm regional interests. 43/

The clearest U.S. objective "is to help people help themselves." Beyond that, aims become fuzzy, because answers to the question "Help them do what?" range from "increase Soviet costs" to "remove radical regimes," with assorted alternatives between. Resultant ambiguities lay a

shaky foundation for plans, programs, and budgets that will fail, unless they match politico-military ends with available means more effectively than those of the opposition.44/

U.S. support at this point is highly selective. "The enemy of our enemy will be assured of our friendship [on!y] if he shares our values . . . and would be preferable to the regime in power." Clearly, "we do not believe it is correct or useful to overthrow one tyranny in favor of another," is how the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs recently phrased official position. His principal deputy advised against

^{2/} Supported insurgencies include resistance movements.

^{3/} Subversive activities in the absence of significant insurgencies and support for coups d'état are excluded.

^{4/} Total sites count each supported insurgency only once.

publicizing definitive policies, because embarrassments (even vulnerabilities) may occur when they refuse to fit particular circumstances. Secretary Weinberger personally warned that "commitment of U.S. forces to combat must be a last resort . . . when other means have failed or have no prospect of succeeding."45/ Proxies, who sometimes cause more problems than they solve, play a large part only in Nicaragua; we deal directly elsewhere.

That approach has neither pleased critics who view too little U.S. assistance for insurgents nor placated those who view too much. The former perceive missed opportunities, the latter fear spiraling escalation and accompanying costs in political capital, as well as lifeblood and treasure.46/ Compromises consequently are unavoidable. Types and amounts of aid vary immensely. Afghani Mujahiddin and anti-Sandinista Contras, for example, enjoy more than 90 percent of all U.S. military and economic aid to undergrounds and guerrillas. Congress in 1985 repealed the Clark amendment, which forbade funds for Angolan resistance forces without its approval, but UNITA (National Union for Total Liberation of Angola) has reaped few subsequent benefits. Congress authorized the Cambodian backwater a total not to exceed \$10 million in fiscal years 1986-87, although the Administration actually allocated almost one-third less.47/ Psychological operations, which should be inseparable from other U.S. assistance, rarely surface as a relevant issue.

That pattern of support leaves little to engage targets of

opportunity, severely limits the capabilities of recipients, and leads them to doubt U.S. reliability over the long haul. Low input levels, in sum, preclude high expectations by participants or their U.S. sponsors.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Foreign internal defense (FID) indicates steps by any government to help another government deter or defeat subversion, insurgency, resistance movements, or transnational terrorism. Types and degrees of support depend on many variables that may include respective interests, objectives, threat perceptions, policies, capabilities, and views about burden sharing. Armed force and measures to strengthen host country political, military, economic, and social institutions are complimentary.*

SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENCY

U.S. analysts commonly assert that the Soviets are more successful fomenting foreign revolutions than they are at FID.48/ In fact, they have not yet \overline{fa} iled to stifle rebellions in any Soviet-style socialist state since World War II.

FID Policies

The Soviets may never publicize foreign internal defense policies, but their activities reveal three

^{*} Annex A, Section 1B(3) outlines counterinsurgency tasks and techniques.

distinct sets. One, with universal applicability, serves principals and proxies equally well. The second is a supplement only where direct Soviet power predominates. The third set applies where it does not.

3

Set One centers first of all on deterrence, which is preferable to defense. Precautions usually precede complete socialist victory and continue indefinitely thereafter. Indoctrination, reeducation, and pervasive security systems fed by informants at home, at work, and at school are standard practices intended to produce desired behavior and uncover deviants before they can cause serious trouble. The Soviets try to limit their involvement, if prevention fails. Major combat forces, for example, have never yet deployed for any purpose where they lack direct logistic links with home territory. City dominance comes first, the countryside waits.49/

Set Two reflects cumulative counterinsurgency experience dating from czarist days. Policies call for conclusive action to crush resistance quickly. Winning the hearts and minds of populations is less important than bending most to Soviet will and breaking the remainder. Moral restraints are scant. Systematic terror is one instrument. "Decapitation" strikes against rebel leaders and their control apparatus are guided by an implicit slogan, "Kill the head and the body will die." Assassination, abduction, and subversion are alternative techniques that pertain, in different proportions at different times and places.

The Soviets also seek to separate "fish" (the insurgent rank and file) from the supporting "sea" (the people), as Mao once put it.50/ Mass deportation and compulsory resettlement schmes are standard practices. So is systematic destruction of the agrarian infrastructure, because abilities to furnish or deny food provide Soviet FID specialists a useful lever. Villages are selectively levelled, crops and livestock are laid waste. Protection is only for confirmed sympathizers.*51/

Set Three replaces Soviet military power with security assistance whenever risks of deep direct involvement could outweigh recompense. Even so, only Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Angola make the Top Ten list of beneficiaries, and they bring up the tail end in that order. 52/ Indigenous troops and de facto proxies, who act as cat's paws and pawns, take all of the casualties and most of the blame for reversals. Moscow reaps benefits from victories.

FID Applications

Soviet rulers, who have implemented FID policies repeatedly since World War II, used massive military power to squelch incipient rebellions before they exploded in the Ukraine and former Baltic States (late 1940s), East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). The latter two are classic examples of "decapitation" to prevent resurgence of resistance already reduced.

^{*} U.S. observers who deplore Soviet brutality tend to forget that human rights and compassion for opponents are recent phenomena in America. General Philip A. Sheridan, for example, was by no means aberrant when he instructed subordinates to let the 1873 Kickapoo campaign be one. "of annihilation, obliteration, and complete destruction." 53/

Soviet duplicity, which led to the separate abductions and subsequent executions of Hungarian Prime Minister Nagy and Defense Minister Maleter left followers without leaders. Finesse was valued more in the case of Dubcek, First Secretary of the Czech Communist Party; Moscow, fearing a martyr, gradually converted him from a national symbol to a faceless functionary. Soviet FID versatility is further evident in Poland, where the government and security forces, acting on Soviet advice, at least temporarily have suppressed Solidarity-inspired resistance that weakens the Warsaw Pact. The 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress, which convened February 25-March 6, 1986, indicates that support for socialist regimes under fire from counterrevolutionaries will continue during this decade.54/

<u>Afghanistan</u>

Afghanistan is the only full-scale resistance movement currently inside the Soviet sphere or on its periphery. Armed attacks on the Soviet-backed regime, which began in April 1978 and provoked Soviet intervention on Christmas Eve the following year, started a struggle that has endured longer than the "Great Patriotic War" against Germany.55/ Gorbachev's promise to recall "six regiments . . . before the end of 1986" by no means presages abatement; three are antiaircraft artillery, for which there is no need, and one contains road-bound armor.56/

"Sovietization" of that conflict was unavoidable, because Afghan armed services, never very effective, collapsed early and remain close to useless, despite extensive military assistance. SOF are far less important than conventional Soviet forces, but Spetsnaz have been used selectively in roles that reportedly include assassination. FID activities of all kinds rely heavily on intelligence from the Afghan State Information Service (KHAD), a huge (40,000) secret police organization under KGB supervision that insinuates agents into every aspect of Afghan society, including resistance camps.57/

Soviet military commanders pursue an attrition strategy with few tactical or technological limitations. Main aims apparently are to secure Kabul, the capital, and other urban centers; cut lines of communication with the outside world; and eliminate rebel strongholds at minimum cost. Guerrilla bands have proved elusive targets for numerically superior Soviet forces with sophisticated weapons, but "scorched earth" and "migratory genocide" policies are gradually reducing their ability to survive in barren terrain. Fire bombings that obliterate crops and villages eventually may starve them into submission, unless external suppliers compensate. Close to a quarter of the population is corralled in cities under tight control, or has crossed the border to Pakistan, which presently harbors the world's largest group of refugees (almost 3 million). Those consequences simplify future FID.*58/

^{*} Soviet tactics in Afghanistan are similar in some respects to U.S. FID activities in Vietnam and produce comparable cause/effect relationships. Motives, however, are much different. The Soviets seek to obliterate opposition and cow the population, not solicit popular support. Atrocities are national policy, not aberrations in battle.

Psychological operations take two twists. Techniques against domestic targets include propaganda campaigns, political indoctrination. education, and reeducation. Thousands of Afghan children attend Soviet schools that prepare them for future responsibility in a socialist state subservient to the U.S.S.R. Strategic psyop supporting foreign policy seeks to justify continued Soviet intervention and limit backlash. A carrot and stick approach plays on Pakistan, which shelters Afghan refugees and funnels rebel supplies, but remains ambivalent about close links with the United States. Economic inducements in that special case combine with crossborder bombings, subversion, and other pressures designed to intimidate.59/

FID Afield

Soviet-supported FID have dragged on for over a decade in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and-Cambodia. Sandinista counterinsurgents seem stalemated in Nicaragua. Early solutions to serious socialist problems seem improbable. 60/

Marxist postures nevertheless are better than might be expected, because their opponents help compensate. Angolan rebels have a strong on-site power base, but those in Ethiopia are badly outnumbered and the government, not guerrillas, controls all urban areas, as it does in Mozambique. Contras and various Cambodian factions, which lack large popular followings (Khmer Rouge recruiters must rely on coercion), are reduced to occasional raids from sanctuaries in Honduras and Thailand respectively, rarely in enough strength to threaten rivals

seriously. Lack of clear U.S. objectives and political commitment further simplify Marxist FID. Aid levels allow recipients to survive, not thrive. Inconsistent American and allied economic policies help some insolvent socialists stay afloat. U.S. companies, for example, buy about half of Angola's oil and plan to subsidize oil exploration by Mozambique.61/

As it stands, the Kremlin still can claim, with little fear of accurate refutation, that socialist gains are irreversible. One serious setback, however, could shatter the myth of invincibility, encourage current resistance movements, and cause others to develop. Both sides consequently are playing for big stakes. 62/

U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY

There is general agreement that the greatest potential armed threats to U.S. interests overseas lie in low-intensity conflicts, which include (some say feature) foreign internal defense.63/ Debates about alleged "lessons of Vietnam,"64/however, create extensive inconsistencies between U.S. FID objectives, policies, practices, and force postures. Politico-military planners, who are uncertain how to proceed, see no sign that their doubts will soon disappear.65/

Basic U.S. FID concepts still subscribe to the Nixon Doctrine, which redefined relationships between helpers and the helped in 1969. "Experience has shown," it stated, "that the best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, paramilitary and

military action by the threatened government . . . [A] direct combat role for U.S. general purpose forces arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression In such cases, we shall consider the efforts of our allies, in determining our response. "66/Subsequent refinements, coupled with the so-called post-Vietnam Syndrome, strengthen that prescription for self-help and a low U.S. profile.67/

Present practices, however, contradict those declaratory poli-Economic and military assistance levels are low for beleaguered U.S. associates who, being unable to bear larger defense burdens alone, bypass or defer reforms needed to undercut insurgent causes and can neither train nor deploy appropriate forces fast enough to deal decisively with resultant problems that, directly or indirectly, endanger U.S. security interests. 68/ The number of U.S. military trainers assigned to any foreign country is legally limited to six, unless Congress explicitly makes exceptions. The ceiling for El Salvador, for example, is 55 to help counter an active insurgency, although covert CIA teams may swell totals somewhat. 69/ Competent law enforcement is the first line of defense against insurgent undergrounds and urban guerrillas but Congress, seeking to avoid assistance for autocrats, has outlawed police training, advice, and financial support since 1975, unless recipients have "a longstanding democratic tradition," lack standing armed services, and consistently avoid gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" (El Salvador and Honduras presently are exceptions).70/ Restrictions on covert action further complicate U.S. efforts to accomplish essential missions while maintaining low visibility.

Š. . .

Involvement of U.S. military services at the last moment to salvage unacceptable situations could occur if, all efforts to the contrary, friends fail to cover interests that U.S. leaders consider critical. Early intervention by strong U.S. FID forces would be desirable, while allies in trouble still display vital signs, but may not be possible, given inhibitions embodied in the War Powers Resolution of 1973, other legal limitations, public aversion to "another Vietnam," and the Pentagon's current proclivity for caution. Swift victory, before disapproval could build abroad and domestic sympathy disappear, may not be possible in any conflict opponents promise to prolong.72/

Intervention in any event would be beneficial only if U.S. forces were well prepared for foreign internal defense, which many observers doubt. Pentagon decisionmakers, for example, believe that general purpose formations designed mainly for midand high-intensity combat can handle FID as a "less included capability." Special operations forces consequently are relatively low priority, although complementary missions demand both. SOF, in turn, concentrate on unconventional warfare (UW) at the expense of FID. Essential skills, however, are not all interchangeable. Establishing undergrounds and guerrilla bands requires different qualifications than rooting them out. Proficiency at clandestine infiltration/exfiltration, subversion, and sabotage is less important for FID than countermeasures in conjunction with host country security forces, who belong to a society with dissimilar styles. 73/

U.S. service schools and colleges devote little time to FID tactics, but difficulties would

persist if they rectified deficiencies, because military personnel officers treat training foreign nationals as a routine requirement that any competent specialist can satisfy. Effective communication in fact depends on cross-cultural understanding, a facet that gets short shrift. U.S. armed forces, as a result, lack sufficient area-oriented cadres whose members can design and conduct FID programs tailored to suit the needs of particular clients and conditions.74/

U.S. FID performance since World War II has been spotty. A "hands off" approach worked well in Greece (1948-49) and, after false starts, in the Philippines (1946-53). Advisers and material assistance sufficed. "Hands off" was unsatisfactory in China (1946-49). "Hands on" intervention by massive U.S. armed forces in Vietnam also failed (1965-72).75/
"No hands" typified U.S. support for more than 15 governments afflicted by Marxist insurgencies between 1960 and 1986 (Figure 13). Oman, the Yemens, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and four South American countries were among them. Some outcomes have been beneficial to U.S. security interests; others are liabilities. Whether U.S. strategists presently are applying abstinence or blends to best advantage in Central America, southern Africa, Lebanon, the Sudan, and Southeast Asia is controversial.

SOVIET TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Terrorism, for purposes of this report, is public, repetitive violence or threats of violence that

strive to achieve sociopolitical objectives by inspiring widespread fear among people not personally involved and by disrupting community routines so severely that compliance with terrorist demands becomes preferable to further disorder.* U.S. policy spurns terrorism of any type, although past and present association with repressive regimes that terrorize their own citizens (such as those of Somoza, apartheidists in South Africa, and the Shah of Iran) fuel false Soviet claims.76/

Some observers brand Soviet participation in, and control over, an international terror network that does the Kremlin's bidding, but most are more cautious, because alleged activities all are covert or clandestine and thus hard to prove. 77/ William J. Casey, speaking as Director of Central Intelligence, concedes that, "to give the devil his due, we have seen only indirect evidence" of more than modest monetary and logistic support for selected individuals and subnational groups. Governments that sponsor terrorism as a matter of state policy receive somewhat more assistance (Casey singled out Libya and Syria as illustrations. President Reagan recognized four other "outlaw states" until recently: Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua; he excluded Syria for political reasons, although it remains on the State Department list, and seems to be amending his position.)78/

Support for de facto proxies seems consistent with Soviet ideology.79/ Soviet forces remain in the shadows, while surrogates they train help instruct transnational terrorists, supply them difficult-to-detect

^{*} Section 1B(5), Annex A summarizes the essence of transnational terrorism and compares it with intranational applications.

arms, equipment, and intelligence, plus false documents to mask movements and conceal true identities, then provide safe havens after missions are complete. The Kremlin "and its allies have thus discovered a highly 'cost-effective' way of making the point that in today's world it is not safe to practice democracy," is the way William Casey puts it.80/ The aim in each case, he believes, is "to undermine our values, shatter our self confidence, and ultimately destroy our way of life."81/

U.S. citizens and installations overseas are relatively "soft," yet lucrative, targets of great propaganda value. Terrorist attacks in the United States are less frequent and intense, but the potential for escalation is present.

INTERNAL DEFENSE

Internal defense, as opposed to FID, includes all measures a government takes to forestall or defeat insurgencies or transnational terrorism on its own territory or against its assets elsewhere. U.S. and Soviet problems, policies, and practices vary greatly for several reasons.

SOVIET INTERNAL SECURITY

Soviet attention to internal defense, reflected in immense KGB and MVD forces, makes it most difficult for outsiders to infiltrate and for

insurgents or transnational terrorists to get a foothold, much less flourish. Informers everywhere operate freely. Strangers are easily recognized and subject to close surveillance in that closed society, which imposes severe limitations on assembly and travel. "House calls" by secret police round-the-clock, search and seizure on slight suspicion or whim, trumped up charges, incarceration without habeas corpus, false witness, torture, and summary execution are standard practices. State-controlled media, which report only what told, never reward rioters, rebels, or terrorists with publicity that could help their cause. 82/

No authoritative Sovietologist foresees any significant change in that system, which serves internal security purposes very well, despite occasional lapses of little strategic significance.

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM

Transnational terrorism has seriously concerned U.S. security officials since the late 1970s. Interest in counterterrorism,* which intermittently attracts more attention than any other U.S. special operation, currently is at a peak, because incidents are increasing in numbers as well as intensity. Almost half involve U.S. personnel, property, or both.83/

U.S. counterterrorism forces described in Chapter 2 are developing tactical capabilities that individually, and to a lesser extent

^{*} Section 1 B(5), Annex A illuminates elements of counterterrorism.

collectively, improve progressively. Optimum performance, however, awaits better employment strategies.

Declaratory Goals and Guidelines

The Reagan Administration has retained most counterterror goals and policy guidelines that President Carter openly and explicitly prescribed. Deterrence, and damage limitation if preventive measures fail, both are important components. The range of response embraces all legal methods, but rules out concessions and bargaining with terrorist blackmailers. Collective security, in collaboration with friends and allies, is preferable to unilateral action, and often is critical to success. 84/

One amendment, however, is usely important. Present U.S. immensely important. counterterror policies emphasize force far more than those in the past Punishment of perpetrators and sponsors for deterrent purposes is a much higher priority. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138 (since replaced by NSDD 207), which President Reagan signed on April 3, 1984, reportedly supplements reactive operations with "pro-active" options as a form of self-defense. Preemption may replace retaliation, provided timely intelligence indicates terrorist intent to attack and U.S./allied planners frame suitable ways to forestall them. Secretary of State Shultz, in a speech before the Trilateral Commission that same date; seemed to reflect NSDD-138, when he declared traditional defense inadequate against terrorist warfare, and proposed more positive steps.85/

Conceptual Disputations

Some of the Executive Branch policies just described are widely respected. Others are in dispute. Gaps between principles and practice will perciet until reconciliations take place.

Fixed Versus Flexible Policies

Terrorists "design their attacks to take place . . . where the challenge will not bring with it an obvious or clear-cut choice of response." U.S. policies consequently should "have an element of unpredictability and surprise. And the prerequisite . . . must be a broad public consensus on the moral and strategic necessity of action," because "there will not be time for renewed national debate after every terrorist attack." 86/

Those opinions, expressed by Secretary of State Shultz, seem to contradict some U.S. declaratory policies, which critics claim are unrealistically restrictive. "No concessions" to terrorist demands, "No for example, may strengthen deterrence by promising to make hostagetaking and abduction non-profit enterprises, but that avowal, if applied literally, rules out compromise, which might be wiser than noncompliance in many situations. Refusal to ransom the Secretary of Defense or JCS members could jeopardize U.S. secrets on a catastrophic scale. It would take steel nerves for Congress and the Executive Branch to ignore reliable reports that terrorists had seeded the Empire

nuclear weapon. Some knowledgeable observers believe that vows never to negotiate are counterproductive for additional reasons. U.S. leaders lose credibility when they relax that rule under duress or pretend that no interchange took place, even though press, radio, and TV announce differently. Another dilemma derives from official policy that puts hostage safety first. Hijackers and other terrorists, who know the risk of fatalities among hostages and spectators is highest during armed rescue operations, might be more impressed by threats of force, if U.S. guidelines were less firm.87/

Disputes about fixed versus flexible policies doubtless will continue. No "broad consensus," however, could "preclude debate after every terrorist attack," because most countermeasures require unique solutions, which must be judged case by case on respective merits. That is why some students of the subject, like Shultz, value "unpredictability and surprise," and object to predetermination, although they also understand that too much flexibility may be as big a liability as too little. Serious problems, for example, ensued with Congress and U.S. allies when the press in November 1986 reported that the Reagan Administration, notifying neither, had ransomed hostages in Lebanon by secretly relaxing longstanding embargoes on arms to Iran.88/

Force Versus Nonviolence

Neither terrorists nor sponsors would have any incentive to desist, if fruits were cost-free.89/Critics of U.S. policy concede that countermeasures should include armed action in certain circumstances, but

relative roles of force and nonviolent means nevertheless remain under review. Some tradeoffs are self-Political and economic evident. pressures, for example, generally are pointless against subnational groups but, properly applied, can pain states that supply arms, equipment, and sanctuaries. Firepower may be mandatory when time is the dominant factor. Pinpointing the most appropriate option or combination, however, is a complex process in most instances.

Political tacks to avenge atrocities and prevent repetition span a spectrum of possibilities. The lower end of the escalation ladder includes steps to limit normal contacts with states that sponsor or sustain transnational terrorism; restrict movement by their representatives in the United States; suspend selected programs, such as education and training; and deny entry to (perhaps deport) their citizens. U.S. leaders may abrogate treaties, close offensive embassies to prevent misuse of diplomatic immunity, revoke favored nation status, or sever relations, if additional clout is required. They also could, as the ultimate unilateral political escalation, withdraw recognition entirely, depriving offenders of rights normally available under U.S. Psychological campaigns that law. expose culprits to public censure and encourage the international community to curb connections could supplement any foregoing option or help foster dissidence against renegade government #.90/

Economic sanctions send equally unmistakable messages to nations that nurture terrorists. Restrictions on trade (especially boycotts and embargoes), foreign assistance, technology transfers, export credits, tourism, capital transactions, and access to commercial facilities,

including ports and airfields, are among the most common penalties open to the President. The economic equivalent of quarantine theoretically is possible, if other countries cooperate but, as Shultz discovered, "too often [friends] are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities or fear of provoking a bully." Unilateral U.S. sanctions against Libya, Nicaragua, and (in the past) Iran have been less satisfactory than expected. Congress rebuffs proposals to prosecute U.S. citizens who traffic with states that assist terrorists, partly because associated legal tangles are mind boggling. Would U.S. businessmen, for example, break the law if they dealt with Saudi Arabia, which bankrolls the Palestine Liberation Organization? Reliable answers to such questions are nonextant.91/

Nonviolent means of countering transnational terrorism never occur in a vacuum. Employers can damage allies and innocent bystanders along with themselves, perhaps worse than intended targets, unless they think moves through thoroughly beforehand. Force consequently may sometimes be preferable.

Debates About Deterrence

Continued development of U.S. counterterror policies will depend a great deal on the dynamics of deterrence, which are dimly perceived.92/ It is true, as CIA analysts indicate, that "terrorists are not chess masters. They are opportunists. Many operations are mounted because they are within the

range of the possible, and many . . . are abandoned because the difficulties become too great." Even so, U.S. strategists cannot explain why terrorist groups exploit known capabilities so sparingly and are so circumspect about escalatory options that include chemical, biological, and (possibly) low-yield nuclear weapons.* Deterrent concepts, unlike those at strategic and theater nuclear levels, can be tested and improved by trial and error, but perplexities nevertheless are immense.

Deterrence that eliminates causes instead of symptoms is particularly elusive. Political, economic, and social reforms, which deflate genuine grievances, help eradicate insurgencies, by convincing a popular majority that government programs are preferable to rebel promises. Winning hearts and minds, however, is less salutary as a counterterror tool. Reforms, at best, may limit terrorist constituencies, undermine claims to legitimacy, and reduce the reservoir of recruits, but rarely placate intractable terrorists, who use violence as a stepping stone to power. Negotiated compromise that offers some satisfaction to opponents customarily is anathema, although terrorists approve the process, since it publicizes their purpose and vests them with status equal to beleaguered governments, which share blame if bloodshed continues. Few rewards short of total success consequently motivate them to relinquish privi-

Tactical deterrence to discourage terrorists and supporting states creates additional dilemmas. Some

^{*} Section 1B (4), Annex A lists many terrorist implements, some of which are little used.

U.S. spokesmen, who tout "swift and sure" punishment as a deterrent, laud Israel as "a model of how a nation should . . . balance law and justice with self-preservation." Disbelievers prefer the British approach, which "has kept [better] faith with humane principles and practices that are our common heritage" (see the following subsection for further discussion of "active defense"). No one has yet devised any reliable way to deter suicidal terrorists, who welcome death. Deliberately overstated declaratory policies probably strengthen nuclear and conventional deterrence, by increasing uncertainties in rival camps. Experience conversely indicates that strong rhetoric by senior officials not only increases terrorist prestige, but may provoke inimical response, unless the government matches means and will with its words.94/

Intensive basic research by knowledgeable individuals and organizations must precede elimination or alleviation of such problems. Incremental improvements to U.S. counterterror deterrent policies and programs are more likely than early resolution.

Advisability of Active Defense

A sizable school of thought, whose adherents include Secretary of State Shultz, contend that U.S. response to terrorist atrocities

"should go beyond passive defense to consider . . . active prevention, preemption, and retaliation." The Secretary of Defense and other senior U.S. officials seem less certain, partly because such acts can be construed as aggression, and the glare of publicity makes penalties for failure severe under the most favorable circumstances.*95/

Who to hit, how to hit them, and what to hit them with generates disagreements, even among staunch supporters of armed reprisal, because easy choices are in short supply.

It is tempting to blame states that furnish safehavens from which terrorists launch assaults and return. Reasonable proof of largescale complicity is relatively easy to acquire, and vulnerabilities are evident. Bombardment is one option, but expensive, and collateral damage is nearly unavoidable, because terrorists with scant concern for human life habitually locate in cities. Many observers therefore believe that blockades are better, or prefer the "scalpel" of special operations to conventional cudgels. Results, however, are hard to predict. Ripostes by countries attacked may be painful, their control over terrorists they harbor is tenuous, and wholly independent radicals elsewhere may involve themselves without invitation.96/

U.S. decisionmakers also must calculate risk-versus-gain ratios carefully, taking all known opponents

^{*} Retaliation makes terrorists pay in some way for previous attacks. Timing is important. The so-called "window of popular support" varies with provocations. Hot pursuit normally is preferable to lengthy delays. Preemptive strikes, launched on evidence that attacks are imminent, try to beat terrorists to the punch. Preventive operations are launched on evidence that attacks are inevitable, but probably not imminent; waiting would increase risks.

into account, when they try to neutralize individual terrorists and small groups. Intelligence problems make that process incredibly complex. The clandestine nature of terrorist operations, which target an infinite variety of victims at random times and places, reduces the value of early warning indicators. Professional police work helps, but informants are scarce, attempts to penetrate small, paranoid cells is a time-consuming, perilous occupation, and payoffs are constrained, unless "plants" in command/control elements expose top terrorists. Otherwise, as one former CIA station chief put it, "all we find is one guy named Mohammed and another guy named Abdul." Tight restrictions on U.S. agents, legal limitations on HUMINT. and reluctance of allies to collab-orate because U.S. "leaks" compromise their sources magnify difficulties immensely.97/

Proper disposition of terrorists we do corner complicates final decisions. Apprehension, followed by public trial and imprisonment, respects due process, but compounds problems when associates outside seek to "liberate" them. Some students of the subject consequently contend that "the only good terrorist is a dead one;" killing, as they see it, is cost-effective and forever deters every deceased. Pro-con appraisals should precede each choice.*98/

Value of Passive Defense

Passive defense of Americans and their property against terrorism at

home and overseas creates controversial issues, because costs, calculated in terms of operational flexibility as well as funds, are severe.

Public education programs that increase alertness, reductions in force to reduce risks at vulnerable sites, and simple steps by key individuals to vary travel times, routes, and other routines are inexpensive ways for the U.S. Government and private sector to upset terrorist plans, but most measures cost money. Susinesses behind an explosive growth of gadgets, such as bullet-proof glass and hydraulic barriers, pass development costs to consumers. Commercial security firms find a multi-billion dollar bull market that continues to expand. It is possible to convert Capitol Hill, the Pentagon, State Department, embassies, official residences, military bases, and other critical installations into fortresses, but budgets would balloon, mission effectiveness and America's image as a free society would sag, and terrorists could gloat over partial success. Secondary targets (cultural centers, attachés) and isolated targets (water and power distribution points) would still be exposed. The question, "How much is enough?," remains unanswered.99/

Hostage rescue, which combines offensive tactics with passive defense, is the hardest mission to accomplish, whether captives are held aboard aircraft or ship, are barricaded in buildings, cached in safehouses, or incarcerated in stockades.** Basic U.S. objectives and policies are specific, 100/ but separate incidents within each

^{*} Section 2B, Annex A covers "surgical" antipersonnel strikes, including assassination, abduction, capture, and termination.

^{**} See Section 2D, Annex A for essentials of hostage rescue.

category demand individual treatment that depends on many strategic and tactical variables. Researchers, who hope their findings will help U.S. officials review options and expedite decisions when crises occur, have scarcely scratched the surface.

Past and Projected Performance

Transnational terrorists thus far have tested U.S. countercapabilities only slightly. American performance since the late 1970s reflects more bumbles than brilliance.

The FBI reportedly foils a significant number of terrorist acts annually, 101/ and "Bull" Simon, backed by H. Ross Perot rather than the U.S. Government, rescued hostages from Teheran in 1980.102/ Foreign policy embarrassments, however, followed two tactical successes in October 1985: President Reagan reneged the day after he publicly approved Israel's bombardment of PLO bases in Tunisia, a U.S. friend; 103/ the in-flight interception of Achille Lauro hijackers aboard an Egyptian airliner strained relations with other U.S. allies. 104/ The Desert One raid to rescue hostages in Teheran $(1980)\frac{105}{}$ and obliteration of a Marine barrack in Beirut (1983)106/ were spectacular failures. No one at this stage can be certain whether long-term effects of the April 1986 U.S. air raid on Libya107/and subsequent saber-rattling108/ served American interests well.

Future U.S. counterterror capabilities depend on steps to strengthen the control structure, settle conceptual disputes, lift the most debilitating legal limitations, 109/ and tighten links with allies. 110/ Prognoses based on dissimilar assumptions about "progress" in such respects variously predict improvement, impairment, or project straight lines. All seem premature.

MID- AND HIGH- INTENSITY CONFLICTS

Neither U.S. nor Soviet special operations establishments as currently constituted have much experience in mid- and high-intensity conflicts,* but every employment mode and skill discussed in foregoing sections has utility.

Soviet preparations apparently concentrate on special reconnaissance, plus direct action missions in enemy rear areas to "decapitate decisionmakers; delay, deceive, and disorganize forces in reserve; neutralize nuclear delivery systems and weapon stockpiles; control bottlenecks; disrupt communications; and otherwise expedite breakthroughs by the main military body. Internal security probably would tighten even more than at present, to prevent resistance movements and insurgencies from increasing vulnerabilities in non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states, as well as at home. Strong payop support for offensive and defensive operations is preordained. Marked

^{*} Section la, Annex A outlines the nature of mid- and high-intensity conflicts in relation to special operations. The last U.S. experience was in Vietnam. Soviet SOF have not been exposed to combat on a similar or greater scale since World War II.

limitations include uneven SOF quality and the absence of specialized aircraft for clandestine infiltration, but the establishment is large enough to remain combat effective after absorbing severe manpower and materiel losses. 111/

Understrength U.S. Army and Air Force SOF are too few and poorly equipped to make comparable contributions in a high-threat environment. One Ranger regiment, organized and trained for combat by battalions and companies, could not remain effective long, if personnel and hardware losses, as anticipated, were large. They probably would suffer the same fate as World War II predecessors in

Europe, which accomplished "impossible" missions after taking frightful casualties, then were erased from the rolls. Special Forces are numerous enough for unconventional warfare against the Warsaw Pact, other socialist states, and certain Soviet Socialist Republics where minorities prevail, but abilities to elude security long enough to take root are suspect, and air power for clandestine support is insufficient. SEALs are in better shape. Psyop is not.

Soviet special operations posture for mid- and high-intensity conflicts, in sum, is somewhat better than that of the United States.

Chapter 4

U.S. PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS

No recapitulation of U.S. special operations problems would be complete without reference to root causes. This chapter therefore identifies the most pervasive, before it summarizes salient deficiencies and reviews remedial options. Entries in each instance are representative, rather than comprehensive.

CAUSE/EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS

Virtually every U.S. macro command/control, planning, and SOP posture problem derives mainly from misunderstandings. Few members of the U.S. Government and military establishment fully appreciate special operations threats, capabilities, limitations, and relationships with the rest of our security apparatus. Even key SOF officials, who advise them, misplace some priorities. Mismatched ends and means thus are common.

COORDINATION PROBLEMS

Horizontal and vertical command/control problems in this field persist at the top, partly because reliable connections between Congress and the Executive Branch are faulty; no special operations element is empowered to issue and enforce

interdepartmental/interagency guidance; none is responsible for collaboration with allies, whose participation in UW, FID, and actions to counter transnational terrorism are inseparable from our own; linkage between U.S. national, state, and local participants is very loose. Voluntary cooperation invites internecine competition and inadvertent oversights.

PLANS AND OPERATIONS PROBLEMS

Misconceptions about special operations, coupled with hodgepodge organization, inhibit sound plans and operations. Objectives, threat assessments, policies, and priorities fit together poorly and change capriciously. Successful operations often depend on close collaboration between SOF and general purpose forces, but connections are nebulous. Important requirements, as a result, routinely fall through cracks. The difference between declaratory statements and performance undercuts U.S. credibility.

Planners and operators repeatedly work at cross-purposes. The State Department and Pentagon, for example, openly debate the utility of military power for assorted special operations. Foreign aid appropriations contradict stated preference for low UW and FID profiles. So do

counterterror targeting policies that permit air strikes on cities, but prohibit selective attacks on individuals. The artificial distinction between military special operations and civilian special activities confuses covert/clandestine issues. America's media, fed by security violators, make it virtually impossible to keep secrets very long.

Peacetime deployments for administrative purposes conflict with planned employment. The 5th Special Forces Group, to cite one instance, recently moved to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, miles from the nearest desert, although its area of responsibility in the Middle East is bone dry. JSOC components, ensconced in the United States where they normally may not operate, are positioned poorly to influence short-fuse counterterror actions elsewhere.

PROGRAM AND BUDGET PROBLEMS

Providing SOF a separate budget, as recently required by law, will solve few problems, as long as funds expended support shaky plans. The proper proportion of active SOF to reserve components remains unresolved. Both are understrength and depend extensively on conventional hardware that never was designed for isolated special operations, which demand low maintenance along with high reliability.

Priorities for improvement are suspect. Programmers, for example, put a premium on expensive aircraft and boats that would be most useful for clandestine infiltration/exfiltration during mid- or high-intensity conflicts and for unconventional warfare against sophisticated foes, such as Vietnam, North Korea, and the

Warsaw Pact. DOD planners, however, consider such contingencies a slim possibility. Those same officials slight HUMINT and psyop, which could be helpful across the full spectrum of hot and cold war competition.

Personnel policies that prohibit stabilized assignments prevent active UW, FID, and psyop specialists from attaining required cultural expertise, including language proficiency, in respective areas of responsibility. Reserve counterparts, which forward deploy rarely for short periods, are less qualified in that respect. Computer-assisted personnel officers who pick SOF to train foreign nationals rarely realize that aptitudes and enthusiasm for that specialized assignment are just as important as professional skills. Square pegs in round holes result.

OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

The "best" way to strengthen U.S. special operations posture is a subjective matter. 1/ Options are profuse, and often complex. Some are susceptible to unilateral implementation by the Executive Branch. Congress must legislate others.

Options below are illustrative starting points for improvement. U.S. leaders probably should consider alternatives carefully, before they approve proposals that overlook standards described.

STRENGTHEN STRUCTURE

Steps to strengthen U.S. special operations high command/control structure seem advisable at three

levels: national staff, OSD/JCS staff, and a military SOF command.*

A small staff, perhaps appended or reporting to the National Security Council (NSC), could ensure close and continuous special operations coordination between the Executive Branch and Congress, between top-level special operations elements in the Executive Branch, and between country teams and U.S. allies. Its director might be vested with authority to:

- -- Act as the President's representative dealing with Congress on interdepartmental, interagency, and international special operations matters.
- X -- Issue interdepartmental/interagency special operations planning and programming guidance, then ensure compliance.
 - -- Set interdepartmental and interagency standards, coordinate, and supervise resultant policies, plans, programs, and activities worldwide.

Whether OSD and JCS staffs remain separate or merge, more rank and better access to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could enhance effectiveness. Whoever directs the OSD or consolidated staff might be vested with authority to:

-- Conduct liaison with Congress on special operations matters.

- -- Act as the SECDEF's representative for interdepartmental, interagency, and international special operations coordination.
- -- Issue special operations planning and programming guidance to all military services, then ensure compliance.
- Set standards, coordinate, and supervise resultant policies, plans, programs, and activities throughout the Department of Defense, including SOF/non-SOF relationships.

The commander of a special operations headquarters to focus efforts of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps SOF might be vested with authority to:

- -- Exercise operational command over all military SOP in the Continental United States (CONUS), including joint training, readiness, and deployment planning.
- -- Plan for and, with requisite approval, employ military SOF in CONUS for counterterror and/or counterinsurgency purposes.
- -- Pass operational command of selected SOF to regionally-oriented unified commands as directed.
- -- Coordinate with regionally-oriented unified commands concerning all

^{*} Items marked "X" indicate organizational options that recent amendments to Title 10, United States Code, addressed only indirectly, incompletely, or not at all.

aspects of special operations, including employment in their areas of responsibility.

X Quality control is an essential aspect of planning, programming, and budgeting, but few participants in those processes are able to critique their own products objectively. Built-in biases and bureaucratic blinders are typical impediments. Periodic inspection of U.S. special operations by an impartial board of professionals thus seems a sensible option.*

STRENGTHEN UNDERSTANDING

No amount of restructuring could strengthen U.S. special operations much, unless top civilian and military leaders, plus respective replacements, become better informed about purposes, capabilities, and limitations. A case consequently exists for formal and informal education programs, short-term as well as long, tailored, for example, to influence the following audiences:

- -- Applicable departments; agencies; congressional members and staff; communications media.
- -- JCS; military services; CINCs and staffs of unified commands.

Awateurs, professionals, theoreticians, and practitioners all could help, individually and in groups that include service schools/colleges and "think tanks." Personal consultation, open publication, radio/TV programs, and conferences are among many available forums.

Basic education on special operations in turn requires better research on related subjects. Lessons learned from systematic dissections of successes, failures, and contrasting styles would help U.S. planners most, if accompanied by cause/effect connections and reasons why any particular experience is (or is not) transferable to a different time and place. Hitler's brutal treatment of recalcitrant Soviet citizens, for example, turned widespread tendencies toward insurgency into resistance that conceivably cost him victory in World War II. Would the same Soviet minorities defect today under similar conditions?

Ten special operations topics, in no particular order of priority, exemplify fundamental studies that U.S. analysts, armed with historical and contemporary precedents, might undertake to capitalize on past accomplishments and avoid repeating past mistakes:

^{*} Complete impartiality is difficult for the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group (SOPAG), which is partly staffed with OSD officials. It is chaired by Lawrence Ropka, Jr., the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Members are R. Lynn Rylander, his deputy; George T. Talbot, the Executive Secretary; retired Army Generals Edward C. (Shy) Meyer and Robert C. Kingston; retired Army Lieutenant Generals Samuel V. Wilson and William P. Yarborough; retired Air Force Lieutenant General Leroy J. Manor; retired Army Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn; and Richard H. Shultz, from Tufts University. Retired Army General Richard G. Stilwell, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and Army Major General Thomas W. Kelly, who is Director, Joint Special Operations Agency, are not official members, but always are invited.

-- Merits of fixed versus flexible policies.

y. .

- -- Proper interface between strategies and tactics.
- -- The dynamics of deterrence in connection with transnational terrorism.
- -- Optimum "peacetime" deployment of JSOC components.
- -- Strategic targeting doctrine for special operations.
- -- Relationships with allies in various special operations environments.
- -- Special operations in sensitive, heavily defended zones.
- -- Special operations under polar icecaps.
- -- Special operations in space.
- -- American media support for special operations.

Products of such research would help the U.S. special operations community, including segments of Congress, first to evaluate apparent policies, plans, programs, and performance of any given country, coalition, or extranational participant, then prepare net assessments that compare the capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, opportunities, and prospects of any given opponents. 2/

STRENGTHEN FORCES

A separate budget for the new DOD special operations unified command seems salutary, but SOF

cannot be properly strengthened merely by spending more money. Revised justification for special operations force quantities and characteristics is required. The key question is, "How much of what (active, reserve, SOF, non-SOF) is needed how fast in what order of priority to accomplish essential special operations missions in cost-effective fashion?" Some equipment understrengths, such as MC-130 Combat Talons and HH-53 Pave Lows, may be overstated. Some functional understrengths, particularly psyop and HUMINT, probably are underrated.

SOF quantity at the expense of quality, in turn, is counterproductive. Initial personnel selection standards should be stringent, because perfect organizational structure, superlative training procedures, stable assignments, and strong incentives (such as promotion opportunities) cannot produce high-caliber performance from poor raw materials. Neither is it possible to create competent SOF after emergencies occur. The process takes time.

Actions to correct JSOC maldeployments, and thereby expedite employment overseas, would strengthen U.S. counterterrorism capabilities considerably. Prepositioning small, self-contained packages in selected U.S. unified commands is one option worth exploration. Similar redisposition of other SOP, such as the 5th Special Forces Group, with particular attention to better area orientation, would reduce response times and improve operational performance. Task organizing, training, and equipping Ranger companies to function as teams suitable for rear area attacks on scattered, highvalue, and time-sensitive targets, in a style similar to Soviet Spetsnaz, could enhance U.S. direct action options at little added expense.

Chapter 5

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The Soviet special operations kit bag contains a diverse set of tools. Some are sharper than others, but all are serviceable and ready for use with what seems to be scant reservation, whenever so doing serves Politburo purposes. Low-cost, low-risk "peacetime" employment proceeds on a grand global scale, sometimes assisted by de facto proxies. Preparations to compete at every other level of the conflict spectrum continue. There are no noticeable crash programs, but neither is there any sign that consistent concentration on special operations will soon slacken.

The full significance of Soviet efforts is difficult to assess, because the record is incomplete. "Peacetime" covert/clandestine operations become public only if they fail or long after they succeed. Afghanistan thus far is the sole large-scale test of "wartime" performance. Some U.S. and allied appraisals, as a result, probably please Soviet propagandists, by inflating present and projected capabilities. Appraisals that take them too lightly probably please Soviet planners. The combination of "sleepers" and Spetsnaz "surgical" teams designed to disrupt rear area security, however, clearly bears

close surveillance. Evidence concerning quantities is uncertain and quality surely is uneven but, at best, potential threats to U.S. and allied security would be serious, even if officials divided prevailing estimates by ten. At worst, Spetsnaz and "sleepers" might cripple opponents as the opening move in a high-intensity war, without Soviet resort to nuclear weapons.

U.S. complacency and inconsistent support for special operations seem insdvisable, given those and lesser capabilities of the Soviet Union, its associates, and other unfriendly forces. country cannot efficiently help resistance movements reverse socialist revolutions around the world, prevent further encroachments that adversely affect U.S. interests, or deal professionally with vindictive governments and subnational groups that could terrorize the United States, if we cede special operations initiative and fail to develop adequate deterrent/defense postures. world's best SOP, however, would be of little value, if all projected improvements were completed and U.S. leaders fully appreciated their potential, unless national consensus on appropriate use emerges.

ANNEX A

THE ESSENCE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

"I don't think they play at all fairly," Alice began in a rather complaining tone, and "they don't seem to have any rules in particular; at least, if there are, nobody attends to them--and you've no idea how confusing it is . . ."

Lewis Carroll Alice in Wonderland

Special operations forces (SOF) with unusual, occasionally unique, skills are designed to undertake unorthodox security tasks that ordinary organizations could accomplish only with far greater difficulty and far less effectiveness, if at all. Irregular warfare is their forte, including insurgency/counterinsurgency, transnational terrorism/counterterrorism, associated psychological warfare, and "surgical" strikes deep in enemy territory. Procedures and training are mainly nonstandard, whether commitment occurs during periods of pseudo peace or in armed combat.

Military, paramilitary, and civilian SOF units are small, and ideally are manned with hand-picked, distinctively-prepared personnel. Independent employment is confined to selective cold war confrontations and certain low-intensity conflicts, but SOF may support conventional, nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities during high-, mid- and low-intensity hostilities. Overt, covert, and clandestine operations for deterrent, persuasive, coercive, and war fighting purposes mix force

with fraud and finesse at every level of competition. The best blend depends on missions and circumstances. Actions that disable people or damage property produce fast tactical effects, but ultimate accomplishment of strategic aims normally depends on cumulative, sustained efforts.

Offensive special operations, which customarily avoid decisive conflict, are low-cost, potentially high-payoff assaults on physical and psychological targets, when alternatives appear inappropriate or infeasible. Subversion, sabotage, disinformation, and rear area raids Defensive are representative. operations also require rare talents and techniques. Bscape, evasion, rescue (hostages, prisoners of war), and recovery (captured materiel, documents), for example, are tricky endeavors.

Concepts, policies, plans, programs, and employment practices at every level of conflict are so unlike conventional operations that the uninitiated often liken them to Alice playing croquet on the Queen's crazy

court. There <u>are</u> "rules," however, rather different than run of the mill and hard to recognize. Those who perceive them have a keen advantage over those who do not.

This short treatise explains special operations as simply as

possible, in generic terms, without addressing U.S. policies, apparatus, or performance. Documentation refers readers to sources for further study. Three figures with a common format illustrate the bonding between special operations tasks, skills, and forces.

Section 1

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENTS

Special operations constitute a potpourri of active and passive tasks that variously serve offensive, defensive, and deterrent purposes in every environment (Figure 15). The list includes lethal and nonlethal entries. Some have limited utility. Others are useful across the spectrum, from cold war through low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts. Hyperspecialization is confined to a few tasks, such as hostage rescue, but even the most conventional--economic and military assistance, for example--have unconventional twists and require scarce skills.

E. IX

A. HIGH- and MID-INTENSITY CONFLICTS

Any future high- or mid-intensity conflict that pits the United States against the Soviet Union or either of them against a heavily-armed third party on the scale of World War II or Korea (1950-1953) is likely to feature uniformed forces employed in traditional fashion, whether combat remains conventional or involves nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Military battlefields, rear areas, combatants, and noncombatants will be identifiable.

Special operations tasks in those contexts primarily assist regular military efforts by physical and psychological means in ways that delay, deceive, disorganize, and

otherwise disrupt enemies. Irregulars may act as important "force multipliers," by diverting enemy attention and additional combat power. French resistance movements, for example, made life miserable for German occupation troops before and after Allied forces landed in Normandy. Partisans of various nationalities performed parallel functions on the Eastern Front.

B. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS

Five types of conflict are low-intensity from U.S. and Soviet perspectives. The first includes small-scale replicas of warfare just described, on the level of recent U.S. combat in the Dominican Republic (1965) and Grenada (1983). Insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, transnational terrorism, and counterterrorism are quite different. Irregular forces and procedures play paramount, rather than supporting, roles; battlefields, rear areas belligerents, and bystanders all are ill-defined.

(1) Mainly Conventional Actions

Mainly conventional conflicts of low intensity historically establish tacit limitations on political objectives, military aims, weapons,

1485

INTERNATION TO

1/	Excludes low-priority employment elsewhere in the conflict spectrum.
1/	Term inters to "surgical" antipersonnel operations against transmittional terrorists and key insurgents.
3/	Operations by military and paramilitary formations.
5/ 5/ 5/ 5/ 10/	Assistance from outsiders to allies or other associates.
3/	includes weapons, equipment, construction, advice, and training.
6/	includes nation-building and civic action.
7/	Meforms may be political, economic, social, or some combination.
8/	indicates special operations output, rather than intelligence requirements.
¥/	Such as clandestine reconnaissance of submerged beach defenses.
Tu/	buth as clandestine surveillance using sensors.
11/	Penetration of terrorist and insurgent .elis is one important method.
17/	"sinly nuclear, chemical, and binlogical weapons.
37	by land, was or sir, individually and by units.

2000 WAR

Direct Action 1/

Raide 3/----Rescue

Indirect Action

intelligence 1/8/

Survival 1/

Target Acquisition

tatiltration 13/

Ter recludes martirs and sulcide square

Assassination----Abduction-----Hostage Taking------Random Killing & Maiming-Sabot age-----Capture 2/----Termination 2/-----Ambushes 3/----

Host ages----

Military PONS------

INSURCENCY

Psychological Operations--Subversion-----Economic Assistance 4/ 6/-Ketorn 7/-----

Unique Reconnais sance 9/--Unique Surveillance 107---

key Personnel 11/-----Critical Meapons 12/----

tstape & tvasion------Personal Security 14/----, ------Site Security------Public Education-----

COUNTER

INSURCEMCY

INTERSITY

COUNTER

TERRORISM

MALEST

CONVENTIONAL

TRANSMATIONAL

TERRORISM

targets, force characteristics/quantities/deployments, geographic boundaries, and allowable escalation. Those restrictions, however, do not rule out symbolic or exemplary employment of nuclear weapons and chemical warfare. One or two tactical nuclear "shots across the bow," for example, might inhibit escalation (even terminate armed action) without any casualties or damage on either side. Special operations tasks in any event parallel those for high- and mid-intensity hostilities.

(2) Insurgency/Resistance

Insurgencies are attempts by citizens -- military, civilian, officials, laymen in any combination-to overthrow established orders (not necessarily governments) by subversive and coercive means. 1/Special operations are most prominent in planned, protracted insurrections led by skilled activists, who mobilize and manipulate people, then focus resultant power to usurp authority. The ultimate aim of actions directed against indigenous governments usually, although not always, is to replace prevailing political and social structures with radically different systems. Counterrevolutionaries, such as those in Nicaragua and Angola,* and resistance to foreign occupation, currently exemplified by Afghan efforts to oust the Soviets, display similar characteristics.

History confirms that neither political, economic, and social

deprivation nor oppressive foreign dictators are enough to incite and sustain insurgencies.2/ Even when conditions become intolerable, headless multitudes remain bound together by blind passion only momentarily, unless clever leaders focus their power on the basic objective, which is to undermine and override the incumbent regime.3/ Sound organization is essential. Full-time, hard core cadres in the illegal underground coordinate and control insurgent movements. Auxiliaries, who lead otherwise normal lives in the community, are part-time members. Combat specialists range from saboteurs and terrorists to propagandists. Others perform supportive functions that include recruitment, indoctrination, training, intelligence, munitions manufacture, transportation, communications, and fund raising.4/ That cadre eventually organizes and controls paramilitary guerrilla units, which intensify and widen the conflict from hideouts in familiar terrain.5/

Host insurgents around the world pursue a three-phase strategy, modified to suit their circumstances: preservation; progressive expansion; decisive power. The process is completely flexible. Different phases characteristically occur concurrently in different parts of an afflicted country. When revolutionaries run into strong resistance they change tactics or retrench, then rejuvenate later. 6/

Protracted conflicts benefit insurgents more than responsible governments, because they have a lot less to lose and everything to gain.

^{*} The Contras, a loose coalition of counterrevolutionaries, oppose the Sandinista government that replaced President Somoza's regime in Nicaragua. Jonas Savimbi heads UNITA, which opposes the Soviet-Cuban backed regime that replaced Portuguese rulers in Angola.

One purpose of violence and subversion is to provoke responses that inadvertently strengthen opposition to the regime and support for the rebels. 2/ Special operations tasks, reflected in Figure 15, are largely offensive. Direct action missions get most publicity, but the battle for men's minds is crucial.

Assistance from outsiders is helpful, but not essential. Castro succeeded in Cuba and the Mational Liberation Front freed Algeria from France with little foreign help. Rebels rely heavily on raids and ambushes to procure small arms, munitions, special items (such as radios and medical supplies), and funds. Civilians, willingly or not, furnish food and shelter. Military aid, particularly modern weapons and unconventional warfare training, nevertheless is most welcome. So is money.8/

(3) Counteringurgency

Basic counterinsurgency objectives are to deter and, if necessary, defeat rebellions against established authority. Political, economic, social, psychological, and military special operations vary with proclivities of afflicted countries and phases of conflict development.9/

Intelligence concerning the temper of the population is critical for leaders who hope to prevent insurgencies. Authoritarian and totalitarian governments, which rely extensively on informant networks at grass roots, make it difficult for malcontents to remain anonymous very long. Less fearful regimes, which permit freedom of oral and written expression, keep fingers on the public pulse by allowing disgruntled citizens to air grievances openly. 10/

Ruthless repression can prevent or control insurgencies for long periods, wherever compassion and ethics receive low priorities. Soviet steps to quash uprisings within their sphere of influence and genocide in Kampuchea are good examples. Even so, force alone can rarely preserve the status quo indefinitely against determined opposition. 11/

Democratic counterinsurgents usually try to manage rather than resist change, raily loyal factions, and convert fence straddlers, leaving malcontents without backers or a base. Retorms that reapportion influence and provide equal opportunity for all may alleviate or eliminate rebel causes, if policymakers take appropriate steps early enough and avoid replacing one set of problems with others that are worse. 12/ Psychological operations are immensely important.

Those techniques, however, will not suffice, if insurgents are determined to depose a despised government or occupying power. Negotiated compromise in such cases is possible, but improbable; rebel motivations normally are to publicize victory, prevent defeat, or open promising psychological fronts, not to "meet in the middle."13/ Static protection for the populare cedes initiative to the ir Attempts to isolate urba. from terrorists and supv...sives seldom succeed. Rural families that relocate to fortified villages find some security and help shield harvests from insurgents, but the revolution remains intact unless direct offensive action roots out the infrastructure, separates underground from guerrillas, and seals off outside assistance.14/

Support from foreign friends serves best if it begins before

insurgency reaches crisis proportions and continues unabated until no longer needed. Military and economic assistance are complementary. The former features weapons, equipment, supplies, and training; the latter generally abets nation building.

(4) Transnational Terrorism

Transnational terrorism is instigated by individuals and small groups, some independent, others in governmental employ. It seeks to intimidate the people and disrupt the routines of neutral as well as hostile nations so severely that beset states eventually avoid further violence by actively or passively helping terrorists achieve their socio-political objectives. 15/Factions that favor a Palestinian homeland, for example, hope that strikes on U.S. and other assets in Europe will put irresistible external pressures on Israel.

Such warfare shares some traits with domestic terrorism, a common tactic of insurgency. 16/ Both are weapons of the weak, cheap to concoct and costly to counter. Most perpetrators are politically motivated, although some are mercenaries. None have many scruples about compassion or morality. 17/ They attack everything and defend nothing, using death and destruction to spread panic far beyond points of physical impact. Targets are carefully picked to transmit psychological messages that shape public opinion and behavior. Indiscriminate attacks that kill and maim innocent civilians make sense when seen in that light: the aim is to make security forces appear impotent and concessions seem preferable to chaos. 18/

Transnational terrorism even so is unique. Participants operate freely in what most dictionaries

define as "peacetime." Popular sympathy and support are not essential. Most importantly, transnational terrorism is accurately called the "great equalizer." The mere prospect of hit-and-run raiders playing hide-and-seek without regard for national or regional boundaries can put heavily-armed countries and their exclaves in a virtual state of siege. 19 / Success seems contagious. 20 /

Assassinations, abductions, hostage-taking, small-scale anti-personnel operations, and simple sabotage nevertheless produce few casualties and little damage, compared with common crime. Improved preventive measures help reduce incidents. Terrorists themselves seem to impose constraints. Unlimited violence, followed by widespread public revulsion, might eliminate legal restrictions on counterterror operations and otherwise make it impossible for transnational terrorists to attain political aims. 21/

Sophisticated fuses and explosives, automatic weapons with armor-piercing ammunition, portable missile launchers, remote control devices, and other new technologies supplement or supplant Saturday night specials and homemade bombs. Intercontinental transportation is available for fast arrivals and getaways. Satellite communications provide almost instantaneous access to audiences around the world. 22/

Opportunities for spectacular escalation are open. Transnational terrorists armed with small nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons would have tremendous coercive power. Even a well-handled hoax could pay off handsomely.23/ Terrorists could shut down modern metropoli without resort to exotic implements. Information storage and transfer sites, transportation nodes (bridges, tunnels, switching centers), and water/power

distribution facilities are among the most vulnerable bullseyes. Calamities would ensue, if commerce and commuter traffic ceased, ventilating systems failed, perishable products spoiled, and conditions encouraged looters. Plammable gas in severs could lift a city off its foundations, if ignited. Nuclear reactors and petrochemical plants are other tempting targets.24/

F. C.

State sponsorship and support can telescope the time it takes terrorists to become proficient and affords flexibility for those in business. Foreign benefactors who provide safe havens along with expertise and funds further complicate problems for counterterror strategists.25/

(5) Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism incorporates many of the most complex special operations. Deterrence and defense both depend to exceptional degrees on centralized planning, decentralized execution, timely, accurate intelligence, meticulous training, clear rules of engagement, and teamwork that most often involves foreign nationals. Technology is important, but human factors predominate. Tactics and strategy must mesh, or the final result is failure. Israel's eye-for-an-eye and tooth-for-a-tooth tactics, for example, have been widely admired for many years; from a strategic standpoint, however, they leave that nation insecure, by creating terrorists faster than air strikes and hit teams can kill them.

Do nothing is poor policy. So is "do something, even if it's wrong." The best policy may be no fixed policy, to permit maximum

flexibility on a case-by-case basis. Long- and short-term tradeoffs complicate the decisionmaking process, because the proper option in any given instance is not always the one most likely to forestall future difficulties. Early ransom for hostages with supersensitive information or concessions to prevent destruction of irreplaceable archives might be advisable, even if so doing sets undesirable precedents. 26/Beyond that, flexible responses probably bolster deterrence, by seeding terrorist camps with uncertainties.

The dynamics of deterrence are less well understood than at any other level of conflict. No one knows why known transnational terrorists use their capabilities so sparingly and with such circumspection.

Nonprovocation sometimes reduces dangers, 27/ but terrorists routinely target neutral states to make them take a stand. Internal security precautions that limit terrorist opportunities (and damage, if deterrence fails) appear more promising. Surveillance, inspections, physical barriers, roving patrols, armored automobiles, bodyguards, and public education concerning the full range of problems are among them. Penalties in personal freedom and the gulf between governments and the governed, however, can grow great. 28/ Political and economic sanctions, which sometimes prove useful against states that sponsor, support, or tolerate transnational terrorism, are less influential against independent terrorist groups, and usually take intended effect only when several countries participate.29/ Finally, afflicted states may threaten armed force to buttress deterrence but, like barking dogs that never bite,

quickly lose credibility, unless they deliver when provoked.30/

Some causes of terrorism, such as Islamic fundamentalism, seem almost incurable. Others require concessions too great for counterterrorists to accept. No known form of deterrence fazes suicidal fanatics, who welcome death. 31/ Defenders of states under attack in such cases must decide whether to act or react.

Preemptive and preventive operations* both invoke the right of self-defense. Both also rely heavily on accurate intelligence, which is hard to acquire. Electronic intercepts occasionally help confirm state involvement in terrorist activities, 32/ but national leaders still must ascertain what tack seems most suitable. U.S. actions against sites in the Warsaw Pact, for example, would look a lot less attractive than those in Libya. So would forbidden intervention in a friendly country inadvertently "Surgical" strikes are involved. impossible, unless agents pinpoint the perpetrators. It takes time and patience to track down suspects using standard police procedures and separate legitimate informants from crackpots who respond to big bribes. Attempts to penetrate tiny terrorist "cells" are extremely hazardous to health, because cliquish members are exceedingly suspicious of outsiders and stringent tests quickly weed out phonies (random murder is a favorite requirement).33/

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Retaliation forfeits initiative, but poses fewer problems than preventive/preemptive strikes. Hot pursuit is easier to justify, identification of culprits is less ambiguous, and allied collaboration is more likely. 34/

The latter point is tremendously important, since transnational terrorists, by definition, pay scant attention to territorial boundaries. Multilateral countermeasures in terms of intelligence, sanctions, forces, facilities, and a host of other factors are far superior to those of nations that for any reason act alone. 35/

C. COLD WAR

Nonviolent special operations, particularly psyop and preparations for irregular combat, predominate during the war called "peace" (Figure 15). Aggressors infiltrate agents for nefarious purposes, encourage subversion, and engage in other skulduggery designed to weaken rivals from within. Opponents strengthen internal security. Objectives are to develop advantageous (perhaps decisive) positions indirectly at little expense. Brainpower replaces firepower as the foremost implement. Sun Tzu summed it all up nicely in the first known text on the art of war: "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."36/

^{*} Preemptive operations are intiated when evidence indicates that an enemy attack is imminent. Preventive operations are initiated against known or suspected foes before any such warning is received.

Section 2

SPECIAL TASKS AND SKILLS

Forces assigned special operations tasks must possess special talents and skills. Innate intelligence, physical strength, agility, stamina, and standard training are not enough. Temperaments also must combine resourcefulness, ingenuity, pragmatism, and patience with self-discipline and dependability to extraordinary degrees. Direct action missions in addition demand unflappable personalities (a quality Ernest Hemingway identified as "grace under pressure").

Area orientation is a universal requirement, for psychological warriors as well as those with lethal weapons, whether operations take place on native or foreign soil. Insurgents, for example, are fish-out of water away from home territory.* Most SOF must be familiar with local languages (preferably dialects), customs, and landscapes. 1/

Even common tasks (Figure 16) call for uncommon skills applied under uncommon circumstances. Any malcontent, for example, can murder

or maim indiscriminately, but it takes expertise and meticulous planning to pick proper targets, times, and places, parlay results into political capital, and replicate successful processes repeatedly. Economic and military assistance to stabilize or destabilize situations often must be administered covertly or clandestinely for political expediency. 2/ Reforms that fail to focus on causes, rather than symptoms, of insurgency are frequently unsatisfactory. 3/ Any rifle company can conduct conventional raids and ambushes, 4/ but it cannot do well indefinitely, while living off hostile land, safely relieve an enemy convoy of volatile cargo, secure vulnerable installations before defenders destroy them, or accomplish many other special missions. 5/

Only full-time master craftsmen have sufficient skill to accomplish tasks listed in Figure 16 and elaborated below. Amateurs and mediocre professionals never last long.

^{* &}quot;What revolutionary logic" could explain Che Guevara, "an Argentinean out of Cuba by way of the Congo in the wilds of the Bolivian jungles memorizing the verbs of the wrong Indian language in order to convert a people, already possessing land, whose vision for endless centuries had turned inward?" Far from being a fish in a sea of people, he was a fish out of water. Any claim that he spoke for Bolivian people was unfounded in fact. 6/ He paid for ineptitude with his life.

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Figure 16

TASKS CONNECTED TO SKILLS Requirements Are Relative to Each Other

•	Special Operations Skills Required			
	Least	Moderate	Extensive	Greatest
Cellular Organization 1/			1	
Simple			z	1
Complex				x
•]	1
Direct Action			ľ	1
Assassination	1			!
Strategic 2/			x	[
Tactical 37		x	<u> </u>	ł
Abduction	}			
Strategic 2/				x
Tactical <u>3</u> 7			x	
Hostage Taking		x		
Random Killing & Maiming	x			
Sabotage	J			
Strategic <u>2</u> /				x
Tactical 37			x	
Capture 4/				x
Termination 4/				x
Ambushes				
Raids		x		
Rescue	}			
Rostages				x
Military POWs			x	
· I				
Indirect Action				
Psychological Operations 5/				x
Subversion				x
Military Assistance		Ì		
Advice and Training 6/				x
Other		x	!	
Economic Assistance		;		
Reform	x			
•		'		
Intelligence		,	ĺ	
Unique Reconnaissance			x	
Unique Surveillance			x	
Target Acquisition				
Key Personnel				x
Critical Weapons		х	}	
!	}		!	
Survival	ļ			
Infiltration 1/	x[[x[x
Exfiltration	}	1	ļ	
Preplanned	x		!	x
Search & Rescue 7/ Escape & Evasion	x!	!	x	x
Escape & Evasion				x
Personal Security			x	
Site Security			X	
Site Security		x	x	

- $\underline{\mathbf{I}}'$ Cellular organization, an input rather than output task, is not reflected in Figure 1.
- 2/ "Strategic" operations, in the context of this table, strongly affect rival war efforts.
- 3/ "Tactical" operations, in the contest of this table, have local and/or short-term effects.
- 4/ Term refers to "surgical" antipersonnel operations against transnational terrorists and key insurgents.
- 5/ Strategic and tactical psychological operations both require great skill.
- 6/ Unconventional warfare and internal defense/foreign internal defense, terroriem, and counterterrorism.
- The skill required for infiltration and exfiltration depends on many variables, except for escape and evasion.

A. "SURGICAL" ANTIPERSONNEL STRIKES

Assassination and abduction are illegal special operations employed offensively for sociopolitical purposes. Official actions to capture or kill key insurgents and transnational terrorists are legal and defensive. The two couplets in some respects are similar. Both call for expert marksmanship, willingness to take human life without hesitation, and professional tracking abilities. It takes less skill to strike lightly-defended tactical targets of local value than well-protected leaders, whose removal would profoundly affect rival war efforts. It is easier to hit the mark with a sniper rifle from afar or a poisoned pellet at point-blank range on a crowded street* than it is to seize and incarcerate any antagonist. Significant differences nevertheless are evident.

(1) Assassination and Abduction

Assassination and abduction (A&A) are direct, discriminating, potentially decisive, economical, and occasionally unique ways to achieve required results. Only agents with exceptional expertise ordinarily can penetrate security systems, accomplish strategically important

missions, and escape unscathed.**?/
Operational skills, even so, are
paltry, compared with those of
planners, who must predict implications correctly.

Pivotal operations that deny opponents leadership and creative talent are the ultimate aim. Speculate how history might have changed, if the prime movers of Project Manhattan had perished while they were perfecting the first atom bombs, or Admiral Rickover disap-peared in the early 1950s, when he alone was pressing development of nuclear-powered submarines. Ventures that rival those in TV's Mission Impossible are possible in real life. The A&A feats of Wehrmacht Colonel Otto Skorzeny, for example, became legendary.8/ Publicity about his exploits reaped at least one big bonus: bodyguards confined General Bisenhower to his headquarters for a week during the crucial Battle of the Bulge, because they feared Skorzeny's band would capture or kill him.9/ The Soviets broke the back of Hungarian resistance in 1956, after that satellite repudiated the Warsaw Pact, when they snared Premier Nagy and his Minister of Defense. 10/

The record, however, is replete with ruinous failures. The assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia, led Hitler to obliterate Lidice, Czechoslovakia in June 1942.11/ The United

^{*} Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian defector living in London, died September 11, 1978, after being stabbed with an umbrella that released poison into his bloodstream. Another Bulgarian defector in Paris survived a similar assault. $\underline{12}$ /

^{**} Even amateurs, however, occasionally elude security. Secret servicemen in the White House apprehended a woman tourist with a handgun on New Year's Day 1981; an intruder accosted Queen Elizabeth in her Buckingham Palace bedroom in July 1982.13/

States might still be battling Japan, if we had harmed Hirohito, the "God Emperor," at the height of World War II. A&A advocates, in short, invite painful reversals, unless professional forecasts indicate that adverse ripostes are very unlikely. 14/

(2) Capture and Termination

Skills required to catch or kill selected insurgents and transnational terrorists are even scarcer than those for A & A. It is difficult to compile dependable target dossiers, because security conscious recalci-trants understand that a single slip can be fatal for all. Concealed identities, code names, and noms de guerre are common. Pew top planners or operators among them have a fixed address, most spurn perilous habit patterns, and clandestine meeting places change more often than floating crap games. Cellular systems seldom produce informants and are practically impenetrable by strangers. 15/ Finally transnational terrorists, unlike intranational insurgents, can use the whole world for hiding places. 16/

Neither legal nor ethical limitations are clearcut concerning operations to incarcerate or kill particular, politically-m tivated, opponents during undeclared wars. 17/ Domestic, foreign, and international laws differ. Some countries, for example, routinely allow armed forces to supplement local police. The United States, among others, does Politics and cultural not.18/ considerations consequently determine what is allowable, when courts cannot answer questions quickly enough. The Principle of Hilitary Necessity, which invokes "the right to compel submission of the enemy with the

least possible expenditure of time, life, and money,"19/ is tempered in many societies by moral restraints, such as those designed to avoid collateral damage and casualties or that forbid torture to extract information expeditiously. Each restriction increases skill requirements.

B. STRATEGIC SABOTAGE

Direct sabotage is personalized, surreptitious interdiction by individuals and small groups to damage or destroy installations, products, or supplies. Indirect sabotage degrades production processes. Both strive to reduce rival capabilities and/or operations. Saboteurs and their employers must understand associated dynamics to reap maximum returns; defenders must understand those dynamics to protect themselves.

It takes little expertise to pour epoxy on movable machinery or sugar in gas tanks. Strategically significant sabotage, however, hinges on highly developed skills. Demonstrations, strikes, riots, boycotts, production delays, and deliberately shoddy industrial output require activists who can mobilize people and coordinate their actions.20/ computer specialists can doctor microchips and software in predetermined disruptive ways. Demolitions and arson demand detailed knowledge about explosives and incendiary devices: what kind, how much, where placed, how detonated.21/ Materials may be abundant -- former CIA agent Edwin Wilson, for example, furnished Libya with 21 tons of C-4 plastic explosives, which have a shelf life of 20 years 22/--but home-made implements are tricky to create, as several amateur Weathermen

found out too late. They blew themselves up in an impromptu bomb factory, because one accidentally completed an electric circuit.23/

Target selection and timing, which are critical, must be based on intelligence that verifies overall value, vulnerable points, security apparatus and procedures, together with advice about ingress and egress. 24/ Parties that pick in haste repent at leisure. Prench saboteurs trying to cut telephone service between Paris and Berlin did so after they touched off a charge where lines in a sewer lay next to gas and water mains. The blast levelled and flooded a city block, leaving many friends injured or dead.25/ Allied planners did a better job casing Hitler's heavy water plant at Vemork, Norway. An 11-man team, following floor plans, crippled his atomic weapon program with one small explosion.26/

Technical analyses, however, are not enough. It sometimes is prudent to spare important targets, if attacks would put too many sympathizers out of work, deprive them of public utilities, or otherwise impair support for popular causes. Poisoning pharmaceuticals, such as Tylenol, would be a poor form of sabotage for resistance forces, unless they controlled distribution. World War II partisans commonly misrouted railway traffic, rather than ruin facilities. 27/

Saboteurs, in sum, can harm instead of help, unless accurate intelligence and skilled planning precede implementation and operators are professional.

C. HOSTAGE RESCUE

Three elemental courses of action, singly or in assorted combinations, can secure the rescue or release of people or property held hostage. Diplomacy is appropriate when intelligence indicates that the perpetrators neither intend to harm their prizes or escape, but prefer discussions to publicize a cause. Political, economic, or social payoffs comprise a second alternative, which some officials find attractive. Force in lieu of, or along with, nonviolent endeavors completes the package open to most democracies. A fourth option, epitomized by the question, "What if they gave a party and no one came?", has worked well in Central America. It ignores hostage lives and isolates holders from news media to convince all terrorists that such activities are fruitless.28/

A spate of variables determine what special operations tactics (frontal attack, envelopment, talk) and tools (lethal firepower, incapacitating chemicals) seem most advantageous. Hostages, for example, might be one, few, or many; healthy, sick, or sedated; cooperate with the rescue party or resist, because of the so-called Stockholm syndrome.29/Schemes that suit loose rules of engagement won't work well if safety is essential. It makes a difference whether captors from companion or competing factions vacillate or show resolve, hold hostages in known or unknown, single or multiple, mobile or static sites that are small or large, heavily or lightly defended, near or far, afloat or ashore on

domestic, foreign, friendly, or hostile territory where intervening facilities are/not available and final approaches are open or covered. Climatic conditions (day or night, hot or cold, wet or dry, windy or calm) and time (abbreviated or abundant) can also be crucial.

Plexibility and a flair for improvisation consequently are imperative. Hostage rescue units that expect the unexpected must maintain a mind-boggling array of special skills on standby, because they cannot predict the nature of any future emergency. Samples include electronic eavesdropping, secure communications, and negotiating techniques, 30/ along with abilities to break into buildings or board public conveyances of all kinds--cellars, skyscrapers, aircraft, trains, buses, cars, subways, and boats are among Procedures to scale walls, them. rappel, pick locks, handle delicate demolitions, and bypass booby traps are essential. Rescuers also must excel at sharpshooting in crowds and hand-to-hand combat, be proficient at first aid, handle hysterical hostages, jump start and drive strange vehicles, refuel jet aircraft, and work well at night. The list is almost endless.31/

Who dares does not always win, because each incident is a discrete case. Some are comparatively simple, others extremely complex. Patience sometimes may pay off better than speed, surprise, or physical prowess. The July 1976 Israeli success in Uganda32/ and U.S. failure in Iran four years later, 33/ for example, both involved long-distance raids into hostile lands, but hijackers conveniently concentrated hostages at Entebbe international airfield, while the Ayatollah Khomeini scattered his through a well-guarded American Embassy compound surrounded by Teheran. The contrast between two

episodes in national capitals, where Muslims held hostages in buildings, reinforce the point. Hanafi radicals with relatively modest demands released 134 captives in Washington, D.C. on March 11, 1977, at the behest of ambassadors from Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan.34/ British Special Air Service (SAS) teams had to storm the Iranian Embassy in London (1980) after negotiations with hard core revolutionaries broke down.35/

Every armed action to rescue hostages nevertheless has a common denominator: it is imagination, coupled with exceptional plans and preparations. Skorzeny proved that fantastic feats are feasible, when he spirited Mussolini from a supposedly impregnable fortress atop Gran Sasso Mountain in 1943, and whisked him away to sanctuary. 36/

D. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological operations, which may precede, accompany, replace, or follow applications of force, constitute the planned use of propaganda and physical actions (such as terror) to influence the behavior of friendly, enemy, or neutral audiences in support of politico-military aims. 37/ Psyop is neither well used nor widely understood in the West, partly because it seldom is possible to prove what worked. 38/ Skills required are super specialized and rare. Technology is less useful than intellect.

Propagandists wield words as nonviolent offensive and defensive weapon systems that publicize, conceal, or misrepresent the real source to set stages properly, exploit successes, minimize failures, and make the most of mixed results. Cohesive programs, which put

collective "good" (variously defined) above self-interest, solicit compliance and collaboration, whether the objective is stability or subversion. Divisive programs, conversely, seek to separate individuals from groups and groups from each other or society at large. Apathy, panic, disobedience, desertion, and surrender are typical objectives. 39/

Psyop specialists target people who share predispositions. Two or more audiences that are equally vulnerable, however, may not be equally susceptible to any given persuasion (Philippine Muslims might listen to offers of autonomy, communist insurgents likely would not) or method of communication (leaflets are useless among the illiterate, unless confined to pictorials). Psyopers therefore must master many political, economic, cultural, and topical subjects, before they can skillfully tailor themes to acquire and sustain attention by particular target groups and effectively refute counterefforts.40/

Subversion, which seeks to undermine the morale and transfer the allegiance of specific groups, is a special form of psyop. Disinformation commonly assists. Competent employers not only make it seem reasonable, but difficult for the duped to ascertain truth if they try. Statements out of context, unfair comparisons, false alarms, smear tactics, oversimplified slogans, and skewed cause/effect relationships are representative techniques. 41/

The best defense against psyop depends on variables, but three rules of thumb seem evident: silence provides rivals little incentive to desist; vague rebuttals rarely are beneficial; hyperbole often boomerangs. 42/ A steady flow of truthful

information, which most Americans advocate, is not automatically the antidote for disinformation, because truth can hurt as well as help. Recipients, for example, may interpret truth quite differently than senders and take actions opposite those desired. Selective release and concealment of unclassified facts after careful assessment of target audience predilections thus is smart psyop. 43/

E. INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION

SOF that perform missions in hostile territory must clandestinely or covertly pass through enemy security screens to reach assigned areas of operation and return safely, or sacrifice hard-to-replace specialists. Some methods are normal, but most are novel.

"Sleepers," who lead routine lives in enemy communities until authorities "activate" them, may infiltrate openly in peacetime on commercial transportation.44/ "Stay behind" forces remain in hostile territory, according to plan, when parent units retreat or withdraw.45/ Most SOF deploy afoot or on various land, sea, and aerial conveyances that are selected in conformance with missions, friendly and enemy situations, distance, time constraints, terrain, weather, astronomical conditions (morning/evening twilight, moon phases), number of personnel, equipment weight, and available transportation.46/

Parachutists with portable equipment can select high altitude low opening (HALO) free falls onto tiny drop zones, glide silently 20 miles or more, using high altitude high opening (HAHO) chutes, or leap from low altitude. 47/ Large groups

with heavy loads usually air land from fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter that fly along the nap of the earth habitually blacked out, using night vision devices and precision navigation aids to find obscure fields. Aerial delivery also serves swimmers, although those with SCUBA gear refer submarines, small boats, or both. Other waterborne infiltrators debark directly onto land. Each mode demands intensive and extensive skills. So do arrangements for reception committees, with recognition signals to separate friends from foes.48/

Most exfiltrators leave much the same way they arrived. Parachutists and severely disabled personnel (sick as well as wounded) are prominent exceptions. Aircraft retrieve a few selected individuals, using special techniques.49/ Some units link up with conventional forces.50/

The most intricate exfiltration task is to establish escape and evasion (R&E) networks, which help selected individuals, such as agents and underground members with blown covers, reach sanctuaries in friendly or neutral lands. Leaders, organizers, trainers, couriers, and the like use the same or similar facilities to move securely within or between hostile sectors.

Some sanctuaries are simply isolated areas where weary travellers can rest. More often, reliable sympathizers, at great risk to themselves, furnish "safehouses," sustenance, directions, and (perhaps) escort to the next stop. Transportation, medical support, money, and weapons may also be available, along with cover stories, disguises, and documents (identity papers, travel permits, passports, and ration cards). Tight counterintelligence and fail-safe procedures are imperative, to prevent compromise.

The entire operation is compartmented. Neither way station tenders nor guides know participants at more than one other stop. Visitors normally arrive and depart at night, to avoid alerting nosy neighbors, and rarely tarry long. Passwords along the line change repeatedly.51/ E&E architects need intimate knowledge of local customs, personalities, and security programs, because one slip could cause the structure to collapse at the start.

F. ADVICE AND TRAINING

On-site advice and training, conducted in a culturally distinctive, largely illiterate Third World country, are difficult and sensitive endeavors. Proficiency in special operations,52/ plus abilities to communicate effectively in native tongues with indigenous leaders and trainees at many levels, both are obligatory.

Tactical and technical expertise, together with knowledge of the local language, climate, and terrain, are essential starting points, 53/ but there is no short-cut to crosscultural understanding and institutional memory, which are equally indispen-sable. We amount of schooling and other second-hand accounts can inform outsiders about political peculiarities, pecking orders, and eccentric social practices as well as lengthy service in any specified area. Advisers and trainers, whose effectiveness depends on official contacts and other useful friendships, find there is no substitute for close association with the "right" people and avoidance of those who are "wrong."54/

Character traits are at least as important as professional competence

for trainers. Know-it-all advisers have little influence with foreign advises, who frequently are senior and, in practical terms, have more experience. It takes great tact and persuasive skill, for example, to change the minds of entrenched autocrats at any echelon, when they resist political, economic, social, and/or military reforms that might weaken their personal positions, even when standing fast risks eventual ruin.55/ Training host nation trainers sounds easy, but is a

frustrating occupation in developing nations, where leaders and the led almost literally live in separate worlds, segregated by age, education, and class barriers. Bridging those gaps takes time and patience, along with pragmatic techniques. 56/

The intellectua' challenge for special operations advisers and trainers consequently is large. Only skilled sophisticates (defined in the broadest sense) qualify.

Section 3

SPECIAL FORMATIONS AND SUPPORT

Nations that need means to accomplish all or most special operations tasks must maintain diversified military, paramilitary, law enforcement, and civilian forces, or employ de facto proxies (Figure 17). No component possesses all essential skills. Transnational terrorists, for example, are exclusively offensive. Units for site security are entirely defensive. Some forces are suitable for direct action missions; others are totally passive. Implements and logistics vary from simple and inexpensive to costly and complex.

A. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Official SOF command and control structures are quite different than those of rival irregulars. The former merely modify conventional apparatus and C3 procedures. The latter feature cells-

(1) Official SOF Establishments

Experience indicates that the SOF of any nation normally perform best when top-level executives centrally synchronize strategically significant policy guidance, plans, budgets, and programs, including force development and/or

procurement from external sources. Training also benefits from central control, which insures uniform standards while saving time, money, and instructors. 1/

Leaders are well advised to delegate responsibility and authority for tactical policy/plans and decentralize all operations, except those that are politically hypersensitive. Too tight a rein inhibits initiative, fosters inflexibility, and risks regrettable decisions, because directors far from the scene of action cannot be universally well in formed or keep abreast of fast-moving situations, no matter how closely they communicate with SOF on the spot.2/

2. Insurgent And Terrorist Cells

Insurgent and transnational terrorist groups, like Apache war parties in the past, assume many sizes and shapes. They generally start with a multipurpose nucleus that amalgamates leadership, combat elements, and support in a single cell that seldom exceeds 10 members and may be much smaller. Some stagnate at that stage. Others, under the supervision of highly-skilled organizers, mature as multifaceted syndicates with numerous offshoots (Figure 18).3/

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1/ Civilian SOF exclude terrorists, but include organizations such as CIA and EGB.

1/ Includes border guarde, internal security forces, coast guarda.

3/ Terroriete look like civilines, but are parenilitary.

4/ Escludes I w priority employment by other forces

3/ includes sevice, training, and other assistance to law unforcument and perantitiony

e lement a .

b) Military return that affects special operations normally must involve the entire occurity establishment.


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-93-


Figure 18

CELLULAR STRUCTURES

SIMPLE SETUP Nothing But a **Multipurpose Nucleus**



COMPLEX SETUP Mature and Multifaceted



LEGEND

- Central control

--- Centralized policy, decentralized operations

····· Decentralized control

Cell operations sharpys are solid lines

NOTES

- Stanch ninets are required only if there are many cets.
 Threats to group security occate the number of rutouts.
 The number of cets cares imembers average 3. 10 Trans minimized.
 Operations and support cets function as follows.
 Interopercy cets function as not violutes.
 It removes cets function as not violutes.
 Cleaders at any ever may are sits orders.
 Wembers from several cets may make up a temporary task from 8. Operations and support cets may be single or multipulpose.
 Step by step support requires securing content of the orders.
 Partitime auxiliaries and informal support functions do not show.

Groups grow by adding cells, instead of expanding those extant, to simplify internal control and help prevent compromise. Intermediaries, known as "cutouts," normally separate chiefs from "indians" and cells from each other, so that captured members who crack under interrogation can furnish few lucrative leads. Many organizations subdivide support tasks and perform them step-by-step in series to keep cells small. One element might purchase commercial materials to make munitions, a second manufacture components, a third complete assembly and disseminate products. Subversives often publish papers in similar fashion: Cell 1 writes, Cell 2 typesets, Cell 3 prints, Cell 4 distributes.4/

4

Tight control from top to bottom permits the sharpest possible focus and decreases duplication of effort, but forfeits flexibility. High-level leaders with limited appreciation for local peculiarities are in poor position to dictate tools and techniques. They deny cells any chance to tackle targets of opportunity and make other time-sensitive decisions. Vulnerabilities burgeon, because frequent meetings and increased communication requirements foster security breaches. Problems of succession can be prickly if the "kingpin" is captured or killed.

Organizational skill requirements skyrocket if multicellular structures elect looser discipline. The Weatherman faction, for example, ran a sort of "franchise" that furnished stimuli, strategies, tactics, and training to affiliates.5/ Most groups favor "steering committees," a more moderate solution that lets subordinate cells act on

their own initiative within general guidelines that lay out policies, concepts, procedures, and priorities. Leaders arrange false documents for all echelons, furnish supplies and funds, run security checks on recruits, resolve rumors, and convert raw facts into intelligence. 6/

B. FORCE CHARACTERISTICS

Non-SOF civilians undertake supremely important political, economic, and social reforms that are beyond SOF purview or capabilities. They also perform special operations-related economic assistance and public education as well or better than SOF. Non-SOF law enforcement elements,* with fingers on the local pulse, are the first line of defense against subversion, terrorism, and insurrection.?/ Civilian SOF usually are better suited than uniformed military forces for covert or clandestine activities, because they blend into the background more easily.

Conventional forces sometimes are suitable for special operations, such as simple sabotage, raids, ambushes, and local security against insurgent and terrorist attacks. SOF, conversely, can accomplish some conventional missions very well, but limitations are severe, and misuse squanders valuable assets. That happened when two lightly-armed U.S. Ranger battalions were decimated at Cisterna, Italy during World War II, after being treated like standard infantry.8/ They were never reconstituted. Hit-and-run guerrillas rarely last long, if ordered to hold

^{*} Special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams and highly-trained hostage negotiating units exemplify law enforcement SOF.

ground against regulars, as Palestinian groups in southern Lebanon learned too late, when Israelis overran and eradicated them in 1982.9/

Special operations land forces are more versatile than SOF from other services (Figure 17), but rely extensively on air and sea counterparts for transportation (infiltration, exfiltration, replenishment) and intelligence, plus search and rescue. Naval SOF are uniquely qualified for stealthy surveillance/reconnaissance along littorals, particularly under water, as well as discriminating destruction of shore installations and ships in port. Tugs, cargo-handling equipment, and merchant vessels are typical targets. 10/ Hen-of-war are not immune. Italian frogmen aboard two-man "torpedoes," for example, Italian frogmen aboard penetrated British port defenses at Alexandria, Egypt on December 19, 1941, then planted explosives that put battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valient on the harbor bed. 11/ Protracted special operations deep in hostile territory normally need long-range air units unlike anything in the conventional inventory. Psyops units serve regular and irregular establishments.

Participation across the full spectrum of offensive and defensive special operations consequently requires a spectrum of Forces. Decisions to settle for less reduce options, regardless of the rationale, which may spurn some courses for practical, legal, moral, or ideological reasons. Whether the resultant posture is acceptable depends primarily on objectives, perceived threats, and strategic/tactical concepts.

C. ACCOUTERMENTS

Contrary to popular opinion, SOF worldwide are armed and equipped mainly with common implements, perhaps slightly modified. Truly special tools, which bring James Bond to mind, are atypical, even in technologically-advanced countries.

Insurgents and transnational terrorists, together with countering SOF, usually rely on stock-in-trade small arms and automatic weapons with silencers and "snooperscopes" for night sniping. Stun guns, rubber bullets, incapacitating chemical agents, gas masks, expedient and professional explosives (Molotov cocktails; plastique), miniature/remote/delayed detonating devices, bumper beepers, electronic "bugs," truth serums, voice prints, and computerized dossiers are universally available. Small, self-contained, portable, accurate, highly-destructive, easily-concealed antiaircraft and antitank weapons, suitable for assorted special operations, are more closely controlled, but nonetheless are widespread. So are aerial gunships, helicopters, short takeoff and landing (STOL) cargo planes, high-speed low-level aerial delivery systems, inflatable boats, diving bells, shallow-draft craft, and secure telecommunications. Terrorists habitually use public transportation to move and tap the mass media to disseminate messages worldwide.12/

SOF also combine common capabilities in unusual ways. They routinely need, for example: transport aircraft that can fly contours blind in darkness and bad weather, refuel aloft, find unmarked drop or landing zones, and return to base undetected; air-droppable boats and "lock-in lock-out" submarines that can unload raiders clandestinely; bubbleless SCUBA, a system to cast and recover

swimmers rapidly, plus sonic underwater links between swimmers, their delivery vehicle, and (when applicable) the mother ship; and narrow-band, digital-coded, burst-transmission and secure voice radios in a compact, state-of-the-art package compatible with satellite relays. 13/

The most exotic SOF implements are classified. Open sources, however, identify plastic pistols that defy electronic detection, "web-footed" submarines that "walk" in shallow water, poisons that lack known antidotes and make the cause of death look natural, self-destructing equipment, sensory deprivation and disorientation instruments to assist tortureless interrogations, and armor-piercing ammunition for handguns.14/

D. SUPPORT

SOF support varies considerably, depending on the type force and conflict intensity. Intelligence and logistics are most important, since no special operations unit is self-sufficient in either respect.

(1) Intelligence

Timely, accurate intelligence is the key to successful special operations. Counterintelligence, and signal security, which prevent opponents from acquiring essential information, are equally critical. 15/Conventional and special operations intelligence share many traits. The production cycle (planning, direction, collection, processing, production, dissemination) is identical. 16/Strategic, tactical,

descriptive, predictive, basic, area, specific, and current reports play complementary parts. Some output is time-sensitive; a lot is not. Debates about the value of centralized versus decentralized control never stop. 17/

Special operations, however, superimpose special requirements that demand special intelligence training and techniques, because no one can predict every development, given evolving situations and many variables described in previous sections. Stress on clandestine collection and human intelligence (HUMINT) increases with needs to target individuals or conduct "surgical" military strikes against small groups concealed amid civilian populations, to cite two common missions. Sympathizers, paid informants, and defectors supplement official agents. 18/ Information from all normally has a short shelf-life. Interagency cooperation is imperative for most operations against insurgents, since no single source has a corner on leads concerning command structures, memberships, and alliances. International collaboration by police helps track down terrorists, who move randomly around the world.19/

(2) Logistics

The official establishment supplies all SOF needs in some countries. Elsewhere (including the United States) special operations units must acquire many tools of the trade from commercial outlets. Those blessed with separate budgets usually fare best. Those that share funds with conventional forces often fare less well.

Transnational terrorists, with rare exceptions, depend on patrons to

provide wherewithal. Their expenses can be prodigious. Insurgents, in the absence of sponsors, scrounge from friends, steal from foes, scavenge from battlefields and, whenever possible, manufacture for themselves. High technology states are the sole source of supremely sophisticated instruments, which they share with surrogates and other associates only when doing so seems to serve their best interest.

Solvent SOF pay for goods and services from a treasury. The

impecunious, especially incipient insurgents, must barter or depend on donations. Those with scant concern for law bolster their cash flow by black marketing, embezzlement, robbery, ransoms, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, extortion, expropriations (occasionally accompanied by IOUs), fraudulent "tax" collections (akin to Mafia "protection"), and proceeds from other ill-gotten spoils.20/

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CLOSSARY

This special operations glossary is limited to terms that high-level U.S. policymakers, planners, practitioners, and overseers commonly employ. Soviet definitions of propaganda, terrorism, and other expressions are different. The list excludes essentially tactical expressions (Molotov cocktail, meaconing).

- A-DETACHMENT: The 12-man basic operational element of a U.S. Army Special Forces group. See also Special Forces.
- ABDUCTION: Kidnapping of individuals or groups by authorities or outlaws for sociopolitical, rather than legal, military, or economic purposes. See also Capture.
- ACTIVE HEASURES: A Soviet term for political and paramilitary steps to influence events in, and the behavior of, states or subnational groups. Strategic psychological operations, subversion, and disinformation are prominent components. Covert/clandestine direct action missions are important.
- ACTIVIST: Any individual who advocates or employs vigorous action, including violence, to achieve sociopolitical objectives.
- AGENT: Any individual, directed and controlled by an organization, who undertakes covert or clandestine missions, while operating essentially alone. See also Sleeper.
- AGENTS OF INFLUENCE: A Soviet term for any person who, knowingly or not, supports and promotes the interests of a foreign power. Some individuals are formally recruited and controlled; "trusted contacts" collaborate informally; others are manipulated indirectly. Lenin called them all "useful idiots."
- AMBUSH: Surprise assault from a concealed position, where attackers lie in wait to kill, wound, or capture individuals or groups and appropriate, damage, or destroy their weapons and equipment. See also Raid.

- AREA STUDY: A synthesis and assessment of political, economic, social, military, geographic, and other factors in a particular locale to assist the preparation of plans and their implementation.
- ASSASSINATION: Premeditated murder of individuals by legal authorities or outlaws for sociopolitical purposes. See also Termination.
- AUXILIARIES: Part-time members of an underground organization. See also Sympathizers; Underground.
- B-DETACHMENT: A 5-man company headquarters, one of nine assigned to each U.S. Army Special Forces group. See also Special Forces.
- BLACK: A synonym for clandestine or covert activities of any kind.
- BLACKLIST: Counterintelligence catalog of known or suspected insurgents, terrorists, agents, auxiliaries, collaborators, sympathizers, and other individuals who might threaten national security.
- BLACK PROPAGANDA: Public information deliberately disseminated in ways that conceal the true sponsor and purportedly identify a false source. See also Gray Propaganda; Propaganda; White Propaganda.
- BLIND DROP: Clandestine delivery of messages and packages to a predesignated pickup point by one individual and clandestine retrieval by another without any personal contact between the two. See also Cutout.
- BORDER GUARDS: Soviet paramilitary internal security forces that belong to the Committee for State Security (KGB). Their basic purpose is to prevent unauthorized arrivals or departures across Soviet land or sea frontiers in peacetime and protect same during war.
- BURST TRANSMISSION: Compressed radio messages sent so fast that enemy forces find them very difficult to intercept and locate the sender.
- C-DETACHMENT: A 22-man battalion headquarters, one of three assigned to each U.S. Army Special Forces group. See also Special Forces.
- CAPTURE: The legal apprehension by authorities of individuals or groups engaged in illegal and/or warlike activities. See also Abduction; Hostage-taking.
- CELL: A small compartment, part of a larger organization, usually directed (sometimes controlled) from above, whose members engage in covert or clandestine pursuits. See also Compartmentation.

- CIVIC ACTION: Political, economic, and social programs undertaken by indigenous governments, occupying powers, other groups, and/or outsiders to strengthen the internal security of a state or territory. See also Military civic action; Reform.
- CIVIL AFFAIRS: 1. Free-will relationships of a foreign military command with, its responsibilities to, and/or authority over national, regional, and local governments and the people of a friendly host country in peacetime or in war; 2. Similar relationships with an occupied country or territory.
- CIVILIAN: Any individual not belonging to an active military, paramilitary, or law enforcement unit. See also Law enforcement; Military; Paramilitary.
- CIVIL WAR: Any intranational conflict, including insurgency. International conflict may be superimposed.
- CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS: Activities conducted so secretly that no one but sponsors, planners, and implementors know they have taken place. See also Covert operations; Overt operations.
- COLD WAR: A state of international tension wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, and psychological measures are orchestrated to attain security objectives. Armed forces deploy primarily to impress; employment is confined to incidents and skirmishes. See also Peace.
- COLLECTIVE SECURITY: Multilateral measures by two or more partners to ensure successful accomplishment of respective deterrent, offensive, or defensive objectives. See also Foreign internal defense.
- COMBAT RESCUE: Armed operations to free prisoners of war or hostages. See also Combat retrieval; Hostage rescue.
- COMBAT RETRIEVAL: Armed operations to recover captured documents or materiel. See_also Combat rescue.
- COMMAND AND CONTROL: An authoritative hierarchy supported by facilities, equipment, personnel, and procedures needed to plan, direct, supervise, and otherwise influence subordinate activities.
- COMPARTMENTATION: Subdivision and isolation of organizations, functions, and/or operations so that knowledge about any given component is available only to individuals who must be informed to perform assigned tasks effectively. See also Cell.
- COMPROMISE: The known or suspected exposure of covert or clandestine personnel, plans, operations, classified papers, hardware, or installations to unauthorized persons.
- CONFLICT SPECTRUM: A continuum of hostilities that ranges from sub-crisis maneuvering in cold war situations to the most violent form of general war.

- CONVENTIONAL (FORCES, OPERATIONS, WEAPONS): Regular military organizations, hostilities, and hardware that exclude nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities. See also Irregular; Regular.
- CORRELATION OF FORCES: The Soviet equivalent of national net assessment, which evaluates every facet of the power balance and calculates the probable cost-risk-benefit of particular courses of international action. The politico-military balance is central. See also Net assessment.
- COUNTERINSURGENCY: 1. Political, economic, social, military, and paramilitary measures that indigenous governments and associates use to forestall or defeat revolutionary war; 2. Similar measures occupying powers use to forestall or defeat resistance movements. See also Insurgency; Internal defense; Resistance.
- COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: 1. Measures designed to deny hostile intelligence services access to security information. Physical safeguards and deception are representative means; 2. Measures to identify and deal with enemy saboteurs, subversives, and espionage agents. See also Intelligence.
- COUNTERREVOLUTION: Operations by losers and associates against the regime installed by winners of a successful insurgency.
- COUNTERTERRORISM: Measures designed to deter, limit casualties and damage from, and eventually defeat intranational or transnational terrorists.

 See also Terrorism; Transnational Terrorism.
- COUNTRY TEAM: Senior members of all U.S. official organizations in a foreign country, headed by the ambassador or principal U.S. diplomatic representative. Members commonly include military and CIA.
- COUP D'ETAT: Brief violence or bloodless action by a small, conspiratorial group to overthrow a government and seize political power. See also Insurgency.
- COVER: Protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to prevent identification with covert or clandestine activities.
- COVERT OPERATIONS: Activities that conceal the identity of sponsors or participants or facilitate plausible denial of their involvement. See also Clandestine operations; Cover; Overt operations.
- CUTOUTS: Intermediaries who deliver messages and packages to prevent members of a covert or clandestine organization from meeting directly with anyone in a superior/subordinate/lateral cell or another group. Ideally, all contacts conceal their true identities. At worst, the intermediary knows his or her two contacts. See also Bli. drop; Cell.
- DECAPITATION: Direct action strikes to neutralize or eliminate key enemy leaders, their command/control apparatus, or both.

- DECEPTION: Measures designed to mislead enemies by manipulation, distortion, or fake evidence; they may build faith in false images or increase ambiguities, so enemies do not know what to believe. See also Disinformation.
- DEFENSIVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS: 1. Activities to counter insurgency (including resistance) and transnational terrorism or any isolated symptoms, such as sabotage and subversion; evasion and escape; 2. Steps to protect against SOF attack. Tactics may be offensive, but the intent is to safeguard.

 See also Offensive special operations; Special operations.
- DELTA FORCE: A U.S. Army counterterrorism unit also capable of other direct action missions that require similar skills.
- DETERRENCE: Steps to prevent opponents from initiating aggressive action and to inhibit escalation if such actions occur. Promises of punishment and reward both may contribute.
- DEVELOPING NATION: Generally, all countries other than NATO/Warsaw Pact,
 Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Specifically, a country, not necessarily poor, in transition from traditional culture and relatively simple economy to different structures, values, and lifestyle. Feelings of political and social dislocation, coupled with rising expectations the government finds difficult to satisfy, sometimes cause serious internal security problems. See also Nation building.
- DIRECT ACTION MISSION: An overt, covert, or clandestine land attack by armed individuals or groups to damage/destroy inanimate targets or slay/seize a person or persons.
- DIRECT SABOTAGE: Clandestine, on-site, "surgical" attacks by individuals or small groups on inanimate targets selected to degrade rival capabilities physically and/or psychologically. See also Indirect sabotage.
- DISINFORMATION: Propaganda deliberately calculated to deceive a particular audience. See also Deception; Propaganda.
- DIVERSION: A Soviet term that connotes assorted direct action missions and deception. See also Deception; Direct action mission.
- DROP ZONE: A planned area where troops, equipment, and/or supplies are delivered by parachute. See also Landing zone.
- DRY DECK SUBMARINE: An undersea vessel with a vestibule for loading and unloading special operations forces rapidly and safely with bulky equipment while submerged. Sometimes called "lock-in lock-out."
- ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: Money, supplies, equipment, advice, education, training, and other nonmilitary aid, provided free of charge or paid for by cash, credit, or barter, calculated to abet nation building by an ally or other

- associate. See also Foreign assistance; Military assistance; Security assistance; Nation building.
- ESCAPE AND EVASION: See Evasion and escape.
- EXFILTRATION: The covert or clandestine movement of individuals or groups through enemy defenses from hostile to friendly territory by land, sea, or air in "peacetime" and war. See also Evasion and escape; Infiltration.
- EVASION AND ESCAPE: 1. Liberation from enemy control and/or exfiltration;
 2. A clandestine, compartmented network of people and facilities to improve prospects of success. See also Exfiltration; Search and rescue.
- FIFTH COLUMN: Covert/clandestine groups that infiltrate into a country or form therein, usually before armed hostilities begin, to conduct subversion, sabotage, and other special operations in support of a foreign enemy.
- FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: Aid to an ally or other associate for political, humanitarian, economic, and/or security reasons that may be altruistic or self-serving. See also Economic assistance; Military assistance; Security assistance.
- FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in programs another government undertakes to forestall or defeat insurgency, transnational terrorism, or lawlessness. See also Collective security; Internal defense.
- FREEDOM FIGHTER: Any belligerent who fights to liberate people from what he or she believes is an unacceptable regime.
- FRONT: A Soviet joint combatant command directly subordinate to a theater commander in wartime.
- FRONT GROUP: See International front group.
- GENDARMERIE: National law enforcement forces armed and equipped much the same as light paramilitary internal security troops. See also Security troops.
- GRAY PROPAGANDA: Public information disseminated in ways that do not specifically identify any source. See also Black propaganda; Propaganda; White propaganda.
- GREEN BERETS: A nickname for U.S. Army Special Forces. See also Special Forces.

- GUERRILLA: Armed member of any paramilitary insurgent or resistance group.

 See also Guerrilla warfare; Paramilitary; Underground.
- GUERRILLA WARFARE: 1. Hit and run operations by paramilitary insurgent or resistant groups against regular armed forces, other irregulars, or noncombatants; 2. Similar operations by regular armed forces. See also Guerrilla.
- HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT (from U.S. perspective): 1. Any war in which any belligerent employs nuclear, lethal chemical, or biological weapons so liberally that survival of the United States and/or its allies is at stake; 2. Any other war which causes casualties and damage so severe that the United States must mobilize most of its military and industrial resources to avoid defeat. See also Low-intensity conflict; Mid-intensity conflict.
- HIJACKING: Illegal seizure, occupation, detainment, and/or diversion of any land, sea, or aerospace transport by individuals or groups (especially terrorists) for any purpose.
- HOSTAGE: Any person or property illegally held captive or in peril until redeemed, rescued, or voluntarily released. See also Hostage rescue.
- HOSTAGE RESCUE: Diplomacy, negotiations, sanctions, and armed action, singly or in some combination, to secure the safe release of persons or property held for redemption, preferably without meeting the holder's demands. See also Hostage.
- HOST COUNTRY: A nation within which foreign organizations operate in response to official invitation and/or international agreement.
- HUMAN INTELLIGENCE: Intelligence derived from information collected by people, rather than technological instruments. Overt, covert, and clandestine (espionage) operations all are involved. See also Information; Intelligence.
- INCIDENTS: Brief, small-scale armed clashes that generally occur during crises in "peacetime" or cold war.
- INDIRECT SABOTAGE: Demonstrations, strikes, riots, boycotts, production delays, deliberately shoddy industrial output, and other mass efforts (excluding direct attacks) to degrade rival capabilities physically and psychologically. See also Direct sabotage.
- INFILTRATION: 1. The covert or clandestine movement of individuals and groups through enemy defenses from friendly to hostile territory by land, sea, or

- air in "peacetime" and war; 2. Similar movement within or between hostile sectors. See also Exfiltration; Insertion.
- INFORMATION: Unprocessed data, regardless of type or derivation, that can be converted into intelligence. See also Intelligence.
- INFRASTRUCTURE: Organizations, fabrications, facilities, and installations that control and support military, paramilitary, law enforcement, and/or subversive activities.
- INSERTION: The overt, covert, or clandestine movement of individuals, groups, or equipment into an operational area by land, sea, or air. See also Infiltration.
- INSURGENCY: Extended, organized efforts to overthrow the established order (not necessarily a government), seize political power by subversive and coercive means, and sometimes (not always) alter social systems. See also Counterinsurgency; Coup d'etat; Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency phases; Resistance; Subversion; Underground.
- INSURGENCY PHASES: I, infrastructure development and preservation, underground activities; II, progressive expansion, which combines Phase I with guerrilla warfare; III, open employment of large paramilitary formations, which supplement Phase I and II operations.
- INSURRECTION: See Insurgency.
- INTELLIGENCE: Products resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of information. <u>See also</u> Counterintelligence; Human Intelligence; Information.
- INTERDICTION: Operations to impede or prevent enemy use of an area or route.
- INTERNAL DEFENSE: All measures a government takes to forestall or defeat insurgency, transnational terrorism, or lawlessness within its own territory. See also Foreign internal defense.
- INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES: See Security troops.
- INTERNATIONAL FRONT GROUP: A purportedly independent organization established and directed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to promote foreign policy and national security objectives.
- IRREGULAR (FORCES, OPERATIONS): Individuals and groups, not part of any official military or law enforcement apparatus, that engage primarily in insurgency, resistance, and/or transnational terrorism. See also Conventional; Regular.
- JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGENCY: A small staff section with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps representatives who evaluate special operations

proposals, polices, plans, and proposals for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and make related recommendations.

- JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: 1. Any special operations headquarters to which forces from two or more military services are assigned or attached; 2. The headquarters that controls, develops doctrine for, deploys and, in some circumstances, employs U.S. Department of Defense counterterrorism forces.
- LANDING ZONE: A planned area where troops debark and equipment/supplies unload from fixed wing aircraft and/or helicopters. See also Drop zone.
- LAW EMPORCEMENT (FORCES, OPERATIONS): Police, gendarmeries, and other lightly-armed forces whose primary purpose is to maintain order within the boundaries of a nation, in accord with local, regional and (sometimes) international legal mandates. See also Gendarmerie; Security troops.
- LOCK-IN LOCK-OUT SUBMARINE: See Dry-deck submarine.
- LOGISTICS: Plans and operations associated with the design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; the movement, evacuation, and medical treatment of personnel; the acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and the acquisition or furnishing of services.
- LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (from U.S. perspective): Any war in which the United States commits a small fraction of its armed forces, mobilisation (if any) is very selective, U.S. objectives are strictly limited, and U.S. forces never risk military defeat. Symbolic or exemplary employment of nuclear weapons and more liberal use of chemical warfare are possible. U.S. operations in the Dominican Republic (1965), and Grenada (1983), are illustrative. See also High-intensity conflict; Incidents; Mid-intensity conflict.
- MID-INTENSITY CONFLICT (from U.S. perspective): Any war in which the United States commits major armed forces, but spurns massive mobilization. Nuclear-chemical-biological warfare is possible, with many limitations. Damage and casualties are sufficiently severe that U.S. defeat is conceivable, but national survival is never at stake. U.S. operations in Korea (1950-53) and Southeast Asia (1965-72) are illustrative. See also High-intensity conflict; Low-intensity conflict.
- MILITARY (FORCES, OPERATIONS): Regular land, sea, and aerospace armed forces of a nation, active and reserve, whose primary purposes are to deter, defeat, or otherwise deal with the full range of external armed aggression against national security interests, as directed, wherever it occurs; secondarily, they assist law enforcement/internal security forces, when required. See also Law enforcement; Paramilitary; Regular.

- MILITARY ASSISTANCE: Money, weapons, equipment, supplies, advice, education, training, construction, services, and other aid, provided free of charge or paid for by cash, credit, or barter, calculated to improve the armed forces of an ally or other associate. See also Economic assistance; Foreign assistance; Security assistance.
- MILITARY CIVIC ACTION: The use of mainly indigenous armed forces to implement economic and social programs that benefit local populations, partly to improve the popular image of those forces. Public works, agriculture, education, and training are representative projects. See also Civic action.
- NATION BUILDING: Activities by a developing country, unilaterally or with outside assistance, to create or strengthen popular acceptance of political, economic, legal, social, and other programs, thereby enhancing internal security. See also Developing nation.
- NET ASSESSMENT: The dispassionate comparison of capabilities possessed by two competing countries or coalitions to ascertain which is best able to achieve its objectives, despite opposition by the other. See also Correlation of forces.
- OFFENSIVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS: 1. Activities to prosecute or support insurgency (including resistance) and transnational terrorism; 2. SOF direct action missions, intelligence collection, and psyop that assist offensive operations by nuclear/biological/chemical and conventional forces. See also Defensive special operations; Special operations.
- OPERATIONAL COMMAND: Control over assigned or attached forces, except for administration and logistics.
- OPERATIONAL CONTROL: See Operational command.
- OVERT OPERATIONS: Activities conducted openly, without concealing the identity of the sponsor or participants. See also Clandestine operations; Covert operations.
- PARAMILITARY (FORCES, OPERATIONS): 1. Land, sea, and air forces of a nation, which have a distinctive chain of command, primarily perform internal security functions beyond the ability of law enforcement units, and supplement the regular military establishment as required; 2. Guerrillas and other armed irregulars that use quasimilitary tactics and techniques. See also Law enforcement; Military; Regular; Security troops.

- PARTISAN: See Guerrilla; Irregular.
- PEACE: A condition characterized by the absence of hostile activities and/or intent in the relations between two or more competitors. See also Cold War; War.
- PEOPLE'S WAR: A term primarily used by China and its disciples to connote revolutionary war and resistance movements. See also Resistance; Revolutionary war; War of national liberation.
- PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT: Overt, covert, or clandestine employment of deception, controlled disclosures, military demonstrations, psyop, psychotropic biological and chemical agents, and other special operations to influence and exploit the emotions, thoughts, and motives of targeted governments, groups, and individuals in ways that help users achieve objectives.
- PREEMPTIVE OPERATIONS: Conflict initiated on the basis of evidence, not necessarily accurate, that an enemy attack is imminent. See also Preventive operations; Retaliation.
- PREVENTIVE OPERATIONS: Conflict initiated on the basis of evidence, not necessarily accurate, that armed combat with a particular opponent, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that delay would involve greater risk. See also Preemptive operations; Retaliation.
- PROPAGANDA: Any form of communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in ways intended to suit the sponsor, directly or indirectly. See also Propaganda of deeds.
- PROPAGANDA OF DEEDS: Direct action, especially terrorist attacks, to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of particular target audiences. See also Propaganda.
- PROXY OPERATIONS: A form of limited warfare in which a competitor seeks to avoid direct confrontation with opponents, yet accomplish security objectives at reduced cost and risk, by relying on de facto or de jura surrogates.
- PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: The planned use of propaganda and actions to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of friends, neutrals, and enemies in ways that assist accomplishment of security objectives. * See also Perception management; Propaganda; Psychological warfare.
- PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: The planned use of propaganda and actions to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemies in ways that assist accomplishment of security objectives. * See also Perception management; Propaganda; Psychological operations.

^{*} For a list of specialized psyop/psywar terms, see PM 33-1: Psychological Operations, Washington, D.C., Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 31, 1979, p. H-1 through H-4.

- RAID: Short, surprise attack to achieve a specific purpose that excludes intent to hold territory. See also Ambush.
- RANDOM KILLING AND MAINING: A terrorist tactic to spread panic and convince rival leaders that chaos will result, unless they make required concessions.
- RANGERS: Elite U.S. Army light infantry units intended for short duration direct action missions.
- REAGAN DOCTRINE: U.S. military and economic assistance on a modest scale for selected anti-communist insurgencies and resistance movements.
- REAR AREA (for special operations purposes): Territory separate from present or prospective main land battlefields, occupied primarily by high-level civil-military command, logistic, and administrative elements; nationally or regionally important communication and transportation nodes, including civil-military airfields and seaports; medium-/long-range missiles; and major military reserves. Rear areas become battlefields during insurgencies, resistance movements, and transnational terrorist operations. See also Rear area security.
- REAR AREA SECURITY: Heasures to deter, defend against, and reduce damage from enemy attacks of any kind on critical targets in territory separate from present or prospective land battlefields. See also Rear area.
- REBELLION: An armed uprising, usually unsuccessful, against established authority. Motives need not be the same as those that inspire insurgency or resistance. See also Insurgency; Resistance.
- RECEPTION PARTY: A group, indigenous or inserted in hostile territory, which facilitates the safe arrival of special operations forces by air or sea and provides initial support, such as intelligence, transportation, and local contacts.
- RECONNAISSANCE: Intelligence operations to collect information about opponents or territory through visual, aural, or technological observation, while patrolling a specified area. See also Surveillance.
- RECOVERY: See Combat retrieval.

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- RECOVERY SITE: A spot, preferably within an ESE safe area, from which evaders and escapees are evacuated to friendly territory. See also Safe area.
- REFORM: Political, economic, social, and/or military measures by a regime to prevent, reduce, or eradicate widespread dissatisfaction, and thereby strengthen popular support.
- REGULAR (FORCES, OPERATIONS) for special operations purposes: 1. Active and reserve military establishments that are organized, trained, and equipped for conventional or nuclear/biological/ chemical conflict. Regular forces may engage in irregular activities. 2. Law enforcement elements. See also Irregular.

REMOTE AREA OPERATIONS: Official steps to establish a strong armed presence and popular support in territory well removed major population centers, where insurgents are undermining the allegiance of locals and/or have built bases.

RESCUE: See Combat rescue.

RESISTANCE: Organized efforts by all or part of a population to importune and, if possible, oust a regime installed by an occupying power. Forces and tactics are similar to those of insurgency. See also Insurgency.

RETALIATION: Reprisal for enemy attacks. See also Preemptive operations; Preventive operations.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR: See Insurgency.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: Authoritative directives that permit armed forces to instigate combat without further orders under specified conditions and prescribe limitations on the conduct of subsequent operations.

SABOTAGE: See Direct sabotage; Indirect sabotage.

SAFE AREA: 1. A relatively secure, usually rural, area within hostile territory where evaders and escapees can rest, recuperate, and perhaps receive assistance before continuing their exfiltration or being evacuated; 2. A similar site where irregular forces assemble before, or seek refuge after, combat operations. See also Evasion and escape; Safe house; Sanctuary.

SAFE HOUSE: 1. Any facility that counterintelligence efforts make reasonably secure for groups to meet covertly or clandestinely; 2. A similar safe haven along an evasion and escape route. See also Evasion and escape; Safe area.

SANCTIONS: Political and/or economic punishment, undertaken unilaterally or multilaterally, to convince opponents they should cease undesirable practices or otherwise bow to the wielder's will.

SANCTUARY: A safe haven in neutral or hostile territory that a belligerent, by tacit agreement, can use for assorted purposes with impunity (reinforce, refurbish, resupply, stage operations, for example). See also Safe area.

SEA-AIR-LAND: U.S. Mavy special operations forces, commonly called SEALs.

SEARCH AND RESCUE: Special crews, equipment, aircraft, and vessels deployed primarily to locate and recover military and naval personnel who are lost or in distress on land or at sea, due to accidents or enemy action. They sometimes assist escape and evasion. See also Evasion and escape.

- SECURITY ASSISTANCE: Foreign aid provided primarily to improve the ability of an ally or associate to resist internal/external aggression and/or contribute more effectively to an alliance. See also Economic assistance; Foreign assistance; Military assistance.
- SECURITY TROOPS: Paramilitary land, sea, and air forces of a nation whose primary purpose is to deal with domestic dissent beyond the capabilities of law enforcement units. See also Law enforcement; Paramilitary.
- SENSITIVE: An agency, installation, person, position, document, material, or activity that requires special protection from disclosure that could embarrass, compromise, or threaten the sponsoring power.
- SKYJACKING: Aerial piracy. Secalso Hijacking.
- SLEEPERS: Enemy agents, positioned in an operational area, who lead apparently normal lives, until they undertake special missions in response to a prearranged signal or receipt of orders. See also Agent.
- SNATCH PICKUP: See Surface-to-air recovery.
- SPECIAL ACTIVITIES: U.S. operations, planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, are solely a CIA responsibility in peacetime. Covert activities must be approved by the President.
- SPECIAL FORCES: U.S. Army forces, organized as groups, intended primarily for unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. Training indigenous troops, rather than direct action, is their forte.
- SPECIAL OPERATIONS: 1. Insurgency, counterinsurgency, resistance, transnational terrorism, counterterrorism; 2. Unorthodox, comparatively low-cost, potentially high-payoff, often covert or clandestine methods that national, subnational, and theater leaders employ independently in "peacetime" or to support nuclear/biological/chemical and/or conventional warfare across the conflict spectrum. See also Counteris urgency; Counterterrorism; Defensive special operations; Direct action mission; Insurgency; Psychological operations; Offensive special operations; Resistance; Special Operations forces; Transnational terrorism.
- SPECIAL OPERATIONS ADVISORY GROUP: A quality control board, whose members review U.S. special operations proposals, policies, plans, and prograzes, and make recommendations.
- SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: Small, carefully selected military, paramilitary, and civilian units with unusual (occasionally unique) skills, which are superlatively trained for specific rather than general purposes, and are designed to undertake unorthodox tasks that ordinary units could accomplish only with far greater difficulty and far less effectiveness, if at all. SOF, however, are not needed for all special operations. See also Special operations.

SPECIAL WARPARE: See Special operations.

- SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS: Elite law enforcement units that use nonstandard tools and techniques primarily for hostage rescue, barricade, and antisniper purposes.
- SPETSNAZ: Soviet special operations forces. Some are subordinate to the Committee for State Security (KGB), others to the Ministry of Defense-specifically the Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet General Staff.
- STAY BEHIND FORCES: Military units that remain in hostile territory to accomplish particular missions after the main body retires or withdraws.
- STOCKHOLM SYNDROME: The tendency of some hostages to feel sympathetic toward captors, coupled with adverse feelings toward, and perhaps resistance of, rescuers.
- STRATEGY: The art and science of applying power of all types, directly and indirectly, under all circumstances to exert desired degrees of control over opponents, and thereby achieve security objectives. See also Tactics.
- SUBNATIONAL GROUP: For special opporations purposes, a nongovernmental organization whose members profess common aspirations that may be political, economic, and/or social, usually possess military or paramilitary capabilities, and oppose official authority in particular places for particular reasons. The Palestine Liberations Organization, Viet Cong, Contras, Kurds, Basque separatists, and Baader-Meinhof are representative.
- SUBVERSION: Measures intended to undermine the morale, discipline, will, and/or loyalty of a populace to a regime, using insidious, mainly psychological means.
- SURFACE-TO-AIR RECOVERY: Specially trained air crews with specially-equipped aircraft designed to rescue individuals ashore or afloat, without landing, using exotic techniques.
- "SURGICAL" STRIKE: Any attack designed to eliminate or stringently limit casualties among people or damage to property not specifically targeted.
- SURROGATE OPERATIONS: See Proxy operations.
- SURVEILLANCE: Intelligence operations to collect information through visual, aural, or technological observation (usually clandestine), while following persons or maintaining close watch from particular positions. See also Reconnaissance.
- SUSCEPTIBILITY: The proclivity of a particular target audience to respond favorably to particular psychological operations. See also Vulnerability.
- SYMPATHIZERS: Individuals and groups who consciously assist insurgent or transnational terrorist organizations by furnishing funds, information, and other support, without joining the underground or guerrilla groups.

 <u>See also</u> Auxiliaries, Guerrilla; Underground.

- TACTICS: Detailed methods used to implement strategy. Military, paramilitary, and law enforcement tactics involve the employment of units in combat, including task organization and maneuvering of forces in relation to each other and/or to the enemy. See also Task organization; Strategy.
- TARGET: 1. People that opponents plan to kill, capture, or influence; 2. Property that opponents plan to capture or destroy; 3. Areas that opponents plan to control or deny; 4. A country, area, agency, installation, person, or group against which intelligence/counterintelligence activities are directed.
- TARGET ACQUISITION: Detection, identification, and (in the case of mobile targets) tracking of a target in sufficient detail to permit focused operations against it. See also Target.
- TASK FORCE: Temporary grouping of units under a single commander to accomplish a specific, transitory purpose. See also Task organization.
- TASK ORGANIZATION: Temporary internal grouping of a unit to accomplish a specific, transitory purpose. See also Task force.
- TERMINATION: A euphemism for killing by authorities of individuals or groups engaged in illegal and/or warlike activities. See also Assassination.
- TERRORISM (for special operations purposes): Public, repetitive violence or threats of violence to achieve sociopolitical objectives by inspiring widespread fear among people not personally involved and disrupting community routines. See also Terrorist.
- TERRORIST: Anyone who, with whatever motive and for whatever purpose, practices terrorism. See also Terrorism.
- THEATER: A major politico-military or geographic area (such as Europe and the Middle East) assigned to a senior commander for peacetime plans/preparations and wartime operations. All U.S. theaters are outside the United States; the commander-in-chief of a unified or specified command is assigned military responsibility. Known Soviet theaters are inside, or contiguous to, the U.S.S.R.
- TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: Terrorism that is staged in, and perhaps supported by, one country, but takes place in another country or other countries. See also Terrorism.
- UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: Activities by a foreign government or group that assist insurgents or resistance movements in another country. See also Offensive special operations.
- UNDERGROUND: An illegal, partly clandestine, partly covert organization that plans and controls an insurgency, transnational terror, or resistance movement; conducts covert or clandestine operations, such as subversion,

- sabotage, and terror; and conducts logistic/administrative support activities that include recruitment, indoctrination, training, intelligence, supply, communications, and fundraising. See also Auxiliaries; Guerrilla; Sympathizers.
- UNIFIED COMMAN: A top-echelon U.S. combatant organization with regional or functional responsibilities, which normally is composed of forces from two or more services. It has a broad, continuing mission and is established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- URBAN GUERRILLA: Member of a city-based underground. See also Guerrilla; Underground.
- VIETNAM SYNDROME: Reluctance of U.S. leaders and the American people to intervene militarily in any foreign country for any purpose in any way following U.S. defeat in Vietnam.
- VULNERABILITY: 1. Weakness of any kind that a competitor could exploit by any means to reduce present or projected security capabilities of an opponent;

 2. The sensitivity of a particular target audience to conditions that could make it susceptible to psychological operations. See also Susceptibility.
- WAR: A condition characterized by hostile activities in the relations between two or more competitors. See also Cold war; Peace.
- WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION: A term used primarily by the Soviet Union and its disciples to connote revolutionary war. See also People's War; Revolutionary war.
- WET AFFAIRS: A Soviet synonym for assassinations and abductions.
- WHITE PROPAGANDA: Public information disseminated in ways that identify the sponsor. See also Black Propaganda; Gray Propaganda; Propaganda.

ANNEX C

ABBREVIATIONS

AFR ANG ARNG	Air Force Reserve (U.S.) Air Mational Guard (U.S.) Army National Guard (U.S.) Aviation	GRU	Chief Intelligence Directorate, General Staff (USSR)
Avn	AVIACION	НАНО	High altitude high opening
BIB	Board for International Broadcasting (U.S.)	HALO	parachute High altitude low opening
Bn	Battalion	Helo	parachute Helicopter
c3	Command, control, and communications	Hq HUMINT	Headquarters Human intelligence
CA	Civil affairs		_
CI	Counterinsurgency;	ID	Internal defense
	counterintelligence	JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
CIA	Central Intelligence		(U.S.)
	Agency (U.S.)	JSOA	Joint Special Operations
CINC	Commander-in-Chief		Agency (U.S.)
Co	Company	JS0C	Joint Special Operations
COIN	Counterinsurgency		Command (U.S.)
CONUS	Continental United States	JUWTF	Joint Unconventional
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union		Warfare Task Force (U.S.)
DAM	Direct action mission	KGB	Committee for State
DIA	Defense Intelligence		Security (USSR)
	Agency	KHAD	State Information Service
DOD	Department of Defense (U.S.)		(Afghan)
DZ	Drop zone	LIC	Low-intensity conflict
E& E	•	LRRP	Long-range reconnaissance patrol (U.S.)
CGE	Evasion and escape	Lt. Col.	Lieutenant colonel
PAA	Federal Aviation	LZ	Landing zone
FAA	Administration (U.S.)	1.6	randing zone
PBI	Federal Bureau of	HAC	Hilitary Airlift Command
LO1	Investigation (U.S.)	nac	(U.S. Air Porce)
FID	Foreign internal defense	Haj.	Hajor
FORSCOM	Forces Command (U.S. Army)	MATC	Mini-armored troop carrier (U.S. Navy)
COF	Group of Forces (USSR)		-
Gp	Group		
•	•		

MAU (SOC)		SCUBA	Self-contained underwater
	(Special Operations)		breathing apparatus
MD	(U.S.) Hilitary district (USSR)	SDVT	SEAL delivery vehicle team (U.S. Navy)
MI	Military intelligence	SEAL	Sea-air-land (U.S. Navy
AIA	Missing in action	000	personnel unit)
XTT	Military training team	SF	Special Forces (U.S. Army)
	(U.S.)	SFOB	Special Forces operating
MVD	Ministry of Interior (USSR)	5105	base (U.S. Army)
*****	miniacly of Incertor (obox)	Sig	Signal
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty	SOC	Special operations capable
M110	Organization	SCCCT	Special operations combat
NM	Nautical Mile	30001	control team (U.S. Air
NSC	National Security Council		Force)
N30	(U.S.)	SOCOM	Special operations command
MSDD	National Security Decision	30001	(U.S.)
#3 <i>0</i> 0	Directive (U.S.)	SOF	Special operations forces
NSWG	Naval special warfare	SOLL	Special operations low
group	(U.S.)	30 LL	level (U.S. Air Force)
NSWU	Naval special warfare unit	SOPAG	Special Operations
2000	(U.S.)	501 NG	Advisory Group (U.S.)
	(0.5.7	sos	Special operations
OPCON	Operational control	505	squadron (U.S. Air
OSD	Office, Secretary of		Force)
000	Defense (U.S.)	SOW	Special operations wing
	201020 (0707)		(U.S. Air Force)
Para	Paratrooper	STARS	Surface-to-air recovery
PBR	River patrol boat (U.S.		system
	Navy)	STOL	Short takeoff and landing
PLO	Palestine Liberation	Svc	Service
	Organization	SWAT	Special weapons and tactics
POW	Prisoner of war	SWCL	Light special warfare
Psyop	Psychological operations	craft	(U.S. Navy)
Psywar	Psychological warfare		•
•	•	TF	Task force
Recce	Reconnaissance		
Recon	Reconnaissance	UBA	Closed-circuit underwater breathing apparatus
SAR	Search and rescue	USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
SBU	Special boat unit (U.S.	USTA	U.S. Information Service
	Navy)	UW	Unconventional warfare
	•		

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
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
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
2. The Soviets clearly recognize the geographic significance of Central America. Strategically, Central America is of vital importance to the economic stability and security of the United States. The Soviets already have a willing partner in Cuba, threatening our sea lines of communication and trade, and placing at risk our access to vital resources. Through the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean pass 55% of our crude oil, 45% of our imports and exports and, in the event of war in NATO or the Persian Gulf, 60% of our reinforcements and supplies. 65% of the trade passing through the Panama Canal is either coming to or from the United States. The Soviets recognize that a foothold on the mainland, particularly on this vital land bridge between North and South America, would be of enormous advantage.




3. In 1983, then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko clearly reflected Soviet intentions. His statements in Moscow were ample indication that the Soviets have designs which we seem to ignore.




4. Also in 1983, Chief of Soviet Armed Forces Marshal Ogarkov, in discussions he had with a visiting delegation from Grenada's communist movement, clearly reflected Soviet views on the "contest" for control of the Caribbean basin.




5. Soviet policy goals summarized from their own writings and journals indicate that the Soviets see considerable advantage in fostering revolution in this hemisphere.




6. The Soviets have backed their policy with more than just rhetoric. They are consistently outspending us in our own hemisphere—both economically and militarily.




7. This 1985 photograph of a Soviet surface action battle group was taken just miles off the Louisiana coast. The Soviets and their surrogates no longer consider the Caribbean to be an "American lake." Deployments such as these send a clear message to our friends in the region that the United States no longer controls the water frontiers off our own coast line. To Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica this serves as intimidation.




8. The Soviets have supplied Cuba with sufficient numbers of diesel submarines to threaten U.S. resupply for Europe in the event of war. In World War II Hitler was able to sink nearly 45% of American shipping headed for Europe with submarines based 4,000 miles away. These submarines are based less than 150 miles away.




9. Soviet bases in Cuba allow aircraft such as this Soviet BEAR Naval reconnaissance flight to land in Cuba after surveilling U.S. military installations on our East Coast. This photograph was taken just 13 miles off the Virginia Capes and, while the Soviet bomber is being escorted by a Navy fighter, the fighter cannot interfere with Soviet intelligence collection.




10. Soviet aircraft are routinely based at facilities they have constructed for this purpose in Cuba. San Antonio De Los Banos shows four Soviet aircraft used to provide surveillance along our East Coast. Completion of similar facilities in Nicaragua will similarly enable the Soviets to threaten our Pacific Coast.



11. The Soviet intelligence collection site at Lourdes, Cuba is the largest signals intelligence site outside the Soviet Union. This site is manned and operated by Soviets not Cubans and is used to intercept our communications—particularly telephone and satellite communications on which we rely for most of our military and diplomatic message traffic.



12. The Soviets have not stopped at constructing facilities. The youth of Cuba are prepared for military service in grade school. Political indoctrination and military training are part of the education for the smallest children.




13. These children become the mercenary army for the Soviet empire Cuban troops are deployed world-wide in support of Soviet strategic interests and serve wherever their Soviet masters desire.




14. Grenada, until October of 1983, offered a similar opportunity for Soviet expansion in this hemisphere. The runway at Point Salines and its associated military facilities alerted us to the fact that something was seriously wrong on this little island.




15. When American and Caribbean troops arrived in Grenada on the rescue mission in October of 1983, they found warehouses full of "Cuban economic aid" in the form of tons of munitions and weapons.



16. Careful research after the Grenada rescue mission shows that the little island of Grenada was being used as a subversion base for Latin America. This rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launcher was captured in El Salvador from Communist guerillas.




17. Inventory lists of weapons held on Grenada indicate that the Salvadoran RPG, along with many other weapons, had been transhipped through Grenada with the support of the Cubans. Interestingly enough, this particular RPG probably was provided by the Communist government in Vietnam, sent to Cuba, then to Nicaragua and on to the FMLN Communist guerillas in El Salvador.




18. Secret military agreements found in the Cuban Embassy and in the Party offices in Grenada indicate that the Soviets and their surrogates had even bigger plans which were aborted by the rescue mission.




19. Soviet designs for this hemisphere have not stopped with Cuba and Grenada. The Soviets clearly see Nicaragua as the best opportunity for advancing their cause in the hemisphere. Approximating the size of the State of Iowa or Michigan, Nicaragua is today the only country in Latin America with a decreasing population. The Nicaraguan people, once numbering about 3 million, are fleeing the Communist takeover of their country by the thousands.




20. Today, Nicaragua has the largest army ever raised in Central America. By 1985, with the support of the Soviet Bloc, and with advisers from the USSR, Cuba, East Germany, Bulgaria, Libya, North Korea and the PLO, the Communist regime in Managua had built the most combat-capable military machine ever seen in Central America. This military capability has two primary purposes—intimidation of its neighbors and the indoctrination of its population.




21. To support this military build-up, enormous quantities of military hardware have been delivered to the Sandinistas. The Soviets have provided more than 150 of these T-55 tanks, more than all the rest of the armor in Central America combined.




 $22.\ PT\text{--}76$ tanks like these and other armored vehicles provide an offensive capability that threatens the stability of the entire region.




 $23. \ \,$ Soviet Bloc support has turned the civilian airfield at Sandino into a military bastion.




 $24. \ The\ El\ Tempisque\ Armor\ staging\ area$ is the largest in the region and was built in accordance with Soviet design.



25. The forward airstrip at San Jose De Bocay, built to Soviet and Cuban design, provides not only a means of attacking the Nicaragua resistance, but threatens Honduras as well.




 $26. \ So$ too does the Mechanized Infantry Brigade at Las Enramadas, located along the main attack route into Honduras.




27. The Soviet improvements to the Pacific Coast port at Corinto have turned this peacetime port into a Naval facility which threatens Honduras and El Salvador. Firepower like that on the Soviet and Korean patrol boats shown here has never before been seen in the region.



28. Corinto is also used as a main depot for receiving Soviet military supplies shipped to the Pacific side of Nicaragua.




29. Bulgarian and Soviet supervised construction at El Bluff on the Atlantic Coast offers a "two ocean" capability to the Soviet Navy. When completed, this port and airfield complex will allow Noviet Bloc ships to base under aircover on the Atlantic Coast of the mainland of the Americas.



30. The Punta Huete Airfield, when completed, will allow any aircraft in the Soviet inventory to launch or recover in Nicaragua. Punta Huete is larger than Andrews Air Force Base and is the largest military airfield in all of Central America. Aircraft based at this facility are protected by Soviet designed revetments from air and ground attack and pose a threat from the Panama Canal to the United States.



31. Initial Soviet support to Nicaragua was not always as blatant as what we have seen in the preceding reconnaissance photographs. Initially the Soviets tried to disguise their deliveries and the Nicaragua military build up. Attack helicopters like this MI-8 HIP were originally sent to the Sandinistas as "agricultural support equipment." Note the unique agricultural uniforms and the "agricultural rocket launcher" on this attack helicopter, which bears the Sandinista party emblem.




32. The Soviets have provided a large number of these MI-24 HIND assault helicopters to the Sandinistas. These "flying tanks" have proven devastating to the Afghan resistance and the Freedom Fighters in Angola and are now being used against the Contras in Nicaragua. The Soviets deliver, assemble and test fly these machines of death which are then flown in combat by Cuban and Nicaraguan pilots. This assault helicopter is the most lethal assault helicopter in the world today. Without effective antiaircraft weapons, like surface-to-air missiles, the Contras are highly vulnerable to these weapons.




33. Not content simply to deliver material and advice from the sidelines, the Soviets have also flown reconnaissance missions for the Sandinistas in an AN-30 reconnaissance aircraft—disguised as an Aeroflot commercial plane. This one was photographed at Sandino Airfield outside Managua.



34. For some reason many have been unable to see what the Sandinistas really represent. Yet their words have been true to their purpose all along. Humberto Ortega, the Sandinista Defense Minister, is the brother of Nicaragua's "President"—a mirror image of that organization in Cuba where Fidel's brother, Raul, is the Defense Minister.




35. Bayardo Arce, regarded by some to be the Sandinista's "Che Gueverra." clearly believes in spreading the Communist philosophy throughout the region.



36. So, too, does Tomas Borge, the Sandinista Interior Minister. Borge doesn't run the National Parks—he runs the secret police. Yet somehow there are many who seem to believe that these people who run Nicaragua today want to live peacefully side by side with democracy. Their own statements deny the fact. By their words we should know them.




37. Daniel Ortega, shown here with his mentor Fidel Castro, can no longer disguise the fact that the believes in Lenin's philosophy of a "vanguard of the revolution."




38. These "brothers in arms"—Daniel Ortega, Muammar Qadaffi and Miguel D'escoto (Nicaragua's Foreign Minister)—clearly pose a threat to the United States and place at risk American interests in our own hemisphere.






39. and 40. Sandinista efforts to destabilize democracies in the region take many forms. Last year this car—a Soviet-built Lada—crashed into a bridge abutment in Honduras. When police officials became suspicious about the documents carried by the two occupants, they checked more carefully and found that the automobile bearing false Costa Rican license tags had more than a dozen secret compartments.




41. The contents of those secret compartments revealed direct Nicaraguan connections to the Communist guerillas in El Salvador. The ammunition, code books, instructions, East German agent radios and counterfeit currency were to be used by the FMLN in their attacks against the struggling democracy in El Salvador.






42. and 43. These weapons, collected after the M-19 terrorist attack in which all the justices of the Supreme Court of Colombia were murdered, originated in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas are intent on exporting their revolution—by supporting insurgent, subversive and terrorist movements in the region.



44. The Sandinistas also insist on enforcing their revolution at home. When Somoza ruled Nicaragua there were two prisons. Today there are eleven—built to Soviet "gulag design" and designed to ensure that the Nicaraguan people who refuse to submit to their Communist rulers are carefully controlled.



45. For those who will not yield there are few choices. This minister, who refused to shut down his church, was bound hand and foot and set afire inside his church.



Grade-school arithmetic books use pictures of Soviet-made AK 47 iffes and hand grenades to teach children to count.

 \times 2

46. Like their Cuban counterparts, school children in Nicaragua are now educated to hate. This is a page from a grade school arithmetic book.


TO TARRAGUAN MARKATAN S



47. Hundreds of thousands of those who will not submit have now become refugees. This entire town fled to neighboring Honduras simply so they could go to church



48. The Moskito, Suma and Rama Indians have been all but wiped out on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua. Over 25,000 Indians have fled to neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica.



49. Denied all other recourse, thousands of young men and women have taken up arms and become freedom fighters against the Communists who now rule from Managua.



50. Some freedom fighters, like this 57 year old coffee farmer, have joined the resistance because their families have felt the brunt of Sandinista repression. This man's entire family was murdered by the Sandinistas simply because they gave water to a Contra patrol.



51. Sandinista propaganda would have us believe that the CIA or Ollie North created the Contras. It is not so. The Sandinistas created the Contras by their own repression and denial of basic human freedoms. It is Sandinista repression that fuels the resistance.



52. Supporters of the Sandinista regime also would have Americans believe that those who oppose the Communists in Managua are simply supporters of the old Somoza regime. This is not true. In this photograph, eleven of the seventeen men present once served with the Sandinistas. Adolfo Calero, on the right, was twice jailed by Somoza.





53. and 54. In spite of a vascillating policy of support for the resistance, the ranks of the freedern fighters continue to grow. During the period when no U.S. government funding was evailable, the private U.S. and foreign supporters provided arms, uniforms, find and medical supplies to keep the resistance from being annihilated.



 $55. \ This young fighter would have died without the medical supplies donated by American donors.$



56. This hospital tent was all that existed prior to the support offered by private Americans and foreign donors. It didn't even have mosquito netting for these grievously injured freedom fighters.



57. Until U.S. government aid was restored, the fighters were forced to draw their own maps on plastic sheets as they went into combat deep inside Communist-held Nicaragua.



58. Today, U.S. support has been restored. This humble wooden cross marks the grace of a Nicaraguan freedom fighter. If we are to offer these brave people more than a chance to die for the freedoms they believe in, our support must continue.

MARTI S PARCEL, FLARISA, VICE CHARGES
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN
UNITED STATES CAPITOL
WASHINGTON, DC 20618
(202) 228-7902

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June 23, 1987

Brendan V. Sullivan, Esquire Williams & Connolly Hill Building 839 Seventeenth Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

The Committees contemplate taking testimony and other evidence from your client, Lt.Col. North. The Committees intend to take that testimony and evidence under the following circumstances:

- 1. Lt. Col. North's public testimony will commence on July 7, 1987.
- 2. Lt. Col. North will be interviewed in an executive session hearing on July 1, 1987, on the subject of the involvement and knowledge, if any, of the President regarding the use of funds generated by the sale of arms to the Iranian government to support the Nicaraguan resistance. At the end of the session, a transcript will be made under oath of questions and answers on this issue.
- 3. The Committees' document subpoenas, after clarification between counsel, will be returnable at 9:00 a.m. on June 30, 1987.
- 4. The Committees will provide copies to Lt. Col. North of his files in the possession, custody or control of the Committees at 9:00 a.m. on June 30, 1987, consisting of documents and other materials or copies thereof (a) obtained from the offices of Lt. Col. North and his staff, (b) sent to or from him or his staff, and (c) tape recordings of conversations or meetings in which he was a participant. These documents and materials will be provided to Lt. Col. North to the extent and in the manner permitted by law and if the law does not permit copies to be given to Lt. Col. North's counsel, then the Committees will provide access on a substantially continuous basis.

Brendan V. Sullivan, Esquire June 23, 1987

Page Two

5. The Committees intend to complete Lt. Col. North's testimony by the close of the hearing on July 10, 1987, and do not intend to recall Lt. Col. North for further testimony unless extraordinary developments create a compelling need therefor, and that any such recall would be limited to the matters that necessitated the recall.

These statements of intention are made in good faith and the Committees are aware that in advising Lt. Col. North to proceed in accordance with this letter and to forego possible legal alternatives, counsel for Lt. Col. North are relying upon these stated intentions. Nonetheless, they are intentions, not commitments. Accordingly, although it is not now the intention of the Committees, the scope and nature of Lt. Col. North's testimony could result in his testimony continuing beyond four days and in his later recall, matters on which the Committees are not waiving their power and we understand that you are not waiving any rights.

Sincerely,

Arthur L. Liman

Chief Counsel

Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition

John W. Nields, Jr.

Chief Counsel

House Select Committee to

Investigate Covert Arms Transactions

With Iran

George W. Van Cleve

Chief Minority Counsel

House Select Committee to

Investigate Covert Arms Transactions

With Iran

ELECTRONIC MEDIA REPORTING ON THE ACHILLE LAURO INCIDENT

Sanator Leahy was interviewed at approximately 7:00 a.m., Friday, October 11, 1985, on the Achille Lauro incident.

The following are descriptions of electronic media reporting the afternoon and evening of Thursday, October 10, 1985 relating to US knowledge of the location of the hijackers at the time Egyptian President Mubarak said they had left Egypt:

ABC TV News

Peter Jennings reports that the White House is questioning Egyptian President Hosni Hubarak's credibility regarding the whereabouts of Palestinian terrorists who hijacked the Achille Lauro.

Barrie Dunsmore discusses a developing major rift between the US and Egypt of the latter's handling of the terrorists. American Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes is shown stating that he believes the hijackers are still in Egypt.

Sam Donaldson reports on US anger at Italy and Egypt, especially over Mubarak's lying.

Peter Jennings, George Will, Sam Donaldson and John McWethy discuss the Administration's belief that Hosni Mubark lied about the hijackers.

CBS TV News

Dan Rather reports that President Hosni Hubarak's claim the terrorists have left Egypt is said to be disputed by US intelligence.

Lesley Stahl discusses the Administration's belief that Mubarak is lying.

NEWSPAPER EXCERPTS ON THE ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING

The New York Times Friday, October 11, 1985 -- Account of Larry Speakes' news conference on Thursday night October 10.

"What we did is we used every available means at our disposal to find out where the hijackers were when they were on Egyptian soil. We used every means at our disposal to be aware of when the aircraft left Egyptian soil and then we were able to locate the aircraft, pursue it, persuade it to go to the airbase at Sigonella."

The New York Times Friday, October 11, 1985 by Bernard Gwertzman

"Crucial to the mission was knowledge of the exact whereabouts of the four gunmen and when their plane left Egypt. Mr. Speakes said that 'we used every available means at our disposal to be aware of when the aircraft left Egyptian soil and then we were able to locate the aircraft, pursue it, persuade it to go to the airbase at Sigonella.' "

"But Mr. Speakes said the Administration believed that the hijackers were still in Egypt at the time Mr. Mubarek said they had left. Officials said they believed that the gunmen were at an airbase outside Cairo waiting for a flight to either Algeria or Tunisia."

"Senior Administration officials said Thursday that the Administration understood that as of that morning Washington time -- early afternoon in Cairo -- the hijackers were at an Egyptian air base awaiting a flight to an undisclosed destination. They said the Egyptians seemed committed to carrying out their end of the bargain with the hijackers to let them have safe passage out of Egypt in return for surrendering the ship."

The New York Times Friday, October 11, 1985 by Bill Keller

"Mr. Weinberger would not provide details of how the officers aboard the Saratoga knew the Egyptian plane was leaving the Cairo airport, or how they were certain they had the right plane. 'I would say that we had very good intelligence.'"

The Washington Fost Friday, October 11, 1985 by Loren Jenkins

"Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had said Thursday that the four hijackers who had surrendered Wednesday to Egyptian authorities had left Egypt five hours later ... "

"The U.S. government, however, announced late Thursday that the four hijackers were still in Egyptian hands and were at an Egyptian Air Force base outside of Cairo waiting for a plane to take them out of the country."

"Earlier on Thursday, special correspondent Jeffrey Bartholet reported from Cairo: ... Hubarak told reporters Thursday morning that the hijackers had gone and were the responsibility of the PLO, but PLO leader Yasser Arafat said they were 'under the Egyptian authorities' control.'

"Adding to confusion was a statement Thursday morning by Abdul Rahman Saramawi, the governor of Port Said, that the pirates 'are still in custody, and it remains to be determined whether they will be tried."

The New York Times Friday, October 11, 1985 by Judith Miller

"Throughout the day, Egyptian officials clung to this position despite skepticism among diplomats in Egypt and statements from Washington that it was believed that the four were still being held at an airport near Cairo."

"In Washington, a senior Reagan Administration official traveling with President Reagan said the four hijackers had been taken to an air base known as Al Mazá, on the outskirts of Cairo, and had been scheduled to leave Egypt about noon Thursday. An Administration official here confirmed this account and said the Reagan administration was 'extremely angry' with Egypt about the affair."

SBTH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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October 11, 1985, Friday, final Edition

SECTION: First Section; At

LENGTH: 1686 words

HEADLINE: U.S. Jets Intercept Hijackers' Plane; F14s Force Egyptian Aircraft to Land at Italian Base

BYLINE: By Loren Jenkins, Washington Post foreign Service

DATELINE: ROME, Oct. 11, 1985

KEYWORD: SHIP

RODY:

Four U.S. Navy jet fighters intercepted an Egyptian airliner carrying the four Palestinian hijackers of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in international airspace and forced it to land early friday morning at a U.S. Navy air base in Sicily.

The plane was surrounded immediately by U.S. and Italian troops, and the four ijackers were taken into custody by the Italians for legal proceedings. In washington, White House officials said they intended to pursue prompt extradition proceedings.

The office of Italian Prime Minister Betting Craxi said the four U.S. jets, fils from the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga, and the Egyptian Boeing 737 landed at the U.S. Navy's Sigonella Air Base at 12:30 a.m. (7:30 p.m. EDT) for a "technical stop." An Italian government statement said that Craxi had agreed to a request from President Reagan that the planes be allowed to land there.

(U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, in a briefing at the Pentagon after midnight Washington time, said the four terrorists were in Italian custody, as well as two other Palestinians also found on the airliner who are being investigated by Italian authorities. The Egyptian crew will be permitted to return the airliner to Cairo "at their convenience," the secretary said.

[In providing details of the military operation, Weinberger said that the Saratoga was off the coast of Albania when it received orders at 7 p.m. Rome time (2 p.m. EDT) to prepare for action. All operations throughout the military intercept were carried out in darkness, Weinberger said, and the carrier had to be turned around because it was heading in the wrong direction at the time the order was given.

(The Egyptian airliner left Cairo around 4:15 p.m. EDT and was intercepted just south of Crete by the fi4s, which were supported by E2C Hawkeye electronic rveillance planes and other support aircraft. The fighters arrived on the .cliner's flight path, where they waited for the quarry and electronically picked it out from other air traffic in the region, Weinberger said.

(No refueling of the fighters was necessary, he said. The airliner had been refused permission to land in Tunis and Athens but apparently was headed

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toward Tunis when it was intercepted, Weinberger said.

(Other U.S. military sources said the pilot of the Egyptian plane seemed surprised when he was intercepted and offered no resistance. These sources said the airliner initially was difficult to find.)

The capture of the terrorists climaxed a bizarre series of events beginning with the hijacking last Monday of the Italian cruise liner with more than 400 passengers and crew members on board. Before the hijackers gave up, one American had been killed.

The dramatic development in the air over the Eastern Mediterranean Thursday night occurred after the U.S. government had reacted with anger and irritation at Egyptian government plans to allow the four hijackers to leave Egypt for an undisclosed destination without prosecuting them for the hijacking and murder of Leon Klinghoffer, 69, of New York City.

Italy and the United States had demanded that the four hijackers be made available to be put on trial. Italy has insisted that the four should be tried here because the ship they hijacked was an Italian vessel and thus the slaying of Klinghoffer, had occurred on Italian territory, meaning the ship.

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had said Thursday that the four hijackers who had surrendered Wednesday to Egyptian authorities had left Egypt five hours later and were the responsibility of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had negotiated their surrender. The hijackers had said they were members of a faction of the PLO.

The <u>U.S.</u> government, however, announced late <u>Thursday</u> that the four hijackers were still in <u>Egyptian</u> bands and were at an <u>Egyptian</u> Air force base outside of Cairo waiting for a plane to take them out of the country. Washington demanded that the <u>Egyptian</u> authorities turn the hijackers over to a sovereign nation for prosecution for the death of Klinghoffer, a retired businessman from Manhattan who was confined to a wheelchair after a stroke.

Reports here originally said that the Egyptian plane had filed a flight plan for Algeria, then changed it in midair and asked for permission to land in the Tunisian capital of Tunis, where the PLO has its headquarters.

When Italy believed the four were in PLO custody Thursday evening, it ordered the Foreign Ministry to enter into negotiations with the PLO to have the four hijackers brought here for trial.

Earlier on Thursday, special correspondent Jeffrey Bartholet reported from Cairo:

President Mubarak and other Egyptian officials had insisted throughout the day that the four hijackers had left Egypt within hours after surrendering on Wednesday. The Egyptians had defended their handling of the affair in the face of criticism from the United States.

Hubarak told reporters Thursday morning that the hijackers had gone and were the responsibility of the PLO, but PLO leader Yasser Arafat said they were funder the Egyptian authorities' control.

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"They left the country, I don't know where they went," Mubarak said. Then in answer to a question, he added, "maybe Tunisia," where the PLO has its headquarters.

At a press conference later, foreign Minister Esmal Abdel-Meguid told reporters, "They left Egypt. I know where they are, but i'm not going to tell you.

The Achille Lauro remained at Port Said, on Egypt's Mediterranean coast, and several of the more than 400 freed hostages, including about a dozen Americans, left the ship to return home. Among them was Marilyn Klinghoffer, whose husband had been killed by the hijackers on Tuesday and, according to accounts from the ship Thursday, was pushed overboard with his wheelchair.

Showing clear sensitivity to the harsh criticism from the United States for their supposed release of hijackers who had killed an American hostage, Mubarak and Abdel-Meguid insisted that at the time the agreement negotiated by the PLO was approved Wednesday, they were unaware of Klinghoffer's death.

Mubarak said that "if the captain had told us that a passenger had been killed, we would have changed our position toward the whole operation. But when this emerged, we already had sent the hijackers out of the country."

Later, Mubarak questioned whether Klinghoffer had actually been killed. There is no body and no proof he had been murdered," he said, according to Egypt's official Middle East News Agency. "Maybe the man was in hiding or did not board the ship at all."

Abdel-Meguid complained to reporters Thursday night, "I don't like the insinuations in the United States now. This is very unfair. . . . I cannot accept any insinuations and I reject them totally. We believe we have done our duty."

Abdel-Meguid pointed out that in the negotiations for the release of the American hostages in the hijacking of a Trans World Airlines plane last June, the hijackers were allowed to go free, although they had killed an American hostage, and Israel later gave in to their demands to release Shiite Moslea prisoners it was holding.

"Thanks were given to Syria for their help," he said. "Let's be serious. This matter should be put in its proper perspective."

Egyptian officials, however, offered incomplete and seemingly contradictory information throughout Thursday about the release of the hijackers.

Early in the day, Mubarak said the hijackers had left the country within five hours of their surrender, which took place at 4:30 p.m. Wednesday, and said they were "now the responsibility of the PLO."

But all day, the PLO denied having possession of them, fueling speculation and rumors about their whereabouts and about what sort of deal had been made to secure the release of the more than 400 passengers and crew who had been held hostage on board the luxury liner since Monday.

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Asked Thursday night at what time the hijackers had left, Audel-Heguid refused to say. "I'm not keeping a chronometer watch," he answered, and then said later, "They will soon be in the hands of Mr. Arafat."

Adding to confusion was a statement Thursday morning by Abdul Rahman Saramawi, the governor of Port Said, that the pirates "are still in custody, and it remains to be determined whether they will be tried."

Abdel-Heguid said the Egyptians had decided to negotiate with the terrorists reluctantly.

At 10 p.m. Tuesday, he said, when he heard that the liner, which had been barred from landing at Syria, was returning to Egypt, he said he awakened the ambassadors of Italy, France, Britain and West Germany, and asked them what they wanted to do.

They replied that they would get in touch with their capitals, and get back with a decision.

He said that he told the ambassadors, "We are not interested in dealing with this group, and might ask the ship to get out."

Haguid added that the ship never entered Egyptian territorial waters, but remained 16 miles north of Port Said.

The following morning -- Wednesday -- Egyptians began contact with the terrorists, at the request of some mestern nations, so as not to be caught off guard. Abdel-Meguid said.

At the 1:30 p.m. meeting with the four ambassadors, he said, he asked them to sign a statement that "strongly urged" Egypt to use "our efforts to seek the release of the ship." But only two -- those from Italy and West Germany -- signed it.

Abdel-Heguid said he told the ambassadors that Egypt negotiated only at the urging of concerned nations who had citizens on board. "I said we could make the ship go away -- that would have been the easiest," he said.

At some point Wednesday afternoon, Abdel-Heguid said, six helicopters began flying over the hijacked liner, and the terrorists threatened to blow it up.

He said the Americans denied they were U.S. helicopters so Egypt contacted Israel. He said nothing of the Israeli response.

Abdel-Heguid said Egypt's primary goal was to "save the lives of the passengers." He said that if Egypt had known about the death of Klinghoffer, "We would never, never have pursued the operation."

PATRICK J. LEARY

COMMITTEES
AGRICULTURE, MUTRITION AND
FORESTRY
CHARMAN
APPROPRIATIONS
AUDICLARY

United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

July 9, 1987

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Chairman Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Hicaraguan Opposition

Dear Dan:

I understand that in the hearing before your Committee today, it was alieged that a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee inadvertantly revealed classified information in a television interview relating to the Achille Lauro hijacking. While my name was not specifically mentioned, I believe the allegation refers to me.

In the interview which was apparently alluded to, I carefully refrained from making any comment that went beyond statements by senior officials of the Administration that were being reported in the national media through the night. I am including excerpts from some articles which appeared in the press the morning of my interview and which I read before appearing on the news program. It should be very clear from these articles that I did not reveal any sensitive information, and it does a serious disservice to US intelligence and to congressional oversight to claim that I did.

I trust this letter and its attachments demonstrate the falsity of this allegation.

With best regards.

PATRICK LEAHY United States Senator

Sincerely

SAMEL K. HOUYE

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20610 POZE 214-3934

July 10, 1987

The Honorable Patrick Leahy United States Senate Washington, D. C.

Dear Pat:

Thank you for your letter regarding the reference made yesterday during the Iran/Contra Committee hearings to a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee revealing classified information to the press.

I have reviewed the transcript of the news program during which you were alleged to have revealed sensitive information. I have also examined the newspaper articles you enclosed from the press the morning of the news program. I certainly share your belief that the remarks you made did not go beyond statements made by Administration officials as reported in the national media. I, therefore, feel the allegations made during yesterday's hearings were unsubstantiated and inappropriate.

I regret that aspersions were apparently cast in your direction during our hearings yesterday. I certainly disassociate myself with these allegations.

OANIEL K. INCUYE United States Senator

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AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY
APPROPRIATIONS
, JUDICIARY

United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

August 3, 1987

Senator Howell Heflin Chairman Senator Warren Rudman Vice Chairman Senate Select Committee on Ethics

Dear Howell and Warren:

Recently, I have been the subject of allegations in the press to the effect that an FBI investigation has identified me as the source of an unnamed leak of classified information based on examination of "visitors" logs, and that such information has been made available to the Ethics Committee.

I request that you inform me if the Ethics Committee is investigating me in connection with any alleged leak of classified information, or has information in its possession which identifies me as the source of any leak of classified formation.

, Thank you for your prompt attention to this request.

Sincerely,

PATRICK LEAHY / / / United States Senator

PJL/jhs

PATRICK J. LEAHY

COMMITTME.
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY DIAMANI
APPROPRIATIONS
JUDICIARY

United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

August 4, 1987

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Chairman Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition

Dear Dan:

As you know, members of the Iran/Contra committees have raised allegations that I revealed classified information relating to the Achille Lauro hijacking incident and that the PBI had traced a leak of classified information to me and turned over the evidence to the Ethics Committee.

I respectfully request that an exchange of letters between you and me on the Achille Lauro allegation, and an exchange of letters between the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Ethics Committee on the second allegation be included in the Record of your Committee's deliberations.

With best regards.

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Sincerely

DATRICK LEAHY Onited States Senator

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM 220 SECOND AND CONSTITUTION AVENUE, ME WASHINGTON, DC 20610-6428 TELEPHONE 224-2881 August 4, 1987

The Honorable Patrick H. Leahy United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

. Dear Senator Leahy:

The Committee has received your letter of August 3, 1987 concerning statements which first appeared in the Washington Times on July 29, 1987 indicating that the Pederal Bureau of investigation had traced leaks of classified material to the Senate Intelligence Committee and had provided that information to the Ethics Committee.

The Committee has received no information such as that described in the Mashington Times article indicating that you or any Member of the Senate has leaked classified material. Further, we have been advised by the Bureau that they have no such information.

With best wishes,

Cordially.

Warren B. Rudman

APPENDIX (C: PREPARE	D STATEMEN	VT

OPENING STATEMENT

My name is Oliver North, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps. My best friend is my wife, Betsy North, to whom I have been married for 19 years. I have four wonderful children, aged 18, 16, 11, and 6.

RONALD REAGAN

I came to the NSC five and one-half years ago to work in the administration of a great President. As a staff member, I came to understand his goals and his desires. I admired his policies, his strength and his ability to bring the country together.

I observed the President as a leader who cared deeply about people and who believed that the interests of our country were advanced by recognizing that this is a dangerous world — and acting accordingly. He tried, and in my opinion succeeded, in advancing the cause of world peace by strengthening our country, by acting to restore and sustain democracy throughout the world, and by having the courage to take decisive action when needed.

We must guard against a rather perverse side of American life, the tendency to launch vicious attacks and criticisms against our highest elected officials. President Reagan has made enormous contributions. He deserves our respect and our admiration.

NSC LEADERSHIP

The NSC is in essence the President's staff which helps to formulate and coordinate national security policy. Some on this committee apparently think that the NSC contained at least one loose cannon and was devoid of experienced leadership. You are wrong on both counts. While at the NSC, I worked most closely with three people: Bud McFarlane, Admiral John Poindexter and CIA Director William Casey. Bud McFarlane is a man who devoted nearly 30 years of his life to public service in many responsible positions. At the NSC he worked long hours, made great contributions, and I admired him for these efforts. Admiral Poindexter is a distinguished Naval officer who served in many important positions of responsibility. He, too, was a tireless worker with a similar record of public service. William Casey was a renowned lawyer, war veteran of heroic proportions, and a former Chairman of the SEC. I understood that he was also a close personal friend and advisor to the President. There is nearly a century of combined public service by these men.

NORTH AS A MEMBER OF THE NSC STAFF

As a member of the NSC staff, I knew that I held a position of significant responsibility — but I knew full well what my position was. I did not engage in fantasy, as some suggest, that I was the President or the Vice President or a Cabinet member or the head of the NSC. I was simply a staff member with a demonstrated ability to get the job done. Over time, I was made responsible for managing a number of complex and

sensitive covert operations. I reported directly to Mr. McFarlane and to Admiral Poindexter. I coordinated directly with others — including Director Casey. My authority to act always flowed from my superiors. My military training inculcated in me a strong belief in the chain of command. Insofar as I can recall, I always acted on major matters with specific approval after fully informing my superiors of the facts, the risks and the potential ramifications. I readily admit that I was action oriented. I readily admit that I took pride in the fact that I was counted on as a man who could get the job done. I don't mean this by way of any criticism at all, but when my superiors were confronted with accomplishing goals or addressing some difficult problem, I would frequently hear directly or implicitly the words: "Fix it, Ollie" or "take care of it, Ollie."

NORTH'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Since graduating from the Naval Academy in 1968, I have strived to be the best Marine officer that one can be. In combat my goal always was to understand the objective, follow orders, accomplish the mission, and to keep the men who served under me alive. One of the few good things to come out of the last six months of instant worldwide notoriety has been the renewed contact I've had with some of the finest people in the world — those I served with in Vietnam. Among the forty thousand or so letters of support that have arrived since I left the NSC, are

many from the men who recount horrors we lived through and who now relate stories about their families and careers.

After Vietnam, my goal was simply to work with my fellow officers, to train good Marines, and to be ready, in case we were called upon anywhere in the world. But at the same time to hope that we never were. Any soldier who has seen war, lives with the fervent hope that he never sees it again.

My Marine Corps career was untracked unexpectedly in 1981 when I was reluctantly pushed into becoming a staff member at the NSC. Uneasy at the beginning, I did come to believe that it was important work and as the years passed and as the responsibilities grew, I got further away from that which I loved -- the Marine Corps.

SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES

During 1984-5-6, I generally worked two days in every day. My guess is that the average work day lasted more than fourteen hours. The travel schedule was brutal. The need to respond to various crises was frequent and it was not uncommon to miss an entire night's sleep with the hope that I would catch up the next night or the night after that. If I had to estimate the number of meetings, discussions, and telephone calls over that five years, it would certainly be in the tens of thousands. My only real regret is that I virtually abandoned my family for work

during those years. Among the things I worked on or contributed to were the following:

- A highly classified and compartmented national security project which is not a part of this inquiry.
- Our politico-military strategy for restoring and sustaining democracy in Central and Latin America
 -- particularly in El Salvador.
- Seeking to achieve a democratic outcome in Nicaragua and keeping the Contras together -- both body and soul.
- Attempts to open a new relationship with Iran and efforts to free hostages.
- 5. The development of a concerted policy regarding terrorists and a capability for dealing with their treachery.
- 6. Various crises such as the TWA 847 hijacking, the capture of the Achille Lauro terrorists, the rescue of American students in Grenada and the restoration of democracy on this small island, and the U.S. raid on Libya as a protective response to terrorist attacks.

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 And, as some of you may admit, there were efforts to work with Congress on various legislative programs.

There were many problems. We worked as hard as we could to solve them. Sometimes we succeeded and sometimes we failed, but at least we tried -- and I want to tell you that I for one will never regret having tried.

THE COMMITTEES' INVESTIGATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

This is a strange process you are putting me and others through. Apparently the President has not asserted his prerogatives and you have been permitted to make the rules. You call before you the officials of the Executive Branch. You put them under oath for what must be collectively thousands of hours of testimony. You dissect their testimony to find inconsistencies. You declare some to be truthful and others liars. You make the rulings as to what is proper and what is not proper. You put on the testimony which you think is helpful to your goals and leave the rest out. It is sort of like a baseball game in which you are both the player and the umpire. It's a game in which you call the balls, and the strikes, and where you determine who is out, or who is safe. And, in the end you determine the score and declare yourself the winner. From where I sit, it is not the fairest process.

One thing is for sure -- you will never investigate yourself in this matter. There is not much chance that you will

conclude at the end of these hearings that the Boland Amendments and your frequent policy changes were unwise, or that your restrictions should not have been imposed on the Executive Branch. You are not likely to conclude that the Administration acted properly by trying to sustain the freedom fighters in Nicaragua when you abandoned them and you are not likely to conclude by commending the President of the United States who tried valiantly to recover our hostages and achieve an opening with strategically located Iran.

I would not be frank with you if I did not admit that the last several months have been difficult for me and my family. It is difficult to be on the front page of the major newspapers day after day and to be the lead story on the national news day after day. It is difficult to be photographed thousands of times by bands of photographers who have followed me around since November and to see your wife [and six year old daughter] pictured on the front page just because her name arose in the hearings. It is difficult to be caught in the middle of a constitutional struggle between the Executive and Legislative Branches over who is to formulate and direct the foreign policy of this nation. It is difficult to be vilified by members of this Committee, some of whom have proclaimed that I am guilty of criminal conduct before they even hear me. Others have said I would not tell the truth when called to testify, and at least one member asked a witness whether the witness would believe me under oath. If you don't think I'll tell the truth, why call me at

all? It has been difficult to see questions raised about my character, my morality and my honesty because you choose to provide distorted snippets of evidence. This Committee's insensitivity is most dramatically illustrated by putting my home address on a large chart for the world to see at a time when my family and I are under twenty-four hour armed guard by over a dozen government agents because of fear that terrorists will seek revenge for my official acts and carry out announced intentions to kill me. It is also difficult to comprehend that my work at the NSC -- all of which was approved and carried out in the best interests of our country -- has led to two massive parallel investigations staffed by more than two hundred people. It is mind-boggling to me that one of those investigations is criminal and that you have attempted to criminalize policy differences between co-equal branches of government and the Executive's conduct of foreign affairs.

ASSESSMENT OF BLAME

It is inevitable that the Congress will, in the end, blame the Executive Branch. But I suggest to you that it is the Congress which must accept the blame in the Nicaraguan freedom-fighter matter. Plain and simple, you are to blame because of the fickle, vacillating, unpredictable, on-again, off-again policy toward the Nicaraguan democratic resistance -- the Contras. You can't treat the support of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters as you do the passage of a budget. I suppose if the

budget does not get passed on time again this year, you can always get another month or two extension. Unfortunately, the Contras are Nicaraguan people; living, breathing young men and women, who have had to suffer a desperate struggle for liberty with sporadic, confusing support from the United States. Armies need consistent help. They need a consistent flow of money, arms, food, clothing and medical supplies. The Congress of the United States encouraged the freedom fighters to do battle and then abandoned them. The Congress of the United States left soldiers in the field unsupported and vulnerable to their Communist enemies. When the Executive Branch did everything possible within the law to prevent them from being wiped out by Moscow's surrogates, you then have this investigation to blame the problem on the Executive Branch. It doesn't make sense to me. Who will investigate the Congress?

DAMAGE FROM THE HEARINGS

These hearings have caused serious damage to our national interests. Our adversaries laugh at us -- and our friends recoil in horror. I suppose it would be one thing if the intelligence committees wanted to hold these very same hearings in private and thereafter to pass laws which in the view of the Congress make for better policies and better functioning of government. But to hold them publicly for the world to see strikes me as very harmful. Not only does it embarrass our friends and allies who have helped us in various programs but it

must make them wary of ever helping us again. The hearings have also revealed matters of great secrecy in the operation of our government, and "sources and methods" of intelligence activities have clearly been revealed to the detriment of our national security.

THE VILIFICATION OF OLIVER NORTH

As a result of rumor, speculation, and innuendo, I have been accused of almost every crime imaginable. Wild rumors abound. Some media reports suggest that I was guilty of espionage for the way I handled various U.S. intelligence; some say I was guilty of treason and suggested -- in front of my 11 year old daughter -- that I should be given the death penalty; some say I stole 10 million dollars; some say I was second only in power to the President of the United States; some say I condoned drug trafficking to generate funds for the Contras; others suggest that I personally ordered assassinations; or that I was conducting my own foreign policy; and it has been suggested that I was the secret confidente of the President. These and many other reports are patently untrue. Some have suggested that I got rich while at the NSC, that I live on a large Virginia horse farm in a splendid home. Not true. My family has lived quite modestly. Like most Americans, I live within my means, I even manage to save some money. I'm not saying it's easy. And as for my home, I invite the two Chairmen -- not the staff, not its lawyers -- to come to my home tonight, visit with me -- sit

down and have a Coors -- look around. And then tell the American people tomorrow morning if you think my lifestyle is beyond my means.

I am going to tell you the truth. Some of it will not be pleasant. But it will be the truth! There will undoubtedly be some who believe me and some who won't want to.

I will tell you this. I am not going to sit here for days without fighting back. I don't mind telling you that I'm angry at what you have attempted to do to me and my family. You may strike some blows. But you will not wound me. I am going to walk out of here with my head up and my shoulders straight because I am proud of our accomplishments. I am proud of the efforts we made. I am proud of the fight we fought. I am proud of serving in the Administration of President Reagan.

I am not ashamed of anything in my professional or personal conduct and as we go through this process, I ask you to keep an open mind. Be open minded and able to admit that your preliminary conclusions about me were wrong.

Do not mistake my attitude here today for lack of respect. I stand in awe of this great institution just as I stand in awe of the Presidency. Both are equal branches of Government with separate areas of responsibility. Although I don't agree with what you are doing or the way you are doing it, I do understand your interest in obtaining the facts.

I am now prepared to answer your questions.